Gang stalking involves the use of multiple Freemason cult lodges

[Dean Roger Ray]

gang (ga[ng]): A group of criminals or hoodlums who
band together for mutual protection and profit.

stalk (stôk): To follow or observe (a person)
persistently, especially out of obsession or
derangement.

gang stalk°ing: A group of criminals or hoodlums who
band together for mutual protection and profit to
follow or observe (a person) persistently,
especially out of obsession or derangement. Also
known as 'cause stalking' or 'vengeance stalking'.

OVERVIEW

Gang stalking involves the use of multiple individuals to stalk, harass
and taunt a victim, as well as to vandalize personal property.
According to victims, this takes place for many years. It appears that
once a person is targeted, they are often targeted for life. This topic
is covered in the following book review of David Lawson's book:
Terrorist Stalking in America.

Techniques of psychological warfare are used against the target in a
methodical and well orchestrated attack that often leaves the target a
victim of ridicule among his friends and family because this occurrence
is so hard to believe. However, it does occur, and the number of
targets are increasing to the point that they can network with one
another and find out that the same tactics are used everywhere. These
tactics, also used in ritual abuse, are intended to weaken the target
to the point of physical and psychological collapse.

The reasons why a person is initially targeted can vary. Sometimes the
person may be a political activist. Others may have been in the wrong
place at the wrong time. Corporations apparently have even been known
to hire these stalking groups to silence people who were once in their
employ. Many times these stalking gangs may be lied to about the
target, thinking that perhaps the person is a deviant who needs to be
driven out of town. The reasons are only limited to the imagination. In
some cases, according to Lawson, the person has done nothing wrong but
is used as a practice target or as an example to others in the group to
show what will happen to them if they 'defect'. This serves to keep the
members of these stalking groups tied to the group through intense fear
of becoming a target. It is such a terrifying prospect because the gang
members are intimately aware that the lives of the targets are utterly
destroyed.

Many people ask, "Why would anyone engage in this kind of activity?".
The psychology behind it is at least, in part, that it is a form of
revenge. It may be that physically harming a person is considered too
extreme or too risky by the perpetrators. In fact, psychological harm
may be a far more effective form of revenge. It can destroy a person's
life while leaving little or no evidence to incriminate the
perpetrators.

There are added reasons that this goes on, for not every participant in
the harassment will know why a person has been targeted, nor will the
vast majority have any personal stake in harassing the victim. Clearly
from the expressions on the faces of the perpetrators who come
face-to-face with their targets, there is a vicious kind of pleasure
that they derive from bullying their victim. They like the feeling of
being "in control". Like any form of abusive or controlling behavior,
this is an addiction that needs to be fed, so victims can remain
targets for their entire lives. If they did not, then the numbers of
fresh victims needed to fill the perpetrator's addictions would
potentially attract too much attention. None-the-less, the numbers of
targeted individuals is increasing. Such is the nature of the
bottomless pit within them that thirsts, evermore, for greater and
greater thrills. To the perpetrators, their targets are merely their
prey, in a game that never ends. But make no mistake, whatever the
reasoning behind it, this is a hate crime.

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES

The types of activities which take place are often subtle, and
sometimes cannot be distinguished from normal everyday things that go
wrong. In the case of a target, however, there are certain behaviors
that are not normal or everyday in nature. It is the anomalous
activities that let a target know they are being stalked. It is a
psychological reign of terror intended to make a victim look crazy and
intended to keep him or her in a constant state of anxiety and stress
as to "what will happen next".

There was a 1944 movie called "Gaslight" about a husband trying to
drive his wife crazy, from which the term "gaslighting" was derived.
According to Slang City, "to gaslight someone is to drive them crazy by
intentionally confusing them. It comes from the 1944 movie Gaslight, in
which sweet heiress Ingrid Bergman marries creepy Charles Boyer, who
hopes to get her inheritance by driving her insane. He convinces her
she's seeing and hearing things that don't exist, including the
gaslights (what they had before light bulbs) going on and off when he
isn't home." The subtle techniques used to make the wife doubt her own
sanity are the same techniques used by these gang stalkers to unnerve a
target. To see a book review by Eleanor White on the topic, click here.

For example, the perpetrators (who appear to always have access to
their targets' homes) may sometimes come into the house while the
target is out and move things around a little bit. The target has the
feeling that something is wrong, but can't quite put his/her finger on
what has changed. This is a clear illustration that this activity is a
psychological game of cat and mouse, and has little to do with any
overt kind of damage that may be caused (such as burning someone's
house down or stealing valuables).

In some cases, the target doesn't know s/he is being targeted. It just
looks as though the world is full of very rude people, and everything
s/he owns breaks constantly ("bad luck"). According to Lawson, the
perpetrators don't need the target to know s/he is targeted in order to
fill the need within themselves that they are in control.

EXAMPLES OF ACTIVITIES

Garbage being strewn on the target's front lawn repeatedly. Not huge
amounts of garbage, but, for example, one thing every day - candy
wrappers, tin cans, coffee cups etc.

Gang symbols, often with a satanic link, such as a pentagram, appearing
near the target's house.

Antagonistic behaviors from people when the target is on foot, such as
giving the target the finger, or similar hand gestures.

Cars parked outside the target's house, often with people inside doing
apparently nothing. In one incident which occurred recently to me, a
limosine was parked outside my house (directly in front of an
elementary school) with the driver inside and the engine running. I was
crossing the street from my house to go to the school and had my back
to the limo driver, but I could hear him turning the car in a U turn
very quickly. As I climbed the steps to the school, I heard the driver
honk. When I turned around, he was giving me the finger as he drove
away. Note: the car was parked when I left my house, and it drove away
after I giving me the finger. What was he doing there parked? Evidently
he was waiting to give me the finger. Only two days later, a teenager
walking along the street held his hand up in front of my face and
wiggled his fingers to get my attention. When I looked at him, he too
gave me the finger.

Another activity is having neighbours leave and arrive at the same time
as the target. The other day I left the house on foot and a woman was
rounding the corner near my house. We were walking towards one another,
and I crossed the street wanting to put some distance between myself
and her (on some level we often sense when a person is a perp before
they do the overt behavior). Without missing a beat, she immediately
crossed the road as well (the timing felt as though she was mirroring
me because I crossed quite suddenly and she followed in a sudden
jerking sort of way). There was nothing on the side of the street I
crossed to except the school (which she walked past), so there was no
reason to behave like that. I found this slightly aggressive, but
thought nothing of it until I was walking back home 15 minutes later
and there she was again in front of my house, walking towards me on the
same side of the road, but from the opposite direction. Victims report
this kind of behavior repeatedly - including the mirroring behavior.

A common occurrence is to have people staring at the target in a
leering or mocking way - usually with a smirk on their faces. This is
not one incident in a blue moon, but several incidents during a single
day.

Targets have reported having people say things to them that refer far
too specifically to something within their lives. For instance, I was
recently discussing with various people the possibility of counselling
targets, since I have training in counselling. While I was out at a
movie, someone said loudly as I walked by, "You can counsel me any
time!" One target said that she had been talking to her daughter on the
phone about the magnets that are inside a fridge when she received a
phone call from an unknown stranger who said to her, "So, you have
magnets in your fridge". Another target reported that a complete
stranger knew her dog Dusty's name and said under his breath in a
menacing, barely audible way, "I would rather have Dusty". This is a
highly effective way of letting the target know s/he is somehow under
surveillance without actually doing anything illegal.

MANY targets report that their animals either seem to get very sick and
die of unknown causes, or they are directly murdered (i.e. with a
weapon). In each case, the target has left the animal on it's own and
returned to a very sick or dead animal.

People nearby behaving in an absurd manner. Targets report that they
get "crazies" coming up and yelling at them. In my case I see 55 year
old caucasian men dressed like 13 year old boys-in-the-hood, wearing
HUGE baggy jeans, and swaggering by. It is an absurd sight if you
happen to notice that the person dressed like this has gray hair.
Unnerving the target and drawing attention to themselves is the name of
the game.

Intense harrassment while driving - all the rude gestures you can think
of on the road, except it happens every single time the target goes
out. This includes tailgating, being cut off, and other hostile
gestures.

Targets report that perpetrators have tried to run them off the road.
This also has been my experience. "Normal" people don't get drivers
coming up behind them very fast and then slamming on the breaks while
fishtailing behind the target. When this happened to me (late last
year), I called 911 on my cell phone and the driver came up beside me
and tried to side-swipe me while I was on the phone with the police!
After almost running into me several times, he gave me the finger (once
again) and drove off.

Placing people in strategic locations to "watch" the target. One target
reports having people dressed in specific "colors" as a signal of who
they are. This is not much different than the old men dressed like
boys. It is a subtle way of getting the target's attention. However, it
doesn't take the target very long to be able to spot the perpetrators
before the behaviors occur. In some cases, there is an air of cockiness
about them that is often accompanied by direct eye contact - think of
the boys (a.k.a. demons) with the hockey sticks in the movie "Dogma"
and you get a sense for the way these people carry themselves. This is
not always the case - there is also the case like the woman mirroring
me on the street who had a blank, zombie-like expression on her face.
This is more common when direct actions are taking place so that the
target doesn't know for sure if this is a perpetrator or just one of
those incidents that will happen every so often that are unrelated. The
cocky expressions usually accompany staring without any overt behavior.
By keeping actions subtle, the target is kept confused and doubting
themselves and their sanity.

Many targets report repeated problems with their cars and other
machinery. When my car was still new, with only 50,000 km on it, I had
to have the engine taken apart at a cost of $2,400. It was, oddly
enough, about 1 month out of warranty when this happened.

Many targets have suspected that "fake" service people have been sent
to their homes. In one victim's case, she had more than just a
suspicion after the following incident. She reports having scheduled to
have her windows cleaned by a company that she had used in the past.
When the company phoned and said they were going out of business and
could they send another company in their stead, she felt apprehensive
but agreed. When the people came to her house, they began an elaborate
game of trying to "psych" her out by telling her that a woman was
passed out in her back yard. This made no sense to her, so she didn't
respond to them. After several more attempts to have her go into her
back yard, she then overheard them talking about how to kill her. When
she picked up the phone to call the police the "window washers" fled.

Crowding and mobbing a person when they're out, i.e. having people
enter the person's "personal space". I recently had this problem when I
started aerobics classes. Someone in the class was getting far too
close to me, i.e. within a few inches of me, moving as much as 10 feet
across the room to follow me. When I asked her to give me some room,
she said, "You move!" After I moved, she moved away from where she had
been crowding me leaving a 20 foot gap, but as soon as I moved back
there, she immediately moved back as well. It was a subtly hostile,
passive/aggressive kind of behavior that resembled the modus operandi
(MO) of the perps.

Destruction or theft of items that are of sentimental value to the
target. For example, I don't wear any jewelry except a sapphire ring
that my father gave me many years ago. One day the ring disappeared and
I never saw it again.

Targets often struggle with health problems - extreme fatigue,
dizziness, headaches, abdominal pain and muscle pain. Although the
stress may be the only reason, there may be other factors involved,
including an electronic component to the harassment. If you think this
is the case, see electronic harassment.

"Brighting" - a tactic of ritual abuse as well as torture. This
involves shining bright lights on the target - either from oncoming
cars or from neighbouring houses. Since I became aware that I was being
stalked, in every single place I have stayed (three including my own
house which I fled), there has been a neighbouring house with a
spotlight that was directed towards my bedroom window. In one case, I
knew that the neighbour was definitely not a perpetrator. However, all
that is necessary is for someone to re-aim the lights outside someone's
house - the perp doesn't actually have to be living there. Also, if I
am walking home after dark, 9/10 times a car will be parked on the
street (in the same spot every time) with the lights on and facing me.
It will drive away as I near the car.

Crowding or mobbing using cars. I've experienced this on foot when
walking home, there will be an exhorbitant number of cars on one small
side street which I walk down. It has happened so many times that it is
no longer a coincidence. The last time I was walking along that street,
my son was with me and it was close to 11 p.m. on a Wednesday night.
Without my ever having mentioned my own suspicions, my son said, "There
sure are a lot of cars around here for so late at night". We were on
the suspect side street when he said it. (The side street had a dead
end, and all the cars went towards the dead end. I never watched to see
exactly what they did when they got there. I will have to next time.)
Other people experience this while in their car - some have reported
being surrounded by a convoy of cars.
Many of the above activities are mentioned in David Lawson's book
Terrorist Stalking in America.

Also, see two Toronto Star articles on extremist group vigilante type
behavior which follows the same model as described above. [Note: the
Toronto Star is a mainstream respected newspaper].

There are other behaviors as well, and I will add to the list as I
remember them, or as people email me with other behaviors that I have
not included.

SENSITIZATION: HOW IT HAPPENS

Be careful of assuming that people are perps. Familiarize yourself with
the concept of "sensitization" because this is how they condition you.

It is like a row of dominoes, where you only have to push the first
domino down and the rest fall by themselves. These people are
capitalizing on human psychology. Here is an example.

For a period of time, perhaps 1 month, they send many perps around you
with laptops. They do some obvious things like stare at you for very
long periods of time, or smile mockingly to get your attention, or even
do bizarre hand movements - something out of the ordinary to grab your
attention. As a result of this "blitz" campaign, the laptops then
become associated with perps in your mind. This is the intention of the
perps. You are now "sensitized". (Or the first domino has been pushed
down by the perps).

