Sermon on the Mount
Paleo
> BTW, despite some real disagreements, I enjoy this exchange. Due to space
> problems I snipped a lot from previous posts (not your most recent post, but
> the ones before that).
I must say that it's nice to talk to somebody in this ng
(alt.society.liberalism is where I'm reading it) who can stick to a topic
sans endless boring personal abuse. I used to do volunteer work at a
state insane mental hospital. There was one ward where, as soon as you
opened the door, you were assaulted with loud lamentations, imprecations,
screams, etc. I am reminded of that place every time I look at this ng.
> >> The extreme ideologies of the Left and the Right marked
> >> the modernist peak of early 20th century life, though in
> >> some ways they simply used high tech to do what authoritarian
> >> leaders, often religious leaders, did in other societies.
> >You're evading the point, and you're making an illegitimate comparison in
> >the process.
> I don't think so -- I'm trying to point out that Communism as practiced had a
> lot in common with other ideologies, and the bogey man wasn't just communism,
> but was a set of social problems in the 20th century.
Look. I think this started because I attempted to show that mid-century
American fundamentalists tended to be in favor of big defense budgets
because of what they perceived as a special and unprecedented threat from
communism. It was the most homicidal political philosophy in the history
of the world. It was implacably opposed to Christianity, having executed
tens of thousands of priests, pastors, monks, nuns, missionaries and
ordinary believers.
This fact would appear easily to account for the response of American
fundies toward communism. You appear to be dragging in some "set of
social problems in the 20th century." I don't know what they might be.
But it's clear that American Christians weren't horrified by whatever
this "set of socials problems" were. They were horrified by mass
murdering regimes that made Hitler look like a Boy Scout. And that's
plenty to account for their attitude.
> > No regime on the right mounted an assault on human life and
> >dignity even remotely comparable to that of the communists. The Nazis,
> >needless to say, were creatures of the left, but even if for the sake of
> You're simply wrong here, the Nazis were far right, and the ideology of
> fascism and nazism is fundamentally different than that of the Left. Consult
> Thobaben and Funderburk, "Political Ideologies," and a book by Leon Baradat by
> the same name, for more exact comparisons. I also have a standard response
> citing political philosophers and historians which make the distinction
> clearly (and if you take any course on political ideology and philosophy,
> you'll see the essential differences). Simply: fascism was irrationalist,
> nationalist, had no goal except the will to power, and had variations ranging
> from Franco's extreme church-centered conservatism (he even stayed out of the
> war and was very religious), and Hitler's social darwinist racism. Communism
> is a rationalist/objectivist ideology, materialist (fascism is not materialist
> at its core), with a belief that the right path is not up to humans to decide,
> but comes from laws of nature and social life.
> From the stand point of ideology, they are diametric opposites, and indeed
> detested each other. Their practices looked similar for the reasons I stated:
> that 20th century technology and modernism created the opportunity for strong
> central states to use and concentrate power. Some of it was psychological,
> leaders were drawn to power because of its ability to be truly "used."
As the history of taxonomy shows us--especially its clash with the
upstart science of cladistics--there can be an almost infinite number of
ways to classify animals, plants, objects and ideas. You can, if you
like, say that my cat Tigger and the field mice he occasionally catches
are more closely related to each other than the field mice and my
daughter's pet white mice, because the cat and the field mouse are both
colored gray, and the pet mice are white. On the basis of other
characteristics, we'd say the mice are more closely related to each other
than each are to the cat. It all depends on which criteria you posit as
most fundamental.
You have cited a number of classification criteria which have something
to be said in their favor (except the rationalist/irrationalist thing,
because Communism was based on deluded claims about rationality and
"science"). And the claim about teleogy is suspect as well, but leave
that for another time.
A better way to understand fascism and communism and their relation to
"right" and "left" is contained in Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn's "Leftism
Revisited: From de Sade and Marx to Hitler and Pol Pot." As he points
out, there is nothing in fascism that Edmund Burke, that great
articulator of conservative truths, would find congenial or even
understandable. Because, as Kuehnelt-Leddihn writes, "The true rightist
is not a man who wants to go back to this or that institution for the
sake of return; he wants first to find out what is eternally true,
eternally valid, and then either to restore it or to reinstall it,
regardless of whether it seems obsolete, whether it is ancient,
contemporary, brand new, or ultra modern."
The Left, by contrast, "is the enemy of diversity and the fanatical
promoter of identity. Unformity is stressed in all leftist utopias,
paradises in which everybody is the same, envy is dead, and the enemy is
either dead, lives outside the gates, or is utterly humiliated. Leftism
loathes differences, deviations, stratifications."
We see these characteristics abundantly illustrated in communist states,
in fascist states, and in the program of contemporary American liberals.
There can be no disagreement, everything must be the same. A state, such
as Virginia, whose populace was content to train only men at its state-
supported military academy because they believed that the profession of
warrior is male in character, must be ground under the heel of brutal
centralized power and hauled back into line. VMI must be destroyed,
because dissent may not be tolerated.
In the place of the bourgeois democratic state state which tolerated
different communities and mediating institutions doing things their own
way, the liberal, the fascist and the communist all insist on installing
the all-powerful central state which oversees everything and erases all
diversity. Leftists worship centralized power; rightists prefer
federalism.
I suggest that this is a better way of understanding where these
philosophies belong on the left/right scale, because it corresponds more
closely to what they actually believe and how they actually behave. I
have a fondness to sticking close to observed fact.
> >argument we put their total to the right's account, there's STILL no
> >comparison. Given this state of affairs, it would seem to be at least
> >forgiveable on the part of fundies that they perceived communism as a
> >special kind of mortal threat.
> I still think most communism was no more a threat than other authoritarian and
> totalitarian governments, and certainly wasn't threatening America.
You may or may not be correct about its threat to America, but it's
utterly perplexing that you could place the mass-murdering genocidal
states the communists established on the same level as nickel-and-dime
authoritarian tyrants.
> >If you're really worried about the concentration of power, you'll be
> >worried by the modern "liberal" mega-state.
> Indeed I am, though its not necessarily liberal. In ideological terms,
> liberalism is very distrustful of government...
Classical liberalism is, of course. Which is one reason why those who
call themselves "liberal" today have nothing whatever in common with
earlier liberals.
> But the term liberal is often
> used to mean "leftist" in political jargon, so I assume thats what you mean
> here. I think the EU's concept of "subsidiarity" has the best chance to give
> an alternative. Centralized power like we have it now in the advanced
> industrialized world does worry me.
Then there's hope for you <grin>.
> >I don't think we're on the same page with this "moral absolute" business.
> >I don't think I understand how you're using the phrase. You apparently
> >perceive some incoherence or hypocrisy on the part of the Church, or of
> >Christians. And somehow it's got something to do with Christian
> >attitudes toward communism. What is your point?
> My point is simply that if the morality of how you treat fellow humans changes
> because of their ideology, its a situational sort of morality (this is moral
> if the person is Communist, but not if she is Christian). That's OK, as long
> as its clear we're talking situational and not absolute morals.
But the morality of how Christians treated other human beings did NOT
change. What are you talking about?
> >Please tell me you're not serious. Lenin and Stalin murdered thousands
> >of priests, monks and nuns, not to mention garden-variety Christians,
> >took away church buildings and officially trashed Christianity at every
> >opportunity. This pattern was repeated in China with the much smaller
> >percentage of Christians there. And you're seriously suggesting that
> >Christians were "misperceiving" what they could see with their own eyes?
> Christians in America were not threatened by any of this...
Possibly you're right, though I suspect you're not.
> ...and Christianity in
> Russia survived as the government learned to accept it unofficially.
> Religions have been attacked by various governments throughout history.
But NOT with the sustained ferocity and barbarism of the communists, who
were so blatantly idolized by American liberals.
> >Please show me how I'm allowing ethics to be "altered."
> Simply: if fear of Communism makes somethings just or moral that otherwise
> would not be, then that fear has altered the ethical stance taken.
But this didn't happen. So there's no problem. Unless you can
demonstrate otherwise.
> >No, it's not. It's simply a recognition of Reality As We Know It. A
> >nation-state with millions of people in it is NOT an individual, nor can
> >it afford to behave like one.
> But the bottom line is that nation-states don't act, individuals act.
> Individuals are government...
But government is NOT individuals.
> Individual decisions across the board create
> state action. Each individual has to decide the morality of the act they will
> take, be it a decision to use an atomic bomb that he knows will kill thousands
> of innocents, or a decision to grab the gun and go attack Serbs in Kosovo.
This is all very well, but you can't gamble with the lives of millions of
innocent people, as the Church very early on recognized. It's one thing
to decide you're gonna turn the other cheek yourself; it's something
entirely different to be placed in a position of trust and sacrifice the
lives of millions of other people.
> >I can't tell if you really disagree or not. The Church has taught that
> >the Beatitudes are not an essay in statecraft. It's been clear on this
> >point. For reasons roughly as I outline above--you can't gamble with the
> >lives of millions of innocents, including children. There is no
> >relativism or hypocrisy here.
> It still seems to me very relativist -- these moral teachings apply to
> somethings, but in the situation of statecraft they don't apply...
Right. For sensible, utterly understandable real-world reasons.
> That would
> be situational morality...
But it's clearly not. It's merely to recognize that rulers have a
different set of responsibilities than do individual Christians.
> If they do apply to statecraft and its just more
> difficult to understand how, then you'd have a point. But since statecraft is
> a result of individual behavior, and if individual morality is constant,
> individuals engaged in statescraft have to adhere to the same moral principles
> as if they are engaged in any other human activity. The morality of their
> actions cannot change.
A father and household head may decide to give a hundred dollars to the
robber who just held him up and took the ten bucks in his wallet. He is
NOT justified in letting the same person steal his kids' toys and sell
them for drugs. Think about it.
> >> Just war theory is pretty vague...
> >As Aquinas formulated it, it's pretty clear. It has not been
> >communicated with clarity many times, and for that the Church is
> >culpable.
> Well, a quibble. It really comes from Augustine, and then Aquinas, Di Vitorio
> and others added to it, and discussed it. Its sort of a set of principles
> which are very hard to apply (there are numerous discussions and debates, with
> some saying that the theory makes NO war justifiable, to disagreements about
> such things as "success must be likely," it must be the "ultima ratio" or
> "last resort," or "proportionality" (you can't use more force than required to
> achieve a minimum -- its not any means necessary; the atom bomb would fail
> that test), or that protection of non-combattants must be guaranteed (this
> means military deaths even on ones own side are preferable to killing
> innocents on the other side).
This is all true. For the record, my friend Joe Sobran agrees with you
about bombing the Japanese. I think he's probably right, but I am
"conflicted," as the trendoids say, because without the bomb, it is very
likely that neither me nor my sister and brothers would have been given
life.
> >If you believe there is such a thing as truth amidst a welter of untruth-
> >-and it makes no difference what the truth concerns, only that there can
> >be such a thing--then it should come as no surprise that one religion
> >might be true and others be, to varying degrees, false. I don't
> >understand why this should trouble people.
> I agree there is truth, but that NO religion has the whole truth...
But how can you so confidently put forward such a proposition? It sounds
as if you consider yourself to be in possession of an absolute truth--
namely, that no religion comprehends all truth.
> ...and all
> share understandings of parts of it. In fact, I can think of no test as to
> which religion is the truth, and all should recognize that they might be wrong
> and the other right, absent proof. That kind of humility is the key to
> understanding, I think. Assuming one is right because one has faith one is
> right is a logical error.
Sure. I merely say you're unjustified in stating as an a priori truth
that no religion is the true religion. You would seem to be claiming the
kind of absolute truth you deny to everyone else.
> >But a religion offers an account of reality. It makes certain truth
> >claims about human nature and purpose, the universe and its origin and
> >fate, etc. If we take it as axiomatic that truth is a good thing, then
> >if you believe you have the truth, you're more or less bound to share the
> >good news with others, n'est-ce pas? And that means potentially large
> >numbers of people, right? How could it be otherwise?
> Part of my truth claim is that the nature of reality is (based on evidence
> I've seen) that we only have glimpses at the truth, without being certain we
> have the whole thing, and that this uncertainty is likely a necessary aspect
> of living in his reality. I may be wrong, but right now it seems to me that
> many religious truth claims are based on wishful thinking, and are in and of
> themselves no discernable from many other religious truth claims.
If you mean that you need faith, yeah. But this isn't exactly a new
revelation.
> I think that is something that religions should acknowledge (many theologians
> do, but many of the 'faithful' do not).
There is more than one kind of religion. A few claim to have a
comprehensive and truthful account of reality. You may disagree that
such a thing is possible. But it's impossible for you to prove
otherwise. We're back to square one.
> >Why does this bother you? You don't have a set of beliefs in whose truth
> >you believe strongly enough to inculcate them into your kids? Why should
> >the Church be any different?
> The problem is the church treats people as kids their whole life...
By this you simply mean that it claims to be in possession of a number of
ultimate truths. You're free to disagree. But to make such a claim is
NOT to treat believers as children. It's simply to propose that there
has been divine revelation, and here it is.
> ...Its one
> thing to teach ethics and explain them, but its another to teach as truth a
> whole dogma that is unprovable and questionable...
For some reason it seems to offend you that some entities believe
themselves to be in possession of truths that are, finally, not subject
to change. Why, I have no idea.
> I want to teach kids to
> understand various views on ethics and religion, and choose for themselves...
I can almost bet the farm that this is NOT what you really believe. You
don't REALLY believe that you'd be happy if one of your kids wound up
buying into, say, the KKK's vision of humanity. I suspect you'd be
willing to teach them that the KKK is, beyond doubt and question,
completely wrong. This kind of teaching partakes of precisely the same
kind absolute quality you profess to dislike coming from the Church.
> ...My beef with organized
> religion is it often neglects the idea that humans can and should think for
> themselves, acting more like an ideology than a search for the truth.
The Church, at different times and places, has been guilty of this. But
it's not hardwired into its doctrine. I hope you're not suggesting, for
example, that Flannery O'Connor couldn't "think for herself." We all
have to operate on certain axiomatic propositions whose truth we can't
demonstrate. You most certainly do yourself. The Church merely proposes
a certain set of axioms. That is, it's not putting you in an existential
situation that is one whit different than the one you already and of
necessity MUST occupy.
> >On the other hand, the armed ideology that was assailing the south was
> >the most homicidal political philosophy in the history of the world.
> >Nothing could compare with its heinousness.
> I disagree...
OK. Show me an ideology that outdid communism in mass murder.
> Ho wanted unity for his nation, and fewer deaths would have taken
> place and lifestyle would have been much better without the bloodshed. I
> think us going over there and proping up a corrupt unpopular regime in the
> south and then engaging in a war that led to the deaths of a million
> Vietnamese before we lost was the immoral act. Ho, like Castro (who met and
> got along well with the Pope, I might add!), wanted to improve things for his
> people. Sure, his choice of communism was wrong, but understandable, and many
> on the Left were not like Stalin or Mao in their acts. In fact, we could have
> helped Ho in the late forties when he asked us for help, and probably even got
> along well with him. Paranoia of communism led to bad policy.
You may be correct from a prudential standpoint about U.S. policy. But
that wasn't my point. Communism's bloody record was clear. It was
sensible to fear it. As Delmore Schwarz often said, even paranoids have
real enemies. Communism is/was a real enemy.
> >The Church doesn't expect your faith to be ignorant. The intellectual
> >edifice built on the Christian worldview is impressive, especially the
> >Roman parts. But in the last analysis, you always found your life on
> >axioms that, by their nature, are unprovable. The atheist can no more
> >prove his than can the Christian. But the Christian can, by contrast,
> >point to a magnificent and humane civilization that is the result of his
> >own religion. Not a bad place to cast your lot.
> Well, at various times Islam, Hinduism, and many other religions could make
> that same point (and indeed, the best civilizations tend to be tolerant of
> many religions). For a long time the Christian world was barbaric...
Because Christian truths don't transform societies overnight.
> ...the
> Europeans were among the most backward civilizations (especially northern
> Europeans) until things like the printing press and renaissance came along.
> Its not just Christianity. But sure, I respect the kind of Christianity you
> describe above, just as Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and other religions also
> deserve that same level of respect.
I don't disrespect them. I merely contend that the Church doesn't expect
you to be ignorant or fear asking questions.
> >Nevertheless, the Church teaches that we are to opt for life whenever
> >possible.
> I don't know -- but that would make any kind of war other than direct
> self-defense immoral. Certainly going to Vietnam to fight, or even to Germany
> in WWII would be seen as risking ones life.
I think there can be a just war, in the classical sense, that consists in
protecting innocent people from the depredations of mass murderers.
> >I still have no idea what you're talking about. Ethical rules exist in a
> >blooming, buzzing, confusing world where laboratory-pure conditions
> >seldom prevail. Complexity is the order of the day. You seem to believe
> >that Christ's teaching is somehow compromised by the Church, but I
> >haven't seen a specific example.
> I think its compromised by the Church trying to be part of the world...
The Church has no choice. It's plopped down in the middle of the world.
> ...trying
> to use a teaching of individual morality to deal with worldly problems of war
> and the like in a way that allows it to be a powerful actor. I think it
> realized that the otherworldliness of Christianity made it doomed to being a
> sideline moral teaching unless made to fit in with the logic of power in the
> real world. That happened to many other religions. I guess I think that
> humans can turn a good idea into an excuse for bad things. But that doesn't
> mean the Church is "bad," only that it is human, fallible, and often does the
> wrong thing.
If all you're saying is that the princes of the Church have screwed up on
many occasions, welcome to the club. Old news. Dante pictured a hell
whose floor was paved with the skulls of bad popes. This is in no way
incompatible with the notion of the Church as the Spotless Bride of
Christ, nor does it mean that the Church qua Church has compromised the
teaching of its Master.
> >Actually, no. The Church is one, just like she always was. Orthodoxy,
> >namely. But please don't let's get into an ecclesiastical argument.
> The church is an abstraction; humans act, interpret and make mistakes.
The claim that the Church is an abstraction is one that would have been
regarded as risible by the early Christians. The Church was (and still
is) a visible and identifiable body.
> >> >But of course. A religion purports to have a coherent account of
> >> >reality. If it changed, it'd be an odd religion.
> >> But it does change...
> >Protestantism is the essence of change. Rome has changed some things,
> >though far less. Orthodoxy none at all.
> None at all? But from what I hear from Russia, changes are in the air as the
> church realizes that it has to deal with modern problems and win back people
> who left. We'll see.
I am aware of no changes in doctrine coming from Russia. In fact, the
Russian Orthodox are the most hidebound in the world. They make American
fundamentalists look like bubble-headed trend-hounds.
> >Why is this fact supposedly incompatible with the notion that one
> >religion might possess the complete truth?
> The thing is that we have no idea what religion possesses the complete truth,
> if any...
Look. You're merely saying that, without faith, we can know nothing.
This ain't exactly front-page news. Paul repeated it over and over
again. It may be that faith ain't for you. But you can't understand a
religion if you insist on analyzing it with alien categories.
> It could be Hinduism, it could be Buddhism, it could be that they all
> have incomplete notions of truth. Unless one gives me a reason to believe
> beyond simply the fact that the church claims it has the complete truth, it
> seems a belief system based on irrationality. I think one can be a rational
> Christian, but only if one recognizes that one's faith might be wrong.
"Master, we would see a sign from thee." You ain't the first guy to ask
this question. You appear to be saying that the only good Christian is a
bad Christian. I.e., one who doubts his Church.
> >Do you believe that truth is good? That it's good for someone to know
> >the truth? If so, why would you refuse to share something that's good?
> The truth is good, but believing you know the one truth when you really don't
> (or if legitimate doubt exists) can lead to self-delusion and in the hands of
> people who may not have your patience, can lead to a desire to force people to
> accept this one truth for their own good. Saying that truth is good doesn't
> mean that one's belief in what's true really is true, after all.
> ciao, scott
The problem here is that you in fact believe yourself to be in possession
of a number of ground truths. I simply don't think you're aware of it.
And you would deny to others what you assume for yourself.
Scott D. Erb
(Note: this is part one of my reply, part two will follow)
>> I don't think so -- I'm trying to point out that Communism as practiced had
a
>> lot in common with other ideologies, and the bogey man wasn't just
communism,
>> but was a set of social problems in the 20th century.
>
>Look. I think this started because I attempted to show that mid-century
>American fundamentalists tended to be in favor of big defense budgets
>because of what they perceived as a special and unprecedented threat from
>communism. It was the most homicidal political philosophy in the history
>of the world. It was implacably opposed to Christianity, having executed
>tens of thousands of priests, pastors, monks, nuns, missionaries and
>ordinary believers.
My point is that you are blaming the ideology for acts done by power hungry
politicians who were driven by things other than the ideology. For instance,
Marx would have been appalled by what Stalin did, Socialist and Leftist
ideology in general argues that humans cannot be truly free unless there is no
exploitation and oppression, and claim capitalism as a system allows some to
get wealthy by exploiting others. Remember, Marx and Engels were inspired by
seeing the horrid conditions in the slums of London. Their dislike of
religion comes from the fact that the upper classes used religion to tell
people to simply give in and not struggle against that oppression.
Now, they were wrong on many points. Marx didn't think democracy could work
against that oppression, he didn't think capitalists would allow things like
child labor laws or worker safety laws, etc. Politics in a democracy did what
Marx considered impossible. Marx also ignored culture and religion, focusing
on economics as driving things; that was also wrong. Lenin thought that to
remake the society to one where there would be no oppression, culture would
have to be reformed, meaning a vanguard party at the top. This centralized
power making it inevitable that a power hungry kook like Stalin could get
drawn to it and abuse it. Communism as practiced was inhumane, but the
ideology was built upon an humane if misguided dream.
>This fact would appear easily to account for the response of American
>fundies toward communism. You appear to be dragging in some "set of
>social problems in the 20th century." I don't know what they might be.
Centralized power, the advent of a pure modernist/materialist society, and
reactions by other traditionalists (the far right, with the fascists on the
extreme) and the socialists (with the Communists on the extreme) to what they
didn't like in the new liberal (free market/individualist) system.
>But it's clear that American Christians weren't horrified by whatever
>this "set of socials problems" were. They were horrifed by mass
>murdering regimes that made Hitler look like a Boy Scout. And that's
>plenty to account for their attitude.
Hitler can't look like a boy scout. His regime killed 11 million, and started
a war that killed near 30 million more. Totalitarian regimes, left right or
neither, all have a pretty bad record. The U.S. had a low tech holocaust
against the Indians, commiting true genocide in many cases (eliminating
languages and cultures). It was part of the spread/growth of modernism,
combining often with racism and exceptionalist beliefs.
-snip valid point on classifications-
>You have cited a number of classification criteria which have something
>to be said in their favor (except the rationalist/irrationalist thing,
>because Communism was based on deluded claims about rationality and
>"science"). And the claim about teleogy is suspect as well, but leave
>that for another time.
The rationalist/irrationalist difference is the essential defining
characteristic of each. Marx's ideas still have power because his scholarship
in Kapital was outstanding, and even modern capitalist economists borrow from
some of his methods. He was committed to science and rationality and falsely
believed he had uncovered laws of history through reason and evidence.
Fascism was overtly irrationalist and anti-intellectual, the opposite of
communism. Fascism tied into nationalism, while communism was
internationalist, focusing on class. Fascism appealled to traditions, while
communism opposed traditionalism. Fascism was supported by right wingers and
nationalists, often because it was seen as a bulwark against communism.
>A better way to understand fascism and communism and their relation to
>"right" and "left" is contained in Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn's "Leftism
>Revisited: From de Sade and Marx to Hitler and Pol Pot." As he points
That kind of work always struck me as "let's define all of the bad guys as one
thing, opposite to us, to help us defend our ideology." I don't think it
works, its a re-interpretation of reality with an extreme, and in my view,
unfounded, bias.
>out, there is nothing in fascism that Edmund Burke, that great
>articulator of conservative truths, would find congenial or even
>understandable. Because, as Kuehnelt-Leddihn writes, "The true rightist
Oh yes, fascism ended up being as anti-conservative as it was anti-communist.
The irrationality of its approach led it to even turn and eat its hosts, the
right wing supporters who thought it was their savoir. But that doesn't make
it left wing; Stalin and left wing extremists (leftists often call Stalin a
right wing fascist who betrayed the ideals of communism) turned the
rationalization of power into something that denied the values of the left,
that being to end exploitation and work for true justice and freedom. Simply,
the extremes of each ended up betraying all the values that actually guided
the ideologies.
