CIA Pays Foreign Journalists To Write What CIA Wants, ALL THE TIME - Former CIA Director William Colby

[FBInCIAnNSATerroristSlayer]

EVERY WORD and EVERY SENTENCE you "hear, read, watch", every day on BBC
CNN Fox ABC NBC CBS etc about EVERYTHING "EXCEPT" gossipy social
policies of abortions, LGBTQ shit and sexual perversions is
"DISINFORMATION" injected into your brains by the EVIL CIA MI6 NSA MI5
ASIS ASIO Psychopaths.


EVERY WORD.

NO EXCEPTIONS.

I am trying to EDUCATE you ALL about things I knew as a 21 year STEALTH
TORTURE VICTIM of the MOST EVIL Shadow US Govt CIA NSA FBI DHS
Psychopaths with Mind Control, Directed Energy Weapons and EVIL AI/ALI.

I will expand on what that EVIL ALI is, soon.


Please CREATE A FILTER around your brain and STOP believing ANYTHING on
your TV about Wars, Foreign Policy, Business Decisions etc.


Former CIA Director William Colby himself publicly said CIA PAYS foreign
journalists TO WRITE whatever CIA wants, ALL THE FUCKING TIME.



William E. Colby, CIA Director

Asked in an interview last year whether the C.I.A. had ever told foreign
journalists, working as paid agents, what to write, he replied, ‘'Oh,
sure, ALL THE TIME.”



I sincerely hope western whites ZOOM OUT, take a deep breath,
introspect, STUDY and ANALYZE EVIL Western Government Psychopaths.


Your EVIL Govts constantly brainwash you 24x7 with COVERTLY CIA MI6
CONTROLLED western media that WEST is "ANGELIC", and REST OF THE WORLD
is "EVIL", so your minds are always FOCUSED on the rest of the world BUT
NOT your own EVIL Government PSYCHOPATHS who are STEALTHILY implementing
DYSTOPIC STASI "NEURALLY ENSLAVED societies" where every human is
REMOTELY CONTROLLED.


If you know what I know about YOUR EVIL GOVT PSYCHOPATHS, you will PACK
UP YOUR BAGS and take the very next flight out of USA UK Aus Can NZ and
seek ASYLUM in Russia and China.

I am telling you 100% TRUTH.


ONLY Russia and China can help me and HELP YOU ALL.




======================================================================


The C.LA.'s 3‐Decade Effort To Mold the World's Views

https://www.nytimes.com/1977/12/25/archives/the-cias-3decade-effort-to-mold-the-worlds-views-agency-network.html

Dec. 25, 1977


For most of the three decades of its existence, the Central Intelligence
Agency has been engaged in an unremitting, though largely unrecognized,
effort to shape foreign opinion in support of American policy abroad.

Although until recently the C.I.A. counted a number of American
journalists among its paid agents, with a few notable exceptions they do
not appear to

C.I.A.: Secret Shaper Of Public Opinion First of a Series

have been part of its extensive propaganda campaign.

Instead, the agency has channeled information and misinformation through
once‐substantial network of newspapers, news agencies and other
communications entities, most of them based overseas, that it owned,
subsidized or otherwise influenced over the years.

The C.I.A.'s propagandizing appears to have contributed to at least some
distortion of the news at home as well as abroad, although the amount
and nature of misinformation picked up by the American press from
overseas is impossible to determine.

Recent attention given the C.I.A.'s involvement with the press has been
focused on reports that the agency employed American reporters as agents
and numbered others as sources of information or “assets” useful to its
operations.

The recurring allegations have led the House Select Committee on
Intelligence schedule hearings on In:. matter, beinning Tuesday, and
prompted The New York Times to survey the C.I.A.'s relationships with
American news organizations.

