Robert Thatcher seems to feel pretty strongly against using spatial filtering (e.g., Laplacian or ICA), although he does not provide (in my mind) a compelling argument, particularly for the neurophysiological validity. His argument seems to rest on the observation that phase values are changed after filtering. This is true. It's also of filtering in the time domain. From there it seems he draws the conclusion that this deprives the data of neurophysiological relevance, although this line of reasoning is not explained and no relevant physiological data are presented.
One could turn the argument around and state that raw EEG measures a spatially mixed signal, and that this signal contains distorted phases due to volume conduction, smearing from the skull, etc. Thus, spatial filtering is a sensible approximation to obtaining the un-mixed signal, and therefore is more physiologically interpretable. One could also, I am sure, present a mathematical model that would show this. This fact -- that voltage EEG data are a mixture of spatially broad signals and the measured phase values are a distorted mix of local activities -- is quite apparent when looking at intracranial EEG.
To me, the validity of a method lies not in results from an oversimplified set of assumptions, but rather in its reproducibility, relevance to other studies using other methodologies, support for predictions from a theory, and ability to inspire new, testable, and biologically plausible hypotheses. In these senses, I am satisfied with Laplacian and other spatial filters. It is by no means a perfect solution, and has its own set of limitations, as any method does. We and others have obtained results using Laplacian across different paradigms, recording setups, and countries, that provide convergent, replicable, and theoretically sensible results that are consistent with findings from fMRI and invasive recordings. To be sure, further work should be done to validate or invalidate other spatial filtering approaches, but the argument provided in this paper is neither compelling nor convincing.
More generally, I should say that (1) neuroscience is a big and complicated field, (2) all methods entail uncertainty, (3) the "ground truth" is difficult or impossible to determine, (4) simulations are OK but are always imperfect and sometimes simply wrong, and, perhaps most importantly (5) neuroscientists tend to be a bunch of strongly opinionated loud-mouths (including yours truly) who are sometimes too convinced of their own personal opinions based on their own personal experiences to appreciate they they are wrong or that their view is correct only in some narrow situations.
I hope that helps, or was at least entertaining.