Enactive Cognition
Nikolaus Maack
he'll grant me one.
From: http://www.magneticfields.org/contested/one/page15.html
-------
An Enactive Cognition Primer
(the way things are)
The basic principles of enactive cognitive science as described by
Francisco Varela, et. al., in The Embodied Mind:
Question 1: What is cognition?
Answer: Enaction: A history of structural coupling that brings forth a world.
Question 2: How does it work?
Answer: Through a network consisting of multiple levels of
interconnected, sensorimotor subnetworks.
Question 3: How do I know when a cognitive system is functioning adequately?
Answer: When it becomes part of an ongoing existing world (as the young
of every species do) or shapes a new one (as happens in evolutionary history).
-----
I think the answer to question two pretty much says it all. Cognition is
a network of processing systems. Fine. Of course, some of those systems
exist in the conscious realm, some in the subconscious realm. Focussing
on the fact that these systems are united as one -- a network -- does not
change their status. Some are conscious, some are subconscious.
What Barrett seems to suggest -- in previous discussions, and in the above
-- is that by networking a subconscious system with a conscious system,
you no longer have either. While wholes are greater than the sum of their
parts, and there is certainly overlap between both systems, it is clear
that we can demonstrate that some material inside our heads is outside our
conscious awareness. Ergo, subconscious material exists.
Ignoring this is the equivalent of networking an IBM computer with a MAC
computer -- if such a thing can be done -- and then insisting that the
result eliminates the existence of BOTH. What we have now is a IMBAMC? I
don't think so.
Nik
--
Every good piece of art kills something soft and small.
The Nik Maack Art Gallery
http://www.nikart.com
barrett john erickson
"Nikolaus Maack" <ac...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA> wrote in message
news:8idg86$osi$1...@freenet9.carleton.ca...
> [...]
> I think the answer to question two pretty much says it all. Cognition is
> a network of processing systems. Fine. Of course, some of those systems
> exist in the conscious realm, some in the subconscious realm. Focussing
> on the fact that these systems are united as one -- a network -- does not
> change their status. Some are conscious, some are subconscious.
>
> What Barrett seems to suggest -- in previous discussions, and in the above
> -- is that by networking a subconscious system with a conscious system,
> you no longer have either. While wholes are greater than the sum of their
> parts, and there is certainly overlap between both systems, it is clear
> that we can demonstrate that some material inside our heads is outside our
> conscious awareness. Ergo, subconscious material exists.
>
> Ignoring this is the equivalent of networking an IBM computer with a MAC
> computer -- if such a thing can be done -- and then insisting that the
> result eliminates the existence of BOTH. What we have now is a IMBAMC? I
> don't think so.
first, you don't appear to be understanding the scope of the term
"cognition" in Varela's (and my) usage.
but more to the point:
what i have and do suggest is that you begin with an attempt to explore and
understand the general process of cognition _as it is revealed through our
experience_ (phenomenology), rather beginning with your _assumptions_ about
that experience (i.e. "that some of those systems exist in the conscious
realm, some in the subconscious realm").
challenge your premise.
if one approaches the subject phenomenologically, as Varela did, there is no
need to posit a "subconscious".
-- barrett
BLUE FEATHERS #3 is now available
http://www.MagneticFields.org/blue/
bar...@MagneticFields.org
http://www.MagneticFields.org/
surrealists in minnesota
Sur...@MagneticFields.org
==============================================
"Everything tends to make us believe that there exists a
certain point of the mind at which life and death, the real and
the imagined, past and future, the communicable and the
incommunicable, high and low, cease to be perceived as
contradictions."
...André Breton
==============================================
Nikolaus Maack
> if one approaches the subject phenomenologically, as Varela did, there is no
> need to posit a "subconscious".
If I approach vision from a purely phenomenological way, there is no blind
spot. That doesn't change the fact that we all have a blind spot in our
vision.
barrett john erickson
> "barrett john erickson" (bar...@magneticfields.org) writes:
> > if one approaches the subject phenomenologically, as Varela did, there
is no
> > need to posit a "subconscious".
>
> If I approach vision from a purely phenomenological way, there is no blind
> spot. That doesn't change the fact that we all have a blind spot in our
> vision.
incorrect.
we know about the "blind spot" because of real experience (experiments
conducted).
Nikolaus Maack
> incorrect.
> we know about the "blind spot" because of real experience (experiments
> conducted).
We know about thinking processes outside our conscious control -- the
subconscious -- for the same reason. Experiments point to the idea that
we don't always know what we know, and that sometimes we process
information and learn without being aware of it. We base our thinking on
old patterns, not even noticing that we do it. We think we're acting at
random, when in fact there is a clear, underlying pattern.
Jesus -- this makes no sense. Why am I in the odd position of explaining
the existence of the subconscious to a surrealist? You should be well
aware of its existence. After all, it is the BASIS for the surrealist
movement.
barrett john erickson
> "barrett john erickson" (bar...@magneticfields.org) writes:
> > incorrect.
> > we know about the "blind spot" because of real experience (experiments
> > conducted).
>
> We know about thinking processes outside our conscious control -- the
> subconscious -- for the same reason. Experiments point to the idea that
> we don't always know what we know, and that sometimes we process
> information and learn without being aware of it. We base our thinking on
> old patterns, not even noticing that we do it. We think we're acting at
> random, when in fact there is a clear, underlying pattern.
you have yet to say _anything_ that requires that we segregate some protion
of our cognitive process for separate consideration as the "subconscious".
you begin at the wrong end -- with your (received) assumptions about human
"thinking processes" -- rather than investigate the process of cognition as
it is actually experienced and observed in various species.
[even more blatant hint: pay attention to the most fundamental biology of
cognitive processes -- in other species as well as our own. "conscious
control" (for that matter, "consciousness" as you employ the term) doesn't
enter into the picture until very late in the evolution/investigation and
there is no need to call anything that existed before it a "subconscious".]
> Jesus -- this makes no sense. Why am I in the odd position of explaining
> the existence of the subconscious to a surrealist? You should be well
> aware of its existence. After all, it is the BASIS for the surrealist
> movement.
the "BASIS" of the surrealist movement was/is the desire to release the
imagination from restraint and integrate it into every day living.
that the early surrealists went looking for the imagination in the
"subconscious" was simply a consequence of the way scientists and
philosophers of their time organized their understanding of cognitive
processes (the prevailing scientific view having embraced a mind/body
dichotomy and finding no better way to account for dreams and other actions
and processes that we seemed not to be specifically "aware" of at the
time -- i.e., processes of cognition that lacked the element of
reflexivity). if the scientific culture of the time was convincingly
supporting the theory that the imagination was a function of the large
intestine, early surrealist games would've been quite different.
surrealists have always been "of their time".
today (if we take the trouble) _our_ time allows us to understand the
cognitive processes differently and look for the imagination were today's
cognitive science says we're more likely to find it.
Nikolaus Maack
> you have yet to say _anything_ that requires that we segregate some protion
> of our cognitive process for separate consideration as the "subconscious".
