What is "Arms Reduction"?
willia...@earthlink.net
How do we disarm? Do we take the pits out and store them on a shelf
next to the weapon? Do we break bombs down into pieces so bomber
crews have to be trained to reassemble them en-route to the target?
A I have posted here, I don't believe disarmament is possible because
the knowledge will always remain. I think "arms reduction" is just
just so much political swill because either side just press a button
to crank up the asembly line again.
-- Bill
Jussi Jaatinen
willia...@earthlink.net wrote:
> How do we disarm? Do we take the pits out and store them on a shelf
> next to the weapon?
In terms of nuclear weapons, for example, one might disassemble the
weapons and delivery vehicles, mix the pits to reactor-grade fuel and
consume it for power generation. The other bomb components would be
destroyed.
On a larger scale, this could be done ultimately and in stages to all
nuclear weapons. Without the pits, ICBMs, SLBMs, SSBNs, command
structures etc. it would take a good deal of time to rebuild a
nuclear-weapons arsenal, and it would be extremely expensive.
Doing so clandestinely would be difficult, at least for a militarily
significant number of weapons that would be needes in some kind of
"first strike". Having a few warheads as "ultimate deterrence" (or a
capability to produce them on some relevant timescale) is a totally
different situation than having thousands of hydrogen bombs sitting on
intercontinental missiles.
-JJ
Hopelessly Midwestern
news:3B5B24BD...@kolumbus.fi...
> ... it would take a good deal of time to rebuild a
> nuclear-weapons arsenal,
How long did it take to develop the nuclear bomb -- from scratch? Not long.
Now, with the knowledge of nuclear bombs widely spread and well understood,
rebuilding weapons wouldn't take long.
> and it would be extremely expensive.
Doesn't that economic powerhouse Pakistan have nuclear weapons? They aren't
expensive relative to the wealth of many nations.
> Doing so clandestinely would be difficult,
No, it would be easy. How would you "prove the negative" that no weapons
were being built secretly?
> at least for a militarily
> significant number of weapons that would be needes in some kind of
> "first strike".
How many warheads would be "militarily significant" in a world with
supposedly zero weapons? Very few. FEMA did a study many years ago about
how few warheads (30-40) aimed at oil refineries only, would bring a country
the size of the US to its economic knees - and even militarily so. Who can
fight without oil these days?
George William Herbert
None of the reports I've seen said "disarmament", they said force
reductions.
I haven't heard anyone with reasonable credibility suggest total
nuclear disarmament in some time. It just won't happen, they're
too easy to build. Reducing US and Russian warhead counts to
much lower levels has been an ongoing process since around 1970.
-george william herbert
gher...@retro.com
John Schilling
>Jussi Jaatinen <jussi.j...@kolumbus.fi> wrote in message
>news:3B5B24BD...@kolumbus.fi...
>> ... it would take a good deal of time to rebuild a
>> nuclear-weapons arsenal,
>How long did it take to develop the nuclear bomb -- from scratch? Not long.
>Now, with the knowledge of nuclear bombs widely spread and well understood,
>rebuilding weapons wouldn't take long.
It took years the first time. More to the point, it took a huge industrial
effort that would have been painfully obvious to anyone who knew what to
look for.
We got away with it the first time because A: nobody knew what to look for
and B: we were on a wartime security footing that allowed us to shoot any
one or any thing approaching our borders without warning, and herd entire
ethnic groups into concentration camps because we thought they might be
predisposed to spying.
There is no fast way to breed plutonium or enrich uranium on the scale
necessary for a major nuclear arsenal, and no way to hide the effort.
A handful of bombs, maybe half a dozen, could be built quickly and/or
in secret, but half a dozen nukes doesn't mean all that much even in a
largely disarmed world.
Major powers like the United States are going to maintain, in even the
most optimistic cases, a hundred or so warheads just to keep hypothetical
mad dictators with a secret half-dozen from doing something stupid. But
even without that sort of hedge, it would be mind-bogglingly stupid to
try and take on the world with half a dozen nukes, or to imagine that
you could assemble a substantially larger arsenal before something very
unpleasant happened to your country.
--
*John Schilling * "Anything worth doing, *
*Member:AIAA,NRA,ACLU,SAS,LP * is worth doing for money" *
*Chief Scientist & General Partner * -13th Rule of Acquisition *
*White Elephant Research, LLC * "There is no substitute *
*schi...@spock.usc.edu * for success" *
*661-951-9107 or 661-275-6795 * -58th Rule of Acquisition *
Jussi Jaatinen
Hopelessly Midwestern wrote:
> How long did it take to develop the nuclear bomb -- from scratch? Not long.
It took years to build just one bomb.
> Now, with the knowledge of nuclear bombs widely spread and well understood,
> rebuilding weapons wouldn't take long.
It would take its time since the fissile materials would be either
destroyed or buried for ever in deep bunkers filled to the brim with
cement.
> Doesn't that economic powerhouse Pakistan have nuclear weapons? They aren't
> expensive relative to the wealth of many nations.
Pakistan has a small number of bombs, but it took them decades to build
and everyone noticed. Besides, they don't have sophisticated,
damage-resistant delivery mechanisms such as mobile ICBMS or SLBMs so
these weapons are a bit vulnerable. (or do they have SLBMs - not sure
about that one. Anyway those don't have global reach)
> > Doing so clandestinely would be difficult,
> No, it would be easy. How would you "prove the negative" that no weapons
> were being built secretly?
You would discover the transmutation needed to produce plutonium, or the
large effort needed to enrich tons of HEU. You would hear of the project
from traitors, from other intelligence sources, from analyzing the
relevant country's statements etc.
> How many warheads would be "militarily significant" in a world with
> supposedly zero weapons? Very few. FEMA did a study many years ago about
> how few warheads (30-40) aimed at oil refineries only, would bring a country
> the size of the US to its economic knees - and even militarily so. Who can
> fight without oil these days?
The US, like every other country, has large reserves of fuel for that
kind of eventuality. Besides, how would those warheads be simultaneously
delivered to cripple NATO's refineries, and prevent NATO from buying
even more oil? Long-range missile tests would not escape detection.
If pure fusion weapons would be perfected, this disarmament scenario
would grow more difficult since fusion fuels are more readily produced.
This is one more reason why research into pure fusion weapons should be
banned and all nuclear explosive tests stopped, so such knowledge never
gets perfected.
-JJ
Hopelessly Midwestern
>
> Hopelessly Midwestern wrote:
>
> > How long did it take to develop the nuclear bomb -- from scratch? Not
long.
>
> It took years to build just one bomb.
A few years, and they didn't even know if it would work. Now we know. How
long would it take to build one now, now that we know how to do it?
> > Now, with the knowledge of nuclear bombs widely spread and well
understood,
> > rebuilding weapons wouldn't take long.
>
> It would take its time since the fissile materials would be either
> destroyed or buried for ever in deep bunkers filled to the brim with
> cement.
It would take time -- but not much time.
> > Doesn't that economic powerhouse Pakistan have nuclear weapons? They
aren't
> > expensive relative to the wealth of many nations.
>
> Pakistan has a small number of bombs, but it took them decades to build
> and everyone noticed.
Neither quantity nor time was your original point. You originally alluded
to the expense as being prohibitive. It isn't, even for a pesthole like
Pakistan.
> Besides, they don't have sophisticated,
> damage-resistant delivery mechanisms such as mobile ICBMS or SLBMs so
> these weapons are a bit vulnerable. (or do they have SLBMs - not sure
> about that one. Anyway those don't have global reach)
An SLBM doesn't need global reach.