>is not a man who wants to go back to this or that institution for the
>sake of return; he wants first to find out what is eternally true,
>eternally valid, and then either to restore it or to reinstall it,
>regardless of whether it seems obsolete, whether it is ancient,
>contemporary, brand new, or ultra modern."
That is one definition, but not one most conservatives would embrace.
Liberalism is also based on a belief in truth and a search for universally
valid laws. All ideologies make a claim like that, even Marx was seeking what
is universally true.
>The Left, by contrast, "is the enemy of diversity and the fanatical
>promoter of identity. Unformity is stressed in all leftist utopias,
>paradises in which everybody is the same, envy is dead, and the enemy is
>either dead, lives outside the gates, or is utterly humiliated. Leftism
>loathes differences, deviations, stratifications."
That simply shows the author is demonizing the left with no understanding of
it. Marx certainly did not see things that way, leftist utopias I see have no
central state, individuals choose their own values, and most leftists see what
you describe as the result of capitalism, oppressing people and promoting
values that can be marketed by elites. What the author has done is try to
defend his own ideological predilections with an unfair and unaccurate
condemnation of all ideologies that are to the "left," not recognizing the
variations and the reality of what is argued and done. Roberto Unger's notion
of politics and anti-statist socialism, Laclau and Mouffe's post-Marxism and
rejection of attempts to try to create conformity and leftist ideals that see
diversity and individual chosen identity as a primary value.
The author you quote is simply wrong -- though I'll check out the work and
look at his argument with more depth.
>We see these characteristics abundantly illustrated in communist states,
>in fascist states, and in the program of contemporary American liberals.
Most contemporary American liberals are appalled by both communism and
fascism, and simply seek to expand individual liberty through making equal
opportunity a reality (education, health care, ending discrimination on race,
lifestyle, gender, etc.) That is a direct outgrowth of the ideas of John
Stuart Mill and the "new liberalism" of 19th century England (as "new"
liberals realized that classical liberalism tended to create ghettos and a lot
of social injustice). The key: such liberalism is an alternative to socialist
thought, as it rejects the idea that capitalism must be destroyed, but only
says it has to be tamed through government regulation to assure equal
opportunity.
>There can be no disagreement, everything must be the same. A state, such
>as Virginia, whose populace was content to train only men at its state-
>supported military academy because they believed that the profession of
>warrior is male in character, must be ground under the heel of brutal
>centralized power and hauled back into line. VMI must be destroyed,
>because dissent may not be tolerated.
That seems to fit in with traditional liberal values (not leftist values),
which stress individual liberty over traditions that deny equal liberty.
Traditional liberals (the extreme form is libertarianism) tend to be
dramatically opposed to socialism and leftist thought.
>In the place of the bourgeois democratic state state which tolerated
>different communities and mediating institutions doing things their own
>way, the liberal, the fascist and the communist all insist on installing
>the all-powerful central state which oversees everything and erases all
>diversity. Leftists worship centralized power; rightists prefer
>federalism.
No. I am a leftist, and I'm absolutely opposed to centralized power, and in
fact prefer something more confederal than federal. The reason is that I
believe in the ideals of the left (ending oppression and exploitation), but
disagree with the tactics (trying to force this change). I believe that
changes only come through choices made within a culture, trying to change
things from the top through regulations tends to simply create new problems.
Therefore, I agree with people like Unger and others who see politics as a
cultural battle to empower individuals and localities, and allow them to make
choices without being controlled by governmental or business elites. I see
the true goal of the left to right such concentrations of power, and that
statist socialism is as much an anti-leftist system as fascism was
anti-conservative. I respect true conservatives, I don't respect fascists. I
respect true liberals, I don't respect communists.
>I suggest that this is a better way of understanding where these
>philosophies belong on the left/right scale, because it corresponds more
>closely to what they actually believe and how they actually behave. I
>have a fondness to sticking close to observed fact.
But then we could also put Stalin on the far right with Hitler...the
left-right scale is probably irrelevant, its really multi-dimensional. To
some extent, arguing about which side to put one ends up being an exercise in
futility.
>You may or may not be correct about its threat to America, but it's
>utterly perplexing that you could place the mass-murdering genocidal
>states the communists established on the same level as nickel-and-dime
>authoritarian tyrants.
Some Communist states, like Cuba and Vietnam after the war were much less
homocial than many authoritarian regimes, like Guatamala, Chile, various
African regimes, etc.
>Classical liberalism is, of course. Which is one reason why those who
>call themselves "liberal" today have nothing whatever in common with
>earlier liberals.
Again, the connection comes from the new liberalism of J.S. Mill and others,
emerging in Britain in the 19th century.
>But the morality of how Christians treated other human beings did NOT
>change. What are you talking about?
In war you shoot to kill someone who has done you no harm and probably has
just been ordered there by political leaders. There is no way that can be
seen as a moral act in any teaching I see from the New Testament. Its a game
of the world, so to speak, something I would think any true believing
Christian would opt out of.
-snip-
>But NOT with the sustained ferocity and barbarism of the communists, who
>were so blatantly idolized by American liberals.
That's unfair; in the thirties when the truth about Stalin was unclear, many
liberal intellectuals did see hope in the Russian experiment. By the late
forties, as the truth became very clear, they realized that what Russia tried
was an abject failure, and most accepted that such an approach was not a way
to a better world.
>> Simply: if fear of Communism makes somethings just or moral that otherwise
>> would not be, then that fear has altered the ethical stance taken.
>
>But this didn't happen. So there's no problem. Unless you can
>demonstrate otherwise.
Well, it does seem that war and intervention in the affairs of others was
justified, but I won't quibble since I don't recall exactly what the example
was.
>> >No, it's not. It's simply a recognition of Reality As
>> But the bottom line is that nation-states don't act, individuals act.
>> Individuals are government...
>
>But government is NOT individuals.
So the whole is greater than the parts? How Marxian :) Seriously, government
is made up of individuals. Individuals act to make a government act. How
else can you conceptualize it?
>This is all very well, but you can't gamble with the lives of millions of
>innocent people, as the Church very early on recognized. It's one thing
>to decide you're gonna turn the other cheek yourself; it's something
>entirely different to be placed in a position of trust and sacrifice the
>lives of millions of other people.
But wouldn't Christian morality say you are to let the individual people all
make their own decisions, that you simply should act according to morality,
not based on the consequences of the act (again, that kind of consequentialism
you promote here is really situational ethics -- because the situation
differs, you're in government and there are other lives at stake, your actions
are judged b a different ethical standard; its OK to order killings because
you can't play with the lives of others, etc.) If you want to make that
argument, fine, but recognize that once you give into situational ethics in
one issue, that opens up a lot of doors for attacks on other times where you
may want to engage in absolute discussions of morality.
Most people do have a system of ethics that is relativist/situational at base,
so if you do, I don't see that as bad. But I think it is bad if someone
claims an absolute ethical set of beliefs but then changes them when
convenient based on the situation.
>> It still seems to me very relativist -- these moral teachings apply to
>> somethings, but in the situation of statecraft they don't apply...
>
>Right. For sensible, utterly understandable real-world reasons.
OK, so ethics are situational if understandable real-world reasons make that
sensible. Great. I misunderstood you as arguing for an absolute sense of
moral truth that humans should stick to regardless of the situation. I still
disagree, but its because I tend to have a deontological view towards ethics
rather than a consequentialist or relativist view, but I recognize the
problems in my position and the logic in your situational perspective.
>But it's clearly not. It's merely to recognize that rulers have a
>different set of responsibilities than do individual Christians.
Because their situation is different. How else can you justify humans having
different moral responsibilities?
>A father and household head may decide to give a hundred dollars to the
>robber who just held him up and took the ten bucks in his wallet. He is
>NOT justified in letting the same person steal his kids' toys and sell
>them for drugs. Think about it.
I do not think he is justified in killing someone for trying to steal his
kids' toys. I do think he should intervene and protect his kids if they are in
danger, but the attempt should be to use non-lethal force and focus on escape.
My view (based on reading everything from simple anti-war pacifists to hard
core no violence pacifists) is that force to protect others should be the
minimal necessary to assure escape; if some kind of force is needed that leads
to the killing of the "bad guy," it is acceptable as long as the force was not
beyond what was needed to escape, and that the goal or intent was not to kill
or try to achieve retribution.
But of course, this is something I still am working through, as I will be my
whole life.
More later, no time right now to reply to the rest of the e-mail...
adios, scott
Paleo
says...
> >Look. I think this started because I attempted to show that mid-century
> >American fundamentalists tended to be in favor of big defense budgets
> >because of what they perceived as a special and unprecedented threat from
> >communism. It was the most homicidal political philosophy in the history
> >of the world. It was implacably opposed to Christianity, having executed
> >tens of thousands of priests, pastors, monks, nuns, missionaries and
> >ordinary believers.
> My point is that you are blaming the ideology for acts done by power hungry
> politicians who were driven by things other than the ideology...
So the attempted extinction of the Jews had nothing to do with Naziism?
It was just the acts of power-hungry individuals?
In excusing the genocide of the communists, you've got a huge logical
task ahead of you. Communist regimes all over the world have engaged in
brutal mass murder and genocide to a degree witnessed nowhere else. The
common factor is the ideology of communism. And you seriously suggest
that communism is not at fault?
> For instance,
> Marx would have been appalled by what Stalin did...
Maybe. But maybe not. In any case, it's beside the point.
> ...Socialist and Leftist
> ideology in general argues that humans cannot be truly free unless there is no
> exploitation and oppression, and claim capitalism as a system allows some to
> get wealthy by exploiting others. Remember, Marx and Engels were inspired by
> seeing the horrid conditions in the slums of London. Their dislike of
> religion comes from the fact that the upper classes used religion to tell
> people to simply give in and not struggle against that oppression.
> Now, they were wrong on many points. Marx didn't think democracy could work
> against that oppression, he didn't think capitalists would allow things like
> child labor laws or worker safety laws, etc. Politics in a democracy did what
> Marx considered impossible. Marx also ignored culture and religion, focusing
> on economics as driving things; that was also wrong. Lenin thought that to
> remake the society to one where there would be no oppression, culture would
> have to be reformed, meaning a vanguard party at the top. This centralized
> power making it inevitable that a power hungry kook like Stalin could get
> drawn to it and abuse it. Communism as practiced was inhumane, but the
> ideology was built upon an humane if misguided dream.
These are mostly unremarkable claims. But they have nothing to do with
the original point, so far as I can see, which was whether or not
American fundamentalists were justified in their fear of communist
states.
> >This fact would appear easily to account for the response of American
> >fundies toward communism. You appear to be dragging in some "set of
> >social problems in the 20th century." I don't know what they might be.
> Centralized power, the advent of a pure modernist/materialist society, and
> reactions by other traditionalists (the far right, with the fascists on the
> extreme) and the socialists (with the Communists on the extreme) to what they
> didn't like in the new liberal (free market/individualist) system.
Look. The premiere example of centralized power in the 20th century has
been communist states. Nothing like it existed in the democracies, and
you'll find it very difficult to maintain that the Nazi state was, in any
sense a traditionalist would recognize, "traditionalist." I don't think
you clearly have in mind a point you want to make. I keep drawing your
attention back to the original proposition: American fundamentalists were
justified in their fear of communists, and they saw nothing remotely
comparable to it on the global scene. You have yet to put forward any
counter, so far as I can see, that this fear on their part was in any way
unrealistic.
> >But it's clear that American Christians weren't horrified by whatever
> >this "set of socials problems" were. They were horrifed by mass
> >murdering regimes that made Hitler look like a Boy Scout. And that's
> >plenty to account for their attitude.
> Hitler can't look like a boy scout. His regime killed 11 million, and started
> a war that killed near 30 million more. Totalitarian regimes, left right or
> neither, all have a pretty bad record...
With the exception that there have been no totalitarian regimes on the
right, of course. The very concept of totalitarianism is foreign to the
true right.
> ...The U.S. had a low tech holocaust
> against the Indians, commiting true genocide in many cases (eliminating
> languages and cultures). It was part of the spread/growth of modernism,
> combining often with racism and exceptionalist beliefs.
OK.
> >You have cited a number of classification criteria which have something
> >to be said in their favor (except the rationalist/irrationalist thing,
> >because Communism was based on deluded claims about rationality and
> >"science"). And the claim about teleogy is suspect as well, but leave
> >that for another time.
> The rationalist/irrationalist difference is the essential defining
> characteristic of each. Marx's ideas still have power because his scholarship
> in Kapital was outstanding...
Please. I hope you're joking. It was precisely his scholarship that was
almost unbelievably shoddy and indeed knowingly dishonest. He had zero
experience of agriculture or industry--so far as anybody knows, he never
set foot in a mine, a factory or a mill in his entire life. And he
contemptuously rejected the advice of those who actually DID have some
experience of the lives of working men.
I had History of Economics under the remarkable David Friedman, the son
of Milton Friedman, and we actually read "Capital" from start to finish.
I have never encountered another person, conservative or liberal, even in
university circumstances, who has similarly plowed through this farrago
of lies and nonsense as I did, from first page to last.
His so-called scientific treatment of the conditions of the working class
in England in based entirely on a book by Engels which he knew to be
based solely on out-of-date secondary sources whose age is consistently
misrepresented. The book is pockmarked with errors and distortions which
were discovered and publicized in 1848 in a work that Marx himself was
familiar with, so he can't plead ignorance. Marx himself used quotations
in a dishonest way and misrepresented their date and/or source. He
selectively used facts chosen solely because they supported his
preconceived notions and ignored all disconformatory information. His
refused to investigate conditions as they actually were, and his contempt
for those who did was boundless.
For a short but thorough precis of his dishonesties, see the chapter on
Marx in "Intellectuals" by Paul Johnson, which utterly annihilates the
fantasy that Marx was a scholar.
> ...and even modern capitalist economists borrow from
> some of his methods...
Who? The plagiarists?
> He was committed to science and rationality and falsely
> believed he had uncovered laws of history through reason and evidence.
This is simply untrue, and it's not merely untrue. It's so utterly the
opposite of his actual method that it's a surreal description of his
method. It is literally impossible to find another "scholar" who was as
irrationalist as this one.
> Fascism was overtly irrationalist and anti-intellectual, the opposite of
> communism...
"Opposite," indeed. It shared many features in common with communism.
It is literally impossible, of course, to get any more irrational than
Marx.
> Fascism tied into nationalism, while communism was
> internationalist, focusing on class. Fascism appealled to traditions...
What traditions? None that were familiar to German Christian culture.
Which WAS Germany.
> ...while
> communism opposed traditionalism. Fascism was supported by right wingers and
> nationalists, often because it was seen as a bulwark against communism.
Fascism was intially supported by any number of leftists, who correctly
perceived it to be socialist in nature.
> >A better way to understand fascism and communism and their relation to
> >"right" and "left" is contained in Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn's "Leftism
> >Revisited: From de Sade and Marx to Hitler and Pol Pot." As he points
> That kind of work always struck me as "let's define all of the bad guys as one
> thing, opposite to us, to help us defend our ideology." I don't think it
> works, its a re-interpretation of reality with an extreme, and in my view,
> unfounded, bias.
If you think it's unfounded, you're welcome, of course, to challenge him
on his interpretation. Fire away.
> >out, there is nothing in fascism that Edmund Burke, that great
> >articulator of conservative truths, would find congenial or even
> >understandable. Because, as Kuehnelt-Leddihn writes, "The true rightist
> Oh yes, fascism ended up being as anti-conservative as it was anti-communist.
It STARTED OUT being anti-conservative. From the start, it portrayed
itself as socialistic.
> The irrationality of its approach led it to even turn and eat its hosts, the
> right wing supporters who thought it was their savoir. But that doesn't make
> it left wing; Stalin and left wing extremists (leftists often call Stalin a
> right wing fascist who betrayed the ideals of communism) turned the
> rationalization of power into something that denied the values of the left,
> that being to end exploitation and work for true justice and freedom. Simply,
> the extremes of each ended up betraying all the values that actually guided
> the ideologies.
You are welcome to tackle von Kuehnelt-Leddihn's thesis. But you haven't
done so yet.
> >is not a man who wants to go back to this or that institution for the
> >sake of return; he wants first to find out what is eternally true,
> >eternally valid, and then either to restore it or to reinstall it,
> >regardless of whether it seems obsolete, whether it is ancient,
> >contemporary, brand new, or ultra modern."
> That is one definition, but not one most conservatives would embrace.
Indeed? It's a congenial definition to just about any conservative I've
ever heard of.
> Liberalism is also based on a belief in truth and a search for universally
> valid laws. All ideologies make a claim like that, even Marx was seeking what
> is universally true.
Liberalism, in the final analysis, is based on a single self-destroying
assumption: that nobody can be in final possession of the truth. Of
course, this insight is itself presented as a final truth, which is self-
contradictory. This is why liberalism is unalterably opposed to
Christianity: Christianity makes certain truth claims which are presented
as final and irrevocable. Liberalism cannot live with a system like this
in its midst. It must be progressively marginalized and pushed back into
the status of private hobby, its consequences and assumptions forbidden
from making an appearance in the public square. Liberalism finds it
impossible to make real moral distinctions. Which is why all moral
standards are eventually eroded, the most recent being the prohibition
against sex with children. Psychologists are making the first tentative
moves toward removing the stigma against this practice. In a generation
or two it will have the same status as homosexual behavior does today.
So far from searching for truth, liberalism is essentially nihilistic.
> >The Left, by contrast, "is the enemy of diversity and the fanatical
> >promoter of identity. Unformity is stressed in all leftist utopias,
> >paradises in which everybody is the same, envy is dead, and the enemy is
> >either dead, lives outside the gates, or is utterly humiliated. Leftism
> >loathes differences, deviations, stratifications."
> That simply shows the author is demonizing the left with no understanding of
> it...
On the contrary, he is merely describing how the left actually behaves,
as opposed to what it says it believes.
> Marx certainly did not see things that way...
Marx is out of the equation. He was a dishonest crank.
> ...leftist utopias I see have no central state...
puh-LEEZ. Leftist utopias embody the apotheosis of centralized power.
> ...individuals choose their own values...
Not if they conflict with those of the left. Which is why Christianity
is so feared by the left.
> ...and most leftists see what
> you describe as the result of capitalism, oppressing people and promoting
> values that can be marketed by elites...
Most leftists are unconscious of why they do what they do. In any case,
it's the ruling elite that's liberal.
> What the author has done is try to
> defend his own ideological predilections with an unfair and unaccurate
> condemnation of all ideologies that are to the "left," not recognizing the
> variations and the reality of what is argued and done...
OK. Show us some counter-examples.
> Roberto Unger's notion
> of politics and anti-statist socialism, Laclau and Mouffe's post-Marxism and
> rejection of attempts to try to create conformity and leftist ideals that see
> diversity and individual chosen identity as a primary value.
> The author you quote is simply wrong -- though I'll check out the work and
> look at his argument with more depth.
Better yet, give us some real-world examples that refute him.
> >We see these characteristics abundantly illustrated in communist states,
> >in fascist states, and in the program of contemporary American liberals.
> Most contemporary American liberals are appalled by both communism and
> fascism, and simply seek to expand individual liberty through making equal
> opportunity a reality (education, health care, ending discrimination on race,
> lifestyle, gender, etc.)...
What they in fact do is transfer income from one class to another by
means of confiscatory taxation. This does the precise opposite of
"expanding individual liberty." Where property rights don't exist,
neither does political liberty.
> That is a direct outgrowth of the ideas of John
> Stuart Mill and the "new liberalism" of 19th century England (as "new"
> liberals realized that classical liberalism tended to create ghettos and a lot
> of social injustice). The key: such liberalism is an alternative to socialist
> thought, as it rejects the idea that capitalism must be destroyed, but only
> says it has to be tamed through government regulation to assure equal
> opportunity.
Which is merely another way of saying that the managerial elite must
rule, as James Burnham so astutely predicted.
> >There can be no disagreement, everything must be the same. A state, such
> >as Virginia, whose populace was content to train only men at its state-
> >supported military academy because they believed that the profession of
> >warrior is male in character, must be ground under the heel of brutal
> >centralized power and hauled back into line. VMI must be destroyed,
> >because dissent may not be tolerated.
> That seems to fit in with traditional liberal values (not leftist values),
> which stress individual liberty over traditions that deny equal liberty.
> Traditional liberals (the extreme form is libertarianism) tend to be
> dramatically opposed to socialism and leftist thought.
What? VMI was destroyed at the behest of liberals. Because they loathe
diversity.
> >In the place of the bourgeois democratic state state which tolerated
> >different communities and mediating institutions doing things their own
> >way, the liberal, the fascist and the communist all insist on installing
> >the all-powerful central state which oversees everything and erases all
> >diversity. Leftists worship centralized power; rightists prefer
> >federalism.
> No. I am a leftist, and I'm absolutely opposed to centralized power, and in
> fact prefer something more confederal than federal...
Then you're not really a liberal. Because any liberal who foreswears the
use of centralized power and lets individual communities live as they
wish is a conservative, not a liberal.
> The reason is that I
> believe in the ideals of the left (ending oppression and exploitation), but
> disagree with the tactics (trying to force this change). I believe that
> changes only come through choices made within a culture, trying to change
> things from the top through regulations tends to simply create new problems.
> Therefore, I agree with people like Unger and others who see politics as a
> cultural battle to empower individuals and localities, and allow them to make
> choices without being controlled by governmental or business elites. I see
> the true goal of the left to right such concentrations of power, and that
> statist socialism is as much an anti-leftist system as fascism was
> anti-conservative. I respect true conservatives, I don't respect fascists. I
> respect true liberals, I don't respect communists.
Please show me a "true liberal" who has foresworn the coercive use of
centralized power.
> >I suggest that this is a better way of understanding where these
> >philosophies belong on the left/right scale, because it corresponds more
> >closely to what they actually believe and how they actually behave. I
> >have a fondness to sticking close to observed fact.
> But then we could also put Stalin on the far right with Hitler...the
> left-right scale is probably irrelevant, its really multi-dimensional. To
> some extent, arguing about which side to put one ends up being an exercise in
> futility.
You're right about one thing: Stalin and Hitler belong together.
> >You may or may not be correct about its threat to America, but it's
> >utterly perplexing that you could place the mass-murdering genocidal
> >states the communists established on the same level as nickel-and-dime
> >authoritarian tyrants.
> Some Communist states, like Cuba and Vietnam after the war were much less
> homocial than many authoritarian regimes, like Guatamala, Chile, various
> African regimes, etc.
I suspect this is untrue, but in any case, all you're saying is, "A few
communist states here and there didn't have quite the body count of
certain third-world mudholes." Not much of a recommendation.
> >Classical liberalism is, of course. Which is one reason why those who
> >call themselves "liberal" today have nothing whatever in common with
> >earlier liberals.
> Again, the connection comes from the new liberalism of J.S. Mill and others,
> emerging in Britain in the 19th century.
Mill disagreed with himself in so many places it's hard to figure out
what he really believed, but over most of his career, he resembled not in
the least liberals as they exist today.
> >But the morality of how Christians treated other human beings did NOT
> >change. What are you talking about?
> In war you shoot to kill someone who has done you no harm and probably has
> just been ordered there by political leaders. There is no way that can be
> seen as a moral act in any teaching I see from the New Testament. Its a game
> of the world, so to speak, something I would think any true believing
> Christian would opt out of.
This is not true. The Church has consistently taught that war is an
unavoidable evil that will be with us til the end of time, and indeed
that some wars are just. The Bible is the Church's book, as I said. You
can't lift out a verse here and there and use it to contradict the
Church's teaching.
> >But NOT with the sustained ferocity and barbarism of the communists, who
> >were so blatantly idolized by American liberals.
> That's unfair; in the thirties when the truth about Stalin was unclear, many
> liberal intellectuals did see hope in the Russian experiment. By the late
> forties, as the truth became very clear, they realized that what Russia tried
> was an abject failure, and most accepted that such an approach was not a way
> to a better world.
Malcolm Muggeridge was telling the truth about Stalin even during the
Ukraine terror/famine. Liberals didn't want to hear it. Liberals
continued to idolize various communist regimes up through Daniel Ortega,
by which time the truth about communism was old news.
> >> >No, it's not. It's simply a recognition of Reality As
> >> But the bottom line is that nation-states don't act, individuals act.
> >> Individuals are government...
> >But government is NOT individuals.
