NO TREASON

[Frosty]

NO TREASON.

No. VI.
_____________

The Constitution of no Authority.
_____________
BY LYSANDER SPOONER
_____________
BOSTON:
PUBLISHED BY THE AUTHOR,
1870.
___________________________________________________
Entered according to Act of congress, in the year 1870,
By LYSANDER SPOONER,
in the Clerk's office of the District Court of the United States, for
the District
of Massachusetts.
___________________________________________________

The first and second numbers of this series were published in 1867.
For reasons not necessary to be explained, the sixth is now published
in advance of the third, fourth, and fifth.
(You can read them all at http://www.lysanderspooner.org/ -Frosty)
NO TREASON
NO. VI.
THE CONSTITUTION OF NO AUTHORITY

I.
The Constitution has no inherent authority or obligation. It has no
authority or obligation at all, unless as a contract between man and
man. And it does not so much as even purport to be a contract between
persons now existing. It purports, at most, to be only a contract
between persons living eighty years ago. And it can be supposed to
have been a contract then only between persons who had already come to
years of discretion, so as to be competent to make reasonable and
obligatory contracts. Furthermore, we know, historically, that only a
small portion even of the people then existing were consulted on the
subject, or asked, or permitted to express either their consent or
dissent in any formal manner. Those persons, if any, who did give
their consent formally, are all dead now. Most of them have been dead
forty, fifty, sixty, or seventy years. And the constitution, so far as
it was their contract, died with them. They had no natural power or
right to make it obligatory upon their children. It is not only
plainly impossible, in the nature of things, that they could bind
their posterity, but they did not even attempt to bind them. That is
to say, the instrument does not purport to be an agreement between any
body but "the people" then existing; nor does it, either ex- [*4]
pressly or impliedly, assert any right, power, or disposition, on
their part, to bind anybody but themselves. Let us see. Its language
is:
"We, the people of the United States (that is, the people then
existing in the United States), in order to form a more perfect union,
insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote
the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves
and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America."
It is plain, in the first place, that this language, as an agreement,
purports to be only what it at most really was, viz., a contract
between the people then existing; and, of necessity, binding, as a
contract, only upon those then existing. In the second place, the
language neither expresses nor implies that they had any right or
power, to bind their "posterity" to live under it. It does not say
that their "posterity" will, shall, or must live under it. It only
says, in effect, that their hopes and motives in adopting it were that
it might prove useful to their posterity, as well as to themselves, by
promoting their union, safety, tranquility, liberty, etc.
Suppose an agreement were entered into, in this form:
We, the people of Boston, agree to maintain a fort on Governor's
Island, to protect ourselves and our posterity against invasion.
This agreement, as an agreement, would clearly bind nobody but the
people then existing. Secondly, it would assert no right, power, or
disposition, on their part, to compel, their "posterity" to maintain
such a fort. It would only indicate that the supposed welfare of their
posterity was one of the motives that induced the original parties to
enter into the agreement.
When a man says he is building a house for himself and his posterity,
he does not mean to be understood as saying that he has any thought of
binding them, nor is it to be inferred that he [*5] is so foolish as
to imagine that he has any right or power to bind them, to live in it.
So far as they are concerned, he only means to be understood as saying
that his hopes and motives, in building it, are that they, or at least
some of them, may find it for their happiness to live in it.
So when a man says he is planting a tree for himself and his
posterity, he does not mean to be understood as saying that he has any
thought of compelling them, nor is it to be inferred that he is such a
simpleton as to imagine that he has any right or power to compel them,
to eat the fruit. So far as they are concerned, he only means to say
that his hopes and motives, in planting the tree, are that its fruit
may be agreeable to them.
So it was with those who originally adopted the Constitution. Whatever
may have been their personal intentions, the legal meaning of their
language, so far as their "posterity" was concerned, simply was, that
their hopes and motives, in entering into the agreement, were that it
might prove useful and acceptable to their posterity; that it might
promote their union, safety, tranquility, and welfare; and that it
might tend "to secure to them the blessings of liberty." The language
does not assert nor at all imply, any right, power, or disposition, on
the part of the original parties to the agreement, to compel their
"posterity" to live under it. If they had intended to bind their
posterity to live under it, they should have said that their objective
was, not "to secure to them the blessings of liberty," but to make
slaves of them; for if their "posterity" are bound to live under it,
they are nothing less than the slaves of their foolish, tyrannical,
and dead grandfathers.
It cannot be said that the Constitution formed "the people of the
United States," for all time, into a corporation. It does not speak of
"the people" as a corporation, but as individuals. A corporation does
not describe itself as "we," nor as "people," nor as "ourselves." Nor
does a corporation, in legal language, [*6] have any "posterity." It
supposes itself to have, and speaks of itself as having, perpetual
existence, as a single individuality.
Moreover, no body of men, existing at any one time, have the power to
create a perpetual corporation. A corporation can become practically
perpetual only by the voluntary accession of new members, as the old
ones die off. But for this voluntary accession of new members, the
corporation necessarily dies with the death of those who originally
composed it.
Legally speaking, therefore, there is, in the Constitution, nothing
that professes or attempts to bind the "posterity" of those who
establish[ed] it.
If, then, those who established the Constitution, had no power to
bind, and did not attempt to bind, their posterity, the question
arises, whether their posterity have bound themselves. If they have
done so, they can have done so in only one or both of these two ways,
viz., by voting, and paying taxes.

