Nichiren Shu (with Kempon Hokke Myomanji Sect) and the Asian Holocaust #2 +^

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Nichiren Shu (with Kempon Hokke Myomanji Sect) and the Asian Holocaust, part 2 of 2

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part 2, continued from part 1 of 2:
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Finally, there is this passage from Jordan's book describing the connection between the boycotts of Japanese corporations and merchants by the Chinese, and how they colluded with the Japanese press, the political establishment, the military and intelligence community and finally the Nichiren Shu priests and youth insurgent organizations distorting Buddhism into a machine for war and the imperialistic domination of China: to maintain a steady stream of revenue and enslaved workers.

It is the natural resistance of the Chinese to this mass poison of greed emanating from the different parts of the Japanese hegemony directed at the Chinese people, that raised the great demon of anger that fed the genocidal frenzy of the Japanese military. How dare they interfere with the Emperor's plans for them and the rest of the Pacific?

I have included the dozens of primary source references from the passages of Jordan's book.

They are proof positive of the mountain of evidence that Nichiren Shu and its lackey youth insurgencies were driving this demonic process in the military, through assassinations and intimidation, through collusion of the priests with military intelligence, and through the general proliferation of distortions of Nichiren's Buddhism of the Lotus Sutra, converting it into a Shinto of total war and domination of the peoples of the Pacific rim.

.. Chinese Boycotts Versus Japanese Bombs, Donald A. Jordan,
.. p. 277-285

.. Chapter 16: The Attack on the Japanese Monks

.. There was a strong similarity between the murder of
.. Captain Nakamura preceding the Manchurian incident and the
.. January 1932 martyrdom of a Japanese monk followed by the
.. Shanghai war. Both were presented by the Japanese press as
.. expressions of irrational anti-Japanese bigotry but on
.. more detached investigation turn out to be more complex in
.. motivation.

.. One of the most publicized and provocative anti-Japanese
.. episodes at Shanghai was the apparent attack on January
.. 18, 1932, against a party that included Japanese monks.
.. From the central vantage point of the Imperial Court, it
.. appeared that up to that point Japanese navy leadership
.. had been moving cautiously to avoid stressing Sino-
.. Japanese relations along the Yangtze valley that it
.. patrolled. The Navy Ministry had lectured to the lower
.. echelons that their responses should be different from
.. those of the army in Manchuria. Then, according to the
.. analysis of Lord Privy Seal Makino Nobuaki, the attack on
.. the monks had struck and "unexpectedly caused the whole
.. uproar" that erupted as the Shanghai incident on January
.. 28, 1932. [Note 1. Saionji-Harada, vol. 2, 241.]

.. Depending on the source, there are discrepancies in the
.. details of the assault, but most reports counted two monks
.. of the Myohoji temple of Nichiren Buddhism plus three
.. disciples among those attacked. According to the later
.. disclosure by then -- major Tanaka Ryukichi, the
.. conspiratorial assistant army attaché at the Japanese
.. Consulate General, he had engineered the attack at the
.. instigation of Itagaki of the K.A. -- quite probably in
.. collaboration with the monks. [Note 2. Tanaka Ryukichi,
.. "Shanhai Jihen wa koshite okosareta" (How the Shanghai
.. Incident was Caused), in a special edition or the magazine
.. Bessatsu Chisei, Dec. 1956, 181-86. Hayashi, ed.,
.. Himesareta Showashi. Also cited by Shimada, "Extension or
.. Hostilities," 307; and Usui Katsumi, Manshu Jihen: Senso
.. to Gaiko to (Manchurian Incident: War and Diplomacy)
.. (Tokyo: Chuo Koron, 1974), 150.]

.. The ethnocentric Nichiren [Shu] sect inspired
.. ultranationalists and militants such as Ishiwara of the
.. K.A., who integrated the ideal of a universal law of
.. Buddha into his ideology of a Japan-led Pan-Asian
.. cooperation against the corrupting influence of the West.
.. By 1931 monks of the Nichiren were supportive of the
.. efforts of the K.A. in Manchuria, and in January 1932
.. reporters in Harbin who were observing Japanese activism
.. there noted that a party of Nichiren monk marched through
.. the city streets for the purpose of "consecrating Harbin
.. to the Japanese emperor." [Note 3. CWR, Jan. 30, 1932,
.. 265, which note that the Chinese were suspect of such
.. Nichiren as Army auxiliaries.] Nichiren monks had been
.. seen working with a detail of marines in Shanghai setting
.. up sandbag barricades at strategic points in the
.. Yangtse'pu district of the I.S. near where the assault
.. took place. [Note 4. IMTFE interview of the Osaka Mainichi
.. correspondent in Shanghai, Tanaka Yukitoshi.] ...

Right there is the proof positive of Nichiren Shu monks ... inculcated with distorting views and rhetoric stemming from the utter betrayal of Nichiren Daishonin by their founders the Five Senior priests ... blatantly operating in collusion with the advance movement of the Asian Holocaust.

Nichiren Shu has always, does now, and will until it has vanished from the face of this earth operate in blythe disregard of the views and desires of Nichiren Daishonin: in a manner totally contrary to the Buddhist Law.

These monks from Myohoji (and other connected temples) were "consecrating Harbin to the Japanese emperor." That is the Shinto part of their syncretic (made up; invented) brand of Buddhism, shining through their lies and distortions. They say "Nichiren", when they mean Tenkai, the founder of the Sanno Ichijitsu Shinto of the Tokugawa, the Shinto of war and worshipping military leaders as God. The Shinto of absolute desolation and worldwide slavery.

Here, once again, is the pointer to the past history of Nichiren Shu and Nichiren Shoshu:

That history is described in 131 pages in a bookmarked Adobe PDF file (turn on the bookmarks pane for ease of navigation through the nine appendices), stored as a Google Doc. The title is:

Shinto Tsuru Shinmon - A Toynbee Analysis of the Fuji School (Incomplete)

There are three versions of the file:

1. With underlines, bolding and highlights for ease of quick reading:
http://docs.google.com/fileview?id=0B1xmnHkI0Z-dYjM0ZDg5NTMtZDNkNy00MDIxLWE1MjMtNTBiZDIwODBhNzIw&hl=en

2. With underlines only (if the highlighting bothers you):
http://docs.google.com/fileview?id=0B1xmnHkI0Z-dNDc2ODU1ZGYtOGVmZS00MGI5LWE5ZmItOTllMmM5ZjVmNGM4&hl=en

3. Plain text (if you like it pristine):
http://docs.google.com/fileview?id=0B1xmnHkI0Z-dOGI0M2U1YzUtN2ZmMC00OGIyLWI3ZjctMmYzMjhmMTk3ZmVm&hl=en

It has been this way with the Nichiren Shu temples since they began their betrayal right after the death of Nichiren Daishonin.

.. ... At the site of the attack, which was just outside the
.. I.S. in the vicinity of the Sanyu Towel Mill, Japanese
.. dressed as monks had been seen circling the mill and were
.. thought to be spies prior to the attack. [Note 5. Chung-
.. yang Jih-pao, Jan. 22, 1932, 1.4.] Spies dressed as monks
.. had been common in Japan for centuries, and by 1931 it was
.. possible that the monks involved may have been prepared to
.. sacrifice themselves in Tanaka's conspiracy to justify a
.. military intervention. The procession of a party of
.. notorious monks pounding on gongs and chanting as they
.. elbowed their way through a mill district crowded with
.. xenophobic Chinese factory workers was sure to infuriate
.. onlookers. The location was also perfect due to the
.. existing level of Sino-Japanese tension there and also
.. since it was just beyond the boundary of the I.S., in
.. Chinese Chapei. An attack there would be the
.. responsibility of the Chinese authorities.

.. The two monks and their three disciples moved out of the
.. I.S. along a street that passed between the Japanese Tokwa
.. Spinning Mill and the Sanyu Towel Mill, a Chinese weaving
.. mill identified since 1925 as a pioneer in the Kuo-huo
.. (domestic products) movement and the site of an AJNSA unit
.. and anti-Japanese militia. Although the Japanese had
.. dominated the towel market in China a decade earlier,
.. Sanyu had led in the import replacement. [Note 6. Kraus,
.. Cotton and Cotton Goods, 95. Bush, Politics, 79, 68f. NJC,
.. vol. 12, no. 5, company ad.]

