weapons
redda...@gmail.com
hrs daily, but the VA says it didnt happen anybody know how to dispute
this claim????
I know that plutonium emits gamma but at what level??
HELP!!!
Vance P. Frickey
http://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov/cgi-bin/sis/search/r?dbs+hsdb:@term+@na+@rel+plutonium,+radioactive
is the TOXNET page on Pu-239, showing the probable routes of
human exposure.
Unless your service involved opening the weapons up, it's
unlikely that you would have had an exposure to Pu-239 that
would have placed you in danger. Carey can tell you more
about this, but in general neither the alphas or the gammas
emitted by the Pu-239 in your shipboard weapons would have
escaped the containment of the weapon itself in quantities
high enough to hurt you.
The plutonium in a nuclear weapon is surrounded by a layer
of plastic explosive and layers of other materials that
would tend to weaken the gamma rays on their way out of the
weapon.
Of course, this is something that experts need to deny or
confirm, looking at your dates of service, ships, whether
you served near storage facilities or in the area of a
weapons mishap. The Navy might not have been completely
candid with the VA, or the VA might have made an error or
two in handling your information. Is an attorney helping
you with this?
--
Vance P. Frickey
remove "safety" from listed Email address to send mail
"In war there is no prize for runner-up."
- Gen. Omar Bradley, US Army
Gashauler
<redda...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:1173537579.5...@c51g2000cwc.googlegroups.com...
You're never get a rating from VA on that one. Sorry but just being in the
area doesn't even come close to giving you an exposure that would hurt you.
I do have a 10% rating for exposure to ionizing radiation but I had my hands
in them. I was also exposed to a leaker and I have symptoms. It's no big
deal and it only involves my thyroid but you never know what can happen in
the future. Besides those ASROC's weren't a real hot weapon to begin with.
If you were more invovled you can e-mail me if you like. I was a GMT bomb
type so I might be able to help if you do have any symptoms that VA is
looking for.
Mike Swift
redda...@gmail.com wrote:
Very low. It is the reason Pu239 is used to make Nuclear weapons. The
Pu240 and Pu241 in power reactor fuel makes it too hot for manufacturing
weapons. In any case the radiation levels on the outside of a packaged
weapon are not a problem unless you sleep with it for twenty or thirty
years.:)
--
Mike
Some say we must tax corporations more. What they do not understand is that
corporations do not pay taxes. One of our governments conditions for their
existence is they collect the taxes from their customers and pass them to
the government.
Mike Swift
Gashauler
"Mike Swift" <toms...@cruzio.com> wrote in message
news:tomswift-53DB12.10491624032007@[198.186.190.159]...
> In article <1173537579.5...@c51g2000cwc.googlegroups.com>,
> redda...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>> I served in two ships with weapons, was in the area with them for 8-10
>> hrs daily, but the VA says it didnt happen anybody know how to dispute
>> this claim????
>>
>> I know that plutonium emits gamma but at what level??
>>
>> HELP!!!
>
> Very low. It is the reason Pu239 is used to make Nuclear weapons. The
> Pu240 and Pu241 in power reactor fuel makes it too hot for manufacturing
> weapons. In any case the radiation levels on the outside of a packaged
> weapon are not a problem unless you sleep with it for twenty or thirty
> years.:)
>
> --
> Mike
>
better than any other material.
Mike Swift
"Gashauler" <sword...@comcast.net> wrote:
I should have stated that *one* of the reasons was the handling
problems. It is also true that Pu240 and Pu241 have higher spontaneous
neutron emissions that reduce the assembly time margins. This means a
higher probability of a fizzle. Designing a fission device is hard
enough without added handling problems, and ultra tight timing
constraints.
Carey Sublette
> In article <krqdnVfqCN8oT5vb...@comcast.com>,
> "Gashauler" <sword...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
>> "Mike Swift" <toms...@cruzio.com> wrote in message
>> news:tomswift-53DB12.10491624032007@[198.186.190.159]...
>> > In article <1173537579.5...@c51g2000cwc.googlegroups.com>,
>> > redda...@gmail.com wrote:
>> >
>> >> I served in two ships with weapons, was in the area with them for 8-10
>> >> hrs daily, but the VA says it didnt happen anybody know how to dispute
>> >> this claim????
>> >>
>> >> I know that plutonium emits gamma but at what level??
>> >>
>> >> HELP!!!
>> >
>> > Very low. It is the reason Pu239 is used to make Nuclear weapons. The
>> > Pu240 and Pu241 in power reactor fuel makes it too hot for
>> > manufacturing
>> > weapons. In any case the radiation levels on the outside of a packaged
>> > weapon are not a problem unless you sleep with it for twenty or thirty
>> > years.:)
Mike is right that quite different manufacturing procedures would be
required for power reactor derived plutonium due to occupational radiation
exposure (Pu-240 and Pu-238 neutron emissions).
Neutron emissions from weapons have been an issue on submarines (the SUBROC,
IIRC) where close contact for extended times occur. Supergrade plutonium was
used to rectify this to keep exposures within occuptional exposure limits.
Gamma emissions from plutonium are not very energetic and are unlikely be a
problem outside of the weapon (they are easily detectable however).
>> >
>> > --
>> > Mike
>> >
>> I have to disagree here Mike. They used Pu239 in weapons because it
>> fissions
>> better than any other material.
>
> I should have stated that *one* of the reasons was the handling
> problems. It is also true that Pu240 and Pu241 have higher spontaneous
> neutron emissions that reduce the assembly time margins. This means a
> higher probability of a fizzle. Designing a fission device is hard
> enough without added handling problems, and ultra tight timing
> constraints.
U.S. weapons introduced after the late 1950s haven't been susceptible to
predetpnation at all (boosting allows designs that have no vulnerability to
this).
PW fuel plutonium creates stockpile reliability issues also due to its
higher level of decay (Pu-238, 240 and 241) and conversion of Pu-241 into
Am-241. Increased neutron damage to the crystal structure, increased
accumulation of helium in the lattice, increased alloy composition change
with the buildup of americium, changes in nuclear properties with Pu-241 to
Am-241 conversion. These have raised concern about the long-term reliability
of plutonium pits, which seem not to have been born out (90 year service
lifes are estimated at present), but would cause more anxiety if the levels
of these constituents were much higher.
Carey Sublette
Gashauler
"Carey Sublette" <care...@earthling.net> wrote in message
news:ghNNh.226$tJ2...@newsfe02.lga...
>
> Neutron emissions from weapons have been an issue on submarines (the
> SUBROC, IIRC) where close contact for extended times occur. Supergrade
> plutonium was used to rectify this to keep exposures within occuptional
> exposure limits.
>
> Gamma emissions from plutonium are not very energetic and are unlikely be
> a problem outside of the weapon (they are easily detectable however).
>
we had a more proficient program on the CV's than the sub's. Once a month we
had to monitor the spaces with an AN/PDR 70 to identify the areas and keep
records so we could tell where the hot spots were. I think the program was
called ALARA, it's been over 26 years. AFAIK the sub's only told their
people to stay away if possible and they carried the same TLD's that we did
and did no monitoring. But the subroc was hot, but not as hot as the mk48
projectile. You couldn't keep paint on that one.
We also had shields that had to be placed on each stack of weapons. They
were heavy but the inside was plastic or some other moderator. These shields
would bolt on top of the handling gear, using the same bolt holes you would
use if another weapon was secured to the stack.
I was involved in a special test where the shield was built right into the
handling gear. We did a test on a stack of B-61's to see if the new handling
gear would slow down getting the bomb from storage to a 21 bomb skid. There
was no difference. I believe the handling gear was H1125?? It's been awhile.
You can see the magazine at
http://www.navynucweps.com/photo_archive_people.htm the picture of the aft
SASS mag is small but right behind the B-57 trainer is a stack of shields
tied down to the deck. And in the bottom fwd SASS picture there's a stack of
three secured to the deck. They are gray.
Bill Baker
> Neutron emissions were a concern on Aircraft Carries as well. I do
> believe we had a more proficient program on the CV's than the sub's.
> Once a month we had to monitor the spaces with an AN/PDR 70 to identify
> the areas and keep records so we could tell where the hot spots were. I
> think the program was called ALARA, it's been over 26 years. AFAIK the
> sub's only told their people to stay away if possible and they carried
> the same TLD's that we did and did no monitoring. But the subroc was
> hot, but not as hot as the mk48 projectile. You couldn't keep paint on
> that one.
Maybe I'm dense, but why would you have MK 48's in the special weapons
magazine of a carrier? It's an artillery shell, no? Plus, being a
155mm shell, it would be used exclusively in land-based artillery, not
naval guns, right?
----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Unrestricted-Secure Usenet News==----
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Gashauler
"Bill Baker" <wab...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1174954352_4601@news-west.n...
> On 2007-03-26 13:45:14 -0700, "Gashauler" <sword...@comcast.net> said:
>
>> Neutron emissions were a concern on Aircraft Carries as well. I do
>> believe we had a more proficient program on the CV's than the sub's. Once
>> a month we had to monitor the spaces with an AN/PDR 70 to identify the
>> areas and keep records so we could tell where the hot spots were. I think
>> the program was called ALARA, it's been over 26 years. AFAIK the sub's
>> only told their people to stay away if possible and they carried the same
>> TLD's that we did and did no monitoring. But the subroc was hot, but not
>> as hot as the mk48 projectile. You couldn't keep paint on that one.
>
> Maybe I'm dense, but why would you have MK 48's in the special weapons
> magazine of a carrier? It's an artillery shell, no? Plus, being a 155mm
> shell, it would be used exclusively in land-based artillery, not naval
> guns, right?
>
Technician and we did all the maintenanace on all navy nuclear weapons. I
won't say where we had the Mk48 but in A-school it was taught along with
C-school. I go back to the B33 and handling target rings. And your also
right it is not used in any naval guns like the old nuke projectiles. But
the Marines used them so we had to keep their stockpile ready. I hope this
cleared up my generalities.
Bill Baker
[Adding in sci.military.naval]
Huh, interesting. It never occurred to me--don't know why not--that
USN GMT's would have handled maintenance for the Marine Corps'
forward-deployed nukes. I guess I assumed that they'd have had their
own logistics and personnel train for handling "their" nukes, including
their own nuclear-trained redleg NCO's, etc.
So back when there were still USN/USMC tactical nukes afloat, how did
the logistics work for the Corps' weapons? Were individual MEU's
nuclear-capable while afloat? If so, were the nuclear artillery shells
stored on the gators? That doesn't seem likely. Google sez that a
cruiser usually accompanies an MEU. But, back when this was a relevant
issue, how many USN cruisers were configured to carry nuclear weapons
(special weapons magazine, Marine security detachment, etc.)? If each
MEU needs to be accompanied by a cruiser capable of handling nuclear
weapons, that's a non-trivial logistics and fleet detailing issue.
Arved Sandstrom
Obviously the actual firers were Marines - that's why we had PRP in Marine
artillery units. But consider even conventional artillery ammunition...who
gets trained to maintain that? If you look at MCO 1510.78A (INDIVIDUAL
TRAINING STANDARDS (ITS) SYSTEM FOR AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE
DISPOSAL OCCUPATIONAL FIELD (OCCFLD) 23), it's not apparent to me that
Marine ammo techs are trained to do something as special as maintain a
nuclear artillery round. They surely know how to handle it and store it,
because 0811s in PRP know how to do that too, plus how to fire it.
But the kind of maintenance you're talking about is high echelon. And
there's no reason for the Navy not to do it, for nuclear weapons. Naturally,
with defective conventional ammo you just destroy it, usually.
> So back when there were still USN/USMC tactical nukes afloat, how did the
> logistics work for the Corps' weapons? Were individual MEU's
> nuclear-capable while afloat? If so, were the nuclear artillery shells
> stored on the gators? That doesn't seem likely. Google sez that a
> cruiser usually accompanies an MEU. But, back when this was a relevant
> issue, how many USN cruisers were configured to carry nuclear weapons
> (special weapons magazine, Marine security detachment, etc.)? If each MEU
> needs to be accompanied by a cruiser capable of handling nuclear weapons,
> that's a non-trivial logistics and fleet detailing issue.