After this, they can reduce the number of people around you who are
carrying laptops to the point where they may stop altogether. This is
because now you ASSUME that anyone carrying a laptop is a perp. (The
rest of the dominos fall by themselves). The problem is that a certain
part of the population naturally carries laptops with them. However, if
they have conditioned you so well that you forget that, you are going
to be anxious everytime you see a stranger with a laptop. The more
laptops you see, the higher your anxiety (and anger) will climb. If you
are very stressed, then they can have the added benefit of watching you
attack someone carrying a laptop, and maybe even get you charged with
something. In the end, it doesn't matter if that person is a perp or
not - you are conditioned to think he is.

This applies to any kind of conditioning. It could be white vans that
they condition you to. It could be red t-shirts that they sensitize you
to. It doesn't matter because once you are sensitized, YOU will be your
own worst enemy.

On the other hand, there are activites that are designed specifically
to let you know that someone is a perp. They need to do this in order
for you to know that you are being stalked. For example, let's say that
for a period of time you saw people with compasses everywhere, and then
it stopped. This is not sensitization because virtually no portion of
the population carries compasses with them and uses them randomly in
public (you are not in a campground or at a Scout meeting when this
happens). So when you see someone using a compass, it is to let you
know that the person is a perp. It would be a rare case indeed if
someone was using a compass who was not a perp.

Similarly, someone who gives me the finger is 99.9% likely to be a
perp, since I am not doing any behaviors that would cause someone to
give me the finger, such as driving aggressively or even looking
disapprovingly at someone (that's stretching it a bit, but just to
illustrate that it is not a "provoked" finger).

We have to be constantly vigilant to distinguish between a sensitizing
attempt and a blatant statement that someone is a perp. The two are not
the same.

HOW WE CAN FIGHT THIS

The only way to fight this is by getting together and supporting one
another. By keeping the victims isolated, the perpetrators have little
fear of their activities being discovered. But together we have
strength. Little by little we can raise the awareness in the public
that this is happening. In therapeutic circles this is called
"normalizing". That is what happens when someone says, "It's OK for you
to say you are being gang stalked because it is taking place". In other
words, something considered "abnormal" by a skeptical public is made
"normal" by the weight of our testimonies. Like women who once were too
ashamed to tell people that they had been raped because it carried a
serious social stigma, people who are gang stalked are seen as
immediately crazy without being given the benefit of the doubt. What
will give us the credibility and acknowedgement that we have a right to
is the "normalization" of the idea that gang stalking happens.

There is a risk in networking because of the nature of the perpetrators
to overwhelm victims, but we can't let that stop us. Otherwise, we may
wait a very long time to be believed, if ever.

There is an online forum created by Eleanor White
(www.multistalkervictims.org). Eleanor is a dedicated activist who
works relentessly to get the word out to people that this is happening.
Please see her site for the instructions to join the forum. On my other
site Electronic Harassment: www.eharassment.ca, I have created a
victim's network to help people network with one another. Almost all
victims of electronic harassment are also victims of gang stalking. I'm
not sure how much the reverse is true. I've spoken to many victims of
both.

If you would like to email me your comments, suggestions, etc., send
email to: li...@gangstalking.ca.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENS

Thank you Jesus for giving me the strength, direction and conviction to
fight these people, one day at a time.

Thank you to all the activists who have come before me and made the
road a little smoother for others to pass.

Thank you to the first victims who bravely endured ridicule, mental
institutions and worse, because they were alone without the internet,
never knowing there were others who were also targeted.

Thank you to those who have only encouraged me and cheered me on as I
got my feet wet in this "activist" thing.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Websites:

Multi-Stalker Victims: www.multistalkervictims.org (Yahoo forum here)

Citizens Against Technological and Covert Harassment: www.c-a-t-c-h.ca

Electronic Harassment: www.eharassment.ca

Stop Covert War: www.stopcovertwar.com

Articles on Gang Stalking and Related Topics:

Suddenly, It Has A Name: "Gang Stalking" (Backup copy here)

Why? Gang stalking perhaps? (Backup copy here)

Psychological Harassment Information Association

Useful Search Terms:

bullying
stalking
mobbing
"psychological harassment"
"psychological violence"

teslacoils2005

Canada
125 Posts
Posted - 01/10/2005 : 21:27:40
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

C.S.I.S sanctions torture
my name is Dean Ray
Most people call it multistalking
You can view my personal information on this site
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/psycologicalwarfair/

After years of research, Copenhagan researchers concluded: "The
target group of
government-sanctioned torture are leaders of ethnic minorities, human
rights fighters, whistle blowers, union members, politicians, student
leaders,
journalists and others."

These were all selected because they were leading personalities,
pursuing goals inimical to government policies. Once broken, these
victims "are full of anxiety, depressions ... their families suffer.
Others are intimidated, afraid of being exposed to the same
treatment, and do not dare to follow their more courageous
exemplars.
Multistalking in canada resembles lessons taken from the C.I.A
Prohibition Against Using Force
The use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to
unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind as an aid to
interrogation is prohibited by law, both international and domestic;
it is neither authorized nor condoned. The interrogator must never
take advantage of the source's weaknesses to the extent that the
interrogation involves threats, insults, torture or exposure to
unpleasant or inhumane treatment of any kind. Experience indicates
that the use of force is not necessary to gain cooperation of
sources. Use of force is a poor technique, yields unreliable results,
may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source
to say what he thinks the interrogator wants to hear. Additionally,
the use of force will probably result in adverse publicity and/or
legal action against the interrogator (et. al) when the source is
released. However, the use of force is not to be confused with
psychological ploys, verbal trickery, or other nonviolent and non-
coercive ruses employed by the interrogator in the successful
interrogation of reticent or uncooperative sources.
Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual - 1983

{{attention}}

'''Psychology of torture''' relies on [[psychological pain]] coupled
with physical [[Physical trauma|trauma]] to achieve the purposes of
the [[torture]]r.

Psychological pain is [[pain]] caused by [[psychological]] stress and
by emotional trauma, as distinct from that caused by
[[Nociception|physiological]] injuries and syndromes. The practice of
[[torture]] induces psychological pain through various acts that
often involve both [[physiological]] pain and psychological
manipulation to achieve a tactical goal or for the gratuitous
[[sadistic]] satisfaction of the torturer.

==Process==

The process of psychological torture is designed to invade and
destroy the presumptions of privacy, intimacy, and inviolability
assumed by the victim. Beyond merely invading the victim's mental and
physical independence on a one-to-one level, such acts are made
further damaging via public humiliation, incessant repetition, and
sadistic glee. As a result, the effects of psychological torture tend
to remain with the victim long after the actual activity is
discontinued.

Psychologically, torture often places the victim in a state where the
mind works against the best interests of the individual, due to the
inducement of such emotions as shame, worthlessness, dependency, and
a feeling of a lack of uniqueness. These and other mental stresses
can lead to a mutated, fragmented, or discredited personality and
belief structure. Even the victim's normal bodily needs and functions
(e.g. sleep, sustenance, excretion, etc.) can be construed as self-
degrading, and ironically, dehumanizing and animalistic.

==Social Implications==

A common factor of psychological torture, sometimes the only factor,
is to extend the activity to family, friends, and others for whom the
victim has a deep concern (the "social body"). This further disrupts
the individual's familiar expectations of their environment, their
control over their circumstances, and the strength and reliability of
their support network.

==Expert Opinions==

Beatrice Patsalides describes this transmogrification thus in "Ethics
of the unspeakable: Torture survivors in psychoanalytic treatment":

:"As the gap between the 'I' and the 'me' deepens, dissociation and
alienation increase. The subject that, under torture, was forced into
the position of pure object has lost his or her sense of interiority,
intimacy, and privacy. Time is experienced now, in the present only,
and perspective-that which allows for a sense of
relativity-is foreclosed. Thoughts and dreams attack the mind
and invade the body as if the protective skin that normally contains
our thoughts, gives us space to breathe in between the thought and
the thing being thought about, and separates between inside and
outside, past and present, me and you, was lost."

Torture robs the victim of the most basic modes of relating to
reality and, thus, is the equivalent of cognitive death. Space and
time are warped by [[sleep deprivation]]. The self ("I") is
shattered. The tortured have nothing familiar to hold on to: family,
home, personal belongings, loved ones, language, name. Gradually,
they lose their mental resilience and sense of freedom. They feel
alien-unable to communicate, relate, attach, or empathize with
others.

Torture splinters early childhood grandiose
[[Narcissism|narcissistic]] fantasies of uniqueness, omnipotence,
invulnerability, and impenetrability. But it enhances the fantasy of
merger with an idealized and omnipotent (though not benign)
other-the inflicter of agony. The twin processes of
individuation and separation are reversed.

==Interpersonal Relationships==

Torture is the ultimate act of perverted intimacy. The torturer
invades the victim's body, pervades his psyche, and possesses his
mind. Deprived of contact with others and starved for human
interactions, the prey bonds with the predator. "Traumatic bonding",
akin to the [[Stockholm syndrome]], is about hope and the search for
meaning in the brutal and indifferent and nightmarish universe of the
torture cell.

The abuser becomes the [[black hole]] at the center of the victim's
surrealistic galaxy, sucking in the sufferer's universal need for
solace. The victim tries to "control" his tormentor by becoming one
with him (introjecting him) and by appealing to the monster's
presumably dormant humanity and empathy.

This bonding is especially strong when the torturer and the tortured
form a dyad and "collaborate" in the rituals and acts of torture (for
instance, when the victim is coerced into selecting the torture
implements and the types of torment to be inflicted, or to choose
between two evils).

The psychologist Shirley Spitz offers this powerful overview of the
contradictory nature of torture in a seminar titled "The Psychology
of Torture" (1989):

:"Torture is an obscenity in that it joins what is most private with
what is most public. Torture entails all the isolation and extreme
solitude of privacy with none of the usual security embodied
therein ... Torture entails at the same time all the self exposure of
the utterly public with none of its possibilities for camaraderie or
shared experience. (The presence of an all powerful other with whom
to merge, without the security of the other's benign intentions.)

A further obscenity of torture is the inversion it makes of intimate
human relationships. The interrogation is a form of social encounter
in which the normal rules of communicating, of relating, of intimacy
are manipulated. Dependency needs are elicited by the interrogator,
but not so they may be met as in close relationships, but to weaken
and confuse. Independence that is offered in return for "betrayal" is
a lie. Silence is intentionally misinterpreted either as confirmation
of information or as guilt for 'complicity'.

Torture combines complete humiliating exposure with utter devastating
isolation. The final products and outcome of torture are a scarred
and often shattered victim and an empty display of the fiction of
power."

Obsessed by endless ruminations, demented by pain and a continuum of
sleeplessness-the victim regresses, shedding all but the most
primitive defense mechanisms: splitting, narcissism, dissociation,
projective identification, introjection, and cognitive dissonance.
The victim constructs an alternative world, often suffering from
depersonalization and derealization, hallucinations, ideas of
reference, delusions, and psychotic episodes.

Sometimes the victim comes to crave pain-very much as self-
mutilators do-because it is a proof and a reminder of his
individuated existence otherwise blurred by the incessant torture.
Pain shields the sufferer from disintegration and capitulation. It
preserves the veracity of his unthinkable and unspeakable experiences.

This dual process of the victim's alienation and addiction to anguish
complements the perpetrator's view of his quarry as "inhuman",
or "subhuman". The torturer assumes the position of the sole
authority, the exclusive fount of meaning and interpretation, the
source of both evil and good.

Torture is about reprogramming the victim to succumb to an
alternative exegesis of the world, proffered by the abuser. It is an
act of deep, indelible, traumatic indoctrination. The abused also
swallows whole and assimilates the torturer's negative view of him
and often, as a result, is rendered suicidal, self-destructive, or
self-defeating.

Thus, torture has no cutoff date. The sounds, the voices, the smells,
the sensations reverberate long after the episode has
ended-both in nightmares and in waking moments. The victim's
ability to trust other people-i.e., to assume that their
motives are at least rational, if not necessarily benign-has
been irrevocably undermined. Social institutions are perceived as
precariously poised on the verge of an ominous, Kafkaesque mutation.
Nothing is either safe, or credible anymore.

Victims typically react by undulating between emotional numbing and
increased arousal: insomnia, irritability, restlessness, and
attention deficits. Recollections of the traumatic events intrude in
the form of dreams, night terrors, flashbacks, and distressing
associations.

The tortured develop compulsive rituals to fend off obsessive
thoughts. Other psychological sequelae reported include cognitive
impairment, reduced capacity to learn, [[memory disorder]]s, [[sexual
dysfunction]], [[social withdrawal]], inability to maintain long-term
relationships, or even mere intimacy, [[phobia]]s, ideas of reference
and [[superstition]]s, [[delusion]]s, [[hallucination]]s, [[psychotic
microepisode]]s, and [[emotional flatness]].

==Results of Torture==

[[clinical depression|Depression]] and [[anxiety]] are very common.
These are forms and manifestations of self-directed aggression. The
sufferer rages at his own victimhood and resulting multiple
dysfunction. He feels shamed by his new disabilities and responsible,
or even guilty, somehow, for his predicament and the dire
consequences borne by his nearest and dearest. His sense of self-
worth and self-esteem are crippled.

In summary, torture victims suffer from a [[post-traumatic stress
disorder]] (PTSD). Their strong feelings of anxiety, guilt, and shame
are also typical of victims of childhood abuse, domestic violence,
and rape. They feel anxious because the perpetrator's behavior is
seemingly arbitrary and unpredictable-or mechanically and
inhumanly regular.