.. The Tokwa factory had been a Chinese mill that was
.. bankrupted in 1929 and then bought up by Japanese -- a
.. common occurrence in a Chinese industry that was dependent
.. periodically on large loans to meet operating needs. While
.. the Tokwa mill had been forced to shut down two days per
.. week since late 1931 to curtail spinning of its cotton
.. yarn and suffered from recent labor unrest, the Chinese
.. Sanyu mill was booming. [Note 7. Fong, Cotton Industry, 7,
.. 9f. Asahi, Nov. 26, 1931, 4.] According to one report,
.. there were unemployed Japanese ronin in the neighborhood
.. who were rankled by what the boycott had done to their
.. factories and who were available for odd jobs with the
.. Japanese military including acting as counterfeit monks.
.. [Note 8. Lu Ching-shih presentation at symposium on the
.. January Twenty-eighth incident, Taipei: May 12, 1980.]
.. Tanaka recalled later that he also hired Chinese "thugs"
.. to set off the attack on what at that time seemed to be a
.. party of militant monks and disciples.

.. Tanaka's conspiracy to ignite conflict at Shanghai
.. sufficient to require a military intervention began back
.. in October, just weeks after the Mukden incident. At that
.. time Major Tanaka had been invited to Mukden by an army
.. academy classmate, Hanatani, who was an aide to Itagaki.
.. In October the K.A. could see that the Minseito government
.. was too hostile to support its expanded offensive into
.. northern Manchuria. There was still the concern that the
.. United States and the League could mount some retaliatory
.. action against Japan.

.. Tanaka said he was sent back to Shanghai with only a
.. general idea of provoking a conflict that would serve to
.. divert Tokyo and the West from the takeover of Harbin and
.. the entire province of Heilungkiang. He claimed that he
.. received 20,000 yen for the project, and then upon return
.. wangled a 100,000 yen "contribution" from the Shanghai
.. branch of the mammoth Kanebo Textile Company, [Note 9.
.. Tanaka R. "Shanhai jihen wa koshite okosareta." Same data
.. included in Hata, "Showa shi no gunjin tachi", chap. on
.. Tanaka R., 89-101.] which was in early 1932 Japan's third
.. largest and founded by Mitsui capital. [Note 10. Kato
.. Toshihiko, "Mitsui ginko to Nakamigawa Hikojiro" (The Bank
.. of Mitsui and Nakamigawa Hikojiro) in "Kinyu Keizai"
.. (Economics of Banking) no. 60 (Feb. 1960); 41-57.] Kanebo
.. (Kanegafuchi Boseki) had decided to shift its production
.. to Tsingtao. During the boycott, it profited from the
.. disruption of Chinese mill production at Tientsin when
.. Doihara engineered the November-December disorders with
.. the Japanese garrison. The connection between Kanebo and
.. the Japanese army has not yet been exposed, but Rockwood
.. Chin in 1937 cited Kanebo and Tokwa textiles as examples
.. of Japan's industrial conquest of North China through
.. buying up Chinese mills that couldn’t compete and that
.. later provided an excuse for the "protective" entrance of
.. the K.A. [Note 11. Chin, "Cotton Mills," 261-64,
.. abstracted from his Ph.D. diss., Yale University.]

An enormous and deadly dose of the three poisons of greed, anger and foolishness will spring abruptly from the bowels of the slander and distortion of Nichiren Daishonin's practice of the Lotus Sutra.

Add to that Nichiren Shu's betrayal of their founder immediately after his death and what you get is a dirty weapon of mass destruction.

The greed of the Japanese corporate and merchant interests in Shanghai, in combination with the anger of the insurgent distorting Nichiren Shu youth militias, paramilitary organizations, ronin and Japanese military and intelligence services, and finally joined by the foolishness of the masses who followed them ... all of this springs from the distorting rhetoric, teachings and practice of Nichiren Shu's Buddhism of world domination through the Tendo of Japanese military might.

.. Corroboration for such a connection came at the Tokyo
.. trials when Diet member Kamei Kenichiro testified that he
.. had been told by army officers in 1937 that President
.. Tsuda Shingo of Kanebo contributed a large sum of money to
.. General Ikeda Junkyu of Japan's North China Army for the
.. "delivery of the Chinese mills in North China to him"
.. Ambassador Grew was also a witness to the rapport that had
.. developed between the army and the Kanebo leadership by
.. 1937. [Note 12. Testimony of Kamei at the IMTFE, I.P.S.
.. case 303, China incident, item 106.] The Tanaka version
.. would indicate that such a connection was present as early
.. as 1931 and also reveals a tie that Mitsui interests
.. developed with the K.A., which claimed to despise the
.. zaibatsu. Tanaka also testified that he had toured North
.. China cities after his trip to Mukden in October 1931. At
.. Tsingtao, Japan's second largest industrial interests in
.. China were clustered in a quite militant community of
.. overseas Japanese where he could have contacted Kanebo
.. people. Curiously, in 1946 Tanaka denied that there had
.. been any connection between the Shanghai and Manchurian
.. incidents but outlined the conspiracy in his postwar
.. writings. [Note 13. TWCT, vol. I, 2173-74, where Tanaka
.. only admitted that he had been in Shanghai at the time of
.. the incident.] There is wide acceptance of Tanaka's
.. version of the conspiracy, which included the attack on
.. the monks.

.. Tanaka was able to use the help of Major Shigeto Nemoto, a
.. brother of a colleague in the General Staff, who was
.. assigned to a unit of military police in the I.S. and
.. gathered intelligence on the influence of the CCP in the
.. Shanghai's labor and anti-Japanese movement. The arrival
.. of army officers Inouye Masaru and Aiuchi Jiro in mid-
.. January for the purpose of provoking conflict between the
.. Japanese ronin and Chinese gangsters was reported to
.. Nanking by the Chinese Garrison Command. [Note 14. Foreign
.. Ministry files on the Shanghai incident, dated January 22,
.. 1932, report from Tai Ji, "Koming Wen-hsien", vol. 36,
.. 1426. "Wai-chiao Wen-t'I", 21-22,25.] Either these men
.. aided Tanaka or may have acted to throw Chinese
.. intelligence off his trail. Tanaka claimed later that he
.. communicated his general scheme to Shigeto Chiaki, chief
.. of the China Division, and colleague Major Kagesa Sadaaki,
.. both of whom were K.A. allies on the army's General Staff.
.. The two encouraged Tanaka in Tokyo to "do his best" but
.. could provide no funding, leaving him to work out the
.. details of his own plans, which had at one point included
.. an attack on Koreans at Shanghai. After hiring a group of
.. Chinese thugs, as Doihara had done at Tientsin, Tanaka
.. arranged for their attack on the monks parading just
.. outside the I.S. boundary near the Sanyu Towel Mill on
.. Mayushan Road. [Note 15. Tanaka, "Shanhai jihen."]

