Battle of A-Shau Valley: April of 1968...
MacTh...@abcxyz.com
The Following is after action report that have been submitted. These
reports were about B Company's involvement in the A-Shaw Valley in
1968.
The Cavalry Magazine/1968
A Shaw Valley is 22 miles long located in I Corps, less than six miles
from Laos, and is between two mountain ranges. The A Shaw Valley was
one of two strong Holds for the communists. The other strong hold was
the U Minh Forest. Both of these strong holds were considered by
Charlie to be his personal territory. In April 1968 there were three
abandoned airfields that were spread along the valleys floor and a
deserted Special Forces Camp that was overrun in March 1966. It marked
the southern boundary. It was the strongest enemy base in South
Vietnam. The enemy garrisoned 5000 to 6000 troops there. It was ringed
by one of the most sophisticated complex of interlocked anti-aircraft
Batteries. The valley had served as a launching point for the Tet
Offensive on the northern provinces. It was a major base for the
infiltration of personnel and supplies into Thua Thien Province and
northern I Corps.
Operation Delaware was launched on April 10th 1968. The 1st Air
Cavalry Division headed into the A Shaw Valley. Between the 14th and
the 19th of April 1968 there were over 100 B-52 sorties and 200 Air
Force and Marine fighter sorties executed along with many ARA
missions. The 1st Brigade of the 101st Air Bourne Division and the
ARVN Air bourne Task Force had set up to the east to interdict enemy
routes of withdrawal and infiltration.
On 19 April 1968, the 227th Assault Helicopter Battalion, commanded by
LTC W.F. Dixon was prepared to commit its maximum available resources
in the third massive helicopter assault within a month,
Operation/Delaware/Lam Son 216. The plan of operation was to
simultaneously assault into the A Shau Valley and to insert a Long
Range Reconnaissance Patrol to secure "Signal Hill," a 4879 foot peak
5 kilometers northeast of A Loui Airfield to be used as a vital
communications relay station. At 0730 hours, 19 April 1968, the
weather, which was to play a harassing part throughout the 29 day
operation, was a thin overcast on the plains and solid overcast above
the valley. The cloud tops, however, were at about 4500 feet. The top
of Signal Hill was above the clouds. With the main assault aircraft on
a temporary weather hold, Co B, 227th AHB, with 4 UH-1H helicopters, a
command and control ship, and 2 escort gunships from D Co were
suddenly in the position of the lead assault element. Carrying an
aircraft load (ACL) of 5, the 4 lift aircraft departed Camp Evans,
climbed through the thin overcast, and were vectored to the initial
landing zone.
It was briefed to be a single ship LZ and intelligence reports had
spotted anti-aircraft positions along the ridge to the northeast and a
heavy concentration of assorted weapons in the valley floor to the
west. The initial approach was attempted directly to the west,
approaching the hill mass at a 45 degree angle. The first view of the
LZ showed it to be a bomb crater on a 40 degree slope surrounded by 50
foot trees. Touchdown was impossible and the LRRP’s would have to be
repelled from about 30 feet. The lead aircraft was unable to maintain
a position over the LZ and made a "go around." The second aircraft
attempting the drop lost power and crashed into the LZ, sliding down
the hill into the trees. The approach axis was shifted from west to
east and the lead aircraft on a second approach successfully repelled
his load and extracted a miraculously uninjured crew of the downed
aircraft. A total of 14 sorties were lifted into Signal Hill without
further incident with constant improvement being made on the LZ. From
the initial assault it looked like a milk run as no significant
anti-aircraft fire was encountered.
Concurrent with the Signal Hill lift at 0930 the main assault,
augmented by the 229th AHB, for a total of 40 lift helicopters and 8
supporting gunships were launched from a marshaling point just
southwest of Camp Evans. With 10 aircraft each, Co led by Major Darwin
A. Peterson and C Co. Led by Major Edward L. Burkhalter, each escorted
by a pair of gunships, lifted off with an aircraft load (ACL) of 6 in
the White and Yellow flights respectively. This assault was to
establish a fire base stop a 3580 foot ridge on the northwest edge of
the A Shau Valley. LZ Tiger would command the approach of RSR 548 into
the northern end of the valley from the west. The entire flight into
the A Shau was forced to climb to 6000 feet to fly over the clouds and
descend one ship at a time into the valley through holes in the
overcast. The aircraft first made their approach from the west to a
less than adequate LZ forced by a bomb crater in a small saddle stop
Hill 122B. From the time the first aircraft came through the clouds,
it was apparent that it would be no ordinary assault. Despite the 209
tactical air sorties and 21 B-52 strikes, each aircraft approaching LZ
Tiger ran the gauntlet of withering anti-aircraft fire, including .50
caliber and 37mm guns. The enemy gunners inflicted damage on a total
of 25 1st Air Cav Div aircraft this first day. It was considered to be
the most formidable air defense yet faced by the 1st Air Cav Div in
Vietnam.