II.
Let us consider these two matters, voting and tax paying, separately.
And first of voting.
All the voting that has ever taken place under the Constitution, has
been of such a kind that it not only did not pledge the whole people
to support the Constitution, but it did not even pledge any one of
them to do so, as the following considerations show.
1. In the very nature of things, the act of voting could bind nobody
but the actual voters. But owing to the property qualifications
required, it is probable that, during the first twenty or thirty years
under the Constitution, not more than one-tenth, fifteenth, or perhaps
twentieth of the whole population (black and white, men, women, and
minors) were permitted to vote. Consequently, so far as voting was
concerned, not more than one-tenth, fifteenth, or twentieth of those
then existing, could have incurred any obligation to support the
Constitution. [*7]
At the present time, it is probable that not more than one-sixth of
the whole population are permitted to vote. Consequently, so far as
voting is concerned, the other five-sixths can have given no pledge
that they will support the Constitution.
2. Of the one-sixth that are permitted to vote, probably not more than
two-thirds (about one-ninth of the whole population) have usually
voted. Many never vote at all. Many vote only once in two, three,
five, or ten years, in periods of great excitement.
No one, by voting, can be said to pledge himself for any longer period
than that for which he votes. If, for example, I vote for an officer
who is to hold his office for only a year, I cannot be said to have
thereby pledged myself to support the government beyond that term.
Therefore, on the ground of actual voting, it probably cannot be said
that more than one-ninth or one-eighth, of the whole population are
usually under any pledge to support the Constitution.
3. It cannot be said that, by voting, a man pledges himself to support
the Constitution, unless the act of voting be a perfectly voluntary
one on his part. Yet the act of voting cannot properly be called a
voluntary one on the part of any very large number of those who do
vote. It is rather a measure of necessity imposed upon them by others,
than one of their own choice. On this point I repeat what was said in
a former number, <fn1> viz.:
"In truth, in the case of individuals, their actual voting is not to
be taken as proof of consent, even for the time being. On the
contrary, it is to be considered that, without his consent having even
been asked a man finds himself environed by a government that he
cannot resist; a government that forces him to pay money, render
service, and forego the exercise of many of his natural rights, under
peril of weighty punishments. He sees, too, that other men practice
this tyranny over him by the use of the ballot. He sees further, that,
if he will but use the ballot [*8] himself, he has some chance of
relieving himself from this tyranny of others, by subjecting them to
his own. In short, he finds himself, without his consent, so situated
that, if he use the ballot, he may become a master; if he does not use
it, he must become a slave. And he has no other alternative than these
two. In self-defence, he attempts the former. His case is analogous to
that of a man who has been forced into battle, where he must either
kill others, or be killed himself. Because, to save his own life in
battle, a man takes the lives of his opponents, it is not to be
inferred that the battle is one of his own choosing. Neither in
contests with the ballot --- which is a mere substitute for a bullet
--- because, as his only chance of self- preservation, a man uses a
ballot, is it to be inferred that the contest is one into which he
voluntarily entered; that he voluntarily set up all his own natural
rights, as a stake against those of others, to be lost or won by the
mere power of numbers. On the contrary, it is to be considered that,
in an exigency into which he had been forced by others, and in which
no other means of self-defence offered, he, as a matter of necessity,
used the only one that was left to him.
"Doubtless the most miserable of men, under the most oppressive
government in the world, if allowed the ballot, would use it, if they
could see any chance of thereby meliorating their condition. But it
would not, therefore, be a legitimate inference that the government
itself, that crushes them, was one which they had voluntarily set up,
or even consented to. "Therefore, a man's voting under the
Constitution of the United States, is not to be taken as evidence that
he ever freely assented to the Constitution, even for the time being.
Consequently we have no proof that any very large portion, even of the
actual voters of the United States, ever really and voluntarily
consented to the Constitution, even for the time being. Nor can we
ever have such proof, until every man is left perfectly free to
consent, or not, without thereby subjecting himself or his property to
be disturbed or injured by others."
As we can have no legal knowledge as to who votes from choice, and who
from the necessity thus forced upon him, we can have no legal
knowledge, as to any particular individual, that he voted from choice;
or, consequently, that by voting, he consented, or pledged himself, to
support the government. Legally [*9] speaking, therefore, the act of
voting utterly fails to pledge any one to support the government. It
utterly fails to prove that the government rests upon the voluntary
support of anybody. On general principles of law and reason, it cannot
be said that the government has any voluntary supporters at all, until
it can be distinctly shown who its voluntary supporters are.
4. As taxation is made compulsory on all, whether they vote or not, a
large proportion of those who vote, no doubt do so to prevent their
own money being used against themselves; when, in fact, they would
have gladly abstained from voting, if they could thereby have saved
themselves from taxation alone, to say nothing of being saved from all
the other usurpations and tyrannies of the government. To take a man's
property without his consent, and then to infer his consent because he
attempts, by voting, to prevent that property from being used to his
injury, is a very insufficient proof of his consent to support the
Constitution. It is, in fact, no proof at all. And as we can have no
legal knowledge as to who the particular individuals are, if there are
any, who are willing to be taxed for the sake of voting, we can have
no legal knowledge that any particular individual consents to be taxed
for the sake of voting; or, consequently, consents to support the
Constitution.
5. At nearly all elections, votes are given for various candidates for
the same office. Those who vote for the unsuccessful candidates cannot
properly be said to have voted to sustain the Constitution. They may,
with more reason, be supposed to have voted, not to support the
Constitution, but specially to prevent the tyranny which they
anticipate the successful candidate intends to practice upon them
under color of the Constitution; and therefore may reasonably be
supposed to have voted against the Constitution itself. This
supposition is the more reasonable, inasmuch as such voting is the
only mode allowed to them of expressing their dissent to the
Constitution. [*10]
6. Many votes are usually given for candidates who have no prospect of
success. Those who give such votes may reasonably be supposed to have
voted as they did, with a special intention, not to support, but to
obstruct the execution of, the Constitution; and, therefore, against
the Constitution itself.
7. As all the different votes are given secretly (by secret ballot),
there is no legal means of knowing, from the votes themselves, who
votes for, and who votes against, the Constitution. Therefore, voting
affords no legal evidence that any particular individual supports the
Constitution. And where there can be no legal evidence that any
particular individual supports the Constitution, it cannot legally be
said that anybody supports it. It is clearly impossible to have any
legal proof of the intentions of large numbers of men, where there can
be no legal proof of the intentions of any particular one of them.
8. There being no legal proof of any man's intentions, in voting, we
can only conjecture them. As a conjecture, it is probable, that a very
large proportion of those who vote, do so on this principle, viz.,
that if, by voting, they could but get the government into their own
hands (or that of their friends), and use its powers against their
opponents, they would then willingly support the Constitution; but if
their opponents are to have the power, and use it against them, then
they would not willingly support the Constitution.
In short, men's voluntary support of the Constitution is doubtless, in
most cases, wholly contingent upon the question whether, by means of
the Constitution, they can make themselves masters, or are to be made
slaves.
Such contingent consent as that is, in law and reason, no consent at
all.
9. As everybody who supports the Constitution by voting (if there are
any such) does so secretly (by secret ballot), and in a way to avoid
all personal responsibility for the acts of his agents or
representatives, it cannot legally or reasonably be [*11] said that
anybody at all supports the Constitution by voting. No man can
reasonably or legally be said to do such a thing as assent to, or
support, the Constitution, unless he does it openly, and in a way to
make himself personally responsible for the acts of his agents, so
long as they act within the limits of the power he delegates to them.
10. As all voting is secret (by secret ballot), and as all secret
governments are necessarily only secret bands of robbers, tyrants, and
murderers, the general fact that our government is practically carried
on by means of such voting, only proves that there is among us a
secret band of robbers, tyrants, and murderers, whose purpose is to
rob, enslave, and, so far as necessary to accomplish their purposes,
murder, the rest of the people. The simple fact of the existence of
such a band does nothing towards proving that "the people of the
United States," or any one of them, voluntarily supports the
Constitution.
For all the reasons that have now been given, voting furnishes no
legal evidence as to who the particular individuals are (if there are
any), who voluntarily support the Constitution. It therefore furnishes
no legal evidence that anybody supports it voluntarily.
So far, therefore, as voting is concerned, the Constitution, legally
speaking, has no supporters at all.
And, as a matter of fact, there is not the slightest probability that
the Constitution has a single bona fide supporter in the country. That
is to say, there is not the slightest probability that there is a
single man in the country, who both understands what the Constitution
really is, and sincerely supports it for what it really is.
The ostensible supporters of the Constitution, like the ostensible
supporters of most other governments, are made up of three classes,
viz.: 1. Knaves, a numerous and active class, who see in the
government an instrument which they can use for their own
aggrandizement or wealth. 2. Dupes --- a large class, no [*12] doubt
--- each of whom, because he is allowed one voice out of millions in
deciding what he may do with his own person and his own property, and
because he is permitted to have the same voice in robbing, enslaving,
and murdering others, that others have in robbing, enslaving, and
murdering himself, is stupid enough to imagine that he is a "free
man," a "sovereign"; that this is "a free government"; "a government
of equal rights," "the best government on earth," <fn2> and such like
absurdities. 3. A class who have some appreciation of the evils of
government, but either do not see how to get rid of them, or do not
choose to so far sacrifice their private interests as to give
themselves seriously and earnestly to the work of making a change.
III.
The payment of taxes, being compulsory, of course furnishes no
evidence that any one voluntarily supports the Constitution.
1. It is true that the theory of our Constitution is, that all taxes
are paid voluntarily; that our government is a mutual insurance
company, voluntarily entered into by the people with each other; that
that each man makes a free and purely voluntary contract with all
others who are parties to the Constitution, to pay so much money for
so much protection, the same as he does with any other insurance
company; and that he is just as free not to be protected, and not to
pay tax, as he is to pay a tax, and be protected.
But this theory of our government is wholly different from the
practical fact. The fact is that the government, like a highwayman,
says to a man: Your money, or your life." And many, if not most, taxes
are paid under the compulsion of that threat.
The government does not, indeed, waylay a man in a lonely place,
spring upon him from the roadside, and, holding a pistol [*13] to his
head, proceed to rifle his pockets. But the robbery is none the less a
robbery on that account; and it is far more dastardly and shameful.
The highwayman takes solely upon himself the responsibility, danger,
and crime of his own act. He does not pretend that he has any rightful
claim to your money, or that he intends to use it for your own
benefit. He does not pretend to be anything but a robber. He has not
acquired impudence enough to profess to be merely a "protector," and
that he takes men's money against their will, merely to enable him to
"protect" those infatuated travellers, who feel perfectly able to
protect themselves, or do not appreciate his peculiar system of
protection. He is too sensible a man to make such professions as
these. Furthermore, having taken your money, he leaves you, as you
wish him to do. He does not persist in following you on the road,
against your will; assuming to be your rightful "sovereign," on
account of the "protection" he affords you. He does not keep
"protecting" you, by commanding you to bow down and serve him; by
requiring you to do this, and forbidding you to do that; by robbing
you of more money as often as he finds it for his interest or pleasure
to do so; and by branding you as a rebel, a traitor, and an enemy to
your country, and shooting you down without mercy, if you dispute his
authority, or resist his demands. He is too much of a gentleman to be
guilty of such impostures, and insults, and villanies as these. In
short, he does not, in addition to robbing you, attempt to make you
either his dupe or his slave.
The proceedings of those robbers and murderers, who call themselves
"the government," are directly the opposite of these of the single
highwayman.
In the first place, they do not, like him, make themselves
individually known; or, consequently, take upon themselves personally
the responsibility of their acts. On the contrary, they secretly (by
secret ballot) designate some one of their number [*14] to commit the
robbery in their behalf, while they keep themselves practically
concealed. They say to the person thus designated:
Go to A_____ B_____, and say to him that "the government" has need of
money to meet the expenses of protecting him and his property. If he
presumes to say that he has never contracted with us to protect him,
and that he wants none of our protection, say to him that that is our
business, and not his; that we choose to protect him, whether he
desires us to do so or not; and that we demand pay, too, for
protecting him. If he dares to inquire who the individuals are, who
have thus taken upon themselves the title of "the government," and who
assume to protect him, and demand payment of him, without his having
ever made any contract with them, say to him that that, too, is our
business, and not his; that we do not choose to make ourselves
individually known to him; that we have secretly (by secret ballot)
appointed you our agent to give him notice of our demands, and, if he
complies with them, to give him, in our name, a receipt that will
protect him against any similar demand for the present year. If he
refuses to comply, seize and sell enough of his property to pay not
only our demands, but all your own expenses and trouble beside. If he
resists the seizure of his property, call upon the bystanders to help
you (doubtless some of them will prove to be members of our band.) If,
in defending his property, he should kill any of our band who are
assisting you, capture him at all hazards; charge him (in one of our
courts) with murder; convict him, and hang him. If he should call upon
his neighbors, or any others who, like him, may be disposed to resist
our demands, and they should come in large numbers to his assistance,
cry out that they are all rebels and traitors; that "our country" is
in danger; call upon the commander of our hired murderers; tell him to
quell the rebellion and "save the country," cost what it may. Tell him
to kill all who resist, though they should be hundreds of thou- [*15]
sands; and thus strike terror into all others similarly disposed. See
that the work of murder is thoroughly done; that we may have no
further trouble of this kind hereafter. When these traitors shall have
thus been taught our strength and our determination, they will be good
loyal citizens for many years, and pay their taxes without a why or a
wherefore.
It is under such compulsion as this that taxes, so called, are paid.
And how much proof the payment of taxes affords, that the people
consent to "support the government," it needs no further argument to
show.
2. Still another reason why the payment of taxes implies no consent,
or pledge, to support the government, is that the taxpayer does not
know, and has no means of knowing, who the particular individuals are
who compose "the government." To him "the government" is a myth, an
abstraction, an incorporeality, with which he can make no contract,
and to which he can give no consent, and make no pledge. He knows it
only through its pretended agents. "The government" itself he never
sees. He knows indeed, by common report, that certain persons, of a
certain age, are permitted to vote; and thus to make themselves parts
of, or (if they choose) opponents of, the government, for the time
being. But who of them do thus vote, and especially how each one votes
(whether so as to aid or oppose the government), he does not know; the
voting being all done secretly (by secret ballot). Who, therefore,
practically compose "the government," for the time being, he has no
means of knowing. Of course he can make no contract with them, give
them no consent, and make them no pledge. Of necessity, therefore, his
paying taxes to them implies, on his part, no contract, consent, or
pledge to support them --- that is, to support "the government," or
the Constitution.
3. Not knowing who the particular individuals are, who call themselves
"the government," the taxpayer does not know whom he pays his taxes
to. All he knows is that a man comes to [*16] him, representing
himself to be the agent of "the government" --- that is, the agent of
a secret band of robbers and murderers, who have taken to themselves
the title of "the government," and have determined to kill everybody
who refuses to give them whatever money they demand. To save his life,
he gives up his money to this agent. But as this agent does not make
his principals individually known to the taxpayer, the latter, after
he has given up his money, knows no more who are "the government" ---
that is, who were the robbers --- than he did before. To say,
therefore, that by giving up his money to their agent, he entered into
a voluntary contract with them, that he pledges himself to obey them,
to support them, and to give them whatever money they should demand of
him in the future, is simply ridiculous.
4. All political power, so called, rests practically upon this matter
of money. Any number of scoundrels, having money enough to start with,
can establish themselves as a "government"; because, with money, they
can hire soldiers, and with soldiers extort more money; and also
compel general obedience to their will. It is with government, as
Caesar said it was in war, that money and soldiers mutually supported
each other; that with money he could hire soldiers, and with soldiers
extort money. So these villains, who call themselves governments, well
understand that their power rests primarily upon money. With money
they can hire soldiers, and with soldiers extort money. And, when
their authority is denied, the first use they always make of money, is
to hire soldiers to kill or subdue all who refuse them more money.
For this reason, whoever desires liberty, should understand these
vital facts, viz.: 1. That every man who puts money into the hands of
a "government" (so called), puts into its hands a sword which will be
used against him, to extort more money from him, and also to keep him
in subjection to its arbitrary will. 2. That those who will take his
money, without his con- [*17] sent, in the first place, will use it
for his further robbery and enslavement, if he presumes to resist
their demands in the future. 3. That it is a perfect absurdity to
suppose that any body of men would ever take a man's money without his
consent, for any such object as they profess to take it for, viz.,
that of protecting him; for why should they wish to protect him, if he
does not wish them to do so? To suppose that they would do so, is just
as absurd as it would be to suppose that they would take his money
without his consent, for the purpose of buying food or clothing for
him, when he did not want it. 4. If a man wants "protection," he is
competent to make his own bargains for it; and nobody has any occasion
to rob him, in order to "protect" him against his will. 5. That the
only security men can have for their political liberty, consists in
their keeping their money in their own pockets, until they have
assurances, perfectly satisfactory to themselves, that it will be used
as they wish it to be used, for their benefit, and not for their
injury. 6. That no government, so called, can reasonably be trusted
for a moment, or reasonably be supposed to have honest purposes in
view, any longer than it depends wholly upon voluntary support.
These facts are all so vital and so self-evident, that it cannot
reasonably be supposed that any one will voluntarily pay money to a
"government," for the purpose of securing its protection, unless he
first make an explicit and purely voluntary contract with it for that
purpose.
It is perfectly evident, therefore, that neither such voting, nor such
payment of taxes, as actually takes place, proves anybody's consent,
or obligation, to support the Constitution. Consequently we have no
evidence at all that the Constitution is binding upon anybody, or that
anybody is under any contract or obligation whatever to support it.
And nobody is under any obligation to support it. [*18]