> So the whole is greater than the parts? How Marxian :) Seriously, government
> is made up of individuals. Individuals act to make a government act. How
> else can you conceptualize it?
A statesman is responsible for the lives of millions of innocent people.
What is appropriate for an individual--the meek shall inherit the earth--
is by no means appropriate for the statesman: the meek have their
countries overrun and their populations killed.
> >This is all very well, but you can't gamble with the lives of millions of
> >innocent people, as the Church very early on recognized. It's one thing
> >to decide you're gonna turn the other cheek yourself; it's something
> >entirely different to be placed in a position of trust and sacrifice the
> >lives of millions of other people.
> But wouldn't Christian morality say you are to let the individual people all
> make their own decisions, that you simply should act according to morality,
> not based on the consequences of the act (again, that kind of consequentialism
> you promote here is really situational ethics -- because the situation
> differs, you're in government and there are other lives at stake, your actions
> are judged b a different ethical standard; its OK to order killings because
> you can't play with the lives of others, etc.) If you want to make that
> argument, fine, but recognize that once you give into situational ethics in
> one issue, that opens up a lot of doors for attacks on other times where you
> may want to engage in absolute discussions of morality.
But it's NOT "situational ethics." It's merely to recognize that a
nation is not an individual. It is utterly impractical to "let the
individual people all make their own decisions" when it comes to matters
like national defense.
> Most people do have a system of ethics that is relativist/situational at base,
> so if you do, I don't see that as bad. But I think it is bad if someone
> claims an absolute ethical set of beliefs but then changes them when
> convenient based on the situation.
I think you simply don't understand what "absolute" and "relativist" mean
in this context.
> >> It still seems to me very relativist -- these moral teachings apply to
> >> somethings, but in the situation of statecraft they don't apply...
> >Right. For sensible, utterly understandable real-world reasons.
> OK, so ethics are situational if understandable real-world reasons make that
> sensible. Great. I misunderstood you as arguing for an absolute sense of
> moral truth that humans should stick to regardless of the situation. I still
> disagree, but its because I tend to have a deontological view towards ethics
> rather than a consequentialist or relativist view, but I recognize the
> problems in my position and the logic in your situational perspective.
It is NOT "situational ethics." It is merely the common-sense
recognition that the calling of statesman is different than that of
individual Christian. The Church has had no trouble recognizing this
basic fact.
> >But it's clearly not. It's merely to recognize that rulers have a
> >different set of responsibilities than do individual Christians.
> Because their situation is different. How else can you justify humans having
> different moral responsibilities?
Because your moral responsibilities naturally are different depending
upon your position in life. Jesus himself recognized this fact: soldiers
always seem to come off pretty good in their encounters with him. He
never suggested that their vocation was unnecessary or somehow inherently
wicked.
> >A father and household head may decide to give a hundred dollars to the
> >robber who just held him up and took the ten bucks in his wallet. He is
> >NOT justified in letting the same person steal his kids' toys and sell
> >them for drugs. Think about it.
> I do not think he is justified in killing someone for trying to steal his
> kids' toys...
I didn't say he should.
> ...I do think he should intervene and protect his kids if they are in
> danger, but the attempt should be to use non-lethal force and focus on escape.
This is beside the point I was attempting to make.
> My view (based on reading everything from simple anti-war pacifists to hard
> core no violence pacifists) is that force to protect others should be the
> minimal necessary to assure escape; if some kind of force is needed that leads
> to the killing of the "bad guy," it is acceptable as long as the force was not
> beyond what was needed to escape, and that the goal or intent was not to kill
> or try to achieve retribution.
> But of course, this is something I still am working through, as I will be my
> whole life.
> More later, no time right now to reply to the rest of the e-mail...
> adios, scott
The essential point is that the Beatitudes are not a textbook on
statecraft, nor were they ever meant to be, nor were they ever taken to
be by orthodox Christians. And this common-sense fact is NOT an
indication of moral relativism or "situational ethics."
Scott D. Erb
I'll deal with all of this one at once. But I'll at least get started here.
I have the other post on my work computer, so I'll have to get that one
finished tomorrow.
In article
<92D22E055DA7DE15.FFCF567A...@lp.airnews.net>,
pale...@operamail.com says...
>So the attempted extinction of the Jews had nothing to do with Naziism?
>It was just the acts of power-hungry individuals?
Nazism was the brainchild of power-hungry individuals. It rested on fear of
the other, and bigotry, as well as extreme nationalism and social darwinism.
>In excusing the genocide of the communists,
Who is excusing anything -- though you probably need to recheck the word
genocide to apply to communists. That word often gets abused.
>task ahead of you. Communist regimes all over the world have engaged in
>brutal mass murder and genocide to a degree witnessed nowhere else. The
>common factor is the ideology of communism. And you seriously suggest
>that communism is not at fault?
You're treating "communism" as a vague vessel including a lot of different
regimes. But far right nazism and far left communism show that extremism
combined with power create the tools of death. Religious fundamentalism does
the same thing -- the crusades, the Spanish inquisition, the Salem witch
trials, the genocide by the Spanish in the new world...any extremist thought
can lead to killing, its just that this century has seen the technology to do
it on a massive scale.
-snip-
>Look. The premiere example of centralized power in the 20th century has
>been communist states. Nothing like it existed in the democracies, and
>you'll find it very difficult to maintain that the Nazi state was, in any
>sense a traditionalist would recognize, "traditionalist." I don't think
>you clearly have in mind a point you want to make. I keep drawing your
>attention back to the original proposition: American fundamentalists were
>justified in their fear of communists, and they saw nothing remotely
>comparable to it on the global scene. You have yet to put forward any
>counter, so far as I can see, that this fear on their part was in any way
>unrealistic.
The fundies were not justified to fear Communism because it was not a threat
to them; in fact, if you look at history, you'll see Genghis Kahn, Alexander,
and many empires were built on a lot of blood, the twentieth century had more
technology to kill more. Also, after Stalin the Soviet Empire, while still
evil, did not engage in the acts of mass killing, proving that it was more
based on Stalin's abuse of power. Some Communist leaders like Castro,
Gorbachev, and others were actually rather humanistic.
>With the exception that there have been no totalitarian regimes on the
>right, of course. The very concept of totalitarianism is foreign to the
>true right.
Except nazism, which is definitely, as I have shown (and as I teach, coming
directly from all texts I know of on political philosophy) is a right wing
ideology. You are conveniently trying to pretend that only the other side is
bad. Sorry, that's a nice illusion, but its NOT TRUE.
>Please. I hope you're joking. It was precisely his scholarship that was
>almost unbelievably shoddy and indeed knowingly dishonest. He had zero
Marx's scholarship is the most impressive of the era. A lot of it was wrong
and shoody, but compared to others at the time, and looking at the scope of
his project, it was truly impressive. His work is required reading to anyone
trying to understand modern political philosophy, and his economic insights
inform even modern economists. People who hate Marx nitpick errors and points
that do look dishonest, but ignore the massive work he did which was truly
ingenious. You again seem to want to pretend that only your side (the
"right") has good scholarship, and the Left is shoody or dishonest. That is
convenient, but simply NOT true.
>experience of agriculture or industry--so far as anybody knows, he never
>set foot in a mine, a factory or a mill in his entire life. And he
>contemptuously rejected the advice of those who actually DID have some
>experience of the lives of working men.
No. His main advisor was Friedrich Engels, a very successful business man who
actually corrected Marx's work when he went into economic issues involving
business. Marx was a scholar, Engels did the business, knew how the
factories worked. I actually really think Engels is underrated for the impact
he had; without him, Marx would not have been able to put together such an
impressive (if ultimately misguided) theory.
>I had History of Economics under the remarkable David Friedman, the son
>of Milton Friedman, and we actually read "Capital" from start to finish.
See, its required reading even from people who don't like him.
>I have never encountered another person, conservative or liberal, even in
>university circumstances, who has similarly plowed through this farrago
>of lies and nonsense as I did, from first page to last.
Argument by ridicule is a logical fallacy.
>His so-called scientific treatment of the conditions of the working class
>in England in based entirely on a book by Engels which he knew to be
>based solely on out-of-date secondary sources whose age is consistently
>misrepresented. The book is pockmarked with errors and distortions which
>were discovered and publicized in 1848 in a work that Marx himself was
>familiar with, so he can't plead ignorance. Marx himself used quotations
>in a dishonest way and misrepresented their date and/or source. He
>selectively used facts chosen solely because they supported his
>preconceived notions and ignored all disconformatory information. His
>refused to investigate conditions as they actually were, and his contempt
>for those who did was boundless.
Those are assertions that are contrary to almost everything I've read and
studied about Marx. He and Engels worked closely together, one can nitpick
his work (or any work), and his social science was mid-19th century, an era
where the scientific method that we know today hadn't really permeated the
field. But such broadsides only show bias.
>For a short but thorough precis of his dishonesties, see the chapter on
>Marx in "Intellectuals" by Paul Johnson, which utterly annihilates the
>fantasy that Marx was a scholar.
Did you read all the attacks on Johnson on similar charges? I defended
Johnson too (for his most recent book). Sure, Johnson is a biased historian,
and he often twists things to his point of view, but his is an interpretation.
You can read Hobsbawm and get a different interpretation. You can't simply
choose to believe the one that suits your biases. Johnson has his opinion,
but you seem to assume its true, and all those who think differently are
wrong. You are assuming whatever supports your argument to be right, and
whatever opposes it to be wrong. That is not rational.
>> He was committed to science and rationality and falsely
>> believed he had uncovered laws of history through reason and evidence.
>
>This is simply untrue, and it's not merely untrue. It's so utterly the
>opposite of his actual method that it's a surreal description of his
>method. It is literally impossible to find another "scholar" who was as
>irrationalist as this one.
You are simply wrong. He was disdainful of irrationality. There is no way
for you defend the charge you make above -- for the first time I'm really
wondering about your honesty here, Marx was committed to applying the Hegelian
dialectic within a program of historical materialism in a desire to find out
the laws of economics that guide social life. I think his theory was wrong,
but your attack on him is pure garbage, it has no basis in reality.
>"Opposite," indeed. It shared many features in common with communism.
>It is literally impossible, of course, to get any more irrational than
>Marx.
You are wrong. I think you know it, you're just being contrary.
>Fascism was intially supported by any number of leftists, who correctly
>perceived it to be socialist in nature.
No, fascism tried to appeal to leftists, but once they got power, they dumped
all socialists from their party and embraced the right wing nationalist
extremism. Right wing extremism is as antithetical to traditional
conservatism as Stalinist Communism is antithetical to social democracy. You
can't demonize one side and say the other side is good. Thats simply a
convenient way to protect your own ideas from being associated with anything
bad. Reality doesn't allow it, nor does the history of political philosophy.
-snip bits on fascism-
I've had this debate before, I've posted quotes from political philosophers,
historians, given examples from Weimar on how Hitler was supported by the
right, used the name "socialist" dishonestly to woe workers, but hated
communism, and was even seen by British conservatives like Chamberlain as a
bulwark against communism. No, the small bits of work that try to claim Marx
was not a scholar and fascism is really left wing is a marginalized
tendentious attempt to rewrite history as something it isn't, and deny the
ideological basis for these thoughts. I recognize a few people will stick to
that, and theres nothing I can do except, as a teacher, try to make sure that
students learn reality, and don't fall into such biases. I doubt I can
convince you, and I've studied the issue and in fact as a specialist on
Germany really dug into the history of Nazism, and I know that you won't
convince me. So on this point we simply will probably have to disagree.
>Liberalism, in the final analysis, is based on a single self-destroying
>assumption: that nobody can be in final possession of the truth. Of
Uh, quite the opposite. Locke argued that there are natural human rights that
can be discovered with reason, and that these include life, liberty and
property. Liberalism is based on the belief that reason can lead to truth,
focused on individual rights.
>course, this insight is itself presented as a final truth, which is self-
>contradictory. This is why liberalism is unalterably opposed to
Oh, come on. Thats the simplistic thing used against relativists by those who
don't understand relativism. Relativists respond to that by simply noting
that it may be possible to find final truth, but so far nothing has been able
to show the capacity to do so, so its rational to believe that there is a
final truth that one can uncover. They then dig into new truth claims to see
if it can be defended as final truth, and usually show that it cannot be. But
they don't claim it as an absolute truth that final truth is impossible. You
fell for the most simplistic and easily dismissed attack on relativism.
But liberals are almost never relativists, you're mixing that up with
post-modernism and other forms of relativist thought.
>Christianity: Christianity makes certain truth claims which are presented
>as final and irrevocable. Liberalism cannot live with a system like this
>in its midst.
Most liberals I know are Christians. In any event, people can choose their
beliefs and live by them, they just can't force others to live according to
their whims.
> It must be progressively marginalized and pushed back into
>the status of private hobby, its consequences and assumptions forbidden
>from making an appearance in the public square. Liberalism finds it
No, as long as you don't create laws and rules that force me to live by your
religious whims and deny my individual rights, then you can have and act on
whatever beliefs you want in your private life, or as you act in public.
>impossible to make real moral distinctions. Which is why all moral
>standards are eventually eroded, the most recent being the prohibition
>against sex with children. Psychologists are making the first tentative
>moves toward removing the stigma against this practice. In a generation
No liberal I know thinks sex with children is good. No liberal I know lacks a
belief in morals. I personally have a strong moral absolutism in my beliefs,
which I live by. It includes fidelity to my wife, and a belief that many acts
are evil and immoral. Yet I am not just a liberal, I'm a leftist.
See, your stereotypes are wrong! You seem compelled to paint the other side
as pure evil and irrational, while your side is goodness and light. Such
simple conclusions are convenient to one's own ability to hold on to his or
her beliefs, but they are rarely accurate.
>or two it will have the same status as homosexual behavior does today.
>So far from searching for truth, liberalism is essentially nihilistic.
If you want to try to infringe on the rights of homosexuals to be who they
are, then you are violating their rights.
>Not if they conflict with those of the left. Which is why Christianity
>is so feared by the left.
Again, most liberals I know are religious, including some clergy people.
Reality doesn't fit into your stereotypes here.
>Most leftists are unconscious of why they do what they do. In any case,
>it's the ruling elite that's liberal.
So now you're even saying that those who think differently than you aren't
conscious of what they are doing? Don't you see how you paint stark pictures
of the left being so irrational, evil, relativist, unable to think, etc., that
you lose the ability to rationally consider their arguments? Some on the left
do that with conservatives too. People like me who have conservative and
liberal friends (and some conservatives I know are atheist), and recognize
both sides as being moral and honest, have to shake our heads and wonder why
people like you have to demonize the other side so.
>What they in fact do is transfer income from one class to another by
>means of confiscatory taxation. This does the precise opposite of
>"expanding individual liberty." Where property rights don't exist,
>neither does political liberty.
So anyone who favors taxation is a liberal? Most conservatives in America
favor taxation. Conservatives in Germany STARTED the modern social welfare
state in the 1870's. And ALL liberals I know strongly favor property rights.
-snip-
>What? VMI was destroyed at the behest of liberals. Because they loathe
>diversity.
VMI was destroyed? Because they loathe diversity? You're statements are
getting bizarre, almost all liberals and leftists I know love diversity, they
love hearing new ideas, meeting different people, traveling, eating different
foods. Again, you demonize the other side so much you discredit your own
arguments.
>Then you're not really a liberal. Because any liberal who foreswears the
>use of centralized power and lets individual communities live as they
>wish is a conservative, not a liberal.
Or maybe people don't fit into your view of good vs. evil, where you try to
define one side in a stereotypical way that does not connect with reality at
all. I really think you need to rethink your biases, they are simply
misguided and often plain weird. I don't mean to insult you, but I really
think you're locked into a belief system that is causing you to interpret
things through your biases rather than seeing them clearly.
>Please show me a "true liberal" who has foresworn the coercive use of
>centralized power.
Depends on how you define things -- conservatism has traditionally been a
statist and paternalist ideology, using coercive power to protect societal
traditions and often religion. I think most ideologies agree that some
coercive use of centralized power is legitimate, only anarchists and radical
libertarians don't (and they tend to be very anti-religion!) I dislike
concentrated power, and think BOTH the Left and the Right often underestimate
its danger.
-snip of minor points -- if I snipped anything you want me to reply to
specifically, let me know, I'm trying to focus on major issues here.
>Mill disagreed with himself in so many places it's hard to figure out
>what he really believed, but over most of his career, he resembled not in
>the least liberals as they exist today.
You seem to disregard all the great thinkers who are respected by attacking
them personally, even Mill now. Well, one can do that with ANY thinker if one
is critical, thats the easy part. But Mill's ideas have power, and his
political philosophy is noteworthy and I think perhaps the most important of
the era. I'd choose him over Marx :)
>This is not true. The Church has consistently taught that war is an
>unavoidable evil that will be with us til the end of time, and indeed
>that some wars are just. The Bible is the Church's book, as I said. You
>can't lift out a verse here and there and use it to contradict the
>Church's teaching.
Not all Christian sects believe that, and its a logical error to say that the
church can't be questioned because the church says it can't be questioned.
That's why people like Martin Luther realized that they had to confront the
church. That's why Orthodox christianity, like in Russia, gets emmeshed in a
backwards society, while protestantism lead to a growth in culture and
commerce. It was dynamic, and didn't try to justify a rule by a small elite.
>Malcolm Muggeridge was telling the truth about Stalin even during the
>Ukraine terror/famine. Liberals didn't want to hear it. Liberals
>continued to idolize various communist regimes up through Daniel Ortega,
>by which time the truth about communism was old news.
Many liberals didn't want to hear it in the thirties. They were proven wrong.
Many conservatives in the US were very high on Hitler. They were proven
wrong. C'est la vie. (I know gdy and others have done a lot of research on
conservatives in America who supported Hitler, and he's posted it). Ortega
was certainly better than the right wing thug Somoza who robbed his people
blind; the Sandinistas at least tried to help the common person. Somoza stole
money meant as earthquake relief and put in his Swiss bank account, among
other things. He deserved to fall.
>A statesman is responsible for the lives of millions of innocent people.
But is still an individual, and unless you embrace situational ethics, where
as the situation you describe above chances the morality of his acts, still
has to act according to what is moral.
>What is appropriate for an individual--the meek shall inherit the earth--
>is by no means appropriate for the statesman: the meek have their
>countries overrun and their populations killed.
OK, situational ethics. Gotcha. Its sort of relativist, which surprises me
from you, but that's OK.
Ooops, but I see below...
>But it's NOT "situational ethics." It's merely to recognize that a
>nation is not an individual. It is utterly impractical to "let the
>individual people all make their own decisions" when it comes to matters
>like national defense.
No, you're saying that an individual has a different morality to live by if he
or she is in a different position -- in this case in government. Morality
changes for individuals depending on their situation. It is a quintessential
example of situational ethics. You can't really deny that.
>I think you simply don't understand what "absolute" and "relativist" mean
>in this context.
I think I do. I think you don't want to accept the consequences of your
belief system.
>It is NOT "situational ethics." It is merely the common-sense
>recognition that the calling of statesman is different than that of
>individual Christian. The Church has had no trouble recognizing this
>basic fact.
Most defenses of situation ethics are common sensical. You lie in some
circumstances, but not in others. You kill in some circumstances, but not in
others. Most relativist systems of ethics are consequentialist, which yours
seems to be. Why do you think I'm wrong here, it seems self-evident to me?
>Because your moral responsibilities naturally are different depending
>upon your position in life.
So rather than situational ethics its positional ethics? Either way, its not
absolute.
> Jesus himself recognized this fact: soldiers
>always seem to come off pretty good in their encounters with him. He
>never suggested that their vocation was unnecessary or somehow inherently
>wicked.
He did suggest they were acting immorally, given that one should love ones
enemy as oneself, be kind to one who would hurt, turn the other check, respond
to evil with kindness, to be other worldly, etc.
-snip-
>The essential point is that the Beatitudes are not a textbook on
>statecraft, nor were they ever meant to be, nor were they ever taken to
>be by orthodox Christians. And this common-sense fact is NOT an
>indication of moral relativism or "situational ethics."
I don't see how you can avoid that conclusion. You're defining away a clear
set of teachings because they are not convenient with the situations you
encounter. Either you have to say Jesus was just mixed up when he said those
things, or you have to say that the moral statements are not absolute, but
situational -- in some situations, its OK to kill your enemy, not to turn the
other check, etc. I, as a non-Christian, love the teachings of Jesus, his
moral philosophy is fantastic. I also like a lot of what Paul said, even if I
don't buy his theology. I jsut I hate how when some people make him out to be
a God they also find a way to somehow ignore those moral teachings because
they aren't convenient.
I don't know...our world views might be just too different...its interesting,
and I want to understand where you're coming from, but you gotta stop seeing
the other side as by definition evil or irrational, it makes it hard to
communicate.
ciao, scott
Adrian
scot...@maine.maine.edu (Scott D. Erb) wrote:
<snip>
>
> You're treating "communism" as a vague vessel including a lot of
different
> regimes. But far right nazism and far left communism show that
extremism
> combined with power create the tools of death. Religious
fundamentalism does
> the same thing -- the crusades, the Spanish inquisition, the Salem
witch
> trials, the genocide by the Spanish in the new world...any extremist
thought
> can lead to killing, its just that this century has seen the
technology to do
> it on a massive scale.
Population grows exponentially, also. I bet this fact contributes more
than anything to the greater numbers of lives lost.
<snip>
>
> Except nazism, which is definitely, as I have shown (and as I teach,
coming
> directly from all texts I know of on political philosophy) is a right
wing
> ideology. You are conveniently trying to pretend that only the other
side is
> bad. Sorry, that's a nice illusion, but its NOT TRUE.
I believe the left/right dichotomy got its start in Germany in 1848.
The first assembly was held in a church on the right side of which
stood the nationalists, and on the left side stood the most radical
democrats with everyone else in between. The original dichotomy was
between autocracy and democracy more than anything else. The Nazis
were definitely as extreme right (autocratical) as it gets. They were
certainly nationalists (nationalsozialist).
>
> >Please. I hope you're joking. It was precisely his scholarship
that was
> >almost unbelievably shoddy and indeed knowingly dishonest. He had
zero
>
> Marx's scholarship is the most impressive of the era. A lot of it
was wrong
> and shoody, but compared to others at the time, and looking at the
scope of
> his project, it was truly impressive.
I disagree. I think his work was only impressive because people like
Hegel set the stage. If really spurious bull shit is in vogue, then
the most "impressive" scholars of the age are just full of shit and not
really that impressive at all.
> His work is required reading to anyone
> trying to understand modern political philosophy, and his economic
insights
> inform even modern economists. People who hate Marx nitpick errors
and points
> that do look dishonest, but ignore the massive work he did which was
truly
> ingenious.
I doubt that. His Labor Theory of Value is not some nit picky little
thing he screwed up. It is the bedrock of his political and econmic
theory. It is total crap, and doesn't inform anyone. It directly
contradicts the Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility (for instance),
which is one of the very most basic common sense ideas in economics.
He was incapable of understanding something as simple as insurance, for
instance.
> You again seem to want to pretend that only your side (the
> "right") has good scholarship, and the Left is shoody or dishonest.
That is
> convenient, but simply NOT true.
I don't know if folks really read Rosenberg anymore (if ever), and
consider that "true scholarship". Many would argue that naziism was
also founded on Neitze. In any case, naziism probably was not based on
terribly good scholarship. But, communism was equally shoddy -- even
for its time. Marx was a step back from Smith.
<snip>
> You are simply wrong. He was disdainful of irrationality. There is
no way
> for you defend the charge you make above -- for the first time I'm
really
> wondering about your honesty here, Marx was committed to applying the
Hegelian
> dialectic within a program of historical materialism in a desire to
find out
> the laws of economics that guide social life. I think his theory was
wrong,
> but your attack on him is pure garbage, it has no basis in reality.
I guess it depends on what one thinks is rational. If one respects
Hegel at all, then one would react to what you say above as in support
of the premise that Marx was rational. Marx and Engels certainly
seemed to think of themselves as rational and scientific (indeed their
socialism was "scientific socialism").
I don't suppose you guys are referring to the rationalist/empiricist
dichotomy for which there would actually be a clear cut definition to
compare them to? (Of course as a materialist, I would think Marx to be
more empiricist than rationalist.) In any case, logical is a different
matter.
>
> >"Opposite," indeed. It shared many features in common with
communism.
> >It is literally impossible, of course, to get any more irrational
than
> >Marx.
>
> You are wrong. I think you know it, you're just being contrary.