You have yet to comment on the experiment I described, which indicates
that there is a portion of our minds that is capable of doing complex
problem solving, without us even being aware that we are doing it. If
there is some way to describe the results of this experiment without
discussing the "subconscious", I would certainly like to hear about it
from you.
> you begin at the wrong end -- with your (received) assumptions about human
> "thinking processes" -- rather than investigate the process of cognition as
> it is actually experienced and observed in various species.
Barrett, you're confused about how I think. I am using the word
"subconscious" as an adjective, not a noun. There are "subconscious"
processes. Some of these processes are a direct result of how our brains
work. We form patterns in our minds -- neural networks -- that we then
over-generalize without even noticing it. I apply the mother pattern to
the quest for a lover event. Why? Giving in to those patterns without
being aware of it is a "subconscious process". It is a way of thinking
that is outside our own awareness.
Looking at the way humans process information, they often make connections
without being aware of it. Advertising is a good example. We learn to
associate a certain product with happiness. Unless you consciously choose
to note the way advertising manipulates, it will act on you
subconsciously. Even if you are aware that, yes, Nike is trying to sell
me shoes, you will STILL process the information in a meaningful way,
retaining it inside your skull.
> [even more blatant hint: pay attention to the most fundamental biology of
> cognitive processes -- in other species as well as our own. "conscious
> control" (for that matter, "consciousness" as you employ the term) doesn't
> enter into the picture until very late in the evolution/investigation and
> there is no need to call anything that existed before it a "subconscious".]
This is true. However, when describing the experience of a human mind, it
is useful to make reference to those processes outside of "consciousness"
with a name. Far too many people assume that the conscious mind -- the
logical, problem solving, neocortex -- is who humans are. Over-emphasis
is laid on this thin rind of brain that coats the animal brain that we
are.
We are mostly irrational, animal creatures who want to eat and fuck and
kill and love. The stripe of conscious brain on top of that spends most
of its time -- in our society -- denying the other parts. Human brains
split themselves constantly.
If you'd prefer me to call these animal processes "the animal brain"
instead of "the subconscious" when discussing the mind in this particular
context, I have no problem with that.
But even the neocortex has an "outside of consciousness" aspect to it,
where a problem is solved without the mind being consciously aware of it.
You do ackowledge this, right? That we can process information without
being aware of it? If this is true, what do you suggest we refer to this
process as? If not "subconscious", then, what? If it is the word that
offends you, give me a better one.
> today (if we take the trouble) _our_ time allows us to understand the
> cognitive processes differently and look for the imagination were today's
> cognitive science says we're more likely to find it.
Can you describe how your particular view of brain structure informs your
understanding of surrealist theory?
I personally see a lot of people that deny their irrationality, their
animal nature, their primitive brains, who deny the thinking processes
that go on outside of their conscious awareness. I see people who claim
to be HYPER RATIONAL. (Usually they are skeptic atheists.) Nothing, they
claim, gets by them, because they use logic and reason to approach the
world.
I would hate to think you are one of these people. Are you?
Point out to these people that they are irrational -- which is fairly easy
to do -- and they writhe in pain. My buddhist friend Andrew spends his
days trying to show people where they are irrational. His favorite
subject -- child molestation.
"Why is molesting children wrong?" he asks.
This causes people to start hooting and hollering and jumping up and down.
It's wrong because it's wrong because it's bad because it's wrong
because... They have no conscious reason for saying that it's wrong --
they just know it is. They just KNOW it.
Andrew points out that there ARE good reasons not to have sex with
children, but that most people have never thought about it. They have
swallowed a societal taboo without thinking, without processing. They
were programmed. In other words, they are irrational.
I have a friend I will call George who is, to say the least, terrified of
his own sexuality. When we were at the art gallery, he saw sculptures of
nudes and covered his face in embarrassment and blushed. A friend and I
tried to talk to George about this, and while he admitted this
embarrassment and shame in relation to sex, he couldn't even bring himself
to discuss WHY he felt this way. It was too painful for him.
We push things out of our conscious mind all the time. "I don't want to
think about it," and SHOVE, it's gone. We're still aware of it on some
level -- we act as though we know about it -- but we're not "aware" of it.
Where is that information? Where did it go? Would it be safe to say it
is now "subconscious" material?
I have friends who admit to disassociative states. Certain subject
matters, when talked about, cause their brains to panic. With George it's
sex. With other friends, other subjects. The minds doesn't WANT to talk
about it, so it shimmers and trembles and tries to make them angry or
scared, and they feel a strange ghostliness, like they're watching
themselves act from a great distance. Their mind fights not to think on
the subject. Why? What does this mean?
To me, these are experiential signs of "subconscious" material. This is
where I am coming from, with my approach to the human mind. I see people
all day, every day, desperate to deny who and what they are. They swallow
down selves, they separate themselves from fear. They deny, they
disassociate, they panic.
At the same time, I know I must have these same processes going on in my
own head -- denial, fear, evasion, irrationality. I don't know what
topics I am doing this with. It's difficult to tell, but I struggle to
understand myself, to dig out the information that tries to hide.
I have digressed, sort of.
I don't see you struggling with the same material as me, Barrett, the same
issues. You project this cold, intellectual, brain chemistry self. I
don't know how you see the mind, but I see it as a messy, evasive,
denying, irrational thing that fights with itself constantly.
"I want to know -- no! No, I don't! Yes, I do. What am I afraid of?
No, don't tell me! I don't want to think about it. Yes, I do! Tell me!
No, no, leave me alone."
Many people fear this irrational mind and deny its existence. They hate
these processes and swear up and down that they are not held under their
sway. People claim to be hyper rational. Again, let me ask you -- are
you such a person?
barrett john erickson
> "barrett john erickson" (bar...@magneticfields.org) writes:
> > you have yet to say _anything_ that requires that we segregate some
protion
> > of our cognitive process for separate consideration as the
"subconscious".
>
> You have yet to comment on the experiment I described, which indicates
> that there is a portion of our minds that is capable of doing complex
> problem solving, without us even being aware that we are doing it. If
> there is some way to describe the results of this experiment without
> discussing the "subconscious", I would certainly like to hear about it
> from you.
>
> > you begin at the wrong end -- with your (received) assumptions about
human
> > "thinking processes" -- rather than investigate the process of cognition
as
> > it is actually experienced and observed in various species.
>
> Barrett, you're confused about how I think. I am using the word
> "subconscious" as an adjective, not a noun. There are "subconscious"
> processes. Some of these processes are a direct result of how our brains
> work. We form patterns in our minds -- neural networks -- that we then
> over-generalize without even noticing it. I apply the mother pattern to
> the quest for a lover event. Why? Giving in to those patterns without
> being aware of it is a "subconscious process". It is a way of thinking
> that is outside our own awareness.
for purposes of understanding enactive cognition, cognitive processes might
be thought of in terms of deeply embedded "layers" of varying complexity.
but it's important to understand that this is just another metaphor to
assist in explanation. these are interactive processes that can _only_ be
understood in their complete interactive contexts as revealed by our
experience (including experimental observation) which is also deeply
embedded in these cognitive processes.
it is also important to understand cognition as an active rather than a
passive process.