IV.
The constitution not only binds nobody now, but it never did bind
anybody. It never bound anybody, because it was never agreed to by
anybody in such a manner as to make it, on general principles of law
and reason, binding upon him.
It is a general principle of law and reason, that a written instrument
binds no one until he has signed it. This principle is so inflexible a
one, that even though a man is unable to write his name, he must still
"make his mark," before he is bound by a written contract. This custom
was established ages ago, when few men could write their names; when a
clerk --- that is, a man who could write --- was so rare and valuable
a person, that even if he were guilty of high crimes, he was entitled
to pardon, on the ground that the public could not afford to lose his
services. Even at that time, a written contract must be signed; and
men who could not write, either "made their mark," or signed their
contracts by stamping their seals upon wax affixed to the parchment on
which their contracts were written. Hence the custom of affixing
seals, that has continued to this time.
The laws holds, and reason declares, that if a written instrument is
not signed, the presumption must be that the party to be bound by it,
did not choose to sign it, or to bind himself by it. And law and
reason both give him until the last moment, in which to decide whether
he will sign it, or not. Neither law nor reason requires or expects a
man to agree to an instrument, until it is written; for until it is
written, he cannot know its precise legal meaning. And when it is
written, and he has had the opportunity to satisfy himself of its
precise legal meaning, he is then expected to decide, and not before,
whether he will agree to it or not. And if he do not then sign it, his
reason is supposed to be, that he does not choose to enter into such a
contract. The fact that the instrument was written for him to sign, or
with the hope that he would sign it, goes for nothing. [*19]
Where would be the end of fraud and litigation, if one party could
bring into court a written instrument, without any signature, and
claim to have it enforced, upon the ground that it was written for
another man to sign? that this other man had promised to sign it? that
he ought to have signed it? that he had had the opportunity to sign
it, if he would? but that he had refused or neglected to do so? Yet
that is the most that could ever be said of the Constitution. <fn3>
The very judges, who profess to derive all their authority from the
Constitution --- from an instrument that nobody ever signed --- would
spurn any other instrument, not signed, that should be brought before
them for adjudication.
Moreover, a written instrument must, in law and reason, not only be
signed, but must also be delivered to the party (or to some one for
him), in whose favor it is made, before it can bind the party making
it. The signing is of no effect, unless the instrument be also
delivered. And a party is at perfect liberty to refuse to deliver a
written instrument, after he has signed it. The Constitution was not
only never signed by anybody, but it was never delivered by anybody,
or to anybody's agent or attorney. It can therefore be of no more
validity as a contract, then can any other instrument that was never
signed or delivered.

V.
As further evidence of the general sense of mankind, as to the
practical necessity there is that all men's important contracts,
especially those of a permanent nature, should be both written and
signed, the following facts are pertinent. [*20]
For nearly two hundred years --- that is, since 1677 --- there has
been on the statute book of England, and the same, in substance, if
not precisely in letter, has been re-enacted, and is now in force, in
nearly or quite all the States of this Union, a statute, the general
object of which is to declare that no action shall be brought to
enforce contracts of the more important class, unless they are put in
writing, and signed by the parties to be held chargeable upon them.
<fn4>
The principle of the statute, be it observed, is, not merely that
written contracts shall be signed, but also that all con- [*21]
tracts, except for those specially exempted --- generally those that
are for small amounts, and are to remain in force for but a short time
--- shall be both written and signed.
The reason of the statute, on this point, is, that it is now so easy a
thing for men to put their contracts in writing, and sign them, and
their failure to do so opens the door to so much doubt, fraud, and
litigation, that men who neglect to have their contracts --- of any
considerable importance --- written and signed, ought not to have the
benefit of courts of justice to enforce them. And this reason is a
wise one; and that experience has confirmed its wisdom and necessity,
is demonstrated by the fact that it has been acted upon in England for
nearly two hundred years, and has been so nearly universally adopted
in this country, and that nobody thinks of repealing it.
We all know, too, how careful most men are to have their contracts
written and signed, even when this statute does not require it. For
example, most men, if they have money due them, of no larger amount
than five or ten dollars, are careful to take a note for it. If they
buy even a small bill of goods, paying for it at the time of delivery,
they take a receipted bill for it. If they pay a small balance of a
book account, or any other small debt previously contracted, they take
a written receipt for it.
Furthermore, the law everywhere (probably) in our country, as well as
in England, requires that a large class of contracts, such as wills,
deeds, etc., shall not only be written and signed, but also sealed,
witnessed, and acknowledged. And in the case of married women
conveying their rights in real estate, the law, in many States,
requires that the women shall be examined separate and apart from
their husbands, and declare that they sign their contracts free of any
fear or compulsion of their husbands.
Such are some of the precautions which the laws require, and which
individuals --- from motives of common prudence, even in cases not
required by law --- take, to put their contracts in writing, and have
them signed, and, to guard against all uncertainties [*22] and
controversies in regard to their meaning and validity. And yet we have
what purports, or professes, or is claimed, to be a contract --- the
Constitution --- made eighty years ago, by men who are now all dead,
and who never had any power to bind us, but which (it is claimed) has
nevertheless bound three generations of men, consisting of many
millions, and which (it is claimed) will be binding upon all the
millions that are to come; but which nobody ever signed, sealed,
delivered, witnessed, or acknowledged; and which few persons, compared
with the whole number that are claimed to be bound by it, have ever
read, or even seen, or ever will read, or see. And of those who ever
have read it, or ever will read it, scarcely any two, perhaps no two,
have ever agreed, or ever will agree, as to what it means.
Moreover, this supposed contract, which would not be received in any
court of justice sitting under its authority, if offered to prove a
debt of five dollars, owing by one man to another, is one by which ---
as it is generally interpreted by those who pretend to administer it
--- all men, women and children throughout the country, and through
all time, surrender not only all their property, but also their
liberties, and even lives, into the hands of men who by this supposed
contract, are expressly made wholly irresponsible for their disposal
of them. And we are so insane, or so wicked, as to destroy property
and lives without limit, in fighting to compel men to fulfill a
supposed contract, which, inasmuch as it has never been signed by
anybody, is, on general principles of law and reason --- such
principles as we are all governed by in regard to other contracts ---
the merest waste of paper, binding upon nobody, fit only to be thrown
into the fire; or, if preserved, preserved only to serve as a witness
and a warning of the folly and wickedness of mankind.

VI.
It is no exaggeration, but a literal truth, to say that, by the
Constitution --- not as I interpret it, but as it is interpreted by
those [*23] who pretend to administer it --- the properties,
liberties, and lives of the entire people of the United States are
surrendered unreservedly into the hands of men who, it is provided by
the Constitution itself, shall never be "questioned" as to any
disposal they make of them.
Thus the Constitution (Art. I, Sec. 6) provides that, "for any speech
or debate [or vote,] in either house, they [the senators and
representatives] shall not be questioned in any other place."
The whole law-making power is given to these senators and
representatives [when acting by a two-thirds vote] <fn5>; and this
provision protects them from all responsibility for the laws they
make.
The Constitution also enables them to secure the execution of all
their laws, by giving them power to withhold the salaries of, and to
impeach and remove, all judicial and executive officers, who refuse to
execute them.
Thus the whole power of the government is in their hands, and they are
made utterly irresponsible for the use they make of it. What is this
but absolute, irresponsible power?
It is no answer to this view of the case to say that these men are
under oath to use their power only within certain limits; for what
care they, or what should they care, for oaths or limits, when it is
expressly provided, by the Constitution itself, that they shall never
be "questioned," or held to any responsibility whatever, for violating
their oaths, or transgressing those limits?
Neither is it any answer to this view of the case to say that the men
holding this absolute, irresponsible power, must be men chosen by the
people (or portions of them) to hold it. A man is none the less a
slave because he is allowed to choose a new master once in a term of
years. Neither are a people any the less slaves because permitted
periodically to choose new masters. What makes them slaves is the fact
that they now are, and are always hereafter to be, in the hands of men
whose power over them is, and always is to be, absolute and
irresponsible. <fn6> [*24]
The right of absolute and irresponsible dominion is the right of
property, and the right of property is the right of absolute,
irresponsible dominion. The two are identical; the one necessarily
implies the other. Neither can exist without the other. If, therefore,
Congress have that absolute and irresponsible law-making power, which
the Constitution --- according to their interpretation of it --- gives
them, it can only be because they own us as property. If they own us
as property, they are our masters, and their will is our law. If they
do not own us as property, they are not our masters, and their will,
as such, is of no authority over us.
But these men who claim and exercise this absolute and irresponsible
dominion over us, dare not be consistent, and claim either to be our
masters, or to own us as property. They say they are only our
servants, agents, attorneys, and representatives. But this declaration
involves an absurdity, a contradiction. No man can be my servant,
agent, attorney, or representative, and be, at the same time,
uncontrollable by me, and irresponsible to me for his acts. It is of
no importance that I appointed him, and put all power in his hands. If
I made him uncontrollable by me, and irresponsible to me, he is no
longer my servant, agent, attorney, or representative. If I gave him
absolute, irre- [*25] sponsible power over my property, I gave him the
property. If I gave him absolute, irresponsible power over myself, I
made him my master, and gave myself to him as a slave. And it is of no
importance whether I called him master or servant, agent or owner. The
only question is, what power did I put in his hands? Was it an
absolute and irresponsible one? or a limited and responsible one?
For still another reason they are neither our servants, agents,
attorneys, nor representatives. And that reason is, that we do not
make ourselves responsible for their acts. If a man is my servant,
agent, or attorney, I necessarily make myself responsible for all his
acts done within the limits of the power I have intrusted to him. If I
have intrusted him, as my agent, with either absolute power, or any
power at all, over the persons or properties of other men than myself,
I thereby necessarily make myself responsible to those other persons
for any injuries he may do them, so long as he acts within the limits
of the power I have granted him. But no individual who may be injured
in his person or property, by acts of Congress, can come to the
individual electors, and hold them responsible for these acts of their
so-called agents or representatives. This fact proves that these
pretended agents of the people, of everybody, are really the agents of
nobody.
If, then, nobody is individually responsible for the acts of Congress,
the members of Congress are nobody's agents. And if they are nobody's
agents, they are themselves individually responsible for their own
acts, and for the acts of all whom they employ. And the authority they
are exercising is simply their own individual authority; and, by the
law of nature --- the highest of all laws --- anybody injured by their
acts, anybody who is deprived by them of his property or his liberty,
has the same right to hold them individually responsible, that he has
to hold any other trespasser individually responsible. He has the same
right [*26] to resist them, and their agents, that he has to resist
any other trespassers.