.. The monks arrived noisily at 5 P.M. on January 18 and were
.. set upon by the hired Chinese, who drew in agitated
.. Chinese workers from the mill and members of the mill's
.. anti-Japanese militia. The report to Tokyo from the
.. Japanese army attaché was immediately careful to blame the
.. Sanyu Mill militia and workers, while naval attaché
.. Kitaoka could only state in his telegram to the naval
.. ministry that the culprits in the Chinese crowd were
.. unknown. [Note 16. JAA RI39 (F63545), "Shina jikyokho"
.. 1932, nos. 1-75, Daishichi Shidan Shireibu, Sanbohonbu
.. (General Staff). Naval Attaché Kitaoka, telegram no. 246,
.. Jan. 18, 1932, to Tokyo, JNA R29, "gaikoku joho, kobun
.. biko gaiji", D4 1932.] The British press at Shanghai
.. reported that some fifty to sixty Chinese had first jeered
.. at the Japanese, who then shouted back. Chinese claimed
.. that the monks provoked the bystanders. When a melee broke
.. out between the inflamed groups, the monks were beaten
.. severely. [Note 17. NCH, Jan. 19, 1932, 85. Li Hsin, ed.,
.. "Chungkuo Hsinmin chih sheng yu koming shihch'i T’ung-
.. shih" (The Comprehensive History of the Birth and
.. Revolution of the New Chinese) (Peking: Institute of
.. Modern Chinese History, 1962), 140 (hereafter cited as Li
.. Hsin, "Chungkuo T’ung-shih").] Japanese from the Tokwa
.. Mill managed to extract three of the five, who were sent
.. to the Sacred Heart Hospital for treatment of their
.. injuries. The other two escaped with serious wounds to the
.. Chinese police substation in Chapei, which sent them to
.. the Fumin Hospital by police car. [Note 18. Report from
.. the Shanghai Municipal Government to the C.E.C., Executive
.. Yuan and the Foreign Ministry, Jan. 19, 1932, "Wai-chiao
.. Wen-t'i", 18, from the Foreign Ministry archives. JA, Jan.
.. 20, 1932, front page.] Reverend Mizukami Hideo, aged
.. thirty-two, slipped into critical condition and later died
.. on January 24 -- a martyr for the outraged Japanese
.. community and their sympathizers in Japan. [Note 19. JA,
.. Jan. 25, 1932, front page.] The attack coincided with the
.. arrival in Shanghai of the vice-chief of the Naval General
.. Staff, Hyakutake Saburo, who seems to have encouraged the
.. local commander, Admiral Shiozawa, to take action. [Note
.. 20. Mainichi, Jan. 17, 1932, 2. JA, Jan. 21, 1932, 1. Paul
.. O. Elmquist, "The Sino-Japanese Undeclared War of 1932 at
.. Shanghai," Harvard Papers on China, vol. 5, 59, speculates
.. on the contributive role of Hyakutake.]

.. Late on the morning after the attack, on January 19,
.. Consul Murai, was driven across the I.S. to the office of
.. Chinese Shanghai's new mayor, Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, but was
.. only received by his secretary, who accepted the Japanese
.. protest note. Murai protested the beating of the monks in
.. Chinese territory, demanded the immediate arrest and
.. punishment of the offenders, and reserved the right to ask
.. payment for injuries pending the prognosis of the wounded
.. Japanese. [Note 21. JA, Jan. 20, 1932, front page, via
.. Nippon Dempo.] A party of local leaders inspected the site
.. of the beatings that afternoon and gathered at the
.. consulate to confer as to a course of action.

.. Present at the meeting of civilians and military on the
.. nineteenth were Murai, Admiral Shiozawa, Marine Commandant
.. Samejima, and spokesmen for the outraged Japanese
.. residents, who took this opportunity to set down demands
.. that, they concluded, would solve the tensions at
.. Shanghai:

.... 1. the immediate dissolution of the anti-Japanese
.... societies at Shanghai, 2. the immediate arrest and
.... punishment of the assailants, 3. the apology of Mayor Wu
.... presented at the Japanese Consulate, 4. the right to
.... demand indemnity payment, 5. a time limit of thirty
.... hours deadline, after which the Chinese will be regarded
.... as insincere as to reaching a settlement and the
.... Japanese should take independent and effective action in
.... self-defense .

.. The conference also decided to organize several thousand
.. ronin to demonstrate until the demands were met. [Note 22.
.. JA, Jan. 21, 1932, front page, via Nippon Dempo.] These
.. demands were far in excess of those made on the nineteenth
.. by diplomat Murai and apparently represented the militant
.. mood of the Japanese civilians and the military agents
.. there. When the Osaka Mainichi's permanent correspondent
.. in Shanghai was questioned in 1946 as to how the Japanese
.. press investigated the facts about the disorders at
.. Shanghai that led up to the intervention, Tanaka Yukitoshi
.. answered that he "knew of no newspapermen who investigated
.. the background ... as the Japanese Consulate issued
.. official announcements of events and forbade any
.. investigations, and furthermore censored all news
.. dispatches from the city to Tokyo home offices." [Note 23.
.. IMTFE, I.P.S. case 303, item 137, China incident.] The
.. demands set the stage at Shanghai for further escalation
.. of stress.

.. Rather than allowing negotiations to settle the local
.. tensions, Major Tanaka proceeded with the next phase of
.. igniting the tinderbox at Shanghai. At 2:30 A.M. in the
.. early morning blackness of January 20, thirty-two members
.. of a local seinendan unit moved quietly across the I.S.
.. boundary and broke into the Sanyu Mill compound. There
.. they used kerosene-soaked torches to set fire to a
.. building that housed the AJNSA facilities and one with
.. weaving looms, twenty-four of which were destroyed as it
.. burned down. The fire attracted the attention of three
.. Chinese policemen nearby in the I.S. who were attempting
.. to call for assistance at their police box when the
.. seinendan youth tried to reenter the settlement. The large
.. gang of Japanese toughs that the Chinese referred to as
.. ronin attacked the Chinese police with pistols, swords,
.. and knives, killing one at the telephone and another as he
.. blew on his police whistle and tried to dash to the
.. neighborhood police station. In the fracas the ronin cut
.. the phone wires, broke the box windows, and wounded
.. another Chinese policeman, suffering the loss of one of
.. its own and casualties before fleeing into the I.S.
.. sanctuary. [Note 24. Japanese army attaché report to the
.. General Staff, JAA R139 (F63545), Jan. 22, 1932. Naval
.. Attaché Kitaoka report, Jan. 20, 1932, JNA R29, div. 4,
.. 1932. "Kuowen", Feb. I, 1932. "Chung-yang Jih-pao", Jan.
.. 21, 1932, pt. I, 4. Mainichi, Jan. 21, 1932, front page.
.. New York Times (Jan. 21, 1932), 11. Shanghai British
.. Consul General Brenan to Lampson in Peking, DOBFP, vol. 9,
.. no. 103.]

.. Although the Chinese and Western reports called the young
.. Japanese ronin, the Japanese army reports referred to them
.. as members of a particular seinendan unit -- the Shanghai
.. Seinen Doshikai. Naval Attaché Kitaoka immediately
.. identified them as the Saga Seinen Doshikai. [Note 25.
.. Attaché reports listed in note 24.] Such civilian
.. seinendan units in Mukden and other Manchurian cities had
.. collaborated closely with the K.A. prior to and after the
.. takeover there. These ultranationalistic youth groups were
.. typically either villagers or city workers in Japan and in
.. mainland East Asian cities where Japan had factory
.. complexes. In his research on the social network that
.. supported the prewar Japanese army, Richard J. Smethurst
.. found such units had been promoted in large textile firms
.. such as Kanebo, Toyo, and Toyota -- all of which had
.. branch mills at Shanghai. [Note 26. Richard J. Smethurst,
.. "A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism: The Army
.. and Rural Community" (Berkeley, Calif.: University of
.. California Press, 1974), 84-85.] Seinendan were generally
.. drilled by reservists who had already been on active duty
.. in the army or, to a lesser extent, the navy. Reservists
.. with armbands and weapons had become a common sight in the
.. Japanese quarter of the I.S. and were to play an important
.. role once the full-scale intervention began. Regular army
.. officers periodically inspected such units that were,
.. thus, military auxiliaries.

.. It was logical that Major Tanaka would make use of such
.. youth, who were disciplined and eager to serve the army
.. and their country. The reference to Saga in the group
.. title did not show up in the army report, perhaps because
.. sympathizers did not want to attract attention to that
.. faction in the army that was named for an anti-Choshu
.. prefecture in Kyushu and had contributed much, according
.. to historian Seki Hiroharu, to the K.A. coup in Manchuria
.. and to the coups that plagued army headquarters. [Note 27.
.. Seki, "Manchurian Incident," 145-46. KMT historian Li Yun-
.. han also cites the Saga Clique as primary conspirators
.. against China.] The Shanghai seinendan did not seem to be
.. under the influence of Japanese business or diplomats, or
.. even the local Japanese naval command since all of these
.. groups immediately criticized the irresponsibility of the
.. arsonists in public statements made on January 20. It is
.. not yet known if the seinendan members can be linked with
.. the fifty some so-called Japanese vigilantes who since
.. August had promoted resistance to the AJNSA. [Note 28.
.. Asahi, Aug. 16, 1931, 2. JA, Aug. 16, 1931, 1.]

.. Fukushima of Mitsui apologized on January 20 to the
.. morning emergency session of the I.S. Municipal Council,
.. as did Consul General Murai. [Note 29. U.S. Consul General
.. Cunningham, 5 P.M. message, Jan. 20, 1932, USDOS
.. 793.94/3582. NCH, Feb. 2, 1932, 167.] The regrets were
.. necessary since the Japanese reprisal had resulted in
.. casualties to the I.S. police, not merely to the Sanyu
.. Mill in Chinese Chapei.