_all_ cognitive action realizes experience -- i.e., transforms latent
reality into reality-as-experienced -- through the structural changes that
occur during the process of cognitive exploration (we change even as we
change what we explore). as i've said many times, this can be thought of as
the equivalent of the quantum measurement that _determines_ the physical
attributes of the quanta during the measurement process in keeping with
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle.
in more evolved life forms, the most basic "layers" of cognitive action are
monitored by more complex "layers". these amount to "feedback loops"
regulating and coordinating complex cognitive activity.
at some point along our evolutionary path a kind of recognition that
cognitive processes have become organized into identifiable self-sustaining
(as opposed to isolated individual) systems emerged along with "feedback
loops" that helped stabolize these systems (and eventually lead to our sense
of "self", reason, imagination, etc.).
all cognitive evolution is driven by the system's (autopoietic) efforts to
develop "feedback" processes that stabolize and organize ever more complex
cognitive activity.
no cognitive activity can be rightly said to be "outside of our own
awareness" because all cognitive action is essentially the same ("a
structural coupling that brings forth a world") _and part of the same
indivisible system_. what we _can_ say is that some cognitive activity is
not currently being monitored by a "higher layer" of cognitive activity
(i.e. it has no reflexive dimension, and is therefore not under observation
by that sense of "self").
[this may sound like the same thing, and i wouldn't place much importance on
this point in a different conversation, but your wording and usage implies a
far more limited definition of cognition than is necessary to understand the
enactive cognitive model and thus becomes important in this context.]
this does not make that activity "unconscious" or "subconscious". there is
just no need to make such a designation because the "difference" is not
between it and some other cognitive act, but only that it is not being
"monitored" while another is.
as for your example...
as the experiment indicates, the specific "high level" cognitive process of
organizing information -- finding patterns -- is working the same whether or
not it is monitored by the "higer level" cognitive process that gives rise
to our ability to create explanations for our behavior.
and it is important to note that _all_ such explanations are just that:
explanations of (cognitive) actions already taken.
to designate some cognitive activities "subconscious" and others "conscious"
based solely on the quirks (or even "failure") of a monitoring process's
attempts to explain/rationalize them is like claiming there is are
significant qualitative differences in a single object that two people
describe differently.
> [...]
> > [even more blatant hint: pay attention to the most fundamental biology
of
> > cognitive processes -- in other species as well as our own. "conscious
> > control" (for that matter, "consciousness" as you employ the term)
doesn't
> > enter into the picture until very late in the evolution/investigation
and
> > there is no need to call anything that existed before it a
"subconscious".]
>
> This is true. However, when describing the experience of a human mind, it
> is useful to make reference to those processes outside of "consciousness"
> with a name. Far too many people assume that the conscious mind -- the
> logical, problem solving, neocortex -- is who humans are. Over-emphasis
> is laid on this thin rind of brain that coats the animal brain that we
> are.
the point i'm trying to make is that it is quite the opposite of "useful" to
do this today. it shifts attention away from the implications of our actual
evolutionary history (which implies, for instance, that the imagination is
our most evovled "sense").
as you do here:
>
> We are mostly irrational, animal creatures who want to eat and fuck and
> kill and love. The stripe of conscious brain on top of that spends most
> of its time -- in our society -- denying the other parts. Human brains
> split themselves constantly.
>
> If you'd prefer me to call these animal processes "the animal brain"
> instead of "the subconscious" when discussing the mind in this particular
> context, I have no problem with that.
these are not the workings of a more primitive cognition. they are the
workings of our current cognitive system. your statements imply a lesser
status (in evolutionary terms) for "the animal brain" or "subconscious", but
much of what gets attributed to this "lesser" realm (certainly by others if
not by you) is the spontaneous working of the imagination, our _most
evolved_ cognitive process.
and that "stripe of conscious brain on top of that spends most of its
time -- in our society -- denying the other parts" is not a _higher_ form of
cognitive activity than the imagination (it isn't even superior to the
"animal brain" for that matter, simply more complex).
>
> But even the neocortex has an "outside of consciousness" aspect to it,
> where a problem is solved without the mind being consciously aware of it.
> You do ackowledge this, right? That we can process information without
> being aware of it? If this is true, what do you suggest we refer to this
> process as? If not "subconscious", then, what? If it is the word that
> offends you, give me a better one.
you see the convolutions you must go through to deal with a very simple
concept?
you might also say that there is an "inside of consciousness" aspect to the
acts you ascribe to the "animal brain" (aka, "subconscious"). so now we
have a disembodied "subconscious" and the implication is again that there
must be some kind of "inside" or "outside of consciousness" attribute to be
found in the cognitive act itself (each "individual" cognitive act!) -- as
if it were possible to non-destructively disect the cognitive process so
that any specific cognitive act could be considered outside of the overall
context of its embodied interactions.
but it's all the same process. there is merely the presence or absence of
attention from the complex monitoring activity from which the "self"
emerges.
>
> > today (if we take the trouble) _our_ time allows us to understand the
> > cognitive processes differently and look for the imagination were
today's
> > cognitive science says we're more likely to find it.
>
> Can you describe how your particular view of brain structure informs your
> understanding of surrealist theory?
it should be obvious from my previous statements.
the imagination appears to be our most evolved sense. as such, the
significance of the surrealist project takes on evolutionary importance for
the species as well as personal importance in our current social context.
as i say on the web site:
the poetry to be found in the most imaginative scientific research of our
day, when extended, converges on paths long walked by surrealists.
>
> I personally see a lot of people that deny their irrationality, their
> animal nature, their primitive brains, who deny the thinking processes
> that go on outside of their conscious awareness. I see people who claim
> to be HYPER RATIONAL. (Usually they are skeptic atheists.) Nothing, they
> claim, gets by them, because they use logic and reason to approach the
> world.
> [...]
> I don't see you struggling with the same material as me, Barrett, the same
> issues. You project this cold, intellectual, brain chemistry self. I
> don't know how you see the mind, but I see it as a messy, evasive,
> denying, irrational thing that fights with itself constantly.
> [...]
> Many people fear this irrational mind and deny its existence. They hate
> these processes and swear up and down that they are not held under their
> sway. People claim to be hyper rational. Again, let me ask you -- are
> you such a person?
http://www.magneticfields.org/sky/aarc/aav20.html
http://www.magneticfields.org/sky/aarc/aarcmain.html
ac...@freenet.carleton.ca
I did a search on "enactive cognition" using Metacrawler, and the only
site it turned up that seemed to use the two words together was yours.
Not to cast aspersions on what is obviously an important theory to you,
but does anyone else consider it important? Are there other websites
out there, besides yours, that talk about it? Who came up with this
model, again?
"barrett john erickson" <bar...@magneticfields.org> wrote:
> in more evolved life forms, the most basic "layers" of cognitive
> action are monitored by more complex "layers". these amount
> to "feedback loops" regulating and coordinating complex cognitive
> activity.
This is actually a useful model, the idea of one layer that does
monitoring of other layers. The only differences, I expect, you and I
would have is:
1) I believe that people often choose (consciously) not to monitor
certain memories, thoughts, and feelings. What's fascinating is that
they also choose not to remember that they chose not to do the
monitoring!