While the three‐month inquiry by team of Times reporters and researchers
indicated that the C.I.A. employed relatively few of the many hundreds
of American journalists reporting from abroad over the past 30 years,
there emerged a broad picture of an agency effort to shape news and
opinions through a far‐flung network of news organizations that it
controlled to a greater or lesser degree.
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The C.I.A. has refused every appeal for details of its secret
relationship with American and foreign journalists and the
news‐gathering organizations that employed them, even though most have
been brought to an end.

One C.I.A. official, explaining that such relationships were entered
into with promises of “eternal confidentiality,” said that the agency
would continue to refuse to discuss them “in perpetuity.”

But in interviews with scores of present and former intelligence
officers, journalists and others, the scope and substance of those
relationships became clearer. Among the principal features that emerged
were the following:

cThe C.I.A. has at various times owned or subsidized more than 50
newspapers, news services, radio stations, periodicals and other
communications entities, sometimes in this country but mostly overseas,
that were used as vehicles for its extensive propaganda efforts, as
“cover” for its operatives or both. Another dozen foreign‐based news
organizations, while not financed by the C.I.A., were infiltrated by
paid C.I.A. agents.

c.'Nearly a dozen American publishing houses, including some of the most
prominent names in the industry, have printed at least a score of the
more than 250 English‐language books financed or produced by the C.I.A.
since the early 1950's, in many cases without being aware of the
agency's involvement.

C.Since the closing days of World War II, more than 30 and perhaps as
many as 100 American journalists employed by a score of American news
organizations have worked as salaried intelligence operatives while
performing their reportorial duties. A few others were employed by the
American military and, according to intelligence sources, by some
foreign services, including the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence agency.

¶Over the years at least 18 American reporters have refused C.I.A.
offers, in some cases lucrative ones, to undertake

clandestine intelligence assignments. Another dozen employees of
American newspapers, wire services and news magazines, though never
paid, were considered by the agency to be valued sources of information
or assistance.

¶In the last 30 years, at least a dozen full‐time C.I.A. officers have
worked abroad as reporters or noneditorial employees of American‐owned
news organizations, in some cases with the approval of the organizations
whose credentials they carried.

According to a number of former C.I.A officials, the agency's broad
campaign of propaganda was carried out with the awareness that the bogus
news stories it planted might be treated as genuine by the American
media, which they sometimes were.

The agency's legislative charter has been interpreted as prohibiting the
propagandizing of Americans, but it says nothing about the propriety of
the domestic effect, inadvertent or intentional, of propaganda
disseminated overseas.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, for many years the C.I.A.'s Inspector General,
said he could not recall any agency employee's ever having raised
questions about the ethics or legality of its endeavors in mass
communications.

Lawrence R. Houston, its retired general counsel, said it had always
been his understanding that the C.I.A. was forbidden by law to employ
American journalists, although he said no one had ever consulted him on
that matter.

The C.I.A.'s efforts to mold foreign opinion ranged from tampering with
his- torical documents, as it did with the 1956 denunciation of Stalin
by the late Nikita S. Khrushchev; to embellishing and distorting
accounts that were otherwise factual, such as the provision of detailed
quotes from a Russian defector; to outright fabrication, as with a
report that Chinese troops were being sent to aid Vietnamese Communists.

According to former C.I.A. officials, the agency has long had an “early
warning network” within the United States Government that advises
diplomats and other key officials to ignore news stories that have been
planted by the agency overseas. The network, they said, has worked well,
with only occasional failures.

But there is no such mechanism for alerting newspapers, magazines and
broadcasting stations in this country as to which of the foreign
dispatches that come chattering across their teletypes are distorted or,
in a few instances, altogether false. There is, the former officials
say, simply no practical way of letting Americans know that some of the
stories they read over their morning coffee were written not by a
foreign correspondent but by a C.I.A. officer in a corner of some
American embassy.

