Realism, Objectivity and Consciousness
DAERON
and re-formatted to be compatible with a text screen. (Done originally
in Windows Write) It addresses a lot of the issues that had been
discussed on the 'Pessimistic or Optimistic' thread- but in far more
intense depth. So, be forewarned: it's 'heavy going'. This isn't for the
'faint of heart'. So, if you're likely to find it not to your tastes,
please pass on, skip over.
DAERON
to sending, this didn't carry over in transmission. Anyway, those with
Netscape should have the 'wrap long lines' option available under 'View'
in the Menu. Those using Windows Explorer, or other programs, I'd expect
you've also got something similar to compensate for the
s-t-r-e-t-c-h-e-d lines.
Sorry for any inconvenience.
Allan Cybulskie
Well, in order to make Daeron happy I probably should state my
qualfications now. I'm in Philosophy and two recent courses were
"Empiricism" and "The Philosophy of Computing". As such, my strongest
discussions here will be on the "simpleton" and computer examples, and in
the idealism versus materialism threads. Almost everything else will
probably be cut. I'll also likely do this in parts, just to save bandwidth
(I may be a little long).
DAERON <sta...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in article
<376961...@ix.netcom.com>...
>2. SYSTEMS OF THOUGHT: BASIS FOR WORLD VIEWS
>REALISM:
>By contrast to idealism, realism is the underlying philosophy of science.
It >asserts that human consciousness receives experiences from an external
world, >quite distinct from that consciousness. As Squires notes (ibid., p.
74): "The >images we obtain, involving for example eyes, ears, telescopes,
etc. are images >of a genuinely existing reality whose existence is not
dependent on our being >aware of the images." Squires notes that in quantum
mechanics, for example, >there is an observer disturbance of the system,
but "just because we observe and >disturb it is not to say we create it."
You should say that this is the underlying philosophy of THEORETICAL
science. The underlying philosophy of experimental science is clearly
empiricism. Empiricism is, though, the notion that the physical objects
exist solely in being perceived -- or, more accurately, that the only
things we KNOW are those things that we perceive through one or more of our
senses, aided or otherwise. Now, admittedly, few empiricists argue that we
CREATE reality by perceiving it, but most empiricists do argue (George
Berkeley the toughest of all) that anything that we cannot perceive cannot
be real.
>According to Flew (ibid., 1984) realism is the belief that physical
objects exist >independently of being perceived. (Or to paraphrase
physicist N. David Mermin: >"The Moon is really there when nobody looks!")
Berkeley's suggestion to this was to use God to perceive everything so that
everything is perceived all the time and so always exists. The counter to
this was simple set theory -- by overlapping what we "perceive" (which most
empiricists argue is not simply by actually looking at it, but that even
thinking about it will suffice).
Note: The reason I'm discussing empiricism here so much is that by the end
of this section I'm hoping to either reconcile empiricism within this
idealsm/realism debate or show how they are indeed incompatible, to break
the "religion versus science" argumentation.
> Arguably, therefore the notion of an "observation" only has significance
in the >context of a realistic philosophy, just as the question "What
exists?" In order to >even think of asking the latter, the implicit
inference must be that there is a real, >externally persistent world.
By this, then, empiricism would be a realistic philosophy, since clearly
observations are important and the answer to the question "What exists?"
is, to varying degrees, "What is perceived." Yet, it seems to fit the
idealistic definition better.
> MATERIALISM
Here is where we get into the interesting part.
Many empiricists deny materialism. Berkeley uses empiricism as a way to
destroy materialism. Since no one can actually show us matter to our
senses, there is no reason for the empiricist to believe that matter
actually does indeed exist. Moreover, if the basis of everything is matter
then what is matter based on (this is, of course, a variation of the
"creation of the universe" logical paradox)? If materialism is part of
realism, then empircism, likely as not, is not part of realism.
>Crude materialism is a direct offshoot of naive realism. It is, in fact,
the simple re->statement of the position of the ancient Greek atomist
school that "whatever >exists is either matter or entirely dependent on
matter for its existence" (cf. Flew, >1984). A more modern re-wording would
be to substitute the phrase "laws of >physics" everywhere for matter. (cf
Squires, 1990, p. 77) thereby obtaining >physicalism.