VII.
It is plain, then, that on general principles of law and reason ---
such principles as we all act upon in courts of justice and in common
life --- the Constitution is no contract; that it binds nobody, and
never did bind anybody; and that all those who pretend to act by its
authority, are really acting without any legitimate authority at all;
that, on general principles of law and reason, they are mere usurpers,
and that everybody not only has the right, but is morally bound, to
treat them as such.
If the people of this country wish to maintain such a government as
the Constitution describes, there is no reason in the world why they
should not sign the instrument itself, and thus make known their
wishes in an open, authentic manner; in such manner as the common
sense and experience of mankind have shown to be reasonable and
necessary in such cases; and in such manner as to make themselves (as
they ought to do) individually responsible for the acts of the
government. But the people have never been asked to sign it. And the
only reason why they have never been asked to sign it, has been that
it has been known that they never would sign it; that they were
neither such fools nor knaves as they must needs have been to be
willing to sign it; that (at least as it has been practically
interpreted) it is not what any sensible and honest man wants for
himself; nor such as he has any right to impose upon others. It is, to
all moral intents and purposes, as destitute of obligations as the
compacts which robbers and thieves and pirates enter into with each
other, but never sign.
If any considerable number of the people believe the Constitution to
be good, why do they not sign it themselves, and make laws for, and
administer them upon, each other; leaving all [*27] other persons (who
do not interfere with them) in peace? Until they have tried the
experiment for themselves, how can they have the face to impose the
Constitution upon, or even to recommend it to, others? Plainly the
reason for absurd and inconsistent conduct is that they want the
Constitution, not solely for any honest or legitimate use it can be of
to themselves or others, but for the dishonest and illegitimate power
it gives them over the persons and properties of others. But for this
latter reason, all their eulogiums on the Constitution, all their
exhortations, and all their expenditures of money and blood to sustain
it, would be wanting.

VIII.
The Constitution itself, then, being of no authority, on what
authority does our government practically rest? On what ground can
those who pretend to administer it, claim the right to seize men's
property, to restrain them of their natural liberty of action,
industry, and trade, and to kill all who deny their authority to
dispose of men's properties, liberties, and lives at their pleasure or
discretion?
The most they can say, in answer to this question, is, that some half,
two-thirds, or three-fourths, of the male adults of the country have a
tacit understanding that they will maintain a government under the
Constitution; that they will select, by ballot, the persons to
administer it; and that those persons who may receive a majority, or a
plurality, of their ballots, shall act as their representatives, and
administer the Constitution in their name, and by their authority.
But this tacit understanding (admitting it to exist) cannot at all
justify the conclusion drawn from it. A tacit understanding between A,
B, and C, that they will, by ballot, depute D as their agent, to
deprive me of my property, liberty, or life, cannot at all authorize D
to do so. He is none the less a robber, tyrant, and murderer, because
he claims to act as their agent, [*28] than he would be if he avowedly
acted on his own responsibility alone.
Neither am I bound to recognize him as their agent, nor can he
legitimately claim to be their agent, when he brings no written
authority from them accrediting him as such. I am under no obligation
to take his word as to who his principals may be, or whether he has
any. Bringing no credentials, I have a right to say he has no such
authority even as he claims to have: and that he is therefore
intending to rob, enslave, or murder me on his own account.
This tacit understanding, therefore, among the voters of the country,
amounts to nothing as an authority to their agents. Neither do the
ballots by which they select their agents, avail any more than does
their tacit understanding; for their ballots are given in secret, and
therefore in such a way as to avoid any personal responsibility for
the acts of their agents.
No body of men can be said to authorize a man to act as their agent,
to the injury of a third person, unless they do it in so open and
authentic a manner as to make themselves personally responsible for
his acts. None of the voters in this country appoint their political
agents in any open, authentic manner, or in any manner to make
themselves responsible for their acts. Therefore these pretended
agents cannot legitimately claim to be really agents. Somebody must be
responsible for the acts of these pretended agents; and if they cannot
show any open and authentic credentials from their principals, they
cannot, in law or reason, be said to have any principals. The maxim
applies here, that what does not appear, does not exist. If they can
show no principals, they have none.
But even these pretended agents do not themselves know who their
pretended principals are. These latter act in secret; for acting by
secret ballot is acting in secret as much as if they were to meet in
secret conclave in the darkness of the night. And they are personally
as much unknown to the agents they select, [*29] as they are to
others. No pretended agent therefore can ever know by whose ballots he
is selected, or consequently who his real principles are. Not knowing
who his principles are, he has no right to say that he has any. He
can, at most, say only that he is the agent of a secret band of
robbers and murderers, who are bound by that faith which prevails
among confederates in crime, to stand by him, if his acts, done in
their name, shall be resisted.
Men honestly engaged in attempting to establish justice in the world,
have no occasion thus to act in secret; or to appoint agents to do
acts for which they (the principals) are not willing to be
responsible.
The secret ballot makes a secret government; and a secret government
is a secret band of robbers and murderers. Open despotism is better
than this. The single despot stands out in the face of all men, and
says: I am the State: My will is law: I am your master: I take the
responsibility of my acts: The only arbiter I acknowledge is the
sword: If anyone denies my right, let him try conclusions with me.
But a secret government is little less than a government of assassins.
Under it, a man knows not who his tyrants are, until they have struck,
and perhaps not then. He may guess, beforehand, as to some of his
immediate neighbors. But he really knows nothing. The man to whom he
would most naturally fly for protection, may prove an enemy, when the
time of trial comes.
This is the kind of government we have; and it is the only one we are
likely to have, until men are ready to say: We will consent to no
Constitution, except such an one as we are neither ashamed nor afraid
to sign; and we will authorize no government to do anything in our
name which we are not willing to be personally responsible for. [*30]

IX.
What is the motive to the secret ballot? This, and only this: Like
other confederates in crime, those who use it are not friends, but
enemies; and they are afraid to be known, and to have their individual
doings known, even to each other. They can contrive to bring about a
sufficient understanding to enable them to act in concert against
other persons; but beyond this they have no confidence, and no
friendship, among themselves. In fact, they are engaged quite as much
in schemes for plundering each other, as in plundering those who are
not of them. And it is perfectly well understood among them that the
strongest party among them will, in certain contingencies, murder each
other by the hundreds of thousands (as they lately did do) to
accomplish their purposes against each other. Hence they dare not be
known, and have their individual doings known, even to each other. And
this is avowedly the only reason for the ballot: for a secret
government; a government by secret bands of robbers and murderers. And
we are insane enough to call this liberty! To be a member of this
secret band of robbers and murderers is esteemed a privilege and an
honor! Without this privilege, a man is considered a slave; but with
it a free man! With it he is considered a free man, because he has the
same power to secretly (by secret ballot) procure the robbery,
enslavement, and murder of another man, and that other man has to
procure his robbery, enslavement, and murder. And this they call equal
rights!
If any number of men, many or few, claim the right to govern the
people of this country, let them make and sign an open compact with
each other to do so. Let them thus make themselves individually known
to those whom they propose to govern. And let them thus openly take
the legitimate responsibility of their acts. How many of those who now
support the Constitution, will ever do this? How many will ever dare
openly pro- [*31] claim their right to govern? or take the legitimate
responsibility of their acts? Not one!

X.
It is obvious that, on general principles of law and reason, there
exists no such thing as a government created by, or resting upon, any
consent, compact, or agreement of "the people of the United States"
with each other; that the only visible, tangible, responsible
government that exists, is that of a few individuals only, who act in
concert, and call themselves by the several names of senators,
representatives, presidents, judges, marshals, treasurers, collectors,
generals, colonels, captains, etc., etc.
On general principles of law and reason, it is of no importance
whatever that these few individuals profess to be the agents and
representatives of "the people of the United States"; since they can
show no credentials from the people themselves; they were never
appointed as agents or representatives in any open, authentic manner;
they do not themselves know, and have no means of knowing, and cannot
prove, who their principals (as they call them) are individually; and
consequently cannot, in law or reason, be said to have any principals
at all.
It is obvious, too, that if these alleged principals ever did appoint
these pretended agents, or representatives, they appointed them
secretly (by secret ballot), and in a way to avoid all personal
responsibility for their acts; that, at most, these alleged principals
put these pretended agents forward for the most criminal purposes,
viz.: to plunder the people of their property, and restrain them of
their liberty; and that the only authority that these alleged
principals have for so doing, is simply a tacit understanding among
themselves that they will imprison, shoot, or hang every man who
resists the exactions and restraints which their agents or
representatives may impose upon them.
Thus it is obvious that the only visible, tangible government we [*32]
have is made up of these professed agents or representatives of a
secret band of robbers and murderers, who, to cover up, or gloss over,
their robberies and murders, have taken to themselves the title of
"the people of the United States"; and who, on the pretense of being
"the people of the United States," assert their right to subject to
their dominion, and to control and dispose of at their pleasure, all
property and persons found in the United States.

