Operation Lam Son 719
MacTh...@abcxyz.com
Operation Lam Son 719
During Operation Lam Son 719, American forces supported Vietnamese
forces in their attack across the Laotian border. Designed to cut
enemy infiltration routes and to destroy North Vietnamese staging
areas in Laos, Operation Lam Son 719 began on February 8 as the 101st
and other American aviation units airlifted South Viet namese troops
into Laos.
For many years, the enemy had controlled the area of Laos adjacent to
South Vietnam and had built up extensive defenses. When the operation
ended on 9 April 1971, less than one Allied aircraft for every
thousand sorties was lost, despite the increased enemy use of
anit-aircraft weapons, artillery, and armor.
In the aftermath of Operation Lam Son 719, combat operations were
conducted in areas of Cambodia adjacent to the South Vietnamese
border.
Like Lam Son, air transport and cover were provided by U.S. forces,
while SVN Army forces conducted the ground operations.
=========================
red...@lava.net
Isn't that the one where the peoples army allowed the highly trained
and motivated South Vietnamese puppets to thunder through the jungle (
how many miles without contact?) before PAVEN tripped the ambush? As I
recall there were pictures of the puppets shooting one another in
desperate attempts to reach the skids of American helicopters for
extraction .
Some actually were able to escape, in a panicked disorganized mob,
forshadowing the collapse of the entire collaborator army in 1976. -
redvet
Dr. Vincent Quin, Ph.D.
he he he...poor Crybaby Vet "Mac" forgot to finish the third paragraph up, so
I'll help him..."For many years, the enemy had controlled the area...and
when the klusterfuck evacuation was over, the enemy still controlled the area."
he he he...his comic history foiled again...
;-)
Anon E. Mouse
<red...@lava.net> wrote in message
news:tc1237p9sqku45dfg...@4ax.com...
while I wasn't there for LS719 I was there for the Spring Offensive in '72
with proper support the SVN 'puppets' as you called em defeated the 3
pronged attack by the NVN puppets. I do agree the main reason was our air
assets both helicoptor and fixed wing. when the North again invaded the
south in '75, the SVN govt, abandoned by clowns like you, were defeated
I'm sure you were overfuckingjoyed. btw, where do you thing the NVN
puppets got their new hardware? your commie pals of course. what I
don't understand is if you think socialism is all that good what the fuck
are you doing living in Hawaii....somehow methinks you ain't livin off'n
your savings. are you a closet capitalist? <G>
Dr. Vincent Quin, Ph.D.
Ah...the Easter Offensive...at last a test of "Vietnamization" where
the ARVN was touted as being able to stand on it's own. Whoops.
Son, the ARVN was being soundly defeated, forcing the U.S. to come
to their rescue in order to avoid the political fallout of yet
another U.S. military fiasco...inability to "Vietnamize" the Vietnamese.
> I do agree the main reason was our air
> assets both helicoptor and fixed wing.
Well that's awfully nice of you, son, to concede the obvious.
> are you a closet capitalist? <G>
Son, are you a socialist...the U.S. *is*, in fact, socialist. If you
don't like it then kindly get the fuck out of my country, thank you. ;-)
well...tell us more of your gallant and glorious victories in vietnam
;-)
Bill Clarke
It was 1975 you dumb shit and you left out the part about the NVA getting their
20 Division ass kicked in 1972. Why?
Bill Clarke
Bill Clarke
Bill Clarke
Dr. Vincent Quin, Ph.D.
Dear Sniveling Little Shit,
Ah...the '72 Easter Offensive...at last a test of "Vietnamization" where
the ARVN was touted as being able to stand on it's own. Whoops.
Son, the ARVN was being soundly defeated, forcing the U.S. to come
to their rescue in order to avoid the political fallout of yet
another U.S. military fiasco...inability to "Vietnamize" the Vietnamese.
well...tell us more of your gallant and glorious victories in vietnam
;-)
(p.s. i love your squealing, son)
> Bill Clarke, typical alt.war.vietnam Crybaby Vet
>
Anon E. Mouse
"Bill Clarke" <Bill_...@newsguy.com> wrote in message
news:j0t2a...@drn.newsguy.com...
Bill Clarke
Bill Clarke
Ph.D. says...
Don�t want to address your 1976 boo boo I see. Okay smart boy, so much for your
knowledge of the history. Tell me what U.S. Infantry Divisions rescued ARVN in
1972?
Or perhaps you would have more knowledge discussing the ground support plus
advisors plus equipment (especially artillery pieces) China gave Ho at Dien Bien
Phu? You being a fan of the communist and all you might know something about
this one.
Bill Clarke
Dr. Vincent Quin, Ph.D.
Dear Sniveling Little Shit,
Squeal. Squeal! over a typo Ha Ha Ha!
> Okay smart boy, so much for your
> knowledge of the history. Tell me what U.S. Infantry Divisions rescued ARVN in
> 1972?
Son, go find the story yourself.
> Or perhaps you would have more knowledge discussing the ground support plus
> advisors plus equipment (especially artillery pieces) China gave Ho at Dien Bien
> Phu? You being a fan of the communist and all you might know something about
> this one.
> Bill Clarke
Squeal, Crybaby Vet loser.
Ha ha ha
;-)
red...@lava.net
>> Don�t want to address your 1976 boo boo I see.
>
>Dear Sniveling Little Shit,
>
>Squeal. Squeal! over a typo Ha Ha Ha!
>
>> Okay smart boy, so much for your
>> knowledge of the history. Tell me what U.S. Infantry Divisions rescued ARVN in
>> 1972?
>
>Son, go find the story yourself.
>
>> Or perhaps you would have more knowledge discussing the ground support plus
>> advisors plus equipment (especially artillery pieces) China gave Ho at Dien Bien
>> Phu? You being a fan of the communist and all you might know something about
>> this one.
>> Bill Clarke
>
>Squeal, Crybaby Vet loser.
>
>Ha ha ha
>;-)
Aloha Doc,
Damn it, and here I was hoping I could get 'good ol' Bill' to blather
and rave over the next six months. You ruined it.
Bill's one of those high falutin' college boys and never lets you
forget it <G> I'm sure you've seen 'em in your classes.
- redvet, who's been called 'muricas worst nightmare, white trash with
money
Dr. Vincent Quin, Ph.D.
>>
>>Dear Sniveling Little Shit,
>>
>>Squeal. Squeal! over a typo Ha Ha Ha!
>>
>>
>>> Okay smart boy, so much for your
>>>knowledge of the history. Tell me what U.S. Infantry Divisions rescued ARVN in
>>>1972?
>>
>>Son, go find the story yourself.
>>
>>
>>>Or perhaps you would have more knowledge discussing the ground support plus
>>>advisors plus equipment (especially artillery pieces) China gave Ho at Dien Bien
>>>Phu? You being a fan of the communist and all you might know something about
>>>this one.
>>>Bill Clarke
>>
>>Squeal, Crybaby Vet loser.
>>
>>Ha ha ha
>>;-)
>
>
> Aloha Doc,
> Damn it, and here I was hoping I could get 'good ol' Bill' to blather
> and rave over the next six months. You ruined it.
Sorry about that...I hate ruining a good joke that we all would have enjoyed.
> Bill's one of those high falutin' college boys and never lets you
> forget it <G> I'm sure you've seen 'em in your classes.
he he he
;-)
Bill Clarke
>
>Dear Sniveling Little Shit,
>
>Squeal. Squeal! over a typo Ha Ha Ha!
Typo my ass. You showed what an ignorant shit you are.
>> Okay smart boy, so much for your
>>knowledge of the history. Tell me what U.S. Infantry Divisions rescued ARVN in
>> 1972?
>
>Son, go find the story yourself.
Well son, the story doesn't exist. That is unless you've pulled another lie out
of your ignorant ass.
>> Or perhaps you would have more knowledge discussing the ground support plus
>>advisors plus equipment (especially artillery pieces) China gave Ho at Dien Bien
>> Phu? You being a fan of the communist and all you might know something about
>> this one.
>> Bill Clarke
>
>Squeal, Crybaby Vet loser.
