Iran plans to build 10 uranium enrichment plants
TKeating
http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/11/29/iran-nuclear-program.html
Gosh, jee whiz, that really sucks in my book.
QUESTION:
What are the chances that one of those uranium enrichment plants could
be secretly diverted for the enrichment of reactor grade plutonium to
weapons grade plutonium (or supergrade)? Does anyone really care about
Iranian nuclear dominance within its sphere of influence?
Peter Fairbrother
> Iran plans to build 10 uranium enrichment plants, see:
>
> http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/11/29/iran-nuclear-program.html
>
> Gosh, jee whiz, that really sucks in my book.
>
> QUESTION:
>
> What are the chances that one of those uranium enrichment plants could
> be secretly diverted for the enrichment of reactor grade plutonium to
> weapons grade plutonium (or supergrade)?
Enhancement of reactor grade plutonium to WG plutonium using centrifugal
separation is a somewhat different process than uranium enhancement, and
quite a bit trickier. For instance the separation efficiency is lower,
the chemistry is different, and plutonium is a lot harder to handle than
uranium.
Also, it is a lot easier to make a uranium bomb than a plutonium bomb,
even with supergrade plutonium an implosion system is needed.
However I reckon the probability of them enhancing the known
reactor-grade uranium output to weapons grade uranium, which would be
straightforward and comparatively quick to do with one of these plants,
is probably 100% - I can't see any other reason for having so many other
uranium enrichment plants, a bigger plant is more efficient.
Does anyone really care about
> Iranian nuclear dominance within its sphere of influence?
I don't know, but some people are, or should be, extremely concerned by
the prospect of Iran selling weapons grade uranium to terrorists ..
-- Peter Fairbrother
TKeating
Granted, Islamic terrorists may be the main threat. If so, then why
not equip a squadron of Preditor drones with mini-nukes? We have a 50
year technical advantage in advanced materials. If nuclear escalation
needs to happen, let it happen, it's good for the economy. We are
better and smarter than Osama bin Laden. If the mini-nukes are 'clean'
nukes, I can't see any problems.
SolomonW
You do not need weapon grade material to make a bomb.
j...@cix.compulink.co.uk
<e4e6122c-3ff4-485e...@2g2000prl.googlegroups.com>,
TKea...@hushmail.com (TKeating) wrote:
> If the mini-nukes are 'clean' nukes, I can't see any problems.
No such animal. "Clean" nukes are H-bombs with almost all the secondary
yield from fusion, and are only "clean" in comparison with H-bombs with
most of the secondary need from fission, which are also easier to make
and have higher yield-to-weight ratios.
You still need an gas-boosted A-bomb's worth of primary fission yield to
light a "clean" H-bomb, and the minimum total yield worth building would
be in the region of 100KT - not a mini-nuke by anyone's standards.
"Clean mini-nukes" are pure Hollywood items, or conspiracy theorist
ideas. They don't exist in the real world.
--
John Dallman, j...@cix.co.uk, HTML mail is treated as probable spam.
Peter Fairbrother
> On Nov 29, 10:14 pm, Peter Fairbrother <zenadsl6...@zen.co.uk> wrote:
>> TKeating wrote:
>>> Iran plans to build 10 uranium enrichment plants, see:
>>> http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/11/29/iran-nuclear-program.html
>>> Gosh, jee whiz, that really sucks in my book.
>>> QUESTION:
>>> What are the chances that one of those uranium enrichment plants could
>>> be secretly diverted for the enrichment of reactor grade plutonium to
>>> weapons grade plutonium (or supergrade)?
>>
>> Enhancement of reactor grade plutonium to WG plutonium using centrifugal
>> separation is a somewhat different process than uranium enhancement, and
>> quite a bit trickier. For instance the separation efficiency is lower,
>> the chemistry is different, and plutonium is a lot harder to handle than
>> uranium.
Another point is that, while it may well be theoretically possible, as
yet no-one has actually separated plutonium isotopes using gas
centrifuges, or at least not in any quantity.