XI.
On general principles of law and reason, the oaths which these
pretended agents of the people take "to support the Constitution," are
of no validity or obligation. And why? For this, if for no other
reason, viz., that they are given to nobody. There is no privity (as
the lawyers say) --- that is, no mutual recognition, consent, and
agreement --- between those who take these oaths, and any other
persons.
If I go upon Boston Common, and in the presence of a hundred thousand
people, men, women and children, with whom I have no contract upon the
subject, take an oath that I will enforce upon them the laws of Moses,
of Lycurgus, of Solon, of Justinian, or of Alfred, that oath is, on
general principles of law and reason, of no obligation. It is of no
obligation, not merely because it is intrinsically a criminal one, but
also because it is given to nobody, and consequently pledges my faith
to nobody. It is merely given to the winds.
It would not alter the case at all to say that, among these hundred
thousand persons, in whose presence the oath was taken, there were
two, three, or five thousand male adults, who had secretly --- by
secret ballot, and in a way to avoid making themselves individually
known to me, or to the remainder of the hundred thousand ---
designated me as their agent to rule, control, plunder, and, if need
be, murder, these hundred thousand [*33] people. The fact that they
had designated me secretly, and in a manner to prevent my knowing them
individually, prevents all privity between them and me; and
consequently makes it impossible that there can be any contract, or
pledge of faith, on my part towards them; for it is impossible that I
can pledge my faith, in any legal sense, to a man whom I neither know,
nor have any means of knowing, individually.
So far as I am concerned, then, these two, three, or five thousand
persons are a secret band of robbers and murderers, who have secretly,
and in a way to save themselves from all responsibility for my acts,
designated me as their agent; and have, through some other agent, or
pretended agent, made their wishes known to me. But being,
nevertheless, individually unknown to me, and having no open,
authentic contract with me, my oath is, on general principles of law
and reason, of no validity as a pledge of faith to them. And being no
pledge of faith to them, it is no pledge of faith to anybody. It is
mere idle wind. At most, it is only a pledge of faith to an unknown
band of robbers and murderers, whose instrument for plundering and
murdering other people, I thus publicly confess myself to be. And it
has no other obligation than a similar oath given to any other unknown
body of pirates, robbers, and murderers. For these reasons the oaths
taken by members of Congress, "to support the Constitution," are, on
general principles of law and reason, of no validity. They are not
only criminal in themselves, and therefore void; but they are also
void for the further reason that they are given to nobody.
It cannot be said that, in any legitimate or legal sense, they are
given to "the people of the United States"; because neither the whole,
nor any large proportion of the whole, people of the United States
ever, either openly or secretly, appointed or designated these men as
their agents to carry the Constitution into effect. The great body of
the people --- that is, men, women, and children --- were never asked,
or even permitted, to signify, in any [*34] formal manner, either
openly or secretly, their choice or wish on the subject. The most that
these members of Congress can say, in favor of their appointment, is
simply this: Each one can say for himself:
I have evidence satisfactory to myself, that there exists, scattered
throughout the country, a band of men, having a tacit understanding
with each other, and calling themselves "the people of the United
States," whose general purposes are to control and plunder each other,
and all other persons in the country, and, so far as they can, even in
neighboring countries; and to kill every man who shall attempt to
defend his person and property against their schemes of plunder and
dominion. Who these men are, individually, I have no certain means of
knowing, for they sign no papers, and give no open, authentic evidence
of their individual membership. They are not known individually even
to each other. They are apparently as much afraid of being
individually known to each other, as of being known to other persons.
Hence they ordinarily have no mode either of exercising, or of making
known, their individual membership, otherwise than by giving their
votes secretly for certain agents to do their will. But although these
men are individually unknown, both to each other and to other persons,
it is generally understood in the country that none but male persons,
of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, can be members. It is also
generally understood that all male persons, born in the country,
having certain complexions, and (in some localities) certain amounts
of property, and (in certain cases) even persons of foreign birth, are
permitted to be members. But it appears that usually not more than one
half, two-thirds, or in some cases, three-fourths, of all who are thus
permitted to become members of the band, ever exercise, or
consequently prove, their actual membership, in the only mode in which
they ordinarily can exercise or prove it, viz., by giving their votes
secretly for the officers or agents of the band. The number of these
secret [*35] votes, so far as we have any account of them, varies
greatly from year to year, thus tending to prove that the band,
instead of being a permanent organization, is a merely pro tempore
affair with those who choose to act with it for the time being. The
gross number of these secret votes, or what purports to be their gross
number, in different localities, is occasionally published. Whether
these reports are accurate or not, we have no means of knowing. It is
generally supposed that great frauds are often committed in depositing
them. They are understood to be received and counted by certain men,
who are themselves appointed for that purpose by the same secret
process by which all other officers and agents of the band are
selected. According to the reports of these receivers of votes (for
whose accuracy or honesty, however, I cannot vouch), and according to
my best knowledge of the whole number of male persons "in my
district," who (it is supposed) were permitted to vote, it would
appear that one-half, two-thirds or three-fourths actually did vote.
Who the men were, individually, who cast these votes, I have no
knowledge, for the whole thing was done secretly. But of the secret
votes thus given for what they call a "member of Congress," the
receivers reported that I had a majority, or at least a larger number
than any other one person. And it is only by virtue of such a
designation that I am now here to act in concert with other persons
similarly selected in other parts of the country. It is understood
among those who sent me here, that all persons so selected, will, on
coming together at the City of Washington, take an oath in each
other's presence "to support the Constitution of the United States."
By this is meant a certain paper that was drawn up eighty years ago.
It was never signed by anybody, and apparently has no obligation, and
never had any obligation, as a contract. In fact, few persons ever
read it, and doubtless much the largest number of those who voted for
me and the others, never even saw it, or now pretend to know what it
means. Nevertheless, it is often spoken [*36] of in the country as
"the Constitution of the United States"; and for some reason or other,
the men who sent me here, seem to expect that I, and all with whom I
act, will swear to carry this Constitution into effect. I am therefore
ready to take this oath, and to co-operate with all others, similarly
selected, who are ready to take the same oath.
This is the most that any member of Congress can say in proof that he
has any constituency; that he represents anybody; that his oath "to
support the Constitution," is given to anybody, or pledges his faith
to anybody. He has no open, written, or other authentic evidence, such
as is required in all other cases, that he was ever appointed the
agent or representative of anybody. He has no written power of
attorney from any single individual. He has no such legal knowledge as
is required in all other cases, by which he can identify a single one
of those who pretend to have appointed him to represent them.
Of course his oath, professedly given to them, "to support the
Constitution," is, on general principles of law and reason, an oath
given to nobody. It pledges his faith to nobody. If he fails to fulfil
his oath, not a single person can come forward, and say to him, you
have betrayed me, or broken faith with me.
No one can come forward and say to him: I appointed you my attorney to
act for me. I required you to swear that, as my attorney, you would
support the Constitution. You promised me that you would do so; and
now you have forfeited the oath you gave to me. No single individual
can say this.
No open, avowed, or responsible association, or body of men, [*37] can
come forward and say to him: We appointed you our attorney, to act for
us. We required you to swear that, as our attorney, you would support
the Constitution. You promised us that you would do so; and now you
have forfeited the oath you gave to us.
No open, avowed, or responsible association, or body of men, can say
this to him; because there is no such association or body of men in
existence. If any one should assert that there is such an association,
let him prove, if he can, who compose it. Let him produce, if he can,
any open, written, or other authentic contract, signed or agreed to by
these men; forming themselves into an association; making themselves
known as such to the world; appointing him as their agent; and making
themselves individually, or as an association, responsible for his
acts, done by their authority. Until all this can be shown, no one can
say that, in any legitimate sense, there is any such association; or
that he is their agent; or that he ever gave his oath to them; or ever
pledged his faith to them.
On general principles of law and reason, it would be a sufficient
answer for him to say, to all individuals, and to all pretended
associations of individuals, who should accuse him of a breach of
faith to them:
I never knew you. Where is your evidence that you, either individually
or collectively, ever appointed me your attorney? that you ever
required me to swear to you, that, as your attorney, I would support
the Constitution? or that I have now broken any faith that I ever
pledged to you? You may, or you may not, be members of that secret
band of robbers and murderers, who act in secret; appoint their agents
by a secret ballot; who keep themselves individually unknown even to
the agents they thus appoint; and who, therefore, cannot claim that
they have any agents; or that any of their pretended agents ever gave
his oath, or pledged his faith to them. I repudiate you altogether. My
oath was given to others, with whom you have nothing to do; or it was
idle wind, given only to the idle winds. Begone!

XII.
For the same reasons, the oaths of all the other pretended agents of
this secret band of robbers and murderers are, on [*38] general
principles of law and reason, equally destitute of obligation. They
are given to nobody; but only to the winds.
The oaths of the tax-gatherers and treasurers of the band, are, on
general principles of law and reason, of no validity. If any
tax-gatherer, for example, should put the money he receives into his
own pocket, and refuse to part with it, the members of this band could
not say to him: You collected that money as our agent, and for our
uses; and you swore to pay it over to us, or to those we should
appoint to receive it. You have betrayed us, and broken faith with us.
It would be a sufficient answer for him to say to them:
I never knew you. You never made yourselves individually known to me.
I never game by oath to you, as individuals. You may, or you may not,
be members of that secret band, who appoint agents to rob and murder
other people; but who are cautious not to make themselves individually
known, either to such agents, or to those whom their agents are
commissioned to rob. If you are members of that band, you have given
me no proof that you ever commissioned me to rob others for your
benefit. I never knew you, as individuals, and of course never
promised you that I would pay over to you the proceeds of my
robberies. I committed my robberies on my own account, and for my own
profit. If you thought I was fool enough to allow you to keep
yourselves concealed, and use me as your tool for robbing other
persons; or that I would take all the personal risk of the robberies,
and pay over the proceeds to you, you were particularly simple. As I
took all the risk of my robberies, I propose to take all the profits.
Begone! You are fools, as well as villains. If I gave my oath to
anybody, I gave it to other persons than you. But I really gave it to
nobody. I only gave it to the winds. It answered my purposes at the
time. It enabled me to get the money I was after, and now I propose to
keep it. If you expected me to pay it over to you, you relied only
upon that honor [*39] that is said to prevail among thieves. You now
understand that that is a very poor reliance. I trust you may become
wise enough to never rely upon it again. If I have any duty in the
matter, it is to give back the money to those from whom I took it; not
to pay it over to villains such as you.