They feel guilty and disgraced because, to restore a semblance of
order to their shattered world and a modicum of dominion over their
chaotic life, they need to transform themselves into the cause of
their own degradation and the accomplices of their tormentors.

The CIA, in its "[[Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual -
1983|Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual - 1983]]"
(reprinted in the April 1997 issue of Harper's Magazine), summed up
the theory of coercion thus:

:"The purpose of all coercive techniques is to induce psychological
regression in the subject by bringing a superior outside force to
bear on his will to resist. Regression is basically a loss of
autonomy, a reversion to an earlier behavioral level. As the subject
regresses, his learned personality traits fall away in reverse
chronological order. He begins to lose the capacity to carry out the
highest creative activities, to deal with complex situations, or to
cope with stressful interpersonal relationships or repeated
frustrations."

Inevitably, in the aftermath of torture, its victims feel helpless
and powerless. This loss of control over one's life and body is
manifested physically in impotence, attention deficits, and insomnia.
This is often exacerbated by the disbelief many torture victims
encounter, especially if they are unable to produce scars, or
other "objective" proof of their ordeal. Language cannot communicate
such an intensely private experience as pain.

Spitz makes the following observation:

:"Pain is also unsharable in that it is resistant to language ... All
our interior states of consciousness: emotional, perceptual,
cognitive and somatic can be described as having an object in the
external world ... This affirms our capacity to move beyond the
boundaries of our body into the external, sharable world. This is the
space in which we interact and communicate with our environment. But
when we explore the interior state of physical pain we find that
there is no object "out there"-no external, referential
content. Pain is not of, or for, anything. Pain is. And it draws us
away from the space of interaction, the sharable world, inwards. It
draws us into the boundaries of our body."

[[Bystander]]s resent the tortured because they make them feel guilty
and ashamed for having done nothing to prevent the atrocity. The
victims threaten their sense of security and their much-needed belief
in predictability, justice, and rule of law. The victims, on their
part, do not believe that it is possible to effectively communicate
to "outsiders" what they have been through. The torture chambers
are "another galaxy". This is how [[Auschwitz]] was described by the
author [[Yehiel Dinur|K. Zetnik]] in his testimony in the [[Eichmann
trial]] in [[Jerusalem]] in 1961.

Kenneth Pope in "Torture", a chapter he wrote for the "Encyclopedia
of Women and Gender: Sex Similarities and Differences and the Impact
of Society on Gender", quotes Harvard psychiatrist Judith Herman:

:"It is very tempting to take the side of the perpetrator. All the
perpetrator asks is that the bystander do nothing. He appeals to the
universal desire to see, hear, and speak no evil. The victim, on the
contrary, asks the bystander to share the burden of pain. The victim
demands action, engagement, and remembering."

But, more often, continued attempts to repress fearful memories
result in psychosomatic illnesses (conversion). The victim wishes to
forget the torture, to avoid re-experiencing the often life
threatening abuse and to shield his human environment from the
horrors. In conjunction with the victim's pervasive distrust, this is
frequently interpreted as hypervigilance, or even paranoia. It seems
that the victims can't win. Torture is forever.

== References ==
* CIA, KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation, July 1963
* CIA, Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual - 1983

* [<http://narcissistic-abuse.com/torturepsychology.html> The
Psychology of Torture]

[[Category:Psychology]]
[[Category:Torture]]

Gannon

Canada
376 Posts
Posted - 01/14/2005 : 19:35:45
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I think there's also info on Jack Bloods website ( www.jackblood.com )
as he was a victim of it...also Eleanor White's website...(from
Canada)...she's also a victim of it...(I think one of the websites
listed here is actually hers).
-------------------
Gannon White

teslacoils2005

Canada
125 Posts
Posted - 01/27/2005 : 09:57:08
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

this link is changed to a msn site
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/psycologicalwarfair/

this link works
http://groups.msn.com/psycologicalwarfare

teslacoils2005

Canada
125 Posts
Posted - 01/27/2005 : 10:00:07
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

APPENDIX B

"THE HERITAGE FRONT AFFAIR": OUR VIEW

A JOINT DISSENTING OPINION AGREED TO BY THE BLOC QUÉBÉCOIS
AND THE REFORM PARTY OF CANADA

Presented by
François Langlois, M.P.
and
Val Meredith, M.P.