Good questions, but I doubt there'll be many answers. :-) I myself would
speculate that there may never have been nuclear artillery rounds on
amphibs. I think you'd want to have an established beach-head with serious
security before you contemplate supplying a Marine arty battery with a
couple of Mk48s, and by that point (D+2, D+5, D+15, who knows?) you could
get the special rounds from other places, including CONUS.
I have this mental picture of a Mk48 round coming ashore in an LVTP, or
carried in a helo, with the first assault waves onshore, and the artillery
just arriving, all desperately embattled and surrounded by enemy ten times
their strength...I think not.
I suspect there was never any strong doctrine for how the _USMC_ would use a
nuclear artillery shell. The fact is, we churned out a shitload of nuclear
weapons, and if there happened to be one that was a 155mm nuclear round, and
the Corps had 155mm howitzers that could fire it, why not train some people
up? Not having a doctrine is perhaps the wrong phrase - specifically needing
it in the context of amphibious operations might be better. Now, let's say
that a MEB or MEF has reinforced the US Army and the rest of NATO in
northern and western Europe in the '80's, GSFG has attacked, and the
decision is made to go nuclear - at that point the Marine artillery is just
other artillery that can fire these rounds. But it wouldn't be an amphibious
context. Amphibious is just how the Marines got there. In that scenario the
rounds would already be in Europe.
AHS
deem...@aol.com
wrote:
> "Bill Baker" <wabo...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
>
> news:1175050408_13@news-west.n...
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 2007-03-27 10:38:34 -0700, "Gashauler" <swordfi...@comcast.net> said:
>
> >> "Bill Baker" <wabo...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> >>news:1174954352_4601@news-west.n...
Other than the most basic, isn't nuke warhead maintenance/
refurbishment done at DOE facilities?
> AHS- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
Fred J. McCall
:But, back when this was a relevant
:issue, how many USN cruisers were configured to carry nuclear weapons
:(special weapons magazine, Marine security detachment, etc.)?
Probably all of them, with no Marine security detachment required. But
those magazines wouldn't have been set up to handle artillery shells
and the handling teams likely wouldn't be trained to handle them,
either.
:If each
:MEU needs to be accompanied by a cruiser capable of handling nuclear
:weapons, that's a non-trivial logistics and fleet detailing issue.
Personally, I'd doubt that Marine special weapons would routinely be
kept afloat. After all, you're supposed to have a specially trained
and certified artillery component to fire them.
--
"Insisting on perfect safety is for people who don't have the balls to
live in the real world." -- Mary Shafer, NASA Dryden
jeffre...@yahoo.com
> On 2007-03-27 10:38:34 -0700, "Gashauler" <swordfi...@comcast.net> said:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >news:1174954352_4601@news-west.n...
> ----= East and West-Coast Server Farms - Total Privacy via Encryption =----- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
What makes you think that nuclear weapons could only be carried on
crusiers? or that a Marine Security Detachment is nessecery?
I can neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons onbourd
the USS....., however by open source documentation Carriers, Cruisers,
Destroyers, Frigates, Submarines, Tenders, Ammunition Ships,
Replenishment Ships and others not coming to immediated mind all
certainly carried nuclear weapons or had the potential to do so. Most
did not have Marines guarding them. Security on other ships could and
was carried out by sailors.
While tactical nucs seemed to have been withdrawn from active
inventories by the time I served on a gator, I can confirm we had all
kinds on munitions stored on board our ship (USS ST Louis LKA-116) as
ready ammunition when ever we embarked marines, and carried the ammo
even when marines were not embarked.
I can also tell you, since the ships are no longer in service, that
the magizine, located directly below my shop, had a big red sign on
the door, that declared it 'Special Weapons Magazine' and at the time
I was on board contained all the fun stuff like Stingers, C4 and Det
devises.
If the policy was for Marines to use tactical nukes, in a manner
simular to the Army policy, I see absolutely nothing that would
prohibit the marines from bringing the weapons on board the same as
any other weapon
a425couple
> >>>> Neutron emissions were a concern on Aircraft Carries as well. I do
> >>>> believe we had a more proficient program on the CV's than the sub's.
> >>> Maybe I'm dense, but why would you have MK 48's in the special weapons
> >>> magazine of a carrier? It's an artillery shell, no? Plus, being a
> >>> 155mm shell, it would be used exclusively in land-based artillery, not
> >>> naval guns, right?
> >> And - right it is not used in any naval guns like the old nuke
> >> projectiles. But the Marines used them so we had to keep their
> >> stockpile ready. I hope this cleared up my generalities.
> > [Adding in sci.military.naval]
> > Huh, interesting. It never occurred to me--don't know why not--that USN
> > GMT's would have handled maintenance for the Marine Corps'
> > forward-deployed nukes. I guess I assumed that they'd have had their
own
> > logistics and personnel train for handling "their" nukes, including
their
> > own nuclear-trained redleg NCO's, etc.
A general thought / idea on above. Special 'programs' need to be
of certain fairly large sizes to be at all efficient and proficient.
In similar way, a.f.a.i.k., the only military veternarians are in the
Army. If Navy, Marines, or AF need vets for either canine care
or food inspection, they use a Army one.
And also similar, the Marines for medical care use Navy.
> Obviously the actual firers were Marines - that's why we had PRP
> in Marine ---- it's not apparent to me that
> Marine ammo techs are trained to do something as special as maintain a
> nuclear artillery round. They surely know how to handle it and store it,
> because 0811s in PRP know how to do that too, plus how to fire it.
> But the kind of maintenance you're talking about is high echelon. And
> there's no reason for the Navy not to do it, for nuclear weapons.
> > So back when there were still USN/USMC tactical nukes afloat, how did
I'm in agreement with Arved's general/logical assesment.
I'd like to point out something supporting on units and size.
(My main familiarity is late 60's/early 70's - Pacific, but think
it's true for fair amount before/later and elsewhere.)
The ARG (Amphibious Ready Group) / MEU (Marine Expeditionary
Unit - previously MAU for amphibious) is built around a BLT
(Battalion Landing Team) plus air/helo. So in those years it would be
3 to 4 Navy amphibious (gators) ships. At the USMC Battalion level
the biggest arty is the 105 - clearly not nuclear capable.
The soonest/smallest you would even get 155s and 8" would
be at Regimental (RLT level), which is Brigade (MEB).
Considering the limited total Navy amphib shipping capacity,
this was a VERY rare thing to put together. Getting 10 to 12
gators all afloat and ready to go in the same area took a fair
amount of planning and work and lead time - and the
"shit hitting the fan".
Although - deep in forgotten memories is some nagging thought
about the Mediteranian cruises maybe having bigger arty?
Any Second Marine Division vets around here?
Any Embarkation, S3, S4, G3, G4 or Arty types?
Arved Sandstrom
news:j5udnbTqYvjT55fb...@comcast.com...
[ SNIP ]
> Although - deep in forgotten memories is some nagging thought
> about the Mediteranian cruises maybe having bigger arty?
> Any Second Marine Division vets around here?
> Any Embarkation, S3, S4, G3, G4 or Arty types?
Well, I _am_ a 10th Marines type. Or was, '86-'92. 10th Marines got its
first M198s in 1982. Prior to that obviously the DS battalion workhorse was
the 105mm, and the M114 155mm was also kicking around; by 1986 the M101 was
officially not TOE, and my first few years in, 1/10, 2/10 and 3/10 (the
MAU/MEU supplying battalions) had M198s. 4/10 (a GS battalion) had M198s.
5/10 (another GS battalion) had M109s and M110s.
To provide more detail, here's a picture of Marine arty in 1988:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1988/GUT.htm It
accords roughly with what I remember, although I honestly don't remember
that the M114s lasted quite as long in 10th Marines as the author asserts.
But then again, I was never in 3/10; I started out in M 4/10, then was in HQ
1/10.
As the author says (and this is what he is largely discussing while
providing a good overall picture), the 105mm's were kept around for a long
time - now that the M777 is here, maybe they're gone - I dunno. But as long
as MAUs/MEUs needed flexibility, they had the choice between M198 and M101,
and as he says, it was not uncommon for a MEU to go with 4 of each.
The USMC never would have been a major player in firing 8in or 155mm nuclear
rounds, even though they had the howitzers to do it with...it would have
been the US Army. The only scenario where I can see it is the one I
described in a previous post - a MEB to MEF scale reinforcement of NATO in
Europe during the '80's. A MEU's artillery battery even being considered for
having a nuclear mission? I just can't realistically see it.
AHS
Arved Sandstrom
news:aeok03tfql1qg84h7...@4ax.com...
> Bill Baker <wab...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> :But, back when this was a relevant
> :issue, how many USN cruisers were configured to carry nuclear weapons
> :(special weapons magazine, Marine security detachment, etc.)?
>
> Probably all of them, with no Marine security detachment required. But
> those magazines wouldn't have been set up to handle artillery shells
> and the handling teams likely wouldn't be trained to handle them,
> either.
>
> :If each
> :MEU needs to be accompanied by a cruiser capable of handling nuclear
> :weapons, that's a non-trivial logistics and fleet detailing issue.
>
> Personally, I'd doubt that Marine special weapons would routinely be
> kept afloat.
I agree with that 100%.
> After all, you're supposed to have a specially trained
> and certified artillery component to fire them.
Yes, and I'm not sure how many people actually were certified. Granted,
under reasonable circumstances you really don't need more than one gun
section per battery, for starters. My knowledge of PRP is limited to M 4/10,
which was a GS battery, and we had a PRP-certified group in '86-'88; after
which I went to HQ 1/10, with a new MOS, and it's not like an 0861 needs
PRP.
I think the main factor would simply have been - why routinely deploy W-48s
on floats? Which is what you said. I see no good argument for it.
AHS
Gashauler
<jeffre...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1175087948....@e65g2000hsc.googlegroups.com...
You hit that right on the nail. I laugh when you said you first statement.
Man we knew that inside and out but you forgot to say "neither confirm or
deny the presence OR ABSENCES..." One of my duty stations I was station
aboard the USNS Furman T-AK 280 that re-supplied the Polaris missile to the
FBM's in the Pacific. There were 6 navy personnel aboard and we were the
guards for the missile. (We ate better on that ship than any submarine ever)
The only time I saw Marines aboard ships for security guards were the CV's
and heavy Cruisers. You could not be a guard and have access to the weapon
to perform maintenance. One was a critical billet and the other was a (I
forgot the term) billet. If you want to see some of the people and what we
did you can look at http://www.navynucweps.com
Gashauler
"Arved Sandstrom" <asand...@accesswave.ca> wrote in message
news:dKrOh.23712$__3.17128@edtnps90...
>
> Obviously the actual firers were Marines - that's why we had PRP in Marine
> artillery units.
Anyone that works around nuke weps are in the Personal Reliability Program
(PRP). Personnel from the warhead technicians to the guards.
Gashauler
it came to projectiles. I only did the maintenance and with the Mk48 there
wasn't much. Not like the B-33 projectile where we had to deal with target
rings. When a weapon is in storage (and there's different srorage levels)
you just didn't put the weapon in the magazine and pull it out when needed.
There were required inspections done to ensure the stockpile remain at the
highest level of reliability. So we would pull these weapons into the work
bay and inspect for corrosion and damage and do any limited life component
exchange if needed. We had more than just one type of weapon but still
nuclear.
But I can tell you that a Cruiser would not handle this weapon, they were
set up for their own. If a MK48 was to be deployed it could go either by air
or by ship. The ship would be an auxiliary ship capable of handling ammo.
Gashauler
<deem...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:1175079549.3...@d57g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...
>
> Other than the most basic, isn't nuke warhead maintenance/
> refurbishment done at DOE facilities?