Domestic ‘Replay’ of Items Was Considered Inevitable

The C.I.A. accepts, as an unavoidable casualty of its propaganda
battles, the fact that some of the news that reaches American readers
and viewers is tainted with what the Russians call “disinformation.” The
agency has even coined terms to describe the phenomenon; blowback, or
replay, or domestic fallout.

“The particularly dangerous thing” about bogus information, a former
senior agency official said recently, “is the blowback potential. It's a
real one and we recognize that.”

A 1967 C.1.A directive stated simply that “fallout in the United States
from a foreign publication which we support is inevitable and
consequently permissible.” Or as one succinct former C.I.A. man put it,
“It hits where it hits.”

The agency's favorite medium for launching what it terms “black,” or
unattributed, propaganda has always been the foreign‐based media in
which it has had a secret financial interest, or the reporters and
editors overseas who were among its paid agents. At one time, according
to agency sources, there were as many as 800 such “propaganda assets,”
mostly foreign journalists. Asked in an interview last year whether the
C.I.A. had ever told such agents what to write, William E. Colby, the
former C.I.A. Director, replied, “Oh, sure, all the time.”

Most often, former officials have said, the C.I.A.'s propaganda
consisted of factual accounts that the agency felt were not being widely
reported, or of essentially accurate accounts with some distortions or
embellishments. But one authoritative former official said that “there
were outright fabrications, too.”

There seems to have been little question that in its efforts to mold
opinion the C.I.A. viewed citizens of foreign countries as its principal
targets. As one veteran C.I.A. officer who had conducted his share of
propaganda operations put it, “I didn' t want Walter Lippmann. I wanted
the Philippine Walter Lippman.”

Some former agency employees said in interviews, however, that they
believed that apart from unintended blowback, some C.I.A. propaganda
efforts, especially during the Vietnam War, had been carried out with a
view toward their eventual impact in the United States.

And although nearly all of the Ameri- can journalists employed by the
C.I.A. in years past appear to have been used for the collection of
intelligence or the support of existing information‐gathering
operations, a few cases emerged in which such agents became, knowingly
or otherwise, channels of disinformation to the American public.

One agency official said that the C.I.A. had in the past used paid
agents in the foreign bureaus of the Associated Press and United Press
International to slip agency‐prepared dispatches onto the news wire. In
some cases, as in the A.P.'s Singapore bureau in the early 1950's, the
agents were natives known as “local hires.” But in others they were
Americans.

Although the A.P. and the U.P.I. are two of the most promient
news‐gathering organizations in the world—the A.P. estimates that its
dispatches alone reach half the world's population in some form—they
were given no special consideration by the C.I.A.

“We would not tell U.P.I. or A.P. headquarters in the U.S. when
something was planted abroad,” one C.I.A. official said, and he conceded
that as a result such stories were likely to he transmitted over those
agencies’ domestic news wires, “if they were any good.”

U.P.I. has said it was satisfied that none of its present employees is
involved in any way with the C.I.A. but that was unable to say what
might have happened in the past. An A.P. executive said his organization
had investigated similar reports in the past and had concluded “that
none of its staffers was involved in C.I.A. activities.”

One story good enough to be widely disseminated, former officials said
was a report in the early 1950's, fabricated by the C.I.A. and put out
by an agent inside one of the major American wire services, that Chinese
troops were on board ships steaming for Vietnam to aid the Communists in
their battle with the French.

Though such examples of propaganda planted directly with American news
organizations were relatively rare, another former C.I.A. official
asserted that throughout the 1950's and 1960's, when the agency's
propaganda network was at peak strength, it was “commonplace for things
to appear in the U.S. press that had been picked up” from foreign
publications, some but not all of them “proprietaries,” in which the
C.I.A, had placed propaganda.