INTRODUCTION
1. In August and September 1994, there were a number of public reports
of allegations about the activities of an alleged CSIS source within
the Heritage Front. It was reported that this source helped set up and
finance the organization with the use of public funds and the support
of a government agency. More specifically, this person was alleged to
have spied on the CBC, used the Heritage Front to infiltrate the Reform
Party of Canada, attempted to obtain personal information about members
of the Jewish community, engaged in illegal activities with "white
supremacists", improperly obtained police information, and spied on a
postal workers union, among other activities. If true, these
allegations would bring into serious question the legitimacy of an
operation undertaken by CSIS and the security intelligence scheme put
in place by Parliament in 1984.
2. When the first allegations became public, both SIRC and the
Subcommittee began their respective reviews. While SIRC was conducting
its investigation, the Subcommittee deferred its review so as to avoid
duplication of effort. In the meantime, we carried out our
consideration of document and personnel security matters arising from
the unauthorized release by an employee of classified material from the
office of a former Solicitor General. SIRC reported to the Solicitor
General on December 9, 1994, and its Report was made public a week
later.
3. The opposition members of the Subcommittee principally based their
review of these events on a detailed, critical consideration of the
SIRC Report. We did not attempt to repeat the exhaustive investigation
undertaken by SIRC because we wanted to avoid unnecessary duplication
of effort and because we did not have the resources to do so. We have,
however, considered SIRC's findings and conclusions, and, based upon
them and our own inquiries, set out our own views and opinions in this
Report.
4. The events dealt with in this Report represent an important test of
the security intelligence scheme put in place by Parliament when it
adopted the CSIS Act, including the roles of the Solicitor General ,
the Deputy Solicitor General, SIRC, the Inspector General, and the
Director of CSIS. In the "Heritage Front Affair", we have the use of
one of the most intrusive investigation techniques possible, the
placement by a security intelligence agency of a human source within a
leadership core before, during and after the founding of a "white
supremacist" group. This happened at a time of vigorous activity and
confrontation between groups and individuals holding radically opposed
points of view. Was this appropriate? Was it properly controlled and
reviewed? These are some of the broad policy questions the opposition
members of the Subcommittee will address in this Report.
BACKGROUND TO SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW
5. At the earliest opportunity, the Subcommittee began its
consideration of the public allegations. On September 13, 1994, SIRC,
which had already begun its review of events, appeared before us in a
public meeting. At that meeting, the Subcommittee released to SIRC and
to the public the questions it expected SIRC to fully investigate and
answer in its Report on the allegations.
SIRC was also pressed by the Subcommittee to describe the investigative
methodology it intended to follow and to prepare its Report in such a
way as to ensure that as much of it as possible could be publicly
released by the Solicitor General.
6. While SIRC was carrying out its investigation, the Subcommittee
heard evidence in public session from the Honourable Doug Lewis, former
Solicitor General, his former Chief of Staff, Michael Dearden, and his
former Executive Assistant (who had responsibility in his office for
CSIS matters), Blair Dickerson. These witnesses were heard from to
determine what light they could throw from their perspectives on the
allegations, and to pursue issues related to the unauthorized release
of classified documents from the office of the former Solicitor
General.
7. Once the SIRC Report was made public on December 15, 1994, the
Subcommittee heard Review Committee members in public session the next
day. Because the Subcommittee concluded that public hearings were too
unwieldy for a detailed consideration of the SIRC Report, it held five
in camera meetings with the Review Committee and its staff. During
these meetings, its Report was examined in detail and SIRC was closely
questioned on its findings. On occasion, SIRC members were unable to
answer queries put to them by members of the Subcommittee, and written
answers to some of these questions were provided at a later time. SIRC
members refused to answer other questions because of their
interpretation of the law. The Subcommittee agreed to disagree with
them.
8. Once this process was completed, the Subcommittee heard from Elisse
Hategan, a former member of the Heritage Front, her counsel, Paul
Copeland, and Martin Theriault of the Canadian Centre on Racism and
Prejudice. Finally, it heard from SIRC in June 1995 at a wrap-up public
session.
9. The opposition members of the Subcommittee have determined, in the
absence of credible evidence to the contrary, that Grant Bristow and
the person referred to in the SIRC Report as the Source are the same
person. Therefore in the balance of this Report, the human source will
be referred to inter-changeably as either "Bristow" or "the Source".
Before proceeding with the opposition members of the Subcommittee's
finding and conclusions, it is important to put them into context by
setting out some elements of the Heritage Front's development and what
it is.
THE HERITAGE FRONT
10. Racist activity in Canada is not new. There have been several waves
of it in the past. It has its modern roots in the 1920s and 1930s, when
the Ku Klux Klan and different fascist groups were active in various
parts of Canada. The second wave occurred between the mid-1960s and the
early 1970s, when US-inspired neo-nazi and anti-Semitic activity
surfaced. The third wave began in the early 1980s, and is with us still
in various forms of "white supremacy". The Heritage Front has been at
the centre of this wave.
11. Wolfgang Droege is at the core of, and is the main force behind,
the Heritage Front. A long-time activist in right-wing extremist
organizations, he in 1989 had the idea to establish an organization
which would act as a kind of umbrella group. After attending, with the
Source, Grant Bristow and others, a conference in Libya organized by
the government of that country, he and a small group, including
Bristow, formed the Heritage Front in September 1989.
12. The Toronto-based Heritage Front draws its membership from racists,
neo-nazis, skinheads, and "white supremacists". There is no reliable
way of knowing the size of its membership. It has no offices or meeting
rooms of its own, nor any formal organizational structure. Its
membership fluctuates, with participants in its activities moving from
one organization to another. Many of its activities are ad hoc in
nature. Its main activities in the past have been to: set up telephone
racist message lines; publish a periodical called Up Front; organize
meetings at which racist and Holocaust denial lecturers speak; and
organize skinhead dances where violent confrontations have at times
occurred. It has also had branches in other parts of Ontario and
contacts in Quebec, as well as relations with similar groups in other
parts of Canada, the US, and elsewhere.
AN APPROPRIATE TARGET
13. When considering the public allegations dealt with in this Report,
the opposition members of the Subcommittee posed several questions to
the Subcommittee itself. Was it appropriate for CSIS to re-focus an
existing investigation of the "extreme right wing" so as to target its
leadership? That is, was the Heritage Front, once formed, through its
leadership a possible threat to the security of Canada under section 2
of the CSIS Act and hence a legitimate target of investigation under
section 12? Once the Heritage Front was formed, was it appropriate for
CSIS to continue targeting its leadership through the placement beyond
an initial period of a human source? This section of the Report and the
following one will deal with these interrelated questions.
14. Section 2 of the CSIS Act defines `threats to the security of
Canada' to include espionage, sabotage, foreign-influenced activities,
politically motivated violence, and subversion. Section 12 of the Act
sets out the Service's security intelligence mandate. It allows CSIS to
collect, analyze, and retain, to the extent that is strictly necessary,
information and intelligence about activities that may on reasonable
grounds be suspected of being threats to the security of Canada.
15. The legislative threshold for beginning the investigation of a
target is a lowone-indeed it is much lower than the requirements in the
criminal law context where there have to be reasonable grounds to
believe that a criminal offence is being or has been committed.
16. In this case, the Heritage Front per se was not targeted by CSIS.
(SIRC Report, Chapter II, para. 2.1) However, Wolfgang Droege was
approved as a Level 2 target by CSIS' internal Target and Review
Committee (TARC) on October 4, 1989 and the Source was explicitly
tasked against him. (SIRC Report, Chapter III, p. 12 and 15)
17. Droege was investigated by CSIS because of his involvement in
politically motivated violence and criminal activity prior to the
October 1989 targeting decision. He spent a good part of the 1980s in
US prisons. In May, 1983, he was released after serving a portion of a
three year prison sentence under the US Neutrality Act for his part in
attempting to organize an invasion of Dominica. In 1985, he was
convicted in the US of weapons and drug trafficking offences for which
he was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment - he returned to Canada in
April, 1989 after having served only part of his sentence. Droege was
targeted after having returned to Canada and having attended the
Libyan-sponsored conference (with the Source, Bristow and others) that
led to the founding of the Heritage Front on September 25, 1989 by him,
Bristow, and others. At the beginning of 1990, CSIS targeted the Source
against Droege because of his increasing leadership role in extreme
right wing activity. CSIS believed Droege trusted the Source and wanted
him to be part of the core group setting up the Heritage Front. The
Service was concerned that if Droege became a leading personality, his
organization would be harder to penetrate because of his past
experience and security consciousness. To quote SIRC, "If this scenario
were to materialize, they would be fortunate to have a source in on the
ground floor". (SIRC Report, chapter III, p. 15, para. 3.3.6)
18. According to SIRC, the leadership of the "extreme right" was at
first targeted in 1990-91 under both paragraphs (b) (foreign-influenced
activities) and (c) (politically motivated violence) of the section 2
CSIS Act definition of threats to the security of Canada. This was
later (after 1991-92) changed to a paragraph (c) targeted threat only.
19. In the 1990-91 submission to TARC, it was concluded that after
investigating the extreme right wing movement since 1985, CSIS found
petty criminal activity, but nothing that could be construed as threats
to the security of Canada. CSIS then continued its TARC-approved
investigation by refocusing its efforts on the leadership of the
extreme right wing. (SIRC Report, Chapter II, p. 2, para. 2)
20. In the view of the opposition members of the Subcommittee, the
leadership of the extreme right and its most prominent emerging
organization, the Heritage Front, were appropriately targeted in the
initial stages of the refocussed investigation. As stated earlier, the
observation was made in 1990 by CSIS that the extreme right wing
movement was not a threat to the security of Canada. The 1992-93
submission to TARC requested the continuation of the targeting
authority because, among other things, there was increased
co-ordination among racist groups in Canada and elsewhere, and the
groups made greater use of modern technology to monitor those who
threatened their ideology. It also asserted that these groups had
become more proactive in furthering their political objectives. Similar
comments were made in the 1993 submission to TARC. These later
submissions to TARC may reflect the impact of the presence of the
Source within the Heritage Front leadership, with his knowledge of
electronic and security matters. Had the Source not been part of the
Heritage Front leadership grouped, its activities might only have been
petty criminal in nature and the investigation would have been
terminated at an early time rather than refocussed.
PLACEMENT OF A SOURCE
21. Effective investigations may be carried out through the use of
number of techniques. Some are more intrusive and more effective than
others. Among these different techniques are: "environmental scanning";
monitoring of open sources; physical surveillance; electronic
surveillance; recruitment of informants; and placement of human
sources. The recruitment and placement of human sources is one of the
most intrusive techniques available, as well as one of the most
effective in terms of potential results. The placement of human sources
brings with it a degree of uncertainty. The control and reliability of
sources is fraught with difficulty. Their impact on individuals and
groups is often unknown. Ensuring that they play a passive,
intelligence-gathering role, rather than an active, provocative,
counteracting role, is a true challenge.
22. Because of these challenges, the Solicitor General of the day in
October, 1989 issued a Ministerial Direction dealing with human
sources, under section 6 of the CSIS Act, to the Director of CSIS (it
was modified in August, 1993 by the Minister then in office). It sets
out comprehensive instructions on the recruitment, authorization, use,
behaviour, remuneration, treatment, and control of confidential human
sources. It enunciates six general principles on the use and management
of confidential sources by CSIS. They are the following:
1. Human sources are to be used only when and to the extent reasonable
and necessary.
2. The need for a human source must be measured against its impact on
rights and freedoms.
3. The use of human sources is to be centrally directed and controlled
within CSIS because of the intrusive nature of this technique.
4. Human sources are not to engage in illegal activities or to do
things that will bring discredit on the Service or the Government of
Canada.
5. Human sources are to be managed in such a way as to protect both the
security of CSIS operations and the personal safety of the source.
6. Human sources are to be treated by the Service ethically and fairly
in terms of handling and compensation.
23. The Ministerial Direction also deals specifically with what it
calls the "most sensitive institutions of our society". It instructs
the Director of CSIS or a designate to personally approve the use of a
human source in relation to any academic, political, religious, media
or trade union institution. They are to be used in relation to such
institutions with caution and with the greatest respect for rights and
freedoms.
24. CSIS has also established a Target Approval and Review Committee,
chaired by the Director of CSIS, to approve and manage human sources,
as well as other approved investigative techniques against designated
targets. There is also provision both at Headquarters and in Regional
Offices for the recruitment, control, and remuneration of human
sources. Finally, the CSIS Operational Manual provides detailed
guidance to CSIS employees on many of these matters.
25. There are two issues to be addressed in this part of the Report.
The first of these is whether it was appropriate for CSIS to place a
source within the leadership group of the Heritage Front. The second
question to be dealt with is whether this Source should have been
initially placed, then left in place and allowed to participate in its
activities in light of events as they unfolded.
26. The placement of a source inside an organization such as the
Heritage Front cannot help but have an effect on it and what it does.
In this instance, CSIS directed a source to the leadership of the
Heritage Front as it was being conceived and during the early days of
its formation. The Service had already been investigating the activity
of extremist right wing groups for a number of years before it
authorized the placement of the Source near Wolfgang Droege in October
1989. The infiltration of a source was an effective means of obtaining
information about a nascent right wing extremist organization being set
up as an umbrella group by an individual with a long history of right
wing extremist activity.
27. However, there came a time, as indicated in the preceding section
of this Report, when it was concluded in a 1990-91 submission to TARC
that extreme right organizations and their related activities were
petty criminal in nature and did not constitute a threat to the
security of Canada. It is not clear to the opposition members of the
Subcommittee why the Service did not simply refer these matters to law
enforcement agencies, rather than redirecting the investigation and the
Source for more than an initial period to the leadership of the extreme
right wing. The key question is what was the justification for the
continued targeting and the presence of the Source after 1990. SIRC did
not clearly address this issue in either its Report on the Heritage
Front Affair or in its 1994-95 Annual Report, released in October,
1995.
28. Having concluded that the placement of a human source was
acceptable, although for a shorter time than this Source was actually
in place, the opposition members of the Subcommittee then asked
themselves whether the Service should have recruited and put in place
this particular Source?
29. Recruiting and controlling sources is not easy. Because of the
conflicting roles they play, as both trusted participant in the
activities being monitored and provider of information about these
activities, they are not always the most reliable people. There must
not only be confidence that the information provided will be accurate
and useful, but that the human source will be trustworthy and discrete
as to the dual roles being played. This is especially important when a
human source is being developed. Human source operations can fail
because of unreliability, character weaknesses or detection by the
target.
30. The Source was not unknown to the Service when he was initially
"directed" to the extreme right wing movement and later to its
leadership. He first came into contact with the Service in early 1986
in relation to a foreign country's intelligence activities in Canada.
The foreign country cut off its connection with him when it learned he
had been providing some assistance to the Service. In February, 1987,
the Source "at his own initiative" was redirected to the "white
supremacist" movement. In April, 1987, CSIS Headquarters was becoming a
little concerned about the overzealousness of the Source. In June of
that same year, a police source told CSIS that it had been advised by
the Source that he was involved in a long-term Service operation.
Consequently, contact by CSIS with the Source ceased at that point.
31. In November, 1988, the Source was back in touch with CSIS with
respect to right wing extremist group activity. The Service decided to
once again make use of him to get the needed information on these
activities. Once more, what SIRC called "the old problem" recurred. On
December 12, 1988 a police source advised CSIS that the Source was
claiming to have Service contacts.
32. Despite his failure to exercise discretion by revealing his
activities on behalf of CSIS, the Source was kept on and allowed to
continue in place until March 1994, when he had his leave-taking. The
opposition members of the Subcommittee have serious misgivings about
the Service's decision to leave this Source in place for another five
years, despite failings in the early days of his contact with CSIS.
This concern is buttressed by the nature of some of the questionable
activities engaged in by the Source in the heyday of the Heritage Front
between 1991 and 1993. Although it is impossible to determine what the
Heritage Front would have become without the presence of the Source as
part of its leadership group, it is possible to know what it did when
he was there. It is the view of the opposition members of the
Subcommittee that SIRC did not deal critically enough in its Report
with this concern.
CONDUCT OF THE SOURCE
33. As indicated earlier in this Report, there is a Ministerial
Direction to the Director of CSIS dealing with the use of confidential
human sources. As stated previously, it sets out six general
principles. Principle 4 is as follows:
4. Confidential sources are to carry out their tasks on behalf of the
Service without engaging in illegal activities. They should conduct
themselves in such a manner as not to discredit the Service or the
Government of Canada.
34. The Ministerial Direction goes on further to say:
As indicated earlier, a special responsibility rests with the Service
to do everything reasonable to ensure that its confidential sources
operate within the law, and do not behave so as to bring discredit on
the Service or the Government. Confidential sources shall be instructed
not to engage in illegal activities in carrying out their work on
behalf of the Service. Further, they shall be discouraged from engaging
in such activities for any reason. Confidential sources shall be
instructed not to act as `agent provocateurs' or in any way incite or
encourage illegal activity.
35. The rules set out in this Ministerial Direction require that human
sources are to operate not only within the law, but also within the
spirit of the law. They are expected not to foster, nurture or
implement the activities about which they are collecting information.
They are to blend into the organizations they are covering and not to
give a hint of the true reason for their presence. This is a difficult
series of rules to respect, but it is not an impossible task. It is
dependent upon forthrightness and honesty in dealings with CSIS on the
part of the source, and effective direction and control on the part of
the Service. These rules and principles of conduct were not fully
respected in this operation.
36. The principled behaviour threshold set by the Ministerial Direction
is a high one. The level of tolerance for inappropriate source activity
is low. Illegal activities by a source are obviously not acceptable.
Activities that bring discredit upon the Service or the Government of
Canada are also not permitted. Although these phrases are not further
defined in the Ministerial Direction, their thrust is clear. Such
activities should not bring the legitimacy, credibility or propriety of
the Service or the Government of Canada into disrepute. This would
appear to preclude such things as: egregiously misusing positions of
authority; purposely acting in a grossly dishonest or misleading way;
unnecessarily acting disrespectfully in relation to others; acting in
such a way as to put the health or safety of others in peril; or acting
in clearly conscious disregard for the rights and freedoms of other
persons.
37. The opposition members of the Subcommittee find that a number of
actions carried out by the Source did contravene or could be seen to
have contravened Principle 4 of the Ministerial Direction:
The "IT" campaign was fostered, nurtured, and implemented by the
Source, with the agreement of his Handler, as an alleged means of
turning an escalating mutual harassment campaign by the Heritage Front
and Anti-Racist Action into an information-gathering effort, with the
Source in control. The opposition members of the Subcommittee see no
benefit being obtained from replacing one type of harassment by
another. These actions are those of an agent provocateur, in direct
violation of the instructions given in the Ministerial Direction. In
the view of the opposition members of the Subcommittee, SIRC, in
concluding that this campaign tested the bounds of what was acceptable,
did not provide a sufficiently critical review of these events.
The impersonation by Grant Bristow of a non-existent journalist by the
name of Trevor Graham, allegedly an associate of author Warren
Kinsella, for the purpose of obtaining information for the Heritage
Front rather than CSIS. This type of action also occurred on other
occasions. Although this may not have constituted the criminal offence
of personation, it clearly tested the limits of acceptable behaviour by
a human source.
The finding of a 12-gauge shotgun and a semi-automatic rifle in the
trunk of a Bristow's car when US "white supremacist" Sean Maguire was
arrested in September, 1991. One of the firearms was inoperative and
both were in their cases when they were discovered. Although there may
not have been a criminal offence as such, it was at best imprudent for
Bristow to have had firearms in his trunk while associating with
individuals with a propensity for politically motivated violence.
The harbouring by Grant Bristow in his home for several days in
September, 1991 of Sean Maguire, a known "white supremacist". At the
time, Sean Maguire was inadmissible under the Immigration Act, and this
was known to CSIS. This action by Bristow, with the knowledge of CSIS
of Maguire's immigration status, was in violation of the instructions
given in the Ministerial Direction that human sources not engage in
illegal activities, and of section 94(1)(m) of the Immigration Act
(knowingly aiding and abetting a contravention of provisions of the
Act).
The participation of the Source, as part of a group of Heritage Front
members, in Reform Party of Canada functions. Although this may not
have been direct participation in political activities as such, in case
of doubt, the personal approval of the Director of CSIS should have
been obtained in relation to this sensitive institution (the Reform
Party of Canada).
38. These incidents, and others, demonstrate that the Source and
Bristow, as well as CSIS management at all levels, were not always as
attentive to the principles set out in the Ministerial Direction as
they should have been. Proper controls and reporting were not always
present. Authorization for the presence of a human source in proximity
to a sensitive institution was not obtained. Certainly, these
incidents, once revealed to the light of day, brought discredit to
CSIS.
39. It is clear to the opposition members of the Subcommittee that the
Ministerial Direction on confidential human sources is in need of
revision. SIRC has identified four issues that have to be addressed in
revising the Ministerial Direction. The matters it has identified are:
the nature of the proactive role to be played by sources;
whether a source should play a leadership role in a targeted
organization;
whether a source should engage in counter-measures to destroy a
terrorist group; and
whether the benefits of maintaining a source outweigh the benefits
obtained by taking measures to destroy a group.
40. The opposition members of the Subcommittee agree that these are
important issues, that although difficult, have to be dealt with. There
is another underlying question that has to be addressed in revising the
Ministerial Direction. It does not enunciate clearly enough the types
of activity engaged in by sources that are unacceptable. Vague
references to a proscribed "illegal activities" and activities "not to
discredit the Service or the Government of Canada" are an inadequate
prescription of ministerial expectations. But even revised and
strengthened Ministerial Directions are inadequate if they are not
fully respected. They are part of the accountability scheme put into
place by Parliament and must be effectively implemented.
RECOMMENDATION 1
THE OPPOSITION MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE RECOMMEND THAT, IN ADDITION
TO WHAT WAS PROPOSED BY SIRC, THE MINISTERIAL DIRECTION ON CONFIDENTIAL
HUMAN SOURCES BE REVISED SO AS TO CLEARLY PROHIBIT, AS THE GENERAL
RULE, HUMAN SOURCES FROM ENGAGING IN ILLEGAL OR DISCREDITABLE
ACTIVITIES. THE REVISED DIRECTION SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT SUCH
ACTIVITIES INCLUDE BREACHES OF THE LAWS OF CANADA, OR ENCOURAGING,
SUPPORTING OR COUNSELLING ANY SUCH LAW-BREAKING ACTIVITIES. FURTHER,
HARASSMENT, INTIMIDATION OR INCITEMENT TO VIOLENCE ON THE PART OF A
HUMAN SOURCE SHOULD BE PROHIBITED BY THE REVISED MINISTERIAL DIRECTION.