>
> >Fascism was intially supported by any number of leftists, who
correctly
> >perceived it to be socialist in nature.
>
> No, fascism tried to appeal to leftists, but once they got power,
they dumped
> all socialists from their party and embraced the right wing
nationalist
> extremism. Right wing extremism is as antithetical to traditional
> conservatism as Stalinist Communism is antithetical to social
democracy. You
> can't demonize one side and say the other side is good. Thats simply
a
> convenient way to protect your own ideas from being associated with
anything
> bad. Reality doesn't allow it, nor does the history of political
philosophy.
>
Fascism was what Mousilini called himself. The national socialists
called themselves socialists, they seemed to think of themselves as the
true socialists, and their philosophy -- that one had a duty to their
folk and fatherland and conversely -- seemed to osentsibly be
socialist. Granted, they were nationalist, but there is no reason that
socialism need not be autocratical. In other words, just because most
extreme leftists practice a certain form of socialism, that does not
mean that socialism cannot also be practiced by the extreme right or
that it must have anything to do with an autocracy/democracy
dichotomy. There were non-socialists standing left of center in 1848.
It seems to me that, although Hitler had many other ideas, he also had
socialist ideas. His conception of utpoia had no more free enterprise
than a democratic socialism would. The only difference is that all the
things a democratic socialist would control democratically, he would
have controlled autocratically.
> -snip bits on fascism-
>
> I've had this debate before, I've posted quotes from political
philosophers,
> historians, given examples from Weimar on how Hitler was supported by
the
> right, used the name "socialist" dishonestly to woe workers, but
hated
> communism, and was even seen by British conservatives like
Chamberlain as a
> bulwark against communism.
He was not communist for sure. I don't think he used the term
socialism dishonestly, though. Socialism need not be left-wing or
democratic. Why do you think Marx and Engels use "communist" in the
first place?
> No, the small bits of work that try to claim Marx
> was not a scholar and fascism is really left wing is a marginalized
> tendentious attempt to rewrite history as something it isn't, and
deny the
> ideological basis for these thoughts. I recognize a few people will
stick to
> that, and theres nothing I can do except, as a teacher, try to make
sure that
> students learn reality, and don't fall into such biases. I doubt I
can
> convince you, and I've studied the issue and in fact as a specialist
on
> Germany really dug into the history of Nazism, and I know that you
won't
> convince me. So on this point we simply will probably have to
disagree.
>
What about socialism? If we read Engels' _Socialism: Scientific and
Utopian_, we have a look into the brief history of modern socialism
that predates Marxism that not even the most left of left culd not deny
as haveing at least some legitimacy. In sucha case, then one cannot
deny that Owen, Fourier, and Saint-Simon stand out as the leading
exponents of socialism at that time. Fourier, out of the three, had a
chance of being very democratic. Owen was authoritarian and Siant-
Simon had basically the same idea as Plato of a Philosopher King (for
Simon it was the "industriels") which was not unlike the nazi idea that
an elite few suited to leadership should run society like a well oiled
machine.
I think you certainly have a point about the nazis not really being
communists (at the very least not aligned with those of their day).
However, I wonder if you both are not making a subtle implicit error in
_necessarily_ associating socialism with leftism or at least the
pretense of democracy.
> >Liberalism, in the final analysis, is based on a single self-
destroying
> >assumption: that nobody can be in final possession of the truth. Of
>
> Uh, quite the opposite. Locke argued that there are natural human
rights that
> can be discovered with reason, and that these include life, liberty
and
> property. Liberalism is based on the belief that reason can lead to
truth,
> focused on individual rights.
Is that modern liberalism or classical liberalism? Modern liberalism
is based more on something like moral subjectivism than on Locke.
That's not to say that there is no such thing as a moral objectivist
liberal. In fact, I belive that Rawls seems to think he has just the
right interpretation of Locke.
>
> >course, this insight is itself presented as a final truth, which is
self-
> >contradictory. This is why liberalism is unalterably opposed to
>
> Oh, come on. Thats the simplistic thing used against relativists by
those who
> don't understand relativism. Relativists respond to that by simply
noting
> that it may be possible to find final truth, but so far nothing has
been able
> to show the capacity to do so, so its rational to believe that there
is a
> final truth that one can uncover. They then dig into new truth
claims to see
> if it can be defended as final truth, and usually show that it cannot
be. But
> they don't claim it as an absolute truth that final truth is
impossible. You
> fell for the most simplistic and easily dismissed attack on
relativism.
>
> But liberals are almost never relativists, you're mixing that up with
> post-modernism and other forms of relativist thought.
>
I don't know what sort of relativism you are talking about, but many
liberals are cultural relativists (or maybe more precisely ethical
relativists). Cultural relativism is a basic tenent of cultural
anthropology that basically says that values are relative to culture.
This tenent often gets extended to say that morals are relative to
culture often under the premise that morality is nothing more than the
reflection of some value system.
In any case, ethical relativism is very liberal.
> >Christianity: Christianity makes certain truth claims which are
presented
> >as final and irrevocable. Liberalism cannot live with a system like
this
> >in its midst.
>
> Most liberals I know are Christians. In any event, people can choose
their
> beliefs and live by them, they just can't force others to live
according to
> their whims.
Well, they certainly might be able to do so. Perhaps you mean they
_may_ not, as in, it is not morally permissible. Such a distinction
between ability and permissibility is often overlooked.
>
> > It must be progressively marginalized and pushed back into
> >the status of private hobby, its consequences and assumptions
forbidden
> >from making an appearance in the public square. Liberalism finds it
>
> No, as long as you don't create laws and rules that force me to live
by your
> religious whims and deny my individual rights, then you can have and
act on
> whatever beliefs you want in your private life, or as you act in
public.
>
> >impossible to make real moral distinctions. Which is why all moral
> >standards are eventually eroded, the most recent being the
prohibition
> >against sex with children. Psychologists are making the first
tentative
> >moves toward removing the stigma against this practice. In a
generation
>
> No liberal I know thinks sex with children is good. No liberal I
know lacks a
> belief in morals. I personally have a strong moral absolutism in my
beliefs,
> which I live by. It includes fidelity to my wife, and a belief that
many acts
> are evil and immoral. Yet I am not just a liberal, I'm a leftist.
>
While I think there are a great many liberals and leftists that believe
morality to be objective or rational in nature, there are a
disproportionately many subjectivists that are liberal. I think he may
have confused a trend (that seems almost undeniable) that moral
subjectivism tends to lead to a liberal political philosophy, with the
converse -- that a liberal political philosophy tends to lead to moral
subjectivism. Or, at least that is what he seems to be trying to
show. Perhaps he is presuming too much with you.
>
> >or two it will have the same status as homosexual behavior does
today.
> >So far from searching for truth, liberalism is essentially
nihilistic.
>
> If you want to try to infringe on the rights of homosexuals to be who
they
> are, then you are violating their rights.
I believe that is a tautology. I guess his point would be that
homesexuals do not have a right to be who they are?
<snip>
> >Most leftists are unconscious of why they do what they do. In any
case,
> >it's the ruling elite that's liberal.
>
> So now you're even saying that those who think differently than you
aren't
> conscious of what they are doing? Don't you see how you paint stark
pictures
> of the left being so irrational, evil, relativist, unable to think,
etc., that
> you lose the ability to rationally consider their arguments? Some on
the left
> do that with conservatives too. People like me who have conservative
and
> liberal friends (and some conservatives I know are atheist), and
recognize
> both sides as being moral and honest, have to shake our heads and
wonder why
> people like you have to demonize the other side so.
I am atheist, by the way, and I am certainly not leftist or liberal in
the modern sense of the word. I am also not terribly conservative as I
understand the term. In fact, I really think that Christianity is more
leftist than anything in nature, and that it is only some recent few
that have tried to contstrue it as a capitalist construction or as if
it endorses capitalism. This attitude which Marxists seem to hold
seems like just the opposite of what has always been the case. The
Lords have certainly tried to hold onto their property under the
pretense of religious rights, but everyone did everything under such a
pretense back then. In reality, the church was always been competing
with the state for power, and its job has always been to (among other
things) help the needy.
>
> >What they in fact do is transfer income from one class to another by
> >means of confiscatory taxation. This does the precise opposite of
> >"expanding individual liberty." Where property rights don't exist,
> >neither does political liberty.
>
> So anyone who favors taxation is a liberal? Most conservatives in
America
> favor taxation. Conservatives in Germany STARTED the modern social
welfare
> state in the 1870's. And ALL liberals I know strongly favor property
rights.
>
Indeed, I think the left has always seemed far more concerned with
property, who has it, and who does not, than the capitalists ever have.
> -snip-
>
> >What? VMI was destroyed at the behest of liberals. Because they
loathe
> >diversity.
>
> VMI was destroyed? Because they loathe diversity? You're statements
are
> getting bizarre, almost all liberals and leftists I know love
diversity, they
> love hearing new ideas, meeting different people, traveling, eating
different
> foods. Again, you demonize the other side so much you discredit your
own
> arguments.
>
> >Then you're not really a liberal. Because any liberal who
foreswears the
> >use of centralized power and lets individual communities live as
they
> >wish is a conservative, not a liberal.
Oh yeah -- that is what the war on drugs is all about -- letting people
live as they wish. Conservatives are all pro: gambling, prostitution,
legalization, etc. They never dream about finally shutting down the
dens of sin in Atlantic City and Nevada. Almost every conservative I
know of favors _federal_ legislation under one banner or another from
stamping out drugs to tax breaks for churches. It is this very thing
that makes them conservative and not libertarian.
<snip>
> >Mill disagreed with himself in so many places it's hard to figure
out
> >what he really believed, but over most of his career, he resembled
not in
> >the least liberals as they exist today.
>
> You seem to disregard all the great thinkers who are respected by
attacking
> them personally, even Mill now. Well, one can do that with ANY
thinker if one
> is critical, thats the easy part. But Mill's ideas have power, and
his
> political philosophy is noteworthy and I think perhaps the most
important of
> the era. I'd choose him over Marx :)
No doubt! I would say that utilitarianism has had more impact on
America than communism ever did. His political philosophy is a whole
lot better and has contributed more to political philosophy in general
than Marx's ever even thought about fantasizing of the merest inkling
that in the most fantastic of scenarios it could possibly ever have
contributed.
Of course, Mill was pretty laissez fair capitalist for most of his
life. His ideas have had a lot more relevance to economics than Marx's
ever will. I suppose the opposite might be true if we were concerned
about the nature of communist economics.
<snip>
> >It is NOT "situational ethics." It is merely the common-sense
> >recognition that the calling of statesman is different than that of
> >individual Christian. The Church has had no trouble recognizing
this
> >basic fact.
>
> Most defenses of situation ethics are common sensical. You lie in
some
> circumstances, but not in others. You kill in some circumstances,
but not in
> others. Most relativist systems of ethics are consequentialist,
which yours
> seems to be. Why do you think I'm wrong here, it seems self-evident
to me?
>
How do you know how to act in any given situation, if not by some
universal rule? I am just pointing this out because I think that all
too often the idea that ethics seems situation gets misconstrued to
mean that ethics must then be subjective.
> >Because your moral responsibilities naturally are different
depending
> >upon your position in life.
>
> So rather than situational ethics its positional ethics? Either way,
its not
> absolute.
>
You see -- right there! How can it not be absolute? It has to be
absolutely true that one act a certain way in that particular
situation. Such an absolute fact is based on some absolute principle --
a principle you might not be entirely sure of at the moment, but a
prinicple that is, itself, as absolute as any of the ten commandments
were ever supposed to be. To deny this is to deny that ethics is
objective -- is to deny that there is a reason why one must act a
certain way under certain circumstances (in a particular situation).
> > Jesus himself recognized this fact: soldiers
> >always seem to come off pretty good in their encounters with him.
He
> >never suggested that their vocation was unnecessary or somehow
inherently
> >wicked.
>
> He did suggest they were acting immorally, given that one should love
ones
> enemy as oneself, be kind to one who would hurt, turn the other
check, respond
> to evil with kindness, to be other worldly, etc.
>
He who lives by the sword, dies by the sword. (Wasn't that Jesus, too?)
> -snip-
>
> >The essential point is that the Beatitudes are not a textbook on
> >statecraft, nor were they ever meant to be, nor were they ever taken
to
> >be by orthodox Christians. And this common-sense fact is NOT an
> >indication of moral relativism or "situational ethics."
>
> I don't see how you can avoid that conclusion. You're defining away
a clear
> set of teachings because they are not convenient with the situations
you
> encounter. Either you have to say Jesus was just mixed up when he
said those
> things, or you have to say that the moral statements are not
absolute, but
> situational -- in some situations, its OK to kill your enemy, not to
turn the
> other check, etc. I, as a non-Christian, love the teachings of
Jesus, his
> moral philosophy is fantastic.
I would change one thing. Instead of doing to others as you would have
done to you, just don't do to others as you would have not done to you.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
Scott D. Erb
messed up. I'm not yet sure exactly how to format things, so if anything is
garbled I apologize.
At 06:50 PM 11/26/99 -0500, you wrote:
>This is all true. For the record, my friend Joe Sobran agrees with you
>about bombing the Japanese. I think he's probably right, but I am
>"conflicted," as the trendoids say, because without the bomb, it is very
>likely that neither me nor my sister and brothers would have been given
>life.
I'd note only that we can't assume that the only options were bomb or invade. We
could have made peace, recognizing that Japan had been weakened and probably would
not want to attack us again! We also could have demonstrated the bomb.
This is an interesting issue, but, of course, the past is the past, and the best
thing to do is learn from it, not judge it.
>> I agree there is truth, but that NO religion has the whole truth...
>
>But how can you so confidently put forward such a proposition? It sounds
Confident, but not certain, based on my study, logic, reason, and the evidence I
see. Its POSSIBLE that one religion has the whole truth. Its possible that I
might be a brain in a petry dish on some alien space ship and all I perceive is an
illusion for their study. But those are to me very improbable.
>as if you consider yourself to be in possession of an absolute truth--
>namely, that no religion comprehends all truth.
Yet I am not stating it as an absolute truth, only a well grounded conclusion
based on reason, evidence, and logic.
(snip of similar issues, since I think the above disspells the notion I'm claiming
absolute truth on my conclusion).
>By this you simply mean that it claims to be in possession of a number of
>ultimate truths. You're free to disagree. But to make such a claim is
>NOT to treat believers as children. It's simply to propose that there
>has been divine revelation, and here it is.
If the church tries to dissuade people from thinking on their own and questioning
Church teachings, then I think the church is acting a bit arrogant, and I would
urge thinking humans to reject it, at least long enough to pose their questions
and consider things on their own. If they find that after personal and honest
reflection they believe in what the church teaches, then cool. If not, then I
think its time for them to grow beyond the confines of someone else's dogma and
dream.
>For some reason it seems to offend you that some entities believe
>themselves to be in possession of truths that are, finally, not subject
>to change. Why, I have no idea.
I'm like Socrates in that sense, a gadfly who wants to make those who appear
certain to recognize the problems in their world view, question their beliefs, and
think about the fact they might be wrong. The unexamined life is not worth
living. In my opinion, the unquestioned belief is not worth believing.
>I can almost bet the farm that this is NOT what you really believe. You
>don't REALLY believe that you'd be happy if one of your kids wound up
>buying into, say, the KKK's vision of humanity. I suspect you'd be
>willing to teach them that the KKK is, beyond doubt and question,
>completely wrong. This kind of teaching partakes of precisely the same
>kind absolute quality you profess to dislike coming from the Church.
Kids are not private property. Sure, I'd be disappointed if they choose a KKK
belief style. I honestly believe that if they learn about reality and learn
critical thinking, its almost impossible they would choose something that
irrational. But as children grow, they decide what to believe. I truly believe
that self-discovery, not programming, is the key to understanding values and
ethics. If I had some kid turn to nazism, I'd keep trying to get him or her to
question their beliefs, hoping to convince them that they are wrong -- and, of
course, that is also part of every discourse. You want to convince me that I'm
wrong in my views, which is wholly legitimate (and I don't get mad at you for
that, though some apparently do!) I'm doing the same in reverse. Thats how one
learns, I think.
>> ...My beef with organized
>> religion is it often neglects the idea that humans can and should think for
>> themselves, acting more like an ideology than a search for the truth.
>
>The Church, at different times and places, has been guilty of this. But
>it's not hardwired into its doctrine. I hope you're not suggesting, for
>example, that Flannery O'Connor couldn't "think for herself." We all
>have to operate on certain axiomatic propositions whose truth we can't
>demonstrate. You most certainly do yourself. The Church merely proposes
>a certain set of axioms. That is, it's not putting you in an existential
>situation that is one whit different than the one you already and of
>necessity MUST occupy.
Some chruches do better than others, in my opinion. Organized religion is too
often prone to make the error of demanding conformity to a norm that often simply
reflects what the past generation believed, which reflects what the generation
before that believed, etc. Thats why Martin Luther -- a heroic figure (and a
religious one, and anti-semetic at times -- I can respect his contribution even as
I disagree strongly with some of his beliefs) had such a struggle and the
reformation caused a war.
>OK. Show me an ideology that outdid communism in mass murder.
I don't think you can blame an ideology for murder. You're over categorizing and
simplifying. After all, after Stalin left, the Soviet Union's mass murders
dropped dramatically, as people realized that this dicatator had abused the system
and grabbed complete power. Lenin's ideas made that possible/likely, but it
wasn't a part of communist ideology. It showed that any ideology which advocates
extreme centralization of power is dangerous. That includes communism,
theocracies, and any other such system.
>I think there can be a just war, in the classical sense, that consists in
>protecting innocent people from the depredations of mass murderers.
OK, that's certainly the most common view around.
>If all you're saying is that the princes of the Church have screwed up on
>many occasions, welcome to the club. Old news. Dante pictured a hell
>whose floor was paved with the skulls of bad popes. This is in no way
>incompatible with the notion of the Church as the Spotless Bride of
>Christ, nor does it mean that the Church qua Church has compromised the
>teaching of its Master.
What is the church, then? How can you criticize acts done in the name of the
church by individuals leading the church, from the church itself?
>The claim that the Church is an abstraction is one that would have been
>regarded as risible by the early Christians. The Church was (and still
>is) a visible and identifiable body.
OK, so what exactly is it? Is it not the acts of the members? Or the members?
>I am aware of no changes in doctrine coming from Russia. In fact, the
>Russian Orthodox are the most hidebound in the world. They make American
>fundamentalists look like bubble-headed trend-hounds.
Yeah, but its causing them problems since they're stuck in a past era, and even in
the late 19th century they were part of Russia's inability to become part of the
modern world. But I've only heard rumors that they might try to change,
especially to battle the baptists and others who are moving en masse with a lot of
money to offer Russians a new religion. Most Russians are suspicious of religion
these days.
>Look. You're merely saying that, without faith, we can know nothing.
>This ain't exactly front-page news. Paul repeated it over and over
>again. It may be that faith ain't for you. But you can't understand a
>religion if you insist on analyzing it with alien categories.
Without faith we can know nothing? Can you explain what you mean by that. Does
it mean only Christians with faith know anything, and everyone else is ignorant
about EVERYTHING? I know my computer is on. I'm not sure what the
epsitemological implications are of what you're stating here.
>"Master, we would see a sign from thee." You ain't the first guy to ask
>this question. You appear to be saying that the only good Christian is a
>bad Christian. I.e., one who doubts his Church.
No, I'm saying it is irrational to accept something just on faith because someone
or some book tells you that you have to accept it on faith. Unless there is a
real reason, it doesn't make sense. Now, I think there can be good reasons that
are subjective rather than objective, and reflect values that people simply have.
But for someone who doesn't have those subjective experiences or desire to
believem, there is no reason they should simply believe because a book or another
person tells them they should.
>The problem here is that you in fact believe yourself to be in possession
>of a number of ground truths. I simply don't think you're aware of it.
>And you would deny to others what you assume for yourself.
No, I simply have a lot of grounded opinions and beliefs that I will dismiss if
evidence and argumentation/logic convince me I should, but until I do, they are my
working principles by which I live and act in the world.
ciao, scott
Scott D. Erb
Adrian wrote:
-snip chunks to focus on a couple points-
> I doubt that. His Labor Theory of Value is not some nit picky little
> thing he screwed up. It is the bedrock of his political and econmic
> theory. It is total crap, and doesn't inform anyone. It directly
> contradicts the Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility (for instance),
> which is one of the very most basic common sense ideas in economics.
> He was incapable of understanding something as simple as insurance, for
> instance.
Remember that Marx was writing mid-19th century. Of course a lot of what he
and every social scientist wrote in that era looks like crap by today's
standards. He was taking a first jab at things that later would be refined
and re-examined and more closely studied.
You can't judge 19th century social scientists by 20th century standards.
That's like juding an old radio from the standard of a modern PC.
> I don't know if folks really read Rosenberg anymore (if ever), and
> consider that "true scholarship". Many would argue that naziism was
> also founded on Neitze. In any case, naziism probably was not based on
> terribly good scholarship. But, communism was equally shoddy -- even
> for its time. Marx was a step back from Smith.
I still have to disagree, Marx looked at structural issues in a way that
still informs a whole set of scholars, even ones that are not Marxist. He
also looked at the connection between social systems and economics in a
truly modern way, also paving the way for a different way of understanding
social reality. He was a pioneer. A pioneer who was wrong in most of his
theories, but then again, that's science. A lot of great scientists look
silly by light of today's knowledge, but their work was needed to build
upon.
> I guess it depends on what one thinks is rational. If one respects
> Hegel at all, then one would react to what you say above as in support
> of the premise that Marx was rational. Marx and Engels certainly
> seemed to think of themselves as rational and scientific (indeed their
> socialism was "scientific socialism").
I took it as meaning rational as opposed to the essential irrationalism of
fascism (more from a cognitive sense). But...
> I don't suppose you guys are referring to the rationalist/empiricist
> dichotomy for which there would actually be a clear cut definition to
> compare them to? (Of course as a materialist, I would think Marx to be
> more empiricist than rationalist.) In any case, logical is a different
> matter.
I don't know, one strength in Marx's approach is that he went beyond normal
empiricism/materialism and developed a type of social theory that informs
structuralism and even post-structuralism. If one judges a scholar by
their impact (not just on politics, but also on thought and scholarship),
Marx certainly cannot be sneezed at.
> Fascism was what Mousilini called himself. The national socialists
> called themselves socialists, they seemed to think of themselves as the
> true socialists, and their philosophy -- that one had a duty to their
> folk and fatherland and conversely -- seemed to osentsibly be
> socialist. Granted, they were nationalist, but there is no reason that
> socialism need not be autocratical. In other words, just because most
> extreme leftists practice a certain form of socialism, that does not
> mean that socialism cannot also be practiced by the extreme right or
> that it must have anything to do with an autocracy/democracy
> dichotomy. There were non-socialists standing left of center in 1848.
The historical evidence I've seen (Peukert and Hobsbawm, I believe) suggests
that Hitler and company knowingly used the term "socialist" in their name to
try to lure votes from the Left. It is clear they got most of their support
from the right.
Also, given that conservatism is traditionally statist and paternalist, what
you call socialism above could also be seen as conservatism. That is a bit
ironic, but remember how much the Pope and Castro had in common when they
met. There may be a lot of similarity between conservatism and socialism at
some level (though ultimately I think they rest on very different
foundations). Each sees a powerful role for the state, and has a strong
idea of community.
> It seems to me that, although Hitler had many other ideas, he also had
> socialist ideas. His conception of utpoia had no more free enterprise
> than a democratic socialism would. The only difference is that all the
> things a democratic socialist would control democratically, he would
> have controlled autocratically.
Well, Hitler's policies certainly made friends with big business, and his
support came from the right wing. Even business that was cool to him before
1933 realized they could profit big time in Nazi Germany. He certainly
didn't govern according to socialist ideology, though since fascism is
essentially irrationalist at base, its not surprising it is a chameleon
that, depending on how you perceive it, can take various shapes and forms.
-snips of interesting comments...I have nothing to add-
> What about socialism? If we read Engels' _Socialism: Scientific and
> Utopian_, we have a look into the brief history of modern socialism
> that predates Marxism that not even the most left of left culd not deny
> as haveing at least some legitimacy. In sucha case, then one cannot
> deny that Owen, Fourier, and Saint-Simon stand out as the leading
> exponents of socialism at that time. Fourier, out of the three, had a
> chance of being very democratic. Owen was authoritarian and Siant-
> Simon had basically the same idea as Plato of a Philosopher King (for
> Simon it was the "industriels") which was not unlike the nazi idea that
> an elite few suited to leadership should run society like a well oiled
> machine.