Sometimes, the foreign publishers and editors were unwitting of the
origin of such stories, but more often they were what the C.I.A. called
“witting.” The agency preferred one official said, to give its
propaganda “to somebody who knows what it is.” Where that was not bodypo
ssible, he said, “You gave it to any-

Propaganda Was Planted In a Multitude of Ways

The propaganda took many forms and surfaced in many forums. It ranged,
officials have said, from the Innocuous, such as letters to the editor
in major American newspapers that did not identify the writer as an
agency employee, to items of far more consequence, such as news reports
of Soviet nuclear weapons tests that never took place.

Such stories were planted in a variety of ways besides the use of media
“assets.” One common focus of propaganda activity, former officials
said, was the press clubs that exist in nearly every foreign capital,
which serve as ‘ mail drops, message centers, hotels and restaurants for
local correspondents and those just passing through.

Until a few years ago, one former official said the manager of the
Mexico City press club was a C.I.A. agent, and so was the manager of the
local press club in Manila.

“He used to work very successfully,” a C.I.A. man with many years in the
Philippines recalled, “Some guys are lazy. They'd be sitting at the bar
and he'd slip them things and they'd phone it In.”

With more diligent correspondents, the man continued, “it was a matter
of making stuff available If, they wanted to use it. My mission was to
get local people to write editorials. This would be material that
wouldn't be coming out of the embassy. It wouldn't be a U.S.I.A.
handout. It would be from some thoughtful local commentator and it would
hopefully carry more weight.”

The United States Information Agency, an arm of the State Department,
has the official responsibility for spreading: the American message
overseas. According to several former C.I.A. officials, the U.S.I.A. was
aware, though sometimes only dimly, of the agency's propagandizing.

“One of the problems that never really got settled journalistically,” a
former C.I.A. man recalled, “was the relationship between U.S.I.A. and
the C.I.A.'s media activities. They knew, but they didn't have the force
or the funds to do anything about it.”

From the C.I.A.'s standpoint, its own “black” propaganda was far more
effective than the “white,” or attributed, version put out by U.S.I.A.
to anyone who would listen.

In Argentina, for example, while the U.S.I.A. was openly making motion
pictures available to groups interested in various facets of life in the
United States, the C.I.A.'s clandestine agents were tampering with the
newsreel accounts of world events shown in local theaters.

The thrust of that particular operation, one C.I.A. man recalled, was
“to get the American point of view across regarding Castro in the
hemisphere. The Argentines didn't believe Castro was any threat, they
were so far away. So we'd get the event on film and then make up the
commentary.”

One of the most ambitious of the C.I.A.'s propaganda efforts occurred in
June 1956, a few months after Mr. Khrushchev, then the Soviet leader,
delivered a “secret” five‐hour speech to a closing session of the 20th
Communist Party Congress in Moscow from which all foreign delegates had
been excluded.

As word seeped through to the West that Mr. Khrushchev had broken in
stunning fashion with Stalin, his predecessor, whom he described as a
savage, half‐mad despot, the word went out within the C.I.A. that a copy
of the text must be obtained at all costs.

Amended Text Was Given To C.I.A. Outlets Abroad

By late May, the agency's counterintelligence staff had succeeded in
obtaining a text in Poland. A few days later was released to American
news organizations through the State Department, and the C.I.A. ever
since has cited its obtaining of the “secret speech” as among its
greatest triumphs of intelligence.

What it has not said about the matter, however, is that the text it
obtained was an expurgated version, preparea tor delivery to the nations
of Eastern Europe, from which some 34 paragraphs of material concerning
future Soviet foreign policy had been deleted.

Although the text made available to United States newspapers was the
genuine expurgated version, another text, containing precisely 34
paragraphs of material on future foreign policy, was put out by the
C.I.A. over several other channels around the world, including the
Italian news agency ANSA.

The 34 paragraphs in the foreign version, former officials said, were
written not by Mr. Khrushchev's speechwriters, but by
counterintelligence experts at C.I.A. headquarters in Virginia. The
effort to cause consternation in Moscow was said to have been a
brilliant success.