To the empiricist, this is just as bad as using "matter". How do we get
our "laws of physics"? By observation. So is there any reason for us to
think that these laws that we derive by reason from observation are more
important, or are more of a basis of reality, than the observations
themselves? Not really. Moreover, there is of course the problem that if
these laws form the basis of our universe, what happens if we've gotten one
of them wrong? If we can change the laws of physics, but do not change the
observations, then the laws of physics cannot form the basis of the
observations. Therefore, what is real is what we see -- and specifically
(mainly from Hume) what is real is what we see CONSISTENTLY, so that we can
form cause-effect relationships by custom.
>Unfortunately, a problem remains in coming to terms with consciousness -
which >appears "real" to every human, yet governed by laws exterior to the
physical. The >answer of physicalism/realism is to refute the latter and
posit consciousness as >an epiphenomenon of the brain. The answer of
idealism is that there can be no >answer at all - since Godelian limits
apply, wherein a brain cannot possibly >comprehend its equivalent construct
in any meaningful way. Hence, only a mega->brain can comprehend the human
brain, and a mega-mega-brain can comprehend >the mega-brain and so forth.
Always, a more complex hierarchical architecture is >required to subsume
the lower one.
The empirical view tends to fit into this as well -- since we cannot
directly observe our consciousness, it is useless for us to examine our own
individual minds to find our self. However, if one believes in a God who
could observe our consciousness, this would be sufficient. I do not
believe that many empiricists (excepting Hume) deny a self or a
consciousness.
It looks very much, then, like the basis of experimental science
(empiricism) is NOT a realist approach or philosophy. By the definitions
given in this section, it looks like it is instead an idealistic view.
Ergo, the realism/materialism debate cannot be a "religion versus science"
issue. Science is very much dependent on empiricism in order to survive,
and it would be interesting to try to decide exactly where empiricism fits
in these ideas.
--
Allan Cybulskie
" 'Do you suffer from long-term memory loss?'
'I don't remember' "
- From "Amnesia" by Chumbawamba
Allan Cybulskie
DAERON <sta...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in article
<376961...@ix.netcom.com>...
>"A zimbo is a zombie that - as a result of self-monitoring has internal
(but >unconscious) higher order informational states... A zimbo is like a
zombie that is >behaviorally complex, thanks to a control system that
permits recursive self-r
>epresentation."
>A perfect example of a ficitional zimbo would be the android "Data" of
Star Trek - >The Next Generation. He is able to perform classical music,
play poker, do >paintings, and act various dramatical parts in stage plays
done by the crew. >Throw in an "emotion chip" - as is done in the recent
film Star Trek Generations, >and he is essentially indistinguishable from
any living human in behavioral terms. >Underneath it all, however, "Data"
is ultimately a machine - run by large and rapid >transfers of 1's and 0's
(the equivalent of high and low electronic voltages) in his >'positronic
brain'..
>What do each of the preceding virtual machines have in common? First,
their >outward performance ("effect") is based ultimately on hidden
electron voltage >changes and transfers - whether this be to play chess,
perform complex >mathematical operations, or write a book. In each case,
the program performs >what amounts to a specialized task, which I will call
a performance simplex. For >playing chess, call it [C], for mathematical
operations call it [M], for writing call it >[W].
>Theoretically, given enough megabytes (gigabytes?) it should be possible
to >combine ALL these specialist performance modules in one program: [C] +
[M] + >[W]. Now let the identified performance skills in a human be: (S1,
S2............SN), >and let there be programs which can match each of these
- if even in a >rudimentary fashion. Then if all are in place - and capable
of mutually interacting >we have formed Dennett's "zombie".
>If I now go into each program, and allow for a recursive loop to be set up
such >that, say an effect can be evaluated by the global program, in order
to modify or >correct or refine it (as in the novel writing), then I have
functionally formed a >"zimbo". In this latter case, certainly, one must
concede there is an intelligence >present - though it may not meet with
one's pre-conceived human notions of >intelligence. (Which are generally
said to include "emotion" as well).
We need only concede that there is an intelligence present if we accept the
Turing test -- that if something looks intelligent it is. Does this sort
of system really learn? Is it independent, or completely dependent on the
rules? If something occurs outside of the rules it has, does it fall apart
or can it adapt (intelligent beings, in general, adapt)?
In short, there's really no reason to assume that simply because something
"fakes" being intelligent that it has or is an intelligence. Even a really
good fake (like a piece of art) is still a fake.
Of course, one of the more serious problems with this sort of thinking is
that it has been discovered that quite a few things that intelligent
creatures do do not really translate well into sets of rules or are not
handled well by rules-oriented systems. Pattern-matching is one of these
(and has been the prime impetus for the formation of the "connectionist"
idea of artificial intelligence). It looks very much like simple
rules-based systems aren't good enough to develop intelligence (even if you
ignore emotion).