I understand you not wishing to discuss this. Okay.
Bill Clarke
Bill Clarke
>
>Dear Sniveling Little Shit,
>
>Squeal. Squeal! over a typo Ha Ha Ha!
Typo my ass. You showed what an ignorant shit you are.
>> Okay smart boy, so much for your
>>knowledge of the history. Tell me what U.S. Infantry Divisions rescued ARVN in
>> 1972?
>
>Son, go find the story yourself.
Well son, the story doesn't exist. That is unless you've pulled another lie out
of your ignorant ass.
>> Or perhaps you would have more knowledge discussing the ground support plus
>>advisors plus equipment (especially artillery pieces) China gave Ho at Dien Bien
>> Phu? You being a fan of the communist and all you might know something about
>> this one.
>> Bill Clarke
>
>Squeal, Crybaby Vet loser.
I understand you not wishing to discuss this. Okay.
Bill Clarke
Bill Clarke
"In your classes"! With funny shit like this I'll be here for 6 months.
>- redvet, who's been called 'muricas worst nightmare, white trash
Big of you to finally admit it, jailbird.
Bill Clarke
Ben
Vietnamese leaders. While North Vietnamese leaders are much more
willing to fight the war in Laos and Cambodia, South Vietnamese
leaders are not. In 1971, through the Vietnamization program the U.S.
provided South Vietnamese with unlimited supports and logistics but
South Vietnamese did not take that opportunity to destroy much of
North Vietnamese troops in Laos. NVA feared that U.S. and South
Vietnamese troops may across the 17th parallel to invade Quang Binh so
it put several divisions in both Laos and Quang Binh. There are about
3 NVA divisions in Laos waiting for ARVN to come. U.S. advisors
suggested Thieu to send ARVN 1st and 2nd infantry divisions along with
the Marines and paratroopers brigades to deal with 3 NVA divisions and
the other 3 div. from North Vietnam that would join them later. Thieu
refused and after a week, ARVN were outnumbered and had to run. The
paratrooper brigade was almost decimated because 2 NVA divisions
ganged up on them after the 1st inf div. ran. In combat, an NVA
division can easily take out an AVRN inf. division but Thieu let ARVN
be outnumbered. This is a serious mistake. The South Vietnamese
should realize that this is their war to defend their own freedom and
should commit at least 3 to 4 inf divisions to deal with possible 6
NVA divisions, but their attitude was this is the American war and
they were not motivated to fight. Communist spies inside ARVN joint
chief of staff and president palace also disclosed the plan to invade
Laos many weeks in advance and thus allowing NVA to calculate all
artillery targets of all hills and landing zones that they predict
ARVN and U.S. will use. By the time ARVN paratroopers took over many
hills for firebases, they were appalled to see all positions are
marked by NVAs troops for artilleries. Communist agents in Join Chief
of Staff also manage to order a delay the delivery of antitank mines
and M72s from Danang and thus delayed the advance of ARVN a few days
so that NVA have enough time to set the ambush. Despite B52 bombings
that killed several thousands communist troops and wiped out an NVA
division headquarter, several ARVN troops were outnumbered by 6 NVA
divisions. Had Thieu sent 5 inf divisions troops to Laos to deal with
6 NVA divisions, with U.S. unlimited air supports, 6 NVA divisions
would be wiped out and NVA would not be able to launch the Easter 1972
attacks. Despite the loss of over 10,000 NVAs troops mostly to U.S.
bombings and artilleries, NVAs won because the ARVN 1st Inf division
were outnumbered and ran for their lives, left behind numerous tanks
and artillery. Furthermore ARVN generals did not care about their own
troops during the operation. Commanders ARVN paratroopers and Marines
never set foot in the battle field. General Lam, commander of I Corps
also refused to come to Quang Tri, leaving everything to lower ranks
and Americans. When South Vietnamese leaders don't care about their
own war, their own troops, they should be defeated.
Ben
> Furthermore ARVN generals did not care about their own
> troops during the operation. Commanders ARVN paratroopers and Marines
> never set foot in the battle field. General Lam, commander of I Corps
> also refused to come to Quang Tri, leaving everything to lower ranks
> and Americans. When South Vietnamese leaders don't care about their
> own war, their own troops, they should be defeated.
>
in the Lamson 719? At Ap Bac battle in 1963, less than 100 ARVN died
as they forced VCs to withdraw, ARVN did not flee and left behind
numerous tanks and artillery like Lamson 719, but U.S. media cried out
loud and demanded the removal of Diem, head of state. At Lamson 719,
the U.S. did not ask for the removal of Gen. Lam out of I Corps or
Gen. Khang out of Marines. Although ARVN Marines and Paratroopers did
nor run in chaos like the ARVN 1st Inf div., failure to set foot with
soldiers in the major battle is dereliction of duty and the commanders
should be fired. Gen. Khang was later replaced by Gen. Lan to head
the Marines. Thieu's should also be removed because he didn't care
about his troops about to be outnumbered by NVAs. Why ARVN troops had
to be under command of irresponsible generals?
Without the removal of Thieu, the destruction of ARVN came in 1975
when Thieu ordered his generals to abandon his troops in I and II
Corps. Within 15 days of March 1975, ARVN lost 500,000 troops, and
billions dollars worth of heavy artillery and tanks. NVA generals were
so surprised that ARVNs were defeated so easily.
The biggest mistake of US leaders is to convince South Vietnamese that
this is their war for their own freedom and survival. By 1975, even
president Thieu still believes that this is the American war, and
Americans have more interests in defending South Vietnam than South
Vietnamese. They were wrong,.
What president Johnson should have done in 1964 is to let communist
forces take over Saigon later and sent South Vietnamese to re-
education camps. By that time South Vietnamese would either decide to
fight for their own freedom or surrender. If the South Vietnamese were
willing to fight and die for their freedom, President Johnson could
appeal to Americans and United Nations to push Communist forces back
to the 17th parallel like the Korean war. And anti-war movement would
not have a reason to exist.
Early intervention in 1964 with massive troops in Vietnam in 1965 only
led to over dependence on the U.S. from the South Vietnamese. By 1975,
except for a small population of less than10 percent, the South
Vietnamese proved to the world that they don't want to fight and die
for their own freedom. They quickly gave up and surrendered. The U.S.
missed the window of opportunity to let South Vietnamese to take over
the fight for their own survival in 1965.
This mistake should be avoided in Iraq and Afghanistan. The people of
Iraq and Afghanistan should realize that they have to fight for their
own freedom and survival.
Dr. Vincent Quin, Ph.D.
>
> Why didn't Americans react to the failure of ARVN
We did, son...we left your phony "South" Vietnam.
;-)
John Michilin
red...@lava.net
John, please clarify....- redvet
John Michilin
> On Wed, 10 Aug 2011 14:28:21 -0700 (PDT), John Michilin
>
> >On Aug 10, 5:06 pm, "Dr. Vincent Quin, Ph.D." <d...@coldine.edu>
> >wrote:
> >> Ben wrote:
>
> >> > Why didn't Americans react to the failure of ARVN
>
> >> We did, son...we left your phony "South" Vietnam.
> >> ;-)
>
> >You lost, loser!
>
> John, please clarify....- redvet
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2049639/posts
http://www.learnhistory.org.uk/vietnam/usdefeat.htm
http://wiki.answers.com/Q/Why_did_the_US_lose_the_Vietnam_War
http://www.enotes.com/history/discuss/why-did-america-lose-vietnam-war-88199
http://www.strategypage.com/militaryforums/1-4072.aspx
http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20071125093201AAIj7WK
red...@lava.net
<johnmi...@gmail.com> wrote:
>On Aug 11, 7:26 pm, red...@lava.net wrote:
>> On Wed, 10 Aug 2011 14:28:21 -0700 (PDT), John Michilin
>>
>> <johnmichi...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> >On Aug 10, 5:06 pm, "Dr. Vincent Quin, Ph.D." <d...@coldine.edu>
>> >wrote:
>> >> Ben wrote:
>>
>> >> > Why didn't Americans react to the failure of ARVN
>>
>> >>
>> >> ;-)
>>
>> >You lost, loser!