(I'd be interested in hearing whether or not you can accept this
notion.)
2) Certain portions of the brain/mind cannot be monitored particularly
well. The portion of the brain responsible for monitoring doesn't
speak the language that the "emotional brain" (the limbic brain)
speaks. As though listening in on a foreign language, the monitor can
pick up broad stripes, but not subtle detail.
Over time, perhaps, a person can learn to understand the subtleties of
the foreign language, but they'll never fully understand what they are
hearing.
> at some point along our evolutionary path a kind of recognition that
> cognitive processes have become organized into identifiable self
> -sustaining (as opposed to isolated individual) systems emerged along
> with "feedback loops" that helped stabolize these systems (and
> eventually lead to our sense of "self", reason, imagination, etc.).
I can buy all this. All the systems are tied into each other, creating
a whole. Seems quite reasonable.
> this does not make that activity "unconscious" or "subconscious".
> there is just no need to make such a designation because
> the "difference" is not between it and some other cognitive act, but
> only that it is not being "monitored" while another is.
Is it safe to assume then, that you believe all portions of the mind
CAN be monitored, given an effort of some kind? Are there any portions
that are simply "out of bounds" in your opinion?
> as for your example...
> as the experiment indicates, the specific "high level" cognitive
> process of organizing information -- finding patterns -- is working
> the same whether or not it is monitored by the "higer level"
> cognitive process that gives rise to our ability to create
> explanations for our behavior.
Interesting. The only difficulty I have with what you're saying is my
conviction that certain sections of the mind CANNOT be monitored. But
if I understand you correctly, there is no way to tell whether
everything is being (or has been) monitored, because it's impossible to
monitor everything all at once. For this reason, a person can never
know if they have done a complete "inventory" of the various workings
of their mind.
> to designate some cognitive activities "subconscious" and
> others "conscious" based solely on the quirks (or even "failure") of
> a monitoring process's attempts to explain/rationalize them is like
> claiming there is are significant qualitative differences in a single
> object that two people describe differently.
But the experiment under discussion was (obviously) repeated with many
subjects. Why would it be that EVERYONE in the experiment fails
to "monitor" the problem solving and pattern recognition? Given your
model, somebody -- purely by chance -- should have been watching as
their problem solver worked the pattern through. Couldn't this be an
indicator that there is a "problem solving system" that exists outside
of monitoring capabilities?
> but it's all the same process. there is merely the presence or
> absence of attention from the complex monitoring activity from which
> the "self" emerges.
A strange series of questions: what purpose does this monitoring agent
serve? Is it necessary? Doesn't it spend most of its time
rationalizing (making excuses) for various incompatible selves beneath
its gaze? You seem to agree that most people use this portion of
themselves to deny the importance of the imagination and
the "irrational" emotional selves. Wouldn't it be in the best interest
of the individual to force the hall monitor of the mind to take a back
seat, and not worry so much about seeing all the processes contained
within? Is this what you see surrealism as being about?
> the imagination appears to be our most evolved sense. as such, the
> significance of the surrealist project takes on evolutionary
> importance for the species as well as personal importance in our
> current social context.
"Evolutionary importance for the species"? That sounds like hubris to
me. I doubt that any one particular approach to life is going to save
humankind.
But other than this last paragraph, you've thrown me some interesting
thoughts to chew on. The "monitoring" metaphor is a good one.
However, I'm still convinced that some things cannot be monitored.
Nik
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
barrett john erickson
<ac...@freenet.carleton.ca> wrote in message
news:8ithk4$ca7$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...
> Barrett,
>
> I did a search on "enactive cognition" using Metacrawler, and the only
> site it turned up that seemed to use the two words together was yours.
> Not to cast aspersions on what is obviously an important theory to you,
> but does anyone else consider it important? Are there other websites
> out there, besides yours, that talk about it? Who came up with this
> model, again?
i posted these links to the most comprehensive on-line resource just last
week:
http://www.informatik.umu.se/~rwhit/AT.html
especially the sub pages:
http://www.informatik.umu.se/~rwhit/Guide.html#WWWsites
http://www.informatik.umu.se/~rwhit/Tutorial.html
add:
http://www.informatik.umu.se/~rwhit/ObsArchive.html
http://plato.acadiau.ca/courses/educ/reid/enactivism/index.html
and a valuable new site in Brazil now taking shape:
http://www.geocities.com/complexidade/ingles.html
the emerging fields of autopoiesis and enactive cognition are most closely
associated with Francisco J. Varela and Humberto R. Maturana.
>
> "barrett john erickson" <bar...@magneticfields.org> wrote:
> > in more evolved life forms, the most basic "layers" of cognitive
> > action are monitored by more complex "layers". these amount
> > to "feedback loops" regulating and coordinating complex cognitive
> > activity.
>
> This is actually a useful model, the idea of one layer that does
> monitoring of other layers. The only differences, I expect, you and I
> would have is:
>
> 1) I believe that people often choose (consciously) not to monitor
> certain memories, thoughts, and feelings. What's fascinating is that
> they also choose not to remember that they chose not to do the
> monitoring!
>
> (I'd be interested in hearing whether or not you can accept this
> notion.)
stating the observation this way only veils the processes we're discussing
in what amounts to yet another anthropomorphic construct, while confusing
the specific aspects of (human) cognitive (sub)processes under discussion
with the overall effect of those processes (human behavior).
saying that "people often choose..." implies that the investigation should
be made into that "choice". but that "choice" is endemic to the more
fundamental processes from which the people emerge.
more accurately put the question is: why do cognitive processes appear
selective?
and the dull answer is that that is how they evolved (evolution being
essentially a process of self-organization driven as much by chance as
anything else). remember that if we think of these as feedback loops, their
"purpose" is to regulate more basic "layers" of cognitive processes in ways
that stabolize the whole.
the more interesting question, as you have observed, is: what is it about
this selection that stabolizes and what are the social/personal implications
of what is selected vs. what is not selected? and here, i would argue, is
where we might find the important emergence of the imagination --as a
compensation, a sense of what is being missed by the selection.
and, of course, _this_ question has significant surrealist interest as it
relates directly to the effort to enhance our experience of reality.
>
> 2) Certain portions of the brain/mind cannot be monitored particularly
> well. The portion of the brain responsible for monitoring doesn't
> speak the language that the "emotional brain" (the limbic brain)
> speaks. As though listening in on a foreign language, the monitor can
> pick up broad stripes, but not subtle detail.
>
> Over time, perhaps, a person can learn to understand the subtleties of
> the foreign language, but they'll never fully understand what they are
> hearing.
>
again, the anthropomorphic metaphor leads us to attribute the selection to
"higher order" cognitive activity rather than recognize it as a fluke of the
way the processes evolved, and a "motivator" for further evolution to
compensate.
> > at some point along our evolutionary path a kind of recognition that
> > cognitive processes have become organized into identifiable self
> > -sustaining (as opposed to isolated individual) systems emerged along
> > with "feedback loops" that helped stabolize these systems (and
> > eventually lead to our sense of "self", reason, imagination, etc.).