>
done at the DOD facilities. Of course there are times the weapon will be
pulled out of the stockpile and sent back to the vendor (DOE). There is no
refurbishment that I know of. Years ago the technicians actually handled the
active material but now the advanced development done by DOE precludes that
activity. Thank goodness.
>>
>>
>> I suspect there was never any strong doctrine for how the _USMC_ would
>> use a
>> nuclear artillery shell. The fact is, we churned out a shitload of
>> nuclear
>> weapons, and if there happened to be one that was a 155mm nuclear round,
>> and
>> the Corps had 155mm howitzers that could fire it, why not train some
>> people
>> up? Not having a doctrine is perhaps the wrong phrase - specifically
>> needing
>> it in the context of amphibious operations might be better. Now, let's
>> say
>> that a MEB or MEF has reinforced the US Army and the rest of NATO in
>> northern and western Europe in the '80's, GSFG has attacked, and the
>> decision is made to go nuclear - at that point the Marine artillery is
>> just
>> other artillery that can fire these rounds. But it wouldn't be an
>> amphibious
>> context. Amphibious is just how the Marines got there. In that scenario
>> the
>> rounds would already be in Europe.
Do you really think for one minute that we would develop a weapon and not
have extensive plans to use that weapon in ALL scenarios???
Bill Baker
> But I can tell you that a Cruiser would not handle this weapon, they
> were set up for their own. If a MK48 was to be deployed it could go
> either by air or by ship. The ship would be an auxiliary ship capable
> of handling ammo.
Thanks, I think I've got the picture now.
Bill Baker
> What makes you think that nuclear weapons could only be carried on
> crusiers? or that a Marine Security Detachment is nessecery?
>
> ...Security on other ships could and
> was carried out by sailors.
Sorry, that's just sheer ignorance talking on my part. I was making an
assumption based on what the Marine Security Detachments do/did on
carriers.
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deem...@aol.com
> <deemsb...@aol.com> wrote in message
>
> news:1175079549.3...@d57g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...
>
> > Other than the most basic, isn't nuke warhead maintenance/
> > refurbishment done at DOE facilities?
>
> No. The chaging of components and depot level maintenance has always been
> done at the DOD facilities. Of course there are times the weapon will be
> pulled out of the stockpile and sent back to the vendor (DOE). There is no
> refurbishment that I know of. Years ago the technicians actually handled the
> active material but now the advanced development done by DOE precludes that
> activity. Thank goodness.
I live near a DOE weapons plant. According to the press releases,
they maintain and refurbish warheads and break down old ones and
recycle what ever is recyclable. My mother-in-law used to do some of
this...including handling the active stuff.
Maybe what DOE considers maintenance/refurbishment is pretty much
complete rebuilds.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >> I suspect there was never any strong doctrine for how the _USMC_ would
> >> use a
> >> nuclear artillery shell. The fact is, we churned out a shitload of
> >> nuclear
> >> weapons, and if there happened to be one that was a 155mm nuclear round,
> >> and
> >> the Corps had 155mm howitzers that could fire it, why not train some
> >> people
> >> up? Not having a doctrine is perhaps the wrong phrase - specifically
> >> needing
> >> it in the context of amphibious operations might be better. Now, let's
> >> say
> >> that a MEB or MEF has reinforced the US Army and the rest of NATO in
> >> northern and western Europe in the '80's, GSFG has attacked, and the
> >> decision is made to go nuclear - at that point the Marine artillery is
> >> just
> >> other artillery that can fire these rounds. But it wouldn't be an
> >> amphibious
> >> context. Amphibious is just how the Marines got there. In that scenario
> >> the
> >> rounds would already be in Europe.
>
> Do you really think for one minute that we would develop a weapon and not
> have extensive plans to use that weapon in ALL scenarios???- Hide quoted text -
Gashauler
<deem...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:1175115491.1...@y80g2000hsf.googlegroups.com...
> On Mar 28, 4:27 pm, "Gashauler" <swordfi...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> <deemsb...@aol.com> wrote in message
>>
>
> they maintain and refurbish warheads and break down old ones and
> recycle what ever is recyclable. My mother-in-law used to do some of
> this...including handling the active stuff.
> Maybe what DOE considers maintenance/refurbishment is pretty much
> complete rebuilds.
>
Welcome to Texas. No those are weapons that have been pulled out of the
stockpile and torn down for their active material. They will never be put
back in service. They do have a stockpile stewardship program for studies
but Carey can tell you more about that than I can.
You have to remember that almost all of the weapons have been pulled from
Naval ships and my old rate or job has been done away with. The only weapons
the Navy has now are strategic weapons. You can get a better understanding
by going to our site for navy nuclear weapons.
www.navynucweps.com
Bill Baker
<asand...@accesswave.ca> said:
> I think the main factor would simply have been - why routinely deploy
> W-48s on floats? Which is what you said. I see no good argument for it.
Well, my understanding is that an MEU is supposed to be a fully
self-contained, forward deployed battle unit capable of going into
action and operating for some substantial period without resupply. If
that's true _and_ they were considered to be routinely "nuclear
capable" at some point back when tactical nukes were in wide use, my
assumption was that they would have had Mk48's with them afloat as part
of their "intrisic capability munitions loadout", so to speak. As part
of the "train like you fight" doctrine.
But as you, Fred, et al., have pointed out, there's a difference
between the artillery section of an MEU being capable of employing
nuclear shells and actually needing to have them on hand. That's what
I was really asking, whether there was ever a period in which some
MEU's were rated with the capability for "instant use" of tactical
nukes, in which case they presumably would have had them with them
afloat.
The informed answer to that question seems to be "No," but it seems as
if it's not that unlikely given that at the height of the Cold War
there were equivalent Army artillery units in Europe with Mk48's and
other tactical nukes more or less at hand. Hell, you had squads
running around in jeeps with Davy Crockett's and SADM's. Wasn't there
an MEU more or less permanently afloat in the Med at the height of the
Cold War, and also one either around the Persian Gulf or off Africa?
In the case of a generalized Soviet attack on Western Europe, there
must have been plans for those units to go right into battle, probably
with contingency plans for employing tactical nukes.
So my response to the "Why would they?" answer is that back when the
doctrine of use for tactical nukes was liberal and prolific, US forces
did a lot more insecure things than keeping nuke-tipped shells in gator
magazines. I'm not disputing that "No"--you guys would know better
than me--I'm just saying there was a time when it might have been a
plausible doctrine.
Gashauler
> On 2007-03-28 06:19:08 -0700, jeffre...@yahoo.com said:
>
>
> Sorry, that's just sheer ignorance talking on my part. I was making an
> assumption based on what the Marine Security Detachments do/did on
> carriers.
>
I worked in. I ask because we did something for them way beyond the normal
duties for them. I was on the USS Constellation and we were on a westpac
when the Marine Corp Birthday came up. We told the Marines that if you would
train a few of our people we would stand guard so ALL the Marines could go
to the Ball. They did. But it was a hassle for us paperwork wise. We had to
downgrade the billets for those sailors and take them off of any access list
to the mags. A guard could not go into the spaces where the weps were.
So the guys had fun running down the passegeways with an M16 yelling at
anyone that wouldn't get out of the way when the alarms went off. They
trained for two weeks and all the paperwork was in place so on the night of
the Ball all the Marines went ashore to attend the activities. They never
forgot what we did for them and we always had good relations with their
department. They were all good guys and it was fun messing with the new
guys. Like telling them we had a hatch down below that would open for
submarines!! I've got lots of stories that are fun with the guards.
deem...@aol.com
> <deemsb...@aol.com> wrote in message
>
> news:1175115491.1...@y80g2000hsf.googlegroups.com...
>
> > On Mar 28, 4:27 pm, "Gashauler" <swordfi...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> <deemsb...@aol.com> wrote in message
>
> > I live near a DOE weapons plant. According to the press releases,
> > they maintain and refurbish warheads and break down old ones and
> > recycle what ever is recyclable. My mother-in-law used to do some of
> > this...including handling the active stuff.
> > Maybe what DOE considers maintenance/refurbishment is pretty much
> > complete rebuilds.
>
> Welcome to Texas.
Or Tennessee....
No those are weapons that have been pulled out of the
> stockpile and torn down for their active material. They will never be put
> back in service. They do have a stockpile stewardship program for studies
> but Carey can tell you more about that than I can.
>
> You have to remember that almost all of the weapons have been pulled from
> Naval ships and my old rate or job has been done away with. The only weapons
> the Navy has now are strategic weapons. You can get a better understanding
> by going to our site for navy nuclear weapons.www.navynucweps.com
So, are the newly designed warheads going to be Air Force, Navy, or
both?
Gashauler
<deem...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:1175122595....@d57g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...
Douglas Eagleson
> "Arved Sandstrom" <asandst...@accesswave.ca> wrote in message
They used to have a single marine between a nuklear locKER AN DTHE
WORLD. Asingle bar and a singlelocker.
Just act drunk and they would wait five feet extra to kill you.
They no long have a single marine between nukle and a marine's
trainer.
Fred J. McCall
: Other than the most basic, isn't nuke warhead maintenance/
:refurbishment done at DOE facilities?
I'd expect that 'remanufacturing' and such (replacing the pit) would
be a DOE job, but there is a lot of other stuff in there.
--
"The reasonable man adapts himself to the world; the unreasonable
man persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore,
all progress depends on the unreasonable man."
--George Bernard Shaw
Arved Sandstrom
news:5ZOdnYayd8wHUpfb...@comcast.com...
You're not understanding what I said. I said that a shitload of nuclear
weapons were produced, along with a fair few nuclear artillery rounds, and I
think it's pretty clear what the doctrine is - if you're in a tactical
nuclear war then you shoot the round at a target that rates it. Fairly
common sense. The first thing I meant was, Marines had the capability
because they also had howitzers that could fire these rounds, so heck, why
not get certified too? That's also common sense. My main point was, however,
that while Marine planners surely thought about amphibious operations in the
context of a nuclear war, just as everyone had to, I really doubt being able
to _fire_ nuclear artillery rounds changed any doctrine at all.
As for developing weapons and not having extensive plans to use them in all
scenarios, there's a difference between using them in all scenarios and
using them properly. If you use the weapon in Scenario X, and your doctrine
was to use the weapon in Scenario X, but you don't actually know _how_ to
use it in Scenario X, where does that leave you? Look at tank usage and
France 1940.
A *real* doctrine includes proper usage, not just usage. And in that respect
plans to use weapons in various scenarios have often been flawed.
AHS
Arved Sandstrom
Yes, I know this. By "actual firers" I meant the people who had to get the
special round to the artillery battery designated to fire it, and then the
certified group within that battery that would guard the round, be the gun
section(s) that physically fired it, and other people who had any form of
access to it.
You have to define "around nuclear weapons" rather liberally. All the PRP
precautions at battery level do you no good if the people passing on the
target information at battalion or regiment are not trustworthy. After all,
if someone is willing to damage a W-48 to prevent it being fired, why would
someone else not grab an M-16A2 and massacre the rest of the FSCC that is
passing on the targeting information to the battery? They never thought
quite that far, though, not in the artillery anyway - it was mostly about
physical access to the weapon itself.
I often wondered how that would have looked in a real situation. The portion
of the battery that is not PRP-certified is kept away at gunpoint by their
own buddies who are. That would have been a real team builder.
AHS
Fred J. McCall
:
:You hit that right on the nail. I laugh when you said you first statement.
:Man we knew that inside and out but you forgot to say "neither confirm or
:deny the presence OR ABSENCES..."
Not how we were trained to say it.
:The only time I saw Marines aboard ships for security guards were the CV's
:and heavy Cruisers. You could not be a guard and have access to the weapon
:to perform maintenance.
They waffled back and forth on this. There was a period of time when
I was both an authorized guard and on the weapons team.
:One was a critical billet and the other was a (I
:forgot the term) billet.