XIII.
On general principles of law and reason, the oaths which foreigners
take, on coming here, and being "naturalized" (as it is called), are
of no validity. They are necessarily given to nobody; because there is
no open, authentic association, to which they can join themselves; or
to whom, as individuals, they can pledge their faith. No such
association, or organization, as "the people of the United States,"
having ever been formed by any open, written, authentic, or voluntary
contract, there is, on general principles of law and reason, no such
association, or organization, in existence. And all oaths that purport
to be given to such an association are necessarily given only to the
winds. They cannot be said to be given to any man, or body of men, as
individuals, because no man, or body of men, can come forward with any
proof that the oaths were given to them, as individuals, or to any
association of which they are members. To say that there is a tacit
understanding among a portion of the male adults of the country, that
they will call themselves "the people of the United States," and that
they will act in concert in subjecting the remainder of the people of
the United States to their dominion; but that they will keep
themselves personally concealed by doing all their acts secretly, is
wholly insufficient, on general principles of law and reason, to prove
the existence of any such association, or organization, as "the people
of the United States"; or consequently to prove that the oaths of
foreigners were given to any such association. [*40]

XIV.
On general principles of law and reason, all the oaths which, since
the war, have been given by Southern men, that they will obey the laws
of Congress, support the Union, and the like, are of no validity. Such
oaths are invalid, not only because they were extorted by military
power, and threats of confiscation, and because they are in
contravention of men's natural right to do as they please about
supporting the government, but also because they were given to nobody.
They were nominally given to "the United States." But being nominally
given to "the United States," they were necessarily given to nobody,
because, on general principles of law and reason, there were no
"United States," to whom the oaths could be given. That is to say,
there was no open, authentic, avowed, legitimate association,
corporation, or body of men, known as "the United States," or as "the
people of the United States," to whom the oaths could have been given.
If anybody says there was such a corporation, let him state who were
the individuals that composed it, and how and when they became a
corporation. Were Mr. A, Mr. B, and Mr. C members of it? If so, where
are their signatures? Where the evidence of their membership? Where
the record? Where the open, authentic proof? There is none. Therefore,
in law and reason, there was no such corporation.
On general principles of law and reason, every corporation,
association, or organized body of men, having a legitimate corporate
existence, and legitimate corporate rights, must consist of certain
known individuals, who can prove, by legitimate and reasonable
evidence, their membership. But nothing of this kind can be proved in
regard to the corporation, or body of men, who call themselves "the
United States." Not a man of them, in all the Northern States, can
prove by any legitimate evidence, such as is required to prove
membership in other legal corporations, that he himself, or any other
man whom he can name, is [*41] a member of any corporation or
association called "the United States," or "the people of the United
States," or, consequently, that there is any such corporation. And
since no such corporation can be proved to exist, it cannot of course
be proved that the oaths of Southern men were given to any such
corporation. The most that can be claimed is that the oaths were given
to a secret band of robbers and murderers, who called themselves "the
United States," and extorted those oaths. But that is certainly not
enough to prove that the oaths are of any obligation.

XV.
On general principles of law and reason, the oaths of soldiers, that
they will serve a given number of years, that they will obey the the
orders of their superior officers, that they will bear true allegiance
to the government, and so forth, are of no obligation. Independently
of the criminality of an oath, that, for a given number of years, he
will kill all whom he may be commanded to kill, without exercising his
own judgment or conscience as to the justice or necessity of such
killing, there is this further reason why a soldier's oath is of no
obligation, viz., that, like all the other oaths that have now been
mentioned, it is given to nobody. There being, in no legitimate sense,
any such corporation, or nation, as "the United States," nor,
consequently, in any legitimate sense, any such government as "the
government of the United States," a soldier's oath given to, or
contract made with, such a nation or government, is necessarily an
oath given to, or contract made with, nobody. Consequently such an
oath or contract can be of no obligation.

XVI.
On general principles of law and reason, the treaties, so called,
which purport to be entered into with other nations, [*42] by persons
calling themselves ambassadors, secretaries, presidents, and senators
of the United States, in the name, and in behalf, of "the people of
the United States," are of no validity. These so-called ambassadors,
secretaries, presidents, and senators, who claim to be the agents of
"the people of the United States" for making these treaties, can show
no open, written, or other authentic evidence that either the whole
"people of the United States," or any other open, avowed, responsible
body of men, calling themselves by that name, ever authorized these
pretended ambassadors and others to make treaties in the name of, or
binding upon any one of, "the people of the United States," or any
other open, avowed, responsible body of men, calling themselves by
that name, ever authorized these pretended ambassadors, secretaries,
and others, in their name and behalf, to recognize certain other
persons, calling themselves emperors, kings, queens, and the like, as
the rightful rulers, sovereigns, masters, or representatives of the
different peoples whom they assume to govern, to represent, and to
bind.
The "nations," as they are called, with whom our pretended
ambassadors, secretaries, presidents, and senators profess to make
treaties, are as much myths as our own. On general principles of law
and reason, there are no such "nations." That is to say, neither the
whole people of England, for example, nor any open, avowed,
responsible body of men, calling themselves by that name, ever, by any
open, written, or other authentic contract with each other, formed
themselves into any bona fide, legitimate association or organization,
or authorized any king, queen, or other representative to make
treaties in their name, or to bind them, either individually, or as an
association, by such treaties.
Our pretended treaties, then, being made with no legitimate or bona
fide nations, or representatives of nations, and being [*43] made, on
our part, by persons who have no legitimate authority to act for us,
have intrinsically no more validity than a pretended treaty made by
the Man in the Moon with the king of the Pleiades.

XVII.
On general principles of law and reason, debts contracted in the name
of "the United States," or of "the people of the United States," are
of no validity. It is utterly absurd to pretend that debts to the
amount of twenty-five hundred millions of dollars are binding upon
thirty-five or forty millions of people, when there is not a particle
of legitimate evidence --- such as would be required to prove a
private debt --- that can be produced against any one of them, that
either he, or his properly authorized attorney, ever contracted to pay
one cent.
Certainly, neither the whole people of the United States, nor any
number of them, ever separately or individually contracted to pay a
cent of these debts.
Certainly, also, neither the whole people of the United States, nor
any number of them, every, by any open, written, or other authentic
and voluntary contract, united themselves as a firm, corporation, or
association, by the name of "the United States," or "the people of the
United States," and authorized their agents to contract debts in their
name.
Certainly, too, there is in existence no such firm, corporation, or
association as "the United States," or "the people of the United
States," formed by any open, written, or other authentic and voluntary
contract, and having corporate property with which to pay these debts.
How, then, is it possible, on any general principle of law or reason,
that debts that are binding upon nobody individually, can be binding
upon forty millions of people collectively, when, on general and
legitimate principles of law and reason, these [*43] forty millions of
people neither have, nor ever had, any corporate property? never made
any corporate or individual contract? and neither have, nor ever had,
any corporate existence?
Who, then, created these debts, in the name of "the United States"?
Why, at most, only a few persons, calling themselves "members of
Congress," etc., who pretended to represent "the people of the United
States," but who really represented only a secret band of robbers and
murderers, who wanted money to carry on the robberies and murders in
which they were then engaged; and who intended to extort from the
future people of the United States, by robbery and threats of murder
(and real murder, if that should prove necessary), the means to pay
these debts.
This band of robbers and murderers, who were the real principals in
contracting these debts, is a secret one, because its members have
never entered into any open, written, avowed, or authentic contract,
by which they may be individually known to the world, or even to each
other. Their real or pretended representatives, who contracted these
debts in their name, were selected (if selected at all) for that
purpose secretly (by secret ballot), and in a way to furnish evidence
against none of the principals individually; and these principals were
really known individually neither to their pretended representatives
who contracted these debts in their behalf, nor to those who lent the
money. The money, therefore, was all borrowed and lent in the dark;
that is, by men who did not see each other's faces, or know each
other's names; who could not then, and cannot now, identify each other
as principals in the transactions; and who consequently can prove no
contract with each other.
Furthermore, the money was all lent and borrowed for criminal
purposes; that is, for purposes of robbery and murder; and for this
reason the contracts were all intrinsically void; and would have been
so, even though the real parties, borrowers and [*45] lenders, had
come face to face, and made their contracts openly, in their own
proper names.
Furthermore, this secret band of robbers and murderers, who were the
real borrowers of this money, having no legitimate corporate
existence, have no corporate property with which to pay these debts.
They do indeed pretend to own large tracts of wild lands, lying
between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and between the Gulf of
Mexico and the North Pole. But, on general principles of law and
reason, they might as well pretend to own the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans themselves; or the atmosphere and the sunlight; and to hold
them, and dispose of them, for the payment of these debts.
Having no corporate property with which to pay what purports to be
their corporate debts, this secret band of robbers and murderers are
really bankrupt. They have nothing to pay with. In fact, they do not
propose to pay their debts otherwise than from the proceeds of their
future robberies and murders. These are confessedly their sole
reliance; and were known to be such by the lenders of the money, at
the time the money was lent. And it was, therefore, virtually a part
of the contract, that the money should be repaid only from the
proceeds of these future robberies and murders. For this reason, if
for no other, the contracts were void from the beginning.
In fact, these apparently two classes, borrowers and lenders, were
really one and the same class. They borrowed and lent money from and
to themselves. They themselves were not only part and parcel, but the
very life and soul, of this secret band of robbers and murderers, who
borrowed and spent the money. Individually they furnished money for a
common enterprise; taking, in return, what purported to be corporate
promises for individual loans. The only excuse they had for taking
these so-called corporate promises of, for individual loans by, the
same parties, was that they might have some apparent excuse for the
future robberies of the band (that is, to pay the debts of [*46] the
corporation), and that they might also know what shares they were to
be respectively entitled to out of the proceeds of their future
robberies.
Finally, if these debts had been created for the most innocent and
honest purposes, and in the most open and honest manner, by the real
parties to the contracts, these parties could thereby have bound
nobody but themselves, and no property but their own. They could have
bound nobody that should have come after them, and no property
subsequently created by, or belonging to, other persons.