The enemy fire was not the only problem so-encountered by the
relatively inexperienced aviators. For the first time the pilots were
experiencing a loss of RPM due to the high density altitude. The
aircraft was unable to maintain a high hover on LZ Tiger and could not
sit down in the LZ without hitting the trees with the blades. The ACL
was lowered to 5 on the second lift and than to safely make the lift.
Blade strikes accounted for the loss of 6 aircraft before the LZ was
finally curved out enough to allow the aircraft to touchdown. With 20
sorties into LZ Tiger the decision was made to split the lift into a
lower LZ approximately 900ft below the original LZ creating an LZ,
(Tiger Lower), and redesignating the upper location (Tiger Upper).
After a number of sorties into Tiger Lower, the intense fire from the
valley floor to the east and south prompted the remaining lift to
revert back to Tiger Upper. During the shift, a D Co gunship was shot
down southeast of the Tiger Upper, but managed to crash land on the
road with no casualties; the crew was inordinately extracted.
The lift into the two Tiger LZ’s was complete at 1300 hours. The air
assault of the 1/7 Cav Bu to establish LZ. Vicky on the northeast side
of the valley began at 1330. This fire base was located directly east
of LZ Tiger on a low finger tucked up against the eastern wall of the
valley. LZ Vicky was a 2 ship LZ and again was formed by bomb craters.
The initial flight path was from Tiger directly cast across the valley
landing to the southeast. The intense enemy fire from the valley floor
had hit several aircraft and destroyed a 229th AHB aircraft
necessitating a quick route change. A relatively secure route farther
north was found with the aircraft skirting the open valley and hugging
the eastern wall. The final approach was made from a dog log to the
southwest.
By 1630, two-thirds of the lift was complete and the planned lift of a
third battalion was canceled due to increasingly bad weather and low
visibility. By this time the aviation resources had dwindled by half
from both maintenance and enemy attrition. The battalion’s maintenance
crews doing a job throughout the day had restored all repairable
aircraft by nightfall. During the day, the 227th A.B. had lost 2
aircraft that were not recovered and over 75% of the fleet had
required maintenance. Maintenance crews worked throughout the night to
prepare for further lifts the next day. We had miraculously taken no
serious casualties though other elements of the 11th Aviation Group
did suffer: KIA and WIA. The 227th had carried a full infantry
battalion into the A Shau Valley.
(20 Apr 68)
The second day of the assault into the A Shau began with an aircraft
hold due to a low overcast and fog on the valley floor. At
approximately 0900 Major Burkhalter led C Company’s yellow flight
followed by A Company’s white flight to assault a ridge line 4
kilometers southwest of LZ Tiger to establish a third fire base LZ
Pepper. The approach was made form the north along the ridge into a
slope studded with stumps. Again the aircraft could not touchdown and
experienced power loss at a hover. The lead aircraft crashed, but all
crew and passengers escaped with only minor injuries. The crash,
however, closed the LZ until members of 2/9 Cav repelled with chain
saws to expand the LZ. Upon resumption of the lift, the new lead
aircraft came too close to the trees on take off and also crashed.
Again the crew got out unhurt. These two crews remained on Pepper for
two nights due to bad weather restricting any further flying into the
valley. Only one infantry company was air lifted into LZ Pepper before
the weather halted all operations.
* See Appendix 2 for total loses of 227th and 11th Group for 19 April
1968.
Koony anti-aircraft fire was limited mostly to small arms fire with
some heavier caliber fire to the north. Two infantry battalions plus
one company now occupied territory in the A Shau Valley. The 227th AHB
had lost two aircraft to a poor LZ on D=1 and had suffered three
slightly wounded.