>>
>> John, please clarify....- redvet
>
>http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2049639/posts
>
>http://www.learnhistory.org.uk/vietnam/usdefeat.htm
>
>http://wiki.answers.com/Q/Why_did_the_US_lose_the_Vietnam_War
>
>http://www.enotes.com/history/discuss/why-did-america-lose-vietnam-war-88199
>
>http://www.strategypage.com/militaryforums/1-4072.aspx
>
>http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20071125093201AAIj7WK
Yes John, interesting and factual evidence of the 'murican defeat in
Vietnam. You do know you were responding to "Dr. Vincent Quin, Ph.D".
" We did, son...we left your phony "South" Vietnam."
Perhaps if you are to be taken seriously, you need to review doc's
posting history on this subject....just sayin'...
redvet
Facilitator
Hawaii Outpost
Vietnam Veterans Against the War/Anti-Imperialist
http://host274.hostmonster.com/~vvawaior/
John Michilin
> On Thu, 11 Aug 2011 16:35:55 -0700 (PDT), John Michilin
>
>
>
>
>
> <johnmichi...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >On Aug 11, 7:26 pm, red...@lava.net wrote:
> >> On Wed, 10 Aug 2011 14:28:21 -0700 (PDT), John Michilin
>
> >> <johnmichi...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> >On Aug 10, 5:06 pm, "Dr. Vincent Quin, Ph.D." <d...@coldine.edu>
> >> >wrote:
> >> >> Ben wrote:
>
> >> >> > Why didn't Americans react to the failure of ARVN
>
> >> >> ;-)
>
> >> >You lost, loser!
>
> >> John, please clarify....- redvet
>
> >http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2049639/posts
>
> >http://www.learnhistory.org.uk/vietnam/usdefeat.htm
>
> >http://wiki.answers.com/Q/Why_did_the_US_lose_the_Vietnam_War
>
>
> >http://www.strategypage.com/militaryforums/1-4072.aspx
>
> >http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20071125093201AAIj7WK
>
> Yes John, interesting and factual evidence of the 'murican defeat in
> Vietnam. You do know you were responding to "Dr. Vincent Quin, Ph.D".
> " We did, son...we left your phony "South" Vietnam."
>
> Perhaps if you are to be taken seriously, you need to review doc's
> posting history on this subject....just sayin'...
>
> redvet
> Facilitator
> Hawaii Outpost
>
> - Show quoted text -
What's wrong when I said, "You lost, loser!"?
Ben
noted weaknesses of Lamson 719 included the failure to commit the ARVN
2nd Inf division to deal with the large amount of NVA troops in the
area, the insubordination and lack of coordination between I Corps
commander and the commander of Airborne and Marine divisions, lack of
participation from Airborne and Marine commanders, and very little air
supports from ARVN 1st Air Force. Without massive air supports from
the U.S., ARVN troops would suffer a lot more casualties.
Below is what Gen Hinh wrote at the end of is book:
http://www.vlink.com/nlvnch/lamson719/lamson7.html
"Observations and Evaluation
Operation LAM SON 719 was terminated unexpectedly and in haste.
Despite official denials to the contrary by GVN authorities, the fact
could not be hidden from the inquisitive media reporters of the Free
World. The campaign had lasted only 45 days, much shorter than its
intended duration, but it was long enough to create a disquieting
impact on the troops and population alike. Much speculation had arisen
about the merits of the operation measured against the losses and
casualties that I Corps had suffered. Was it worth all the bloodshed
and the bodies and wounded left behind? Was it a victory or a defeat?
Popular sentiment seemed to be aroused by the dramatic accounts and
personal feelings of the I Corps troops who returned from Laos. Almost
without exception, they did not believe they were victorious.
To political and military leaders of South Vietnam, the Laotian
incursion offered further proof of close cooperation between the U.S.
and RVN in the face of the enemy's threat. They had long coveted such
an action but knew that South Vietnam alone could not destroy the war
sustaining lifeline from North Vietnam so they had welcomed the
American initiative with unconcealed enthusiasm.
The general situation at that time also lent itself to a focus of
attention on our objectives in lower Laos. The turnabout in Cambodia's
political attitude and the resulting cross-border operations of 1970
brought about encouraging prospects of denying safe havens and storage
areas to the enemy in that terminal section of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
The prospects would look still better if the Communist lifeline could
be cut at its most sensitive point - in lower Laos. Domestically, the
Vietnamization program was making excellent progress. After the
Cambodian incursion of 1970, the RVNAF felt as if they had matured
overnight and desired another chance to prove it. With every passing
day, the security situation looked better and better despite our
anticipation of additional reductions in U.S. combat forces; at the
beginning of 1971 a total of over 250,000 U.S. troops had already
departed since the Vietnamization program was initiated and another
redeployment increment was scheduled in the near future. Politically,
two important events, the RVN and U.S. presidential elections, in late
1971 and 1972 respectively, were drawing near. These and the improved
military situation in South Vietnam joined hands to provide the
rationale for LAM SON 719.
Once the decision had been made, the combined planning for the
operation between Vietnamese and American staffs became a shining
example of close and effective cooperation. By the time the J-3, JGS
relayed the official decision to the I Corps commander and briefed him
on the general concept of the operation, the initial planning process
was already underway by the I Corps and the U.S. XXIV Corps staffs.
This was made possible by an instant exchange of data concerning the
enemy situation, U.S. support, characteristics of the area of
operations, especially those pertaining to North Vietnam and the
target area which were almost exclusively provided by the C-2, U.S.
XXIV Corps. Everything that should be known by I Corps about the enemy
was made available including order of battle on NVA forces in North
Vietnam and Laos, the status of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and enemy
activities on it, the situation in Base Areas 604 and 611, and
disposition of enemy units and detailed information on the enemy's
anti-aircraft capabilities in the area of operation. Aerial photos
were scrutinized with particular care. Our intensive study and
planning resulted in estimates that bolstered confidence. The enemy's
opposition would be initially light. His antiaircraft system would be
effectively neutralized by our devastating firepower. Our helilift
capabilities and mechanized assets would make short work of the
occupation of key objectives. Initially, it was thought that Tchepone
could be ours after three days of combat. (6) Naturally, after that,
our search activities would expand and continue until the enemy's
logistical system in the area of operation was effectively strangled.
Although there was no official record of the anticipated duration of
the campaign, it could be inferred from public statements and private
comments made by authorities that the operation was to last until the
onset of the rainy season in lower Laos, or about early May 1971. From
then on, monsoon rains over the Truong Son Mountain Range would
inhibit the enemy's infiltration and logistic activities.
The close coordination between I Corps and U.S. XXIV Corps continued
during the entire course of the operation by a constant exchange of
combat information which resulted in appropriate modifications of the
original plan and even better cooperation. Intelligence continued to
be an important aspect of the combined effort. Initial data provided
by U.S. forces were corroborated and complemented by battle reports
and intelligence gathered from enemy prisoners and ralliers which in
time became particularly important with regard to the confirmation of
enemy units, the movements of enemy troops and the day to day
situation along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. All these data were shared
between the U.S. and ARVN staffs. During the initial phase of the
campaign, the advance of ARVN units was bold, swift and effective. The
concept of maneuvering along ridgelines by helilift combined with a
series of fire support bases allowed an audacious progress, well
supported by artillery. Heliborne movements were coordinated with an
armor thrust; these forces linked up at predetermined objectives along
the axis of the main effort. Both the northern and southern flanks of
this effort were also protected and once the final objective was
attained, the actual search of the target area and exploitation of
combat gains could be expanded.
This was a sound concept whose success depended on the superiority
enjoyed by ARVN in terms of heliborne mobility, air power and
mechanized capabilities. Swift progress made step by step and from
peak to peak, and occupation of dominating terrain features by a
series of mutually supporting fire support bases where the essence of
that concept. It was in fact the faithful transplant of a combat
tactic that had worked for so
many years in South Vietnam and should work in lower Laos, given the
considerable concentration of resources. This also offered the ARVN
forces an opportunity to put into combat practice what they had
learned from combined operations with U.S. forces.