> > > Doing so clandestinely would be difficult,
> > No, it would be easy. How would you "prove the negative" that no
weapons
> > were being built secretly?
>
> You would discover the transmutation needed to produce plutonium, or the
> large effort needed to enrich tons of HEU. You would hear of the project
> from traitors, from other intelligence sources, from analyzing the
> relevant country's statements etc.
Which wouldn't "prove the negative." You'd still be dealing in
probabilities.
> > How many warheads would be "militarily significant" in a world with
> > supposedly zero weapons? Very few. FEMA did a study many years ago
about
> > how few warheads (30-40) aimed at oil refineries only, would bring a
country
> > the size of the US to its economic knees - and even militarily so. Who
can
> > fight without oil these days?
>
> The US, like every other country, has large reserves of fuel for that
> kind of eventuality.
Three day's worth or so. Refineries are required to turn the Strategic Oil
Reserve into usable energy.
My point stands well that in a world supposedly without nuclear weapons, a
country without deterence would be very vulnerable to a country with
relatively few weapons.
> Besides, how would those warheads be simultaneously
> delivered to cripple NATO's refineries, and prevent NATO from buying
> even more oil? Long-range missile tests would not escape detection.
Oh, do we stop all space exploration? Aren't missiles already
"off-the-shelf" technology anyway?
> If pure fusion weapons would be perfected, this disarmament scenario
> would grow more difficult since fusion fuels are more readily produced.
> This is one more reason why research into pure fusion weapons should be
> banned and all nuclear explosive tests stopped, so such knowledge never
> gets perfected.
That may be a good idea.
Jussi Jaatinen
Hopelessly Midwestern wrote:
> > > How long did it take to develop the nuclear bomb -- from scratch? Not
> long.
> > It took years to build just one bomb.
> A few years, and they didn't even know if it would work. Now we know. How
> long would it take to build one now, now that we know how to do it?
The main obstacle is producing the fissile material and this hasn't
changed since then. You need reactors for plutonium or enrichment plants
for uranium, both of which are expensive, specialized and large
equipment.
> > It would take its time since the fissile materials would be either
> > destroyed or buried for ever in deep bunkers filled to the brim with
> > cement.
> It would take time -- but not much time.
Recovering the fuel from such a tomb would take about one year, and
since the tombs are well known everyone would immediately see you mining
there.
> Neither quantity nor time was your original point. You originally alluded
> to the expense as being prohibitive. It isn't, even for a pesthole like
> Pakistan.
No, I just said it would be "extremely expensive". Besides, Pakistan's
nuclear arsenal (about 20 small fission bombs) is not militarily
decisive since Pakistan's ability to deliver them is limited. Also, I
note again that the world knew of Pakistan's nuclear ambitions 10 years
in advance.
> > You would discover the transmutation needed to produce plutonium, or the
> > large effort needed to enrich tons of HEU. You would hear of the project
> > from traitors, from other intelligence sources, from analyzing the
> > relevant country's statements etc.
> Which wouldn't "prove the negative." You'd still be dealing in
> probabilities.
That's right, but hardly relevant anymore. You wouldn't suddenly have a
breakout country with 100 or so sophisticated bombs and associated
delivery mechanisms. You might have a North Korea situation with a
country with 0-2 bombs.
> My point stands well that in a world supposedly without nuclear weapons, a
> country without deterence would be very vulnerable to a country with
> relatively few weapons.
Relatively few here means really few and no strategic delivery options
at all. I don't buy the claim that such a proliferator could knock out
all of the Western world's oil refineries, if only because there must be
hundreds of relevant refineries and only half a dozen bombs on pickup
trucks.
> > even more oil? Long-range missile tests would not escape detection.
> Oh, do we stop all space exploration? Aren't missiles already
> "off-the-shelf" technology anyway?
Launchers are common, but not many coutries have them. Plus, if they
were tested in a precision delivery role to the Earth, that would again
be noticed. What you're saying that a country would put 3-4 or so
untested warhead designs on an untested missile, hoping to disarm the
rest of the world. Not likely. What's more likely is that their military
buildup would be noticed months in advance and the launcher destroyed
with conventional weapons well before it's even erected.
-JJ
Hopelessly Midwestern
> The main obstacle is producing the fissile material and this hasn't
> changed since then. You need reactors for plutonium or enrichment plants
> for uranium, both of which are expensive, specialized and large
> equipment.
So you advocate eliminating all nuclear power plants?
> Recovering the fuel from such a tomb would take about one year, and
> since the tombs are well known everyone would immediately see you mining
> there.
If it really takes that long (I doubt it.) If the monitoring wasn't
interupted by political/military squabbles. If *all* the fuel was in the
"tomb." If...if...if... like I said, you'll be dealing in probabilities,
not certainty.
> No, I just said it would be "extremely expensive".
It's not "extremely expensive" enough to matter; Pakistan can afford 'em.
> That's right, but hardly relevant anymore. You wouldn't suddenly have a
> breakout country with 100 or so sophisticated bombs and associated
> delivery mechanisms.
Yes, you might indeed have a break-out country with 100 or so sophisticated
bombs and associated delivery mechanisms.
> You might have a North Korea situation with a
> country with 0-2 bombs.
Now how would that happen with your plan?
Do you remember the Russian secret deployment of the SS-23s in Eastern
Europe? What other secrets do they still hold?
According to Herman Kahn's _On Thermonuclear War_ it would be very easy for
a country to hide a cache of 100 weapons in a disarmament treaty scenario.
Jussi Jaatinen
Hopelessly Midwestern wrote:
> > The main obstacle is producing the fissile material and this hasn't
> > changed since then. You need reactors for plutonium or enrichment plants
> > for uranium, both of which are expensive, specialized and large
> > equipment.
> So you advocate eliminating all nuclear power plants?
No, of course not. Fuel for power plants is produced under international
safeguards.
> If it really takes that long (I doubt it.) If the monitoring wasn't
> interupted by political/military squabbles. If *all* the fuel was in the
> "tomb." If...if...if... like I said, you'll be dealing in probabilities,
> not certainty.
In life, you never have a certainty. However, satellites can be used to
monitor the tombs, and anyway interfering with the monitoring would in
itself be a treaty violation and extremely suspicious.
> > No, I just said it would be "extremely expensive".
> It's not "extremely expensive" enough to matter; Pakistan can afford 'em.
Because of their nuclear-weapons program Pakistan can afford less other
things. Less conventional weapons, for instance.
> > That's right, but hardly relevant anymore. You wouldn't suddenly have a
> > breakout country with 100 or so sophisticated bombs and associated
> > delivery mechanisms.
> Yes, you might indeed have a break-out country with 100 or so sophisticated
> bombs and associated delivery mechanisms.
Without nuclear tests the warheads can't be very sophisticated, i.e.
miniaturized fusion weapons. Without missile tests you don't have
missiles. If you don't practise dropping nuclear weapons from aircraft
you'll have only crude delivery options. If you do practice, the
conscripts (or whoever) are going to tell about it.
> > You might have a North Korea situation with a
> > country with 0-2 bombs.
> Now how would that happen with your plan?
If a country invested a lot of money to clandestinely, with minimal
staff, produce those bombs. For instance using an underground
accelerator instead of a reactor to produce the fissile material. A
small-scale project.