(21-22 Apr 68)
Bad weather prevailed throughout the entire day on 21 April 1968 with
not air assaults being conducted. D Co with 6 aircraft was on standby
to haul a badly needed resupply to LZ Tiger. Shortly after noon the
aircraft took off at 1 minute intervals with an 800 pound sling load
under each aircraft. One by one, the aircraft were radar vectored to a
point over LZ Tiger. Each aircraft had to feel its way through the
holes in the overcast creating a separate approach axis for each. The
gambit proved quite effective and a total of 14 sling loads were taken
into both Tiger LZ’s before the weather again closed. For most of the
crews, it was their first actual instrument flight. No other aviation
action took place on the 21st. The 22nd brought much improved weather
conditions and the air lift into LZ Pepper continued with a maximum of
aircraft again committed. Anti-aircraft fire was harassing but far
less than previous days. At the day’s and the 3rd Brigade was firmly
entrenched in the A Shau Valley with 3 Infantry battalions plus
supporting artillery.
(23-24 Apr 68)
On the 23rd of April, no major moves were made by air. LZ Goodman was
secured by ground attack as aircraft resources were used to resupply
all units in the valley. On 24 April, A Co and B Co with 6 aircraft
each joined the 229th AHB to air assault elements of the 1st Bde into
LZ Cecil, 2 kilometers south A Luoi Airfield. Again weather played a
significant part forcing the lifts to climb as high as 11,000 feet to
clear the cloud tops. Once over the valley and through the holes in
the overcast the aircraft delay-chained from 13 Evens to the new 12,
covered a route by the guns of both 229th AHB and 227th AHB, Cecil was
a two ship 12 at the southern end of a ridge about 2200 feet high.
Although all aircraft were exposed to sniping fire on the approach the
main threat came from an automatic weapons position about 500 meters
down the ridge to the southeast. Since the approach was made to the
south, the enemy gunners get crack at each aircraft as it departed no
matter which way it broke. Very few hits were sustained, however, and
no aircraft were lost as the lift of the 2/8 Cav on to Cecil was
completed prior to 1400 hours.
Late in the afternoon B Co. was given the mission of an emergency
re-supply of 12 Cecil. The 2/8 Cav had run short of ammunition and
supplies after making contact on the landing zone. A hole was found in
the overcast and the six aircraft climbed on top at 6000 feet. A radar
vector was obtained to get out to the valley and the calling in the A
Shau Valley was forecast at about 800 feet. When the aircraft arrived
a hole was found in the vicinity of 12 tiger and the ships proceeded
in trail from 8500 feet to 800 feet above the valley floor. The ships
low level was another story. The flight received heavy automatic
weapons fire during the entire traversing of the valley floor. One
ship was hit in the engine tail pipe, but remained flyable. The
aircraft found a hole to climb through near 12 Tiger and exited the A
Shau.
(25 Apr 68)
On 25 April 1968 the 1st Brigade took advantage of improving weather
and quickly air assaulted the 1/8 Cav into A Loui Airfield,
establishing LZ Stallion. The 227th AHB played a minor role in this
maneuver because very little resistance was not on the assault.
(28 Apr 68)
On 28 April the 227th AHB committed ships to lagger during the night
at LZ Stallion. The weather had varied between low ceilings and ground
fog in the morning to high calculus clouds in the afternoon. This had
seriously restricted the operations because at the time when the
valley floor was clear enough for operations, ships could get into the
valley due to the high, dense, clouds surrounding the A Shau. The
laggered ships could support units in the valley in case the A Shau
weather deteriorated to the point that ships could not get in while
the floor of the valley allowed airmobile operations. Co. B of the
227th AHB was the first unit to stay in the valley at night
accompanied by 2 D Co. gunships. The program of staggering six (6)
aircraft at LZ Stallion continued for three days and then the plan was
shifted to one (1) flare aircraft longer for night illumination, since
a flight from A Co. had been hit by a heavy mortar barrage while
laggered at A Luci. During the remainder of the operation the
battalion performed general support of the ground tactical units. The
majority of missions being devoted to re-supply of the fire bases and
movement of personnel to and from the A Shau.
(10 May 68)
On 10 May the extraction phase of Operation Delaware began. The
weather, Which had been poor throughout the operation began to
deteriorate and the decision was made on 7 May to begin the extraction
on 10 May. A Co., 227th AHB was assigned the mission to extract two
battalions from the A Shau Valley. The battalions involved were the
1/7th and 5/7th Cav. The flight leader had been briefed the day before
the move by the ground commanders on the execution of the mission.