>
> I can buy all this. All the systems are tied into each other, creating
> a whole. Seems quite reasonable.
>
> > this does not make that activity "unconscious" or "subconscious".
> > there is just no need to make such a designation because
> > the "difference" is not between it and some other cognitive act, but
> > only that it is not being "monitored" while another is.
>
> Is it safe to assume then, that you believe all portions of the mind
> CAN be monitored, given an effort of some kind? Are there any portions
> that are simply "out of bounds" in your opinion?
>
again, i think your question points in the wrong direction.
_all_ cognitive activity is an integrated (single) process within which we
can speak of various subprocesses as contributing to the effect of the whole
(which is something more than the sum of its "parts"). which activities are
or are not "monitored" by the "feedback loops" is an autopoietic accident of
our evolution. we organized this way, tapirs organized a bit differently,
and jellyfish a bit more differently, but in each case the underlying
principle of autopoietic evolution is the same.
the question needs to be approached from the bottom not the top, from the
perspective of ever increasing complexity emerging in response to the drive
to enhance experience.
> > as for your example...
> > as the experiment indicates, the specific "high level" cognitive
> > process of organizing information -- finding patterns -- is working
> > the same whether or not it is monitored by the "higer level"
> > cognitive process that gives rise to our ability to create
> > explanations for our behavior.
>
> Interesting. The only difficulty I have with what you're saying is my
> conviction that certain sections of the mind CANNOT be monitored. But
> if I understand you correctly, there is no way to tell whether
> everything is being (or has been) monitored, because it's impossible to
> monitor everything all at once. For this reason, a person can never
> know if they have done a complete "inventory" of the various workings
> of their mind.
and again, we need to think of this monitoring as endemic to the cognitive
process as it has evolved, not something a person does. the "person" -- the
"self" -- emerges from that cognitive process, it isn't something the person
possesses.
> [...]
> A strange series of questions: what purpose does this monitoring agent
> serve? Is it necessary? Doesn't it spend most of its time
> rationalizing (making excuses) for various incompatible selves beneath
> its gaze? You seem to agree that most people use this portion of
> themselves to deny the importance of the imagination and
> the "irrational" emotional selves. Wouldn't it be in the best interest
> of the individual to force the hall monitor of the mind to take a back
> seat, and not worry so much about seeing all the processes contained
> within? Is this what you see surrealism as being about?
>
> > the imagination appears to be our most evolved sense. as such, the
> > significance of the surrealist project takes on evolutionary
> > importance for the species as well as personal importance in our
> > current social context.
>
> "Evolutionary importance for the species"? That sounds like hubris to
> me. I doubt that any one particular approach to life is going to save
> humankind.
>
from an autopoietic perspective, evolution is a process of ever increasing
cognitive complexity in search of enhanced real experience.
i argue that the imagination is our most complex cognitive activity. from
this perspective, it's not that we need to restrict the "hall monitor" but
rather that we need to discover and integrate the full potential of the
imagination to fill in its blind spots so as to enhance our experienced
reality.
it's not a matter of "saving humankind". i'm only arguing that this is
clearly our evolutionary direction, that amazingly enough it is something we
can actively pursue now, and furthermore that this pursuit has in fact,
always been the fundamental surrealist project.
Andrea Chen
> i'm only arguing that this is
> clearly our evolutionary direction, that amazingly enough it is something we
> can actively pursue now, and furthermore that this pursuit has in fact,
> always been the fundamental surrealist project.
>
The problem is that your sources don't understand evolution. I quote:
>
>
> In describing the relationship between an entity and its environment, the mistake is sometimes made of seeing the environment as prescribing the
> structure of the entity. For example, in the popular understanding of Darwin's theory of evolution animals are seen as having certain features
> because their environment requires that feature. So polar bears are white, unlike most other bears, because they live in snowy surroundings.
This certainly isn't the Darwinian view of evolution. Natural selection
says nothing about an environment "requiring" a feature. It simply says
that mutations which help in survival have a higher chance of being
propagated. So your people erect a straw man.
> The
> enactivist view of evolution is one of natural drift, based on an animal's environmentproscribing certain features. This proscription is simply another
> way of looking at the breakdown of the structural coupling between the animal and its environment. If the animal's structure does not allow for
> interaction with its environment, then it dies.
This isn't "another way" of looking at the relationship. Natural
selection also assumes that mutations or behaviors not helpful in an
environment are selected against. It's believed that these mutations
are far more common than beneficial mutations. Changes in environment
are also known to make certain features helpful or destructive.
> In effect it is not allowed to have that structure. This is not the same as the environment requiring that it
> have a certain structure, and in fact many different structures are possible within the constraints imposed by the need to remain structurally coupled.
But *nobody* claims that a structure is required. This is a strawman.
Of course many structures are possible! This is one of the points
between biology opposing telelogical theories of development.
> The full range of possible structures defines a sphere of behavioral possibilities within which animals can act.
>
A tautology. The possibilities define the possibilities. Not really
accurate anyway.
Why don't you get a book on basic biology rather than trust ignorant
people who use complicated language to spout nonsense?
barrett john erickson
"Andrea Chen" <fallin...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:395BCE...@earthlink.net...
> barrett john erickson wrote:
> > i'm only arguing that this is
> > clearly our evolutionary direction, that amazingly enough it is
something we
> > can actively pursue now, and furthermore that this pursuit has in fact,
> > always been the fundamental surrealist project.
> >
>
you should at least give attribution for such a quotation... especially
since you have proven to be an unreliable conduit.
> > In describing the relationship between an entity and its environment,
the mistake is sometimes made of seeing the environment as prescribing the
> > structure of the entity. For example, in the popular understanding of
Darwin's theory of evolution animals are seen as having certain features
> > because their environment requires that feature. So polar bears are
white, unlike most other bears, because they live in snowy surroundings.
>
> This certainly isn't the Darwinian view of evolution. Natural selection
> says nothing about an environment "requiring" a feature. It simply says
> that mutations which help in survival have a higher chance of being
> propagated. So your people erect a straw man.
it is you (surprise, surprise) who is erecting straw men.
i don't know where you've taken this quote from so i can't place it in
proper context and offer my comments on it.
but more to _your_ point: an enactivist perspective on evolution doesn't
depend upon refuting Darwin's observations, it simply reaches a conclusion
rejecting any implication that evolution is driven by adaptations to
pre-existing environmental characteristics.
which is, after all, the "popular understanding of Darwin's theory", right
or wrong.
so, as usual, the balance of your comments are irrelevant.
but i feel compelled to note that your statement, "mutations which help in
survival have a higher chance of being propagated", also implies this
"popular (mis)understanding".
from an enactivist perspective (and i simplify greatly), such "mutations"
are either trivial (that is, neutral -- fitting without consequence into
that species' existing reality) or they shape a new reality for that
species -- a new reality that may be either neutral (i.e., the species lives
on somewhat differently) or detrimental (i.e., the individual or species
dies off).
but a such a "mutation" cannot "help in survival" because species survival
depends on the _stability_ of key, deeply embedded, interactive processes
that are themselves a by-process of (emerged from) prior evolution.
survival does not depend on (nor is it "helped" by) conformance to (or
adaptation to) some pre-existing outside conditions within which the species
functions -- poorly or well -- as a psuedo-autonomous entity.
the key to understanding enactive cognition (and its resulting perspective
on evolution) is the rejection of the stimulus-response model of cognition.