XVIII.
The Constitution having never been signed by anybody; and there being
no other open, written, or authentic contract between any parties
whatever, by virtue of which the United States government, so called,
is maintained; and it being well known that none but male persons, of
twenty-one years of age and upwards, are allowed any voice in the
government; and it being also well known that a large number of these
adult persons seldom or never vote at all; and that all those who do
vote, do so secretly (by secret ballot), and in a way to prevent their
individual votes being known, either to the world, or even to each
other; and consequently in a way to make no one openly responsible for
the acts of their agents, or representatives, --- all these things
being known, the questions arise: Who compose the real governing power
in the country? Who are the men, the responsible men, who rob us of
our property? Restrain us of our liberty? Subject us to their
arbitrary dominion? And devastate our homes, and shoot us down by the
hundreds of thousands, if we resist? How shall we find these men? How
shall we know them from others? How shall we defend ourselves and our
property against them? Who, of our neighbors, are members of this
secret band of robbers and murderers? How [*47] can we know which are
their houses, that we may burn or demolish them? Which their property,
that we may destroy it? Which their persons, that we may kill them,
and rid the world and ourselves of such tyrants and monsters?
These are questions that must be answered, before men can be free;
before they can protect themselves against this secret band of robbers
and murderers, who now plunder, enslave, and destroy them.
The answer to these questions is, that only those who have the will
and power to shoot down their fellow men, are the real rulers in this,
as in all other (so-called) civilized countries; for by no others will
civilized men be robbed, or enslaved.
Among savages, mere physical strength, on the part of one man, may
enable him to rob, enslave, or kill another man. Among barbarians,
mere physical strength, on the part of a body of men, disciplined, and
acting in concert, though with very little money or other wealth, may,
under some circumstances, enable them to rob, enslave, or kill another
body of men, as numerous, or perhaps even more numerous, than
themselves. And among both savages and barbarians, mere want may
sometimes compel one man to sell himself as a slave to another. But
with (so-called) civilized peoples, among whom knowledge, wealth, and
the means of acting in concert, have become diffused; and who have
invented such weapons and other means of defense as to render mere
physical strength of less importance; and by whom soldiers in any
requisite number, and other instrumentalities of war in any requisite
amount, can always be had for money, the question of war, and
consequently the question of power, is little else than a mere
question of money. As a necessary consequence, those who stand ready
to furnish this money, are the real rulers. It is so in Europe, and it
is so in this country.
In Europe, the nominal rulers, the emperors and kings and parliaments,
are anything but the real rulers of their respective countries. They
are little or nothing else than mere tools, em- [*48] ployed by the
wealthy to rob, enslave, and (if need be) murder those who have less
wealth, or none at all.
The Rothschilds, and that class of money-lenders of whom they are the
representatives and agents --- men who never think of lending a
shilling to their next-door neighbors, for purposes of honest
industry, unless upon the most ample security, and at the highest rate
of interest --- stand ready, at all times, to lend money in unlimited
amounts to those robbers and murderers, who call themselves
governments, to be expended in shooting down those who do not submit
quietly to being robbed and enslaved.
They lend their money in this manner, knowing that it is to be
expended in murdering their fellow men, for simply seeking their
liberty and their rights; knowing also that neither the interest nor
the principal will ever be paid, except as it will be extorted under
terror of the repetition of such murders as those for which the money
lent is to be expended.
These money-lenders, the Rothschilds, for example, say to themselves:
If we lend a hundred millions sterling to the queen and parliament of
England, it will enable them to murder twenty, fifty, or a hundred
thousand people in England, Ireland, or India; and the terror inspired
by such wholesale slaughter, will enable them to keep the whole people
of those countries in subjection for twenty, or perhaps fifty, years
to come; to control all their trade and industry; and to extort from
them large amounts of money, under the name of taxes; and from the
wealth thus extorted from them, they (the queen and parliament) can
afford to pay us a higher rate of interest for our money than we can
get in any other way. Or, if we lend this sum to the emperor of
Austria, it will enable him to murder so many of his people as to
strike terror into the rest, and thus enable him to keep them in
subjection, and extort money from them, for twenty or fifty years to
come. And they say the same in regard to the emperor of Russia, the
king of Prussia, the emperor of France, [*49] or any other ruler, so
called, who, in their judgment, will be able, by murdering a
reasonable portion of his people, to keep the rest in subjection, and
extort money from them, for a long time to come, to pay the interest
and the principal of the money lent him.
And why are these men so ready to lend money for murdering their
fellow men? Soley for this reason, viz., that such loans are
considered better investments than loans for purposes of honest
industry. They pay higher rates of interest; and it is less trouble to
look after them. This is the whole matter.
The question of making these loans is, with these lenders, a mere
question of pecuniary profit. They lend money to be expended in
robbing, enslaving, and murdering their fellow men, solely because, on
the whole, such loans pay better than any others. They are no
respecters of persons, no superstitious fools, that reverence
monarchs. They care no more for a king, or an emperor, than they do
for a beggar, except as he is a better customer, and can pay them
better interest for their money. If they doubt his ability to make his
murders successful for maintaining his power, and thus extorting money
from his people in future, they dismiss him unceremoniously as they
would dismiss any other hopeless bankrupt, who should want to borrow
money to save himself from open insolvency.
When these great lenders of blood-money, like the Rothschilds, have
loaned vast sums in this way, for purposes of murder, to an emperor or
a king, they sell out the bonds taken by them, in small amounts, to
anybody, and everybody, who are disposed to buy them at satisfactory
prices, to hold as investments. They (the Rothschilds) thus soon get
back their money, with great profits; and are now ready to lend money
in the same way again to any other robber and murderer, called an
emperor or king, who, they think, is likely to be successful in his
robberies and murders, and able to pay a good price for the money
necessary to carry them on. [*50]
This business of lending blood-money is one of the most thoroughly
sordid, cold-blooded, and criminal that was ever carried on, to any
considerable extent, amongst human beings. It is like lending money to
slave traders, or to common robbers and pirates, to be repaid out of
their plunder. And the men who loan money to governments, so called,
for the purpose of enabling the latter to rob, enslave, and murder
their people, are among the greatest villains that the world has ever
seen. And they as much deserve to be hunted and killed (if they cannot
otherwise be got rid of) as any slave traders, robbers, or pirates
that ever lived.
When these emperors and kings, so-called, have obtained their loans,
they proceed to hire and train immense numbers of professional
murderers, called soldiers, and employ them in shooting down all who
resist their demands for money. In fact, most of them keep large
bodies of these murderers constantly in their service, as their only
means of enforcing their extortions. There are now, I think, four or
five millions of these professional murderers constantly employed by
the so-called sovereigns of Europe. The enslaved people are, of
course, forced to support and pay all these murderers, as well as to
submit to all the other extortions which these murderers are employed
to enforce.
It is only in this way that most of the so-called governments of
Europe are maintained. These so-called governments are in reality only
great bands of robbers and murderers, organized, disciplined, and
constantly on the alert. And the so-called sovereigns, in these
different governments, are simply the heads, or chiefs, of different
bands of robbers and murderers. And these heads or chiefs are
dependent upon the lenders of blood-money for the means to carry on
their robberies and murders. They could not sustain themselves a
moment but for the loans made to them by these blood-money
loan-mongers. And their first care is to maintain their credit with
them; for they know [*51] their end is come, the instant their credit
with them fails. Consequently the first proceeds of their extortions
are scrupulously applied to the payment of the interest on their
loans.
In addition to paying the interest on their bonds, they perhaps grant
to the holders of them great monopolies in banking, like the Banks of
England, of France, and of Vienna; with the agreement that these banks
shall furnish money whenever, in sudden emergencies, it may be
necessary to shoot down more of their people. Perhaps also, by means
of tariffs on competing imports, they give great monopolies to certain
branches of industry, in which these lenders of blood-money are
engaged. They also, by unequal taxation, exempt wholly or partially
the property of these loan-mongers, and throw corresponding burdens
upon those who are too poor and weak to resist.
Thus it is evident that all these men, who call themselves by the
high-sounding names of Emperors, Kings, Sovereigns, Monarchs, Most
Christian Majesties, Most Catholic Majesties, High Mightinesses, Most
Serene and Potent Princes, and the like, and who claim to rule "by the
grace of God," by "Divine Right" --- that is, by special authority
from Heaven --- are intrinsically not only the merest miscreants and
wretches, engaged solely in plundering, enslaving, and murdering their
fellow men, but that they are also the merest hangers on, the servile,
obsequious, fawning dependents and tools of these blood-money
loan-mongers, on whom they rely for the means to carry on their
crimes. These loan-mongers, like the Rothschilds, laugh in their
sleeves, and say to themselves: These despicable creatures, who call
themselves emperors, and kings, and majesties, and most serene and
potent princes; who profess to wear crowns, and sit on thrones; who
deck themselves with ribbons, and feathers, and jewels; and surround
themselves with hired flatterers and lickspittles; and whom we suffer
to strut around, and palm themselves off, upon fools and slaves, as
sovereigns and lawgivers specially appointed by Almighty God; and to
hold them- [*52] selves out as the sole fountains of honors, and
dignities, and wealth, and power --- all these miscreants and
imposters know that we make them, and use them; that in us they live,
move, and have their being; that we require them (as the price of
their positions) to take upon themselves all the labor, all the
danger, and all the odium of all the crimes they commit for our
profit; and that we will unmake them, strip them of their gewgaws, and
send them out into the world as beggars, or give them over to the
vengeance of the people they have enslaved, the moment they refuse to
commit any crime we require of them, or to pay over to us such share
of the proceeds of their robberies as we see fit to demand.