I believe you're looking for 'controlled'.
--
"I know Slayers. No matter how many people there are around
them, they fight alone."
-- Spike, the vampire
Fred J. McCall
:They used to have a single marine between a nuklear locKER AN DTHE
:WORLD. Asingle bar and a singlelocker.
:
:Just act drunk and they would wait five feet extra to kill you.
Well, I wasn't a Marine but I used to play guard on occasion. There
was a big read and white sign that read "USE OF DEADLY FORCE
AUTHORIZED BEYOND THIS POINT". You could have acted any way you
liked. You pass that sign and I would have killed you. Same point
for everyone, no matter how drunk.
--
"Now watch as the ball revolves and the nighttime falls.
Again the hunt begins, Again the blood wind calls.
By and by, the morning sun will rise,
But the darkness never goes from some men's eyes."
-- "Throwing Stones", The Grateful Dead
Arved Sandstrom
> On 2007-03-28 12:03:04 -0700, "Arved Sandstrom" <asand...@accesswave.ca>
> said:
>
>> I think the main factor would simply have been - why routinely deploy
>> W-48s on floats? Which is what you said. I see no good argument for it.
>
> So my response to the "Why would they?" answer is that back when the
> doctrine of use for tactical nukes was liberal and prolific, US forces did
> a lot more insecure things than keeping nuke-tipped shells in gator
> magazines. I'm not disputing that "No"--you guys would know better than
> me--I'm just saying there was a time when it might have been a plausible
> doctrine.
And perhaps it was considered. The main reason I think it wouldn't have been
done is because of the very nature of the Marine Corps. At the height of the
Cold War even, the MAUs/MEUs were there for the limited options, not in case
the entire Soviet military decides to preemptively counterattack western
Europe. There's no MAU/MEU mission I can think of - not hasty, not
deliberate - that requires nuclear weapons that couldn't be done better with
a nuclear weapon delivered by someone else.
As for the Europe scenario, there's no reason not to have the rounds
prepositioned. The Marines will get there by air (that's how we did a NATO
exercise into northern Norway), or trundle across in ships as a large force
(MEB or MEF-sized) that by the time it gets there, will be wondering if it
has any place to land anyhow, and whether perhaps it should not divert to
the UK instead. 4th MEB was actually planning for such a northern European
exercise just when Saddam invaded Kuwait. In both cases, it makes sense to
have the special rounds already there. If things go nuclear, the Army is
going to want their W-48's in Germany already, not in CONUS, and hence the
stockpile is already there for the Marines to draw on.
AHS
Arved Sandstrom
Nice anecdote - thanks. :-)
Incidentally, in another post you were searching for the other term along
with "critical". That would be "controlled". Those are two of the three PRP
positions - the third is "you're not in it".
AHS
Arved Sandstrom
Just to clear up confusion, W48, not Mk48. I made the typo myself I think in
at least one post. I believe that for a nuclear artillery shell it would be
a W followed by a number; conventional arty shells of course are M followed
by a number. I'm not busting on your knowledge - I have made slipups like
that myself.
Your last para makes sense in particular. Why have a cruiser carry a nuclear
artillery round? You can't even guarantee that the CG will ever stay with
the amphib group - when shit goes down with the carrier group the cruiser is
the first to leave the Marines and go and help the birdfarm...there go your
special rounds. In fact, your comments make perfect sense - either get it by
air if it's a prepared operation and you know you need the round, or if you
think you may need it, have it ready on a ship that can deal with
ammunition. In the latter case I think there is a better than 50/50 chance
that the gators will never see the round anyway, because you can helolift it
off the auxiliary, and if the artillery is ready for it that means they are
already onshore and fairly secure.
AHS
Fred J. McCall
:I often wondered how that would have looked in a real situation. The portion
:of the battery that is not PRP-certified is kept away at gunpoint by their
:own buddies who are. That would have been a real team builder.
Not necessarily that outlandish (or even unlikely). I once had a GMT
friend of mine give me some problems when I was standing guard duty
(he refused to move away from the alarm panel when instructed to do so
and responded with, "What are you going to do, shoot me?").
I said, "No, of course not". Then I gave him a stroke to the groin
with my weapon. He decided to move away from the panel in preference
to getting a second helping.
Remember, "The presence of a hostage will in no way affect your
actions." And it's pretty close to 100% that you will know any
hostage.
Fred J. McCall
:Incidentally, in another post you were searching for the other term along
:with "critical". That would be "controlled". Those are two of the three PRP
:positions - the third is "you're not in it".
That last one is also known as 'target'...
--
"You keep talking about slaying like it's a job. It's not.
It's who you are."
-- Kendra, the Vampire Slayer
Bill Baker
> Remember, "The presence of a hostage will in no way affect your
> actions." And it's pretty close to 100% that you will know any
> hostage.
Shoot the hostage first--that'll show 'em your serious.
(Y'know, though, I can almost imagine situations where that'd be the
best thing to do, if you aimed to wound the hostage. But I assume that
standing orders were to use lethal force first (and repeatedly, if
necessary) on the perp trying to penetrate the restricted space.)
Thomas A. Hoffer
in this group. I was one of those "pencil-neck geeks" specializing in
personnel policy and analysis.
My understanding though is that while Marines had doctrine on the use of
nuclear (special) weapons, and some personnel -especially aviation- had
training in the deployment of such weapons, nuclear weapons were not part of
a deploying unit's peacetime weapons inventory, especially at the MAU/MEU
level. My understanding of Marine practice was units would deploy with such
weapons only in the event of a "hot" war with Soviet forces.
Andrew Chaplin
Given the legacy of the Trudeau Liberals that made Canada "No-Nuke of the
North," I could hardly conceive of a situation where the Canadian cabinet
would allow the use of the RCHA's guns to fire nuclear shells. All the same,
we trained in the procedures to be followed in order to execute such a strike;
all Instructors-in-Gunnery and Artillery Staff Duties officers were trained in
nuclear fire planning, as were the Ack-Is. (Hell, we even trained a New
Zealander in nuke fire planning.) Procedures on the gun position were another
matter, but IIRC, 1 RCHA in Europe exercised them as part of CENTAG.
--
Andrew Chaplin
SIT MIHI GLADIUS SICUT SANCTO MARTINO
(If you're going to e-mail me, you'll have to get "yourfinger." out.)
Fred J. McCall
:On 2007-03-29 00:41:05 -0700, Fred J. McCall <fmc...@earthlink.net> said:
:
:> Remember, "The presence of a hostage will in no way affect your
:> actions." And it's pretty close to 100% that you will know any
:> hostage.
:
:Shoot the hostage first--that'll show 'em your serious.
:
:(Y'know, though, I can almost imagine situations where that'd be the
:best thing to do, if you aimed to wound the hostage. But I assume that
:standing orders were to use lethal force first (and repeatedly, if
:necessary) on the perp trying to penetrate the restricted space.)
Actually, I answered the question that way once during an NWAT visit.
They asked for an explanation. I told them that I would put out two
quick rounds at about thigh to knee level. With luck, me firing
immediately when they expected a hostage negotiation would freeze the
hostage taker and the leg hits would cause the hostage to start
falling.
After the first two, the rounds start going out chest high. If the
hostage makes it, that's great. If not, they were already dead
anyway; it just hadn't quite happened yet when the shooting started.
This understandably used to make my friends on the weapons team (the
likely hostages) a little nervous.
Manual: "Shoot to wound, if possible."
Training: "And that shit's never possible. Do you think you're in a
fucking movie? Nobody is that good a shot - go for center of mass."
--
"If it's the fool who likes to rush in.
And if it's the angel who never does try.
And if it's me who will lose or win
Then I'll make my best guess and I won't care why.
Come on and get me, you twist of fate.
I'm standing right here, Mr Destiny.
If you want to talk, well then I'll relate.
If you don't, so what? 'Cuz you don't scare me.
-- "Gunfighter", Blues Traveler
Gashauler
"Fred J. McCall" <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:7akn03pncrbvej15n...@4ax.com...
> Bill Baker <wab...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> :On 2007-03-29 00:41:05 -0700, Fred J. McCall <fmc...@earthlink.net>
> said:
> :
> :> Remember, "The presence of a hostage will in no way affect your
> :> actions." And it's pretty close to 100% that you will know any
> :> hostage.
> :
> :Shoot the hostage first--that'll show 'em your serious.
> :
> :(Y'know, though, I can almost imagine situations where that'd be the
> :best thing to do, if you aimed to wound the hostage. But I assume that
> :standing orders were to use lethal force first (and repeatedly, if
> :necessary) on the perp trying to penetrate the restricted space.)
>
> Actually, I answered the question that way once during an NWAT visit.
> They asked for an explanation. I told them that I would put out two
> quick rounds at about thigh to knee level. With luck, me firing
> immediately when they expected a hostage negotiation would freeze the
> hostage taker and the leg hits would cause the hostage to start
> falling.
>
> After the first two, the rounds start going out chest high. If the
> hostage makes it, that's great. If not, they were already dead
> anyway; it just hadn't quite happened yet when the shooting started.
>
> This understandably used to make my friends on the weapons team (the
> likely hostages) a little nervous.
>
> Manual: "Shoot to wound, if possible."
>
situation only applies to the exclusion areas. Deadly force is not an option
in just a limited area unless they are attempting to gain access to the
exclusion area. And your story about the GMT was about an Asroc GMT no
doubt. Asroc GMT's were no way close to what we did. Even though they had
the same rating, they took a different test for advancement. The Navy
changed a bunch of Asroc GMG's to GMT's for reasons us GMT bomb types could
never understand.
Gashauler
> "Gashauler" <sword...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
> :
> :You hit that right on the nail. I laugh when you said you first
> statement.
> :Man we knew that inside and out but you forgot to say "neither confirm or
> :deny the presence OR ABSENCES..."
>
> Not how we were trained to say it.
>
> :The only time I saw Marines aboard ships for security guards were the
> CV's
> :and heavy Cruisers. You could not be a guard and have access to the
> weapon
> :to perform maintenance.
>
> They waffled back and forth on this. There was a period of time when
> I was both an authorized guard and on the weapons team.
>
> :One was a critical billet and the other was a (I
> :forgot the term) billet.
>
> I believe you're looking for 'controlled'.
>
>
then you must be up there in age. I've never heard of anyone else besides
Marines standing guard aboard a CV. It would have to be back in the 50's.
But Asroc had sailors standing guard. Have you looked into joining our group
Navy Nuclear Weapons Assoc.?
Gashauler
> "Gashauler" <sword...@comcast.net> wrote in message
> news:ecednaUNipKmUZfb...@comcast.com...
>>
>> "Bill Baker" <wab...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
>> news:1175050408_13@news-west.n...
>>> On 2007-03-27 10:38:34 -0700, "Gashauler" <sword...@comcast.net> said:
>
> Just to clear up confusion, W48, not Mk48. I made the typo myself I think
> in at least one post. I believe that for a nuclear artillery shell it
> would be a W followed by a number; conventional arty shells of course are
> M followed by a number. I'm not busting on your knowledge - I have made
> slipups like that myself.
>
weapons name was actually the M-454. See
http://www.johnstonarchive.net/nuclear/wrjp159u.html but then again if you
look at http://www.navynucweps.com/photo_archive.htm your see in the Navy we
called it the MK48.
Gashauler
"Thomas A. Hoffer" <t.ho...@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:Zvidnd5-Tu6d4pbb...@comcast.com...
weapons are "Tactical" and are not first strike weapons. However, the
planning is there as with all nuke weps.
Gashauler
>
> You're not understanding what I said. I said that a shitload of nuclear
> weapons were produced, along with a fair few nuclear artillery rounds, and
> I think it's pretty clear what the doctrine is - if you're in a tactical
> nuclear war then you shoot the round at a target that rates it. Fairly
> common sense. The first thing I meant was, Marines had the capability
> because they also had howitzers that could fire these rounds, so heck, why
> not get certified too? That's also common sense. My main point was,
> however, that while Marine planners surely thought about amphibious
> operations in the context of a nuclear war, just as everyone had to, I
> really doubt being able to _fire_ nuclear artillery rounds changed any
> doctrine at all.