PROVISION SHOULD BE MADE TO PERMIT A SOURCE TO ACT IN CONTRAVENTION OF
THE GENERAL RULE, IN APPROPRIATE CASES, BUT ONLY AFTER THE DIRECTOR OF
CSIS PERSONALLY AUTHORIZES SUCH ACTIVITIES FOR PURPOSES AUTHORIZED
UNDER THE CSIS ACT.
THE DIRECTOR SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO REPORT SUCH ACTIVITIES TO THE
MINISTER IN A MANNER SIMILAR TO THAT REQUIRED UNDER SECTION 20 (2)-(4)
OF THE ACT (UNLAWFUL CONDUCT OF CSIS EMPLOYEES). IN EXCEPTIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES ONLY, THE DIRECTOR COULD PERSONALLY AUTHORIZE SUCH
ACTIVITIES, NUNC PRO TUNC (NOW FOR THEN).
ADVISING THIRD PARTIES
41. On October 26, 1993, the Source learned that there was a threat of
possible serious physical violence against certain leaders of the
Jewish community in Toronto. When this was learned by CSIS, it advised
the Metropolitan Toronto Police six days later. The Jewish community
leadership only learned of this threat of serious physical violence
with the release of the SIRC Report on the "Heritage Front Affair".
(SIRC Report, Chapter V, p. 34-35)
42. In the Summer and Fall of 1991, the Service was being administered
by an Acting Director, pending the appointment of a new Director. The
Deputy Director, Operations and Analysis, occupied the acting position.
He and the Assistant Director, Requirements, in the Summer of 1991
decided not to inform the Reform Party of Canada of the attempts to
infiltrate and discredit it by various right wing extremists because,
in their view, the situation was not sufficiently "egregious" to
warrant such action. It was also observed at the time that the law did
not allow for such a step. CSIS has, however, disclosed information
held by it to third-party business interests in Vancouver and
elsewhere, despite its strict interpretation of the law in the this
case.
43. Section 19 of the CSIS Act deals with the authorized disclosure of
information held by the Service. It allows CSIS to provide information
to law enforcement agencies, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the
Department of National Defence, and, and in the public interest, to
Ministers and public servants. These are the only circumstances under
which the law allows the Service to provide the information held by it
to others. In neither of the cases outlined at the beginning of this
part of the Report would the law have permitted the provision of
information to those most directly affected by it.
44. SIRC dealt with a similar issue in its 1985-86 and 1986-87 Annual
Reports. At that time, it asked if there were some way in which CSIS
could warn voluntary organizations being infiltrated by persons wishing
to subvert them. It also asked if there were some way to warn
individuals joining "front" organizations, because they support their
overt aims, that these organizations really have covert objectives.
SIRC did not find an answer to these questions.
45. The incidents described in this part of the Report, and CSIS'
failure to notify those most directly affected by threats of violence
in one case and attempted infiltration in the other, demonstrate the
unacceptable limits imposed by the present law. The Act, in the view of
the opposition members of the Subcommittee, has to be amended to deal
with this issue. It must be changed to allow the Director, in
appropriate circumstances, to advise individuals and organizations of
threats of imminent serious physical violence, or of
politically-motivated infiltrations inimical to an organization's best
interest. Such advisories should normally only be made where they would
not compromise an on-going Service investigation.
46. Such an arrangement would have to be accompanied by measures
ensuring that advisories would be issued in only the most exigent
circumstances. An advisory should only be given by the Director of CSIS
personally, and not by a delegate. Both the Minister and SIRC should be
advised of the issuance of such an advisory at the same time as it is
being given. Some means must also be found to allow Parliament to
effectively review the issuance of any such advisories.
RECOMMENDATION 2
THE OPPOSITION MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE RECOMMEND THAT THE CSIS ACT
BE AMENDED SO AS TO ALLOW THE DIRECTOR OF CSIS TO DIRECTLY ADVISE
AFFECTED PARTIES OF THREATS OF IMMINENT SERIOUS PHYSICAL VIOLENCE OR OF
POLITICALLY-MOTIVATED INFILTRATION ATTEMPTS BY TARGETED
PERSONS/ENTITIES INIMICAL TO AN ORGANIZATION'S BEST INTERESTS.
THE ACT SHOULD BE FURTHER AMENDED TO REQUIRE THAT THE DIRECTOR OF CSIS
PERSONALLY EXERCISE THIS AUTHORITY, AND THAT THE MINISTER AND SIRC BE
INFORMED OF THE ISSUANCE OF SUCH AN ADVISORY. PARLIAMENT SHOULD BE
ALLOWED TO EFFECTIVELY REVIEW THE ISSUANCE OF ANY SUCH ADVISORY.
THE CSIS INVESTIGATION OF AN UNKNOWN CONTRIBUTOR TO PRESTON MANNING'S
1988 CAMPAIGN
47. Chapter VIII of the SIRC Report deals with the CSIS investigation
of an unknown contributor to Preston Manning's 1988 campaign. This
chapter was included in the Report by SIRC because it came across this
1989-90 investigation during its file review. The opposition members of
the Subcommittee have singled this Chapter of the SIRC Report for
specific attention because of the sensitive issues it deals with and
because of concerns with some of SIRC's findings. This part of our
Report will not recite in detail what is to be found in Chapter VIII of
the SIRC Report but will only set out the matters that are of concern
to us. To deal with the issues addressed in this part of the Report, we
have had access to the CSIS file on these matters in an expurgated form
- it was obtained by Mr. Manning and provided to us by him.
48. In November, 1988, CSIS received information that there may have
been some attempt by a foreign country to influence the outcome of the
1988 election in a riding by contributing to the campaign of Preston
Manning. The Regional Investigator dealing with this information urged
caution with respect to its reliability because the veracity of the
source was unknown. In January, 1989, CSIS Headquarters provided the
Region with its analysis - it expressed some reservations about
arguments supporting an investigation of this information. Despite
these concerns from within CSIS, the Unit Head in the Region on October
17, 1989 authorized a three-month Level 1 investigation. It is
interesting to note that the TARC authorization form indicated that the
information upon which it was based had been provided by a source of
unknown reliability.
49. An issue to be dealt with in this part of the Report is who or what
was the target of the TARC Level 1 investigation. The caption on the
October 17, 1989 targeting authority contained the name "Preston
Manning". It was later changed on March 30, 1990 to read "LNU-FNU
(Unknown Contributor(s) to Preston Manning's Electoral Campaign)" -
this change was made after the January 17, 1990 expiry of the TARC
Level 1 authorization.
50. The name contained in the caption of the targeting authority is
important because, on its face, it indicates that the activities of
this subject of investigation may on reasonable grounds be suspected of
constituting a "threat to the security of Canada." Consequently, for
three months, CSIS investigators could have collected information with
respect to Preston Manning. There are two possible explanations for Mr.
Manning's name being in the TARC caption - either he was the target of
the TARC Level 1 investigation or as CSIS would like us to believe, his
name appeared there as the result of a clerical error which was later
rectified.
51. The fact that Mr. Manning's name was originally on the caption does
not appear in Chapter VIII of the SIRC Report. It only came to light
after SIRC, at the Subcommittee's request, revisited this part of its
investigation and in a January, 1995 letter to our Chairman confirmed
the presence of Mr. Manning's name in the original caption.
52. Two observations flow from these facts. The first of these is that
the Service for three months did not appear to appreciate the impact of
what they claim to be a mere clerical error which had the effect of
making Mr. Manning the target, in technical terms at least, of a TARC
Level 1 investigation. This investigation was under way shortly after a
new Ministerial Direction had been issued dealing with, among other
matters, sensitive institutions.
53. The second observation is that this information only came to light
at the Subcommittee's prompting and was not to be found in Chapter VIII
of the SIRC Report. SIRC has admitted that they were aware of the
change in captions prior to the tabling of their Report, but the
opposition members of the Subcommittee have not received a reasonable
explanation as to why the change was not mentioned. SIRC's conduct in
this regard raises some very serious questions about their general
intentions in producing their Report.
54. The last matter to be dealt with in this part of our Report is the
question of when the TARC Level 1 investigation actually ended. As
indicated earlier, it is our understanding that the targeting
authorization ended on January 17, 1990. It is interesting to note that
in April, 1990, the TARC assessment report states that the
investigation was over and yet still recommended that the Reform Party
election returns be obtained. In September, 1990, there was an exchange
of memos within CSIS about the possible acquisition of this
information.
55. This is a curious situation. If the targeting authorization expired
on January 17, 1990, either a new one had been approved or there was no
authority for seeking this information. In either case, this issue is
not fully addressed by SIRC. Considering that a TARC authorization is
required for any investigation, this is an important omission from
their Report.

teslacoils2005

Canada
125 Posts
Posted - 01/27/2005 : 10:02:35
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

THE CANADIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Prepared by:
Philip Rosen
Senior Analyst
Revised 24 January 2000

----------------------------------------------------------------------
----------

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ISSUE DEFINITION

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

A. The Origins and Development of the Security Intelligence
Service

B. Abuses by the Security Service

C. The McDonald Commission's Recommendations

D. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act

E. The Controversial Issues

F. 1984 to Present

PARLIAMENTARY ACTION

CHRONOLOGY

SELECTED REFERENCES

----------------------------------------------------------------------
----------

THE CANADIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE*

ISSUE DEFINITION

In July 1984, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act was
proclaimed in force. It brought into existence a new civilian
security intelligence service, and terminated the previous Security
Service, which had functioned as part of the RCMP.

Passage of the Act was an attempt to bring the security intelligence
function under more effective control and made Canada at that time
one of the few western democracies to give its security intelligence
service an explicit statutory charter. The Act provides a defined
mandate for the operations of the agency; it interposes a system of
judicially authorized warrants in the agency's use of intrusive
investigative techniques; and it establishes monitoring and review
bodies, which purport to ensure that the agency does indeed act
within the limits of its mandate.

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

A. The Origins and Development of the Security Intelligence Service

The origins of the CSIS Act may be found in the 1981 report of the
Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police (the "McDonald Commission"). That Commission
had been created in 1977 as a result of the revelation of a series of
apparently illegal acts and practices carried out by the Security
Service of the RCMP. The Commission was to determine the extent and
prevalence of investigative practices or other activities "not
authorized or provided for by law"; to report the facts of such
practices; and to advise the government what action should be taken
to deal with them; and to advise the government generally on
necessary or desirable changes in "policies and procedures regarding
national security."

The Security Service the McDonald Commission began to study in 1977,
like many other Canadian institutions, developed gradually and
incrementally. It was subsumed within the RCMP, and had no distinct
statutory basis, deriving its authority from a power given to the
Governor in Council in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act to
assign certain functions to the Force. It was not until 1975 that the
Service was given an explicit mandate, and even that mandate
consisted only of a cabinet directive drafted in quite broad terms.

The Security Service had its genesis in certain duties assigned in
1864 by Sir John A. Macdonald to what was to become the Dominion
Police Force. These duties included such things as providing security
for government buildings, and providing information and intelligence
on threats to Canada's security, such as the Fenians. The North West
Mounted Police assumed similar functions in the west.

The security intelligence role of the federal police gradually grew
after Confederation through to the first World War, in response to
labour unrest, anarchism, and the growth of communism. This role
intensified between the world wars. But it was not until the end of
the second World War that the security function was removed from the
Criminal Investigation Branch of the RCMP, which had been formed in
1920.

The 1946 Gouzenko case led to a new awareness of the necessity for
stricter security in government institutions, and for specific
counter-espionage and counter-intelligence capabilities to deal with
the new aggressive nature of East Bloc activities. In 1946 the
Special Branch was created: its officer in charge reported to the
Commissioner of the RCMP. The Branch had the specific responsibility
of providing intelligence on espionage, subversion, and of ensuring
that federal institutions were staffed by loyal and trustworthy
persons. By 1956, the Special Branch had been raised to the
directorate level within the RCMP, under the control of an Assistant
Commissioner. Finally, in 1970, the Branch was renamed the Security
Service under the control and management of a civilian (i.e. not a
member of the RCMP) Director General (equivalent to a deputy
commissioner) who reported to the Commissioner and to the Solicitor
General. (In 1966 the RCMP had become the responsibility of the
Solicitor General, when that position was raised to full ministerial
status. Prior to that year, the force had been under the authority of
the Minister of Justice.)

The 1970 reorganization was principally the result of the 1969 Report
of the Royal Commission on Security (the "Mackenzie Commission").
That commission had been formed in 1966 following the widely
publicized case of a security lapse in a federal institution. Its
mandate was to look into security procedures in government, but it
was also to inquire generally into the question of Canada's national
security. The principal recommendation of the Mackenzie Commission,
based upon this last element of its mandate, was that a separate
civilian security agency be formed. The commission found that it was
not appropriate for a law enforcement body like the RCMP to be
involved in security intelligence work. Such functions were found to
be incompatible with the role of ordinary police; and the Special
Branch was found to lack sufficient sophistication and powers of
analysis, drawing as it did only on members of the force, to fully
discharge the security intelligence role. The commission also
recommended legislation to deal with the use by the security agency
of intrusive investigative techniques, and an improved system of
security screening, including an appeal process.