> Do you remember the Russian secret deployment of the SS-23s in Eastern
> Europe? What other secrets do they still hold?
Secrets have a way of getting out, as in fact happened in this case.
> According to Herman Kahn's _On Thermonuclear War_ it would be very easy for
> a country to hide a cache of 100 weapons in a disarmament treaty scenario.
I haven't read the book. Maintaining those weapons (especially
thermonuclear ones) would not go undetected in the long run. People have
to be told and law-obiding people will blow the whistle. Anyway, when
the plutonium and bomb production records are audited, missing nuclear
materials and related paraphernalia will turn up. If they've been
forging all their records for decades, lots of people will know about
it. When lots of people know something, it's no longer a secret.
-JJ
Hopelessly Midwestern
> No, of course not. Fuel for power plants is produced under international
> safeguards.
And in say, a conventional war, who is going to stop another? Even in
peacetime, such safegurards have proven fallible.
> In life, you never have a certainty.
You're talking in very certain terms, not probabilities. I'm glad you
realize that now.
>However, satellites can be used to
> monitor the tombs, and anyway interfering with the monitoring would in
> itself be a treaty violation and extremely suspicious.
And in say, a conventional war, what would you do about it? War is war.
This isn't Never Never Land.
> Without nuclear tests the warheads can't be very sophisticated, i.e.
> miniaturized fusion weapons.
We've got the blueprints already.
> Without missile tests you don't have
> missiles.
See above.
> If you don't practise dropping nuclear weapons from aircraft
> you'll have only crude delivery options. If you do practice, the
> conscripts (or whoever) are going to tell about it.
Who says they'ed even know they were practicing with potential nuclear
weapons?
> If a country invested a lot of money to clandestinely, with minimal
> staff, produce those bombs. For instance using an underground
> accelerator instead of a reactor to produce the fissile material. A
> small-scale project.
Small scale for small poor NK, big scale for big rich country.
> Secrets have a way of getting out, as in fact happened in this case.
Yes, finally. But not for a long time.
> I haven't read the book. Maintaining those weapons (especially
> thermonuclear ones) would not go undetected in the long run. People have
> to be told and law-obiding people will blow the whistle.
Tattling to the UN stronger than patriotism and nationalism? Again, this
isn't Never Never Land.
> Anyway, when
> the plutonium and bomb production records are audited, missing nuclear
> materials and related paraphernalia will turn up.
It's already happened. Plutonium missing. Nuclear Bombs missing. Not much
to do about it. Except deter.
Jussi Jaatinen
Hopelessly Midwestern wrote:
> And in say, a conventional war, what would you do about it? War is war.
> This isn't Never Never Land.
So, you're saying there's no difference in a war beginning with the
combatants having hundreds of nuclear weapons and delivery mechanisms
ready, and one where they have neither? Producing the nuclear weapons
during wartime would place a great burden on the nation building them,
especially if they want them completed in time to have an impact on the
war. Using the newly-built nukes in war would be considered an atrocity,
and it would be illegal both nationally and internationally. Expect
people to refuse to work on them and blow the whistle to the enemy.
> > Without nuclear tests the warheads can't be very sophisticated, i.e.
> > miniaturized fusion weapons.
> We've got the blueprints already.
Who has? I don't. You mean "secret copies" would be kept? That's
technically possible, but again illegal. Besides, only a few nations
have blueprints to tested nuclear weapons.
> > Without missile tests you don't have
> > missiles.
> See above.
Missiles rebuilt after decades of not having them, from ancient
blueprints and parts no longer in production. Not likely. Missiles don't
just get built - they require specialized alloys and other parts, and
trade in them can be detected.
> > If you don't practise dropping nuclear weapons from aircraft
> > you'll have only crude delivery options. If you do practice, the
> > conscripts (or whoever) are going to tell about it.
> Who says they'ed even know they were practicing with potential nuclear
> weapons?
They would notice, and observers would notice. Military excersizes are
very closely watched.
> > If a country invested a lot of money to clandestinely, with minimal
> > staff, produce those bombs. For instance using an underground
> > accelerator instead of a reactor to produce the fissile material. A
> > small-scale project.
> Small scale for small poor NK, big scale for big rich country.
Big scale, lots of people, no secrets. Remember Manhattan Project - that
was supposed to be very hush-hush too, but was not. In modern times,
projects like that are even more readily detected because they are
actively sought for.
> > I haven't read the book. Maintaining those weapons (especially
> > thermonuclear ones) would not go undetected in the long run. People have
> > to be told and law-obiding people will blow the whistle.
> Tattling to the UN stronger than patriotism and nationalism? Again, this
> isn't Never Never Land.
This most certainly is. And it would also be patriotic to expose
projects that defile the fatherland. If a headhunter approached you to
work on a super-secret bioweapons program, would you agree? Some would,
but many would expose the project immediately and others would do so
after working on it for a while. Participating in such a project is a
crime of considerable magnitude, a bit like raping little girls.
> > Anyway, when
> > the plutonium and bomb production records are audited, missing nuclear
> > materials and related paraphernalia will turn up.
> It's already happened. Plutonium missing. Nuclear Bombs missing. Not much
> to do about it. Except deter.
See - missing bombs noticed. Since there is no disarmament treaty, there
obviously isn't much to do about it.
Now of course nothing like this will happen overnight and in fact hasn't
happened for 50 years, but the point in this thread was just to lay out
a plan how the weapons could be physically destroyed so rebuilding them
would not be straightforward. Projects of this magnitude require time,
money, strong political will and readiness to accept intrusive
inspections.
-JJ
Hopelessly Midwestern
> So, you're saying there's no difference in a war beginning with the
> combatants having hundreds of nuclear weapons and delivery mechanisms
> ready, and one where they have neither?
No. And frankly I don't understand how you could misunderstand my post so
poorly.
My point is that your schemes of monitoring will not work because of
politics and war. Do you think that if Russia and the US were in a
conventional war that such monitoring would be allowed in the desperate
wartime conditions?
> > We've got the blueprints already.
>
> Who has? I don't.
Of course YOU don't.
> You mean "secret copies" would be kept? That's
> technically possible, but again illegal.
It would be highly likely, and prohibition would be totally uninforcable.
> Besides, only a few nations
> have blueprints to tested nuclear weapons.
Oh, now we know who has them, even if YOU don't. Geeesh.
> Missiles rebuilt after decades of not having them, from ancient
> blueprints and parts no longer in production. Not likely. Missiles don't
> just get built - they require specialized alloys and other parts, and
> trade in them can be detected.
And production/trade in them can be not detected.
> They would notice, and observers would notice. Military excersizes are
> very closely watched.
During peacetime they may be.
> Big scale, lots of people, no secrets. Remember Manhattan Project - that
> was supposed to be very hush-hush too, but was not. In modern times,
> projects like that are even more readily detected because they are
> actively sought for.
But we still don't know what the big-scale Yamantau Mountain is all about,
even though such information is actively sought for.
> This most certainly is. And it would also be patriotic to expose
> projects that defile the fatherland.
Only if they swallowed your definition of "defile."
> Projects of this magnitude require time,
> money, strong political will and readiness to accept intrusive
> inspections.
When the Russian's will accept intrusive inspections -- and you can gurantee
they will accpet intrusive inspections during wartime -- let us know.
BERNARDZ
says...
>
>
> Hopelessly Midwestern wrote:
>
> > How long did it take to develop the nuclear bomb -- from scratch? Not long.
>
> It took years to build just one bomb.