The Utopian socialists are interesting, and also writing in a time where you
didn't really have a strong conception of democracy. There was a diversity
in their thinking that seemed silence for a long time by the scientific
claims of Marxian socialism.
> I think you certainly have a point about the nazis not really being
> communists (at the very least not aligned with those of their day).
> However, I wonder if you both are not making a subtle implicit error in
> _necessarily_ associating socialism with leftism or at least the
> pretense of democracy.
I suppose one could say national socialism was a right wing variant of
socialism, but aren't we then ready to say that conservatism is a form of
traditional socialism. After all, conservative ideology is collectivist at
base. I think socialism is best defined as being opposed to exploitation
and oppression caused by the structure of economic relations within
capitalism (or other forms of producing value). I'd prefer to separate
socialist collecitvism from nationalist or conservative collectivism.
Though it might be intriguing to look for congruities. I still remember
being fascinated by the similarity in a lot of ideas the Pope and Castro
shared when the Pope visited Cuba.
> Is that modern liberalism or classical liberalism? Modern liberalism
> is based more on something like moral subjectivism than on Locke.
> That's not to say that there is no such thing as a moral objectivist
> liberal. In fact, I belive that Rawls seems to think he has just the
> right interpretation of Locke.
I think modern liberals share Locke's ideals, but tend to say politically
you need intervention to achieve them. I distinguish between modern
liberals (related to Mill and others) and Leftists (who have a more
socialist view, and distrust moral objectivism). I think most American
"liberals" are modern liberals with a view based on moral objectivism, even
if they believe in tolerance and diversity of other views. The ideological
gulf between American "liberals" and "conservatives" seems to me narrow:
they are all liberals, the "conservatives" are more like classical liberals,
and the "liberals" are more like new liberals. There are some true
conservatives (maybe Buchanan or Bauer?) and true leftists (Jesse Jackson or
Ted Kennedy?) out there within each party, of course.
> I don't know what sort of relativism you are talking about, but many
> liberals are cultural relativists (or maybe more precisely ethical
> relativists). Cultural relativism is a basic tenent of cultural
> anthropology that basically says that values are relative to culture.
> This tenent often gets extended to say that morals are relative to
> culture often under the premise that morality is nothing more than the
> reflection of some value system.
I think that American liberals are very concerned with Human Rights (Carter,
etc.), and that reflects a belief going back to Wilson and even classical
liberalism that there are essential values we humans have by nature, which
are not relative to culture. I think that is part and parcel of liberal
ideology, including most American "new" liberals (e.g., Democrats). In
some ways conservatives are the true relativists, since they look to culture
and society to grant the individual meaning.
-snip-
> While I think there are a great many liberals and leftists that believe
> morality to be objective or rational in nature, there are a
> disproportionately many subjectivists that are liberal. I think he may
> have confused a trend (that seems almost undeniable) that moral
> subjectivism tends to lead to a liberal political philosophy, with the
> converse -- that a liberal political philosophy tends to lead to moral
> subjectivism. Or, at least that is what he seems to be trying to
> show. Perhaps he is presuming too much with you.
I think most people in this country are almost instinctly relativist. It
amazes me in talking to first year college students about ethics how
relativism is the default point of view. I can see a connection to
liberalism, as liberalism is rooted in a rational, scientific view of
reality. Science leads to a relativism since it automatically demands
openness to new evidence and theories. Still, I also see a lot of
relativism among conservative thinking, perhaps as much if not more as among
liberals.
-lets of snips, no real bones of contention to pick-
> No doubt! I would say that utilitarianism has had more impact on
> America than communism ever did. His political philosophy is a whole
> lot better and has contributed more to political philosophy in general
> than Marx's ever even thought about fantasizing of the merest inkling
> that in the most fantastic of scenarios it could possibly ever have
> contributed.
>
> Of course, Mill was pretty laissez fair capitalist for most of his
> life. His ideas have had a lot more relevance to economics than Marx's
> ever will. I suppose the opposite might be true if we were concerned
> about the nature of communist economics.
I agree, Mill is one of my favorites. But Mill's impact is more pragmatic,
Marx's is more theoretical.
-snip-
>You see -- right there! How can it not be absolute? It has to be
> absolutely true that one act a certain way in that particular
> situation. Such an absolute fact is based on some absolute principle --
> a principle you might not be entirely sure of at the moment, but a
> prinicple that is, itself, as absolute as any of the ten commandments
> were ever supposed to be. To deny this is to deny that ethics is
> objective -- is to deny that there is a reason why one must act a
> certain way under certain circumstances (in a particular situation).
But thats what situational ethics is -- that rules are not universal, but
are altered by differences in the situation. Is killing right or wrong?
Depends on the situation. Now, I suppose you could say there is a greater
principle that has a different application depending on the situation, but
that often gets vague and thus subject to interpretation which results in
one rationalizing doing what ones via the way this "greater principle" is
applied.
Of course, the dilemmas at this level of abstraction are immense. Rawls,
Locke, Kant, etc., have tried to look for some kind of absolute ethical
principle. I like Kant's approach, but ultimately it ends up being a
subjective call. That doesn't mean that ethics are subjective, only that
each person has to make the call. That sounds contradictory, but think
about it. If there is no way to prove an ethical system absolutely true
(and so far I haven't seen anyone who could do it; Kant is impressive, Rawls
pretty good, some like Rand are very unimpressive), then each person has to
decide what convinces them, and that could be an absolute ethic, or a purely
relativist one. For politics, this means that we can't have one correct
political system that simply should be enforced, but a way to allow the
holding of different ethical beliefs in a manner which stabilizes conflict
and allows people in society to work towards certain goals. How can you do
this without making absolute ethical determinations? A form of pragmatism
seems all that is possible, at least at the political level.
Is that situational? Is that relativist? Can one compromise in terms of
law and politics if ones' own personal ethical views are different than that
held in law (e.g., personally believing that abortion is absolutely wrong,
but also believing a woman has to make that call on her own). Is there a
limit (e.g., murder, rape, burglary, gambling, drug use, etc.)?
> I would change one thing. Instead of doing to others as you would have
> done to you, just don't do to others as you would have not done to you.
OK, though I'd probably end up with something more like Kant's categorical
imperative if I really had to figure out the right wording :)
ciao, scott
Steve Canyon
<scot...@maine.edu> wrote:
>BTW, I'm trying different software since some complained by attributions were
>messed up. I'm not yet sure exactly how to format things, so if anything is
>garbled I apologize.
>
>At 06:50 PM 11/26/99 -0500, you wrote:
>
>>This is all true. For the record, my friend Joe Sobran agrees with you
>>about bombing the Japanese. I think he's probably right, but I am
>>"conflicted," as the trendoids say, because without the bomb, it is very
>>likely that neither me nor my sister and brothers would have been given
>>life.
>
>I'd note only that we can't assume that the only options were bomb or invade. We
>could have made peace, recognizing that Japan had been weakened and probably would
>not want to attack us again! We also could have demonstrated the bomb.
Japan had already demonstrated that they would fight to the very end.
It is their tradition to do this.
At the time, the Japanese army consisted of approx. 5,000,000 men, at
least 1/3rd on the mainland, and around 500 suicide aircraft that the
japanese had already demonstrated their willingness to use. In march
of 1945, the U. S dropped incendiary bombs on Tokyo and other cities
that caused more destruction and deaths than did the bomb at
Hiroshima, and the Japanese did not surrender. The atomic bombs were
dropped only after an ultimatum had been issued to the Japanese that
unless they surrendered we would proceed to destroy their army and
their homeland and the potsdam ultimatum, as it was called, was
scornfully rejected. The Postdam ultimatum did not tell the Japanese
about the atomic bomb, but they were well aware of our ability to
wield destruction of that magnitude. They must have assumed that our
resolve to do so would be tempered by the losses they believed they
would be able to inflict upon us. In other words, they were willing to
accept the responsibility of the losses providing they could get their
own licks in. The only thing they did not know is that we could
destroy them without so much as a sore arm. The concept that we
should have demonstrated the bomb is foolish. At the time we only had
two and we could not afford to waste one.
Many will argue that the bomb was not necessary, but in the end, it
did, without any doubt save the lives of american servicemen fighting
a war that we did not only initiate, but was initiated against us with
no warning at all. I simply feel that people who choose to initiate
and wage a terrible war have no right to expect leniency and the
people they attacked should not be expected to lose any more people
than necessary to preserve lives of the attackers.
Ace
Steve Canyon
(Steve Canyon) wrote:
>On Mon, 29 Nov 1999 16:04:15 -0500, "Scott D. Erb"
><scot...@maine.edu> wrote:
>
>>BTW, I'm trying different software since some complained by attributions were
>>messed up. I'm not yet sure exactly how to format things, so if anything is
>>garbled I apologize.
>>
>>At 06:50 PM 11/26/99 -0500, you wrote:
>>
>>>This is all true. For the record, my friend Joe Sobran agrees with you
>>>about bombing the Japanese. I think he's probably right, but I am
>>>"conflicted," as the trendoids say, because without the bomb, it is very
>>>likely that neither me nor my sister and brothers would have been given
>>>life.
>>
>>I'd note only that we can't assume that the only options were bomb or invade. We
>>could have made peace, recognizing that Japan had been weakened and probably would
>>not want to attack us again! We also could have demonstrated the bomb.
>
>Japan had already demonstrated that they would fight to the very end.
>It is their tradition to do this.
>
> At the time, the Japanese army consisted of approx. 5,000,000 men, at
>least 1/3rd on the mainland, and around 500 suicide aircraft that the
correction: make that 5000 suicide aircraft
Ace
Steve Canyon
<scot...@maine.edu> wrote:
>
>
>Steve Canyon wrote:
>
>>Japan had already demonstrated that they would fight to the very end.
>
>Uh, no. Not only that, but recent military analysis says that only about 76,000 lives
>would have likely been lost by the US in a full invasion. But Japan wanted peace at
>that time, they wanted to end the war with the US. They didn't have the capacity to
>threaten us anymore.
>
>They just didn't want unconditional surrender.
>
hogwash
Ace
Scott D. Erb
Steve Canyon wrote:
>Japan had already demonstrated that they would fight to the very end.
Uh, no. Not only that, but recent military analysis says that only about 76,000 lives
would have likely been lost by the US in a full invasion. But Japan wanted peace at
that time, they wanted to end the war with the US. They didn't have the capacity to
threaten us anymore.
They just didn't want unconditional surrender.
-rest snipped-
Dan Fahey
Steve Canyon wrote:
> On Mon, 29 Nov 1999 17:23:05 -0500, "Scott D. Erb"
> <scot...@maine.edu> wrote:
>
> >
> >
> hogwash
>
> Ace
ACE .. Scott is correct. By accepting Unconditional Surrender with the USA,
the USSR could not go in and occupy the Japanese mainland.
They already attacked and occupied several of Japans northern islands.
However the Japanese Military was well prepared for a long siege.
They hoarded aircraft, weapons and fuel.
In fact their interceptors became a worry as they
could compete on a more than equal basis then our aircraft.
We had our shorter range interceptors on the decks
of the carriers that never made it into battle.
The Unconditional Surrender presented Japan with a great
opportunity to return the government to civilian rule.
That and the Marshal Plan made things as they are today.
The first economic major world wide policy change to a commercial economy.
df
Adrian
scot...@maine.edu wrote:
>
>
> Adrian wrote:
>
> -snip chunks to focus on a couple points-
>
> > I doubt that. His Labor Theory of Value is not some nit picky
little
> > thing he screwed up. It is the bedrock of his political and econmic
> > theory. It is total crap, and doesn't inform anyone. It directly
> > contradicts the Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility (for instance),
> > which is one of the very most basic common sense ideas in economics.
> > He was incapable of understanding something as simple as insurance,
for
> > instance.
>
> Remember that Marx was writing mid-19th century. Of course a lot of
what he
> and every social scientist wrote in that era looks like crap by
today's
> standards. He was taking a first jab at things that later would be
refined
> and re-examined and more closely studied.
>
> You can't judge 19th century social scientists by 20th century
standards.
> That's like juding an old radio from the standard of a modern PC.
I guess you are entitled to your opinion. But I would like to point
out here that you are referring to him as a social scientist when I
think he ought to be compared to political philosophers and/or maybe
specifically to economists. In any case, Smith predates him with much
more insightful ideas. He had the opportunity to build on that. He
did not.
>
> > I don't know if folks really read Rosenberg anymore (if ever), and
> > consider that "true scholarship". Many would argue that naziism was
> > also founded on Neitze. In any case, naziism probably was not
based on
> > terribly good scholarship. But, communism was equally shoddy --
even
> > for its time. Marx was a step back from Smith.
>
> I still have to disagree, Marx looked at structural issues in a way
that
> still informs a whole set of scholars, even ones that are not
Marxist. He
> also looked at the connection between social systems and economics in
a
> truly modern way, also paving the way for a different way of
understanding
> social reality. He was a pioneer. A pioneer who was wrong in most
of his
> theories, but then again, that's science. A lot of great scientists
look
> silly by light of today's knowledge, but their work was needed to
build
> upon.
You talk as if he invented social science or as if he invented
economics. I personally think Mandeville did. Certainly at least
Smith was doing economics. As for everything else, it only exists
under such a pretense of science. It is not real science. So then the
question would be what genuinely Marxist ideas were there – where did
he really pioneer? You look on him as sort of inventing…something.
What exactly was it that he had great insight into? As far as I can
tell, his blinding insight was into the fallacy of equating economics
with morality, and his most original idea was that of laborers being
alienated from their labor through capitalist exploitation and based on
the absurd (even for his time) Labor Theory of Value.
In fact, consider his Labor Theory. Try to imagine such a theory as a
real bona fide theory. Why would Locke not have taken up such an
obvious direction from his political philosophy. The reason is because
there are a lot of good reasons that there is a perfectly good
explanation of how property rights might be legitimate. Look at his
conclusions. Look where he thinks the ideal society should lead.
Especially for his time it sounded like science fiction. It sounds
like a story – like a fairy tale. How can you call that science or
even a half hearted attempt at it?
Well, you do have a point about his popularity. I guess to me that is
purely an unfortunate event. Much the same as Hegel’s popularity is an
unfortunate embarrassment for mankind. You know how you feel sometimes
when you realize you have been playing some sort of game of make-
believe – that sort of ashamed feeling of being an adult playing kids
games? Well, the kind of “philosophy” these guys perpetrated might
have been tolerable in Ancient Greece – much the same way we tolerate
Aristotle’s four elements and that sort of thing. But, the fact that a
true philosopher – a mature adult mind – like Kant gets followed by
that is embarrassing. It is no wonder there is so much skepticism in
the twentieth century.
Well, I think the question then is what is the nature of socialism?
Where does it go back to? What are its intellectual roots? We can
look at Engels and Marx and see that socialism was not at all
necessarily democratic by their own estimation. As many a socialist
(or more precisely Hal Draper in _The Two Souls of Socialism_) might
say, socialism of that day was from the top down and not the bottom up
type of socialism you see endorsed in this day and age that possibly
Marx was one of the pioneers of at least in some abstract way.
(There! I think I found Marx’s contribution!) The point is that
socialism had little to do with power to the people, but just a better
lot for the people. Power to the people was embodied by democracy
and/or representative government which was a completely independent
development.
> > It seems to me that, although Hitler had many other ideas, he also
had
> > socialist ideas. His conception of utpoia had no more free
enterprise
> > than a democratic socialism would. The only difference is that all
the
> > things a democratic socialist would control democratically, he would
> > have controlled autocratically.
>
> Well, Hitler's policies certainly made friends with big business, and
his
> support came from the right wing. Even business that was cool to him
before
> 1933 realized they could profit big time in Nazi Germany. He
certainly
> didn't govern according to socialist ideology, though since fascism is
> essentially irrationalist at base, its not surprising it is a
chameleon
> that, depending on how you perceive it, can take various shapes and
forms.
That is not entirely clear. He may have had some cronies that actually
managed to profit in Germany at that time. Nonetheless, if we consult
(say) William Shirer’s account of nazi Germany, we see an economy
dominated by the nazi party. Most of the businessmen that were
previously in Germany, notwithstanding their support of the party,
regret the nazis rise to power, fleeing for their lives if not rotting
in concentration camps themselves – and I am not talking about the
Jewish businessmen either.
This was exactly what Hitler, in fact, had in mind – a country run by
the elite best suited for leadership. He made no pretense about it –
it seems like nazi 101 to me. And that is in fact what happened. I
guess the question then is whether or not such a thing is really
socialist.
>
> -snips of interesting comments...I have nothing to add-
>
> > What about socialism? If we read Engels' _Socialism: Scientific and
> > Utopian_, we have a look into the brief history of modern socialism
> > that predates Marxism that not even the most left of left culd not
deny
> > as haveing at least some legitimacy. In sucha case, then one cannot
> > deny that Owen, Fourier, and Saint-Simon stand out as the leading
> > exponents of socialism at that time. Fourier, out of the three,
had a
> > chance of being very democratic. Owen was authoritarian and Siant-
> > Simon had basically the same idea as Plato of a Philosopher King
(for
> > Simon it was the "industriels") which was not unlike the nazi idea
that
> > an elite few suited to leadership should run society like a well
oiled
> > machine.
>
> The Utopian socialists are interesting, and also writing in a time
where you
> didn't really have a strong conception of democracy. There was a
diversity
> in their thinking that seemed silence for a long time by the
scientific
> claims of Marxian socialism.
I would not be too sure about that. A lot of the silence came from the
fact that there were plenty of experiments in Fourierism and Owenism
performed and failed. That is why “utopian” probably stuck. They
really tried to make utopias. I believe a city – New Harmony,
Connecticut – is still around (like a grave stone). Now it is a city,
but Owen had wanted to make it a successful co-op. He failed in this
as with basically all of his co-ops as did many experiments in
Fourierism. Today, probably a lot of their ideas are not only echoing
in something like Marxism, but also its alternatives – democratic
socialism at large. One of the main ideas that is now almost
indispensable to a socialist is the idea of democracy which was not at
all big with these guys. I suppose this democracy issue was more a
reaction to all the bad experience with dictatorships…
>
> > I think you certainly have a point about the nazis not really being
> > communists (at the very least not aligned with those of their day).
> > However, I wonder if you both are not making a subtle implicit
error in
> > _necessarily_ associating socialism with leftism or at least the
> > pretense of democracy.
>
> I suppose one could say national socialism was a right wing variant of
> socialism, but aren't we then ready to say that conservatism is a
form of
> traditional socialism. After all, conservative ideology is
collectivist at
> base.
That’s not true, or at least, not necessarily. And besides that, I am
not really just saying that nazi Germany was somehow collectivist.
What do we see when we look in Mein Kampf for his economic positions?
Not much admittedly, but we do see a legitimate concern for
undervaluing the laborer. He is not so concerned as Marx was, but he
certainly seemed to think every German had a right to meaningful work
and endorsed wage control and that sort of thing. H railed against the
bourgeoisie and mostly condemned communism not because it was socialist
or some such thing, but because Marx was a Jew in league with the
international capital interests that were holding the Germans down.
> I think socialism is best defined as being opposed to exploitation
> and oppression caused by the structure of economic relations within
> capitalism (or other forms of producing value).
That is Marxism. What about democratic socialists, for instance, that
are perfectly willing to allow capitalism to thrive in the nonessential
industries? Socialism is just public means of production. That is
consistent with the nazi ideal – that the autocracy ensures gainful
employment and otherwise runs everything as it sees fit. It is not
just some sort of hierarchy like feudalism that could have peasants
starving in silence. It is also a workers movement to some extent.
Hitler did reduce unemployment to nil and that wasn’t just for his
capitalist buddies. It seemed to be a genuine part of his political
philosophy. I believe there is a section on life in the Reich in
Shirer’s book. I have even gotten together a long list of quotes.
> I'd prefer to separate
> socialist collecitvism from nationalist or conservative collectivism.
> Though it might be intriguing to look for congruities. I still
remember
> being fascinated by the similarity in a lot of ideas the Pope and
Castro
> shared when the Pope visited Cuba.
Like I said above, it wasn’t just collectivism and conservatives need
not be that collectivist. There was more importance put on the laborer
– not as much as Marx, maybe, or many socialists today, but more than
most conservatives.
I have to shudder at your use of Locke to identify modern liberals.
Rawls maybe, but Locke’s discussion of property seems a bit to
capitalist for a welfare state. Locke’s idea of helping the needy is a
bit like Kant’s idea of a duty to beneficence. It goes all the way to
maybe a couple homeless shelters or the duty of hospitals to accept
emergency patients (that are dying), but it doesn’t even get close to a
progressive tax or food stamps or medicaid or anything like that. Many
laissez fair capitalists would do back flips at the prospect of
returning society to a Lockean or Kantian one.
>
> > I don't know what sort of relativism you are talking about, but many
> > liberals are cultural relativists (or maybe more precisely ethical
> > relativists). Cultural relativism is a basic tenent of cultural
> > anthropology that basically says that values are relative to
culture.
> > This tenent often gets extended to say that morals are relative to
> > culture often under the premise that morality is nothing more than
the
> > reflection of some value system.
>
> I think that American liberals are very concerned with Human Rights
(Carter,
> etc.), and that reflects a belief going back to Wilson and even
classical
> liberalism that there are essential values we humans have by nature,
which
> are not relative to culture.
Well, you would not be he first to point something like this out and I
am not one to defend moral subjectivism. However, cultural relativism
and emotivism are two big leftist and/or liberal ideologies. Marxism
is really subjectivist, for that matter. He tries to replace
philosophical moralizing with real hard scientific, economic fact.
That general attitude is how the subjectivists end up making what seem
to be moral conclusions (but according to them is not exactly the
same). In any case, think carefully about a lot of liberal attitudes.
A lot of it has as much to do with discrediting the idea that one
really has that much of a “right” to property or that a murder (say)
really did anything that could be considered all that “wrong”, and so
on.
> I think that is part and parcel of liberal
> ideology, including most American "new" liberals (e.g., Democrats).
In
> some ways conservatives are the true relativists, since they look to
culture
> and society to grant the individual meaning.
Well, that is certainly true, but the majority of them are not.
Certainly there are exceptions to the rule.
>
> -snip-
>
> > While I think there are a great many liberals and leftists that
believe
> > morality to be objective or rational in nature, there are a
> > disproportionately many subjectivists that are liberal. I think he
may
> > have confused a trend (that seems almost undeniable) that moral
> > subjectivism tends to lead to a liberal political philosophy, with
the
> > converse -- that a liberal political philosophy tends to lead to
moral
> > subjectivism. Or, at least that is what he seems to be trying to
> > show. Perhaps he is presuming too much with you.
>
> I think most people in this country are almost instinctly
relativist. It
> amazes me in talking to first year college students about ethics how
> relativism is the default point of view. I can see a connection to
> liberalism, as liberalism is rooted in a rational, scientific view of
> reality. Science leads to a relativism since it automatically demands
> openness to new evidence and theories. Still, I also see a lot of
> relativism among conservative thinking, perhaps as much if not more
as among
> liberals.
Well, there is actually a much more deliberate connection than all
that. Logical positivism is basically the ideology that science really
ought to replace philosophy altogether. There are a lot of problems
with all this, but the point is that it was a real movement in the
early part of this century. That movement has also permeated society
to a large extent. Science is not quite as open as one might think,
incidentally. And, the exact problem I have with logical positivism is
in its putting ethics on the level of intellectual activities as
science – perhaps sociology. The fact is that (at least on my view) it
is a lot more like math. And one must also understand my view of math
– as being really rather philosophical – to really appreciate that last
statement. Anyway, that is often one of the basic flaws of something
like replacing philosophy with science – the error in thinking that
math boils down to just deductive analysis or more science.
>
> -lets of snips, no real bones of contention to pick-
>
> > No doubt! I would say that utilitarianism has had more impact on
> > America than communism ever did. His political philosophy is a
whole
> > lot better and has contributed more to political philosophy in
general
> > than Marx's ever even thought about fantasizing of the merest
inkling
> > that in the most fantastic of scenarios it could possibly ever have
> > contributed.
> >
> > Of course, Mill was pretty laissez fair capitalist for most of his
> > life. His ideas have had a lot more relevance to economics than
Marx's
> > ever will. I suppose the opposite might be true if we were
concerned
> > about the nature of communist economics.