The government rejected "civilianization" of the Special Branch. It
did, however, determine to make the security intelligence
function "increasingly separate in structure and civilian in nature,"
in the words of the Prime Minister, within the RCMP. Hence the
creation of the Security Service and the appointment of a civilian
Director General. The government also pledged to bring more civilians
into the Security Service and thereby expand its expertise and
increase its flexibility. Another partial response to the Mackenzie
Commission took place in 1974, when s. 16 of the Official Secrets Act
was passed. That section allowed the Solicitor General to authorize
the interception or seizure of communications if satisfied that
conduct being investigated fell within a broad definition of activity
inimical to national security - including espionage, sabotage,
activities of foreign intelligence bodies and political violence.

B. Abuses by the Security Service

The Security Service in the early 1970s was in a precarious position.
Its members retained all the extraordinary powers accorded to peace
officers. It also remained almost exclusively composed of RCMP
members who had risen through the ranks. For the force, tight-knit,
highly disciplined and loyal, strenuously resisted the infusion of
civilian personnel. By the end of the decade there was not a single
civilian in an officer-equivalent position in planning or operations
of the Security Service.

Thus the service's post-1970 personnel remained essentially similar.
But organizationally they found themselves increasingly independent
in matters of policy, budget, and operations. Service employees had
the best of both worlds - police powers and a large degree of
autonomy from the police command structure. This independence was
reinforced by the government's policy with respect to the RCMP - "non-
interference." Politicians were not to be involved in controlling the
police or directing their operations. This is a laudatory and
effective principle when one is dealing only with the police who
operate in a public context of checks and balances. It is not,
however, ideal for a security intelligence agency which, perforce,
acts in secrecy; and which, indeed, requires a degree of political
control. Because the RCMP was both a police force and a security
agency, abuses by the latter element were not immediately apparent.

It took the mere pressure of events to disturb the precarious
position of the Security Service. The 1970 October Crisis stunned the
government, which found itself with inadequate information as to the
nature and scope of Quebec separatism. The government requested the
RCMP to undertake a "proactive" strategy in this area - to try and
get advance information as to the intentions and activities of
nationalist organizations and, if possible, to prevent or "counter"
disruptive acts. This the Security Service proceeded to do. It
embarked on an extensive campaign of intelligence-gathering,
infiltration, harassment and disruption directed at virtually all
stripes of nationalist sentiment in Quebec. In many circumstances,
the Service committed clearly illegal acts. Three of the most
spectacular examples were: the burning down of a barn to prevent a
meeting of militant nationalists and American radicals; a break-in at
the offices of a Montreal left-wing news agency, followed by the
theft and destruction of some of their files; and a break-in and
theft of the membership lists of the Parti Québécois. Operations such
as these had not, the McDonald Commission found, been ordered by the
government. They were generated from within the Service in response
to government directions to find out more about separatism. Quite
aside from being illegal, these operations showed a lack of
discrimination between true threats and legitimate dissent. None had
any major effect on the organizations targeted, and none brought in
intelligence of much importance.

Although the most spectacular acts of the Security Service were
committed in Quebec, they certainly were not limited to that
province. Throughout Canada, the Service engaged in a whole series of
illegal or improper activities, particularly in relation to left-wing
or radical groups. So-called "dirty tricks" were used against
perceived threats to national security. In 1975, at the behest of the
RCMP, a cabinet directive was issued, setting out the Service's
mandate. But this directive merely restated the status quo,
permitting the Service to "discern, monitor, investigate, deter,
prevent and counter" persons engaging in subversive or other activity
inimical to national security.

The abuses of the Security Service were not limited to the 1970s, or
to excesses in "countering" nationalist or radical threats. It was
revealed by the McDonald Commission that some activities such as
surreptitious entry, mail-opening, and the gaining of access to
supposedly confidential information in the possession of the
government, had gone on for many years, in relation to various
aspects of national security - from espionage and counter-
intelligence to subversion. In many cases, the Commission concluded,
the investigative power used was needed but was not authorized by
law. The Commission also found that it was not only the Security
Service that had engaged in this "institutionalized" wrongdoing. The
Criminal Investigation branch also had a long history of abuses in
this area.

C. The McDonald Commission's Recommendations

During the four years of its existence, the McDonald Commission
conducted an exhaustive review of the Security Service. It catalogued
the many illegalities and improprieties. It found, on the whole, that
the supposed political masters of the Service were ignorant of its
misdeeds. But this exoneration was also an inherent criticism in that
the structure of control and accountability was so weak as to allow
these things to happen. In the same way, these matters had come to
light not by reason of review or audit but as a result of fortuitous
disclosures by disgruntled former members of the Service and of
pressure by the press and the opposition.

The report of the McDonald Commission was highly critical of the
Security Service. While Canada's basic security needs, particularly
in dealing with espionage and the activities of foreign intelligence
agencies, had been adequately dealt with, the Commission found that
the Service lacked sophistication and analytical ability. In
particular, there was an inability to distinguish subversion from
dissent and a concomitant anti-left wing bias. The Service also
lacked a precise mandate, effective political control and adequate
review of its activities.

The principal recommendation of the report was that an entirely
separate civilian security agency be formed. The reasons were much
like those posited by the Mackenzie Commission. There was a need for
a reorientation toward information-gathering and analysis rather than
deterring or countering. New personnel were needed. Organizationally,
the new agency would have to be politically accountable and subject
to strict review. It would not be appropriate to impose this on the
RCMP. Law enforcement and security work are incompatible, the report
concluded.

The proposed new agency would have a statutory mandate, consisting of
a definition of the threats to Canada's security it would be
permitted to investigate. The definition would have four elements:
espionage and sabotage, foreign interference; political violence and
terrorism; and revolutionary subversion - activities directed towards
the destruction of the democratic system. The report also recommended
that the agency be expressly forbidden from investigating lawful
advocacy, protest or dissent. It would also not have the authority
to "enforce" security.

The Commission also determined that, in order to be effective, the
agency would have to have access to certain intrusive investigative
techniques, such as electronic surveillance, surreptitious entry,
mail-opening, and the ability to obtain confidential information. But
these investigative methods would only be used pursuant to judicial
warrant, which would only be issued where a court was satisfied that
the matter fell within the mandate. Further, they would not be
available against "subversive" threats.

The Commission's agency would be under the management and control of
a Director General, who would in turn be responsible to the Solicitor
General. This minister would play a significant role in the operation
of the agency. He would issue directives having to do with its
functioning, and would have to authorize applications for warrants.
To ensure compliance with the law, the Commission recommended
substantial external review of the agency's activities. First there
would be the Advisory Committee on Security and Intelligence - an
appointed three-member body which would submit operations to
continuous review to ensure legality and propriety. It would also
investigate complaints, and report to the Minister and Parliament.
The second fundamental element of review would be a special joint
parliamentary committee. The committee, appointed for the life of a
Parliament, would be the ultimate control on the agency. In
conjunction with the advisory committee it would, on behalf of
Parliament, attempt to ensure that the agency observed its mandate.

D. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act

Immediately after the August 1981 release of the McDonald Commission
Report, the government indicated its acceptance of the most
fundamental recommendation - the creation of a civilian security
service. At the ministry of the Solicitor General, a special
transitional group was established to translate the Commission's
recommendations into legislation.

In May 1983, during the first session of the 32nd Parliament, Bill C-
157 was introduced in the House of Commons. That bill would have
established the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), based
on the framework suggested by the McDonald Commission. The bill also
made substantial and significant alterations and additions to that
framework. Almost immediately, it became the object of critical
comment. It was alleged to be an attack on civil liberties, giving
the proposed service extremely wide powers, insulating the government
from accountability, and failing to institute a precise mandate or a
workable review system. So vehement was public opposition that the
government decided against proceeding to second reading, and instead
referred the subject matter of the bill to a special committee of the
Senate. That committee held hearings throughout the summer of 1983,
exposing a broad cross-section of public opinion on the bill. It
issued its report in November 1983, recommending over 40 changes to
the bill so that, in the words of the committee, there might be "a
more appropriate balance between collective and individual security."

Following the report, Bill C-157 was allowed to die on the order
paper. In the second session of the 32nd Parliament a new Bill, C-9,
was introduced which incorporated virtually all the recommendations
of the Senate Committee. Given first reading in January 1984, Bill C-
9 was referred to the Justice Committee of the House of Commons in
March, passed third reading in June, and was proclaimed in force in
July and August 1984. The legislation, as passed, is virtually
identical to the bill that was introduced in January.

The central provision of the legislation is the definition
of "threats to the security of Canada" in s. 2, which comprises the
basic limit on the activities of the CSIS. The four elements
recommended by the McDonald Commission remain:

espionage or sabotage that is against Canada or is detrimental to
the interests of Canada or activities directed toward or in support
of such espionage or sabotage;

foreign influenced activities within or relating to Canada that are
detrimental to the interests of Canada and are clandestine or
deceptive or involve a threat to any person;

activities within or relating to Canada directed toward or in
support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against
persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political
objective within Canada or a foreign state; and

activities directed toward undermining by covert unlawful acts, or
directed toward or intended ultimately to lead to the destruction or
overthrow by violence of, the constitutionally established system of
government in Canada.

The definition also goes on to stipulate that lawful advocacy,
protest or dissent is not within the scope of threats to security.

The basic function of the service is stated in s. 12 - to
investigate, collect, analyze, and retain information and
intelligence on security threats. Bill C-157 contained a further
provision which expressly permitted the CSIS to "remain informed"
about the current economic, social and political climate, from public
sources of information. That section at first appeared in Bill C-9,
but was eventually deleted as surplusage. By virtue of s. 13, the
CSIS is to provide security assessments with respect to individuals
to be employed in the government. Finally, by s. 16, the CSIS is
given the role of assisting in the collection of "foreign
intelligence," intelligence gained from investigation or surveillance
of persons who are neither Canadian citizens nor permanent residents,
with respect to defence or international affairs. As a result of the
Senate committee's recommendations, this function has been more
sharply focused on non-Canadians, and may only be undertaken at the
written request of the Minister of National Defence or the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, with the consent of the Solicitor General.

Under Part II of the Act (ss. 21-28), the Federal Court may issue
warrants to the service to carry out its functions under ss. 12 and
16. Such warrants allow the full range of investigative techniques to
be used, with the exception of access to confidential census data
maintained by Statistics Canada. The warrant process contains many
safeguards and information requirements that were absent from Bill C-
157, but which were added on the recommendation of the Senate
Committee. Essentially, they parallel the Criminal Code requirements
for warrants to allow electronic surveillance. A one-year limit is
placed on warrants, with the exception of those obtained to
investigate a paragraph (d) threat - subversion - which last only 60
days. This provision was added in the House Justice Committee, a
partial recognition of the McDonald Commission recommendation that
subversion not be the subject of intrusive investigative techniques
at all. All warrants are renewable, on re-application to the court.

The Act assigns management and control of the CSIS to the Director, a
Governor in Council appointee. The Solicitor General is given an
active supervisory role. Originally, Bill C-157 had adopted a model
borrowed from similar Australian legislation, which would have given
the Director the final say on targeting and the release of
information, and would not have given the Minister any operational
role whatsoever; the ostensible purpose of these provisions was to
ensure that the CSIS could not be used for partisan purposes. The
provisions elicited considerable public outcry on the ground that
they reduced the direct political responsibility of the Minister for
the agency in order to avoid a fairly remote danger. They were
roundly criticized by the Senate Committee. The Act provides that the
Minister has an override and must approve all warrant applications.
Another provision of Bill C-157 which aroused criticism was the
defence given to agency employees for such reasonable acts done in
pursuance of their duties as were "reasonably necessary." In the Act,
this is replaced by s. 20, which gives employees the protection
afforded by law to peace officers.

Two aspects of Bill C-157 which survived its revision into the Act
had to do with control and review. The Act establishes the office of
Inspector General (s. 30) and the Security Intelligence Review
Committee (SIRC, s. 34). The former officer, appointed by the
Governor in Council, is to monitor CSIS operations and to report to
the Deputy Solicitor General and the SIRC on the legality and
propriety of those operations. The SIRC is a committee to be composed
of up to five Privy Councillors appointed by the Governor in Council
after consultation by the Prime Minister with opposition leaders in
the House of Commons. It is to conduct a review of CSIS operations
and to report to the Minister and Parliament on them. It also has a
variety of investigative duties. It deals with complaints about CSIS
activities and acts as an appeal board with respect to security
assessments and security-influenced decisions under the Citizenship
and Immigration Acts.

A final aspect of the legislation, which was not dealt with by the
McDonald Commission, is what was formerly Part IV of the Act (ss. 56-
61), now known as the Security Offences Act. This Act addresses
police and prosecutorial authority to deal with security-related
offences. It gives the RCMP "primary responsibility" over the
investigation of such offences, in pursuance of which they may enter
into agreements with other police forces. The Security Offences Act
also gives the federal Attorney General the power to prosecute
security offences and, by fiat, to intervene in, and take over,
provincial prosecutions of such offences. Despite considerable
provincial criticism of the Act as an impingement on a traditional
provincial area of jurisdiction, it remained essentially unchanged as
it went through the legislative process.

E. The Controversial Issues

The legislation which emerged from Parliament is far from being the
product of consensus. Indeed, the committee proceedings and report
stage dealing with Bill C-9 were extremely contentious. Both
opposition parties vociferously opposed fundamental elements of it,
giving voice to substantial public concern.