>
> > Now, with the knowledge of nuclear bombs widely spread and well understood,
> > rebuilding weapons wouldn't take long.
>
> It would take its time since the fissile materials would be either
> destroyed or buried for ever in deep bunkers filled to the brim with
> cement.
>
> > Doesn't that economic powerhouse Pakistan have nuclear weapons? They aren't
> > expensive relative to the wealth of many nations.
>
> Pakistan has a small number of bombs, but it took them decades to build
> and everyone noticed.
What evidence do you have to support this claim that everyone noticed.
It appears to that even India was quite stunned by it. Prime Minister
Singh stated as late as June 1998 before the Pakistan tests that
"Pakistan had not quite acquired the bomb" when it already had.
John Schilling
>In article <3B5DA2CB...@kolumbus.fi>, jussi.j...@kolumbus.fi
>says...
>> > Doesn't that economic powerhouse Pakistan have nuclear weapons? They
>> > aren't expensive relative to the wealth of many nations.
>> Pakistan has a small number of bombs, but it took them decades to build
>> and everyone noticed.
>What evidence do you have to support this claim that everyone noticed.
>It appears to that even India was quite stunned by it. Prime Minister
>Singh stated as late as June 1998 before the Pakistan tests that
>"Pakistan had not quite acquired the bomb" when it already had.
One of the unintended side effects of the current non-proliferation
regime is a broad tendency to Officially Not Notice even the most blatant
unapproved nuclear arsenals. We, for example, would be shocked - shocked -
to find nuclear weapons in Israel. Ditto India v. Pakistan, as one of the
few things more threatening to India than a Pakistan with nuclear weapons
is a Pakistan with nuclear weapons ostracized and impoverished by the
sanctions that automatically kick in when the world officially takes
notice of such.
Lots of people were surprised by the recent Indo-Pakistani tests, but
nobody was really surprised to find that both nations had had working
nuclear weapons all along. The nuclear program that actually surprised
people, in retrospect, was South Africa's.
Jussi Jaatinen
Hopelessly Midwestern wrote:
> > So, you're saying there's no difference in a war beginning with the
> > combatants having hundreds of nuclear weapons and delivery mechanisms
> > ready, and one where they have neither?
> No. And frankly I don't understand how you could misunderstand my post so
> poorly.
Alright, then we're principally in agreement, i.e. nuclear disarmament
is a worthwhile and valuable pursuit, even if it isn't a perfect world.
> > Besides, only a few nations
> > have blueprints to tested nuclear weapons.
> Oh, now we know who has them, even if YOU don't. Geeesh.
Exactly. So, for instance, if Iraq and Iran went to war again, god
forbid, neither would have secret blueprints of tested atom bombs. Or,
if Vietnam and Cambodia went to war. Or, or, or. this covers most of the
nations in the world.
> But we still don't know what the big-scale Yamantau Mountain is all about,
> even though such information is actively sought for.
But if there was a global treaty that allowed intrusive inspections,
we'd know what Yamantau Mountain was about and we could verify that it
isn't involved in concealing or producing nuclear weaponry.
> > This most certainly is. And it would also be patriotic to expose
> > projects that defile the fatherland.
> Only if they swallowed your definition of "defile."
And they would, since in fact most of the global population already does
and we don't even have this treaty yet.
> When the Russian's will accept intrusive inspections -- and you can gurantee
> they will accpet intrusive inspections during wartime -- let us know.
So, just because you think the Russians won't agree to this anytime
soon, the whole idea doesn't deserve attention? You have a short
attention span.
-JJ
George William Herbert
>But if there was a global treaty that allowed intrusive inspections,
>we'd know what Yamantau Mountain was about and we could verify that it
>isn't involved in concealing or producing nuclear weaponry.
Yes, but for every Yamantau mountain there could be dozens of
parts caches in random holes dug in the ground, under buildings,
in welded-shut parts of ships, etc.
You'd have to require 100% intrusive inspections of every square
foot of ground, and underground, in the world. Which woudn't work;
not only is it impractical, but some countries like the US maintain
that their citizens have rights recognized in our constitution which
trump any such international agreement, including the right not to
be subjected to arbitrary invasions of privacy or searches.
The rest of the world can't be reasonably expected to submit to
more embarrasing searches than would cause outright open violent
revolt in parts of Texas.
-george william herbert
gher...@retro.com
Hopelessly Midwestern
> Alright, then we're principally in agreement, i.e. nuclear disarmament
> is a worthwhile and valuable pursuit, even if it isn't a perfect world.
Please do not put words in my mouth. Nuclear disarmament would be
wonderful - if it were doable. It isn't.
> > > Besides, only a few nations
> > > have blueprints to tested nuclear weapons.
> > Oh, now we know who has them, even if YOU don't. Geeesh.
>
> Exactly. So, for instance, if Iraq and Iran went to war again, god
> forbid, neither would have secret blueprints of tested atom bombs. Or,
> if Vietnam and Cambodia went to war. Or, or, or. this covers most of the
> nations in the world.
Most, but not the significantly important nations of the world. (You're
getting desperate now mentioning VietNam and ignoring the US, UK, France,
Russia, China.)
> But if there was a global treaty that allowed intrusive inspections,
> we'd know what Yamantau Mountain was about and we could verify that it
> isn't involved in concealing or producing nuclear weaponry.
Treaties are merely paper. Russia breaks them all the time -- it's policy
for them.
And in wartime, a treaty is worth less than paper.
> > > This most certainly is. And it would also be patriotic to expose
> > > projects that defile the fatherland.
> > Only if they swallowed your definition of "defile."
>
> And they would, since in fact most of the global population already does
> and we don't even have this treaty yet.
Correction: *you* believe in your definition of "defile."
> > When the Russian's will accept intrusive inspections -- and you can
gurantee
> > they will accpet intrusive inspections during wartime -- let us know.
>
> So, just because you think the Russians won't agree to this anytime
> soon, the whole idea doesn't deserve attention?
Even if they agree, they could easily and significantly "disagree" during
wartime's desperate conditions.
> You have a short attention span.
Let the ad homs begin! Nah, I'll refrain from stooping to your level this
time.
Justin Wigg
> Hopelessly Midwestern wrote:
> > "Jussi Jaatinen" <jussi.j...@kolumbus.fi> wrote:
> > > If a country invested a lot of money to clandestinely, with minimal
> > > staff, produce those bombs. For instance using an underground
> > > accelerator instead of a reactor to produce the fissile material. A
> > > small-scale project.
> > Small scale for small poor NK, big scale for big rich country.
>
> Big scale, lots of people, no secrets. Remember Manhattan Project - that
> was supposed to be very hush-hush too, but was not. In modern times,
> projects like that are even more readily detected because they are
> actively sought for.
ISTR popular media stories reporting that Pakistan caught the US completely
by surprise a few years ago when they performed an underground test. Was
this the case?
--
He who knows best knows how | Justin Wigg - Hobart, AUSTRALIA
little he knows. -Jefferson | Reply: justi...@yahoo.com
BERNARDZ
> BERNARDZ <BERNAR...@iname.COM> writes:
>
> >In article <3B5DA2CB...@kolumbus.fi>, jussi.j...@kolumbus.fi
> >says...
>
> >> > Doesn't that economic powerhouse Pakistan have nuclear weapons? They
> >> > aren't expensive relative to the wealth of many nations.
>
> >> Pakistan has a small number of bombs, but it took them decades to build
> >> and everyone noticed.