>
> I agree, Mill is one of my favorites. But Mill's impact is more
pragmatic,
> Marx's is more theoretical.
But what theory? What did he really add to theory? Was it the Labor
Theory of Value? Was it that Dictatorship of the Proletariate? Was it
the ensuing peaceful anarchy of collectivist heaven?
Not so at all. In fact, my problem with a lot of Kant’s conlusions is
that he gets away from the hard deductive reasoning and often ends up
in “practical reason”. I am glad you like Kant. There are a lot of
reasons, then why one must allow society to evolve into a principle of
universality – simply because it is so complicated in its ramifications
that not even a genius could just figure them all out in a life time.
Kant’s approach is not a subjective call – it is just often leading to
hard problems which any truly honest and accurate theory has to.
> That doesn't mean that ethics are subjective, only that
> each person has to make the call. That sounds contradictory, but
think
> about it. If there is no way to prove an ethical system absolutely
true
> (and so far I haven't seen anyone who could do it; Kant is
impressive, Rawls
> pretty good, some like Rand are very unimpressive), then each person
has to
> decide what convinces them, and that could be an absolute ethic, or a
purely
> relativist one.
Well what you are saying is something like ultimately we all have to
acquire pour own knowledge personally and in that sense
“subjectively”. But, that does not make such knowledge subjective or
“relative”. It just makes it subjective as to whether or not one has
figured a particular thing out yet – the answer, itself, does not vary
according to the subject (unless they made an error). Basically it is
an equivocation on having the knowledge versus what the knowledge in
fact is. The former can be as subjective as it wants to be without
affecting the latter’s objectivity.
> For politics, this means that we can't have one correct
> political system that simply should be enforced, but a way to allow
the
> holding of different ethical beliefs in a manner which stabilizes
conflict
> and allows people in society to work towards certain goals. How can
you do
> this without making absolute ethical determinations? A form of
pragmatism
> seems all that is possible, at least at the political level.
What about the very goals you have presumed of “a way to allow the
holding of different ethical beliefs in a manner which stabilizes
conflict?” Kant had only one unconditional command (Categorical
Imperative) that he thought all else was derived, namely, the principle
of universality. In political philosophy such a command is distilled
by the following quote:
“Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in
accordance with a universal law, or if on its own maxim the freedom of
choice of each can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a
universal law.”
Or even better:
“Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice),
insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance
with a universal law, is the only original right belonging to every man
by virtue of his humanity.”
It really is no different from your more Hobbesian idea of stabilizing
conflict. Political philosophy is the pursuit of deciding which one is
the right one or if the right unconditional command is something else
altogether. Here, when I use “right” I mean “correct” or “true”. The
whole issue is which principle is it? Saying that ethics is
situational really just means that the principle is more sophisticated
than the ten commandments – not that there is no principle.
>
> Is that situational? Is that relativist? Can one compromise in
terms of
> law and politics if ones' own personal ethical views are different
than that
> held in law (e.g., personally believing that abortion is absolutely
wrong,
> but also believing a woman has to make that call on her own). Is
there a
> limit (e.g., murder, rape, burglary, gambling, drug use, etc.)?
It is not surprising to me that some seem to automatically contradict
themselves by saying “X is wrong” but “Choosing X is permissible” or
some such thing. Kant makes a distinction between matters of Justice
and matters of Virtue. Justice is what is all tied up with that
principle of universal freedom. Virtue is one’s propensity to be
just. So, one may act in a way that is actually completely just but
that suggests to others that they might act unjustly. A perfect
example might be a sleazy business partner – he may never have actually
“done” anything, but you just don’t trust him. Why? Because he lacks
virtue.
I think a lot of people are becoming more and more aware of this
distinction – that there are some things that to them seem unwholesome
or even objectively unwholesome but that are not necessarily, in
themselves, wrong. Alternatively, there are other things that seem
really wrong – that seem like they are not just unwholesome but truly
unjust. Perhaps the dichotomy underlying it all is the presence or
absence of a victim. Perhaps in matters of virtue the only victim that
ever exists is always also the perpetrator, and in matters of justice
the victims are always other individuals besides the perpetrator.
>
> > I would change one thing. Instead of doing to others as you would
have
> > done to you, just don't do to others as you would have not done to
you.
>
> OK, though I'd probably end up with something more like Kant's
categorical
> imperative if I really had to figure out the right wording :)
> ciao, scott
>
>
Exactly. In fact, Kant's Categorical Imperative is nothing more than
the “negative golden rule”. There is a subtle but profound
difference. One calls for action, the other simply prohibits. Such a
difference could mean the difference between laissez fair capitalism
and communism.
Scott D. Erb
>I guess you are entitled to your opinion. But I would like to point
>out here that you are referring to him as a social scientist when I
>think he ought to be compared to political philosophers and/or maybe
>specifically to economists. In any case, Smith predates him with much
>more insightful ideas. He had the opportunity to build on that. He
>did not.
Smith and Marx are the forerunners of different approaches to social theory
(if not social science), one more focused on agency, the other on structure.
Since Smith did not try to be so scientific -- he recognized the interplay of
economics, politics and culture while Marx focused on one cause because he
wanted to build a theory of everything that was parsimonious and mechanistic
-- I'd have to ultimately agree Smith's insights were more profound.
A lot of people on the Left falsely criticize Smith; I'm convinced most
haven't read him.
>You talk as if he invented social science or as if he invented
>economics. I personally think Mandeville did. Certainly at least
>Smith was doing economics. As for everything else, it only exists
>under such a pretense of science. It is not real science. So then the
>question would be what genuinely Marxist ideas were there – where did
>he really pioneer?
Oh, he was trying to apply science to social and economic life in a typically
19th century overly ambitious way. It failed, just as much of those early
attempts fail. Still, his logic created a type of analysis that has been
built upon and informs a lot of scholarship today. Don't take that as being
more praise than I mean it to be.
> You look on him as sort of inventing…something.
>What exactly was it that he had great insight into? As far as I can
>tell, his blinding insight was into the fallacy of equating economics
>with morality, and his most original idea was that of laborers being
>alienated from their labor through capitalist exploitation and based on
>the absurd (even for his time) Labor Theory of Value.
But alienation, exploitation, and the way capitalism functions (contradictions
within capitalism, and the like) all represented really significant insights.
Most of them were incomplete at best, some were wrong, but it helped move
towards the development of structural and holistic theories that provided a
different style of analysis.
>In fact, consider his Labor Theory. Try to imagine such a theory as a
>real bona fide theory. Why would Locke not have taken up such an
>obvious direction from his political philosophy. The reason is because
>there are a lot of good reasons that there is a perfectly good
>explanation of how property rights might be legitimate. Look at his
>conclusions. Look where he thinks the ideal society should lead.
>Especially for his time it sounded like science fiction. It sounds
>like a story – like a fairy tale. How can you call that science or
>even a half hearted attempt at it?
Marx and Engels recognized the reality of their era -- a lot of workers were
getting paid sustinence wages to produce goods that made a small group rich.
The Labor Theory of value had some legitimacy at that time, though ultimately
it could not capture the dynamism of reform and technology. But it did help
create notions of exploitation and oppression, something that all of us would
admit was in existence if we ventured into those London slums.
-snip: most snips are old bits from past posts, unless otherwise noted-
>Well, you do have a point about his popularity. I guess to me that is
>purely an unfortunate event. Much the same as Hegel’s popularity is an
>unfortunate embarrassment for mankind. You know how you feel sometimes
Oh, come on! Hegel's philosophy is often fascinating, even though I don't
agree with him on most issues. Its important in the history of philosophy,
and has some insights that have to be taken seriously.
>when you realize you have been playing some sort of game of make-
>believe – that sort of ashamed feeling of being an adult playing kids
>games? Well, the kind of “philosophy” these guys perpetrated might
>have been tolerable in Ancient Greece – much the same way we tolerate
>Aristotle’s four elements and that sort of thing. But, the fact that a
>true philosopher – a mature adult mind – like Kant gets followed by
>that is embarrassing. It is no wonder there is so much skepticism in
>the twentieth century.
Look at it differently, look at it as a necessary attempt for humans to
understand their changing conditions as we entered the age of reason, the age
of modernism, and the moving away from tradition and the predominance of
religion. I really reject the idea that philosophy that is proven weak over
time or which we disagree with strongly is considered bad or unnecessary. A
lot of people do that with Derrida or Foucault as well. I disagree with those
two, but the ideas are important and need to be dealt with. Hegel has some
really intriguing ideas, and delved into a type of thought that I think we had
to explore as we (as a culture) went deeper into the modern era.
>Well, I think the question then is what is the nature of socialism?
>Where does it go back to? What are its intellectual roots? We can
>look at Engels and Marx and see that socialism was not at all
>necessarily democratic by their own estimation. As many a socialist
They certainly mistrusted democracy, though revisionists (and even Engels
slightly towards the end of his life) reconsidered and rejected much of the
anti-democratic ideas of Marx. Marx thought capitalists would simply control
democracy, and doubted workers would ever really get the right to vote. He
was wrong.
>(or more precisely Hal Draper in _The Two Souls of Socialism_) might
>say, socialism of that day was from the top down and not the bottom up
>type of socialism you see endorsed in this day and age that possibly
>Marx was one of the pioneers of at least in some abstract way.
>(There! I think I found Marx’s contribution!) The point is that
>socialism had little to do with power to the people, but just a better
>lot for the people. Power to the people was embodied by democracy
>and/or representative government which was a completely independent
>development.
OK. I think Laclau and Mouffe and the post-marxists (who are often a bit too
post-modern for my tastes) have it right when they say democracy is PART of
the socialist revolution, and when they reject the socialism of Marx. In
short, I think they're realizing that the ideals of both utopian and marxian
socialism, as well as many of the critiques of capitalism, were accurate, but
the method and the misunderstandings of culture and politics led to a cure
that was worse than the disease. Marx made an error with serious
consequences, but it probably was an error that had to be made given the era,
and a listen that had to be learned through actual events, given the
development of modern society.
-snip bits about nazism...its very complex, some businesses made peace with
the nazis, others suffered...but the nazi organization was much different than
most so-called socialist societies...you raise good points, I won't quibble-
>I would not be too sure about that. A lot of the silence came from the
>fact that there were plenty of experiments in Fourierism and Owenism
>performed and failed. That is why “utopian” probably stuck. They
>really tried to make utopias. I believe a city – New Harmony,
>Connecticut – is still around (like a grave stone). Now it is a city,
>but Owen had wanted to make it a successful co-op. He failed in this
>as with basically all of his co-ops as did many experiments in
>Fourierism. Today, probably a lot of their ideas are not only echoing
>in something like Marxism, but also its alternatives – democratic
>socialism at large. One of the main ideas that is now almost
>indispensable to a socialist is the idea of democracy which was not at
>all big with these guys. I suppose this democracy issue was more a
>reaction to all the bad experience with dictatorships…
Probably. Its a development of thought and experience, the victory of
democratic ideals over the extremes of left or right.
-snip a bit about nazism; again, I see your point and won't quibble-
>> I think socialism is best defined as being opposed to exploitation
>> and oppression caused by the structure of economic relations within
>> capitalism (or other forms of producing value).
>
>That is Marxism. What about democratic socialists, for instance, that
>are perfectly willing to allow capitalism to thrive in the nonessential
>industries? Socialism is just public means of production.
OK, though I think the post-Marxists argue that public means of production can
be accomplished through radical democracy; democracy in the workplace, in
planning, in government, in regulations. They see true socialism as a
democratic and in fact individually empowering experience, rather than an
elite ruled system. I think they have a point, though I'm not sure I know how
they can get there from here.
-again, snips on nazism...these debates rage on and on, and I think your view
is logical, I'd need to look into some issues more to determine if I'm
convinced, but at this point I can't quibble, except I don't think Nazis cared
about workers at all, except as part of the machine. That goes along with
conservative notions of an organic society with inherent inequality and
elitism. Nazism certainly borrowed heavily from traditional conservative
ideals-
>Like I said above, it wasn’t just collectivism and conservatives need
>not be that collectivist. There was more importance put on the laborer
>– not as much as Marx, maybe, or many socialists today, but more than
>most conservatives.
-snip-
>I have to shudder at your use of Locke to identify modern liberals.
Really?
>Rawls maybe, but Locke’s discussion of property seems a bit to
>capitalist for a welfare state.
Come on, is Bill Clinton anything but a capitalist at heart? Heck, he's more
classical liberal than people like Helmut Kohl and Jacques Chirac. Maybe
similar to John Major (though Thatcher was more classical liberal).
> Locke’s idea of helping the needy is a
>bit like Kant’s idea of a duty to beneficence. It goes all the way to
>maybe a couple homeless shelters or the duty of hospitals to accept
>emergency patients (that are dying), but it doesn’t even get close to a
>progressive tax or food stamps or medicaid or anything like that. Many
I don't know, I've seen arguments that Locke also can be seen as underlying
social democratic norms with his limitations on property rights. I'd have to
dig them up to find exactly why they said that...
>laissez fair capitalists would do back flips at the prospect of
>returning society to a Lockean or Kantian one.
Sure, but they wrote at a different time. Their ideas still contain within
them the seeds of modern liberalism. They wrote just as modernism was
starting to really tear apart the traditions of society. The next couple
centuries would change everything.
I'll reply to the rest later!
ciao, scott
Scott D. Erb
In article <81vbku$hcg$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, adrian...@my-deja.com says...
>> I think that American liberals are very concerned with Human Rights
>(Carter,
>> etc.), and that reflects a belief going back to Wilson and even
>classical
>> liberalism that there are essential values we humans have by nature,
>which
>> are not relative to culture.
>
>Well, you would not be he first to point something like this out and I
>am not one to defend moral subjectivism. However, cultural relativism
>and emotivism are two big leftist and/or liberal ideologies. Marxism
>is really subjectivist, for that matter. He tries to replace
>philosophical moralizing with real hard scientific, economic fact.
I don't see that as subjectivist! I do see it as an attempt to derive ethics
and morality from nature, using the tools of reason and science -- something
all the rave in the 19th century. Cultural relativism doesn't seem leftist to
me, it seems rather conservative since conservatives usually value the
cultures and traditions of the society above all else. I'm not sure why
you're making those classifications.
>That general attitude is how the subjectivists end up making what seem
>to be moral conclusions (but according to them is not exactly the
>same). In any case, think carefully about a lot of liberal attitudes.
>A lot of it has as much to do with discrediting the idea that one
>really has that much of a “right” to property or that a murder (say)
>really did anything that could be considered all that “wrong”, and so
>on.
I really have no idea why you're making those claims, its not anything I've
seen in current thought, except on the real fringes both left and right. If
you're saying people, even scientists and philosophers try to rationalize
their subjective biases and make reasons for people to consider them
universal, yeah, that happens. Marx on the Left, Rand on the libertarian
extreme (neither left nor right), Hitler on the right...that sort of thing
happens all the time. Maybe none of us are immune, but critical thinking can
help at least recognize the danger of bias.
-snip-
>Well, there is actually a much more deliberate connection than all
>that. Logical positivism is basically the ideology that science really
>ought to replace philosophy altogether. There are a lot of problems
>with all this, but the point is that it was a real movement in the
>early part of this century.
OK, though I don't see it argued much any more.
> That movement has also permeated society
>to a large extent. Science is not quite as open as one might think,
>incidentally. And, the exact problem I have with logical positivism is
>in its putting ethics on the level of intellectual activities as
>science – perhaps sociology. The fact is that (at least on my view) it
>is a lot more like math. And one must also understand my view of math
>– as being really rather philosophical – to really appreciate that last
>statement.
:) Or is math a religion (I remember the old Calvin and Hobbes cartoon about
math as a religion)
Seriously, I think that ethics and philosophy necessarily is both an empirical
and abstract endeavor. Science along can't find ethics; they deal with value
and meaning, things that can't be measured and tested. Yet ethical
propositions are virtuallyimpossible without some kind of referent in the
world. A balance of science to inform philosophy seems best. I think any
good moral philosopher, if not a trained scientist, needs to read Discover,
Scientific American, and other publications to keep abreast of general
scientific discoveries and think about how that affects ethical philosophy.
> Anyway, that is often one of the basic flaws of something
>like replacing philosophy with science – the error in thinking that
>math boils down to just deductive analysis or more science.
One can't replace one with the other, they at best complement each other.
-snip bit on Marx...I think we've beaten that guy into the ground by now!-
>Not so at all. In fact, my problem with a lot of Kant’s conlusions is
>that he gets away from the hard deductive reasoning and often ends up
>in “practical reason”. I am glad you like Kant. There are a lot of
>reasons, then why one must allow society to evolve into a principle of
>universality – simply because it is so complicated in its ramifications
>that not even a genius could just figure them all out in a life time.
>Kant’s approach is not a subjective call – it is just often leading to
>hard problems which any truly honest and accurate theory has to.
Kant was also a scientist, I think he represented the type of blend of science
and philosophy that is essential.
>Well what you are saying is something like ultimately we all have to
>acquire pour own knowledge personally and in that sense
>“subjectively”. But, that does not make such knowledge subjective or
>“relative”. It just makes it subjective as to whether or not one has
>figured a particular thing out yet – the answer, itself, does not vary
>according to the subject (unless they made an error). Basically it is
>an equivocation on having the knowledge versus what the knowledge in
>fact is. The former can be as subjective as it wants to be without
>affecting the latter’s objectivity.
I look at it this way. We have three "realities".
1) Objective reality -- the world out there, as it really is.
2) Subjective reality -- the world as we perceive and understand it.
We always experience objective reality indirectly, through our senses and our
interpretation of senses. That of course creates all the epistemological
problems philosophers have gone on and on about.
3) Social reality -- that is the world of shared understandings and beliefs
about reality which make social life possible. Language, norms, symbolic
representations of reality, etc., are in this realm. Social reality is more
distant from objective reality, and provides some of the lenses through which
we subjectively interpret our sensory perception of objective reality (the
norms and understandings we learn). That is the realm of politics and
sociology, and it also shows the difficulty in ethical philosophy. We're
dealing with a reality in some ways twice removed from objective reality, and
more likely to reflect numerous "errors."
I'm going to save the rest for now. Its not long, but I have some
disagreements I need to express clearly, and I'm really tired and have been
working too long and just can't generate the creative energy to give it the
thought it deserves. Until tomorrow!
-scott
Adrian
Well, time will tell. We will both likely be long since dead when
history looks back on these ideas and sorts them into absurd
superstition and blinding insight.
Well, I think that what we certainly want is a republic or a
democracy. The socialism is ancillary.
Just a point here. The nazis were right wing conservatives. The
question is whether or not socialism is a right wing conservative sort
of thing. "Nazi" stands for "national socialist". The first term
without a doubt puts them on the right side of that church. They were
for autocracy -- that is definitely right wing. The question is what
is _socialism_ really about? For the answer to that we have to look at
the early Christians, Plato perhaps as well as others maybe through the
ages, but definitely Owen, Fourier and Saint-Simon.
I guess that is my real point about naziism when it comes to this type
of a discussion. I think that is the point many laissez fair
capitalists want to make if they ever say something like "the nazis
were really left wing". The statement they are probably trying to make
is more like "socialism is really right wing". Socialism has never
been that concerned (as many socialists often admit looking back in
history) with real _power_ to the people so much as a better lot for
the worker. It has always been concerned more with better rulers.
>
> >Like I said above, it wasn’t just collectivism and conservatives need
> >not be that collectivist. There was more importance put on the
laborer
> >– not as much as Marx, maybe, or many socialists today, but more than
> >most conservatives.
>
> -snip-
>
> >I have to shudder at your use of Locke to identify modern liberals.
>
> Really?
>
> >Rawls maybe, but Locke’s discussion of property seems a bit to
> >capitalist for a welfare state.
>
> Come on, is Bill Clinton anything but a capitalist at heart? Heck,
he's more
> classical liberal than people like Helmut Kohl and Jacques Chirac.
Maybe
> similar to John Major (though Thatcher was more classical liberal).
>
Well, your leftism is certainly showing here...
> > Locke’s idea of helping the needy is a
> >bit like Kant’s idea of a duty to beneficence. It goes all the way
to
> >maybe a couple homeless shelters or the duty of hospitals to accept
> >emergency patients (that are dying), but it doesn’t even get close
to a
> >progressive tax or food stamps or medicaid or anything like that.
Many
>
> I don't know, I've seen arguments that Locke also can be seen as
underlying
> social democratic norms with his limitations on property rights. I'd
have to
> dig them up to find exactly why they said that...
Please -- I beg you -- have a truly open mind when you look at those
arguments and ask yourself if they are just trying to defend a position
or if they are arguing for something they really think is true. It is
certainly true that Locke has many points (especially in his first
treatise) that he sounds almost like a socialist, but the fact is that
when it comes right down to it he is pretty laissez fair capitalist.
But, he also writes specifically about property and about property
rights. It is spurious at best to argue he was really a democratic
socialist.
>
> >laissez fair capitalists would do back flips at the prospect of
> >returning society to a Lockean or Kantian one.
>
> Sure, but they wrote at a different time. Their ideas still contain
within
> them the seeds of modern liberalism. They wrote just as modernism
was
> starting to really tear apart the traditions of society. The next
couple
> centuries would change everything.
>
Obviously classic liberals were the seeds to modern liberals. The
point is that they were the seeds not the tree itself and they did not
agree with the principles of modern liberalism. Rawls might say that
Locke was wrong about several points and that his ideas lead to
something else (modern liberalism). It takes somebody more like Tony
Blair (if he even knows who Locke was) to say something like "You know -
- Locke -- that big socialist from the 17th century."
Adrian
In article <81vjsr$dp7$1...@rupert.unet.maine.edu>,
scot...@maine.maine.edu (Scott D. Erb) wrote:
Well, I had seen you guys arguing over "relativism". The guy who
sounded kind of like a fundie was saying a lot of things that were
along the lines of the conservative Christian rebuke of secular
humanism which might broadly contain a lot of cultural relativity or
emotivism varying from humanist to humanist.
In any case:
1) A conservative would be more inclined to preserve _their_ culture at
the expense of any other if anything (the opposite of cultural
relativism). A doctrine of tolerance of all cultures including, for
instance, promiscuous tribal cultures is extremely liberal. I am not
sure if you know a whole lot about the history of cultural
anthropology, but there is this pretty famous "study" done by Margaret
Mead into the culture of primitive people of Samoa (their promiscuous
sexual habits, for instance, in particular). Derek Freeman (another
anthropologist from Australia) has drawn into question a lot of Mead's
findings.
2) Nonetheless, the entire field almost seems like a construction to
justify certian (liberal) political positions. I say this after having
all of my beliefs systematically debunked by my wife -- an experience
that is charming at first, but almost humiliating and shameful to the
extent that it happened. Almost everything I "learned" from cultural
anthropology was a myth -- everything from the Eskimos having how ever
many different names for snow to "monkies can talk". Anyway, that is a
somewhat biased perspective on a field and some of its tenents that
have had a large influence in moral phislophy. Ethical relativism,
though not big among philosophers, has a wide following and is
certainly addressed by philsophers.
>
> >That general attitude is how the subjectivists end up making what
seem
> >to be moral conclusions (but according to them is not exactly the
> >same). In any case, think carefully about a lot of liberal
attitudes.
> >A lot of it has as much to do with discrediting the idea that one
> >really has that much of a “right” to property or that a murder (say)
> >really did anything that could be considered all that “wrong”, and so
> >on.
>
> I really have no idea why you're making those claims, its not
anything I've
> seen in current thought, except on the real fringes both left and
right. If
> you're saying people, even scientists and philosophers try to
rationalize
> their subjective biases and make reasons for people to consider them
> universal, yeah, that happens. Marx on the Left, Rand on the
libertarian
> extreme (neither left nor right), Hitler on the right...that sort of
thing
> happens all the time. Maybe none of us are immune, but critical
thinking can
> help at least recognize the danger of bias.
Well, look into logical positivism. Look more broadly into moral
philosophy and at the political philosophy that has a base to it. I
don't know. I would say that skepticism for the validity of objective
morality has played a major role in modern moral and political
philosophy and has pushed in the liberal direction. Granted, a
utilitarian would have an objective basis for morality and a grounds
for socialism, maybe. But, one cannot also deny the influence of those
that try to promote science over philosophy in this matter. It is
necessary to reject objective morality to do so and replace it with
something more scientific.