Perhaps the most fundamental concern had to do with the removal of
the security function from the RCMP and the creation of a civilian
service. Several provincial attorneys general, the Progressive
Conservative party, some civil liberties groups, and, eventually the
New Democratic Party, opposed the change. The principal contention
was that, given a clear mandate and efficient review, the RCMP was
still best equipped to discharge the security function, having
discipline, a long and honourable tradition, an established system of
contacts, and being virtually immune from penetration by foreign
agencies. Others took the position that the defects in the
legislation were so patent that it would be better to maintain the
status quo.

There was also considerable opposition to the mandate given to the
CSIS. This opposition had reference not only to the breadth of the
definition, but to the whole idea of a security agency dealing with
matters such as "subversion" or "foreign influenced activities." The
Canadian Civil Liberties Association, for example, took the position
that there was no need for more than a relatively small agency to
deal with the distinct threats of espionage or sabotage from foreign
nations. Regular law enforcement could deal with the other elements
of threat, when the criminal law was contravened.

The scope of the threats definition is also quite controversial. Some
contend that it is so broadly drafted as to bring within its scope a
variety of acts having nothing to do with true security. The
government took the position that the definition must be read in the
context of those provisions which protect lawful dissent and which
limit the agency to what is "strictly necessary" and in the context
of the new system of monitoring and review. Given this context, it is
said, the definition is reasonable. The "foreign intelligence"
function of the agency (s. 16) is also quite contentious. Many find
it inherently unreasonable to submit foreign nationals to
surveillance if they do not constitute a security threat, but can
merely provide Canada with useful information having to do with
defence or international affairs. Another area of concern is the
scope of the warrant system, which gives the CSIS access to virtually
any investigative technique from surreptitious entry to access to
doctor-patient confidences.

Most of the remainder of the Act is not particularly contentious,
save for two areas having to do with review of the agency. The first
has to do with the access to information by the Inspector General and
the SIRC. Both bodies are given access to all information in the
possession of the CSIS except cabinet documents. These exceptions
(see ss. 31(2) and 39(3)) first appeared in Bill C-157 and have been
almost universally condemned, critics taking the position that the
review bodies should have access to all documents held by the agency
in order to fully discharge their important functions. The Senate
Committee recommended deletion of the exceptions. In the House
Justice Committee, some government members joined the opposition to
vote to remove them. They were, however, restored at report stage in
the House. The government took the position that the cabinet system
requires utmost confidentiality.

The other area is direct parliamentary oversight of the CSIS.
Recommended by McDonald, it was absent from Bill C-157. The Senate
committee had also rejected it as impractical, duplicative of the
SIRC, and subject to weaknesses in preserving secrecy. Both
opposition parties supported the idea of a special parliamentary
committee, with access to agency information, in order that
Parliament could be assured that the CSIS was acting within its
mandate. They were not confident that Parliament would get a full
picture of agency operations from the SIRC, and pointed to the
examples of the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, to
show that such a committee could be workable and successful. The
government was firm on this matter, however, and refused to add
direct parliamentary oversight.

F. 1984 to Present

On 17 August 1987, the Federal Court of Appeal, by a two-to-one
majority, held that the warrant-granting provision of the Canadian
Security Intelligence Service Act (s. 21) is not in violation of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In this case, an individual
(Atwal), accused of involvement in an attack in B.C. on a Punjabi
Cabinet Minister, applied for access to a sworn affidavit in support
of a warrant application in Federal Court. Heald J. on 30 April 1987
upheld s. 21 of the CSIS Act under the Charter and denied access to
the affidavit. On appeal, Mahoney J. and MacGuigan J. not only upheld
s. 21 under the Charter, but reversed Heald J. and allowed access to
the affidavit with the names of CSIS agents and informants deleted.

On 11 September 1987, Mr. T.D. Finn resigned as Director of CSIS and
was replaced by J. Reid Morden, former Assistant Secretary to the
Cabinet for Foreign and Defence Policy. Mr. Finn resigned when it was
revealed in Federal Court that day that the affidavits behind the
warrant in the Atwal case contained inaccuracies and irregularities.

The Solicitor General on 30 November 1987 released the Report of a
three-member independent advisory team chaired by Gordon Osbaldeston,
and announced his acceptance and implementation of its
recommendations. The Report was critical of CSIS and recommended
changes in relation to all facets of the service. More particularly,
criticisms and recommendations were made about the excessive internal
compartmentalization of CSIS operations, inadequate reliance on open
sources, under-developed analytical capacity, lack of clear policy
directives on targeting, the use of human sources and of intrusive
investigative techniques, and inadequate training programs. The
Report urged the re-opening of the CSIS staff college and the
elimination of the Counter Subversion Branch.

On 29 March 1988, the Solicitor General released the SIRC's report to
him of 25 March 1988, on CSIS's use of its investigative powers with
respect to the labour movement. The Committee concluded that neither
Marc André Boivin, one of CSIS's human sources, nor CSIS had targeted
union members or unions for their labour activities as such. The
report was critical of CSIS for retaining Mr. Boivin's services after
they had ceased to be useful, for not having in place a policy to
determine when the use of human sources was reasonably necessary, and
for maintaining, adding to and utilizing R.C.M.P. Security Service
files in a way that may have been beyond the agency's mandate as set
out in the CSIS Act. The report indicated the SIRC'S satisfaction
that both the Solicitor General and the Director of CSIS had moved
expeditiously to deal with these difficulties.

In the Thomson case, an individual (Thomson) had been refused a
position with the Department of Agriculture because of an
unfavourable security assessment by CSIS. He appealed this decision
to SIRC which conducted a hearing and recommended that he be given a
positive security clearance. The Deputy Minister of Agriculture
rejected this recommendation. On 7 March 1988, the Federal Court of
Appeal ruled that because of the statutory structure of the CSIS Act,
the SIRC's recommendations are binding on government. It also ruled
that, because the Deputy Minister of Agriculture was
exercising "administrative" powers, the Federal Court of Appeal did
not have jurisdiction to make a binding ruling in this matter. On 17
June 1988, Dubé J. of the Federal Court, Trial Division, expressed
his respect for the reasoning in the Federal Court of Appeal's obiter
opinion, but declined to follow it. He held that the recommendations
made by the SIRC in security clearance cases are not "decisions" and
hence not binding on government. Dubé J.'s ruling was appealed to the
Federal Court of Appeal. On 17 May 1990, a differently constituted
bench of the Federal Court of Appeal overruled Dubé J.'s decision and
said he was bound by the initial appellate ruling. The Thomson
decision was followed by Joyal J. on 4 October 1990 in the Kwan
Lihuen case, which involved the removal of a security clearance from
a Chinese language translator employed by CSIS. The Supreme Court of
Canada on 25 January 1991 granted leave to appeal in the Thomson
case. In reasons handed down in the Thomson case on 13 February 1992,
the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the SIRC's recommendations in
security clearance cases are not binding on government.

On 26 January 1989, the Federal Court of Appeal rendered its decision
in the Russell case. In this case, an individual (Russell) wanted to
know if he had been the subject of investigation by CSIS. The SIRC
advised Russell that CSIS had done nothing improper or illegal. In a
decision rendered from the Bench, Pratte J.A. ruled that the March
1988 letter from the SIRC to Russell was merely a "report of
findings," not a "decision," and hence not subject to judicial review.

On 9 March 1989, Stephen Ratkai, who had pleaded guilty to charges
under the Official Secrets Act that he had engaged in espionage
activities on behalf of the Soviet Union, was sentenced to nine
years' imprisonment.

On 23 March 1989, Marc André Boivin instituted litigation in the
Federal Court against CSIS, the SIRC and the Solicitor General in
which he claimed damages in the amount of half a million dollars. He
sued CSIS for having revealed his activities on its behalf to the
Sûreté du Québec, and the SIRC for having reported publicly on his
activities without giving him an adequate opportunity to present his
side of the events.

On 15 May 1989, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association initiated
litigation in the Ontario Court (General Division) in which it
requested a judicial declaration that certain provisions of the CSIS
Act were in violation of the Charter of Rights and hence of no force
or effect. Mr. Justice Potts of the Ontario Court (General Division)
rendered a judgment on 16 August 1990 in which he concluded that the
Canadian Civil Liberties Association had legal standing to continue
its litigation. In reasons for judgment released on 25 March 1992,
Mr. Justice Potts ruled that the CSIS Act was not in violation of the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Ontario Court of Appeal, by a 2
to 1 majority, dismissed the Canadian Civil Liberties Association
appeal in a 9 July 1998 decision. The Supreme Court of Canada refused
to grant leave to appeal in this case.

In the Chiarelli case, the Federal Court of Appeal decided on 23
February 1990 that the provision of the CSIS Act that allowed the
SIRC to exclude complainants and their counsel from certain parts of
its hearings was in violation of the Charter of Rights. The Supreme
Court of Canada granted leave to appeal in this case. On 26 March
1992, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the provision of the
CSIS Act allowing the SIRC to exclude complainants and their counsel
from certain parts of hearings was not in violation of the Charter.

On 14 August 1990, the SIRC issued a report and recommendations
involving the Canadian Armed Forces and Ms. M.D. Douglas, a former
member. In this report, the SIRC was critical of the Forces for the
way in which an investigation of Ms. Douglas's sexual orientation had
been carried out and her security clearance withdrawn. Concluding
that Ms. Douglas was not a security risk, it recommended that her
security clearance be restored and that she be reinstated in her
former employment. This decision was appealed to the Federal Court of
Appeal.

PARLIAMENTARY ACTION

A parliamentary role in the oversight of CSIS operations is provided
for in s. 53 of the Act, which stipulates that the Solicitor General
must lay the annual report of the SIRC before Parliament. The
Standing Orders of the House of Commons deem any report required by
law to be tabled in Parliament to be permanently referred to a
committee of the House. For SIRC reports, this is the Standing
Committee on Justice and Human Rights.

Another source of parliamentary input into the assessment of the
legislation are s. 56 of the CSIS Act and s. 7 of the Security
Offences Act, which were recommended by the Senate Committee. These
sections provided that a committee of the House or of the House and
the Senate was to conduct a review of the operation of the Acts
within five years of their coming into force. That committee was to
make a report, which would include "a statement of any changes" it
recommended. The House of Commons set up a Special Committee on 27
June 1989 to conduct a review of the CSIS Act and the Security
Offences Act. That Committee reported its findings and 117
recommendations on 24 September 1990.

The Committee's report, entitled In Flux but not in Crisis, generally
concluded that the Canadian security and intelligence system was
sound and that any reforms should be based on the continuation and
extension of already-established institutions. Its recommendations
dealt with the definition of mandates, labour relations and human
resources, the review roles of the Inspector General and the SIRC,
the complaints roles of the SIRC and the RCMP Public Complaints
Commission, and the establishment of a parliamentary sub-committee to
monitor and review the security and intelligence community. The
Committee called upon the government to respond to its report and
recommendations within 150 days.

The government tabled its response, entitled On Course: National
Security for the 1990's, on 25 February 1991. The government set out
its belief that legislative changes in the CSIS Act and the Security
Offences Act were not needed. It further asserted that it was
unwilling at that time to contemplate structural changes to the
national security model in place. The response did undertake that,
starting in 1992, the Solicitor General would at the time of tabling
of Main Estimates also provide Parliament with a statement of
national security issues facing Canada. This statement was to be
accompanied by a public Annual Report, by the Director of CSIS, which
would discuss the "threat environment." The government accepted the
Committee recommendation that there be another parliamentary review
of the CSIS Act and the Security Offences Act, and undertook to
arrange for it to begin in 1998.

On 26 February 1991, a debate was held on an Opposition motion that
the House of Commons concur in the Committee's report "In Flux but
not in Crisis." The House adjourned that day without coming to a vote.

The House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Solicitor
General, pursuant to a recommendation made in "In Flux but not in
Crisis," established on 13 June 1991 a permanent Sub-Committee on
National Security. The Sub-Committee held its first meeting on 18
June 1991.

In fulfillment of a commitment made by the government in "On Course:
National Security for the 1990's," the Solicitor General made his
first Annual Statement on National Security and tabled the CSIS
Director's first Public Report in the House of Commons on 19 March
1992.

The Solicitor General on 11 April 1994 made his Annual Statement on
National Security and at the same time tabled in the House of Commons
the CSIS Director's Public Report 1993. Two days later, on 13 April
1994, the Solicitor General, during an appearance on Main Estimates
before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Legal
Affairs, provided for the first time a three-figure breakdown of
CSIS's budget. Under the 1994-95 Main Estimates, CSIS was to be
allocated $206,834,000, to be made up of $115,454,000 for personnel,
$17,196,000 for construction or land acquisition, and $74,184,000 for
other subsidies and payments. These budgetary details were made
public for the first time.

The House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs
on 3 May 1994 adopted a motion re-establishing a Sub-Committee on
National Security.

On 14 August 1994, there were public allegations that a CSIS human
source, Grant Bristow, had played a prominent role in the
establishment and activities of the Heritage Front. That day, the
SIRC undertook to investigate these and related public allegations.
Because of subsequent public developments, the House of Commons Sub-
Committee on National Security on 29 August 1994 announced that it
would be investigating these events.

The SIRC Report to the Solicitor General on CSIS's involvement in the
Heritage Front was released by the Minister on 15 December 1994. The
report confirmed that CSIS had had a human source within the Heritage
Front who had been properly targeted and had provided valuable
security intelligence. It concluded that the source, whom it did not
identify, had played a support, rather than a leadership, role in the
founding and running of the Heritage Front. It also concluded, after
lengthy consideration, that many of the public allegations were
either exaggerated or untrue, though it expressed some concern about
the "borderline" activities of the source. The SIRC recommended that
more complete policy guidance be developed for the placement and
control of CSIS human sources.