>
> >What evidence do you have to support this claim that everyone noticed.
> >It appears to that even India was quite stunned by it. Prime Minister
> >Singh stated as late as June 1998 before the Pakistan tests that
> >"Pakistan had not quite acquired the bomb" when it already had.
>
>
> One of the unintended side effects of the current non-proliferation
> regime is a broad tendency to Officially Not Notice even the most blatant
> unapproved nuclear arsenals.
(a)
Agreed. Everyone trying to pretend that its not occurring because they
think (probably correctly) that its worse if they bring it into the
open.
> We, for example, would be shocked - shocked -
> to find nuclear weapons in Israel.
Why? I was not surprised by this. I remember Kissinger was talking about
this years ago. If we drive Israel into a corner they will be forced to
go nuclear. We are driving them into a corner.
> Ditto India v. Pakistan, as one of the
> few things more threatening to India than a Pakistan with nuclear weapons
> is a Pakistan with nuclear weapons ostracized and impoverished by the
> sanctions that automatically kick in when the world officially takes
> notice of such.
>
> Lots of people were surprised by the recent Indo-Pakistani tests, but
> nobody was really surprised to find that both nations had had working
> nuclear weapons all along.
But the fact remains that the country most effected by it India had not
idea how advanced the Pakistani were. This is what I am saying is that
certainly not everyone noticed.
> The nuclear program that actually surprised
> people, in retrospect, was South Africa's.
Agreed. In retrospect its the same as (a). But it dramatically shows
that many governments could build a bomb and we would not know.
>
>
>
Carey Sublette
John Schilling wrote:
>
> BERNARDZ <BERNAR...@iname.COM> writes:
>
> >In article <3B5DA2CB...@kolumbus.fi>, jussi.j...@kolumbus.fi
> >says...
>
> >> > Doesn't that economic powerhouse Pakistan have nuclear weapons? They
> >> > aren't expensive relative to the wealth of many nations.
>
> >> Pakistan has a small number of bombs, but it took them decades to build
> >> and everyone noticed.
I have to give qualified agreement to both statements - nuclear weapons
are within the capability of most any state in the world today.
But it is extremely difficult to develop them without detection prior to
completion, and virtually impossible to hope to escape eventual
detection.
>
> >What evidence do you have to support this claim that everyone noticed.
> >It appears to that even India was quite stunned by it. Prime Minister
> >Singh stated as late as June 1998 before the Pakistan tests that
> >"Pakistan had not quite acquired the bomb" when it already had.
No one was "stunned" by Pakistan's test. Upset, sure. But Pakistan's
nuclear program was public knowledge by 1979, and the fact that they had
made preparations for tests was made public by the U.S. in early 1984.
Pakistan began acquiring the components for their enrichment plants in
1975. The world was a bit slow to catch on at the time, since controls
on enrichment technolgy were lax at the time, and everyone was focused
on plutonium production as the preferred route for proliferators. In
1981 Indian intelligence had expected that Pakistan would test bomb
within a year (which was actually a bit premature in terms of
capability). The earliest that Pakistan was able to produce material for
a bomb was probably the end of 1984 (if then).
But both India and Pakistan conducted their "arms race", such as it was,
at a remarkably leisurely pace. Brief sprints, accompanied by casual
moseying, and the occasional siesta. Amazingly India, considered a
nuclear-armed nation since its 1974 test, did not actually have a
deliverable weapon until the mid-late 80s, and no weapon entered into
regular service until the early 90s.
Any statments that Pakistan, or India, or Pakistan, had "had not quite
acquired" a weapon are statements about national policy, not technical
capability.
>
> One of the unintended side effects of the current non-proliferation
> regime is a broad tendency to Officially Not Notice even the most blatant
> unapproved nuclear arsenals. We, for example, would be shocked - shocked -
> to find nuclear weapons in Israel. Ditto India v. Pakistan, as one of the
> few things more threatening to India than a Pakistan with nuclear weapons
> is a Pakistan with nuclear weapons ostracized and impoverished by the
> sanctions that automatically kick in when the world officially takes
> notice of such.
>
> Lots of people were surprised by the recent Indo-Pakistani tests, but
> nobody was really surprised to find that both nations had had working
> nuclear weapons all along.
The only real surprise about the Indian tests was that anyone claimed to
be surprised. That India was poised to test had been known for years. In
1985-86 India came within days, perhaps hours of conducting tests - the
weapons were actually placed in the same test shafts used in 1998. The
first short-lived BJP government actually gave orders to conduct tests
- one of its first acts of government - but rescinded them before it
fell a few days later. This became known to U.S. intelligence within
months. What could they have expected when the BJP was reelected two
years later? That it intended to conduct tests was one of its campaign
planks!
The only sense in which the first 1998 tests were a surprise was that no
one in Washington was sitting around expecting a test *that day*. That
U.S. intelligence had not put monitoring India's test site as a high
priority the day of the BJP election to office is a gross failure of
management.
> The nuclear program that actually surprised
> people, in retrospect, was South Africa's.
Even here the surprise was that De Klerk came clean when he did, and
that South Africa had voluntarily DENUCLEARIZED. No one thought the
South African enrichment plant was built to just crank out low enriched
uranium fuel for civilian use. It manifestly wasn't producing any (or
perhaps more than a token amount). Again - preparations for tests were
detected years before the program was declassified.
Carey Sublette
Carey Sublette
As HM has observed in a world with 100% formal nuclear disarmament, the
value of cheating is greatly increased since a small unilateral arsenal
provides powerful military advantages.
Accordingly in a world that looks anything like what we have today - in
which large autocratic states and international suspicion exist - I
don't see complete nuclear disarmament as an achievable goal. Since
China has hundreds of warheads today, how could we be sure that they
didn't keep 10, or 50?
Radical reductions in armament, and changes in policies toward nuclear
weapons (with consequent changes in practices) are feasible I think.
Currently nations with nuclear arms reserve the right to use them
however they see fit as instruments of state power. But they are not
seen as practical and useful weapons of war in general, which is a big
change from the 1950s.
We should move toward an environment in which the only accepted role for
nuclear weapons is to deter their use by others, and that this is
declared policy of each nuclear state, and is backed up practices that
recognize this, and by international agreement and monitoring regimes.
In such a situation the arsenal of each nation would be small (say, no
more that 100 warheads per nation), kept in secure internationally
monitored storage (converting ICBM silos to warhead bunkers - one
warhead per silo would be convenient), separate from the delivery
systems that would themselves be kept in a verifiably dealerted state
(put a hundred ton concrete slab over the silo door - a large vehicle
could pull it off but would take hours to bring in and do so).
Cheating wouldn't give any advantage since the kind of arsenal required
to disarm even one nuclear state would be far beyond what cheating could
hide, and once cheating was revealed the nations that felt threatened
would reactivate their arsenals to full alert status in a matter of
days.
Its also important to distinguish between cheating by existing nuclear
powers, which is impossible to eliminate as a possibility since they
already have large existing stockpiles and could just make some warheads
diappear off the books, and cheating my new proliferators. New weapons
programs by nations that did not already have them is vitually
impossible to conceal indefinitely. Fissile material production
facilities cannot be hidden forever from satellites and environmental
monitoring, and such concealment can only be contemplated at all in a
police state.