.. Although Murai expressed his regrets over the Sanyu
.. disorder, he stated that it had happened due to the pent-
.. up feeling among Japanese over the Chinese press slurs
.. against the emperor and, then, the overt attack on the
.. Japanese monks. Murai ended by expanding on the simple
.. demand for justice presented on the nineteenth, including
.. those demands added at the Japanese conference the day
.. before: the dissolution of the anti-Japanese organization,
.. Mayor Wu's apology, and Chinese provision for compensation
.. to the injured monks and consolation to the family of the
.. dying monk. Murai also wired his ministry in Tokyo for
.. permission to attach a deadline for Mayor Wu's
.. concessions. [Note 30. JA, Jan. 22, 1932, front page.]

.. Admiral Shiozawa told an Asahi reporter that the attack on
.. Sanyu had injured the Japanese case. However, he
.. threatened that, if the assailants were not dealt with by
.. the Chinese, the navy would consider reprisals against the
.. anti-Japanese groups behind the episode with the monks
.. once reinforcements arrived. [Note 31. NCH, Jan. 26, 1932,
.. 113. A. Morgan, "Young Imperial Japan" (London, George
.. Allen & Unwin, 1938), 136.]
..
.. Although Fukushima apologized, there is evidence that
.. Major Tanaka had at the same time pressured him to wire
.. Baron Dan of the Mitsui zaibatsu to ask the Seiyuikai
.. cabinet to support a military response at Shanghai in the
.. near future. [Note 32. Furuya Keiji, "Chiang Kai-shek",
.. 351.] The day prior, Mitsui board members heard Director
.. Kawamura Teijiro describe the role their capital could
.. play in the development of Manchuria's vast agricultural
.. potential through investment in large-scale cattle and
.. wheat operations. [Note 33. Mainichi, Jan. 22, 1932, front
.. page.] In north Manchura Doihara was busy expanding his
.. new Harbin branch of Special Services in anticipation of
.. the next coup; Shanghai's more militant Japanese circle
.. were not content merely to listen to threats. [Note 34.
.. Report of U.S. Consul Hanson at Harbin on local disorders
.. and the increasing Japanese presence, USDOS 793.94/3577.]

.. On January 20 in the afternoon, the Japanese Residents'
.. Association joined in with a rally of some one thousand at
.. the Japanese Club in the I.S. where fiery speakers struck
.. out at the humiliation and menace to their lives caused by
.. the AJNSA and the boycott. Once again they sent off
.. resolutions -- this time to their own authorities in
.. Tokyo: to send more warships and troops to defend them at
.. Shanghai and to suppress completely the anti-Japanese
.. movement there. About five hundred of the most militant
.. civilians proceeded from the Japanese Club to the Japanese
.. Consulate, where they forced their way in and demanded
.. that Consul Murai take action to meet their demands. When
.. he promised to do his best, they chided him to resign in
.. light of the ineffectiveness of his current negotiations
.. with the Chinese. From the consulate the Japanese, who
.. were quite likely army reservist ronin and seinendan,
.. marched arrogantly up North Szech'uan Road, fighting with
.. Chinese youths and using their clubs to smash Chinese shop
.. windows and batter streetcars and buses en route to the
.. Japanese Marine Headquarters at Hengk'ou Park in the
.. northern extension of the I.S. bordering Chapei. Along the
.. busy thoroughfare they managed to scuffle with British and
.. Indian police on the I.S. force, which prompted the
.. mobilization of the entire I.S. police force to stand by
.. for Sino-Japanese riots. Once they gained the attention of
.. Marine Commandant Samejima, they threatened to petition
.. the Japanese army to come to their aid if the navy refused
.. to take the necessary action to defend them.

.. Escorted by marines back to the Japanese Club, the
.. dissidents proceeded to regroup into yet another rally
.. where they drafted demands for a January 23 ultimatum
.. after which the ronin threatened to wreck the KMT
.. headquarters, the Chinese city hall, the Minkuo newspaper
.. office, and the I.S. municipal office. Reminiscent of the
.. destruction meted out by militant Japanese civilians in
.. Tsingtao just one week earlier over the Minkuo reference
.. to the emperor, the dissidents also wanted the punishment
.. of the British and Indian policemen who had just clubbed
.. the Japanese protesters, plus indemnity! The rally raged
.. on until an army colonel urged the agitators to go home
.. and await instructions from Tokyo. [Note 35. Army report
.. to the General Staff, Jan. 22, 1932, JAA RI39 (F63545),
.. 63581. Kitaoka's telegram no. 250, Jan. 20, 1932, JNA R29,
.. D4 1932. JA, Jan. 21, 1932, 1, 5, via Nippon Dempo. U.S.
.. Shanghai Post Report 44, "Shanghai Incident," by Consul
.. Paul R. Josselyn, USDOS 893.00. Li Hsin, "Chungkuo T’ung-
.. shih", 140. British Consul Brenan report from Shanghai on
.. Jan. 21, 1932, DOBFP, vol. 9, no. 103. JA, Jan. 22, 1932,
.. 2.]

.. Earlier on January 20, at 4 P.M. a spokesman from the
.. office of the newly appointed mayor, Wu T'ieh-ch'eng,
.. visited the Japanese Consulate on the Bund and lodged a
.. formal protest against the destruction of the Sanyu
.. facilities and the wounding of Chinese police. The Chinese
.. counter demands paralleled those that Murai had made: (1)
.. a Japanese apology, (2) punishment for the arsonist
.. murderers, (3) payment for the damages and
.. hospitalization, and (4) preventive measures against
.. recurrences.

.. Murai admitted that Japanese had been involved but said
.. that some Chinese workers fired earlier by Sanyu had also
.. joined in the destructive binge as an act of revenge. He
.. reminded the spokesman for Mayor Wu that a satisfactory
.. Chinese response had yet to be received for the affront
.. against the emperor in the Chinese Minkuo Jih-pao on
.. January 9. [Note 36. "Chung-yang Jih-pao", Jan. 22, 1932,
.. 1.4. JA, Jan. 24, 1932, 1.] His apology contrasted with
.. that received a week before from the mayor of Tsingtao
.. (after the Japanese ronin had burned out the local Minkuo
.. building). The two sides at Shanghai were thus faced with
.. an accretion of unresolved irritations that complicated a
.. settlement. The Chinese felt peeved that the Japanese
.. would consider how much indemnity to charge for the attack
.. on the monks when the losses of life and property in
.. Japanese Korea back in July had gone uncompensated -- the
.. episode that had triggered the original anti-Japanese
.. boycott. The Japanese seemed to the Chinese to be
.. insensitive to the honor of others. On January 20, when
.. the Chinese representative brought up the destruction of
.. JRA demonstrators on North Szech'uan Road en route to the
.. naval headquarters, Murai countered with mention of the
.. brutality of the police treatment there, which had
.. resulted in two wounded Japanese. [Note 37. "Shih-chiu Lu-
.. chun K'ang-Jih Hsueh-chan-shih" (The History of the
.. Nineteenth Route Army's Bloody Battle of Resistance
.. against Japan) (Shanghai: Shenchou Kuo-kuang-she, 1947),
.. 2d ed., 62 (hereafter cited as Nineteenth RA Battle
.. History), quotes Wu's protest note, dated the twentieth.
.. "K'ang Jih Chan-shih" (History of the War of Resistance
.. against Japan), ed. Chang Ch'i-yun (Taipei: National
.. Defense Research Institute, 1966), 8.] On the following
.. day there were new signs that the two sides were beginning
.. to stiffen in their obstinacy.

.. p. 286-287

.. According to Wu's secretary at that time, Cantonese Wu had
.. been a candidate put forward for the mayor's position by
.. Chiang himself in early January because Wu was a longtime
.. friend of Sun Fo and could stand as part of the compromise
.. with the Canton Faction. [Note 43. Report of British
.. Consul Brenan based on conversation with W. Donald, who
.. was advising Wu, Jan. 25, 1932, to Lampson at Peking,
.. DOBFP, vol. 9, no. 118.] Since Shanghai was a special
.. municipal area, its mayor was appointed by the central
.. government. During the decline of the Sun Fo premiership
.. in January, Wu had to deal with the Japanese on his own
.. until central authority would again coalesce at Nanking.