>"What sort of 'rules' could possibly capture all of what we think of as
intelligent >behavior? Certainly there must be rules on all sorts of
different levels. There must >be many "just plain" rules. There must be
'metarules' to modify the just plain >rules; then meta-metarules to modify
the meta-rules and so on. The flexibility of >intelligence comes from the
enormous number of different rules and levels of >rules. The reason that so
many rules on so many different levels must exist is >that in life, a
creature is faced with millions of situations of completely different
>types. In some situations, there are stereotyped responses that require
"just >plain" rules. Some situations are mixtures of stereotyped situations
- thus they >require rules for deciding which of the "just plain" rules to
apply. Some situations >cannot be classified, thus there must exist rules
>for inventing new rules.... and so on and so on."
This is a huge number of rules, and actually turns out to be a very
inefficient way to do things. Rules-based learning, for example, is
generally very slow and inefficient (the connectionist model is usually a
lot faster and better). An additional question is how do those small
neurons have the processing power to process all of these rules? Large
scale computer processors can't do this at the scale required to perform at
the human level, yet blow us away at mathematical ability. If things like
learning and pattern-matching were simply rules-based, clearly computers
would be performing far better at them than they are now. And where do we
store all of these rules? And where do the rules stop? How meta do we go
on the rules?
>The point of this exercise has been to show that a virtual machine model
human >[H] is quite capable of out performing a typical human in a variety
of areas. Of >course, the obscurantist is likely to disagree that what the
modules of [H] do >qualifies as thought. He is then obliged to articulate
in a precise and formal >fashion exactly what criteria DO qualify as
thought. I submit that [H], in a game >of chess, is every bit as capable
of "thought" as a "flesh and blood" human >biological entity. Another
objector (teleologist) may complain here that what the >computer does is
not "thinking" since it is really comparing a multitiude of >scenarios to
select the one with least numerical disadvantage (or position
>disadvantage). But so what? Who is to say - unambiguously, that human
>thought processes do not follow a similar sort of selection process.
Evidence >already exists (as pointed out by R.obert Ornstein in his book
The Evolution of >Consciousness, Prentice-Hall, 1991) that as much as a
full second before one >raises a pinky finger, the electrical impulse train
has already been set in motion >in the brain. This could easily show a
sorting process or selection of action >processes at work - a significant
time before the action is manifested.
The question, though, is whether or not something that plays chess is
intelligent -- whether chess-playing is the criteria for intelligence or
thought. By this, those tiny little machines you buy at Radio Shack
"think" because they play chess with you. It is also clear that being able
to OUT-PERFORM a human being is not a criteria for intelligence or thought.
Turing's famous test only requires equivlance to humans, and certainly it
would seem rather odd to argue that a system that does better than humans
does thinks but a system that performs as WELL as humans is not.
We have been able to create computer systems that can outperform humans in
certain areas, but there is no real evidence that their being able to
perform those areas really means that they are really intelligent or think.
The onus, really, is not on the opponent to show what actions do make one
intelligent (nasty answer: all of them) or mean that it thinks, but on the
supporter to show why their being able to perform those actions means that
they DO think.
One of the strongest counters to rules-based models is understanding. If,
say, someone had Chinese symbols passed into them under a door, and they
had a set of rules to look up that allowed them to pass the right Chinese
symbols back underneath the door, but they didn't understand what the
symbols meant or what they passed back, could we say that the person in the
room (or the system) really "understood" Chinese? Of course not. Yet this
is what a rules-based system usually does. Does the system really
understand that they are playing chess and what it really means to play
chess? If you can prove that it does, then you likely have a system that
actually thinks -- but we are no where near that point yet.
>The use of language, in an original form, is often cited as a peculiarily
human >attribute. However, I've already pointed out the existence of
language-formulating >software that can write passable novels (better than
most humans!!). It is also >common knowledge now among the computer
cognoscenti of the world that the >next step up from present day
click-and-point commands will be voice-issued. It >is logical to assume
that voice feedback from the computer - say in giving its >chess move, will
also be part of the package. Indeed, computer voice language >translators
should be ready by the time quantum dot technology is incorporated >into
the next generation of chips. Ultimately, a full-complex [H] may not be as
far >away as we may think.
One of the problems with language is that it is technically infinite, yet
is supposed to be run on a finite machine (for AI). This is a bit of a
paradox.