XIX.
Now, what is true in Europe, is substantially true in this country.
The difference is the immaterial one, that, in this country, there is
no visible, permanent head, or chief, of these robbers and murderers
who call themselves "the government." That is to say, there is no one
man, who calls himself the state, or even emperor, king, or sovereign;
no one who claims that he and his children rule "by the Grace of God,"
by "Divine Right," or by special appointment from Heaven. There are
only certain men, who call themselves presidents, senators, and
representatives, and claim to be the authorized agents, for the time
being, or for certain short periods, of all "the people of the United
States"; but who can show no credentials, or powers of attorney, or
any other open, authentic evidence that they are so; and who
notoriously are not so; but are really only the agents of a secret
band of robbers and murderers, whom they themselves do not know, and
have no means of knowing, individually; but who, they trust, will
openly or secretly, when the crisis comes, sustain them in all their
usurpations and crimes.
What is important to be noticed is, that these so-called presidents,
senators, and representatives, these pretended agents of all "the
people of the United States," the moment their exactions [*53] meet
with any formidable resistance from any portion of "the people"
themselves, are obliged, like their co-robbers and murderers in
Europe, to fly at once to the lenders of blood money, for the means to
sustain their power. And they borrow their money on the same
principle, and for the same purpose, viz., to be expended in shooting
down all those "people of the United States" --- their own
constituents and principals, as they profess to call them --- who
resist the robberies and enslavements which these borrowers of the
money are practising upon them. And they expect to repay the loans, if
at all, only from the proceeds of the future robberies, which they
anticipate it will be easy for them and their successors to perpetrate
through a long series of years, upon their pretended principals, if
they can but shoot down now some hundreds of thousands of them, and
thus strike terror into the rest.
Perhaps the facts were never made more evident, in any country on the
globe, than in our own, that these soulless blood-money loan-mongers
are the real rulers; that they rule from the most sordid and mercenary
motives; that the ostensible government, the presidents, senators, and
representatives, so called, are merely their tools; and that no ideas
of, or regard for, justice or liberty had anything to do in inducing
them to lend their money for the war. In proof of all this, look at
the following facts.
Nearly a hundred years ago we professed to have got rid of all that
religious superstition, inculcated by a servile and corrupt priesthood
in Europe, that rulers, so called, derived their authority directly
from Heaven; and that it was consequently a religious duty on the part
of the people to obey them. We professed long ago to have learned that
governments could rightfully exist only by the free will, and on the
voluntary support, of those who might choose to sustain them. We all
professed to have known long ago, that the only legitimate objects of
government were the maintenance of liberty and justice equally for
all. All this [*54] we had professed for nearly a hundred years. And
we professed to look with pity and contempt upon those ignorant,
superstitious, and enslaved peoples of Europe, who were so easily kept
in subjection by the frauds and force of priests and kings.
Notwithstanding all this, that we had learned, and known, and
professed, for nearly a century, these lenders of blood money had, for
a long series of years previous to the war, been the willing
accomplices of the slave-holders in perverting the government from the
purposes of liberty and justice, to the greatest of crimes. They had
been such accomplices for a purely pecuniary consideration, to wit, a
control of the markets in the South; in other words, the privilege of
holding the slave-holders themselves in industrial and commercial
subjection to the manufacturers and merchants of the North (who
afterwards furnished the money for the war). And these Northern
merchants and manufacturers, these lenders of blood-money, were
willing to continue to be the accomplices of the slave-holders in the
future, for the same pecuniary considerations. But the slave-holders,
either doubting the fidelity of their Northern allies, or feeling
themselves strong enough to keep their slaves in subjection without
Northern assistance, would no longer pay the price which these
Northern men demanded. And it was to enforce this price in the future
--- that is, to monopolize the Southern markets, to maintain their
industrial and commercial control over the South --- that these
Northern manufacturers and merchants lent some of the profits of their
former monopolies for the war, in order to secure to themselves the
same, or greater, monopolies in the future. These --- and not any love
of liberty or justice --- were the motives on which the money for the
war was lent by the North. In short, the North said to the
slave-holders: If you will not pay us our price (give us control of
your markets) for our assistance against your slaves, we will secure
the same price (keep control of your markets) by helping your slaves
against you, and using them as our tools for main- [*55] taining
dominion over you; for the control of your markets we will have,
whether the tools we use for that purpose be black or white, and be
the cost, in blood and money, what it may.
On this principle, and from this motive, and not from any love of
liberty, or justice, the money was lent in enormous amounts, and at
enormous rates of interest. And it was only by means of these loans
that the objects of the war were accomplished.
And now these lenders of blood-money demand their pay; and the
government, so called, becomes their tool, their servile, slavish,
villanous tool, to extort it from the labor of the enslaved people
both of the North and South. It is to be extorted by every form of
direct, and indirect, and unequal taxation. Not only the nominal debt
and interest --- enormous as the latter was --- are to be paid in
full; but these holders of the debt are to be paid still further ---
and perhaps doubly, triply, or quadruply paid --- by such tariffs on
imports as will enable our home manufacturers to realize enormous
prices for their commodities; also by such monopolies in banking as
will enable them to keep control of, and thus enslave and plunder, the
industry and trade of the great body of the Northern people
themselves. In short, the industrial and commercial slavery of the
great body of the people, North and South, black and white, is the
price which these lenders of blood money demand, and insist upon, and
are determined to secure, in return for the money lent for the war.
This programme having been fully arranged and systematized, they put
their sword into the hands of the chief murderer of the war, and
charge him to carry their scheme into effect. And now he, speaking as
their organ, says, "Let us have peace."
The meaning of this is: Submit quietly to all the robbery and slavery
we have arranged for you, and you can have "peace." But in case you
resist, the same lenders of blood-money, who furnished the means to
subdue the South, will furnish the means again to subdue you. [*56]
These are the terms on which alone this government, or, with few
exceptions, any other, ever gives "peace" to its people.
The whole affair, on the part of those who furnished the money, has
been, and now is, a deliberate scheme of robbery and murder; not
merely to monopolize the markets of the South, but also to monopolize
the currency, and thus control the industry and trade, and thus
plunder and enslave the laborers, of both North and South. And
Congress and the president are today the merest tools for these
purposes. They are obliged to be, for they know that their own power,
as rulers, so-called, is at an end, the moment their credit with the
blood-money loan-mongers fails. They are like a bankrupt in the hands
of an extortioner. They dare not say nay to any demand made upon them.
And to hide at once, if possible, both their servility and crimes,
they attempt to divert public attention, by crying out that they have
"Abolished Slavery!" That they have "Saved the Country!" That they
have "Preserved our Glorious Union!" and that, in now paying the
"National Debt," as they call it (as if the people themselves, all of
them who are to be taxed for its payment, had really and voluntarily
joined in contracting it), they are simply "Maintaining the National
Honor!"
By "maintaining the national honor," they mean simply that they
themselves, open robbers and murderers, assume to be the nation, and
will keep faith with those who lend them the money necessary to enable
them to crush the great body of the people under their feet; and will
faithfully appropriate, from the proceeds of their future robberies
and murders, enough to pay all their loans, principal and interest.
The pretense that the "abolition of slavery" was either a motive or
justification for the war, is a fraud of the same character with that
of "maintaining the national honor." Who, but such usurpers, robbers,
and murderers as they, ever established slavery? Or what government,
except one resting upon [*57] the sword, like the one we now have, was
ever capable of maintaining slavery? And why did these men abolish
slavery? Not from any love of liberty in general --- not as an act of
justice to the black man himself, but only "as a war measure," and
because they wanted his assistance, and that of his friends, in
carrying on the war they had undertaken for maintaining and
intensifying that political, commercial, and industrial slavery, to
which they have subjected the great body of the people, both black and
white. And yet these imposters now cry out that they have abolished
the chattel slavery of the black man --- although that was not the
motive of the war --- as if they thought they could thereby conceal,
atone for, or justify that other slavery which they were fighting to
perpetuate, and to render more rigorous and inexorable than it ever
was before. There was no difference of principle --- but only of
degree --- between the slavery they boast they have abolished, and the
slavery they were fighting to preserve; for all restraints upon men's
natural liberty, not necessary for the simple maintenance of justice,
are of the nature of slavery, and differ from each other only in
degree.
If their object had really been to abolish slavery, or maintain
liberty or justice generally, they had only to say: All, whether white
or black, who want the protection of this government, shall have it;
and all who do not want it, will be left in peace, so long as they
leave us in peace. Had they said this, slavery would necessarily have
been abolished at once; the war would have been saved; and a thousand
times nobler union than we have ever had would have been the result.
It would have been a voluntary union of free men; such a union as will
one day exist among all men, the world over, if the several nations,
so called, shall ever get rid of the usurpers, robbers, and murderers,
called governments, that now plunder, enslave, and destroy them.
Still another of the frauds of these men is, that they are now [*58]
establishing, and that the war was designed to establish, "a
government of consent." The only idea they have ever manifested as to
what is a government of consent, is this --- that it is one to which
everybody must consent, or be shot. This idea was the dominant one on
which the war was carried on; and it is the dominant one, now that we
have got what is called "peace."
Their pretenses that they have "Saved the Country," and "Preserved our
Glorious Union," are frauds like all the rest of their pretenses. By
them they mean simply that they have subjugated, and maintained their
power over, an unwilling people. This they call "Saving the Country";
as if an enslaved and subjugated people --- or as if any people kept
in subjection by the sword (as it is intended that all of us shall be
hereafter) --- could be said to have any country. This, too, they call
"Preserving our Glorious Union"; as if there could be said to be any
Union, glorious or inglorious, that was not voluntary. Or as if there
could be said to be any union between masters and slaves; between
those who conquer, and those who are subjugated. All these cries of
having "abolished slavery," of having "saved the country," of having
"preserved the union," of establishing "a government of consent," and
of "maintaining the national honor," are all gross, shameless,
transparent cheats --- so transparent that they ought to deceive no
one --- when uttered as justifications for the war, or for the
government that has succeeded the war, or for now compelling the
people to pay the cost of the war, or for compelling anybody to
support a government that he does not want.
The lesson taught by all these facts is this: As long as mankind
continue to pay "National Debts," so-called --- that is, so long as
they are such dupes and cowards as to pay for being cheated,
plundered, enslaved, and murdered --- so long there will be enough to
lend the money for those purposes; and with that [*59] money a plenty
of tools, called soldiers, can be hired to keep them in subjection.
But when they refuse any longer to pay for being thus cheated,
plundered, enslaved, and murdered, they will cease to have cheats, and
usurpers, and robbers, and murderers and blood-money loan-mongers for
masters.

APPENDIX.
Inasmuch as the Constitution was never signed, nor agreed to, by
anybody, as a contract, and therefore never bound anybody, and is now
binding upon nobody; and is, moreover, such an one as no people can
ever hereafter be expected to consent to, except as they may be forced
to do so at the point of the bayonet, it is perhaps of no importance
what its true legal meaning, as a contract, is. Nevertheless, the
writer thinks it proper to say that, in his opinion, the Constitution
is no such instrument as it has generally been assumed to be; but that
by false interpretations, and naked usurpations, the government has
been made in practice a very widely, and almost wholly, different
thing from what the Constitution itself purports to authorize. He has
heretofore written much, and could write much more, to prove that such
is the truth. But whether the Constitution really be one thing, or
another, this much is certain --- that it has either authorized such a
government as we have had, or has been powerless to prevent it. In
either case, it is unfit to exist.
NOTES
<fn1> See "No Treason, No. 2" pages 5 and 6.
<fn2> Suppose it be "the best government on earth," does that prove
its own goodness, or only the badness of all other governments?
<fn3> The very men who drafted it, never signed it in any way to bind
themselves by it, as a contract. And not one of them probably ever
would have signed it in any way to bind himself by it, as a contract.
<fn4> I have personally examined the statute books of the following
States, viz.: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama,
Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Michagan, Indiana, Illinois,
Wisconsin, Texas, Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Kansas, Nveada, California, and Oregon, and find that in all these
States the English statute has been re-enacted, sometimes with
modifications, but generally enlarging its operations, and is now in
force.
The following are some of the provisions of the Massachusetts statute:
"No action shall be brought in any of the following cases, that is to
say:
. . . .
"To charge a person upon a special promise to answer for a debt,
default, or misdoings of another: . . . .
"Upon a contract for the sale of lands, tenements, hereditaments, or
of any interest in, or concerning them; or
"Upon an agreement that is not to be performed within one year from
the writing thereof:
"Unless the promise, contract, or agreement, upon which such action is
broughtm or some memorandum or note thereof, is in writing, and signed
by the party to be charged therewith, or by some person thereunto by
him lawfully authorized: . . . .
"No contract for the sale of goods, wares, or merchandise, for the
price of fifty dollars or more, shall be good and valid, unless the
purchaser accepts and receives part of the goods so sold, or gives
something in earnest to bind the bargain, or in part payment; or
unless some note or memorandum in writing of the bargain is made and
signed by the party to be charged thereby, or by some person thereunto
by him lawfully authorized."
<fn5>And this two-thirds vote may be but two-thirds of a quorum ---
that is two-thirds of a majority --- instead of two-thirds of the
whole.
<fn6> Of what appreciable value is it to any man, as an individual,
that he is allowed a voice in choosing these public masters? His voice
is only one of several millions.