The rough, jungled terrain of lower Laos proved particularly difficult
for ARVN forces. In every advance, they were apt to be engaged by the
enemy in heavy firefights. At almost all prominent terrain features in
the area, they met head on with solid defensive positions deployed by
enemy logistic units. This defense system, consisting of mutually
supporting, well dug in, crescent shape, covered trench segments,
which the enemy called "horseshoe blocks," was extremely difficult and
time consuming to break through since their destruction would require
accurate, highly concentrated artillery fire.
One of the first major problems that our forces had to face, in
addition to the enemy's blocking positions, was his elusive but
devastating anti-aircraft system. The most common weapon he used
against our air-craft was the 12.7-mm heavy machinegun which
constantly switched firing positions. In addition, throughout the
area, there were about 200 AAA pieces from 23-mm up to 100-mm, some of
them radar controlled. Even these heavy weapons frequently changed
their firing positions which were usually well concealed. In general,
the enemy's anti-aircraft system seemed to be well coordinated and its
fire controlled with skill and discipline. His heavy machineguns such
as 12.7-mm, 14.5-mm or even 23-mm, were arranged in a diamond or
circle pattern, affording mutual protection and providing a well
coordinated fire trap. For example, one weapon could open fire to draw
our aircraft to it and when our aircraft made the attack, it would
enter another weapon's field of fire. Enemy AAA positions not only
changed frequently, they also moved in uncomfortably close to our
units in coordination with an envelopment and attack by infantry
troops. As a result, they were extremely difficult to destroy and the
price our helicopters had to pay when lifting troops, delivering
supplies or evacuating the wounded was high.
Another enemy weapon that was least expected in view of the adverse
terrain in lower Laos was the tank. Since the very first days of the
operation, our troops had detected and reported traces of tracked
vehicles. Then enemy prisoners provided additional information which
pointed to the presence of an armor regiment in the area. It was only
later when some of these tanks made their appearance that they were
observed and attacked by U.S. aircraft. Then, a combined infantry-
armor attack against FSB 31 made it all too clear that tanks were
being used extensively by the enemy although in a rather unorthodox
manner. In his attack against FSB 30, for example, the enemy used
tanks only to provide direct support fire, and at FSB Delta, his flame
throwing tanks repulsed a counterattack by our Marine troops. The
enemy's employment of armor was even more unorthodox in that tanks
were used individually to ambush our troops along well concealed
jungle paths, as if they were playing a hide and seek game. This
tactic worked because the enemy knew well the system of paths that
crisscrossed the area. Against our armor or truck convoys, enemy tanks
were usually positioned in ambush, then suddenly opened fire and
withdrew quickly into jungle paths. In addition to PT-76's, the enemy
also employed medium T-54 and T-34 tanks whose 100-mm and 85-mm guns
had a greater firepower than our 76-mm M-41 light tanks. Confined to a
one way road with little room for cross-country maneuvers, ARVN armor
units found themselves in an extremely disadvantageous position.
While enemy infantry troops seemed to have excellent anti-tank
capabilities with their B-40 and B-41 teams and their ambush tactics,
our infantrymen were not well prepared against enemy tanks. ARVN
airborne troops, for example, complained about the ineffectiveness of
the M-72 light anti-tank weapon(7). As a result, old 3.5" rocket
launchers
and new 90-mm recoilless rifles were quickly brought in as
replacements. Even U.S. gun-ships during the early stage of the
operation were not armed with HEAT rockets which were required to
knock out tanks. Our head on collision with enemy tanks, therefore,
was obviously a big tactical surprise.
Enemy artillery also posed a challenge that could not be easily met.
In the first place, mortars of all calibers formed close rings of fire
around our positions. Their continuous firing indicated that the enemy
had an ample supply of ammunition which was probably pre-positioned.
Next came recoilless rifles, rockets and artillery of all types. For
the first time in the war, ARVN forces came to grips with the deadly
fire of enemy 152-mm howitzers and 130-mm guns which had a range far
greater than their own 105-mm and 155-mm howitzers. Enemy artillery
was emplaced in scattered, individual positions, some dug into
mountain slopes to elude our counter battery fire. In action, several
pieces would open fire at the same time from several directions,
making them all the more difficult for our forces to locate. Without
field radar, ARVN forces had to rely on their technique of crater
analysis which did not produce accurate results.
The enemy effectively coordinated all his capabilities, to include
antiaircraft, artillery, mortars and massive infantry formations to
envelop and overrun our FSBs as well as our mobile units. As soon as a
FSB was established or a unit had debarked on a landing zone, the
enemy's encirclement process would begin, first by mortars which moved
in at close range around the position and opened fire every time
helicopters landed or took off. Then, antiaircraft teams and infantry
units advanced to complete the ring, always keeping as close as they
could to our position, while from many directions further away, enemy
artillery guns zeroed in to create a continuing state of tension
within our base. The surrounding web of antiaircraft weapons, mortars
and artillery gradually became so thick that the base was effectively
isolated and no re-supply or medical evacuation activities could be
conducted. A FSB was usually occupied and defended by an ARVN
battalion which normally deployed from two to three companies to man a
security
belt around the base. This ARVN tactic worked fine in South Vietnam in
most situations. However, in the face of a more concentrated
encirclement combined with artillery fire and ground attacks and
frequently with an armor thrust, this ARVN defensive tactic proved to
be less effective. Under these conditions, a single battalion was
eventually overpowered and lost the initiative. The final attack to
overrun a base was usually conducted with a massive concentration of
infantry troops usually outnumbering the defenders by three to five
times without regard to losses.
In the face of these difficulties which ARVN forces were not prepared
to meet, Operation LAM SON 719 bogged down as soon as it reached Ban
Dong. First the rangers, then the paratroopers, and finally the armor
troops, all had the chance to prove their gallantry in combat and
indeed inflicted severe losses to the enemy. But by this time, the
ARVN forces had lost their initiative and our vigorous offensive
thrust was blunted. The state of inconclusive, seesaw fighting
continued until the beginning of March when, with increased U.S.
helilift and firepower support, the 2d Regiment of the 1st Infantry
Division succeeded in landing in Tchepone, the major terrain objective
of the entire operation. For all its merits, this exploit was more a
symbolic gesture than a real achievement. It merely meant that "we
were there."
The 2d Regiment did not stay long in Tchepone. The imbalance of forces
by that time precluded any attempt at holding and exploiting this
objective. Our success in reaching Tchepone was largely due to a
flexibility in plans and the awesome capability of U.S. helicopters.
The real prize, however, was not to be found there. It was located
further west where the enemy's more important supply caches still lay
unsheltered on the ground. But ARVN forces could not get there nor
could they afford to linger long in Tchepone. As swiftly as they came
in, they were extracted in haste before the enemy had time to regroup
and react. A previous prolonged search of the area of Route 914 by the
1st Division had shown that enemy reactions were swift. This was
another indication of our inability to achieve what had been
originally intended. It was true that U.S. helicopters helped with the
maneuvering
of our forces but the overall tactical imbalance that prevailed at
that time made it impossible for ARVN forces to hold terrain and
exploit the gains. This was a truth that no one could deny.
Throughout the operation, the role played by U.S. combat support was
particularly illustrious. It was evident that without this support, no
incursion would have been possible, much less on such a large scale.
The fact that ARVN forces were able to progress into Laos as far as
Tchepone was a measure of the significance of United States support.
When enemy resistance developed into such proportions that no further
progress was possible, it became all the more obvious that without
U.S. combat troops in the rear and without U.S. helicopters and
tactical air support for the frontline, it would have been impossible
to withdraw with any satisfactory degree of unit integrity.