And then there is the question of what the cheater could hope to
accomplish by cheating (the motivation). If the arsenal is kept secret,
no advantage is gained, and secrecy is impossible to maintain in the
long run anyway, even in police states (there are always leaks,
defectors, mistakes, etc. even if they take decades to occur). If
cheating is discovered or admitted, then in a world in which a general
security guarantee against nuclear attack is extended to all nations by
all nuclear states, this would only bring the weight of the entire world
down on the cheater to isolate and punish them (actually using the
weapons would bring worse).
George Herbert earlier suggested that the notion of expanding NATO to
include Russia is alogical way to advance international stability. I
second this idea and think that the NATO provides a model of collective
security that should be expanded and adapted to include (at least) all
nuclear armed states. It would be somewhat different, since formal
alliance and military integration wouldn't be a necessary part of it,
but NATO could provide the actual nucleus for such a system.
I'm more optimistic about basing a new system on NATO but outside the UN
framework than to try to create this sort of power-based organization
within the UN.
Carey Sublette
Carey Sublette
John Schilling
>"Jussi Jaatinen" <jussi.j...@kolumbus.fi> wrote in message
>news:3B5F4151...@kolumbus.fi...
>> Hopelessly Midwestern wrote:
>> > "Jussi Jaatinen" <jussi.j...@kolumbus.fi> wrote:
>> > > If a country invested a lot of money to clandestinely, with minimal
>> > > staff, produce those bombs. For instance using an underground
>> > > accelerator instead of a reactor to produce the fissile material. A
>> > > small-scale project.
>> > Small scale for small poor NK, big scale for big rich country.
>> Big scale, lots of people, no secrets. Remember Manhattan Project - that
>> was supposed to be very hush-hush too, but was not. In modern times,
>> projects like that are even more readily detected because they are
>> actively sought for.
>ISTR popular media stories reporting that Pakistan caught the US completely
>by surprise a few years ago when they performed an underground test. Was
>this the case?
I definitely recall popular media stories in which the Pakistani government
issued press releases essentially saying, "we are going to test nuclear
weapons next week" for a week or so prior to the test.
You may be thinking of the *Indian* tests, which did come as somewhat of
a surprise. But only in the fact and the timing of that specific test
series; we knew damn well that both the Pakistanis and the Indians had
nuclear weapons. Or, at very minimum, some-assembly-required nuclear
weapons kits so their diplomats could claim to not have nuclear weapons
with a straight face while their generals could engage in nuclear war
on a day's notice.
Interim Books
<care...@earthling.net> wrote:
>Cheating wouldn't give any advantage since the kind of arsenal required
>to disarm even one nuclear state would be far beyond what cheating could
>hide, and once cheating was revealed the nations that felt threatened
>would reactivate their arsenals to full alert status in a matter of
>days.
The only thing I'd be concerned about here, is that if one nation
resumed alert, for whatever reason, then the others would follow.
This could lead to a constant and tension building cycle of
alert-dealert.
We don't want to play a nuclear version of the League of Nations or
the London (naval) Treaties.
D.
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Carey Sublette
Interim Books wrote:
>
> On Fri, 27 Jul 2001 16:07:42 GMT, Carey Sublette
> <care...@earthling.net> wrote:
> >Cheating wouldn't give any advantage since the kind of arsenal required
> >to disarm even one nuclear state would be far beyond what cheating could
> >hide, and once cheating was revealed the nations that felt threatened
> >would reactivate their arsenals to full alert status in a matter of
> >days.
>
> The only thing I'd be concerned about here, is that if one nation
> resumed alert, for whatever reason, then the others would follow.
> This could lead to a constant and tension building cycle of
> alert-dealert.
>
> We don't want to play a nuclear version of the League of Nations or
> the London (naval) Treaties.
The situation of the arsenals going on alert would only happen if a some
unpleasant surprise changed the international situation. Even then
general alerting would be unlikely to occur since this isn't Europe
circa 1914 (or the world circa 1955) with all powers aligned in two
opposing blocs.
Diplomacy of one sort or another would then be required to address the
underlying issue that led to alerting. Deterrence would tend to dissuade
anyone from going beyond simply reactivating their forces.
Carey
John Schilling
>John Schilling wrote:
>> BERNARDZ <BERNAR...@iname.COM> writes:
>> >In article <3B5DA2CB...@kolumbus.fi>, jussi.j...@kolumbus.fi
>> >says...
>> >> > Doesn't that economic powerhouse Pakistan have nuclear weapons? They
>> >> > aren't expensive relative to the wealth of many nations.
>> >> Pakistan has a small number of bombs, but it took them decades to build
>> >> and everyone noticed.
>I have to give qualified agreement to both statements - nuclear weapons
>are within the capability of most any state in the world today.
>But it is extremely difficult to develop them without detection prior to
>completion, and virtually impossible to hope to escape eventual
>detection.
A large industrial nation might manage to deploy a force of up to a dozen
or so nukes and keep the secret, but that's about it. Large industrial
nations of course don't need to do this because they either already have
acknowledged nuclear arsenals, could become accepted as minor nuclear
states with a modest diplomatic effort, and/or deploy conventional forces
whose effective firepower dwarfs that of a dozen simple nuclear weapons.
>> The nuclear program that actually surprised
>> people, in retrospect, was South Africa's.
>Even here the surprise was that De Klerk came clean when he did, and
>that South Africa had voluntarily DENUCLEARIZED. No one thought the
>South African enrichment plant was built to just crank out low enriched
>uranium fuel for civilian use. It manifestly wasn't producing any (or
>perhaps more than a token amount). Again - preparations for tests were
>detected years before the program was declassified.
Yes, but in that case the Israeli connection confused things a bit. IIRC,
one plausible interpretation at the time was that the South Africans were
just providing materials for the Israeli nuclear program, in exchange for
Israeli assistance in developing South Africa's conventional arms industry.
But this still serves as an example of the extreme difficulty of concealing
a nuclear arms program in anything short of a large industrial nation.
Everybody knew that nukes were being made, it was only the details regarding
deployment that were uncertain.
John Schilling
>George William Herbert wrote:
>> Jussi Jaatinen <jussi.j...@kolumbus.fi> wrote:
>> >But if there was a global treaty that allowed intrusive inspections,
>> >we'd know what Yamantau Mountain was about and we could verify that it
>> >isn't involved in concealing or producing nuclear weaponry.
>> Yes, but for every Yamantau mountain there could be dozens of
>> parts caches in random holes dug in the ground, under buildings,
>> in welded-shut parts of ships, etc.
>> You'd have to require 100% intrusive inspections of every square
>> foot of ground, and underground, in the world. Which woudn't work;
>> not only is it impractical, but some countries like the US maintain
>> that their citizens have rights recognized in our constitution which
>> trump any such international agreement, including the right not to
>> be subjected to arbitrary invasions of privacy or searches.
>> The rest of the world can't be reasonably expected to submit to
>> more embarrasing searches than would cause outright open violent
>> revolt in parts of Texas.
>> -george william herbert
>> gher...@retro.com
>As HM has observed in a world with 100% formal nuclear disarmament, the
>value of cheating is greatly increased since a small unilateral arsenal
>provides powerful military advantages.
I'm not sure I agree, at least if "small" means a dozen or so nukes
rather than a hundred or so. The alternate histories in which the
Manhattan Project is replaced by the Tokyo Project still end up with
Japan losing the war.
You cannot conquer even a wholly denuclearized with a dozen nuclear
weapons, and it would be a tall order with a hundred. What is required
is a firm commitment to the elimination of any cheating state, a way
to deal with the deterrent effect of a modest arsenal (pre-emptive
strike capability, strategic defenses, and/or a willingness to take
the hit), and the ability to act quickly while the breakout arsenal
is still small.