>
> As for developing weapons and not having extensive plans to use them in
> all scenarios, there's a difference between using them in all scenarios
> and using them properly. If you use the weapon in Scenario X, and your
> doctrine was to use the weapon in Scenario X, but you don't actually know
> _how_ to use it in Scenario X, where does that leave you? Look at tank
> usage and France 1940.
>
> A *real* doctrine includes proper usage, not just usage. And in that
> respect plans to use weapons in various scenarios have often been flawed.
>
> AHS
heard of any scenarios where a weapon might be used improperly. I attended a
school where I was the only enlisted man there. It was Standard Operating
Procedures in time of nuclear war. This is the only formal training I've had
in any scenario planning. You can rest my friend in knowing that all the
bases have been covered including deployment from stockpile to target. Now
that covers all of what is needed and it also covers target identification
and fail safe. I think you have to come out of the conventional weapon
thinking.
Derek Lyons
>I suspect there was never any strong doctrine for how the _USMC_ would use a
>nuclear artillery shell. The fact is, we churned out a shitload of nuclear
>weapons, and if there happened to be one that was a 155mm nuclear round, and
>the Corps had 155mm howitzers that could fire it, why not train some people
>up?
That was big problem all through the 50's - and not just with the
USMC! We had all kinds of nuclear and thermonuclear nasties, but no
clear and cogent idea on how to use them.
This is why the USN could sell Polaris as a 'naval sidearm for use
against naval targets' - and also part of what lead to the creation of
the SIOP.
D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.
-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL
Derek Lyons
>Do you really think for one minute that we would develop a weapon and not
>have extensive plans to use that weapon in ALL scenarios???
I don't have to think it - because it's pretty much a fact in certain
periods.
Derek Lyons
>"Fred J. McCall" <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
>news:7akn03pncrbvej15n...@4ax.com...
>>
>> likely hostages) a little nervous.
>>
>> Manual: "Shoot to wound, if possible."
Fred is either a) misremembering or b) full of his usual bullshit.
The rule around nuclear weapons was very clear: if you shoot, shoot to
kill. (At least on SSBN's we were forbidden specifically from
shooting warning or wounding shots.)
>That's all talk because the rules are spelled out very clearly. A no hostage
>situation only applies to the exclusion areas. Deadly force is not an option
>in just a limited area unless they are attempting to gain access to the
>exclusion area.
The assumption we were taught is that if they failed to depart the
limited area on the first warning, they were to treated as if they
were attempting penetration.
Derek Lyons
Given the errors on that (navynucweps.com) page, I'd be loath to trust
it.
Arved Sandstrom
You've never heard of scenarios where conventional weapons were used
improperly? I could give you dozens. But I'll stick to just one for
starters - every side in WW1 spent the majority of the war learning how to
use artillery improperly, entirely defeating the purpose eventually. It
wasn't until the last year or so of that war that artillery started to be
used properly. By improper usage I mean prolonged saturation bombardments
that lasted a week or two - these achieved little and in many senses
defeated the purpose.
But during the war, right from the start, all sides began to get better at
_shooting_ artillery, even while not using artillery as a whole in a proper
or useful manner. So you could have artillerists using the most advanced
techniques, but their actual final application was a relative waste of time.
It wasn't until the breakthrough tactics arrived (which required a specially
trained infantry, and a difefrent type of artillery application) that
artillery was actually used _properly_.
Actually, I will give you another example. If a trained machine gunner loses
his cool and starts to try to pick off individual enemy soldiers out of the
entire mob running at the platoon he is supporting, just because they appear
to threaten him personally, he's not really using his machine gun properly
anymore. But he's certainly still using it.
I think you're still not quite understanding my point, although you're not
doing it deliberately, not like some people in this NG. I didn't mean
improper use as in using a grenade to hammer tent pegs. Your entire
paragraph above describes _one_ aspect of using a weapons system, and it's
what I thought you must be talking about. In that sense, to use my first
example, the WW1 artillerists certainly knew how to use their artillery
pieces. But the sense you mean is that of being able to *operate* the
weapons system.
What I mean by proper usage is tactical employment of the weapon in such a
way as to best achieve results on the battlefield. In that sense there is
*no* difference between conventional and nuclear artillery - if you are good
at using conventional artillery (and this means the commander of the
combined arms force) then you are good at using nuclear artillery. The only
slight adjustment you have to make to your thinking is to have your people
thinking a bit about radiation, but that's not a major leap. A W48 is not a
big boom - I believe it was rated at 70-100 tons (in one test shot it was
estimated at 72 tons). You know, that's a big explosion, but it's not a huge
one. As it's a single explosion, it's also not going to have a major blast
radius - it'll piss off a Soviet MR Bn. Unfortunately the single test was a
tunnel test at about 400 feet underground, so I don't know exactly what the
effective blast radius would be against T-54s, say, but it wouldn't be very
great.
I hope this makes the distinction I am using more clear.
AHS
Arved Sandstrom
news:46120adc....@news.supernews.com...
> "Gashauler" <sword...@comcast.net> wrote:
>>"Fred J. McCall" <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
>>news:7akn03pncrbvej15n...@4ax.com...
>>>
>>> This understandably used to make my friends on the weapons team (the
>>> likely hostages) a little nervous.
>>>
>>> Manual: "Shoot to wound, if possible."
>
> Fred is either a) misremembering or b) full of his usual bullshit.
>
> The rule around nuclear weapons was very clear: if you shoot, shoot to
> kill. (At least on SSBN's we were forbidden specifically from
> shooting warning or wounding shots.)
That's pretty much the rule for armed guards in any case. Nuclear weapons
have nothing to do with it. If you have to shoot at all, the reasons that
you are doing it is because the person(s) you are shooting at must be
stopped in their tracks. Since you're not on the rifle range, there's no
question of calmly shooting to disable. Besides, who is to tell what a
disabling shot is? Some guys can take a bullet or two in the shoulders, arms
or legs and still manage to kill _you_. The only effective disabling shots
happen to also be potential killing shots.
Certainly Marine armoury guards back in my day had precisely the same
orders. If the rules for deadly force applied, then you shot to kill. And
it's called deadly force, not disabling force, after all. And we were also
forbidden to fire warning shots. In fact, the only warning was in the
initial recognition/identification phase - the routine "Halt, who goes
there...get on your knees and move forward slowly, slide your ID under the
chainlink fence" kind of thing. Once the decision to initiate deadly force
is made, there is not even even verbal warning that you are going to shoot.
AHS
deem...@aol.com
wrote:
> "Derek Lyons" <fairwa...@gmail.com> wrote in message
>
> news:46120adc....@news.supernews.com...> "Gashauler" <swordfi...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >>"Fred J. McCall" <fmcc...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
When in doubt, empty the magazine?
Gashauler
>
> You've never heard of scenarios where conventional weapons were used
> improperly? I could give you dozens.
There, you just hit one the major point. Nuclear weapon scenarios are
completely different than conventional weapon and the planning is done by
more than just one type of field.
>
> I think you're still not quite understanding my point,
You're right, but your missing my point as well.
But please the W48 is the wrong terminology. The MK48 uses the W48 warhead.
A warhead may have more than one miltary use like the W45. It's what the DOD
does with the warhead that makes a particular weapon system.
Gashauler
I don't know what kind of errors you're talking about But I'd take their
readings long before yours. After all they had the hands in the weapon where
you only touched the outside. And I'm sorry your statement about Polaris is
bunk too. Polaris has always been a strategic weapon. Let me guess you're a
MT and never got around the REB shop.
Paul J. Adam
<fair...@gmail.com> writes
>The rule around nuclear weapons was very clear: if you shoot, shoot to
>kill. (At least on SSBN's we were forbidden specifically from
>shooting warning or wounding shots.)
Anywhere in UK forces, the rule is really, really clear - if you shoot
at someone, you are trying to kill them. There is no "shoot to wound" -
if you discharge a firearm at someone you will be assumed to be making
your best effort to kill them.
You can bleed to death remarkably quickly from a shot to the thigh...
--
The nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its
warriors, will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done
by fools.
-Thucydides
Paul J. Adam - mainbox{at}jrwlynch[dot]demon(dot)co<dot>uk
John Schilling
<asand...@accesswave.ca> wrote:
>"Bill Baker" <wab...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
>news:1175118173_41900@news-west.n...
>> On 2007-03-28 12:03:04 -0700, "Arved Sandstrom" <asand...@accesswave.ca>
>> said:
>>
>>> I think the main factor would simply have been - why routinely deploy
>>> W-48s on floats? Which is what you said. I see no good argument for it.
>>
>[ SNIP ]
>> So my response to the "Why would they?" answer is that back when the
>> doctrine of use for tactical nukes was liberal and prolific, US forces did
>> a lot more insecure things than keeping nuke-tipped shells in gator
>> magazines. I'm not disputing that "No"--you guys would know better than
>> me--I'm just saying there was a time when it might have been a plausible
>> doctrine.
>
>And perhaps it was considered. The main reason I think it wouldn't have been
>done is because of the very nature of the Marine Corps. At the height of the
>Cold War even, the MAUs/MEUs were there for the limited options, not in case
>the entire Soviet military decides to preemptively counterattack western
>Europe. There's no MAU/MEU mission I can think of - not hasty, not
>deliberate - that requires nuclear weapons that couldn't be done better with
>a nuclear weapon delivered by someone else.
That's true of nuclear artillery shells in general - missiles are pretty
much always a safer, more reliable, and more versatile way of getting the
job done. The only "advantage" of nuclear artillery was that one could
deploy the weapons and delegate operational control down to the brigade
(or MAU) level.
Given the late 1950s/early 1860s mindset that actually did see this sort
of thing as an advantage, though, I can certainly see reasons why an MAU
might be seen as "needing" organic nukes. It's not like they were going
to just sit out World War III on account of it being Too Big For The
Marines, and they probably wouldn't be used as light infantry in the
Fulda Gap.
They'd have been deployed in the peripheral areas where there was still
important warfighting to be done and their mobility outweighed their
lightness. Possibly including actual amphibious assaults, Inchon-style
landings behind a Soviet advance down Norway, for example, or attacks
on Murmansk and Vladivostok.
But, in any event, places where there isn't going to be a U.S. Army
heavy brigade with its own nukes, or even the logistical system by
which Army brigades get their nukes delivered. And, quite possibly,
places where a just-deployed USMC brigade can expect fairly quickly
to meet a division-scale counterattack.
Given the genera attitude for tactical nuclear warfare at the time,
this would have called for Marine Corps 155mm howitzers to be lobbing
W48s at Russian tank battallions.
--
*John Schilling * "Anything worth doing, *
*Member:AIAA,NRA,ACLU,SAS,LP * is worth doing for money" *
*Chief Scientist & General Partner * -13th Rule of Acquisition *
*White Elephant Research, LLC * "There is no substitute *
*schi...@spock.usc.edu * for success" *
*661-951-9107 or 661-275-6795 * -58th Rule of Acquisition *
Fred J. McCall
:
:"Fred J. McCall" <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
And just what do you think they gave me that weapon for? We weren't
protecting pet rocks...
:And your story about the GMT was about an Asroc GMT no
:doubt. Asroc GMT's were no way close to what we did. Even though they had
:the same rating, they took a different test for advancement. The Navy
:changed a bunch of Asroc GMG's to GMT's for reasons us GMT bomb types could
:never understand.
Tell me something I don't know. If it makes you feel better, they
didn't think much of you guys, either...
--
"Oooo, scary! Y'know, there are a lot scarier things
in the world than you ... and I'm one of them."
-- Buffy the vampire
Fred J. McCall
:"Gashauler" <sword...@comcast.net> wrote:
:>"Fred J. McCall" <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
:>news:7akn03pncrbvej15n...@4ax.com...