.. Wu countered Consul Murai's demands by apologizing for the
.. irritating Minkuo reference to the Japanese emperor and
.. promising that the newspaper was including a correction
.. and apology in its next edition. [Note 44. "Shanghai
.. Incident" (Shanghai: Japanese Press Union, 1932), 5.] The
.. Chinese had already tried to dismiss the
.. "misunderstanding" as being due to a Japanese mistake in
.. reading Chinese. In return for this concession, Murai
.. announced that, although he sympathized with the agitated
.. state of the Japanese offenders, his office was seeking
.. out the seinendan members responsible for the Sanyu
.. episode and would seek compensation to the factory and the
.. injured parties. [Note 45. "Kuowen", Feb. I, 1932.] Since
.. the Japanese military attaché had already reported to
.. Tokyo concerning the group's responsibility, and given the
.. tight accountability within the Japanese community, Murai
.. must have been able to easily round up the seinendan
.. members.

.. From Japanese press reports, it would appear that Murai
.. was unaware of Major Tanaka's role in the attack on the
.. monks since he placed the entire responsibility on the
.. Chinese side. If Murai was knowledgeable at that time, he,
.. like Shidehara after the Mukden incident, might have
.. wished to use the threat of violence to pressure the
.. Chinese into a permanent settlement. Murai had been
.. frustrated by Chinese inaction toward his protests of the
.. boycott since July, and by January he was also harried by
.. Shanghai's militant civilians who wanted action to end the
.. AJNSA and had even demanded his resignation. Following his
.. talk with Mayor Wu, Murai wired Foreign Minister Yoshizawa
.. for permission to fix a deadline on the demand for
.. dissolution of the AJNSA. [Note 46. JA, Jan. 22, 1932,
.. front page. "Mainichi", Jan. 24, 1932, front page.] To buy
.. time, Wu sent back to Murai an official note protesting
.. the Sanyu destruction, including demands that would force
.. Murai to deal with arresting the arsonists and payment for
.. damages. [Note 47 . "Shih-chiu Lu-chun K'ang-jih Hsueh-
.. chan-shih", 61-62, quote.] Thus, the Japanese and Chinese
.. spokesmen on the spot in Shanghai had turned back to their
.. respective higher authorities before proceeding further.
.. The local Japanese naval commander also felt pressure from
.. local civilians to force the Chinese to end the boycott
.. enforcement.

.. p. 287-289

.. The KMT press released information originating with the
.. intelligence apparatus of the Garrison Command and the
.. Foreign Ministry, which opened a special file with daily
.. reports on the street violence of the Japanese strong arms
.. designated ronin (lang-jen in Chinese). An uprising of
.. ronin near the Tokwa Mill had been predicted and was to
.. have the support of Japanese marines. Considering the
.. connection between the seinendan and the Japanese army,
.. the intelligence was most likely false, but, when the
.. Japanese youths did attack the Sanyu Towel Mill, the top
.. KMT newspaper, the Chung-yang Jih-pao of Nanking, reported
.. one full day later, on January 21, that the ronin had been
.. transported in marine trucks and aided by marines. [Note
.. 50. Shanghai Garrison Command report, Jan. 20, 1932,
.. Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives (CFMA) (012:85/351-88).]
.. The news item also featured the hundreds of ronin in the
.. protest march after the JRA rally on the twentieth who had
.. shouted "kill all Chinese" as they destroyed Chinese shops
.. along North Szech'uan Road. [Note 51. Chung-yang Jih-pao,
.. Jan. 21, 1932, pt. 1, 4. Report by attaché Kitaoka on the
.. Chinese press report, Jan. 21, 1932, JRA R29, telegram no.
.. 253, D4 1932. Report of Shiozawa to Naval Ministry, Jan.
.. 22, 1932, quoted in Mainichi, Jan. 24, 1932, front page.]
.. This news was apparently also carried in the Minkuo, which
.. had already been scathed by Japanese over disrespect for
.. the emperor. Admiral Shiozawa not only used the Press
.. Union to issue his informal threat but also sent a report
.. to Tokyo on the Chinese press's dishonorable linkage of
.. the night attack on the Sanyu to the naval marines, which
.. made headline news. He claimed the Chinese dailies were
.. continuing "to fling mud" at Japanese honor in Shanghai
.. when they alleged that the attack was supported by the
.. marines. This allegation had, in turn, demanded an
.. additional strong protest from Consul Murai. The navy
.. claimed to be responding to the pleas for aid from the
.. endangered and humiliated Japanese civilians at Shanghai,
.. who were in the vortex of the gathering storm.

.. The large Japanese Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai
.. gathered that evening and listed in their petition to
.. Tokyo the aggravating Chinese press slurs against the
.. honor of the emperor and the beating of the Japanese monks
.. as evidence that further inaction would only allow the
.. anti-Japanese movement to worsen. Stories of stones thrown
.. against Japanese school children and harassment on
.. streetcars and buses in Shanghai revealed the fear that
.. the Japanese residents had of xenophobic Chinese "mobs."
.. Both in the background of the Mukden incident and at
.. Shanghai can be seen the traditional respect for direct
.. action over diplomatic sophistry and equivocation. The
.. chamber petition on January 21 urged that Tokyo support
.. with military force an ultimatum forcing the dissolution
.. of the AJNSA and boycott. [Note 52. Mainichi, Jan. 26,
.. 1932, front page, from Shanghai dated the twenty-third.
.. JA, Jan. 23, 1932, 2.] That same night the Japanese elite
.. gathered as the Shanghai Crisis Committee, a group that
.. had formed during the tense weeks of the Tientsin incident
.. in late November.

.. Chaired by Consul Murai, the committee represented big
.. Japanese business in Shanghai with Funatsu of the Japanese
.. Cotton Mill Owners' Association in China, Fukushima of the
.. Mitsui Bank and councilman in the I.S. Municipal Council,
.. Yoshida of Mitsubishi Bank, Izawa of the S.M.R. branch
.. office, and Manager Yonezato of boycotted Nishin
.. Steamship, who was also president of the Japanese Chamber
.. of Commerce. Along with a legation diplomat and the two
.. military attaches -- probably including Major Tanaka
.. Ryukichi -- the group exchanged information on the
.. elevating tensions and decided to press Murai to assign a
.. deadline against the AJNSA after which naval force should
.. be called in. [Note 53. Report no. 6 on the Chinese crisis
.. by the army attaché at Shanghai, Jan. 26, 1932, JAA 139
.. (F63545), General Staff, 63608.] The uniformity of the
.. petitions from the JRA, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce,
.. and the elite Crisis Committee reveals the desire for
.. consensus in the Japanese community. Tanaka's scheme was
.. unfolding so that the army inspiration was invisible, and
.. it was civilian instigators who demanded local action by
.. the navy, the authority that had responsibility for
.. Japanese nationals in Chinese ports. The navy was
.. beginning to increase its presence at Shanghai, apparently
.. in response to the civilian pleas.

.. The day of the JRA rally on January 20, Shiozawa postponed
.. the sailing upriver of the China Squadron flagship Ataka,
.. put the marines on standby, and wired his superiors to
.. ready warships at Sasebo naval base. [Note 54. JA, Jan.
.. 21, 1932, front page; Jan. 22, 1, 2. New York Times, Jan.
.. 21, 1932, 11.] On the twenty-first, a cruiser, one
.. aircraft carrier, and four destroyers steamed out of Kure
.. naval base bound for Shanghai to enhance the demands laid
.. down before Mayor Wu. [Note 55. Gaiko Jiho, Feb. 15, 1932.
.. New York Times, Jan. 22, 1932, 10. Chung-yang Jih-pao,
.. Jan. 22, 1932.]

.. By January 21, Shanghai was crackling with pent-up angers
.. as Japanese marines in trucks sped to and fro from guard
.. duty around the Tokwa and Daiko Cotton Mills within the
.. I.S. Rumors were rampant of the Japanese intention to
.. occupy Chinese Chapei as leverage against the boycott. The
.. Japanese armored cars patrolling the vulnerable North
.. Szech'uan Road section that linked the naval headquarters
.. at Hengk'ou Park in the north with the I.S. proper to its
.. south added to a sinister air of apprehension. [Note 56.
.. JA, Jan. 22, 1932, front page. Chung-yang Jih-pao, Jan 22,
.. 1932.] Was the Inukai cabinet in Tokyo sanctioning a show
.. of force at Shanghai?