Nuclear weapons in the hands of the international security regime offer
some extra capability in all three areas, but are not absolutely necessary
to cope with cheaters.
I do agree, though, that the most plausible international security regimes
are ones which accept modest nuclear arsenals of a hundred or so weapons
in a dozen or so nations.
[...]
>Radical reductions in armament, and changes in policies toward nuclear
>weapons (with consequent changes in practices) are feasible I think.
>Currently nations with nuclear arms reserve the right to use them
>however they see fit as instruments of state power. But they are not
>seen as practical and useful weapons of war in general, which is a big
>change from the 1950s.
>We should move toward an environment in which the only accepted role for
>nuclear weapons is to deter their use by others, and that this is
>declared policy of each nuclear state, and is backed up practices that
>recognize this, and by international agreement and monitoring regimes.
>In such a situation the arsenal of each nation would be small (say, no
>more that 100 warheads per nation), kept in secure internationally
>monitored storage (converting ICBM silos to warhead bunkers - one
>warhead per silo would be convenient), separate from the delivery
>systems that would themselves be kept in a verifiably dealerted state
>(put a hundred ton concrete slab over the silo door - a large vehicle
>could pull it off but would take hours to bring in and do so).
Two slight problems at the detail level. First, I expect the United
States would want and get a somewhat larger arsenal than the rest, perhaps
500 weapons or so. The 800-pound gorilla doesn't do crash diets. Second,
the existing British and French arsenals are entirely SSBN-based; I don't
see either nation wholly denuclearizing nor do I see them buying entirely
new arsenals. So we're probably going to have to accept SSBNs, and thus
weapons mated to delivery systems out of immediate reach of observers.
We can deal with both of these limitations. The United States just needs
to understand that throwing its extra weight around unifies all the other
nuclear states against it; the SSBN operators that their boats get inspected
before and after each deployment and (by surfacing and opening the hatches
to the satellites) immediately after any unclaimed missile emerges from the
deep blue. The important things are the modest arsenals and the absolute
consensus on No First Use Or Else.
>Cheating wouldn't give any advantage since the kind of arsenal required
>to disarm even one nuclear state would be far beyond what cheating could
>hide, and once cheating was revealed the nations that felt threatened
>would reactivate their arsenals to full alert status in a matter of
>days.
>And then there is the question of what the cheater could hope to
>accomplish by cheating (the motivation). If the arsenal is kept secret,
>no advantage is gained, and secrecy is impossible to maintain in the
>long run anyway, even in police states (there are always leaks,
>defectors, mistakes, etc. even if they take decades to occur). If
>cheating is discovered or admitted, then in a world in which a general
>security guarantee against nuclear attack is extended to all nations by
>all nuclear states, this would only bring the weight of the entire world
>down on the cheater to isolate and punish them (actually using the
>weapons would bring worse).
Right. As I said, I think plausible cheaters can be dealt with through
overwhelming conventional force, but we'll probably keep the nukes around
for such occasions.
>George Herbert earlier suggested that the notion of expanding NATO to
>include Russia is a logical way to advance international stability. I
>second this idea and think that the NATO provides a model of collective
>security that should be expanded and adapted to include (at least) all
>nuclear armed states. It would be somewhat different, since formal
>alliance and military integration wouldn't be a necessary part of it,
>but NATO could provide the actual nucleus for such a system.
>I'm more optimistic about basing a new system on NATO but outside the UN
>framework than to try to create this sort of power-based organization
>within the UN.
I am somewhat more skeptical on that point. The relative success of NATO
is in large part I think due to its consensus regarding mission and its
ability to engage in collective action towards that mission. It had a
common external enemy that outweighed any internal division as a percieved
threat.
A NATO including Russia as an equal partner, and by implication including
the Eastern European nations as well, is much shorter on clear external
enemies and much more lavishly supplied with internal tension. It is
also much less likely to be able to take significant action in a crisis
without being effectively vetoed by one of its four power blocs. Which
would breed smaller and more responsive alliances in response to any
crises which do arise, defeating the whole purpose and reducing NATO
to the level of the UN or the League of Nations.
OTOH, I don't have any better ideas either. I can see what a stable
international security regime might look like, but the path from here
to there is less clear.
George William Herbert
The problem with the assumption in your first paragraph is that we
can't assume that a new security regime won't eventually end up
having to cope with an evolved new bipolar alignment of some sort.
There are plenty of scenarios... west vs asia, US versus everyone
else, etc., which could qualify. As Jervis quite rightly points
out, much of what is stabilizing and deterring in peacetime will
become destabilizing and inviting of attacks in a crisis as the
psychology does its reversal into crisis-mode. The worst thing
in the world would be to move to a new security regime that when
really stressed by a crisis flips into an autodestabilizing mode.
Not having any weapons on alert at all might make everyone feel
vulnerable in a crisis, ergo prompting panic reactions in a crisis.
I am not sure what the right answer is, but I've wondered if something
like 100 warheads armed and ready (3 subs on patrol with single warhead
Tridents; 50 single warhead Minuteman-III in silos) and a few
hundred to 1 thousand warheads and bombs in bunkers with international
security regime open monitoring might be a good position for the
US to be in, with equivalent scaled levels for the other nuclear states.
That's enough on alert to mean that a crisis has to get
pretty bad before rearming more weapons becomes really attractive,
but not so many that it destabilizes peacetime very much.
-george william herbert
gher...@retro.com
George William Herbert
reviewed by Jervis in the current issue of "Foreign Affairs"? I missed its
publication, and am feeling remiss (though Amazon should do to catch
me up in a week or so...).
-george william herbert
gher...@retro.com
Jussi Jaatinen
Hopelessly Midwestern wrote:
> > Exactly. So, for instance, if Iraq and Iran went to war again, god
> > forbid, neither would have secret blueprints of tested atom bombs. Or,
> > if Vietnam and Cambodia went to war. Or, or, or. this covers most of the
> > nations in the world.
> Most, but not the significantly important nations of the world. (You're
> getting desperate now mentioning VietNam and ignoring the US, UK, France,
> Russia, China.)
the 5-10 or so nations that have those blueprints form a minority among
the world's 200-odd nations. Pointing this out is hardly "desperate".
> Treaties are merely paper. Russia breaks them all the time -- it's policy
> for them.
If that is your attitude I really don't see any point in continuing this
discussion.
-JJ
Carey Sublette
John Schilling wrote:
> Carey Sublette <care...@earthling.net> writes:
> ...
>
> >As HM has observed in a world with 100% formal nuclear disarmament, the
> >value of cheating is greatly increased since a small unilateral arsenal
> >provides powerful military advantages.
>
> I'm not sure I agree, at least if "small" means a dozen or so nukes
> rather than a hundred or so. The alternate histories in which the
> Manhattan Project is replaced by the Tokyo Project still end up with
> Japan losing the war.
>
> You cannot conquer even a wholly denuclearized with a dozen nuclear
> weapons, and it would be a tall order with a hundred. What is required
> is a firm commitment to the elimination of any cheating state, a way
> to deal with the deterrent effect of a modest arsenal (pre-emptive
> strike capability, strategic defenses, and/or a willingness to take
> the hit), and the ability to act quickly while the breakout arsenal
> is still small.
"Powerful military advantages" does not equate with "ability to conquer the
world".
Even if a state were to acquire a small unilateral arsenal prior to detection I
find it extremely unlikely that they would use it (see reasoning below).