:>>
:>> This understandably used to make my friends on the weapons team (the
:>> likely hostages) a little nervous.
:>>
:>> Manual: "Shoot to wound, if possible."
:
:Fred is either a) misremembering or b) full of his usual bullshit.
Neither. That's what it said. It was our judgment as to what sort of
unusual circumstances might make it possible.
Derek needs to go back to my original post to see the bit that got
clipped out right after that statement, above.
:The rule around nuclear weapons was very clear: if you shoot, shoot to
:kill. (At least on SSBN's we were forbidden specifically from
:shooting warning or wounding shots.)
Warning shots were prohibited. From the same pub - "A warning shot is
neither necessary nor desirable."
:>That's all talk because the rules are spelled out very clearly. A no hostage
:>situation only applies to the exclusion areas. Deadly force is not an option
:>in just a limited area unless they are attempting to gain access to the
:>exclusion area.
:
:The assumption we were taught is that if they failed to depart the
:limited area on the first warning, they were to treated as if they
:were attempting penetration.
Same here.
--
"The way of the samurai is found in death. If by setting one's heart
right every morning and evening, one is able to live as though his
body were already dead, he gains freedom in The Way. His whole life
will be without blame, and he will succeed in his calling."
-- "Hagakure Kikigaki", Yamamoto Tsunetomo
Arved Sandstrom
news:1175197901....@r56g2000hsd.googlegroups.com...
Well, deadly force doesn't mean you have to kill the guy, it just means that
if in the course of stopping him doing what he isn't supposed to be doing,
you also happen to kill him, that's OK.
I wouldn't use the phrase "when in doubt" - police have to deal with
ambiguities, but a military guard on post has a lot less grey area to worry
about. Guarding an armoury, guarding an ammo depot, maintaining a perimeter
for special weapons...rules of deadly force are clearcut.
Presumably if he's down and not moving after two or three shots, there's no
real need to expend the rest of your rounds into his body. I think the
investigators might raise a few eyebrows at that...
AHS
Arved Sandstrom
Thank you. I figured it had to have an Mxxx designation. I read your Mk48 as
a typo, because I knew that no artillery shell would be designated that way.
My apologies.
AHS
Arved Sandstrom
I just found this website. How does it parse?
http://www.designation-systems.net/usmilav/nuke.html
AHS
deem...@aol.com
wrote:
> <deemsb...@aol.com> wrote in message
Reminds me of a Houston cop who shot a suspect 17 times with his
revolver. There were questions about just how frisky the guy was when
the cop reloaded for the second time.
Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
Gashauler
>
> :And your story about the GMT was about an Asroc GMT no
> :doubt. Asroc GMT's were no way close to what we did. Even though they had
> :the same rating, they took a different test for advancement. The Navy
> :changed a bunch of Asroc GMG's to GMT's for reasons us GMT bomb types
> could
> :never understand.
>
> Tell me something I don't know. If it makes you feel better, they
> didn't think much of you guys, either...
>
could do an LLC! I think they had alot of resentment when the Navy made then
GMT's. They should have had there own rate. But it's all gone now. No more
GMT's and even after the Navy changed the GMT's to Weapons Technicians
they're gone too.
I have to say that this has been the best thread I've seen on this group for
along time. Thanks to all.
Gashauler
>
> I just found this website. How does it parse?
>
> http://www.designation-systems.net/usmilav/nuke.html
>
> AHS
http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/nuclear/wrjp159s.html and there's alot more
sources that put that table together than the one listed. What we used in
the Navy may have been incorrect but we still used the terms. Like the
projectile (as you say) W33 we called it the B33 projectile. That's what was
taught to us in the Joint Service Nuclear Weapons School in Alb. NM. We
called most of the weapons for what they were. We never said Mk57 bomb or
Mk43 we called them B57 and B43, this is all evident on
http://www.navynucweps.com/photo_archive.htm. That list was made by serveral
weapons type people. Some have been around since Little Boy was deployed.
Like I said it may have been incorrect but it was used in everyday language
including documentation like a OCR's report or a UR report.
Gashauler
>
> I just found this website. How does it parse?
>
> http://www.designation-systems.net/usmilav/nuke.html
>
> AHS
call the W30?
Derek Lyons
>
>"Arved Sandstrom" <asand...@accesswave.ca> wrote in message
>news:UuGOh.24777$x9.18351@edtnps89...
>>
>> respect plans to use weapons in various scenarios have often been flawed.
>>
>> AHS
>Just what do you think using a nuclear weapon properly means? I've never
>heard of any scenarios where a weapon might be used improperly.
When you have limited resources and multiple target sets - doctrine
and tactics evolved from doctrine help you prioritize between them.
Even when your resources match your target sets, you still need to
prioritize in time and space.
>I think you have to come out of the conventional weapon
>thinking.
I think you need to realize the Arved has been on the pointy end, and
you haven't.
Derek Lyons
>Given the late 1950s/early 1860s mindset that actually did see this sort
>of thing as an advantage, though, I can certainly see reasons why an MAU
>might be seen as "needing" organic nukes. It's not like they were going
>to just sit out World War III on account of it being Too Big For The
>Marines, and they probably wouldn't be used as light infantry in the
>Fulda Gap.
<snippage excellent discussion>
Another point to keep in mind is that in the 1950's/early-to-mid
1960's, 'nuclear capable' was _the_ buzzword of the day. If you
couldn't fight on a nuclear battlefield, or carry nuclear nasties -
the Service Chiefs feared their branch would become obsolescent at
best, if not completely obsolete.
In the Navy this lead to such lunacy as planning for carriers refitted
to carry mass amounts of Regulus (and some cruisers as well), an
ASuW/'NGFS' attack mode for nuclear tipped Talos, AFAPs for BB main
batteries, and the Able Dog being assigned a strategic role. (Not to
mention the original scheme to deploy Polaris on surface ships.)
An AFAP for the USMC fits perfectly into this mindset.
I wonder if the USMC ever considered Davy Crockett?
Derek Lyons
><deem...@aol.com> wrote in message
>news:1175197901....@r56g2000hsd.googlegroups.com...
>>
>>
>> When in doubt, empty the magazine?
>
>Well, deadly force doesn't mean you have to kill the guy, it just means that
>if in the course of stopping him doing what he isn't supposed to be doing,
>you also happen to kill him, that's OK.
>
>I wouldn't use the phrase "when in doubt" - police have to deal with
>ambiguities, but a military guard on post has a lot less grey area to worry
>about. Guarding an armoury, guarding an ammo depot, maintaining a perimeter
>for special weapons...rules of deadly force are clearcut.
Yep. In King's Bay I saw a marine end up with NJP (and narrowly
missing a court martial), because he broke someones hand with the butt
of his rifle rather than taking a shot.
The cause of the incident was some paperwork got blown *just* across
the cargo net barrier on the weather decks. The clueless owner of
said paperwork decided to reach through the net (five feet from the
sentry) and retrieve it. Once you are across the net, you are in the
exclusion zone - and just like article 120, penetration however
slight, is sufficient.
Derek Lyons
>I don't know what kind of errors you're talking about But I'd take their
>readings long before yours. After all they had the hands in the weapon where
>you only touched the outside.
Actually, I rarely touched the outside - but I have spent twenty plus
years studying the issue.
A clue for you - hands on experience with a tiny component of a system
does not equate to full knowledge of that system, its ramifications,
and its history.
>And I'm sorry your statement about Polaris is bunk too. Polaris has always been
>a strategic weapon.
Well, then I'm in good company in being wrong, as every authoritative
history of either nuclear weapons or the Polaris system agrees with
me.
Derek Lyons
>
>I just found this website. How does it parse?
>
>http://www.designation-systems.net/usmilav/nuke.html
That one isn't bad, and I've worked with Andreas off and on over the
years to fix his errors in SLBM descriptions. (For example, his
original page on the C4B repeated the oft found misstatement that it
replaced the C3 in the classes prior to the 726.)
Derek Lyons
>
>"Arved Sandstrom" <asand...@accesswave.ca> wrote in message
>news:Ig5Ph.28361$__3.12872@edtnps90...
>>
>> I just found this website. How does it parse?
>>
>> http://www.designation-systems.net/usmilav/nuke.html
>>
>> AHS
>That table is not totally correct either. See
>http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/nuclear/wrjp159s.html and there's alot more
>sources that put that table together than the one listed. What we used in
>the Navy may have been incorrect but we still used the terms.
Real historians and real researchers prefer to the correct and
standarized terms instead of slang.
Arved Sandstrom
news:iq9p03dc7uqlljh9c...@4ax.com...
That's an important point, and I concede that. I was thinking more from an
'80's mindset. But back in the '50's and '60's, which is when the nuclear
artillery rounds were produced, yes, people were thinking differently.
> They'd have been deployed in the peripheral areas where there was still
> important warfighting to be done and their mobility outweighed their
> lightness. Possibly including actual amphibious assaults, Inchon-style
> landings behind a Soviet advance down Norway, for example, or attacks
> on Murmansk and Vladivostok.
Not that those ideas disappeared. :-) When 4th MEB sailed off to the Middle
East in the summer of 1990 it was still designated as the MEB for NATO's
northern flank, and was in fact preparing to do a northern European op,
which we were all looking forward to, many of us having been to northern
Norway on a previous occasion, but now wishing to see a bit of Germany and
England perhaps. Alas, not to be. On the first occasion we went as a sort of
REFORGER type thing - the equipment was already in Norwegian caves, and we
simply flew over (incongruously, on an Israeli charter airline). In that
case we did not actually have a great amount of capability to do amphibious
assaults...we were just arctic-trained light infantry.
On the second planned exercise the MEB was set up as a real MEB with the
capability to do what you just described, that is, independent operations to
conduct amphibious assaults. As it happened, Saddam did his thing, and
that's why there was a worked-up MEB over in the North Arabian Sea so
quickly. Although we did have a brief spazz repainting vehicles, and getting
desert gear...
> But, in any event, places where there isn't going to be a U.S. Army
> heavy brigade with its own nukes, or even the logistical system by
> which Army brigades get their nukes delivered. And, quite possibly,
> places where a just-deployed USMC brigade can expect fairly quickly
> to meet a division-scale counterattack.
>
> Given the genera attitude for tactical nuclear warfare at the time,
> this would have called for Marine Corps 155mm howitzers to be lobbing
> W48s at Russian tank battallions.
Yes, I'd have to agree. But I doubt that a routine peacetime Marine float
had nuclear artillery rounds with it, at any time. In the case of a MEB or
MEF rapidly assembling and crossing the Atlantic to arrive at the northwest
German coast 10 days after the Soviets crank through the border, yes, I
wouldn't be surprised if the ATF didn't tote a few special rounds with them.
But it never happened, so we'll never know. :-)
AHS
Gashauler
I just think your assessment of the program is fairy tales and full of
holes. Show me where the Navy ever had Regulus on any Aircraft Carriers.
Maybe you should go back to the Navy site that you don't believe and read
LCDR Roy A. Norman. Or even Jack Hayes, he was there too. Your studies are
very limited (of what I've seen) and you should stick to the bubble head
fleet. After all you studies are self taught and if you did know the systems
then you would know that GMT's were instructed in more subjects than just
standing watch on a FBM. I did my time at SWFPAC and I've seen plenty of
your kind. And like I said before you a prime example why you weren't
allowed in the REB shop.
Gashauler
Go ahead and say what you like it won't matter to me since you're going in
the shitcan. But know this, this was a very good thread until you came in
with your chest puffed out trying to impress the world or your knowledge or
what I saw your lack of it.
Gashauler
>
> I think you're still not quite understanding my point, although you're not
> doing it deliberately, not like some people in this NG.
I completely understand this statement and it's a shame because it chases
people away that have lots of first hand knowledge. They just won't put up
with the soapbox dictators that they know are only book smart. Book smart is
ok but field experience should be counted and not disregarded like some do.