U.S. support assets were plentiful, but it appeared that during the
early stage of the operation, their control and coordination were not
entirely satisfactory. Part of the problem seemed to derive from the
physical separation of major operational headquarters. The U.S. XXIV
Corps Forward CP was installed at Quang Tri Base while its
counterpart, I Corps Forward CP was at Dong Ha, about 10 miles to the
northwest. Still, another important element of I Corps Forward CP, the
operational control staff, was located further west at Ham Nghi Base
(Khe Sanh) which was 35 miles southwest of Dong Ha. Operating on the
principle of cooperation and coordination, both the U.S. and ARVN
staffs found it difficult to work effectively while physically
separated. At Ham Nghi Base, an important hub of support activities
where all ARVN divisions' rear echelon headquarters and U.S. forward
support agencies were located, there was no official representative of
the Commanding General, U.S. XXIV Corps with authority for control and
coordination. All decisions pertaining to support and the distribution
of support assets had to be made at the Quang Tri Base. As a result,
at the forward echelon, the direction of support effort suffered from
delays and the coordination of support activities was too loose for a
fast changing tactical situation which required timely decisions on
the spot.
This shortcoming was remedied however, when a U.S. Joint Coordinating
Group (JCG) was established on 1 March 1977 under the control of the
Commander, U.S 108th Artillery Group who represented, the Commanding
General, U.S. XXIV Corps. Members of the JCG included the deputy
commander U.S. 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) who acted as an
aviation officer, a representative of the G-3, U.S. XXIV Corps, and a
representative of the U.S. 7th Air Force (not a permanent member). Co-
located with I Corps Tactical Control CP at Ham Nghi Base, this Joint
Coordinating Group proved to be extremely effective in the rapid
coordination of U.S. combat support assets. Working hand in hand with
the I Corps commander and his staff who provided timely data for the
planning of support operations, the JCG chief and his aviation officer
were able to assist them in the process of operational planning and
decision making by providing expert advice.
Although a combined operation, LAM SON 719 had an unusual character of
its own. It was the first large scale operation undertaken without the
direct participation of U.S. advisers. Long accustomed to the presence
of advisers which they found reassuring and invaluable, especially in
difficult combat situations, ARVN regimental and battalion commanders
went into Laos with apprehensive feelings. They realized that this was
going to be a difficult challenge and they were not too sure they
could handle the problem of communications with supporting U.S. units.
This had always been an exclusive service provided by their advisers
in addition to regular and routine advisory assistance. But they had
to accomplish all requirements by themselves this time, and despite
some apprehensions, they all felt proud and believed they could excel
without their advisers. After all, as unit commanders, they were
accustomed to assuming responsibility which they routinely discharged
without difficulty whether it was administrative work, troop training
or the conduct of combat operations with only ARVN support. Their self
assurance and determination was demonstrated throughout LAM SON 719.
Due to special arrangements to provide Vietnamese interpreters aboard
FAC and AFCC aircraft, ARVN unit commanders handled the problem of
calling for U.S. support quite professionally.
U.S. advisers could have helped more had they been permitted to do so.
As it was, only one member from each division advisory team was
allowed in the air at any time over his division's tactical area of
responsibility. The division senior advisers were not allowed to
overfly Laos at any time. Although the advisers in the air over the
divisions monitored the situation closely and helped greatly in
difficult problems of support, they were often overwhelmed by requests
for assistance from several divisional units which were being engaged
by the enemy simultaneously. Confined to the divisions' rear echelon
CPs inside South Vietnam, the senior advisers were able only to
expedite support through reports or map studies.
The question has often surfaced concerning President Thieu's personal
influence on the operation. From the beginning it was obvious that his
influence was decisive. It was he who approved the idea of launching
an offensive into lower Laos, concurred with the general concept of
operation and decided to augment the forces for I Corps. The JGS only
acted with his approval. The attachment of the Airborne and Marine
Divisions to I Corps for the offensive effort, for example, could not
have been done without President Thieu's personal approval. But the
selection of 8 February as D- day, as far as I can determine, was a
recommendation of the combined planning staffs of I Corps and the U.S.
XXIV Corps. President Thieu had been briefed on this selected date by
the I Corps commander. Therefore, without strong reasons for a change,
the I Corps commander apparently felt committed to the decision that
he had recommended and obtained from the President.
But President Thieu's role was not confined just to the decision to
proceed with the operation. At least on two occasions, the directives
he gave to the I Corps commander clearly affected the course of the
operation itself. During a visit to I Corps on 19 February, in the
company of a central government delegation, he received an operational
briefing presented by the participating ARVN field commanders. During
this briefing they outlined for him the serious difficulties being met
by ARVN units in lower Laos with the implied suggestion that a deeper
incursion would be inadvisable. At that time, the Ranger 21st and 39th
Battalions were being heavily engaged and FSBs 30 and 31 began
to detect strong enemy pressure. President Thieu made a few remarks to
the effect that ARVN forces should take their time and should conduct
search operations in the vicinities of their present positions while
waiting for developments. From that day on, the Airborne Division
would not make any further advance.
The second time involved the decision to push into Tchepone. On 28
February, President Thieu met again with the I Corps commander in
Saigon. By this time, progress on the ground had been stalled for over
two weeks and the foreign press was publicizing daily ARVN's inability
to advance further. During this meeting, it was President Thieu who
decided that ARVN forces should go into Tchepone. As a result, General
Lam produced his plan to occupy Tchepone and President Thieu ordered
the JOS to reinforce I Corps with the entire Marine Division and
additional armor elements. The attack against Tchepone was conceived
merely as a short term raid to be conducted primarily for its
propaganda and morale value. Although President Thieu suggested that
the Marine Division be used to relieve the Airborne Division in the
main effort, General Lam convinced him that the 1st Division would be
better in this role, while the marines could be employed to protect
the rear and the LOC. The division commanders present also agreed that
the advance, except for the raid to Tchepone, should be suspended
until the enemy's intentions and capabilities became more clear. The
field commanders and General Lam also persuaded President Thieu that
reinforcement with the 2d Division in Laos would not improve the
situation. Now that the initiative had been largely assumed by the
NVA, a much more potent force than the 2d Division would be required
to recapture it. Finally, President Thieu's desire to conduct a raid
in force into Muong Nong ceased to be a practicable course of action
by the time the withdrawal was beginning and General Lam exercised his
command prerogatives by not attempting it. It was clear that President
Thieu listened carefully to the recommendations of his field
commanders, that he did not arbitrarily impose rigid instructions upon
them, but that he allowed them the latitude in the execution of plans
and orders that combat commanders must have.
The conduct of the operation was also plagued by dissension verging on
insubordination among some ARVN field commanders. Lieutenant General
Lam was never able to exercise full control over the commanders of the
Airborne and Marine Divisions who were his equals in rank. Of the two,
Lieutenant General Du Quoc Dong, the paratrooper, proved to be more
submissive, but he did not always carry out the I Corps commander's
orders in a strict manner. Lieutenant General Le Nguyen Khang,
Commander of the Marine Division, who was more senior in rank than the
I Corps commander, delegated his command authority to his deputy,
Colonel Bui The Lan, who directly exercised operational control over
the entire division. While occasionally present at the Marine
Division's rear echelon CP, General Khang never attended any official
operational briefings presided over by the I Corps Commander. Because
of this, the Marine Division acted independently on a few occasions
when the odds were against it. For example, it made its own decision
to abandon FSB Hotel and withdraw its troops from Laos.
President Thieu and General Vien, Chief of the JGS, were probably
aware of the discord among their subordinates, but they took no
remedial action. Perhaps General Lam did not ask for such an action.
Or perhaps the matter was so delicate among these generals, who were
all considered pillars of the regime, that it defied any easy
solution.
This dissension among commanders adversely affected staff coordination
between I Corps and the Airborne and Marine Divisions. Many reports
were delayed; at times, there were no reports at all. As a result, I
Corps was unable to control the situation effectively, especially when
the enemy pressure began to increase significantly. Because of this,
General Lam chose an organic unit of I Corps, the 1st Division, for
the Tchepone mission instead of the Airborne or Marine Division.