People have tried, at least experimentally - I seem to remember the US
spent some billions on this, Carey? - but there haven't been any
production plants built.
Besides, the quantities involved are incompatible, by 3 OOMs - to enrich
enough reactor grade plutonium for a bomb you have to process maybe 20
kg of material, whereas to enrich enough natural uranium for a bomb you
have to process maybe 20 tons. That takes a very different type of plant.
Finally, Iran doesn't *have* any reactor-grade plutonium to enrich - so
overall, the chances of the Iranians using a uranium enrichment plant to
enrich _plutonium_ are about zero.
>> Also, it is a lot easier to make a uranium bomb than a plutonium bomb,
>> even with supergrade plutonium an implosion system is needed.
Using a uranium enrichment plant to enrich _uranium_, of course, is a
different matter - and WG enriched uranium is the terrorist's, or
smaller state's, fissile material of choice.
>> I reckon the probability of them enhancing the known
>> reactor-grade uranium output to weapons grade uranium, which would be
>> straightforward and comparatively quick to do with one of these plants,
>> is probably 100% - I can't see any other reason for having so many other
>> uranium enrichment plants, a bigger plant is more efficient.
They may claim it's in order to deter Israel from attacking, but the
only deterrence is that one of the plants will still be in operation
after an attack, and that is only a deterrent if the intention is to
produce, or at least gain the capacity to produce, WG material.
>>
>> Does anyone really care about
>>> Iranian nuclear dominance within its sphere of influence?
>> I don't know, but some people are, or should be, extremely concerned by
>> the prospect of Iran selling weapons grade uranium to terrorists ..
>>
>> -- Peter Fairbrother
>
> Granted, Islamic terrorists may be the main threat. If so, then why
> not equip a squadron of Preditor drones
Predators, nuclear-armed or not, are of little use against smugglers [*].
The problem is finding them, and if say three bombs are dispatched by
three different routes the chance that at least one will get through is
extremely high - drug smugglers routinely get over 90% of their
shipments through, so for three routes that's a chance of success of
99.9% or better.
> with mini-nukes?
There's no such thing, especially a clean mini-nuke.
-- Peter Fairbrother
[*] they're probably not much use against terrorists either, but that's
another story.
George Orwell
472d-90e3-0...@z10g2000prh.googlegroups.com...
> Iran plans to build 10 uranium enrichment plants, see:
>
> http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/11/29/iran-nuclear-program.html
>
> Gosh, jee whiz, that really sucks in my book.
>
> QUESTION:
>
> What are the chances that one of those uranium enrichment plants could
> be secretly diverted for the enrichment of reactor grade plutonium to
> Iranian nuclear dominance within its sphere of influence?
This isn't merely a provocation, this is like putting your chin up and
saying 'Take your best shot!' Iran WANTS a war with the West for some
unfanthomable reason, that much is clear. Seems to me they're pretty
sure they can either give the combined Western armed forces a black
eye, or they're gambling that if they pull back at the brink (when the
Western nations are building up forces on their borders) that the
Western nations will be easily appeased. Sounds like a very dangerous
gamble to me.
If I were Obama I'd start preparing for war, maybe even preparing the
world for the usage of nuclear weapons since it's clear the U.S. can't
stomach yet another conventional war. Also, once the train leaves the
station the Western forces should not pull back no matter what
concessions Iran makes in desperation, they should go in and finish the
job once and for all. After victory turn Iran into one large brothel.
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Carey
> TKeating wrote:
>> On Nov 29, 10:14 pm, Peter Fairbrother <zenadsl6...@zen.co.uk> wrote:
>>> TKeating wrote:
>>>> Iran plans to build 10 uranium enrichment plants, see:
>>>> http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/11/29/iran-nuclear-program.html
>>>> Gosh, jee whiz, that really sucks in my book.
>>>> QUESTION:
>>>> What are the chances that one of those uranium enrichment plants could
>>>> be secretly diverted for the enrichment of reactor grade plutonium to
>>>> weapons grade plutonium (or supergrade)?
