Thursday Seminar, today --- Aidan Gray (UIC)
12 views
Skip to first unread message
Joshua Pearson
May 20, 2026, 5:19:29 PMMay 20
to anu-phi...@googlegroups.com
Hello everyone,
Today, the Thursday Seminar warmly welcomes Aidan Gray (UIC), who will be presenting today at 3.30pm, in the RSSS Auditorium (room 1.28). Title and abstract are below.
Title: Frege’s Puzzle and Nature of Semantic Facts
Abstract: Frege noted that sentences that differ from each only by the substitution of coreferential proper names can differ in their role in rational linguistic activity. For example, “Robert Zimmerman is Bob Dylan” can be used to make an informative assertion; “Bob Dylan is Bob Dylan” cannot. Examples like this show that coreferential names can fail to be ‘logically integrated’, in that their being coreferential can be irrelevant to the rational features of sentences containing them. The traditional way to respond to this is to posit a difference in meaning between coreferential names. In this talk, expanding on recent work by Kit Fine, I explore a different strategy. Perhaps Frege’s Puzzle teaches us something fundamental about the nature of semantic facts: that the semantic facts, themselves, can fail to be logically integrated. I use this idea to explain how recent ‘Relationist’ solutions to Frege’s Puzzle provide a genuinely novel approach to the puzzle.
Join us for what should be a great talk and discussion,
Poshua Jearson...
Other events in the day include:
- A grads-only pre-talk session with the speaker in room 6.68 at 2:00pm;
- Tea in the School of Philosophy tearoom at 3:00pm;
- Drinks at Badger & Co at 5:00pm;
- Dinner at Amara (changeable before 12; let me know if you have an alternative preference!) at 6:30pm, half-subsidized for grad students. (Put your name down here if you would like to join; fyi you now need to scroll a little to the right to find the right date!).
- All visitors (faculty, graduate students, undergraduates) are welcome to join for dinner. Faculty dine at a rate of ~$30.00 AUD, and graduate students and undergraduates at a rate of roughly $15.00 AUD.
Title: Frege’s Puzzle and Nature of Semantic Facts
Abstract: Frege noted that sentences that differ from each only by the substitution of coreferential proper names can differ in their role in rational linguistic activity. For example, “Robert Zimmerman is Bob Dylan” can be used to make an informative assertion; “Bob Dylan is Bob Dylan” cannot. Examples like this show that coreferential names can fail to be ‘logically integrated’, in that their being coreferential can be irrelevant to the rational features of sentences containing them. The traditional way to respond to this is to posit a difference in meaning between coreferential names. In this talk, expanding on recent work by Kit Fine, I explore a different strategy. Perhaps Frege’s Puzzle teaches us something fundamental about the nature of semantic facts: that the semantic facts, themselves, can fail to be logically integrated. I use this idea to explain how recent ‘Relationist’ solutions to Frege’s Puzzle provide a genuinely novel approach to the puzzle.
Join us for what should be a great talk and discussion,
Poshua Jearson...
(Poshua Jearson is Joshua Pearson!)
Reply all
Reply to author
Forward
0 new messages