Moreover, there are many, many things that computers and rules-based
systems in particular cannot do (like walk around a room, or learn to walk)
that humans do with ease. A system that can perform like a human in most
areas is indeed a long way away.
>A dozen or more such "simpletons" may "inhabit" each human brain - and
come >to the fore if the correct stimulus appears. Thus, a
"hostile-aggressive" simpleton >may appear if one is cut off in a lane of
traffic, or is chewed out by one's boss. A. >"lust" simpleton may appear
for any number of stimuli-images which I won't >bother to detail, but which
anyone can imagine! A "caring-loving" simpleton may >appear in response to
words of endearment, or an affectionate hug from one's >spouse, or child. A
"comic" simpleton may appear spontaneously - and proceed >to play a
practical joke, or take a humorous perspective on everything for the time
>it is "in control".
>In the next instant, t2 , the simpleton [S5] suddenly breaks "free" from
the pack >and begins to dominate, whereupon in the next instant [S4] now
dominates and >takes precedence over the others, finally some stimulus
appears at t3 - so strong >that it immediately elicits [S1] to finally
break through to manifestation- action. >This gives a glimpse of what the
hidden world of "multiple drafts" human >consciousness is like in the
simpleton limit of Ornstein. A constant battle is >being waged by
simpletons to see which will "win" and attain the goal of exterior
>manifestation.
>It is often the case that through prolonged acculturation, or parental
conditioning - >a consciousness will present a public "persona" comprised
of one or two favorite >simpletons. These lead to certain archetypes in our
society - especially when >there is a sudden simpleton change that catches
everyone off-guard. The classic >is the "nice, polite quiet guy" who
suddenly goes bonkers and commits serial >mayhem. The usual reaction is:
"We never thought so-and-so could ever do a >thing like that! He was so
nice and quiet!" Obviously, his "murderous-raging" >simpleton - long
repressed - wasn't informed (disconnection of thought and >emotion
circuits) and wasn't about to be held down by the "nice guy" simpleton >any
longer. (Critical cortical threshold crossed by neural firing in the
>hypothalamus region).
>The preceding model brings up interesting questions and considerations -
>particularly in regard to "free will". If, for example, simpletons are
primarily >governed by (inaccessible) brain circuits (or genetics) , it may
not always be >possible to exert control over them (especially if one is in
the thought circuit, and >the other in the emotion circuit). In the
example above, of the "nice, quiet guy" >who goes bonkers - can we hold
the whole consciousness (ie.. all his collective >simpletons) responsible
for one simpleton getting out of control? How can this be, >if that one
(murder-rage) simpleton is tied to a part of the brain architecture
>(paleo-cortex) wherein reptilian characteristics predominate? Do we haul a
>crocodile to trial for a "capital crime", say when it devours a careless
swimmer? >Do we condemn it as a "sinner" or "evil"? And yet, for the time
the paleo-cortical >simpleton is acting in human consciousness, it is - in
truth - not ontologically >different from the crocodile, with which (for
that time) it shares the same "ancient" >brain, instincts, destructive
impulses and all.
>Clearly, the "free-will" postulate is based on the assumption - which
Dennett and >Ornstein have shown to be false - that there exists a unique,
"persistent" self - >governed by a unique, persistent center of control
("soul", "mind"?). If instead, >each human has multiple selves
(drafts-simpletons), and no "center of control" >that is unphysical or
immaterial, then the free will postulate goes out the window. >Free will is
a totally meaningless concept in the context of multiple "selves"
>competing in a mini-Darwinian 'survival of the fittest' for outward
manifestation - >governed at root by random electron motions, biochemical
reactions and neural >firings.*
I kept a lot of quotes here because I think the context is somewhat
important. There is no reason to believe, simply by the simpleton
argument, that there is no unique, persistent center of control. It is
quite simple to reconcile both notions. It is quite possible that what we
have is an overall "self" that is made up of all of these simpletons and
one or more controllers whose job it is to determine which simpletons (or
combination of simpletons) are active at any one time. Looked at from one
perspective, there is not one "self", but from another the simpletons and
controllers are simply part of one large "self", which is what we display
to the outside world. It is clear from observation that most people do
seem to act as if they have and display distinct "selves". This is likely
just the combination of how the controllers allow these simpletons to
display themselves and dicate the "personality" of the individual. This
argument is nice because it allows us to definitely argue that people can
indeed control themselves and their personalities. Without a controller,
how do we do so? If all we have are these competing "simpletons" how do we
exert control over them? And if we did, are we not simply repressing them,
risking the "nice guy exploding" scenario? With a controller idea, we have
a way to control these simpletons, and the "exploding" becomes a
mishandling on the part of the controller in determining which of these (or
which combination of these) are active at any one time. For example, it is
quite possible that the nice guy exploding was not a result of the
aggressive simpleton coming to the fore at the wrong time, but may have
simply been the result of other balancing simpletons NOT becoming or
remaining active. If we were under stress or tired, our controller may not
realize that it is supposed to keep those active OR it may have to shut
them down due to overuse (exhaustion of the neurons) while the "aggressive"
simpleton is relatively rested and can fire off quickly and strongly.