[ and, i repeat, my argument is that it is the human imagination (our most
complex cognitive process) that allows _us_ to conceive of evolutionary
paths and even of attempting to enhance _our own_ experience. and it is our
imaginations that give us the opportunity to do so. ]
brandon...@my-deja.com
> Why am I in the odd position of explaining the existence of the
> subconscious to a surrealist? You should be well aware of its
> existence. After all, it is the BASIS for the surrealist movement.
I thought freedom was the BASIS for the surrealist movement.
?
Or maybe I'm just freaking out again.
Dale Houstman
<brandon...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
news:8jhq4a$tf3$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...
> Nikolaus Maack wrote:
> > Why am I in the odd position of explaining the existence of the
> > subconscious to a surrealist? You should be well aware of its
> > existence. After all, it is the BASIS for the surrealist movement.
>
>
> I thought freedom was the BASIS for the surrealist movement.
>
> ?
>
> Or maybe I'm just freaking out again.
>
gluteal fungi, ignoring it seems the ticket to recovery.
Dr. Dale
reddad...@hotmail.com
the polar bear discussion verbatim. It's not unreasonable for us to
assume that you have read and are familiar with the pages that you
claim support your position.
Frankly, I am reading these, and they are EXTREMELY general so far, and
I see nothing in them that necessarily refutes any notion of
subconscious processes.
Cases in point:
----------------------
A system is complex if "a great many independent agents are interacting
with each other in a great many ways"
"That is, the components interact in ways which are continually
changing, but which at the same time allow for the continuation of
interactions so that the system continues to exist. In addition, the
interactions of the components of an autopoetic system are responsible
for the production of the components themselves. In summary, an
autopoetic system is an emergent phenomenon arising from the
interaction of components which, by way of these interactions, give
rise to new interactions and new components, while preserving the
system's autopoetic character. "
---------------------------------
Please elaborate on how these "complex components" rule out the notion
of conscious/subconscious awareness?
In article <395bfabc$0$8310$7f89...@newsreader.visi.com>,
"barrett john erickson" <bar...@magneticfields.org> wrote:
>
> "Andrea Chen" <fallin...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
> news:395BCE...@earthlink.net...
> > barrett john erickson wrote:
> > > i'm only arguing that this is
> > > clearly our evolutionary direction, that amazingly enough it is
> something we
> > > can actively pursue now, and furthermore that this pursuit has in
fact,
> > > always been the fundamental surrealist project.
> > >
> >
> -- barrett
>
> BLUE FEATHERS #3 is now available
> http://www.MagneticFields.org/blue/
>
> bar...@MagneticFields.org
> http://www.MagneticFields.org/
>
> surrealists in minnesota
> Sur...@MagneticFields.org
>
> ==============================================
>
> "Everything tends to make us believe that there exists a
> certain point of the mind at which life and death, the real and
> the imagined, past and future, the communicable and the
> incommunicable, high and low, cease to be perceived as
> contradictions."
>
> ...André Breton
>
> ==============================================
>
>
reddad...@hotmail.com
seems to negate human mind and creativity altogether, reducing humans
to biological determinism (which they call "structural determinism").
Action preceeds thought seems to be what I am getting from this. Seems
to me a purely esoteric stance as a way of rethinking human processes,
since the accepted paradigm (which I have heard no compelling argument
to reject) is that "thought" preceeds action. By thought, I mean not
the person saying to themselves "I think I will move my arm now", but
the process by which the arm, hotwired to the brain, moves upon
instruction from the brain, which happens too quickly to impress itself
upon our awareness. Nonetheless, the muscles and tendons do not do
things independently and then report back to the brain, it is vice
versa. Now, if you are describing this brain-body process as "action"
in and of itself, then I suppose the action preceeds thought model
might work. But it's a Rhino in a girdle as far as I'm concerned. Why
bother trying to cram that in there to make it fit?
It certainly doesn't make the Rhino any more beautiful. Nor does it
make it no longer a Rhino.
althought it might make the other Rhinos laugh.
In article <395bfabc$0$8310$7f89...@newsreader.visi.com>,
"barrett john erickson" <bar...@magneticfields.org> wrote:
>
> "Andrea Chen" <fallin...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
> news:395BCE...@earthlink.net...
> > barrett john erickson wrote:
> > > i'm only arguing that this is
> > > clearly our evolutionary direction, that amazingly enough it is
> something we
> > > can actively pursue now, and furthermore that this pursuit has in
fact,
> > > always been the fundamental surrealist project.
> > >
> >
> -- barrett
>
> BLUE FEATHERS #3 is now available
> http://www.MagneticFields.org/blue/
>
> bar...@MagneticFields.org
> http://www.MagneticFields.org/
>
> surrealists in minnesota
> Sur...@MagneticFields.org
>
> ==============================================
>
> "Everything tends to make us believe that there exists a
> certain point of the mind at which life and death, the real and
> the imagined, past and future, the communicable and the
> incommunicable, high and low, cease to be perceived as
> contradictions."
>
> ...André Breton
>
> ==============================================
>
>
reddad...@hotmail.com
is doing--all doing is knowing." We DO know things we do not act
upon. We know that cars pollute the environment, but we not stop
driving them. We know that if we do certain things to our bodies,
there are consequences, but it does not always alter our behavior.
Similarly, humans ARE able to pass along knowledge without direct
experience. We can be told not to stick our hand into a flame, and
each human does not have to do so in order to know that we will be
burned. We can learn and understand consequences without direct
firstand knowledge. Read the journals of Julian Beck, founder of the
living theatre. There are some interesting passages in there about if
we could truly empathize with each other, we would live very
differently. If we could actually feel one another's starvation, we
would abolish money, if we could hear the wail of the oppressed, we
would abolish the state, etc. We would immediately do whatever we
could to ameliorate one another's suffering if it were only REAL to
us. In other words, we have intellectual knowledge of these things,
but we are able to ignore it because it does not affect us on a
visceral level.
While I agree with their pursuit of a holistic approach to mind/body,
subject/object, individual (or "system")/environment, I, personally,
think their theory of structural determination is somewhat limiting.
Humans, as "systems" or "organisms" can only do what we are
structurally programmed to do. Or, perhaps, I am taking too limited a
view of this--we appear to be structurally programmed for much more
than we have actually accomplished or discovered. I still fail to see
how this negates the subconscious. The summaries on the pages you
posted simply talk about complexities that drive the behavior and the
cognition of a system. I see no reason that conscious/subconscious
cannot be among those complexities. The whole thing strikes me as
purely a posture against "dualism".
And I am sorry, but I will tell you right now that I have no intention
of diving into that reading list on the sites. but if you would like
to post some passages from Valera that directly support your position
"against" the subconscious, feel free to do so. But do post them in
ENGLISH, please, not in academese. I am not stupid nor anti-
intellectual, but if I have to read everything six times to figure out
what the hell they're talking about, they may not be saying anything at
all.