Twelve lift ships an two gunships were committed the next morning to
begin the extraction of the 5/7th. Plans had changed considerably from
the briefing that was given the previous day and the flight was to
take the entire battalion back to Camp Evans, instead of the airstrip
at LZ Stallion and await further orders. About 1200 hours a company of
the 2/7th Cav came into heavy contact about 2 kilometers northwest of
LZ Pepper. The flight was to extract the unit back to LZ Pepper. The
extraction was accomplished smoothly with the assistance of two
gunships from Company D, 227th AHB 2 fighters and 8 ARA gunships. Once
this was completed the flight returned to LZ Stallion to wait for the
1/7 to get into a pickup posture. During the time that the extraction
to LZ Pepper, the 229th AHB was extracting the 3rd Regt, 1st ARVN
Div., from 12 Upland Lucy. Several of their aircraft had maintenance
problems and the S-3 of the 229th requested that the 227th flight
extract the last twelve sorties of the 3rd ARVN Regt. And take them to
LZ Sally. The weather was quite bad and the extraction was conducted
low level. Upon completion of this move the flight returned to LZ
Stallion. About 1600 hours the Battalion Commander of the 1/7th
informed the Flight Commander that he was ready to be picked up.
Coordination had to be made with CH-47s to pull out the artillery and
the night was rapidly approaching. During this mission, two aircraft
from the flight had to break off to assist in an emergency re-supply
of the 2/7th Cav. The entire mission for the day was accomplished
without incident, with the outstanding support that was given to the
lift aircraft by the gunships of Co. D, 227th AHB. For the remainder
of the extraction place of Operation Delaware, the aircraft of the
227th AHB gave maximum air-support t the ground commanders.
The 227th Avn Bn accomplished its mission during Operation
Delaware/Lam Son in an outstanding manner. Perhaps the most
significant feature of the entire mission was the total reliance on
the Airmobile concept. The 1st Cav operated in enemy held territory
that proved to be a veritable stronghold. The A Shau Valley was
extremely well defended by numerous anti-aircraft weapons, to include
37mm guns. Thought to be no match for the bug guns, and though
operating for the first time (at least initially) beyond the range of
friendly artillery, the slow moving helicopters proved to be quite
elusive and consequently suffered only a reasonable number of losses
in light of the goals achieved. This operation was a real tribute to
the flexibility of the Airmobile Concept.
The problems encountered by the 227th were only overcome by the sheer
determination and true professionalism displayed by all members of the
Battalion. Adverse weather conditions offered the most pressing
difficulties, but by establishing navigation aids and laggering
aircraft at LZ Stallion, weather problems were minimized. The terrain
also played an important role in affecting au mission capabilities.
Due to high altitudes coupled with high temperatures the density
altitude was such that loads had to be cut and pilot techniques had to
be of the finest to avoid accidents. On top of this, the First Team
met stiff enemy resistance at every turn of the A Shau. Besides the
anti-aircraft weaponry, the enemy had developed elaborate defenses to
safeguard his highway through the Valley. He was firmly entrenched on
the hillsides and ridge lines and only grudgingly gave up his ground.
The aviators of the 227th never waived and eventually the enemy guns
were silenced by the coordinated efforts of the First Team. All of
these problems eventually fell on the shoulders of maintenance
personnel at Camp Evans. These people worked night and day to repair
damages sustained along with normally scheduled maintenance. The
maintenance effort was outstanding in keeping the 227th availability
at a high. By this maximum output and coordination the 227th was able
to help insure the success of Operation Delaware/Lam Son.
******************
Dai Uy
> The Following is after action report that have been submitted. These
> reports were about B Company's involvement in the A-Shaw Valley in
> 1968.
Our resident expert who was *personally* involved in the battle
of the A-Shau (Au Shaw) Valley could help you out and lend you his
insights -- unfettered by official MACV After Action Reports and
multiple source eye-witness news reporting.
See URL: http://tinyurl.com/f95mb
"Those were some of the battles I *personally* was involved, and
I *personally* watched and heard the "newsboys" broadcast our tactics"
***
MacTh...@abcxyz.com
If it is that one person with the inflated perception of himself, and
his many activities in Vietnam and Latin America, etc., I think I
would rather go over to CoffeePeople and have a Velvet Hammer and read
a James Rollins novel...
But thank you for your suggest Dai Uy.
-Mac, the Medic