> >>
>>> Enhancement of reactor grade plutonium to WG plutonium using centrifugal
>>> separation is a somewhat different process than uranium enhancement, and
>>> quite a bit trickier. For instance the separation efficiency is lower,
>>> the chemistry is different, and plutonium is a lot harder to handle than
>>> uranium.
>
> Another point is that, while it may well be theoretically possible, as
> yet no-one has actually separated plutonium isotopes using gas
> centrifuges, or at least not in any quantity.
>
> People have tried, at least experimentally - I seem to remember the US
> spent some billions on this, Carey? - but there haven't been any
> production plants built.
While gas centrifuge separation of plutonium is probably feasible using
PuF6 in a hot centrifuge (URENCO enriches or can enrich a number of
heavy elements besides uranium, BTW), I don't know of anyone pursuing this.
The U.S. did spend billions on a laser isotope separation process, and
was interested in using that with plutonium.
Anyone desiring nearly pure Pu-239 would be strongly motivated to go the
EMIS route. A single pass would produce the final product, and the EMIS
machine output is >90% product (we are removing contaminants, not
enriching low grade material) so a small plant could supply a
substantial weapons program.
Dave U. Random
472d-90e3-0...@z10g2000prh.googlegroups.com...
>
> http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/11/29/iran-nuclear-program.html
>
> Gosh, jee whiz, that really sucks in my book.
>
> QUESTION:
>
> What are the chances that one of those uranium enrichment plants could
> be secretly diverted for the enrichment of reactor grade plutonium to
coonass
> TKeating wrote:
> > Iran plans to build 10 uranium enrichment plants, see:
>
> >http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/11/29/iran-nuclear-program.html
>
> > Gosh, jee whiz, that really sucks in my book.
>
> > QUESTION:
>
> > What are the chances that one of those uranium enrichment plants could
> > be secretly diverted for the enrichment of reactor grade plutonium to
> > weapons grade plutonium (or supergrade)?
>
> Enhancement of reactor grade plutonium to WG plutonium using centrifugal
> separation is a somewhat different process than uranium enhancement, and
> quite a bit trickier. For instance the separation efficiency is lower,
> the chemistry is different, and plutonium is a lot harder to handle than
> uranium.
>
> Also, it is a lot easier to make a uranium bomb than a plutonium bomb,
> even with supergrade plutonium an implosion system is needed.
>
> However I reckon the probability of them enhancing the known
> reactor-grade uranium output to weapons grade uranium, which would be
> straightforward and comparatively quick to do with one of these plants,
> is probably 100% - I can't see any other reason for having so many other
> uranium enrichment plants, a bigger plant is more efficient.
Interestingly, Iran very nearly GOT a plant to make supergrade
plutonium in the mid-1990s.
Right before a summit meeting in Moscow, an interesting appendix to
the deal by which Russia sold Iran the Bushehr reactor would have
provided them with another nuclear reactor for "desalination" which
would have by coincidence have had the same characteristics as a
nuclear reactor in Aktau, Kazakhstan (back when that country was a
Soviet republic). The Aktau reactor was capable of creating "ivory-
grade" (very high purity) plutonium-239, the best weapons-grade
plutonium there is.
The head of the Russian environmental protection agency learned of
this aspect of the deal and sent a copy of the contract, marked up to
show the incriminating details, to the science attache at the US
Embassy in Moscow, causing letters of demarche to be sent just prior
to the summit meeting and the breeder reactor sale to be canceled.
The design of reactors similar to the Aktau reactor is undoubtedly
complex, but probably less so than a gas-centrifuge which could
separate Pu-239 from the worst contaminant, Pu-240.
I would be more interested in adapting laser separation technology to
that particular problem if I were head of an up-and-coming nth country
than in pushing gas centrifuge technology farther than it could
probably be pushed.
I think that this announcement about the ten centrifuges is more for
domestic consumption - the opposition in Iran is attacking the current
government partly on the grounds that the guys in power now are
knuckling under to the West (the Iranian equivalent to the "soft on
Communism" political gambit, apparently). This does not bode well for
the rest of the world - we have a choice between the nuclear
warmongers in power in Iran now, or the "reformists" whose rhetoric is
even more inflammatory on the nuclear issue than Ahmadinejhad's is.