Perhaps we can discuss this point in particular further, but I can tell
right away that I would likely go on for several paragraphs in order to
elaborate on that point. Nonetheless, the history is there -- cultural
relativism and logical positivism are big moves toward subjective
morality and also very liberal. Actually, now that I think of it, did
you see "Instinct" with Cuba <somebody -- Gooding, Jr?> and Anthony
Hopkins? The ideas expressed and/or implied in that movie are like the
paradigm of cultural anthropology, ethical relativism, etc. They are
also extremely liberal.
>
> -snip-
>
> >Well, there is actually a much more deliberate connection than all
> >that. Logical positivism is basically the ideology that science
really
> >ought to replace philosophy altogether. There are a lot of problems
> >with all this, but the point is that it was a real movement in the
> >early part of this century.
>
> OK, though I don't see it argued much any more.
Yes you do!! Your students....
Do you really think something like an academic journal matters --
something that 1% of which might live on to be valuable to future
generations -- something that has almost no substance in the long run?
The only reason it matters is because the only substance to be had is
contained within it. That 1% that actually was insightful and not just
scholarly might actually trickle down after half a century and even be
carried on and built on by future generations. The point is that
despite a trend in academics, the papers that matter in the long run
and that actually make it very far outside of academia are some small
percentage that move along independent trends.
In any case, what has a hold of a lot of the public is emotivism and
cultural relativism whether academicians take it seriously anymore or
not. Consider for instance, how many athiests are Randians? Far fewer
are like me -- just a hodge podge of ideas. The vast majority are
secular humanists which puts them broadly into ethical relativism or
emotivism (logical positivism) and moral subjectivism in general. In
fact, going back to the trend issue, ethical relativism was never taken
too seriously by philosophers, but look at its influence on everyone
else. It is not just a matter of education or some such thing. It is
more a dispute between fields of a certain issue. Those "educated" one
way have a certain set of beliefs, and those "educated" in a different
way have a deifferent set.
Well, of course, I might disagree with some of the statements as you
have made them about the nature of moral philosophy, but I think the
idea you are trying to convey is quite true. A philosopher that does
not look outside his field for facts can be left without much
meaningful subject matter to discuss. I guess philosophers are like
poets in that regard.
Just for the record, by the way, I am pretty Kantian when it comes to
moral philosohy -- you could probably tell by the quotes. So to me
morality is like geometry. There is no truly empirical knowledge to be
gained in it. All science does is pose hard ethical questions that we
could have strictly speaking thought of purely hypothetically without
science and that must have solutions that stand on their own
philosophically.
I suppose Kant would say that there are things in themselves, but we
can only ever know of the phenomenon of those things -- the
phenomenological thing. And we can have certain knowledge of the
phenomenon (in other words we need not doubt our experiences).
>
> 3) Social reality -- that is the world of shared understandings and
beliefs
> about reality which make social life possible.
That seems artificial (and heavily influenced by tenents of
anthropology).
> Language, norms, symbolic
> representations of reality, etc., are in this realm. Social reality
is more
> distant from objective reality, and provides some of the lenses
through which
> we subjectively interpret our sensory perception of objective reality
(the
> norms and understandings we learn).
You have just expressed the major tenent of cultural anthropology --
that norms are subjective (or learned within some cultural or societal
context). In fact, that term -- "norm" -- is sort of an
anthropological term. There are a lot of interesting and extremely
subtle issues here about whether language provides meaning or if it
just articulates it and that sort of thing. These sorts of questions
were only asked a century ago to begin with and are still being very
carefully considered.
In any case, the point is that you were kind of wondering where I was
getting all this cultural relativism and emotivism from -- why I
thought it was an issue and what did it have to do with liberalism.
Look carefully at what you are saying above....
> That is the realm of politics and
> sociology, and it also shows the difficulty in ethical philosophy.
We're
> dealing with a reality in some ways twice removed from objective
reality, and
> more likely to reflect numerous "errors."
I would have the opposite view -- that we are "closest" to moral and
political _philosophy_. These items are a priori -- like goemetry. We
can be most certain of the philosophy and its principles. What might
become difficult is posing the real moral question in the first place
(in other words seeing what is really going on socially to begin
with). But, such a matter is a lot less ambiguous than if there were
this further complexity that existed in moral philosophy. The
complexity outside of philosophy I am referring to is more like knowing
who said what to whom and what it meant than something else. It is
like knowing the "low down" on what is really going on as opposed to
some further inherent complexity in moral philosophy, itself.
>
> I'm going to save the rest for now. Its not long, but I have some
> disagreements I need to express clearly, and I'm really tired and
have been
> working too long and just can't generate the creative energy to give
it the
> thought it deserves. Until tomorrow!
> -scott
>
>
Actually, I have to confess, I am interested in this cultural
anthropology/logical positivism thing. I don't know about the stuff
about the the history of socialism and Hitler -- that stuff is more for
agitated rebukes than discussion. I think this modern philosophy might
be sort of interesting, though. I am 99% certain we have serious
disagreements about the foundation of moral philosophy. I am certainly
no leftist, so there is the political philosophy. But, what I find
especially interesting is the fact that you act almost oblivious to
trends/movements that seem real and significant to me (and that I don't
even agree with so its not like it is my pet movement or anything). It
even looks as if a lot of it might be right there in your own outlook.
Adrian
Scott D. Erb
OK...the last part. Last night I deleted some parts of the post to focus on
what I thought was more important (and explained why), but please re-state
something if you think I should give it more thought.
>What about the very goals you have presumed of “a way to allow the
>holding of different ethical beliefs in a manner which stabilizes
>conflict?” Kant had only one unconditional command (Categorical
>Imperative) that he thought all else was derived, namely, the principle
>of universality. In political philosophy such a command is distilled
>by the following quote:
>
>“Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in
>accordance with a universal law, or if on its own maxim the freedom of
>choice of each can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a
>universal law.”
Yikes, that's a mouthful. I always have trouble applying Kant to politics.
His effort on perpetual peace seems to suggest something akin to what later
would develop as liberal democracy (i.e., a constitutional republic based on
certain principles we consider 'liberal' -- ideas of human rights of life,
liberty, and property), with a legitimate authority (as opposed to tyranny or
illegitimate authority). I can't really comment much on that statement above,
it needs to be deconstructed some (not meaning a post-modernist treatment,
mind you!)
>Or even better:
>
>“Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice),
>insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance
>with a universal law, is the only original right belonging to every man
>by virtue of his humanity.”
I don't like this formation, I think it goes another step and potentially
ignores the essential social nature of all human acts. Everything we do has
an impact on others in one way or another, directly or indirectly; we are
social creatures, living in societies. The difficulty in political philosophy
is the tension between liberal individualism (which often errs to the point of
ignoring that essential societal aspect of human existence, be it in language
or life choices) and structuralism (which often erros to the point of ignoring
individual agency and identity, too often seeing structures as constructing
identity and power capacities). The reality is more like Giddens'
strucurationist ideas, I think, which means that in political philosophy
statements like the above are too loaded and prone to over simplify the actual
condition of social life.
Or maybe I'm reading too much into it :)
>It really is no different from your more Hobbesian idea of stabilizing
>conflict. Political philosophy is the pursuit of deciding which one is
>the right one or if the right unconditional command is something else
>altogether. Here, when I use “right” I mean “correct” or “true”. The
>whole issue is which principle is it? Saying that ethics is
>situational really just means that the principle is more sophisticated
>than the ten commandments – not that there is no principle.
But political philosophy can also be recognizing that epistemological
limitations make any proposition about what it is right and true inherently
questionable. As I noted last night, no political philosophy has been
actually proven true; we just find arguments we like or dislike, probably out
of a mix of emotion, experience, and our use of reason (even if we try to say
its just the last one). To me a real political philosophy has to go a step
beyond just a philosophy of ethics and trying to come up with universals, but
requires dealing with the reality that belief on universals is inherently
conflictual, with no clear mechanism for deciding.
That's why I end up being in favor of constitutional democracy. Its a balance
of various ideas and ideals, not representing any perfect political
philosophy, but working with the reality of various conflicting philosophies.
>It is not surprising to me that some seem to automatically contradict
>themselves by saying “X is wrong” but “Choosing X is permissible” or
>some such thing. Kant makes a distinction between matters of Justice
>and matters of Virtue. Justice is what is all tied up with that
>principle of universal freedom. Virtue is one’s propensity to be
>just. So, one may act in a way that is actually completely just but
>that suggests to others that they might act unjustly. A perfect
>example might be a sleazy business partner – he may never have actually
>“done” anything, but you just don’t trust him. Why? Because he lacks
>virtue.
OK
>I think a lot of people are becoming more and more aware of this
>distinction – that there are some things that to them seem unwholesome
>or even objectively unwholesome but that are not necessarily, in
>themselves, wrong. Alternatively, there are other things that seem
>really wrong – that seem like they are not just unwholesome but truly
>unjust. Perhaps the dichotomy underlying it all is the presence or
>absence of a victim. Perhaps in matters of virtue the only victim that
>ever exists is always also the perpetrator, and in matters of justice
>the victims are always other individuals besides the perpetrator.
That sounds reasonable.
>Exactly. In fact, Kant's Categorical Imperative is nothing more than
>the “negative golden rule”. There is a subtle but profound
>difference. One calls for action, the other simply prohibits. Such a
>difference could mean the difference between laissez fair capitalism
>and communism.
Interesting. I'm still not sure about applying Kant's Categorical Imperative
to politics. In fact, when people do that (for instance, Fernando R. Teson
using Kant to try to justify interventionism in international relations by
countries like the US against states that have "illegitimate rulers" - *A
Philosophy of International Law* Westview Publishing), they seem to be
twisting the imperative around in the way you object to, making it more like
the "positive" golden rule. (As one person says, he's using Kant as a means
to his end of rationalizing his position). Politics, even to create a system
which prohibits intervention in the economy (laissez-faire capitalism), is
potentially an act of forcing people to do things they wouldn't normally want
to do, or prohibit them from acts they would want to do. That is active, that
isn't passive. That's why I think Kant's ethics end up hard to apply to
politics.
In an ironic twist to how this whole thread started, Paleo was saying that the
church has to be "in the world," and thus is justified in compromising some of
the moral teachings of Christ (as they are not meant for statescraft, etc.)
Augustine's "City of God" sort of set out the rationale for that. With Kant
we have the same problem -- applying his ethics to politics might require
contradicting some of that ethical principle. So maybe politics is another
realm.
I'll have to think about this. I'll have to go back and read bits of Kant
(and Hegel and others) that have been sitting on my shelf for a long time --
I'm sure my rustiness with this stuff shows. But thanks -- your post is
getting me thinking about things I enjoy thinking about, but too often don't
have time for.
ciao, scott
Scott D. Erb
-snip old bits-
>Well, time will tell. We will both likely be long since dead when
>history looks back on these ideas and sorts them into absurd
>superstition and blinding insight.
Yeah, but even what someday will be seen as absurd superstition is part of the
building process. I mean, Aristotle thought the planets and sun circled the
earth in crystal spheres, among other ideas that seem really silly now. Early
scientists had really strange theories. Part of the mystery of life is not
knowing just what will be seen as blinding insight or absurd theory. I
suspect we'd both be very surprised if we could glimpse, 500, 1000 or even
10,000 years in the future. Can you imagine 10,000 years ahead???
-snip-
>Well, I think that what we certainly want is a republic or a
>democracy. The socialism is ancillary.
In this day and age I'm convinced that the only kind of republic that won't
drift towards authoritarian abuses is a democratic republic, supported by a
political culture built on shared norms and ideals, protecting individual
liberties, and having a strong judicial system. Within that you can have more
or less social welfare, different regulations of capitalism, etc. In fact,
experiments within different countries can help the process of choosing whats
best (as we define it) move forward.
>Just a point here. The nazis were right wing conservatives. The
>question is whether or not socialism is a right wing conservative sort
>of thing. "Nazi" stands for "national socialist". The first term
Conservatism is collectivist at the core, so I suppose one could use the word
socialist. I think its misplaced in this context though; I suspect the
conventional interpretation (that they played up some socialist ideas to get
support from workers then dropped them when they got to power) is better. Now
if you replace "socialist" with "collectivist," then I'd be more comfortable.
It was a right wing conservative collectivist system.
>without a doubt puts them on the right side of that church. They were
>for autocracy -- that is definitely right wing. The question is what
>is _socialism_ really about? For the answer to that we have to look at
>the early Christians, Plato perhaps as well as others maybe through the
>ages, but definitely Owen, Fourier and Saint-Simon.
OK, though perhaps the easiest way is to label things differently. I can
almost accept a label of right wing or conservative socialism, but it really
raises questions about the philosophical underpinnings of socialist thought,
and what exactly distinguishes the Left from the Right. The more I think of
it, the more the symbolism of the Pope and Castro agreeing on so many points
intrigues me.
>I guess that is my real point about naziism when it comes to this type
>of a discussion. I think that is the point many laissez fair
>capitalists want to make if they ever say something like "the nazis
>were really left wing". The statement they are probably trying to make
>is more like "socialism is really right wing". Socialism has never
>been that concerned (as many socialists often admit looking back in
>history) with real _power_ to the people so much as a better lot for
>the worker. It has always been concerned more with better rulers.
That's similar to the argument post-marxists and anti-statist socialists, as
well as some Social Democrats make, at least about Communism. Schumacher (SPD
leader in post-war Germany) the Communists "red lacquered fascists.
Ultimately I think laissez-faire capitalists tend to accept a dose of social
darwinism and exploitation as a driving force for progress, while socialists
consider that inhumane and unnecessary. I agree with socialists on this,
except I'd note that this doesn't require equality in material goods; I think
the materialism of socialism is misguided. You could have equal status
(rights, etc.) and opportunity in society, but still differentiate outcomes on
the basis of effort (rather than structural advantage, etc.)
>> Come on, is Bill Clinton anything but a capitalist at heart? Heck,
>he's more
>> classical liberal than people like Helmut Kohl and Jacques Chirac.
>Maybe
>> similar to John Major (though Thatcher was more classical liberal).
>>
>
>Well, your leftism is certainly showing here...
Am I wrong? I mean in Germany Clinton's policies would be smack dab in the
middle of the CDU. Heck, I don't know anyone in Germany, left or right, who
would want to ditch their health care system, pension plan or social
protections. Some may want cuts, but I know maybe one or two people who would
seriously want something like an American system. The US is really a liberal
capitalist state; taxes are 29% of GDP (they're about 48% of GDP in Germany, I
think near 60% in Sweden...I don't know about Britain off the top of my head).
>Please -- I beg you -- have a truly open mind when you look at those
>arguments and ask yourself if they are just trying to defend a position
>or if they are arguing for something they really think is true. It is
Certainly, its intriguing, and of course ultimately Locke didn't imagine what
the next centuries would bring, so its hard to really extrapolate into the
very different circumstances that the industrial revolution would create.
That makes it easy to interpret the philosophy in ways that are self-serving,
and it could well be that the argument I recall was done that way.
>certainly true that Locke has many points (especially in his first
>treatise) that he sounds almost like a socialist, but the fact is that
>when it comes right down to it he is pretty laissez fair capitalist.
Liberalism was emerging in response to aristocracy, and most thought
laissez-faire capitalism would work in a manner that would create free,
autonomous humans using reason to make it in the world. I'm not sure what
even Adam Smith would say if plopped down in sweat shops now in Southeast
Asia, or in the worst slums of the mid-19th century Britain.
>But, he also writes specifically about property and about property
>rights. It is spurious at best to argue he was really a democratic
>socialist.
Again, if one takes the essence of his claims and thinks about the conditions
that pure capitalism created in the industrial revolution, I suspect one can
imagine thinkers like Locke and even Smith questioning their faith in liberal
principles. But thats the trouble with talking about the ideas of
philosophers outside their time frames. Its worth doing, but always tricky,
and always open to various intepretations.
>Obviously classic liberals were the seeds to modern liberals. The
>point is that they were the seeds not the tree itself and they did not
>agree with the principles of modern liberalism. Rawls might say that
>Locke was wrong about several points and that his ideas lead to
>something else (modern liberalism). It takes somebody more like Tony
>Blair (if he even knows who Locke was) to say something like "You know -
>- Locke -- that big socialist from the 17th century."
I'm sure Blair knows who Locke was :)
But yeah, Locke can't be called a socialist. At best one can say the ideas he
had, when applied to different contexts, could be seen as justifying both some
types of social democracy (but not communism) and classical liberal
governance. Ultimately Locke, like any human, would have altered his thinking
if he saw what was to come; great thinkers always reflect on and adjust their
theories when new and surprising evidence emerges. Assuming he sticks with
his basic principles, the alteration probably wouldn't have gone to full blown
social democracy, but one could suspect he'd approve of someone like Blair.
But again, talking about philosophers outside their time frame really opens
things up to interpretation, even imagination. Its useful to do, but I
wouldn't push any of what I said there as being anything more than my own
questionable mid-morning ramblings.
ciao, scott
Adrian
Kant deconstructs it or rather clarifies it further in his _Metaphysics
of Morals_. It might be interesting to see what he says and see how
liberal he may be (in th emodern sense) or if it is more twisting. The
only group more culpable of twisting than lawyers and politicians are
philosophers. Actually, I think I would even say "distorting
reality". In any case, Kant was a lot more like a conservative than a
liberal in the modern sense. He was not a laissez fair capitalist, but
I read his political and moral philosophy in the _Metaphysics of
Morals_ which is sort of his big statement of it in all its
ramifications, and it is just way too conservative (by today's
standards or even for his time).
>
> >Or even better:
> >
> >“Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice),
> >insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in
accordance
> >with a universal law, is the only original right belonging to every
man
> >by virtue of his humanity.”
>
> I don't like this formation, I think it goes another step and
potentially
> ignores the essential social nature of all human acts. Everything we
do has
> an impact on others in one way or another, directly or indirectly; we
are
> social creatures, living in societies.
What about "insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every
other"? It simply makes a statement about the relationship of people
morally. Of course one cannot help but to see certain directions in
reasoning that would seem to beg to be taken from such a maxim.
> The difficulty in political philosophy
> is the tension between liberal individualism (which often errs to the
point of
> ignoring that essential societal aspect of human existence, be it in
language
> or life choices) and structuralism (which often erros to the point of
ignoring
> individual agency and identity, too often seeing structures as
constructing
> identity and power capacities). The reality is more like Giddens'
> strucurationist ideas, I think, which means that in political
philosophy
> statements like the above are too loaded and prone to over simplify
the actual
> condition of social life.
>
> Or maybe I'm reading too much into it :)
I don't think you are. I think that you are mistaken about a false
compromise that you see as being "called for". For instance, suppose I
have ten dollars. You walk up and demand ten dollars from me. We
argue, then you say "Okay lets compromise." And now under the pretense
of "being reasonable", you demand five dollars. All things being
equal, there should be no compromise. Morality is about volitional
individual beings not about societies. It is far mroe general and
fundamental than anything that relies on a society for its validity.
There may be exploitation or trends in society that have some moral
relevance, but such exploitation or trend must not rely on its social
nature to be related to morality. It must be related independently of
all that.
So, while possibly "everything it connected" may have something to it,
it alone is not sufficient to be compelling on any moral grounds. All
it can do is suggest a direction of exploration that will yield a
different argument, that will bring to bear the real _details_ of the
actual _moral_ significance of acts. To say something like "he did
this and they suffered over there" is not at all sufficient -- you have
to show how his actions _caused_ their sufferring (without glossing
over any details). It is that last part and sometimes even the very
idea that there must be an identifiable causality at all that is always
inadequately addressed.
That's not true. The mechanisms just aren't obvious. You do not get
all the answers in just coming up with a universal principle. For
instance, we have been counting for thousands of years, but only
recently have formulated Peano's Axioms. Some of the most profound
results have occurred as a result of this not the least of which being
that mathematics is not reducible to the axioms of logic. The point is
that we have understood the basic principles of counting for thousands
of years, but haven't even articulated them formally until just now and
are still exploring meaningful ramifications of it. Don't expect to
finish it all in one paper or even one lifetime.
I think if you look at it from this perspective, perhaps it is just far
more complicated than it appears on the surface. So, what seems likea
crap shoot to you is actually something that will be ironed out over
the course of a few thousand years. It may not even seem like an
objective question -- you may not even know what the real question is
or what the real issues are. We haven't known what they are in math
until just recently, and yet if math is not deemed objective, then I do
not know what is.
>
> That's why I end up being in favor of constitutional democracy. Its
a balance
> of various ideas and ideals, not representing any perfect political
> philosophy, but working with the reality of various conflicting
philosophies.
>
I think that we shouldn't be surprised if the answer is not so simple
as majority rule or something like that. But I also do not think that
such a result would reflect that the answer is some sort
of "compromise" between conflicting principles, either.
Kant, himself, twisted his own words (in my opinion). He had a great
idea -- the universality principle. Not many dispute that particular
idea. That is progress, and for that we will be indebted to him. He
really articulated something -- made a distinction no one really "got"
exactly. As for the rest of what he thinks such a discovery entails,
that must be evaluated as the first discovery was and not simply
accepted as though he must have just figured it all out then. I mean,
it is certainly possible that that one distinction was the stumbling
block -- was the "trick" -- to solving all these problems. But, that
is unlikely when you look at the principle of universality and how
littel _specific_ information you can easily get out of it.
You are quite right it can be twisted. You are quite right that it is
hard to apply. But when you say that to me it is like saying that math
is hard so let's just do physics without the math. Well, unfortunately
if you want to do physics you are going to have to do the math. And,
if you want to do ethics you are going to have to deal with that
principle of universality one way or another. Don't expect a lot of
progress. The problems are hard, and just because we didn't solve them
in a few years or even if Kant himself only got one thing right about
it, that does not mean they are insoluble or that we should try to
solve an easier set of problems under the pretense of solving these.
> Politics, even to create a system
> which prohibits intervention in the economy (laissez-faire
capitalism), is
> potentially an act of forcing people to do things they wouldn't
normally want
> to do, or prohibit them from acts they would want to do.
I don't know about the first one. However, force is necessary in any
case.
> That is active, that
> isn't passive.
Not true. The former is active and the latter is passive (or at least
it can be). In any case, let's suppose we try to have a purely passive
society. What result do we get? Is it a simple one? Could you just
blurt out the answers to any dilemma based on the rule of passivity?
Could you at least figure it out, say, in a lifetime of studying it --
all the subtle logical ramifications?
I very highly recommend Kant's authoritative book on the matter, _The
Metaphysics of Morals_. I bet it might put a unique spin on Kant that
you wouldn't get from those of us that claim to interpret him. Even I
am giving my own view of what he said or meant. I promise you won't
regret it. I doubt you will agree very much with him, but he does seem
to at least raise some interesting issues.
Scott D. Erb
Adrian wrote:
> Actually, this discussion is far more interesting...
I agree/
> In article <81vjsr$dp7$1...@rupert.unet.maine.edu>,
> scot...@maine.maine.edu (Scott D. Erb) wrote:
> > OK, to finish up...
> Well, I had seen you guys arguing over "relativism". The guy who
> sounded kind of like a fundie was saying a lot of things that were
> along the lines of the conservative Christian rebuke of secular
> humanism which might broadly contain a lot of cultural relativity or
> emotivism varying from humanist to humanist.
OK...
> In any case:
>
> 1) A conservative would be more inclined to preserve _their_ culture at
> the expense of any other if anything (the opposite of cultural
> relativism). A doctrine of tolerance of all cultures including, for
> instance, promiscuous tribal cultures is extremely liberal. I am not
> sure if you know a whole lot about the history of cultural
> anthropology, but there is this pretty famous "study" done by Margaret
> Mead into the culture of primitive people of Samoa (their promiscuous
> sexual habits, for instance, in particular). Derek Freeman (another
> anthropologist from Australia) has drawn into question a lot of Mead's
> findings.
It varies. A lot of conservative thinkers embrace sovereignty because it
allows each state or culture to live by its traditions and values, and many
conservatives don't want to impose their values on other cultures because
they don't want others to try to do the same (in international relations
political realism from folk like Hans Morgenthau embrace this sort of
approach). The focus on traditional values is inherently relativist
because it is grounded not in philosophical truth, but cultural practices
and beliefs. True, it can also turn into a belief that ones own culture
represents the only proper set of values, and so both liberals and
conservatives can be absolutists or relativists. I think conservative
thought is based on a type of relativism though, as culture determines
proper ethics and morality (even if that culture is often defined by
religion or tradition).
