On Jan 14, 11:12 am, John Lemke <
jfle...@locallink.net> wrote:
> Interesting to see the mainstream media start to pick this up and
> speak. Nice to see some commentary from someone that may not be
> selling precious metals.
>
> Subprime credit crisis? Just the tip of the iceberg, folks.
>
> You can pat your elitist monkey masters on the back and say, "Thank
> you very much" just before you line them up against a wall a few years
> from now.......................
>
> It's Not 1929, but It's the Biggest Mess Since
>
>
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/04/AR200...
>
> By Steven Pearlstein
> Wednesday, December 5, 2007; D01
>
> It was Charles Mackay, the 19th-century Scottish journalist, who
> observed that men go mad in herds but only come to their senses one by
> one.
>
> We are only at the beginning of the financial world coming to its
> senses after the bursting of the biggest credit bubble the world has
> seen. Everyone seems to acknowledge now that there will be lots of
> mortgage foreclosures and that house prices will fall nationally for
> the first time since the Great Depression. Some lenders and hedge
> funds have failed, while some banks have taken painful write-offs and
> fired executives. There's even a growing recognition that a recession
> is over the horizon.
>
> But let me assure you, you ain't seen nothing, yet.
>
> What's important to understand is that, contrary to what you heard
> from President Bush yesterday, this isn't just a mortgage or housing
> crisis. The financial giants that originated, packaged, rated and
> insured all those subprime mortgages were the same ones, run by the
> same executives, with the same fee incentives, using the same
> financial technologies and risk-management systems, who originated,
> packaged, rated and insured home-equity loans, commercial real estate
> loans, credit card loans and loans to finance corporate buyouts.
>
> It is highly unlikely that these organizations did a significantly
> better job with those other lines of business than they did with
> mortgages. But the extent of those misjudgments will be revealed only
> once the economy has slowed, as it surely will.
>
> At the center of this still-unfolding disaster is the Collateralized
> Debt Obligation, or CDO. CDOs are not new -- they were at the center
> of a boom and bust in manufacturing housing loans in the early 2000s.
> But in the past several years, the CDO market has exploded, fueling
> not only a mortgage boom but expansion of all manner of credit. By one
> estimate, the face value of outstanding CDOs is nearly $2 trillion.
>
> But let's begin with the mortgage-backed CDO.
>
> By now, almost everyone knows that most mortgages are no longer held
> by banks until they are paid off: They are packaged with other
> mortgages and sold to investors much like a bond.
>
> In the simple version, each investor owned a small percentage of the
> entire package and got the same yield as all the other investors. Then
> someone figured out that you could do a bigger business by selling
> them off in tranches corresponding to different levels of credit risk.
> Under this arrangement, if any of the mortgages in the pool defaulted,
> the riskiest tranche would absorb all the losses until its entire
> investment was wiped out, followed by the next riskiest and the next.
>
> With these tranches, mortgage debt could be divided among classes of
> investors. The riskiest tranches -- those with the lowest credit
> ratings -- were sold to hedge funds and junk bond funds whose
> investors wanted the higher yields that went with the higher risk. The
> safest ones, offering lower yields and Treasury-like AAA ratings, were
> snapped up by risk-averse pension funds and money market funds. The
> least sought-after tranches were those in the middle, the "mezzanine"
> tranches, which offered middling yields for supposedly moderate risks.
>
> Stick with me now, because this is where it gets interesting. For it
> is at this point that the banks got the bright idea of buying up a
> bunch of mezzanine tranches from various pools. Then, using fancy
> computer models, they convinced themselves and the rating agencies
> that by repeating the same "tranching" process, they could use these
> mezzanine-rated assets to create a new set of securities -- some of
> them junk, some mezzanine, but the bulk of them with the AAA ratings
> more investors desired.
>
> It was a marvelous piece of financial alchemy, one that made Wall
> Street banks and the ratings agencies billions of dollars in fees. And
> because so much borrowed money was used -- in buying the original
> mortgages, buying the tranches for the CDOs and then in buying the
> tranches of the CDOs -- the whole thing was so highly leveraged that
> the returns, at least on paper, were very attractive. No wonder they
> were snatched up by British hedge funds, German savings banks, oil-
> rich Norwegian villages and Florida pension funds.
>
> What we know now, of course, is that the investment banks and ratings
> agencies underestimated the risk that mortgage defaults would rise so
> dramatically that even AAA investments could lose their value.
>
> One analysis, by Eidesis Capital, a fund specializing in CDOs,
> estimates that, of the CDOs issued during the peak years of 2006 and
> 2007, investors in all but the AAA tranches will lose all their money,
> and even those will suffer losses of 6 to 31 percent.
>
> And looking across the sector, J.P. Morgan's CDO analysts estimate
> that there will be at least $300 billion in eventual credit losses,
> the bulk of which is still hidden from public view. That includes at
> least $30 billion in additional write-downs at major banks and
> investment houses, and much more at hedge funds that, for the most
> part, remain in a state of denial.
>
> As part of the unwinding process, the rating agencies are in the midst
> of a massive and embarrassing downgrading process that will force many
> banks, pension funds and money market funds to sell their CDO holdings
> into a market so bereft of buyers that, in one recent transaction, a
> desperate E-Trade was able to get only 27 cents on the dollar for its
> highly rated portfolio.
>
> Meanwhile, banks that are forced to hold on to their CDO assets will
> be required to set aside much more of their own capital as a financial
> cushion. That will sharply reduce the money they have available for
> making new loans.
>
> And it doesn't stop there. CDO losses now threaten the AAA ratings of
> a number of insurance companies that bought CDO paper or insured
> against CDO losses. And because some of those insurers also have
> provided insurance to investors in tax-exempt bonds, states and
> municipalities have decided to pull back on new bond offerings because
> investors have become skittish.
>
> If all this sounds like a financial house of cards, that's because it
> is. And it is about to come crashing down, with serious consequences
> not only for banks and investors but for the economy as a whole.
>
> That's not just my opinion. It's why banks are husbanding their cash
> and why the outstanding stock of bank loans and commercial paper is
> shrinking dramatically.
>
> It is why Treasury officials are working overtime on schemes to stem
> the tide of mortgage foreclosures and provide a new vehicle to buy up
> CDO assets.
>
> It's why state and federal budget officials are anticipating sharp
> decreases in tax revenue next year.
>
> And it is why the Federal Reserve is now willing to toss aside
> concerns about inflation, the dollar and bailing out Wall Street, and
> move aggressively to cut interest rates and pump additional funds
> directly into the banking system.
>
> This may not be 1929. But it's a good bet that it's way more serious
> than the junk bond crisis of 1987, the S&L crisis of 1990 or the
> bursting of the tech bubble in 2001.
So "Mortgage Meltdown" or "The Mother of All Depressions" might be the
phrases
for 2008 to watch ?!??!
HOOROO
UNCLE WALLY
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