In article <395bfabc$0$8310$7f89...@newsreader.visi.com>,
"barrett john erickson" <bar...@magneticfields.org> wrote:
>
> "Andrea Chen" <fallin...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
> news:395BCE...@earthlink.net...
> > barrett john erickson wrote:
> > > i'm only arguing that this is
> > > clearly our evolutionary direction, that amazingly enough it is
> something we
> > > can actively pursue now, and furthermore that this pursuit has in
fact,
> > > always been the fundamental surrealist project.
> > >
> >
> -- barrett
>
> BLUE FEATHERS #3 is now available
> http://www.MagneticFields.org/blue/
>
> bar...@MagneticFields.org
> http://www.MagneticFields.org/
>
> surrealists in minnesota
> Sur...@MagneticFields.org
>
> ==============================================
>
> "Everything tends to make us believe that there exists a
> certain point of the mind at which life and death, the real and
> the imagined, past and future, the communicable and the
> incommunicable, high and low, cease to be perceived as
> contradictions."
>
> ...André Breton
>
> ==============================================
>
>
barrett john erickson
<reddad...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:8jieta$cm5$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...
> She's quoting directly out of the articles YOU posted. Andrea posted
> the polar bear discussion verbatim. It's not unreasonable for us to
> assume that you have read and are familiar with the pages that you
> claim support your position.
i don't think i claimed these pages supported my position.
i was asked for and offered some links to enactive cognition resources on
the web that might serve as an introduction to the concepts. i offered the
ones i'm aware of. this doesn't mean i endorse or have even familiarized
myself with their content beyond the introductory level.
my position on enactive cognition, as on all subjects, is a creative
endeavor based in exploration and experience.
the "observer" site is very densely packed with numerous texts from many
different people. it seems perfectly appropriate for me to insist upon a
specific attribution when asked to react to some one else's words.
[and i notice you don't provide one either.]
> Frankly, I am reading these, and they are EXTREMELY general so far, and
> I see nothing in them that necessarily refutes any notion of
> subconscious processes.
certainly _all_ attempts to describe the same real phenomena will agree to
some degree. the importance is in the points of divergence. saying you
find nothing that refutes your current notions means one of two things: you
have already arrived at an enactivist perspective independently (not likely)
or you haven't found or understood that point of divergence yet.
> Cases in point:
>
> ----------------------
>
> A system is complex if "a great many independent agents are interacting
> with each other in a great many ways"
>
> "That is, the components interact in ways which are continually
> changing, but which at the same time allow for the continuation of
> interactions so that the system continues to exist. In addition, the
> interactions of the components of an autopoetic system are responsible
> for the production of the components themselves. In summary, an
> autopoetic system is an emergent phenomenon arising from the
> interaction of components which, by way of these interactions, give
> rise to new interactions and new components, while preserving the
> system's autopoetic character. "
>
> ---------------------------------
>
> Please elaborate on how these "complex components" rule out the notion
> of conscious/subconscious awareness?
again, it seems appropriate that if you ask me to comment on someone else's
text, that you provide an attribution so i can place your quote in its full
context.
that said, _my_ position is not that "'complex components' rule out the
notion of conscious/subconscious awareness" it's rather that there is no
justification for subdividing "awareness" into conscious and subconscious
components. what people generally refer to as "conscious" (as opposed to
"subconscious") is that specific element of _"self"_ awareness.
as i said at the beginning of this thread, it is my argument that the
concept of the "subconscious" is a no longer unnecessary (and is, in fact,
now a misleading) artifact of 19th century attempts to explain observations
that appear to indicate conflicts within "the human mind".
this construct now hinders rather than aids our understanding.
when the "self" is seen as an _emergent_ property of increasingly complex,
fully integrated and deeply embedded (sub)processes, there is no need to
posit a "subconscious" for separate consideration. to do so implies that
the inquiry is not being approached from the position of our current
knowledge of human cognitive systems, but is instead still clouded by the
indoctrination of 19th century assumptions we all received in school.
barrett john erickson
<reddad...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:8jife4$d51$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...
> If I am reading these correctly, applying these theories to humans
> seems to negate human mind and creativity altogether, reducing humans
> to biological determinism (which they call "structural determinism").
actually, it would be closer to viewing them as an argument that the old
unresolvable philosophical contest between determinism and free-will is an
irrelevant paradox that only has meaning within the traditional framework of
thinking that enactivists have rejected.
> Action preceeds thought seems to be what I am getting from this. Seems
> to me a purely esoteric stance as a way of rethinking human processes,
> since the accepted paradigm (which I have heard no compelling argument
> to reject) is that "thought" preceeds action. By thought, I mean not
> the person saying to themselves "I think I will move my arm now", but
> the process by which the arm, hotwired to the brain, moves upon
> instruction from the brain, which happens too quickly to impress itself
> upon our awareness. Nonetheless, the muscles and tendons do not do
> things independently and then report back to the brain, it is vice
> versa. Now, if you are describing this brain-body process as "action"
> in and of itself, then I suppose the action preceeds thought model
> might work. But it's a Rhino in a girdle as far as I'm concerned. Why
> bother trying to cram that in there to make it fit?
cognition _is_ action. it is a process of structural coupling which
produces changes on "both sides" of the equation. think of the physics and
biology of our senses (which are highly complex cognitive processes). what
we call "vision" _emerges_ as a kind of meta-process that not only "senses"
the activity of all the various nerves and synaptic firings that are
biologically associated with the function of our eyes, but also coordinates
this nerve activity while also provoking further exploration involving both
"voluntary" and "involuntary" muscle movement. this is all then organized
into what we think of when we talk of "vision".
nowhere in the biology of vision is there a representation of an umbrella
and sewing machine on a disecting table. this _emerges_ from the process
but cannot be said to be _located_ in it (or determined by it).
so it is with all our cognitive processes.
enactivists understand that the complexity of cognition is an emergent
autopoietic process -- complexity increases as a result of self-organizing
activities.
barrett john erickson
<reddad...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:8jiget$e04$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...
> Some interesting notions in there. I reject the "logo" --"all knowing
> is doing--all doing is knowing." We DO know things we do not act
> upon. We know that cars pollute the environment, but we not stop
> driving them. We know that if we do certain things to our bodies,
> there are consequences, but it does not always alter our behavior.
you seem to limit your concept of "action" to volition. understanding
enactive cognition requires that you understand that (biologically) all
cognition, and all sensual processes are active rather than passive -- which
is to say: abandon the assumed stimulus-response model.
> Similarly, humans ARE able to pass along knowledge without direct
> experience. We can be told not to stick our hand into a flame, and
> each human does not have to do so in order to know that we will be
> burned. We can learn and understand consequences without direct
> firstand knowledge.
you seem to limit your concept of "experience" to something that happens on
the "outside" and artificially set that in opposition to "knowledge" (that
happens on the inside). understanding enactive cognition requires that you
understand that (biologically) experience is anything that results in
structural changes, whether these structural changes are the result of a
synaptic spark or an unfortunate encounter with a chain saw.