LAM SON 719 was further impeded by advance news dispatches in the
press. During the preparatory period, reporters were not allowed into
the Quang Tri area but this aroused their curiosity and gave rise to
speculation. The press seemed to be able to pick up leads and develop
them into news dispatches that gave every detail of the operation as
of the end of January 1971. Thus, the advantages of surprise were lost
very
early and the enemy had ample time to prepare. As early as during the
first days of February, Tchepone had already been mentioned as an
objective. After that, U.S. Government officials publicly praised the
merits of the Laotian campaign which would ensure the continued
redeployment of U.S. forces. Then on 8 February, the day I Corps
forces crossed the border into Laos, President Thieu went on TV to
personally break the news to the Vietnamese public. As the operation
continued, press reports increasingly focused on the small district
town of Tchepone as the final objective. To the RVN, it had become an
objective to be attained at all costs.
While the RVN announced that its troops had occupied Tchepone, North
Vietnam quickly and loudly disclaimed it. The GVN in the mean time
received foreign press reporters with a total lack of enthusiasm and
did not allow them easy access to battleground visits as it had during
other operations. This increased suspicion and speculation. Subsequent
press articles and pictures depicting the withdrawal of ARVN troops
from Laos further confused attempts at assessing the offensive
campaign correctly, particularly by foreign observers. However, with
the exception of the minority elite in big cities, the South
Vietnamese general public was not influenced by the foreign press.
Still, the initial publicity about LAM SON 719 looked embarrassingly
hollow in their eyes in view of the hasty termination of the
operation. This impression lingered on despite official announcements
of victory and the ribbons and medals awarded to the "victorious"
troops of I Corps.
If the premature conclusion of the Laotian campaign could not be
effectively screened from the outside world, it was all too clear to
insiders that the campaign was an unfinished job. The intended and
desired goal to sustain combat until the onset of the rainy season in
order to strangle the enemy's supply route could not be accomplished.
Only 45 days after ARVN forces had crossed the border, they were
already back in South Vietnam. The two lesser raids that were
subsequently conducted sought to enhance the public image of the RVNAF
more than to achieve military gains. Finally, the returns produced by
LAM SON 719 in terms of enemy caches destroyed were not even as
impressive
as those of the Cambodian incursion. For one thing, ARVN forces had
stopped short of the real prize, the area west of Tchepone where most
of the enemy's supplies lay vulnerable on the ground. For another, the
search and destruction of Base Area 611 could not be carried out as
planned because the tactical balance no longer favored the
continuation of the operation in that direction.
Regardless of these shortcomings, a substantial number of the
objectives had been accomplished which required ARVN units to fight
hard and incur great sacrifices. Topping the honor roll, the 1st ARVN
Infantry Division stood up to its reputation as the number one ARVN
combat unit. The division's organic units maneuvered with skill and
were well led; its well disciplined troops fought with gallantry and
dedication. During its 42 days of operation in Laos, the division was
extremely active south of Route No. 9. Switching its effort during the
final days, it successfully pushed toward Tchepone and occupied it.
During the withdrawal, some of its units were heavily engaged and
suffered losses. Despite this, the 1st Infantry Division accomplished
its mission with top honors.
Long considered as the elite unit of the RVNAF, the Airborne Division
did not perform as brilliantly as its reputation would indicate during
LAM SON 719. Despite the enemy's superiority in maneuvering forces and
his employment of new weapons, the fact that the division was unable
to hold FSB 31 seemed to be indicative of its lack of contingency
planning for such a situation. But our airborne units fought extremely
well as individual elements. One of the division's brigade commanders
was missing in action - probably captured by the enemy; and five out
of nine of its battalion commanders were either killed or wounded.
This testified to the intense fighting that the division had to face
but by and large, the division accomplished nothing spectacular in its
assigned mission. During the final stage, the division also failed to
provide effective flank protection for the major effort and secure
Route No. 9 even with the reinforcement of four armor squadrons. This
failure greatly complicated the ARVN withdrawal from Laos.
As for the Marine Division, it was the first time it had participated
in an operation as a division. Accustomed to operating separately at
brigade level, and in view of the traditional autonomy of its
brigades, the division seemed to have problems of command and control.
The 147th Marine Brigade did not succeed in clearing the enemy
pressure around FSB Delta despite continuous efforts for several days.
Then the division made its own decision to withdraw from FSB Hotel and
its positions on the Co Roc promontory, apparently to avoid facing a
difficult battle. This action clearly reflected the autonomy enjoyed
by the division commander, Lieutenant General Le Nguyen Khang, who did
not consider himself under the control of the I Corps commander but
still made tactical decisions that affected the latter's conduct of
the operation. Despite this, Marine units fought extremely well during
sustained combat under heavy enemy pressure. Regardless of losses,
they always retained unit integrity and cohesiveness.
The 1st Ranger Group was heavily engaged as soon as it was deployed.
Its 39th and 21st Battalions responded well to the enemy's massive
attacks and also inflicted severe losses on enemy units. The early
withdrawal of this Group did not allow a correct evaluation of its
performance.
As to ARVN armor units, their employment in LAM SON 719 was perhaps
one of the very few occasions of any large concentration during the
war. The 1st Armor Brigade was committed initially with only two
squadrons; this total was later increased to four in addition to two
troops of M-4l light tanks re-deployed from MR-2. These reinforcements
were introduced to offset some losses but still the deployment of all
these armored forces on a short stretch of narrow jungle road not even
20 kilometers in length and affording no room for maneuver represented
perhaps one of the unwisest moves on the part of the tactical
commanders involved (8). If this decision was deliberate, then perhaps
they had
seriously underestimated the enemy's capabilities or the restrictions
dictated by the terrain in that area. As a result, the 1st Armor
Brigade was at a great disadvantage when faced with enemy tanks deep
in the jungle. In those circumstances, ARVN armor officers were
naturally unable to make effective use of combat tactics they had
learned in Western service schools. The brigade commander was also not
resourceful enough to meet this unusual combat challenge. The outcome
was evident: only one third of the total number of armored vehicles
committed managed to return home after accomplishing nothing
substantial. If someone was to be held responsible for this failure,
the question would arise as to whether it should be the commander of
the brigade or his superior, who committed this unit to such an
undesirable and impossible situation.
In contrast, I Corps artillery performed exceptionally well during the
entire operation. Fire coordination between ARVN and U.S. supporting
units was extremely flexible and effective. Divisional artillery units
providing direct support in Laos fared less well, however. Their
deployment was also limited. Each infantry regiment or brigade was
supported by only one 105-mm battery and one 155-mm battery. Given the
number of artillery pieces left behind in Laos after the hasty
withdrawal, one may wonder whether we should have committed more
artillery assets to the battle.
The 1st Air Division, Vietnam Air Force, did not play a significant
role in providing close air support for I Corps forces. Its
participation and contributions were rather modest even by RVNAP
standards due to the availability of the United States Air Force. The
1st Area Logistics Command, by contrast, proved to be resourceful and
capable enough to meet the challenge of providing support for a corps
size operation on short notice. Its lack of initial preparations were
more than offset by the solid backing given by U.S. logistical
agencies.
Lessons learned
LAM SON 719 reflected quite accurately the strengths and weaknesses of
the RVNAF combat effectiveness in almost every area: organization,
command, leadership, motivation, operating techniques, planning, and
execution. It was impeded by certain significant errors and
shortcomings that made the entire effort fall short of its intended
goal.
Foremost among the most significant problems of LAM SON 719 was
perhaps timely tactical intelligence. To give due credit to the
intelligence effort, one must admit that intelligence estimates
concerning the operation were definitely accurate or nearly accurate
as far as enemy capabilities in antiaircraft weapons and troop
reinforcements were concerned. However, they were less accurate in
other areas. Enemy artillery and armor capabilities were not listed as
significant factors. In addition, reports on the area of concentrated
supplies were not entirely accurate. Several enemy prisoners in fact
disclosed that most supplies caches had been evacuated to areas
outside the AO. The enemy appeared not to be surprised at all; by
contrast, he had been prepared and expecting our forces to come in.
This led to the conclusion that several things concerning the enemy
had eluded our collection capabilities. Once more, the Vietnam war
seemed to have taught us some useful things about intelligence and
security. To be more effective, a more extensive collection network
would seem to be indicated with emphasis on human intelligence in the
areas under enemy control. Then, analysis, evaluation and
interpretation of enemy capabilities should be made with the full
cognizance that they were apt to change very rapidly and as a result,
estimates would have to concentrate not only on the current situation
but also on how it was going to change. At the same time, for an
operation of that scale and importance, a more conscious effort at
deceiving the enemy by a comprehensive deception scheme perhaps would
have helped offset the adverse effect of publicity and effectively
confused the enemy. What we did for LAM SON 719 was certainly not
enough for the purpose contemplated.