On 16 December 1994, members of SIRC appeared before the House of
Commons Sub-Committee on National Security to answer questions about
the report on CSIS and the Heritage Front.

On 28 March 1995, the Solicitor General made his Annual Statement on
National Security and at the same time tabled in the House of Commons
the CSIS Director's Public Report 1994. For the first time, the
Public Report contained a Program Outlook covering the period until
the end of the 1997-98 fiscal year. This document projected that
CSIS's budget would decline from $207 million to $159 million and its
personnel component from 2,366 Full Time Equivalents (FTEs) to 2,021.

The House of Commons Sub-Committee on National Security tabled its
report on document and personnel security on 4 October 1995. Its five
recommendations proposed that the Government Security Policy be
strengthened and that it be extended to Ministers' offices. In its 28
February 1996 response to the report, the Government accepted the
thrust of the Sub-Committee's recommendations.

On 19 June 1996, the House of Commons Sub-Committee on National
Security tabled its Report on the "Heritage Front Affair." The Sub-
Committee released a majority report, a joint dissenting opinion, and
two dissenting opinions, based on its review of the December 1994
SIRC Report on these matters

On 1 August 1996, Heald J. of the Federal Court ruled in Zundel that
there was well-founded apprehension of bias in relation to the SIRC's
consideration of a citizenship case of a person on whom it had
commented adversely in its Heritage Front Affair Report. This
decision was appealed by the government to the Federal Court of
Appeal. In the meantime, Bill C-84, amending the Citizenship Act and
the Immigration Act to provide an alternative process in situations
analogous to that in Zundel, was passed by the House of Commons and
the Senate, and received Royal Assent on 25 April 1997. The Federal
Court of Appeal on 27 November 1997 reversed Heald J's decision in
Zundel. On 30 April 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada denied leave to
appeal in the case.

CHRONOLOGY

1946 - With the increase of security functions assigned to the RCMP,
personnel working in that area were for the first time
organizationally separated from the Criminal Investigations Branch
into the Special Branch.

1956 - The Special Branch was elevated to the Directorate level
within the RCMP, under the command of an Assistant Commissioner.

1969 - The Royal Commission on Security recommended creation of a
civilian security agency. The government decided against this, but
promised to make the Special Branch more separate and increase the
civilian staff.

1970 - The Special Branch became the Security Service, under the
direction of a civilian Director General, Mr. John Starnes.

October 1970 - James Cross was kidnapped; Pierre Laporte was
kidnapped and murdered. The War Measures Act was proclaimed.

1971-74 - Particularly, but not exclusively, in Quebec, the Security
Service undertook a series of acts, many apparently illegal, to
neutralize radical and separatist groups.

27 March 1975 - The federal cabinet issued a directive governing the
operations of the Security Service. It remained secret until 1978.

30 March 1976 - Cpl. R. Samson, on trial for an unrelated incident,
revealed his participation in Operation Bricole in 1972 (a break-in
and theft of files).

June 1977 - Former Security Service staff-sergeant Donald McCleery
revealed to officials from the Department of Justice the details of
other operations, including Operation Ham (the break-in and theft of
PQ membership lists).

6 July 1977 - Solicitor General Fox announced the appointment of Mr.
Justice D.C. McDonald to head a commission of inquiry into the
allegations of RCMP wrongdoing.

June 1981 - Following the report of its own inquiry, the government
of Quebec laid charges against 17 current or former RCMP members.

25 August 1981 - The final report of the McDonald Commission was made
public.

18 May 1983 - Bill C-157 was given first reading in the House of
Commons during the 1st Session of the 32nd Parliament.

29 June 1983 - The subject matter of Bill C-157 was referred to a
special committee of the Senate, which in its November report
recommended substantial amendment of the bill.

18 January 1984 - Bill C-9 was given first reading in the House of
Commons during the 2nd Session of the 32nd Parliament. The bill
incorporated most of the changes recommended by the Senate Committee.

21 June 1984 - After three months in committee, Bill C-9 was given
third reading and passed by the House. Shortly thereafter it was
passed by the Senate.

16 July 1984 - All but Part II of the CSIS Act was proclaimed in
force.

31 August 1984 - Part II of the CSIS Act, which deals with warrants,
was proclaimed in force.

29 November 1984 - The first members of the SIRC were appointed,
under the chairmanship of Ronald Atkey, a former Conservative cabinet
minister.

15 February 1985 - Richard Gosse, former deputy attorney general of
Saskatchewan, was appointed first Inspector General under the CSIS
Act.

22 July 1987 - The Solicitor General announced the establishment of a
three-member independent advisory team to report by 30 October 1987
on the implementation of the SIRC's recommendations concerning
counter-subversion and civilianization.

30 July 1987 - The Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and the
Public Safety released its Report.

11 September 1987 - T.D. Finn resigned as first Director of CSIS and
was replaced by J. Reid Morden.

30 November 1987 - The Solicitor General released the independent
advisory team's report and announced his acceptance of its
recommendations.

29 March 1988 - The SIRC issued its Special Report on CSIS activities
in relation to the labour movement and on the actions of Marc André
Boivin.

27 June 1989 - The House of Commons established a Special Committee
to conduct the five-year review of the provisions and operation of
the CSIS Act and the Security Offences Act. This Committee was to
report by 16 July 1990.

28 June 1989 - The Special Committee of the Senate on Terrorism and
Public Safety tabled its second and final report.

24 September 1990 - The House of Commons Special Committee on the
Review of the CSIS Act and the Security Offences Act tabled its
report entitled In Flux but not in Crisis."

25 February 1991 - The government tabled "On Course: National
Security for the 1990's," its response to the Report of the House of
Commons Special Committee on the Review of the CSIS Act and the
Security Offences Act.

26 February 1991 - A debate on a concurrence motion in the Report of
the Special Committee on the Review of the CSIS Act and the Security
Offences Act was held in the House of Commons.

13 June 1991 - The House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and
Solicitor General established a Sub-Committee on National Security.

18 June 1991 - The Sub-Committee on National Security met for the
first time.

3 May 1994 - The House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and
Legal Affairs adopted a motion re-establishing its Sub-Committee on
National Security.

14-29 August 1994 - A number of public allegations were made about
the role of a CSIS human source, Grant Bristow, in the establishment
and activities of the Heritage Front. The SIRC decided to investigate
public allegations concerning CSIS and the Heritage Front.

29 August 1994 - The House of Commons Sub-Committee on National
Security announced an investigation into public allegations of a CSIS-
Heritage Front link.

15 December 1994 - The SIRC Report on CSIS's activities within the
Heritage Front was made public by the Solicitor General.

4 October 1995 - The House of Commons Sub-Committee on National
Security tabled its Report Document and Personnel Security.

19 June 1996 - The House of Commons Sub-Committee on National
Security tabled its Report on the Heritage Front Affair.

1 August 1996 - Heald J. of the Federal Court rendered his judgment
in Zundel.

25 April 1997 - Bill C-84 received Royal Assent.

3 October 1997 - McGillis J. of the Federal Court rendered a judgment
critical of attempts by CSIS to include "visitors clauses" in
warrants for security intelligence investigations.

27 November 1997 - The Federal Court of Appeal reversed Heald J's
decision in Zundel. The Supreme Court of Canada later denied leave to
appeal.

26 March 1998 - The Senate established a Special Committee on
Security and Intelligence which was to report in the fall of 1998.

9 July 1998 - The Ontario Court of Appeal, by a 2-1 majority,
dismissed the appeal in the Canadian Civil Liberties Association
case. The Supreme Court of Canada later denied leave to appeal.

January 1999 - The Senate Special Committee on Security and
Intelligence tabled its report.

November 1999 - Media accounts contained reports of theft and
mishandling of confidential CSIS documents.

16 December 1999 - The Solicitor General made the Annual Statement on
National Security in the House of Commons and responded to the Report
of the Senate Special Committee on Security and Intelligence.

SELECTED REFERENCES

Atkey, Ronald G., "Reconciling Freedom of Expression and National
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Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on the Review of the CSIS
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Crisis. Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, 1990.

Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Legal
Affairs, Sub-Committee on National Security. Document and Personnel
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1996.

Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Legal
Affairs, Sub-Committee on National Security. The Heritage Front
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19 June 1996.

Canada. Report of the Royal Commission on Security. Queen's Printer,
Ottawa, 1969.

Canada, Senate Special Committee. Delicate Balance: A Security
Intelligence Service in a Democratic Society. Supply and Services
Canada, Ottawa, November 1983.

Canada, Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety.
Report. Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, 1987.

Canada, Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety.
Second and Final Report. Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, 1989.

Canada, Senate Special Committee on Security and Intelligence.
Report. Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, 1999.

Canada, Solicitor General. On Course: National Security for the
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Commons Special Committee on the Review of the CSIS Act and the
Security Offenders Act. Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, February
1991.

Canada, Solicitor General. People and Process in Transition: Report
to the Solicitor General by the Independent Advisory Team on The
Canadian Security Intelligence Service. Communications Group,
Ministry Secretariat, Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, October
1987.

Canadian Security Intelligence Service. Public Reports (1991 to
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Cleroux, Richard. Official Secrets: The Story Behind the Canadian
Security Intelligence Service. McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Toronto, 1990.

Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the RCMP.
Second Report - Freedom and Security Under the Law. Ottawa, 1981.

Eddy, Troy Andrew. The Politics of Intelligence: A Study of Factors
Influencing Canada's Security and Intelligence Network: Requirements
versus Capabilities. M.A. Thesis, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova
Scotia, August 1991.

Farson, A. Stuart. "Accountable and Prepared? Reorganizing Canada's
Intelligence Community for the 21st Century." Canadian Foreign
Policy, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1993, p. 43-66.

Farson, A. Stuart. David Stafford and Wesley K. Wark, (eds.).
Security and Intelligence in a Changing World: New Perspectives for
the 1990's. Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., London, England, 1991.

Farson, A. Stuart. "In Crisis and In Flux?: Politics, Parliament and
Canada's Intelligence Policy." Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. 16,
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Farson, A. Stuart. "Is Canadian Intelligence Being Re-Invented?"
Canadian Foreign Policy, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1999, p. 49-83.

Finn, T. D'Arcy. "Does Canada Need a Foreign Intelligence Service?"
Canadian Foreign Policy, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1993, p. 149-162.

Franks, C.E.S. (ed.). Dissent and the State. Oxford University
Press, Toronto, 1989.

Granatstein, J.L. and David Stafford. Spy Wars: Espionage and Canada
from Gouzenko to Glasnost. Key Porter Books, Toronto, 1990.

Hanks, Peter and John D. McCamus (eds.). National Security:
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éditions Yvon Blais Inc., Cowansville, Quebec, 1989.

Hensler, Alistair. "Canadian Intelligence: An Insider's Perspective."
Canadian Foreign Policy, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1999, p. 127-132.

Hensler, Alistair. "Creating a Canadian Foreign Intelligence
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Kilgour, David. Betrayal: The Spy Canada Abandoned. Prentice-Hall
Canada Inc., Scarborough, Ontario, 1994.

Krieber, Janine. "La démocratie du secret: le contrôle des activités
de renseignement au Canada." 13 Politique, 1988, p. 37-62.

Leigh, Ian. "Secret Proceedings in Canada." (1996) Osgoode Hall Law
Journal, Vol. 34, No. 1. 113-173.

Lester, Normand. Enquête sur les services secrets. Les Éditions de
L'homme, Montreal, 1998.

Potter, Evan, (Ed.). Economic Intelligence and National Security.
Carleton University Press, Ottawa, 1998.

Prados, Alfred B. and Richard A. Best Jr. Intelligence Oversight in
Selected Democracies. Congressional Research Service, Library of
Congress, Washington D.C., 21 September 1990.

Rosen, Philip. The Communications Security Establishment: Canada's
Most Secret Intelligence Agency. BP-343E, Research Branch, Library of
Parliament, Ottawa, September 1993.

Saltstone, Scot P. "Some Consequences of the Failure to Define the
Phrase "`National Security'" Conflict Quarterly, Vol. 11, 1991, p. 36-
54.

Security Intelligence Review Committee. Annual Reports (1985-86 to
1998-99). Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa.

Security Intelligence Review Committee. The Heritage Front Affair:
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1994, released by the Solicitor General on 15 December 1994.

Security Intelligence Review Committee. Section 54 Report to the
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with Respect to the Labour Movement. Mimeo dated 25 March 1988,
released by the Solicitor General on 29 March 1988.

Shulsky, Abram N. Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of
Intelligence. Brassey's (U.S.) Ltd., McLean, Virginia, 1991.

Starnes, John. Closely Guarded: A Life in Canadian Security and
Intelligence. University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1998.

Weller, Geoffrey R. "Comparing Western Inspectors General of
Intelligence and Security." International Journal of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence, 1996-97, Vol. 9, No. 4, p. 383-406.

Whitaker, Reg and Gary Marcuse. Cold War Canada: The Making of a
National Insecurity State 1945-57. University of Toronto Press,
Toronto, 1994.

Whitaker, Reg. "Security and Intelligence in a Cold Climate," in: How
Ottawa Spends - 1996-1997, Carleton University Press, Ottawa, 1996,
pp. 409-441.

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* The original version of this Current Issue Review was published in
September 1984; the paper has regularly been updated since that time.

[Rontus Mekora]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paranoid_personality_disorder

[Marriage Hole SODDI]

Hoodlums?

I prefer hooligans, it's jauntier.