One dilemma posed by the C.I.A.'s use of its media assets abroad,
especially those published or broadcast in the English language, was
that they were liket to be closely watched by American correspondents
not fluent in the local language and thus became prime sources of
potential “replay” in the United States.

Former agency officials have said that the English‐language assets were
used with impunity under the C.I.A. charter, on the ground that the
intended propaganda target was not American correspondents or tourists
traveling abroad but English‐speaking foreigners, a rationale that one
former agency man said “always seemed absurd to me.”

Agency Fostered the Spread Of Stories to Other Nations

Within foreign countries, the agency did all it could to foster
“replay.” In Latin America, for example, lest its disinformation efforts
be forgotten as soon as they had appeared, the agency began an
operation, known by the cryptonym KM FORGET, in which stories• planted
in one country were clipped and mailed to others for insertion by local
media assets. Such efforts enhanced the likelihood that the stories
would be seen by an American correspondent and transmitted home.

In spite of the agency's insistence that domestic fallout was unsought
but unavoidable, there is some evidence that may have been welcome in
certain cases.

One of the C.I.A.'s most extensive propaganda campaigns of the past
decade was the one it waged against Chilean President Salvador Allende
Gossens, Marxist, in the years before his election in 1970 and until his
overthrow and death in 1973,

According to the report of the Senate intelligence committee, millions
of dollars were spent by the C.I.A. to produce stream of anti‐Allende
stories, editorials and broadcasts throughout Latin America.

A C.I.A. propaganda assessment obtained by the committee, prepared
shortly after Mr. Allende's election in September 1970, reported a
“continued replay of Chile theme materials” in a number of Latin
American capitals, with pickups by United States newspaper's,

“Items also carried in New York Times, Washington Post,” the summary
went on. “Propaganda activities continue to generate good coverage of
Chile developments along our theme guidance.”

In interviews, a number of former C.I.A. officers spoke about what they
said were, to them, unmistakable attempts to propagandize the American
public indirectly through “replay” from the foreign press.

One agency official recalled the heavy propaganda campaign waged by the
C.I.A. during the Vietnam War, conducted along the lines that “whatever
bad happened in Vietnam had to be the enemy's fault.”

A former C.I.A. official recalled that at the time of the “incursion” by
American forces into Cambodia in the spring of 1970, the Hong Kong
station “got cable from headquarters instructing us to have all our
assets present this in as favorable a light as possible.”

Most of the Chinese in the region, the man said, resented the American
military presence in Southeast Asia and were only further inflamed by
the favorable portrayal of the motives for the American invasion and of
its success. But he noted that the newspapers in which the slanted
stories appeared were read by a number of influential American
correspondents.

Some American Reporters Got Misleading Information

One of the reasons for the C.I.A.'s wide use of foreign “assets” in its
black propaganda efforts, another former official said, was that most
American journalists, even those on the agency's payroll, were too
scrupulous to “take stuff they knew was phony.”

But other sources cited some occasions on which American reporters
accepted misleading information from the C.I.A. in the belief that it
was legitimate.

As a rule, one former C.I.A. man said, such stories were fundamentally
accurate, though with “embellishments” supplied for operational
purposes. He recalled one such report, a dispatch to The Christian
Science Monitor from Rangoon nearly 20 years ago, that he said “was
really dressed up.”

The dispatch by a Monitor special correspondent, Arnold Beichman, was an
account of a young Russian named Aleksandr Kaznacheyev, who some months
earlier had walked into the American Embassy in Rangoon and asked for
asylum. Asked about the nature of the embellishment, the former C.I.A.
man replied, “Defectors usually don't have very good English.”

Mr. Beichman's account contained extensive quotes from Mr. Kaznacheyev,
some of them remarkably well phrased, about the “hatred” for the Soviet
system that had driven him from his homeland.