Degrading our own nuclear deterrent in the face of Iran's intentions
(and if they want the Bomb badly enough, they'll get it) and Vladimir
Putin's revival of nuclear brinkmanship is not just ill-advised, it is
extremely dangerous and destabilizing. Our unilateral moves toward
nuclear disarmament will have the paradoxical effect of making nuclear
war MORE likely, not less so.
Peter Fairbrother
Thanks, that was it.
> Anyone desiring nearly pure Pu-239 would be strongly motivated to go the
> EMIS route. A single pass would produce the final product, and the EMIS
> machine output is >90% product (we are removing contaminants, not
> enriching low grade material) so a small plant could supply a
> substantial weapons program.
Yes - which reminds me of a story about the development of Thin Man, the
US's plutonium gun weapon.
The first samples of plutonium were made using an EMIS-type separation,
and were very pure Pu-239, and the initial numbers suggested that a high
velocity gun weapon might work. Later samples proved to have too much
Pu-240 for a gun weapon, and Thin Man was dropped in favour of Fat Man.
One question which I haven't seen an answer to however is whether Thin
Man was dropped because the purity of the available Pu was insufficient,
or was it dropped because a pure Pu gun-type weapon wouldn't work at
all, or would at best be marginal?
The idea of using EMIS purification on the available Pu should have been
obvious to the Los Alamos people, after all at the time they were using
cyclotrons to enrich uranium, and if a gun weapon using pure Pu-239,
would actually work then the effort of making Fat Man would be wasted -
I reckon that, even then, EMIS would have been cheaper then an implosion
system.
-- Peter Fairbrother
Carey
Actually, it was bombardment of uranium by cyclotron produced neutrons.
It was very high purity Pu-239 simply because the integrated neutron
flux was so low. It is the very high flux in production reactors that
allows the capture chain to become significant.
>
>
> One question which I haven't seen an answer to however is whether Thin
> Man was dropped because the purity of the available Pu was insufficient,
> or was it dropped because a pure Pu gun-type weapon wouldn't work at
> all, or would at best be marginal?
With pure Pu-239 the gun would have worked as they thought.
>
> The idea of using EMIS purification on the available Pu should have been
> obvious to the Los Alamos people, after all at the time they were using
> cyclotrons to enrich uranium, and if a gun weapon using pure Pu-239,
> would actually work then the effort of making Fat Man would be wasted -
> I reckon that, even then, EMIS would have been cheaper then an implosion
> system.
The problem with separating the Pu-240 with EMIS is that its spontaneous
fission rate is about 50,000 times higher than Pu-239. So to prevent the
Pu-240 from merely doubling the already marginal spontaneous fission
rate you have to reduce its concentration below 0.002% (from the 1.5%
they were producing), removing >99.9% of the Pu-240 was beyond their
capability at the time.
An additional problem would be that even if you tried this, you couldn't
do the enrichment until the plutonium was produced, adding another
process (group of processes really) in the production chain, and adding
weeks more to the time for weapon availability
Also, they had other reasons taking the spherical implosion path - if it
worked it would be a superior bomb technology and they actually had the
time and could get the resources to do it due to the pacing of the
production program.
If that option had not existed they might have gone after some low
efficiency design variants (still using explosive compression) and tried
to get EMIS purification working despite the high bar that had to be passed.
BTW you can make a gun with regular plutonium, it just has a very low
yield, a few tons. The Orion project proposed a plutonium gun to test
the physics and materials of the propulsion process.
Allen Thomson
> BTW you can make a gun with regular plutonium, it just has a very low
> yield, a few tons.
Which, I trust, reminds us that there's a considerable difference
between military weapons and terrorist devices. A few tons of bang
accompanied by some prompt radiation and fallout (just the unfissioned
plutonium would be icky) might be almost as terrorizing and disruptive
if exploded in the right place as a bomb with much greater explosive
yield.