> Read the journals of Julian Beck, founder of the
> living theatre. There are some interesting passages in there about if
> we could truly empathize with each other, we would live very
> differently. If we could actually feel one another's starvation, we
> would abolish money, if we could hear the wail of the oppressed, we
> would abolish the state, etc. We would immediately do whatever we
> could to ameliorate one another's suffering if it were only REAL to
> us. In other words, we have intellectual knowledge of these things,
> but we are able to ignore it because it does not affect us on a
> visceral level.
>
> While I agree with their pursuit of a holistic approach to mind/body,
> subject/object, individual (or "system")/environment, I, personally,
> think their theory of structural determination is somewhat limiting.
but of course, it's _not_ a theory of structural determination. it is a
theory that says cognitive action is defined by structural changes even as
they determine the characteristics of reality (in the same way quantum
measurements determine the characteristics of subatomic "particles").
"What we learn about is not nature itself, but nature subjected to our
methods of questioning." (Heisenberg)
enactivists think of "reality" as what a species experiences as the result
of it's (active and incessant) methods of questioning.
from my perspective, volition vs. reflex or free-will vs. determinism
doesn't really come into play. these oppositions appear to exist only if
one begins with assumptions that make them relevant (e.g., the
stimulus-response model; and cause/effect, conscious/subconscious or
mind/body dualisms; etc. _all_ of which i argue, are simplifications which
have outlived their usefullness and become obstacles to understanding).
if both the "self" and "reality" emerge from the cognitive process, and
their characteristics are determined by that process, and one of the
emergent characteristics of _our_ cognitive process is the sense of liberty
and a capacity for revolt, i don't see any point in asking if our
"free-will" is determined by our biological evolution. we simply need to
aviod surrendering it.
> Humans, as "systems" or "organisms" can only do what we are
> structurally programmed to do. Or, perhaps, I am taking too limited a
> view of this--we appear to be structurally programmed for much more
> than we have actually accomplished or discovered. I still fail to see
> how this negates the subconscious. The summaries on the pages you
> posted simply talk about complexities that drive the behavior and the
> cognition of a system. I see no reason that conscious/subconscious
> cannot be among those complexities. The whole thing strikes me as
> purely a posture against "dualism".
it's not that complexities drive a species' behavior or cognitive processes,
its that behavior and cognition is a complex self-organizing system also
involved in trying to maintain its biological integrity in the face of
continuous structural changes (experience). greater complexity within a
species is the result of continuous efforts to maintain that integrity
through autopoiesis (self-organization) while its range of experience
expands.
but enactive cognition is incompatible with "dualisms" of any kind. the
artificial distinction between "conscious" and "subconscious" is just
another form of dualism.
there is simply no need to posit a "subconscious" as some kind of
counter-equivalent to "consciousness" when its only definable feature is
that it lacks that property of "self" that emerged from the same cognitive
processes that you now want to call "subconscious" just because you've
decided to isolate the property called the "self" and designate that
"conscious" when it is actually better understood as an emergent property of
an increased complexity of cognitive functioning.
it not only confuses things, as i think i've admirably demonstrated, but
lessens the evolutionary significance of that emergent property.
there is only cognition as an aggregate of sensory processes from which the
"self" emerged as one (self-organizing) property when a sufficient degree of
complexity was reached.
> And I am sorry, but I will tell you right now that I have no intention
> of diving into that reading list on the sites. but if you would like
> to post some passages from Valera that directly support your position
> "against" the subconscious, feel free to do so. But do post them in
> ENGLISH, please, not in academese. I am not stupid nor anti-
> intellectual, but if I have to read everything six times to figure out
> what the hell they're talking about, they may not be saying anything at
> all.
sorry, i do my best to simplify in discussions like this, but as i explained
on previous occasions, understanding enactive cognition involves a kind of
"ah-ha!" experience that is somewhat like what the situationists referred to
as "reversible coherence".
that is, nothing about our current experience -- our reality -- is in any
way different. you can't lay out a long list of different ways various
observable phenomena are different to an enactivist versus say a
"connectionist".
there is only the enactivists' rejection (based on the latest scientific
understanding of physics and cognitive science) of the subtle but ubiquitous
underlying assumption of the stimulus-response model that we've all been
brought up to believe in -- replacing it with a more interactive quantum
measurement like model -- and an understanding of the process by which
complex systems can evolve spontaneously and naturally from less complex
systems through self-organization (autopoiesis).
the result is the same coherence everyone else experiences, but a different
way of understanding it that (once the "ah-ha!" inversion is experienced)
has that elegant simplicity that scientists value so highly and appears (to
me anyway) to resolve many, if not most of its most nagging paradoxes.
so no matter how i try to explain it, i wind up talking in circles because
ultimately its a lot like the common optical illusion based on a
field-ground inversion. the picture doesn't change, but once you see it, it
gains dimensions and the experience becomes much richer.
but you either see it or you don't. there's no almost. and all i can do
for others is try to give better clues.
scot...@earthlink.net
>Nikolaus Maack wrote:
>> Why am I in the odd position of explaining the existence of the
>> subconscious to a surrealist? You should be well aware of its
>> existence. After all, it is the BASIS for the surrealist movement.
>
>
>I thought freedom was the BASIS for the surrealist movement.
>
>?
>
>Or maybe I'm just freaking out again.
>
No, you are forgetting there is surrealism and there is the business
of surrealism. The two are not really connected.
Within the realm of the business of surrealism Nik's statement is
accurate and important; and necessary to maintain market value.
sur·re·al·ism
n.
1.A 20th-century literary and artistic movement that attempts to
express the workings of the subconscious and is characterized by
fantastic imagery and incongruous juxtaposition of subject matter.
2.Literature or art produced in this style.
Source: The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language,
Third Edition
surrealism n 1: a 20th century movement in art and literature
(developing out of Dadaism) that used fantastic images and
incongruous juxtapositions in order to represent unconscious thoughts
and dreams 2: art and literature attempting to express the working of
the subconscious and characterized by fantastic imagery and
incongruous juxtapositions
Source: WordNet ® 1.6, © 1997 Princeton University
Dale Houstman
<scot...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:LOqEOQbqi5a27a...@4ax.com...
> On Fri, 30 Jun 2000 09:43:40 GMT, brandon...@my-deja.com wrote:
>
> >Nikolaus Maack wrote:
> >> Why am I in the odd position of explaining the existence of the
> >> subconscious to a surrealist? You should be well aware of its
> >> existence. After all, it is the BASIS for the surrealist movement.
> >
> >
> >I thought freedom was the BASIS for the surrealist movement.
> >
> >?
> >
> >Or maybe I'm just freaking out again.
> >
>
> No, you are forgetting there is surrealism and there is the business
> of surrealism. The two are not really connected.
>
> Within the realm of the business of surrealism Nik's statement is
> accurate and important; and necessary to maintain market value.
>
>
igloo?
Why does the VCR expect so much from my grasp of Incan physics?
Is the latest fashion in 4-D colon wear entirely too late to vbe danced
with?
Who ARE the "Silverware Technicians" and why do they want my skin?
dmh