According to the article, the quotations were taken from a tape
recording that Mr. Kaznacheyev had made. But Mr. Beichman said in a
recent telephone interview that he could not now say where he had
obtained the quoted material. “I can't say if I heard a tape recording
or saw a transcript,” he said. “I don't know how to check it.”

Mr. Beichman said that he had never met Mr. Kaznacheyev, but had “pieced
the story together from officials in the American Embassy.” “For all I
know,” he conceded, “he might never have been in the embassy. It might
have, been a fraud.”

There have been other instances over the years in which American news
organizations were taken in by the C.I.A. One former agency official
recalled, for example, a riot at a Soviet trade fair in the Far East
that he said had been staged by the C.I.A.

The agency, the man said, later planted an article with a major American
magazine that cited the “riot” as evidence of dissatisfaction with the
Russians in that part of the world.

Some correspondents, as well, were quick to acknowledge that they had
been duped on some occasions by the C.I.A.

One reporter, a Latin American specialist, recalled that a few years
back he had met with a C.I.A. station chief in a country he would not
identify who gave him what appeared to be an exclusive story. The local
Communist Party, which had until then been following a peaceful line in
seeking power, was said by the station chief to have a cache of 400
rifles provided by outside supporters.

Correspondent Learned That Story Was Unfounded

The correspondent, unable to check the information, decided to use it
rather tentatively, in an article on the general situation in the
country. Later he found the C.I.A. material had been unfounded.

Another Instance in which the C.I.A. passed information to an American
journalist, according to an agency official, involved C. L. Sulzberger,
the foreign affairs columnist of The New York Times.

The C.I.A. official, who in the past has had access to relevant agency
files, said that a column about the Soviet K.G.B. that appeared on Sept.
13, 1967, under Mr. Sulzberger's name in The Times was, “verbatim,” a
briefing paper that the C.I.A. had prepared for Mr. Sulzberger on the
subject.

Mr. Sulzberger has denied that he ever “took a paper from the C.I.A. and
put my name on it and telephoned it to The New York Times.”

In addition to its efforts to make the news, the C.I.A. has also
attempted on several occasions to intervene directly with American news
organizations to shape the way in which they report It.

In some cases the agency's overtures have been rebuffed and in others
they have been accepted. Some news organizations, sources have said,
have even provided the C.I.A. with the opportunity for such Intervention
without being asked.

One former official recalled an Instance several years ago In which the
nov,Ncle- funct Collier's magazine received an article from a
correspondent in the Far East, mentioning that two ostensibly private
corporations in the area, Sea Supply in Bangkok and Western Enterprises
on Taiwan, were the C.I.A.'s princpal operating proprietaries in that
part of the world.

The editors of Collier's, the former official said, submitted the
article to the C.I.A. for censorship. The agency officer who read the
manuscript pointed out that the C.I.A.'s links with both corporations
were an open secret throughout the Far East, but the magazine killed the
article anyway.

A large part of the C.IA.'s efforts at domestic censorship appear to
have been concerned with impending news accounts not about world affairs
but rather about its own operations.

In the months before the 1961 invasion of Cuba by C.I.A.‐trained exile
forces at the Bay of Pigs, for example, the agency was successful in
halting the publication of several stories, including a major article by
David Kraslow, then of The Miami Herald, about the training of the exile
forces in Florida.

Mr. Kraslow, now publisher of The Miami News, said that his editors had
asked him to take the details he had uncovered to Allen W. Dulles, then
head of the C.I.A., and that Mr. Dulles had cautioned that their
publication would not be “in the national interest.” Soon afterward, the
C.I.A. moved the training from Florida to Guatemala.

Agency Denigrated Book After Trying to Suppress It

Three years later, when David Wise and Thomas B. Ross published “The
Invisible Government,” the agency's first reaction was to try to
suppress the volume.

Among other things, the C.I.A. seriously considered a plan to buy up the
entire first printing of the book to keep it from public view.