I remember one of my trips to Sandia and talking to a nuclear physicist with
a doctorate degree and how easy it was to understand him no matter what the
subject. I believe that's what makes a doctorate, someone that can convey
their thoughts to anyone and get the understanding. That's what Dr. Teller
did. He would go to a school and teach sixth graders about physics and not
ramble on trying to impress others on what he knew.
Arved Sandstrom
Considering that the words doctor and doctrine derive from the Latin
"cocere" - to teach - it would indeed be fitting that a person with a
doctorate be a good teacher. Unfortunately that's often not the case.
Judging by the experience of my peers, I fared better than others when
getting my professors - most of them were good teachers and some of them
lived for teaching.
And university aside, PhD's in research (military, government, industry etc)
have a responsibility to teach other researchers and the wider public.
Everybody has read impenetrable scientific articles published in academic
paper mills that quite frankly are turgid pap, and are fit for nothing but
the outhouse.
I may be biased, but I hold up my father as an example of someone who can
teach. Ten years now since he retired, but he still goes mornings to Bedford
Institute of Oceanography (if you Google on Helmuth Sandstrom then you get
him). His article output is low, always has been, but he's not trying to
impress anyone. His doctoral thesis was on internal waves, and that was back
in 1966 - and here in 2007, forty years later, he's still studying internal
waves. As you can imagine quite a lot of what he has done in that field is
of interest to various people. I still remember one evening when he brought
a videotape home, and proceeded to show it to me and my mother on the TV -
it was clips of SAR images from racetracks over the Scotian Shelf that him
and a colleague had done. He was doing exactly what you say - he was
teaching internal waves to us laymen using that videotape, explaining how
_that_ pattern on the surface, picked up by SAR, was an indication of
internal waves deeper, caused by bottom topography *there*.
Granted, I wasn't exactly a layman - I had a BSc in Physics, with one course
in oceanographic fluid dynamics - so I could follow, but I think even my
mother grasped the essence of the subject.
There were (and still are) quite a few oceanographic researchers that seem
to have this same gift, that they can teach their subject.
I think neither book smarts nor field smarts should be discounted. As an
example, let's take blacksmithing. We know that excellent metal alloys were
produced well before most metalworkers could read, or indeed there was
anything to read on the subject. So you don't _need_ book smarts to produce
a great knife or door hinge or helmet or wire. And even these days,
practical blacksmithing books (I have a few) concentrate on the empirical,
so what they are doing is recording the oral knowledge that was passed on
from smith to smith, and making it more widely available. Someone venturing
into blacksmithing, having read several of these books carefully, would have
one kind of book smarts, but actually they have the equivalent of a Chilton
or Haynes car manual. There would be yet another kind of book smarts, which
would derive from having studied materials science as an engineer, in which
case you'd know a lot about steel, for starters, from the scientific
standpoint. Now ideally, you'd have a blacksmith who has the practical
books, has field smarts (experience), and _also_ has a background in formal
materials science, so that he can in theory advance the discipline and not
perpetuate it.
Pure experience by itself is less and less useful these days for an
increasing number of jobs. To bring it back to SMN, I could not have done my
job as an FO in the Marines without having book smarts - the idiots who
think we are taking borderline retards into the military should look at some
of the manuals and forms and plans that actually go into a job as ostensibly
simple as directing mortars, artillery and naval gunfire. This may actually
be a good example - you absolutely needed the book smarts to be an effective
well-rounded 0861, but equally you needed the experience.
There is another word for "field experience", and some modern software
knowledge systems used by corporations have the avowed aim of capturing it -
it's acquired knowledge, or non-traditional knowledge. In short, it's the
corpus of facts that all of us have that was never taught to us in a
classroom, and that if you were to look at our resumes you'd never guess
that we know how to do X, Y and Z. Do you necessarily put in your resume
that you regularly keep up your St John Ambulance or Red Cross
certification, and that you belong to a search and rescue group? Is it in
your SRB that so far in your military career you got some combat engineer
experience with mines and demo, or that you've had so much crosstraining
from Comm Plt across the street that by now you're almost a 2531? Do people
really know what your hobbies and interests may perhaps bring to the current
job?
The answer being No - in most people is a much wider well of untapped
knowledge that is not generally known to others.
AHS
La N
Wow. Great post, Arv. I didn't know this about your father's background.
And, without going into great detail, I agree wholeheartedly with your last
paragraph.
- nilita
Arved Sandstrom
If a former Marine can be mild, let me mildly say that there's no point in
getting into a pissing match.
If this subthread were to continue, the reasonable way to do it would be not
to attack the man, but for both sides to identify points of contention. And
there do appear to be a few. :-) Then those points can be ironed with
reference to verifiable sources. It's pretty simple as long as it doesn't
get personal.
Believe it or not, when I talk artillery and NGF on this NG I don't fall
back on just my memories and experience - I do a formidable amount of
background research, diving into my books, re-reading my handbooks,
Googling. I think most regulars have recognized that I do that, because
after 15 years of being a civilian I couldn't possibly recall things that
exactly. And there are also things that I didn't know when I was in. It
might help if everyone did a bit more of that, plus supplied a few links to
back up the more controversail claims - I myself try to do that on occasion.
As far as dumping people in the shitcan, that's your call. I myself have
never done it and never will, not on this NG nor in any others. If I do it
on Usenet, my feeling is that I will start doing it in real life.
AHS
Arved Sandstrom
> "Gashauler" <sword...@comcast.net> wrote in message
> news:85mdnffO6eSuBJDb...@comcast.com...
>>
>> "Arved Sandstrom" <asand...@accesswave.ca> wrote in message
>> news:uzUOh.28215$x9.197@edtnps89...
>>>
>>> I think you're still not quite understanding my point, although you're
>>> not doing it deliberately, not like some people in this NG.
>>
>> I completely understand this statement and it's a shame because it chases
>> people away that have lots of first hand knowledge. They just won't put
>> up with the soapbox dictators that they know are only book smart. Book
>> smart is ok but field experience should be counted and not disregarded
>> like some do. I remember one of my trips to Sandia and talking to a
>> nuclear physicist with a doctorate degree and how easy it was to
>> understand him no matter what the subject. I believe that's what makes a
>> doctorate, someone that can convey their thoughts to anyone and get the
>> understanding. That's what Dr. Teller did. He would go to a school and
>> teach sixth graders about physics and not ramble on trying to impress
>> others on what he knew.
>
> Considering that the words doctor and doctrine derive from the Latin
> "cocere" - to teach - it would indeed be fitting that a person with a
> doctorate be a good teacher. Unfortunately that's often not the case.
Obvious typo - docere.
AHS
Bill Baker
> ...AFAPs for BB main batteries...
I wonder if the employment-doctrine regulations for the 16" nuke shells
for the BB's will ever be declassified, because I'd sure like to cruise
through 'em. I imagine that the bulk of the doctrine involved the
standard scenarios for NGFS as developed for the 11" shells. But I've
always wondered if some old warhorse of a battleship admiral--this was
the early 50's, after all, and some of them must have still been
kicking around--wrote an addendum on using the nuclear main-battery
rounds as the ultimate ship-to-ship weapon.
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Arved Sandstrom
> On 2007-03-30 12:12:52 -0700, fair...@gmail.com (Derek Lyons) said:
>
>> ...AFAPs for BB main batteries...
>
> I wonder if the employment-doctrine regulations for the 16" nuke shells
> for the BB's will ever be declassified, because I'd sure like to cruise
> through 'em. I imagine that the bulk of the doctrine involved the
> standard scenarios for NGFS as developed for the 11" shells. But I've
> always wondered if some old warhorse of a battleship admiral--this was the
> early 50's, after all, and some of them must have still been kicking
> around--wrote an addendum on using the nuclear main-battery rounds as the
> ultimate ship-to-ship weapon.
They surely must have thought of it. It's hard to say...I am now myself, as
a former NGF spotter, starting to salivate thinking of the possibilities of
a 15-20 kT round. I wouldn't use it on D-Day or afterwards, but a couple of
days prior to the actual landing? Sure - the residual effects of radiation
wouldn't be bad; AFAIK the round in question would be a time-fuzed airburst
so it's not like immense amounts of dirt would get sucked up and blown
around...not like counterforce strikes.
I have a couple of target arrays in mind right now...how much easier some of
the planned landing sites in Kuwait would have been to deal with if we'd had
Mk23 rounds.
But I can't imagine that at the time some clever individuals didn't also
think of how useful such a thing would be against ships - although said
enemy ship would be uncomfortably close if in the '50's or '60's (I have no
idea when the round was retired) it was close enough to shoot at with 16"
guns.
AHS
Gashauler
written by Phd's that they had the sole purpose of impressing others instead
of teaching. Those are the books the class didn't use that much.
Gashauler
>
>> ...AFAPs for BB main batteries...
>
> I wonder if the employment-doctrine regulations for the 16" nuke shells
> for the BB's will ever be declassified, because I'd sure like to cruise
> through 'em. I imagine that the bulk of the doctrine involved the
> standard scenarios for NGFS as developed for the 11" shells. But I've
> always wondered if some old warhorse of a battleship admiral--this was the
> early 50's, after all, and some of them must have still been kicking
> around--wrote an addendum on using the nuclear main-battery rounds as the
> ultimate ship-to-ship weapon.
>
>
downgrading. But it's funny I was thinking the same thing when this thread
was talking about weapon designations. One poster put up a table that
clearly spelled out that bombs would be identified as MK until a certain
date. Then I got to thinking that can't be right because of the publications
every service branch used. We used pubs for everything we did and here's an
example. The Navy Swop B57-0 pub was general capabilities of the weapon. The
Swop B57-1 was maintenance procedures and the Swop B57-1A was more I won't
go into to. I believe the Air Force called these pubs TPO's I could be wrong
here but I know the other services had a different heading than Swop. The
Swop's for the B43 bomb were listed as the same.
Gashauler
insulted anyone on any group. Maybe I took his post the wrong way but I
don't think so. So to end any further disruptions on my part I just simple
place the offensive individual in my killfile.
I too go back and check my sources. And I think I showed that when I listed
a different table backing up what I said. There's alot of information out
there on nukes and I try to keep my references to the people at DOE, Sandia,
DOD, and the people that were there. I try to stay away from the political
aspects of the subject and stay to what I know was written or taught to me.
If you look this whole thread started when a poster asked about being
exposed to radiation. I feel I'm more qualified than most on his subject
since I've gone through the VA and have been rated 10% disability for
ionizing radiation. It took over 5 years to show the VA that I was not just
a sailor that stood watches but had my hands in the weapons. Also the
subject came up about shielding on FBM subs and I pointed out that there
were other places that did just the same if not more and backed that up with
pictures. So I agree that people should not talk off the top of there head
and if you feel that I just went on memories and experience I'm sorry you
feel that way.
Arved Sandstrom
>
[ SNIP ]
> If you look this whole thread started when a poster asked about being
> exposed to radiation. I feel I'm more qualified than most on his subject
> since I've gone through the VA and have been rated 10% disability for
> ionizing radiation. It took over 5 years to show the VA that I was not
> just a sailor that stood watches but had my hands in the weapons. Also the
> subject came up about shielding on FBM subs and I pointed out that there
> were other places that did just the same if not more and backed that up
> with pictures. So I agree that people should not talk off the top of there
> head and if you feel that I just went on memories and experience I'm sorry
> you feel that way.
I am not passing judgmernt on either you nor Derek - I assume that both of
you have the experience you claim to have, until proven different. I have no
problem with using memories and experience - most posters here do that to a
greater or lesser degree, myself included.
I just figured you guys had reached a non-productive point, and said so,
without myself having the knowledge to say who's right and who's wrong.
AHS
Bill Baker
<asand...@accesswave.ca> said:
> "Bill Baker" <wab...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:1175330368_190@news-west.n...