This leads to another notion: that it need not be a competition. What
purpose would such a system serve? Surely we cannot survive if our
personality is based on only one simpleton. So why would they be fighting
to displace the other? It seems more likely that it is a CO-OPERATIVE
system, where they work to achieve the best "self" they can. Sometimes,
the pathways are tired, and so they don't balance as well as they should,
and oddities occur. There is no reason, however, to insist that there be a
Darwinistic idea around our simpletons.
>And by all rights, if I get upset at being beaten by a human opponent I
should >exhibit similar upset at being bested by a computer. It's the same
game is it not? >( "Er... well.. no, you see the computer doesn't really
"think", it actually bases >its moves on comparing voltage differences in
its accumulators and registers. >That doesn't count. It's like talkin' to a
wall") Oh really? Then if you are going to >deny 'thought' to the
computer in this instance, you are obliged to provide me with
>comprehensive objective criteria about what exactly would qualify as
"thought" - >in your opinion. What precise difference in quality of thought
is there that permits >me some degree of upset at being clobbered in chess
by a human, but denies >me that upset if the opponent happens to be a
computer? Please spell it out, >then prove it to me.
Why would I not be angry that a computer beat me? Because the computer did
not beat me -- the person who programmed it did, since the computer simply
followed the instructions it was given by the programmer, which humans,
really, do not do. Moreover, the computer does not care that it won,
whereas most humans do. It is hard to argue that the computer even
understands what has just happened, while it certainly appears that humans
do understand.
>"Faith is superior to logic, because faith goes beyond logic in its
approach to >truth".
>Hence, the person who "buys into" this meme, will value faith over his or
her own >logic, and not be willing to question that faith in logical terms.
(Since faith is >"superior"). One can say that the so-called "virtue" of
faith is paradoxical >(certainly to a rational skeptic) since it requires
"going beyond logic") With this >high survival value, the faith meme - like
the god-meme, can more easily "infect" >other brains by replication. (The
"infection" has been likened by Dawkins to a >"mind virus" in his article
Viruses of the Mind , Free Inquiry, Vol. 13, No. 3, p. >34).
The benefit of faith IN ADDITION TO logic is that faith allows someone to
believe in that which they cannot prove, while logic does not allow one to
say anything in such situations. For example, by pure logic one cannot say
that the sun will rise tomorrow, but faith allows for that. Logic demands
certainty; faith does not.
Unfortunately, oftentimes faith is used to deny evidence that the statement
is incorrect when really one should consider the statement doubtful or just
plain wrong.
>Before leaving this issue, it is interesting to note another paradoxical
meme - that >for belief in the "Devil", the famous 'bogeyman' of many
orthodox Chrtistians. In >one Larry King show, on which Paul Kurtz (author
of "Living without Religion") >appeared, one woman called him to take him
to task for not believing in "Satan". >All excited, she could hardly
contain the emotion in her voice when she finally >blurted out: "You see?
That's just what Satan wants. He wants people NOT to >beleive in him, so he
can become more powerful." A perfect example of a self->sustaining meme
(and mind virus, certainly!) in action.
This is actually a perfectly logical statement. How many people who
believed in Satan and believed in his evil would allow him to come up to
them and offer them wonderful things? If they really believed in him,
they'd realize that all he was doing was trying to lead them astray, and so
they would refuse. However, if they don't really believe in him, they
won't think that way, and so he can gain more power and influence.
Really, this is similar to many of your arguments about the censorship from
the Corporatocracy. They don't want us to believe the Corporatocracy
exists. Why? Because if we did, we would resist them -- but if we don't,
then they can do whatever they want without strong or organized resistance.
I find it odd that you would argue that this type of argument is a "mind
virus" since you do make it, at least occasionally.