.. p. 289-290

.. By January 21 the Seiyukai cabinet lacked sufficient
.. support in the lower house of the Diet to authorize its
.. action and convened a session where cabinet leaders
.. explained their policies. The Diet was then dissolved, and
.. a general election was scheduled for February 20. The
.. final speeches reveal much about the attitudes of the
.. ruling Seiyukai party toward Manchuria, China, and related
.. issues.

.. Foreign relations with the mainland had become foremost in
.. Japanese politics by January 1932. The Seiyukai foreign
.. minister, Yoshizawa Kenkichi, who had been reassigned from
.. ambassador to the League of Nations, addressed Japan's
.. recent relations with China. He blamed China for breaking
.. existing treaty obligations by taking advantage of what
.. was misinterpreted as Japanese submissiveness under
.. Shidehara. While not supporting the prior policies,
.. Yoshizawa criticized China for ignoring Japan's patient
.. warnings against the treaty infringements and over-
.. straining Japanese forbearance with Revolutionary
.. Diplomacy. Since China was so unreasonable, an incident on
.. the S.M.R. had precipitated a militant response from
.. Japanese, who had already lost their patience with
.. discussion of Japanese interests in Manchuria. Yoshizawa
.. pointed out Japan's perennial role of maintaining peace
.. and order there. This role had been endangered first by
.. the Russians in 1904 and then in 1931, when China's
.. internal disorders brought with it a new threat to Japan's
.. rights and obligations in Manchuria. If China in 1931 had
.. "chosen to respect the treaty obligations and to uphold
.. international ethics," the incident at Mukden would not
.. have touched off such a serious intervention.

.. The foreign minister, fresh from Geneva, reminded the Diet
.. that Japan had "no territorial design whatever in
.. Manchuria and Mongolia" but rather was "anxious as ever to
.. uphold the ... Open Door and Equal Opportunity" principles
.. and treaty obligations. It was the Chinese government,
.. Yoshizawa noted, that had systematically promoted anti-
.. Japanese agitation, even against the wishes of the
.. majority of Chinese merchants. This agitation had
.. intensified since Mukden. Although he said Chinese were
.. guaranteed safety in Japan (not mentioning Korea), in
.. "striking contrast," the Japanese were oppressed and
.. insulted in China. Yoshizawa stressed Japan's correctness
.. in her relations with China in that "morally and
.. technically, Japan has the perfect right to do what she
.. has done in Manchuria whereas China has not a foot of
.. ground to stand on in her repeated anti-Japanese
.. outbursts." It was up to Japan "to make China right the
.. wrong." He assured the Diet that, due to Japan's "cordial
.. spirit and sincerity, ... both the League and America have
.. gradually come to recognize our just claims" over
.. Manchuria.

.. p. 290

.. Prime Minister Inukai also spoke to the Diet of the
.. contempt in China's Revolutionary Diplomacy for
.. international treaties and contracts that Japan, on the
.. other hand, considered to be basic to her international
.. relations and had defended in Manchuria for all states.
.. Japan had "no imperialistic designs upon Manchuria" but
.. had only begun the process of making that region safe "for
.. natives and foreigners." Inukai said that Japan's protests
.. and warnings had gotten nowhere with China and that "only
.. when all existing treaties are observed can Sino-Japanese
.. relations be regarded as being on a solid basis." From
.. these public expressions, can be seen the confidence that
.. the Seiyukai civilian leadership enjoyed as to the
.. righteousness of their role in Manchuria and of their
.. stance toward China. Finally, Finance Minister Takahashi
.. Korekiyo defended his cabinet's policies.

.. p. 290-292

.. Hirohito had consistently reflected the moderate views of
.. courtiers placed around him by Prince Saionji, the last of
.. the Genro, and he resisted the militant approach toward
.. China. David Titus's use of court diaries showed the
.. emperor and his advisors to be Sinophiles. Hirohito had
.. been instrumental in bringing Tanaka Giichi to resign as
.. Seiyukai prime minister after the intervention at Tsinan
.. in 1928-29 had damaged Sino-Japanese relations
.. significantly. During the disastrous Yangtze flood of mid-
.. 1931, Hirohito had sent a contribution for flood relief
.. work. In the Manchurian incident Hirohito also supported
.. the efforts of Prime Minister Wakatsuki to rein in the
.. army -- such as at Chinchou in November 1931. [Note 61.
.. Titus, 4, 145, 216. Also in Harada's Saionji memoirs.
.. Hane, "Emperor Hirohito", references to emperor's
.. attitude, 60, 65.] On January 21, 1932, Hirohito's
.. displeasure with deteriorating relations with China were
.. evident to the minister to China, Shigemitsu, who
.. "lectured" him on the situation with China.

.. After Shigemitsu had surveyed the recent occurrences such
.. as the attack on the monks, Hirohito asked him whether
.. these recent incidents precluded hope for a close
.. friendship with China. Shigemitsu replied that, as long as
.. the tension over Manchuria existed, it would be "difficult
.. to enjoy a good friendship." Diarist Kido recorded that
.. those around the emperor all "felt sorry for his Majesty
.. because we knew well that His Majesty is always hoping for
.. a good friendship between Japan and China." [Note 62. Kido
.. diary entry, Jan. 21, 1932, in TWCT, vol. 13, 30754-55.]
.. Prime Minister Inukai had hoped to rescue some sort of
.. mutual respect when he sent his personal emissary to talk
.. with both Chiang and the Cantonese KMT in late December.

.. p. 292-294

.. The Inukai cabinet gathered on January 22 despite the
.. "indisposition" of Inukai and his naval minister, Admiral
.. Osumi Mineo, who was frustrated by the continued
.. harassment of Japanese communities in China. The cabinet
.. met over a wide range of problems with China over
.. Manchuria. Reports of anti-Japanese incidents in China
.. were presented by Foreign Minister Yoshizawa and minister
.. to China Shigemitsu. Since the navy was responsible for
.. the protection of Japanese overseas communities, naval
.. ministry personnel had heard Shigemitsu's survey of the
.. background to the current tension in Shanghai. After
.. discussing the various sides of the issue, the cabinet
.. ministers decided to entrust the protection of Japanese
.. nationals at Shanghai to the discretion of Naval Minister
.. Osumi, who had earlier shown prudence. In the event that
.. the demands that Consul Murai had presented were not met,
.. the cabinet allowed for the navy to take "strong measures"
.. to protect Japanese lives and property. This decision was
.. well publicized diplomatically and in the Japanese press.
.. [Note 64. Mainichi, Jan. 24, 1932, front page; Jan, 27, 1.
.. JA, Jan. 23, 1932, 1, 2. Report from the U.S. Legation in
.. Peking, based on Reuter news from Tokyo, Jan. 22, 1932,
.. USDOS 793.94/3614.] Chinese sources claimed that the
.. cabinet also implied a general approval for not only naval
.. reinforcements to Shanghai, but also for future army
.. reinforcement if necessary. [Note 65. Nineteenth RA Battle
.. History, 72-73.] The escalation into the Shanghai
.. incident, then, was quite different from the coup carried
.. out by the K.A. at Mukden four months earlier in that the
.. Seiyukai cabinet at least supported a naval show of force,
.. if not a full-scale intervention, in order to gain an end
.. to the anti-Japanese organizations and boycott. The
.. authorization to "protect Japanese nationals" at Shanghai
.. marked a move further away from Shidehara's policy, which
.. had favored evacuation of nationals, rather than risk
.. escalation into armed conflict with China. [Note 66.
.. lriye, After Imperialism, 195.] Since many Japanese who
.. lived in or near the Chinese sector of Shanghai had either
.. shipped home, moved into the I.S. already or were
.. preparing to leave on short notice, a shadow of doubt was
.. cast as to the real motivation underlying the show of
.. naval force.

.. Although the cabinet ministers apparently were not aware
.. of the unfolding K.A. scheme to grab northern Manchuria,
.. they did follow their session of the twenty-first in which
.. they dealt with the Shanghai situation, with sessions on
.. the next two days discussing the future of Manchuria.