Cord Meyer Jr., the C.I.A. official in charge of many of the agency's
propaganda activities, visited Random House, the book's publisher, and
was told that the agency was welcome to purchase as many printings as it
liked but that additional copies would be produced for public sale.

That idea was abandoned, but former C.I.A. officials have said that a
propaganda campaign was initiated to, encourage reviewers to denigrate
the book as misinformed and dangerous.

Mr. Meyer, who is still a senior C.I.A. official, declined to talk about
this episode or any aspect of his career with the agency.

What one former senior agency official described as another “period of
great crisis” for the agency occurred two years later, in 1966,.when the
Washington bureau of The New York Times set out to produce a series of
articles aimed at determining whether the C.I.A. did in fact amount to
an “invisible government.”

Cables were sent by editors to most of The Times's overseas bureaus,
asking correspondents to file memorandums on several aspects of C.I.A.
operations in their areas, and the former official recalled that the
consternation within the agency was nearly immediate.

The agency's fear that The Times might divulge some sensitive secrets
abated, however, when the newspaper submitted the articles in advance of
publication to John A. McCone, who by then had retired as Director of
Central Intelligence. According to Tom Wicker, then the chief of The
Times Washington bureau, Mr. McCone removed some elements of the series
before it appeared.

The inquiry by The Times unearthed yet another occasion in which the
C.I.A. interfered with the newspaper's reporting. In 1954 Allen Dulles,
then the chief of the C.I.A., told a Times executive that he did not
believe that Sydney Gruson, the newspaper's correspondent in Mexico, was
capable of reporting with objectivity on the impending revolution in
Guatemala.

Mr. Dulles told The Times that his brother, John Foster Dulles, then
Secretary of State, shared his concern, and he asked that the newspaper
keep Mr. Gruson, whom the agency believed to have “liberal” leanings,
away from the story.

It did not become known until several years after the overthrow of Col.
Jacopo Arbenz Guzmtin, the leftist Guatemalan leader, that the C.I.A.
had played a central role in fostering the revolution that led to his
downfall. There is some evidence in agency files that the C.I.A. feared
that Mr. Gruson's reporting was edging toward a premature discovery of
its role.

Mr. Gruson, now an executive vice president of The Times, said in an
interview that he had learned later that Ar• thur Hays Sulzberger, then
the newspaper's publisher, had complied with the C.I.A.'s wishes by
contriving to keep him in Mexico City and away from Guatemala during the
revolution, on the pretense that he had received a tip that the fighting
might spill across the border into Mexico.

Not all of the C.I.A.'s propaganda efforts have been conducted through
the news media. For example, some of the thousand or so books published
by the C.I.A. or on its behalf have contained propaganda ranging from
tiny fictions to outright deceptions.

One such book, sources said, was “The Penkovsky Papers.” published for
what the Senate intelligence committee called “operational reasons” by
the C.I.A. through Doubleday & Company in 1965. The book purports to be
a journal kept by the Soviet double agent, Col. Oleg Penkovsky, in the
months before he was unmasked by his Soviet superiors, tried and
executed. In the book, the colonel's name was transliterated according
to C.I.A. style.

Although the information in the book was largely authentic, sources said
that it had not been taken from Colonel Penkovsky's iournal—which did
not exist—but was compiled from C.I.A. records by Frank Gibney, then an
employee of The Chicago Daily News, and Peter Deriahin, a K.G.B.
defector employed by the C.I.A.

“It was not a diary,” said one C.I.A. official, “and it was a major
deception to that extent.” Another former official acknowledged that the
book had been “cosmetized,” and a third added drily, “Spies don't keep
diaries.”

Authors Were Assisted For Operational Purposes

Reached by telephone in Japan, Mr. Gibney conceded that “the journal as
such did not exist.” He said he had taken most of the material directly
from reports of the C.I.A.'s interviews with Colonel Penkovsky during
his brief visits to the West.