>> On 2007-03-30 12:12:52 -0700, fair...@gmail.com (Derek Lyons) said:
>>
>>> ...AFAPs for BB main batteries...
>>
>> I wonder if the employment-doctrine regulations for the 16" nuke shells
>> for the BB's will ever be declassified, because I'd sure like to cruise
>> through 'em. I imagine that the bulk of the doctrine involved the
>> standard scenarios for NGFS as developed for the 11" shells. But I've
>> always wondered if some old warhorse of a battleship admiral--this was
>> the early 50's, after all, and some of them must have still been
>> kicking around--wrote an addendum on using the nuclear main-battery
>> rounds as the ultimate ship-to-ship weapon.
>
> They surely must have thought of it. It's hard to say...I am now
> myself, as a former NGF spotter, starting to salivate thinking of the
> possibilities of a 15-20 kT round...
Why just one? You've got 9 guns on an Iowa...
Seriously--or not so seriously, since it's 4/1--can you imagine a
scenario that would justify a full main-battery broadside of MK-23's
(W-23's, S-23's, whatever)? Not that any of the reactivated Iowa's
probably carried 9 nuclear rounds during the 50's, but they could have
done. Woo hoo, the ultimate dream mission for a Cold War battlewagon
flag officer!
So what would have justified the order of, "Load main battery for
nuclear salvo!" Can't think of too many, although it would have been a
heckuva way to flatten Shanghai or Vladivostok on very short notice
(assuming the BB was already offshore). Any such plausible targets for
such a firing mission would probably have been NGFS land targets, of
course.
The one non-NGFS scenario for salvo fire nuclear I can imagine would
be, of all things, AAA. Think about it--9 15Kt bursts could sanitize a
whole air defense sector of bogeys!
> ...although said enemy ship would be uncomfortably close if in the
> '50's or '60's (I have no idea when the round was retired) it was close
> enough to shoot at with 16" guns.
Nah, a buttoned-up Iowa would be pretty safe from the effects of a 20Kt
shot at 15-20 miles, assuming an airburst.
Andrew Swallow
[snip]
>
> So what would have justified the order of, "Load main battery for
> nuclear salvo!" Can't think of too many, although it would have been a
> heckuva way to flatten Shanghai or Vladivostok on very short notice
> (assuming the BB was already offshore). Any such plausible targets for
> such a firing mission would probably have been NGFS land targets, of
> course.
1 ship vs 18 enemy ships at anchor.
Andrew Swallow
John Schilling
>On 2007-03-30 12:12:52 -0700, fair...@gmail.com (Derek Lyons) said:
>
>> ...AFAPs for BB main batteries...
>
>I wonder if the employment-doctrine regulations for the 16" nuke shells
>for the BB's will ever be declassified, because I'd sure like to cruise
>through 'em. I imagine that the bulk of the doctrine involved the
>standard scenarios for NGFS as developed for the 11" shells. But I've
>always wondered if some old warhorse of a battleship admiral--this was
>the early 50's, after all, and some of them must have still been
>kicking around--wrote an addendum on using the nuclear main-battery
>rounds as the ultimate ship-to-ship weapon.
I think we might be a tad optimistic in assuming policy for the use of
such weapons was well-enough developed as to merit the term, "doctrine".
I rather suspect that there was simply a vague notion that if the balloon
went up, a Battleship captain (or at least the admiral in charge of an
ASuW Task Group) would probably be able to find *something* worth nuking
and so we ought to go ahead and arm battleships with nukes.
As people got more serious about actual nuclear warfighting doctrine,
some of these less plausibly useful nuclear weapons started going away.
--
*John Schilling * "Anything worth doing, *
*Member:AIAA,NRA,ACLU,SAS,LP * is worth doing for money" *
*Chief Scientist & General Partner * -13th Rule of Acquisition *
*White Elephant Research, LLC * "There is no substitute *
*schi...@spock.usc.edu * for success" *
*661-951-9107 or 661-275-6795 * -58th Rule of Acquisition *
Derek Lyons
>I think neither book smarts nor field smarts should be discounted.
Very true. My problem arises when certain people claim that field
experience makes them experts on things they have no actual experience
with - even if they are related to the field they do have experience
in.
Gashauler
> On Sat, 31 Mar 2007 01:37:56 -0700, Bill Baker <wab...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>>On 2007-03-30 12:12:52 -0700, fair...@gmail.com (Derek Lyons) said:
>>
>>> ...AFAPs for BB main batteries...
>>
>>I wonder if the employment-doctrine regulations for the 16" nuke shells
>>for the BB's will ever be declassified, because I'd sure like to cruise
>>through 'em. I imagine that the bulk of the doctrine involved the
>>standard scenarios for NGFS as developed for the 11" shells. But I've
>>always wondered if some old warhorse of a battleship admiral--this was
>>the early 50's, after all, and some of them must have still been
>>kicking around--wrote an addendum on using the nuclear main-battery
>>rounds as the ultimate ship-to-ship weapon.
>
> I think we might be a tad optimistic in assuming policy for the use of
> such weapons was well-enough developed as to merit the term, "doctrine".
> I rather suspect that there was simply a vague notion that if the balloon
> went up, a Battleship captain (or at least the admiral in charge of an
> ASuW Task Group) would probably be able to find *something* worth nuking
> and so we ought to go ahead and arm battleships with nukes.
>
> As people got more serious about actual nuclear warfighting doctrine,
> some of these less plausibly useful nuclear weapons started going away.
>
when they can release. I came in 1970 and those BB rounds were out of the
stock[pile then.
Derek Lyons
>On Sat, 31 Mar 2007 01:37:56 -0700, Bill Baker <wab...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>>On 2007-03-30 12:12:52 -0700, fair...@gmail.com (Derek Lyons) said:
>>
>>> ...AFAPs for BB main batteries...
>>
>>I wonder if the employment-doctrine regulations for the 16" nuke shells
>>for the BB's will ever be declassified, because I'd sure like to cruise
>>through 'em. I imagine that the bulk of the doctrine involved the
>>standard scenarios for NGFS as developed for the 11" shells. But I've
>>always wondered if some old warhorse of a battleship admiral--this was
>>the early 50's, after all, and some of them must have still been
>>kicking around--wrote an addendum on using the nuclear main-battery
>>rounds as the ultimate ship-to-ship weapon.
>
>I think we might be a tad optimistic in assuming policy for the use of
>such weapons was well-enough developed as to merit the term, "doctrine".
It's not entirely clear that _anything_ was well developed WRT these
weapons.
>I rather suspect that there was simply a vague notion that if the balloon
>went up, a Battleship captain (or at least the admiral in charge of an
>ASuW Task Group) would probably be able to find *something* worth nuking
>and so we ought to go ahead and arm battleships with nukes.
Much like the MK VI exploder - pushed out to the Fleet w/o the Fleet
knowing much about it.
>As people got more serious about actual nuclear warfighting doctrine,
>some of these less plausibly useful nuclear weapons started going away.
Indeed.
Derek Lyons
>
>"Derek Lyons" <fair...@gmail.com> wrote in message
>news:46126520....@news.supernews.com...
>
>I just think your assessment of the program is fairy tales and full of
>holes. Show me where the Navy ever had Regulus on any Aircraft Carriers.
I guess even bothering to google on "Regulus aircraft carrier" is too
hard for you. You might find out that you don't know what the fuck
you are talking about.
Here is the first link that comes up:
http://hometown.aol.com/ntspark/myhomepage/Regulus-Missile12.html
The *second* link that comes up even has a picture of a Regulus being
launched from a cruiser and *also* discusses the aircraft carrier
program:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulus_missile
>And like I said before you a prime example why you weren't
>allowed in the REB shop.
I wasn't allowed in the REB shop by regulation - the same way you
weren't allowed acess to the inner SIOP safe (as I was). So what?
Derek Lyons
>"Gashauler" <sword...@comcast.net> wrote in message
>news:3oednSXg4fwnEpDb...@comcast.com...
>>
>> "Derek Lyons" <fair...@gmail.com> wrote in message
>> news:46126520....@news.supernews.com...
>>
>> Go ahead and say what you like it won't matter to me since you're going in
>> the shitcan. But know this, this was a very good thread until you came in
>> with your chest puffed out trying to impress the world or your knowledge
>> or what I saw your lack of it.
>
>If a former Marine can be mild, let me mildly say that there's no point in
>getting into a pissing match.
>
>If this subthread were to continue, the reasonable way to do it would be not
>to attack the man, but for both sides to identify points of contention. And
>there do appear to be a few. :-) Then those points can be ironed with
>reference to verifiable sources.
I always do - and Gashauler always falls back on personal insults.
He can't seem to get over himself and learn that what he thought he
knew was wrong.
>Believe it or not, when I talk artillery and NGF on this NG I don't fall
>back on just my memories and experience - I do a formidable amount of
>background research, diving into my books, re-reading my handbooks,
>Googling.
Precisely. And for my part - very little of my posting on nuclear
weapons comes from my military experience (Which touched on those
topics little, if at all.) Almost all of it comes from decades of
research.
>It's pretty simple as long as it doesn't get personal.
Please quote my message citing sources to him. I wonder if he'll
accuse them of being wrong too?
Arved Sandstrom
> "Arved Sandstrom" <asand...@accesswave.ca> wrote:
>
[ SNIP ]
>>Believe it or not, when I talk artillery and NGF on this NG I don't fall
>>back on just my memories and experience - I do a formidable amount of
>>background research, diving into my books, re-reading my handbooks,
>>Googling.
>
> Precisely. And for my part - very little of my posting on nuclear
> weapons comes from my military experience (Which touched on those
> topics little, if at all.) Almost all of it comes from decades of
> research.
My anecdotes, my personal knowledge of how to serve many somewhat oldish
howitzers, and my perhaps-not-so-obsolete knowledge of how to direct
indirect fires, is what my experience gives me. But well over 90% of what I
claim to know about artillery even is also the result of research, and even
re-reading familiar FMs I still to this day come across nuggets that I don't
recall knowing 15 or 20 years ago.
I don't discount research because I suspect that that is what fuels the
prodigious knowledge of many people in this NG, regardless of military
experience or no. For most of the subjects I have an opinion on, I have done
some reading about them, and I pick my reading fairly carefully.
>>It's pretty simple as long as it doesn't get personal.
>
> Please quote my message citing sources to him. I wonder if he'll
> accuse them of being wrong too?
Could be. I'm not taking sides. :-)
AHS
Vance P. Frickey
> "Mike Swift" <toms...@cruzio.com> wrote in message
> news:tomswift-53DB12.10491624032007@[198.186.190.159]...
>> In article
>> <1173537579.5...@c51g2000cwc.googlegroups.com>,
>> redda...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>> I served in two ships with weapons, was in the area with
>>> them for
>>> 8-10 hrs daily, but the VA says it didnt happen anybody
>>> know how to
>>> dispute this claim????
>>>
>>> I know that plutonium emits gamma but at what level??
>>>
>>> HELP!!!
>>
>> Very low. It is the reason Pu239 is used to make Nuclear
>> weapons. The
>> Pu240 and Pu241 in power reactor fuel makes it too hot
>> for
>> manufacturing weapons. In any case the radiation levels
>> on the
>> outside of a packaged weapon are not a problem unless you
>> sleep with
>> it for twenty or thirty years.:)
>>
>> --
>> Mike
>>
> I have to disagree here Mike. They used Pu239 in weapons
> because it
> fissions better than any other material.
No, Mike's right. Pu240 and the rest of the decay chain
tend to reduce yield - perhaps the source of some of the
fizzles "new" nuclear weapons states tend to get early in
their development programs - because they make it harder to
get hypercriticality (the really sharp upsurge in number of
fissions crucial to a good yield before the primary
disassembles itself).
--
Vance P. Frickey
"False words are not only evil in themselves, but they
infect the soul
with evil." -- Socrates
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"If any question why we died,
Tell them, because our fathers lied." - Rudyard Kipling,
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