Powerful advantages would include temporary "escalation dominance" - the ability
to trump attempts to escalate a conflict. A unilateral proliferator could employ
the threat of use to cover a conventional attack, thus neutralizing an alliance
for example.
I agree with what you're saying though. Most any nation in the world attempting
to break out of a nuclear weapons ban, and finding a large part of the world
lined up against it, would get hammered in detail in the end though it might
take several years. Rather like Germany and Japan in WWII.
The former nuclear superstates (anyone formerly with a sophisticated nuclear
arsenal) could heavily rearm with nuclear weapons in a few of years (and perhaps
much faster than that...). A state of the size of Iraq, with a modest nuclear
arsenal, lined up against the U.S. and NATO would get hammered *even if the
allies didn't resort to nuclear weapons*. Even a giant power like China could
not take on the world with a stealth arsenal and hope to prevail in the long
term.
I like Kennedy's _The Rise and Fall of Great Powers_ for showing how in a
multi-power world, over a period of 400 years of history, no power could gain a
lasting unilateral dominance since the other powers uniting against the dominant
force can always bring it down. It doesn't appear that the world has changed in
any fundamental way so that this principle has become invalid..
Carey Sublette
Carey Sublette
John Schilling wrote:
Yep. Though I'll add that the sighting of the "Arniston" Jericho missile clone in
SA painted a pretty clear picture of a major aspect of the collaboration. If SA
was acquiring a missile like this, they must have intended to have a suitable
warhead to go on top.
John Schilling
>John Schilling wrote:
>> Carey Sublette <care...@earthling.net> writes:
>> ...
>> >As HM has observed in a world with 100% formal nuclear disarmament, the
>> >value of cheating is greatly increased since a small unilateral arsenal
>> >provides powerful military advantages.
>> I'm not sure I agree, at least if "small" means a dozen or so nukes
>> rather than a hundred or so. The alternate histories in which the
>> Manhattan Project is replaced by the Tokyo Project still end up with
>> Japan losing the war.
>> You cannot conquer even a wholly denuclearized with a dozen nuclear
>> weapons, and it would be a tall order with a hundred. What is required
>> is a firm commitment to the elimination of any cheating state, a way
>> to deal with the deterrent effect of a modest arsenal (pre-emptive
>> strike capability, strategic defenses, and/or a willingness to take
>> the hit), and the ability to act quickly while the breakout arsenal
>> is still small.
>"Powerful military advantages" does not equate with "ability to conquer the
>world".
In the specific case of reintroducing nuclear weapons to a completely
denuclearized world, I think it does. I don't think absolute nuclear
disarmament is likely, but if it does occur it will be as a result of
a broad international consensus that No Nukes Period trumps all other
military or political issues. In which case...
>Even if a state were to acquire a small unilateral arsenal prior to detection
>I find it extremely unlikely that they would use it (see reasoning below).
>Powerful advantages would include temporary "escalation dominance" - the
>ability to trump attempts to escalate a conflict. A unilateral proliferator
>could employ the threat of use to cover a conventional attack, thus
>neutralizing an alliance for example.
...the result of such strategy in mid to long term would be to solidify
the antinuclear alliance of Everybody Against the Cheater. Short term,
you might deter hasty or unilateral action. Long term, everybody gangs
up on you and either you conquer the world or the world conquers you.
>I agree with what you're saying though. Most any nation in the world
>attempting to break out of a nuclear weapons ban, and finding a large part
>of the world lined up against it, would get hammered in detail in the end
>though it might take several years. Rather like Germany and Japan in WWII.
>The former nuclear superstates (anyone formerly with a sophisticated nuclear
>arsenal) could heavily rearm with nuclear weapons in a few of years (and
>perhaps much faster than that...). A state of the size of Iraq, with a modest
>nuclear arsenal, lined up against the U.S. and NATO would get hammered *even
>if the allies didn't resort to nuclear weapons*. Even a giant power like
>China could not take on the world with a stealth arsenal and hope to prevail
>in the long term.
Exactly. A world with the unified political will necessary to completely
eliminate nuclear weapons in the first place, is a world with the unified
political will to take down cheaters with or without nukes.
Carey Sublette
Note I said *temporary* escalation dominance.
If other nations do not have nuclear weapons, then cheating creates a
real military advantage - for awhile. A cheater may - mistakenly (we
hope) - think that this confers an advantage that can be parlayed into a
long term gain.
An example of this type of thinking is Hussein's decision to invade
Kuwait. One could have argued a priori that Iraq would never do this
because this obviously threatened U.S. and Saudi vital interests, and
even without any other nations getting involved these states would
certainly exert force sufficient to drive Iraq out. But Iraq did it.
Why? Because Hussein was mistaken. This is not infrequently how wars
start - one side has a serious misperception about how events will
likely evolve and undertakes war with the notion that they will most
likely prevail, only to be proven wrong later.
It is interesting to note the history of Europe from around 1600 to
1815, one in which scarcely a decade passed without a major power
coalition war, most of which were inconclusive but all were staggeringly
expensive. One might think that the major powers would have taken note
of the largely futile nature of this pattern, and abstained from war.
But they didn't.
I seriously doubt any regional state will think one score of bombs would
let it "rule the world", but autocratic governments might get the idea
that it would convey some significant regional advantage.
>
> >I agree with what you're saying though. Most any nation in the world
> >attempting to break out of a nuclear weapons ban, and finding a large part
> >of the world lined up against it, would get hammered in detail in the end
> >though it might take several years. Rather like Germany and Japan in WWII.
>
> >The former nuclear superstates (anyone formerly with a sophisticated nuclear
> >arsenal) could heavily rearm with nuclear weapons in a few of years (and
> >perhaps much faster than that...). A state of the size of Iraq, with a modest
> >nuclear arsenal, lined up against the U.S. and NATO would get hammered *even
> >if the allies didn't resort to nuclear weapons*. Even a giant power like
> >China could not take on the world with a stealth arsenal and hope to prevail
> >in the long term.
>
> Exactly. A world with the unified political will necessary to completely
> eliminate nuclear weapons in the first place, is a world with the unified
> political will to take down cheaters with or without nukes.
But potential cheaters may not believe that, so it might actually be
necessary to do it in the end.
Carey Sublette
John Ringo
John
--
"The spirit of resistance to government is so valuable on certain occasions,
that I wish it to be always kept alive. I like a little rebellion now and
then. It is like a storm in the atmosphere." .....
Thomas Jefferson
John Schilling
>John Schilling wrote:
[examples]
>I seriously doubt any regional state will think one score of bombs would
>let it "rule the world", but autocratic governments might get the idea
>that it would convey some significant regional advantage.
Yes, but they might just as well get that idea in the present world or
in a partially-denuclearized world. Arguably they are *more* likely to
get that idea if the world is not (or not completely) denuclearized.
The uncertainty is in whether the rest of the world will unite against
the emergent nuclear power, not in what will happen once it does. And
a world in which some powers are accepted as having modest nuclear
arsenals, strikes me as more conducive to misapprehensions by dictators
that their modest nuclear arsenals will be accepted.
But this is a minor effect. Mostly, I think that the question of whether
the Bad Guys will be tempted to break out of a nuclear disarmament regime
is orthogonal to the question of whether the Good Guys need nuclear weapons
to enforce that regime. And I think the answer to the second question is
no, even though I think the Good Guys will insist on keeping a few nukes
around anyhow.