In several other instances, agency sources said, the C.I.A. has assisted
authors with hooks that it felt might serve some operational purpose,
even where the agency had no hand in preparing the manuscript.

One such case, sources said, was the agency's decision to cooperate with
John Barron in his research on a recent book about the Soviet K.G.B.
That decision, sources said, was a response to the K.G.B.'s publication
a few years before of a small volume, largely accurate, entitled “Who's
Who in the C.I.A.”

That book named dozens of C.I.A. officers, along with some American
diplomats and others who have never had any connection with the agency,
and the C.I.A. is still angry over the combined deception and
large‐scale “burning,” or identification, of its personnel by a hostile
intelligence service.

The Barron book contains a 35‐page compendium of names of K.G.B.
officers serving under various covers around the world. Mr. Barron said
in an interview that although he had received “quite a bit of help’ from
the C.I.A., the list of names had been compiled from a variety of
sources worldwide.

One of the more intriguing C.I.A. disinformation campaigns of recent
years was its attempt to discredit the Cuban revolutionary movement in
the eyes of other Latin American nations by planting the suggestion that
it was controlled to some extent from Moscow.

The agency's strategy, one official said, was to take an East German
woman named Tamara Bunke who had joined the guerrilla band of Maj.
Ernesto Che Guevara in Bolivia and make her out to be “the biggest,
smartest Communist there ever was,” as well as an operative of the East
German Ministry of State Security and the Soviet K.G.B.

Asked how the agency had disseminated its fabrication, the official
recalled that it had provided “material and hackground” to Daniel James,
an American author and former managing editor of The New Leader, living
in Mexico, who• pubished a translation of Major Guevara's Bolivian
diaries in 1968.

In his introduction, Mr. James noted that Miss Bunke, who had taken the
nom de guerre of Tania and who is scarcely mentioned in the diaries, had
nonetheless been identified a few months earlier by a low‐level East
German defector’ as an agent of the East German security agency.

C.I.A. Portrayal of Woman Helped Make Her a Hero

Mr. James did not provide any support in the book for his assertion
that, during her time with Major Guevara's group, Miss Bunke was
“attached to the Soviet K.G.B.” He said in an interview that that had
been his own conclusion, although he acknowledged having talked to the
C.I.A. in connection with the book.

“I did get information from them,” he said. “1 got information from a
lot of people.” He said that he had been acquainted with Winston Scott,
at the time the C.I.A.'s Mexico City station chief, and that he had
asked Mr. Scott for “anything that they could get for me or help me with.”

He declined to say whether the agency had supplied him with any of the
material concerning Miss Bunke.

Perhaps in part because of the C.I.A.'s portrayal of Tania, the dead
woman has become a hero of the revolutionary left around the world, Her
alias was adopted by Patricia Hearst, the San Francisco heiress, after
she was kidnapped in 1974 by the Symbionese Liberation Army and
announced that she had decided to join the group.

Reminded of that the C.I.A. official chuckled. “Domestic fallout,” he said.

Next: The C.I.A.'s Propaganda Network.

Most C.I.A. propaganda was planted overseas, but it was once
‘commonplace,’ a former agency official said, for United States
newspapers to pick it up.

The C.I.A.'s involvement with mass communications in this country was
sometimes aimed at censoring impending accounts of the agency's own
activities.

Associated Press

William E. Colby

Asked in an interview last year whether the C.I.A. had ever told foreign
journalists, working as paid agents, what to write, he replied, ‘'Oh,
sure, all the time.”

Associated Press

Allen W. Dulles

In 1954, he told a New York Times executive that he did not believe the
paper's Mexico correspondent was capable of reporting with objectivity
on impending Guatemala revolution.

[Confirmation]

In article <PgZ1K.521194$LN2.2...@fx13.iad>
FBInCIAnNSATerroristSlayer <FBInCIAnNSATe...@yahoo.com> wrote:

Flush.

[FBInCIAnNSATerroristSlayer]