Planning and preparations for the offensive were another major area
that needed improvement. The operational plan for LAM SON 719 was
adequate only so long as the operation progressed smoothly and ARVN
forces were able to hold the initiative. It should have taken
contingencies into full consideration and been able to respond to them
with resourcefulness. The extent and intensity of enemy reactions, for
example, were one contingency that planners apparently overlooked.
Then the enemy could well reinforce his resistance by diversionary
actions elsewhere in South Vietnam, too. The absence of contingency
planning was a glaring deficiency of LAM SON 719. ARVN units were also
not thoroughly prepared when they went into Laos. Elite troops like
the paratroopers, for example, had problems using the M-72 light anti-
tank weapon. Several other units did not have enough warm clothes and
blankets for their troops. FSB 31, which was supposed to serve as a
major supporting base during the entire course of the operation, had
only a most rudimentary defense system: a single concertina ring
thrown around it. The command and control center of the 3d Airborne
Battalion, which was responsible for the defense of FSB 31, was
sheltered only by 12 PSP sheets protecting the battalion headquarters,
its S-3 section, and communications and medical elements. With this
kind of defense and protection, how could FSB 31 hold out against
enemy 130-mm shells and tanks? Obviously, planning and preparations
should have been more extensive, more careful.
The problem of preparations was closely related to the need to
preserve secrecy. How to proceed with preparations at the unit level
while keeping them from being detected by the enemy? That was a major
problem that needed to be solved. At the JGS level, even the J-2 was
not informed about the operational plan until the campaign had
started. He did not have the opportunity to contribute to the planning
process either his intelligence data or his own expert assessment of
the enemy's capabilities. I Corps staff agencies other than the G-2
and G-3 divisions, and those of participating units were similarly
left out. It seemed as though the whole undertaking had been just a
contingency action to meet a difficult situation.
As far as command and control were concerned, the most important
problem to be solved was insubordination on the part of general
reserve unit commanders who like many other generals considered
themselves the pillars of the regime. The I Corps commander apparently
bowed to the political powers of these generals and this adversely
affected his conduct of the operation. The (insubmissive attitude of
the Marine and Airborne Division commanders was actually inexcusable
in that they placed themselves above the national interest and let
their personal pride interfere with the task of defeating the enemy.
For the operation to succeed as planned, the problem of effective
command had to be satisfactorily solved above everything else because
it affected the relationship between subordinate staffs and the
control of the operation itself. At least, the I Corps commander
should have been given the authority to require that his orders be
strictly carried out.
The arrangements for effective operational control did not necessarily
require the traditional echelons of tactical command posts as had been
organized: main CP, forward CP and tactical control CP. In view of
effective signal communications and the availability of command ships,
the tactical control CP and the forward CP could be combined into one.
Its location was immaterial as long as the CP was able to exercise
effective control and coordination of subordinate units. At this
operational CP, there should have been adequate staff personnel, a
clear division of responsibilities among staff elements and full
authority should have been given them to solve every problem at hand
without having to refer to another echelon of command. The effective
functioning of this CP would inspire confidence among subordinate
units and their staffs. The breaking down of I Corps headquarters into
three echelons for the control of LAM SON 719 required a dilution of
its limited staff personnel with the end result that no echelon was
able to function properly.
ARVN units that participated in the operation definitely lacked a
system of accurate and timely reporting. This was not only a matter of
training or experience but also a matter of loyalty. A higher
command's exercise of control was only as effective as its subordinate
units' reporting was reliable. In the case of LAM SON 719, this
reporting was most deplorable. Because the intensity of the fighting
did not permit frequent visits by the I Corps and division commanders,
they depended entirely on reports for the control of the situation.
But reports by their subordinate units were slow, inaccurate, and
sometimes non-existent. During the operation, there were several
instances in which division commanders lost control of their units.
Even the I Corp. commander sometimes did not know the major events
affecting his divisions.
A significant development which turned out to be extremely valuable
for the effective support of the operation was the creation of the
Joint Coordinating Group (JCG) by the XXIV Corps as of the beginning
of March 1971. The group exercised operational control of all U.S.
support activities. Its centralized coordinating authority was
instrumental in providing timely and appropriate support for every
ARVN combat need during the operation. Co-located with the I Corps
tactical control CP, the Joint Coordinating Group assisted it with
invaluable data for effective planning. An organization of this type
was clearly indicated for every combined effort in which the U.S. only
played a supporting role. On its part, the ARVN could have benefited
more if it had established a counterpart "support coordination center"
or equivalent to coordinate ARVN support activities with those of U.S.
units through the JCG. This would have enabled the operational
commander to monitor closely the flow of support activities and plan
his tactical moves more systematically.
In the area of combat tactics, a most remarkable feature of LAM.SON
719 was the use of semi-fixed fire support bases installed on high
peaks. This tactic was a duplication of the American usage in South
Vietnam. But the situation in lower Laos did not favor the
installation of these FSBs for the reason that the area of operation
had been under enemy control for a long time; the enemy was well
entrenched and well organized for defense. The several peaks in the
area gave the enemy an advantage in observation which resulted in
accurate indirect fire on our fixed fire control bases. The amount of
troops deployed for the defense of
each FSB was also not adequate. The inevitable result was that our
units were immobilized in these FSBs and gradually became fixed
targets for enemy encirclement and attacks. Most of the 96 artillery
pieces lost in Laos resulted from our system of lame duck FSBs. This
system could have been replaced by other alternatives such as mobile
FSBs, selection of lower, more accessible sites and increased use of
mortars to augment artillery firepower. A system of mobile FSBs would
have fully utilized the U.S. helilift capabilities; it would also have
afforded better defense and greater opportunities to keep the
offensive moving. Heliborne operations as a tactic were thoroughly put
to test during the Laotian campaign because they were conducted in an
area of operation where fighting was more intense than in any past
experience in South Vietnam and where the enemy's antiaircraft system
was effective. But the U.S. Army's rules governing these operations
seemed to hold fast and were proved valid. However, their execution
could stand some improvement in terms of coordination and fire
support; in any case, it should be done with expertise and attention
to details.
First, it appeared that the enemy would have been confused if more
landing zones (LZ) had been prepared than were really needed. B-52
strikes should not be used too far in advance of the actual landings.
After that other types of firepower could be used to prepare LZs.
Experience showed that it would be better to divide the area into
several sectors, each sector assigned to a particular type of
firepower so that all the various types firepowers available could be
applied at the same time to achieve a maximum effect: tactical air,
aerial artillery, air cavalry, ground artiliery, etc. The use of fire
power should not be confined to the preparation of LZS; it should also
be directed against avenues of approach and areas where enemy
artillery or troops concentration were suspected. Shortly before the
landings, all firepower should be concentrated for the last time on
the selected sites. Next, air cavalry elements would carry out their
classic reconnaissance mission. Since they were familiar with LZ
sites, local terrain and flight approaches, the air cavalry commander
should be made responsible for fire coordination. When landings began,
support fire
should be continued but diverted to other pre-selected areas. Aircraft
laid smoke screens could be useful to conceal landing activities; they
could also be used elsewhere to deceive the enemy. Air cavalry
reconnaissance, in the meantime, should extend its coverage to protect
landings. For command and control purposes during landings, at least
two command ships should be utilized, one above the pick up zone (PZ)
and the other above the LZ. Each should have command authorities
aboard with full power to solve contingency problems. Both the air
mission commander and the ground commander should be airborne together
at the LZ. Alternate troop commanders should be designated in advance
to take over in case of accidents. All protective fires and
reconnaissance flights should continue until the landings are
completed.