.. Foreign Minister Yoshizawa and army minister Araki
.. dominated the deliberations. According to the press
.. releases, the cabinet consensus was to not stand in the
.. way of the creation of a new Manchurian state. It was
.. growing into an independent country "which will be founded
.. in the near future." Since the "old warlord government" of
.. Chang had "collapsed," some state system had to take its
.. place in order to have peace and order. The new state
.. would be worthy of official recognition of it separation
.. from China. The cabinet furthermore agreed not only to
.. maintain and expand Japanese rights and interests in the
.. territory but also an "open door" policy for all nations.
.. Considering the resistance of the Chinese to a non-Chinese
.. Manchuria up to that point, the cabinet concluded that
.. Japan must "be prepared for interference from other powers
.. in regard to the problem of territorial integrity as
.. stipulated in the Anti-War and Nine-Power Treaties." This
.. "problem" was to be carefully studied by the Foreign
.. Ministry since it involved "some extremely delicate
.. points" that the moderates feared might bring more
.. negative response from the West. It was a rather general
.. rationale that allowed the new Inukai cabinet to
.. acknowledge the prior fait accompli of the K.A. without
.. further loss of face. [Note 67. Asahi, Jan. 24, 1932.]
.. While the cabinet members mooted the creation of
.. Manchukuo, the navy prepared for a show of force at
.. Shanghai.

In this next chapter of Jordan's book, we see the absolute inability of the Nanking government to cope with the coming disaster. Nichiren Shu held all the cards and played them at the right times and places. Their priesthood, in alliance with the military and the insurgent Nichiren Shu militias, created an unstoppable tsunami of anger and hatred directed at the Chinese people by the Shinto war machine of Japan.

That war machine had been started and aimed at the Chinese target, by none other than the Nichiren Shu priests and scholars at Rissho University converting Nichiren Buddhism into an ideology of genocidal expansion by the Japanese.

.. Chinese Boycotts Versus Japanese Bombs, Donald A. Jordan,
.. p. 302-303

.. Chapter 17: Japanese Demands and Chinas Ability to Respond

.. From Tokyo, British Ambassador Lindley's trust for the
.. Japanese finally began to slip. He reported to London that
.. vice-minister of foreign affairs, Nagai Matsuzo, who had
.. been a colleague of Shidehara, had just confided to him
.. privately that the Manchurian incident had indeed been
.. engineered by field officers of the K.A., who should have
.. been curtailed in early October.

.. On the morning of January 24, the Japanese navy was irate
.. to find the morning edition of the Minkuo on the streets
.. of the I.S., somewhat shorter but in print. The Minkuo
.. directors had circumvented the closure by simply finding
.. another press in the city on which to print their
.. newspaper. The Minkuo had not accepted the lesson of
.. submission to Japanese power, as demanded by Shiozawa and
.. Samejima. Furthermore, the docking of the newly arrived
.. cruiser Oi at the I.S. wharf near the Japanese consulate
.. the day before seemed to only infuriate Chinese activists.

.. p. 303-305

.. Later, Consul Murai formally cited the anti-Japanese bias
.. of the Chinese press, exemplified by Shanghai's Minkuo, as
.. contributing to the outbreak of fighting on January 28.
.. Captain Samejima, who had been transferred to Shanghai in
.. early December as part of the reinforcement, later
.. testified that the irresponsibility of the Minkuo in
.. slurring the emperor and then in accusing the marines of
.. duplicity was a major cause of the conflict that erupted.
.. By the time of his testimony, Samejima had learned of the
.. role of Major Tanaka in setting up the other provocations
.. at Shanghai. On January 23, however, the naval leaders at
.. Shanghai suffered more loss of face.

.. When one of the beaten Nichiren monks died, the I.S.
.. banned Japanese residents -- who were in a violent mood --
.. from processing to the funeral, which the Japanese
.. consulate had to enforce with its police. The Rengo news
.. service eulogized his death as peaceful -- "in the spirit
.. of a martyr" -- which was quite likely the original
.. intent. On the twenty-third thousands of irate nationals
.. attended the temple funeral in the I.S. and then the
.. cremation at a Japanese cemetery in Chapei -- a crowded
.. zone where Chinese and Japanese residents rubbed
.. shoulders. Murai’s staff struggled to prevent influence
.. over the large Japanese community from slipping into the
.. hands of the navy while pressing Mayor Wu to meet Japanese
.. demands peacefully.

.. On that same day Murai gained some leverage for his side
.. when seven among the ronin who had attacked the Sanyu mill
.. turned themselves in. They identified themselves as
.. seinendan members and were led to the consulate by the
.. head of the unit who typically held himself responsible
.. even though he had not participated in the raid. The
.. Japanese negotiating with Mayor Wu pointed to their
.. "sincerity" in apprehending those guilty for the attack,
.. while the Chinese had as yet not arrested any of those who
.. had attacked the monks. The so-called inner Japanese
.. sincerity in punishing the killers of the Chinese police
.. who also destroyed Chinese property might be questioned in
.. light of the punishment of the ronin repatriated to
.. Nagasaki and tried in mid-1932. Six of the seven convicts
.. were released with a stay of sentence after several months
.. in jail, and one was given eighteen months imprisonment,
.. which he successfully appealed. In Shanghai the arrest of
.. the ronin was read as a Japanese concession, even though
.. they were not turned over to Chinese courts.

.. Rumors compounded the Japanese threat felt by unseasoned
.. Mayor Wu. The Western press transmitted a warning that, if
.. the Chinese did not close the anti-Japanese boycott
.. associations, the Japanese marines would land and occupy
.. all Chinese barracks, fortifications, and military
.. establishments in the area. The Japanese navy and marines
.. at Shanghai obviously assumed that the Chinese would not
.. resist. While Wu tried to placate the Japanese, he sought
.. instructions at Nanking on January 23, where Chinese
.. leadership was struggling to regroup in order to defend
.. against the Japanese.
..
.. The KMT Factions Again Attempt to Regroup

.. Mayor Wu was able to convey the crisis to president of the
.. Executive Yuan, Sun Fo, acting as a prime minister, as
.. well as with Wang Chingwei and Chiang Kai-shek, who had
.. been persuaded to return to the government. Swallowing
.. their pride and rancor, Chiang's Cantonese opponents urged
.. him to return to Nanking on January 14 where, they argued,
.. all KMT leaders must reunite in order to fend off the
.. crisis with Japan that had shifted to Shanghai. At that
.. point, Sun Fo and Eugene Chen concluded that they lacked
.. both the financial and military support to meet China's
.. current needs. Lacking power, Sun and Chen postponed
.. severing relations with Japan and began their offers to
.. resign.

.. Their pending resignations and Chiang's recovery were
.. partly attributable to the intense pressure from Japan
.. that was felt by all. Chiang's circle had opposed an
.. immediate diplomatic break -- seeing it as unrealistic and
.. suicidal.

.. Back in September, on the thirtieth, following the Mukden
.. incident, Chiang had written in his diary that those
.. wanting to rush immediately into war lacked "any good
.. plans to save the country and resist the Japanese." On
.. October 7, he cautioned himself that:

.... if we are just temporarily aroused, but lack long-term
.... resistance, it will not help the country but only bring
.... its early death ... If we are forced into a corner
.... without escape ... I..will just stand and fight to the
.... death and sacrifice myself and exemplify national
.... character and national spirit.

.. On January 10, from his retirement in Chekiang, Chiang
.. reiterated that "[t]he greatest danger for us now would be
.. to sever relations without any internal preparations." His
.. disagreement with the pro-war faction, however, was not
.. over whether or not to resist Japan, but when and how to
.. resist.

.. Chiang's analysis of Chinese potential agreed with the
.. K.A. in Mukden that China's internal weakness precluded
.. effective military defense. Writing for the New York Times
.. from China, George Sokolsky attributed to Max Bauer, a
.. German advisor to the Chinese army, that, although the
.. Chinese forces were numerous, they lacked a real general
.. staff and the industrial base to be effective. Mukden had
.. proven that China's "military decentralization" had
.. allowed defeat by a much smaller Japanese force and that
.. "China cannot fight Japan in Manchuria or anywhere else."
.. The decision makers in the KMT finally showed willingness
.. to drop their fratricidal competition in order to deal
.. with the foreign threat. Top spokesmen took trains to
.. Hangchou, which was a middle ground between Nanking,
.. Shanghai, and Chiang's home at Fenghua.

