Robert McNamara and the expendable pilot
Brightlight
ROBERT MCMAMARA AND THE EXPENDABLE PILOT
The following is a condensed version of an article that appeared in
the July issue of Proceedings, journal of the US Naval Institute in
Annapolis, Maryland as printed in Air Force Magazine, October 1999.
It was written by Commander Glenn Tierney, a retired US Navy fighter
pilot.
It was a quiet Sunday afternoon in Hawaii on 5 June 1964. . . . I was
the assistant current air operations (Navy, J-3116) on the staff of
the commander in chief, Pacific (CinCPac). Admiral Harry D. Felt. . .
My four-digit designator put me well down on the totem pole. As one
of the few Navy pilots on the staff with any recent fleet experience,
however, I wound up in the middle of things when the air war in
Southeast Asia expanded.
After many months of indecision, on 23 May 1964 the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) finally authorized the Navy to conduct low-altitude
photographic reconnaissance flights over the Plaine des Jarres [in
Laos]. Within days, Photographic Squadron (VFP)-63 pilots began
flying missions from the USS Kitty Hawk (CVA-63), which was operating
from Yankee Station in the Gul f of Tonkin. Along with the
authorization came orders that the RF-8 Crusader photo planes were to
operate without armed escorts--even though the practice hand been
standard operating procedure since World War II. The potential
problems with the flights were their frequency and Times Over Target
(TOT), which were specified by the Secretary of Defense.
For these missions, the TOTs were specified as every other day a 1
p.m. (Laotian time). Anyone could see that such a pattern created a
built-in opportunity for the Pathet Lao to spring an ambush. . . .
The telephone in my quarters rang late on that Sunday afternoon: "You
asked me to call you whenever we had a problem with one of your
projects [meaning overt and covert aerial reconnaissance]. We have a
bad one," said Army Master Sergeant Duncan, in charge of
communications in the CinCPac Command Center. . . . I automatically
assumed that we had lost a Navy photo plane and pilot in the Plaine
des Jarres; that day's TOT had been about an hour earlier.
Duncan confirmed my fears: The pilot had been shot down and the
escort pilot had seen him moving about. The Rescue Combat Air Patrol
(ResCAP) from the ship had launched, he added quickly, but had been
recalled because the "word" had come down that there was to be "No
round-eye" [American] effort to rescue the pilot. I could not believe
it. We had two Air America helicopter s stationed on a hill about 20
miles away, on alert for just this purpose.
The ridiculous aspect of the order was that there were no other
forces available. For all practical purposes, at this point the photo
pilot had been abandoned by the government that had sent him in
harm's way. I called the JCS on the secure telephone and spoke with
the Army brigadier general who was the duty flag officer. He confirmed
the order. When I literally demanded to know who had issued such an
order, he said he was not sure. I respectfully suggested that he find
out as soon as possible and we would be calling him back, also ASAP.
As I dropped the secure phone, I called my immediate boss, Marine
Brigadier General George Bowman, our J-3/operations officer, but he
was not at home. To hell with this, I said to myself, and I called
Admiral Felt on his private line at his quarters in Makala pa, just
down the hill; I was bypassing at least three other senior flag
officers. The line was not secure, so I told him briefly that we had
a serious problem in th e PDJ. 'I'm on the way," he replied.
Less than 10 minutes later, the JCS brigadier general was telling the
admiral that the order had come from the Secretary of Defense
himself. (Before he called the JCS Admiral Felt had instructed me to
pick up a second secure phone and admonished me: "You listen; you do
not speak.") .
Admiral Felt spoke quietly: "General, get me the Secretary of Defense
on this line immediately." . . . Several minutes later, sounding very
wide awake, and almost jovial, Robert McNamara came on the line and
asked Admiral Felt the reason for the call. Admiral Felt was never
one to mince words. "Mr. Secretary, I have been told that you are
aware that we just had a Navy photo pilot shot down in the Plaine des
Jarres and that an order had been issued by your office that there was
to be no 'round-eye' effort to rescue the pilot. Is that correct?"
"That is correct, Admiral," McNamara answered. At this point Admiral
Felt interrupted him: "May I ask by whose authority this order was
issued?" "The recommendation came from State," McNamara replied, "and
the Secretary of State and I discussed it and agreed that this is the
best course of action." . . . Admiral Felt turned slightly to look at
me.
He spoke again, very quietly but in a short clipped tone that I had
never heard him use before. "Mr. Secretary, that is not a decision
that can be made by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of
Defense. The decision to rescue this pilot or not to rescue him can
be made only by the Commander in Chief of the United States armed
forces, and I am asking you to put me through to the Commander in
Chief--now, sir."
After a few seconds, McNamara started almost mumbling; he didn't
argue the point, or refuse the request, but he made a big point that
it was very late and that the President had just retired after a long
evening. Again, Admiral Felt quietly repeated his previous statement
word for word. McNamara, without another word on the subject, said,
"All right, I will ring the President."
Within 30 seconds President Johnson came on the line. . . . "Good
morning, Admiral Felt, what can I do for you?" "Mr. President, we just
had a Navy photo pilot shot down over the Plain des Jarres in
northern Laos, but the Navy and Air America rescue effort has been
called off by the Secretary of Defense as recommended by the
Secretary of State. I just spoke to the Secretary of Defense and told
him that this is a critical military decision that cannot be made by
the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State, but one that can
be made only by the Commander in Chief of the United States armed
forces, and I am asking your permission to go in and rescue this
pilot." Without hesitation, President Johnson came back, "Well, I'll
be damned. Of course, go in and get him--and let me know how it comes
out."
Note: The unfortunate Navy photo pilot was Lt. Charles F. Klusmann.
He was not rescued but was captured. It was several hours before Air
America helicopter crews reached the scene. Heavy ground fire drove
off the lead aircraft; Klusmann waved off the second helo because it,
too, was flying into an ambush. The Kitty Hawk's ResCAP never did
show up; they had been recalled. The author writes that, in all
probability, they would have neutralized the area by the time the
helicopters arrived and the Air Amer ica crews would have been able
to make the pickup.
Klusmann, captured on June 6, escaped from his captors on August 31.
He is now a retired US Navy CAPTAIN living in Pensacola, Florida.
webm...@vwip.org
<Dai...@hawaii.rr.com> wrote:
>
>
>ROBERT MCMAMARA AND THE EXPENDABLE PILOT
>
>The following is a condensed version of an article that appeared in
>the July issue of Proceedings, journal of the US Naval Institute in
>Annapolis, Maryland as printed in Air Force Magazine, October 1999.
>It was written by Commander Glenn Tierney, a retired US Navy fighter
>pilot.
I have taken the liberty of reposting this on www.vwip.org