A basic weakness of ARVN forces participating in LAM SON 719 was their
lack of ground mobility. Since the concept of operatio evolved around
the extensive use of helicopters, ARVN forces tended to be over
dependent on them. They used helicopters indiscriminately for every
activity, even for short movements which could have been made more
effectively by marching. This was a serious mistake that not only
overtaxed U.S. helilift units but also incurred their complaints. The
use of helicopters should have been conceived more judiciously and
then only for extensive movements such as a shift of effort direction,
the move toward Tchepone, or an exploitation of gains and creating
surprise for the enemy. More troops movements should have been made by
marching to ensure discretion and initiative. In this regard, the 1st
Infantry Division was particularly commendable. Another short coming
of ARVN units at battalion and lower levels was their failure to
maneuver when being engaged. After the first contact, they tended to
stop and wait for support rather than conduct probes and maneuver to
attack or close in on the enemy. This shortcoming indicated a need for
additional training for small unit leaders.
With regard to combined arms tactics, there was no doubt that ARVN
units had received extensive training but in actual combat they seemed
to falter easily. In the face of a formidable enemy, neither the
airborne nor the armor units displayed evidence of effective
cooperation and teamwork. Armored vehicles were mostly used for
transportation. When an engagement was made, infantry troops left
tanks unprotected in the jungle and tanks were compelled to fend for
themselves, alone. It was apparent that because of this lack of
teamwork and mutual protection, the Airborne Division and the four
armor squadrons could not operate effectively along the road and in
the jungle of lower Laos.
Another serious shortcoming was the employment of reserves. During LAM
SON 719, all participating divisions had their own reserve force. I
Corps, on its part, had a reserve force consisting of a Marine brigade
and a Ranger group. But the strange thing was that in no instance
during the course of the operation was a reserve force thrown into
combat to help clear an area from heavy enemy pressure. All reserve
forces were used piecemeal at the rear echelon. No commander ever
thought of using them at the forward echelon to his advantage. When a
FSB was threatened with being overrun, the only course of action our
unit commanders took was to destroy the artillery, abandon the base
and extricate their troops by helilift. It was apparent that to be
more combat effective, ARVN units needed to learn how to organize
reserves and employ them decisively on the battlefield.
A lesser but no less dangerous shortcoming was the lack of
communications security. In general, ARVN units at lower levels were
not disciplined enough in the application of security procedures
concerning radio communications. At corps and division levels,
however, these procedures were more strictly observed through the
systematic encoding of messages sent by CW radio or radioteletype. But
at lower level units, which made extensive use of FM voice radio sets,
communications were usually sent in dear text in sheer disregard of
basic encoding procedures. ARVN commanders were accustomed to talking
freely over radio networks, using the most rudimentary system of
codes. Something was missing in the enforcement of communications
discipline among ARVN units.
Finally, the withdrawal operation conducted by I Corps was such that
this experience should be examined with utmost candor. First of
all, withdrawing under enemy pressure was always a difficult operation
which should be carefully planned and executed. The time allowed for
its execution was too short. The extrication of troops by helicopters
naturally increased their vulnerability when compared to a withdrawal
on foot. However, some movements to the rear on foot were not executed
in a satisfactory manner. Our forces suffered serious losses on routes
selected for withdrawal because of combined armor-infantry ambushes
laid by the enemy. During the withdrawal, the Airborne Division and
the entire armor force were unable to ensure protection for their own
movements. The Marine units, however, fared much better; their
withdrawal was a successful operation.
In summary, LAM SON 719 was a bloody field exercise for ARVN forces
under the command of I Corps. Nearly 8,000 ARVN soldiers and millions
of dollars worth of valuable equipment and materiel were sacrificed.
The realities of battles fought in Laos certainly taught us many
invaluable lessons that the RVNAF would have to learn in order to
defend South Vietnam effectively. Many of these lessons - those that
were appropriate for such treatment - became subjects of instruction
at RVNAF service schools and training centers. "
On Aug 10, 11:51 am, Ben <pb5...@gmail.com> wrote:
Ben
wrote:
This is a Communist propaganda. South Vietnam, West Germany, S Korea,
Taiwan, N Vietnam, East Germany, N Korea, China are all divided
because of the cold war and are not phony like your communist leader
had brainwashed you. Vincent Quin is too brainwashed by his communist
ideology and thus can not think properly.
Ben
>
> > - Show quoted text -
>
> What's wrong when I said, "You lost, loser!"?
Everyone knows that communists control all the media and brainwash
their own people, so Quin is not a special exception.
Dr. Vincent Quin, Ph.D.
> ARVN General Nguyen Duy Hinh wrote a book about the Lamson 719 and
The fate of the losing side...endless explainin...who to blame (WHO!)
...if we could have had just one more chance...it wasn't our fault...
Too many ARVN soldiers had no personal *commitment* because they
knew their country was phony and propped up by the U.S. throwing
billions of dollars at it...and American lives.
John Michilin
wrote:
Kid,
Here is some old thing for you to learn:
------------------------------------------------
In 1971, Kissinger told Premier Zou Enlai of China that the U.S.
accepted the collapse of South Vietnam after U.S. withdrawal. In a
meeting with Zou Enlai, he told Zou that "Our position is not to
maintain any particular government in South Vietnam,... And if it is
overthrown after we withdraw, we will not intervene."
South Vietnam was sold in 1971.
Full text on New York Times below:
John Michilin
Kid,
The war in Vietnam was not just between the North and the South; it
was between the Communist block and the "free" block. The North could
not survive by itself, and the South couldn't either.
When the whole "free" block, which included the US, South Korea,
Canada, Australia, you name it, could not win the war in Vietnam,
don't expect the South can survive while the US cut off its supports
to the South and the Communist block increased its supports to the
North.
I would stop right here because I'm afraid that you are unable to
digest with your level of understanding.
----------------------------------------------------
More Vietnam War Papers Released
By Calvin Woodward
Associated Press
Saturday, May 27, 2006
Henry A. Kissinger quietly acknowledged to China in 1972 that
Washington could accept a communist takeover of South Vietnam if that
evolved after a withdrawal of U.S. troops -- even as the war to drive
back the communists dragged on with mounting deaths.
President Richard M. Nixon's envoy told Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai:
"If we can live with a communist government in China, we ought to be
able to accept it in Indochina."
Kissinger's blunt remarks surfaced from a collection of papers
released yesterday by George Washington University's National Security
Archive. The collection, from his years of diplomacy, was made up of
documents available at the National Archives and obtained through the
research group's declassification requests.
Kissinger's comments appear to lend credence to the "decent interval"
theory posed by some historians who say the United States was prepared
to see communists take over Saigon as long as, to save face, that
happened long enough after a U.S. troop departure.
But Kissinger cautioned in an interview yesterday against reaching
easy conclusions from his words of more than three decades ago. "One
of my objectives had to be to get Chinese acquiescence in our policy,"
he said.
"We succeeded in it, and then when we had achieved our goal, our
domestic situation made it impossible to sustain it," he said,
explaining that he meant Watergate and its consequences.
The papers consist of about 2,100 memorandums of Kissinger's secret
conversations with senior officials abroad and at home from 1969 to
1977 while he served under Nixon and President Gerald R. Ford as
national security adviser, secretary of state and both. The collection
contains more than 28,000 pages.
The meeting with Zhou took place in Beijing on June 22, 1972, during
stepped-up U.S. bombing and the mining of harbors meant to stall a
North Vietnamese offensive that began in the spring. China, North
Vietnam's ally, objected to the U.S. course but was engaged in a
historic thaw of relations with Washington.
Kissinger told Zhou that the United States respected its Hanoi enemy
as a "permanent factor" and probably the "strongest entity" in the
region. "And we have had no interest in destroying it or even
defeating it," he insisted.
He complained that Hanoi, in negotiations, had made one demand that he
could never accept -- that the United States force out the Saigon
government.
"This isn't because of any particular personal liking for any of the
individuals concerned," he said. "It is because a country cannot be
asked to engage in major acts of betrayal as a basis of its foreign
policy."
In January 1973, the Paris Peace Accords officially halted U.S.
action, left North Vietnamese troops in the South and preserved the
Saigon government until it fell in April 1975.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/26/AR2006052601926.html