.. p. 305-306

.. The Hangchou conference attracted army minister Ho Ying-
.. ch'in, T. V. Soong, Ch'en Mingshu, Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang, and
.. Ch' en Kuo-fu, as well as the top Cantonese. According to
.. one version, Chiang and Wang wired an invitation to Sun Fo
.. to advise them as to how they could serve the government
.. that Sun headed. When Sun Fo joined the conference, he
.. urged Chiang to return to his place on the political
.. council. Chiang, who had lost his official titles
.. excepting membership on the party's Political Council
.. Standing Committee, said he could only help as an
.. individual private citizen. He reiterated his opposition
.. to any rush into war. He said that, without a realistic
.. plan, war would be suicidal and therefore reasoned that:

.... If I don't go back to Nanking, there is a real
.... possibility that the Government might, on the spur of
.... the moment, be pressured into breaking relations with
.... Japan ... and, carried away by emotionalism, ... gamble
.... with China's future.

.. At Hangchou Chiang also began to respond to intelligence
.. reports that the Japanese navy was about to initiate a
.. military action at Shanghai that could expand. According
.. to the recollection of Yu Chi-shih, who commanded the 88th
.. division, Chiang told him before he left Hangchou that Yu
.. should begin to concentrate his entire division in the
.. Suchou vicinity using the canals and roads as defenses
.. against a probable Japanese offensive. Chiang would also
.. add his modernized 87th division under Chang Chi-chung
.. from the Nanking area where they guarded the capital to
.. form a force that became the Fifth Army. The conferees at
.. Hangchou also had to recognize the bankrupt state of
.. Nanking's coffers, which had so frustrated Sun Fo.
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Squirrel Tactics and Strategy

Outside my window, when I chant to the gohonzon, I have often noticed the squirrels that live in the palm tree behind the house. Down the tree scamper the gray squirrels and then back up again, doing their business out in their domain, which we share with them.

One day, I heard an almight thunk, as something fell from a great height and landed on the hood of my car. The fellow that lives in the front of my house and I went out to see what happened. It looked like a funny circular arrangement of palm fronds to me, he said it was a squirrel nest, with baby squirrels that did not survive the fall from fifty feet up. I thought, what a tragedy to the squirrel parents, and thought no more of it.

The next season, I saw something out of the ordinary: After the squirrel came down the tree and went to do his business, a stranger came to visit. A very dark, almost black squirrel came and ran up the tree. After a little while, the gray squirrel came back and they met up the trunk and the black squirrel flew down the tree with the gray squirrel after him.

I saw the extended chase over rooftops, with the gray following the black all the way back to his home tree, in dogged pursuit, like a ferret follows his pursuit past any obstacle.

After thinking about this, I figured out what was up: the black squirrel had, out of competitive instinct, knocked loose last year's nest and would destroy this year's as well. The only protection the grays had was to find his home and wipe it out, otherwise perpetual guarding and starving would be their destiny. Hence the determined chase back to the black squirrel's lair.

They had no other choice, but such a pursuit, when their nest was continually being destroyed by an one who was bent on their annhilation.
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Nichiren Shu and Nichiren Shoshu

Nichiren Shu has continually undermined the Fuji School over the last four or five centuries, and they will never stop, until they are stopped.

They revealed their evil intent during the Pacific War, and by their attacks on the Soka Gakkai since their founding: directly and through their Rissho University-trained lackeys in the Nichiren Shoshu priesthood.

Nichiren Shu has dominated the Fuji School (since 1912 called Nichiren Shoshu) since the absolute authority over the Nichiren branch (all Nichiren temples) under the Tokugawa Shinto temple hierarchy was bestowed upon Nichiren Shu by Ieyasu's grandson, the Tokugawa 3rd Shogun Iemitsu and his servant, Tenkai the Tendai distorter of Lotus Sutra Buddhism.

The tozan of the 17th Nichiren Shoshu high priest Nissei, to that Shinto shrine at Mt. Nikko to worship the ashes of Ieyasu the God over all gods and buddhas in 1637 was only one instance in an endless series of betrayals of Nichiren Daishonin and the Fuji School, by their successive Fuji School high priests, mostly at the direction of their Nichiren Shu masters at Mt. Minobu and elsewhere.

Having destroyed our Fuji School nest repeatedly, it has become my determination to pursue the Nichiren Shu and reveal them as the unrepentant and unindicted founders of the genocide of countless Chinese innocents, and countless others during the Second World War. This paper has provided evidence from many independent sources of what Nichiren Shu has perpetrated upon the Chinese people and humanity at large. This cannot be ignored anymore, because they need to be held to account.

There is also the matter of the Transfer Box for Minobu Temple and the forged document therein, which the recent issue of the missing Transfer Box for Taisekiji, has brought to light by the self-appointed high priest Nikken of Nichiren Shoshu. That issue, and the return of the temples of Nichiren to his true followers will need to be pursued, with the fierce determination of a small gray squirrel.
____________________________________________________________

In the weeks before September 11th, 2001, many evil causes were made around the world.

Among them was a distracting attack by a Zen Roshi against the SGI. In his book "Zen at War", Roshi Brian Victoria made the case that all of Japanese Buddhists either went along with the Imperial State Zen war machine, in the guise of Imperial Way Buddhism (state Shinto), or they resisted and were crushed: he made the argument that no one stood up to Imperial Stat Zen and continued to resist throughout the war.

His specific argument provided a kind of amoral screen, for the Zen-Shinto-Nichiren-Shu evil to hide behind: arguing that no one was as bad as Zen-Shinto-Nichiren-Shu, but then no one was really any better. It was an extremely weak case of moral equivalency.

This denied the facts in evidence of the imprisonment of Tsunesaburo Makiguchi, the President of Soka Kyoiku Gakkai (the previous name of the Soka Gakkai and the SGI), and his trusted disciple, Josei Toda (who became the second President after the war), and several others by the military government and state Shinto.

Makiguchi and Toda never gave up their resistance: Makiguchi died in prison and Josei Toda was released as the invasion of Japan by the United Nations forces loomed.

Nevertheless, Roshi Victoria doubled down, and aided by his bad translations and narrow interpretations of Makiguchi's writings, and some exceedingly bad historiography (prochronism, which is the form of anachronism such as a wristwatch on a Roman soldier in movie about Caesar), he launched a character assassination called "The Putative Pacifism of Tsuneaburo Makiguchi", which was released by the journal to the reviewers, on the week before the 9/11 attacks were launched. Not much attention was paid at the time to this disgusting attempt at scholarly ass-covering by repeatedly attacking the victims. (A silver lining in every cloud.)

Since that time, Victoria's disgusting rant has been thoroughly debunked by others and myself. However, Jon Petry of Nichiren Shu has taken this filthy rag up as his banner, his cause celebre, flourishing it time and again.

Until I had done this research on Nichiren Shu's complicity in the war crimes in China, I did not understand Jon Petry's motive for protecting a Zen academic from Australia. Now the reasons are easier to discern. Zen-Shinto-Nichiren-Shu are the perpetrators of the Asian Holocaust and any distraction they can hide behind, even that of repeatedly attacking the innocent victims of their atrocities, covers their naked evil and their corruption and keeps it out of public view.

Mixing slander with the Buddhism of the Lotus Sutra is entirely Shinto, and Shinto is entirely the creature of toxic Zen. Nichiren Shu is the modern purveyor of the worst that Shinto has to offer.

It is long past time for these evil-doers to be held to account for their crimes, and to stop being shielded by the bodies of their victims who resisted them to the bitter end.

-Chas.
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LS Chap. 16 .....

All harbor thoughts of yearning
and in their minds thirst to gaze at me.
When living beings have become truly faithful,
honest and upright, gentle in intent,
single-mindedly desiring to see the Buddha
not hesitating even if it costs them their lives,
then I and the assembly of monks
appear together on Holy Eagle Peak.
At that time I tell the living beings
that I am always here, never entering extinction,
but that because of the power of an expedient means
at times I appear to be extinct, at other times not,
and that if there are living beings in other lands
who are reverent and sincere in their wish to believe,
then among them too
I will preach the unsurpassed Law.
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