> 2) Nonetheless, the entire field almost seems like a construction to
> justify certian (liberal) political positions. I say this after having
> all of my beliefs systematically debunked by my wife -- an experience
> that is charming at first, but almost humiliating and shameful to the
> extent that it happened. Almost everything I "learned" from cultural
> anthropology was a myth -- everything from the Eskimos having how ever
> many different names for snow to "monkies can talk".
Hell, in Minnesota I counted over ten words for snow in English :) I've
been following actually interesting research in the popular science
magazines about animals, and how animals and humans are in many ways more
similar than people used to suspect (biologists doing this, not
anthropologists). I agree myths should be debunked. Its often hard to
tell what is myth and what is reality.
> Anyway, that is a
> somewhat biased perspective on a field and some of its tenents that
> have had a large influence in moral phislophy. Ethical relativism,
> though not big among philosophers, has a wide following and is
> certainly addressed by philsophers.
I'll be upfront with my view:
1. I think that almost everyone recognizes the epistemological issue; how
can we know what the "right" ethical system is. From my analysis, I don't
think it is possible (though I can't rule it out) for us to ever develop a
system that will provide a true set of ethics without having to make
unprovable (unfalsifiable) assumptions. Thus, all claims on ethics and
morality are subject for questioning, none can be asserted (as far as I can
tell) as certain.
Now, a lot of people jump from that to ethical relativism. But ethical
relativism suggests that there IS no one set of ethics or absolute
morality. That does not follow from the above. It is certainly possible
that there is one set of absolute ethics (I actually think it is probable),
but that we can't know for certain we have it, and if someone questions the
assumptions we make, they can come to a very different conclusions. Its
like cosmologists fighting over the big bang, string theory and other issues
-- the theories all make sense in their own right, but we can't know at this
point which is right. Yet that doesn't mean that they are all right; there
is a right answer, and maybe none of the current theories hit it.
So I disagree with the relativists in jumping from skepticism to a claim
that there is no absolute ethic, but agree with them that claims of ethical
absolutism can all be questioned and rejected if assumptions are dropped or
different assumptions made.
That to me is a challenge in life; to try to determine the "right" ethical
system and live by it, even if we can't KNOW for certain it is the right
system. I don't see a need to try to claim certainty (indeed, religious
views and some secular views like Randism seem geared towards trying to give
the individual a sense of certitude, which strikes me as more a
psychological crutch than anything based in reality). But I do try to find
what is right and live by it. The epistemological skepticism has a profound
impact on my politics, however. If I can't know one system is right, I can
act on my own, but what "right" do I have to try to force others to live
according to my beliefs. And if others deny an individualist ontology for a
structural one (where you can't simply posit a right to be left along since
it is holistic), who am I to say one particular system is best? I think
there are answers to those questions, but they are really tough in
politics. Thats what I mean when I say that the issue of what is ethical is
sometimes different than what is political.
My ethics lead me to anti-war pacifism. I think killing in war is akin to
murder in most cases. Yet I respect and am friends with soldiers who think
very differently. They live by a different ethic. I can accept that
without being a relativist in philosophy (I believe there is one ethical
truth, and I live by what I believe it to be), but have to be tolerant in
practice (I cannot prove my belief and thus have to respect the beliefs of
others). The challenge for politics is how far does that respect go (should
I respect the person who believes it is ethical to kill other races?), and
what happens when such differing worldviews collide.
I'm sorry. I have to stop now because of pressing demands. I know I just
got started, but I'll finish responding to your post a bit later. Sorry to
keep breaking this up into smaller posts...
-scott
Scott D. Erb
Adrian wrote:
>Well, look into logical positivism. Look more broadly into moral
> philosophy and at the political philosophy that has a base to it. I
> don't know. I would say that skepticism for the validity of objective
> morality has played a major role in modern moral and political
> philosophy and has pushed in the liberal direction. Granted, a
> utilitarian would have an objective basis for morality and a grounds
> for socialism, maybe. But, one cannot also deny the influence of those
> that try to promote science over philosophy in this matter. It is
> necessary to reject objective morality to do so and replace it with
> something more scientific.
OK, but I think the two can inform each other. Philosophy is not separate
from reality, it wouldn't make sense without refering to reality.
> Perhaps we can discuss this point in particular further, but I can tell
> right away that I would likely go on for several paragraphs in order to
> elaborate on that point. Nonetheless, the history is there -- cultural
> relativism and logical positivism are big moves toward subjective
> morality and also very liberal. Actually, now that I think of it, did
> you see "Instinct" with Cuba <somebody -- Gooding, Jr?> and Anthony
> Hopkins? The ideas expressed and/or implied in that movie are like the
> paradigm of cultural anthropology, ethical relativism, etc. They are
> also extremely liberal.
I don't know exactly what you mean by "liberal" here, and unfortunately I
didn't see that movie. I guess I'm having trouble seeing exactly the link
between a specific view on logical positivism and cultural relativism (or
science) and liberalism. I suppose liberals are inherently more prone
towards believing science than conservatives, who rely on tradition and
culture. But, I don't know. I'm not sure what you mean by liberal here...
>
> > OK, though I don't see it argued much any more.
>
> Yes you do!! Your students....
OK, though there its more an instinctive reaction -- a judge not lest you be
judged sort of mentality.
> Do you really think something like an academic journal matters --
Not really - some rare articles will be important; most forgotten.
> something that 1% of which might live on to be valuable to future
> generations -- something that has almost no substance in the long run?
> The only reason it matters is because the only substance to be had is
> contained within it. That 1% that actually was insightful and not just
> scholarly might actually trickle down after half a century and even be
> carried on and built on by future generations. The point is that
> despite a trend in academics, the papers that matter in the long run
> and that actually make it very far outside of academia are some small
> percentage that move along independent trends.
OK, my point is simply that I don't see a lot of people making strong
arguments that all ethics is relative. I do see recognition of the
epistemological issue of how we determine what ethics exist, and how
attempts to build just on philosophy alone make the result pre-programmed by
the assumptions and starting points of the philosophy (it often appears
tautological). But again, there is a vast difference between saying "ethics
are relative," and "we can't be certain what ethical standard is right, or
even if there is an ethical standard." The former is a specific statement
the presents a view as factual. The latter recognizes the difficulties in
determining an answer, but keeps open the possibility that there is one
"correct" ethical system.
There is another possibility, and I suppose this could be seen as
relativist. Namely, since we can't be certain of which ethical system is
right, we construct one as a society by which we live, often allowing it to
grow and change as we learn. It still doesn't require one believe no
ethical system is right, and I would argue that it in essence can be seen
more as a descriptive statement than a normative statement. As social
creatures in a world where reality drives us to regulate behavior, but where
the rules for doing so are unclear, we end up constructing something. One
can hold that belief (as I do) while still believing (as I do) that there is
likely a proper, right ethical system. My own beliefs are different than
that of the socially constructed system around me, so I act to try to change
that through persuasion (not force). But even that gives me concerns, so
rather than persuasion in the terms of trying to simply win a debate, I
really think the goal is to try to get people to use their own minds to
think critically and assess evidence and theories for themselves, not
relying on emotion and past "programming" to determine their choice. (Some
would say that is not possible). For me, that relies on what I'm sure Paleo
would call a "leap of faith" -- I believe that there is a right ethical
system out there, and the more free humans are to choose and act; the less
constrained they are by tradition and programming, the more likely they are
to find that right system -- they may be "naturally" driven there.
That might be wrong too. I don't know!
> In any case, what has a hold of a lot of the public is emotivism and
> cultural relativism whether academicians take it seriously anymore or
> not. Consider for instance, how many athiests are Randians? Far fewer
> are like me -- just a hodge podge of ideas. The vast majority are
> secular humanists which puts them broadly into ethical relativism or
> emotivism (logical positivism) and moral subjectivism in general. In
> fact, going back to the trend issue, ethical relativism was never taken
> too seriously by philosophers, but look at its influence on everyone
> else. It is not just a matter of education or some such thing. It is
> more a dispute between fields of a certain issue. Those "educated" one
> way have a certain set of beliefs, and those "educated" in a different
> way have a deifferent set.
Yeah, thats the problem...people have different views and the fact there is
no clear test to determine which are right makes it possible to justify and
defend different views. But I still say this kind of skepticism, while
perhaps a necessary condition for becoming an ethical relativist, is not in
and of itself enough.
> Well, of course, I might disagree with some of the statements as you
> have made them about the nature of moral philosophy, but I think the
> idea you are trying to convey is quite true. A philosopher that does
> not look outside his field for facts can be left without much
> meaningful subject matter to discuss. I guess philosophers are like
> poets in that regard.
Good point.
> Just for the record, by the way, I am pretty Kantian when it comes to
> moral philosohy -- you could probably tell by the quotes. So to me
> morality is like geometry.
Wasn't that Plato's quote over the doors of the Academy -- only geometers
can enter.
> There is no truly empirical knowledge to be
> gained in it. All science does is pose hard ethical questions that we
> could have strictly speaking thought of purely hypothetically without
> science and that must have solutions that stand on their own
> philosophically.
OK.
>I suppose Kant would say that there are things in themselves, but we
> can only ever know of the phenomenon of those things -- the
> phenomenological thing. And we can have certain knowledge of the
> phenomenon (in other words we need not doubt our experiences).
Yes.
> > 3) Social reality -- that is the world of shared understandings and
> beliefs
> > about reality which make social life possible.
>
> That seems artificial (and heavily influenced by tenents of
> anthropology).
Yes, social reality is a human construction. We produced it, we reproduce
it or transform it, it si artificial. But it is real. A building is
artificial, but buildings are real and create cities. The key I'm getting
at is that the social reality we've built may be divorced from objective
reality, and culturally constructed systems of ethics may be distant from
any objectively true set of ethics. Each may exist. Understanding how
close or distant they may be is tough.
> You have just expressed the major tenent of cultural anthropology --
> that norms are subjective (or learned within some cultural or societal
> context). In fact, that term -- "norm" -- is sort of an
> anthropological term. There are a lot of interesting and extremely
> subtle issues here about whether language provides meaning or if it
> just articulates it and that sort of thing. These sorts of questions
> were only asked a century ago to begin with and are still being very
> carefully considered.
I see norms as being a shared set of principles; in other wrods, they are
not reflective of any natural or correct ethical system, but represent the
ethical system we have constructed. We construct ethical systems whether or
not there is one right objective ethical view -- that seems undeniable.
Anthropologists are I believe correct to note that, and I think that
commonalities between cultures point to things more likely to be natural or
relate to a common ethic, while things that vary greatly are more likely to
be just our human construct or whim. But of course it could be that even
widely shared norms across cultures are simply misguided human constructs,
taking us away from a correct ethical system. I know it sounds like I'm
getting way into the relativist framework here, but I twist it back -- IF we
all construct ethics in our cultures, THEN given the nature of ethics and
shared norms as providing the framework of a society, that construction is
the most important social endeavor of a society.
From there, I would argue that since the epistemological skepticism of
ethics that relativists build from cannot be used to show there is no
universal or correct ethic, it is logical to see the pursuit of ethical
truth through philosophy to of paramount importance, that you can't simply
say it doesn't matter. Only if relativists proved there was NO ethical
truth (something they really can't do without making the type of absolute
statements they condemn), normative ethical relativism relativizes itself.
> In any case, the point is that you were kind of wondering where I was
> getting all this cultural relativism and emotivism from -- why I
> thought it was an issue and what did it have to do with liberalism.
> Look carefully at what you are saying above....
OK, I think I see your point....
> I would have the opposite view -- that we are "closest" to moral and
> political _philosophy_. These items are a priori -- like goemetry. We
> can be most certain of the philosophy and its principles. What might
> become difficult is posing the real moral question in the first place
> (in other words seeing what is really going on socially to begin
> with). But, such a matter is a lot less ambiguous than if there were
> this further complexity that existed in moral philosophy. The
> complexity outside of philosophy I am referring to is more like knowing
> who said what to whom and what it meant than something else. It is
> like knowing the "low down" on what is really going on as opposed to
> some further inherent complexity in moral philosophy, itself.
OK...though I'm a tad skeptical about how close we really are, and if we
know enough about human nature to really understand the "geometry" involved.
> Actually, I have to confess, I am interested in this cultural
> anthropology/logical positivism thing. I don't know about the stuff
> about the the history of socialism and Hitler -- that stuff is more for
> agitated rebukes than discussion. I think this modern philosophy might
> be sort of interesting, though. I am 99% certain we have serious
> disagreements about the foundation of moral philosophy. I am certainly
> no leftist, so there is the political philosophy.
I can't really pin myself on the left, but I'm also definitely not the
right. I'm not really a materialist, so that puts me outside both
capitalism and communism. And while I am not religious, I tend to believe
that the whole of human existence reaches beyond the realm of the material,
even though we don't have any sort of direct access to that. That is why
these questions remain riddles, our data is uncertain, and we are challenged
to do the best we can with what we understand. Frustrating at times, but a
fascinating existence!
> But, what I find
> especially interesting is the fact that you act almost oblivious to
> trends/movements that seem real and significant to me (and that I don't
> even agree with so its not like it is my pet movement or anything). It
> even looks as if a lot of it might be right there in your own outlook.
Thanks for the interesting and thought provoking post!
-scott
Scott D. Erb
>Kant deconstructs it or rather clarifies it further in his _Metaphysics
>of Morals_. It might be interesting to see what he says and see how
>liberal he may be (in th emodern sense) or if it is more twisting. The
>only group more culpable of twisting than lawyers and politicians are
>philosophers. Actually, I think I would even say "distorting
>reality". In any case, Kant was a lot more like a conservative than a
>liberal in the modern sense. He was not a laissez fair capitalist, but
>I read his political and moral philosophy in the _Metaphysics of
>Morals_ which is sort of his big statement of it in all its
>ramifications, and it is just way too conservative (by today's
>standards or even for his time).
OK, I'll give it a look....
>What about "insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every
>other"? It simply makes a statement about the relationship of people
>morally. Of course one cannot help but to see certain directions in
>reasoning that would seem to beg to be taken from such a maxim.
Freedom is a tricky concept. Virtually every act, even small, can be seen as
at least minimally constraining the freedom of others. Freedom is perhaps the
most abused concept in politics; true freedom doesn't exist, we are social
creatures and social acts bleed over and affect the entire system. Thus if
you define freedom as the right to be left alone, for instance, you end up
with an impossible to fulfill demand -- or one that can be decided upon by an
arbitrary definition of freedom.
>> Or maybe I'm reading too much into it :)
>
>I don't think you are. I think that you are mistaken about a false
>compromise that you see as being "called for". For instance, suppose I
>have ten dollars. You walk up and demand ten dollars from me. We
>argue, then you say "Okay lets compromise." And now under the pretense
>of "being reasonable", you demand five dollars. All things being
>equal, there should be no compromise. Morality is about volitional
>individual beings not about societies.
But what if you have ten dollars because you took something I considered mine,
and that you considered yours. What if, in fact, we each had valid claims to
that thing (we each constructed part of it or something like that). Thats a
simplification for a deeper issue of whether or not the fact someone has
something means its just. In Brazil you have 2% of the population with 98% of
the land. You have landless peasants who are descendents of slaves and are
shot in the city and wander in poverty, while the descendents of plantation
owners live in luxury. Is that just? Do the landless peasants have a right
to demand something? Does the fact that social structures privileged one
group make it right that they retain that privilege?
> It is far mroe general and
>fundamental than anything that relies on a society for its validity.
>There may be exploitation or trends in society that have some moral
>relevance, but such exploitation or trend must not rely on its social
>nature to be related to morality. It must be related independently of
>all that.
How would that relate, for instance, to the above example?
>So, while possibly "everything it connected" may have something to it,
>it alone is not sufficient to be compelling on any moral grounds. All
>it can do is suggest a direction of exploration that will yield a
>different argument, that will bring to bear the real _details_ of the
>actual _moral_ significance of acts. To say something like "he did
>this and they suffered over there" is not at all sufficient -- you have
>to show how his actions _caused_ their sufferring (without glossing
>over any details).
But if its structural -- as in the above example, maybe you can't point to a
precise action taken by the rich descendents of plantation owners, even though
you can point to the institution of slavery as a cause of the current
condition. You don't have records of all slaves and their births, so you
can't even try to go back painstakingly individual by individual. In short,
the power relations are more complex and indeed omnipresent in society in a
way that defies such traditional analysis.
>It is that last part and sometimes even the very
>idea that there must be an identifiable causality at all that is always
>inadequately addressed.
But sometimes you can't identify a direct causality, because the causality may
not be identifiable with methods we have, or the impact is still felt long
after the identifiable marks of the event have faded. That impact may in fact
structure relations that empower some at the expense of others. Thats the
difficult part.
>That's not true. The mechanisms just aren't obvious. You do not get
>all the answers in just coming up with a universal principle. For
>instance, we have been counting for thousands of years, but only
>recently have formulated Peano's Axioms. Some of the most profound
>results have occurred as a result of this not the least of which being
>that mathematics is not reducible to the axioms of logic. The point is
>that we have understood the basic principles of counting for thousands
>of years, but haven't even articulated them formally until just now and
>are still exploring meaningful ramifications of it. Don't expect to
>finish it all in one paper or even one lifetime.
OK...
>I think if you look at it from this perspective, perhaps it is just far
>more complicated than it appears on the surface. So, what seems likea
>crap shoot to you is actually something that will be ironed out over
>the course of a few thousand years. It may not even seem like an
>objective question -- you may not even know what the real question is
>or what the real issues are. We haven't known what they are in math
>until just recently, and yet if math is not deemed objective, then I do
>not know what is.
I can't rule out that over thousands or tens of thousands of years we'll
figure it all out. Quite the opposite, I think we will settle on general
principles that most people are convinced are ethical universals, even if they
may not be provable in any "scientific" sense. To be sure, it may be a
different sort of philosophy than you or I might imagine. Maybe it isn't so
comparable to geometry -- you're going with that theory and seeing where it
leads, and I find that intriguing, but its not necessarily the only way one
can go, and I can't see how it can be proven right to those who might approach
the question differently (say, with a religious belief).
>I think that we shouldn't be surprised if the answer is not so simple
>as majority rule or something like that. But I also do not think that
>such a result would reflect that the answer is some sort
>of "compromise" between conflicting principles, either.
OK, but some kind of democracy seems best given the alternatives I've seen so
far.
>Kant, himself, twisted his own words (in my opinion). He had a great
>idea -- the universality principle. Not many dispute that particular
>idea. That is progress, and for that we will be indebted to him. He
>really articulated something -- made a distinction no one really "got"
>exactly. As for the rest of what he thinks such a discovery entails,
>that must be evaluated as the first discovery was and not simply
>accepted as though he must have just figured it all out then. I mean,
>it is certainly possible that that one distinction was the stumbling
>block -- was the "trick" -- to solving all these problems. But, that
>is unlikely when you look at the principle of universality and how
>littel _specific_ information you can easily get out of it.
OK, Ok, I have to go back and read Kant again, it has been awhile.
>You are quite right it can be twisted. You are quite right that it is
>hard to apply. But when you say that to me it is like saying that math
>is hard so let's just do physics without the math. Well, unfortunately
>if you want to do physics you are going to have to do the math. And,
>if you want to do ethics you are going to have to deal with that
>principle of universality one way or another. Don't expect a lot of
>progress. The problems are hard, and just because we didn't solve them
>in a few years or even if Kant himself only got one thing right about
>it, that does not mean they are insoluble or that we should try to
>solve an easier set of problems under the pretense of solving these.
But the question is: how do you decide what the problem is? The principle of
universiality reminds me abit of Douglas Adams' Hitchhikers Guide to the
Galaxy where the meaning of life was 42. That doesn't say much unless you
really can ask the right question. Simply, various definitions of freedom,
conceptions of human nature, notions of agency vs. structure, etc., co-exist,
each of which alters the way ethical problems are posed, even if one believes
that there is one ethic. If one doesn't, then the problem is very different,
but easier -- those who don't seek a kind of universal ethic tend to simply
allow the descriptive to be the normative; what is, should be. We agree that
such an answer is unpersausive, but you can't really start working on a
problem if you don't know quite how to pose it and what it actually is.
>> Politics, even to create a system
>> which prohibits intervention in the economy (laissez-faire
>capitalism), is
>> potentially an act of forcing people to do things they wouldn't
>normally want
>> to do, or prohibit them from acts they would want to do.
>
>I don't know about the first one. However, force is necessary in any
>case.
>
>> That is active, that
>> isn't passive.
>
>Not true. The former is active and the latter is passive (or at least
>it can be). In any case, let's suppose we try to have a purely passive
>society. What result do we get? Is it a simple one? Could you just
>blurt out the answers to any dilemma based on the rule of passivity?
>Could you at least figure it out, say, in a lifetime of studying it --
>all the subtle logical ramifications?
But the question is loaded -- you can't suppose a purely passive society, that
variable along says nothing. You need to know how the society is structured,
what passivity means, etc. For instance, a society of passivity where slavery
is the norm might be seen as bad, with people accepting violations of their
human rights in the name of an ethic of passivity. In a society of relative
equals in status where passivity is simply letting each other live the way
they want, it may be seen as good. One thing about true libertarians and even
anarchists, they often imagine society at its least complex (small towns,
voluntary exchanges) where one can imagine choices easily turned into the
structuring principles of life. That would make a direct connection between
choices one makes and the results. The trouble is that kind of situation is
easier to imagine in a simplified model of reality than in the real world
where complexity dominates, and causes contention about defintions, measures,
etc.
>I very highly recommend Kant's authoritative book on the matter, _The
>Metaphysics of Morals_. I bet it might put a unique spin on Kant that
>you wouldn't get from those of us that claim to interpret him. Even I
>am giving my own view of what he said or meant. I promise you won't
>regret it. I doubt you will agree very much with him, but he does seem
>to at least raise some interesting issues.
I will read it. Maybe not this week -- this time is hectic at work -- but
I'll get to it sometime next month.
-scott
Loren Petrich
Scott D. Erb <scot...@maine.edu> wrote:
.... Almost everything I "learned" from cultural
>> anthropology was a myth -- everything from the Eskimos having how ever
>> many different names for snow to "monkies can talk".
>Hell, in Minnesota I counted over ten words for snow in English :)
In both cases, all these snow words are words for different kinds
of snow; if one lives in a snowy place, one will eventually have to have
names these. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (language->thought) may be bogus,
but the inverse Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (thought->language) is *very*
well-supported.
... I've
>been following actually interesting research in the popular science
>magazines about animals, and how animals and humans are in many ways more
>similar than people used to suspect (biologists doing this, not
>anthropologists). I agree myths should be debunked. Its often hard to
>tell what is myth and what is reality.
Teaching language to apes has been tried for the last couple of
decades, with poor results. The first attempts involved teaching human
sounds, but apes cannot produces most of these. There has been better luck
teaching chimpanzees sign language, though even there, the results are not
very good. They can learn a sizable number of signs, but they are not good
at combining them into sentences -- two-sign phrases seems to be their
maximium. And there has been some controversy as to whether the apes are
simply acting like Clever Hans, a horse who picked up inadvertent cues
from those around him.
So the extent of ape language skills is still very much up in the air.
However, they do other sorts of interesting social behavior, such
as deception. A chimpanzee who wants to keep other chimps away from some
bananas may try to create deceptive hints that the bananas are somewhere
else.
--
Loren Petrich Happiness is a fast Macintosh
pet...@netcom.com And a fast train
My home page: http://www.petrich.com/home.html
Zepp
>In article <38441D53...@maine.edu>,
>Scott D. Erb <scot...@maine.edu> wrote:
>
>.... Almost everything I "learned" from cultural
>>> anthropology was a myth -- everything from the Eskimos having how ever
>>> many different names for snow to "monkies can talk".
>
>>Hell, in Minnesota I counted over ten words for snow in English :)
Much of the western world has many words that mean "fuck", and America
has more phrases for killing people than any other country in the
world. Versatility in language reflects emphasis on ideas.
>
> In both cases, all these snow words are words for different kinds
>of snow; if one lives in a snowy place, one will eventually have to have
>names these. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (language->thought) may be bogus,
>but the inverse Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (thought->language) is *very*
>well-supported.
>
>... I've
>>been following actually interesting research in the popular science
>>magazines about animals, and how animals and humans are in many ways more
>>similar than people used to suspect (biologists doing this, not
>>anthropologists). I agree myths should be debunked. Its often hard to
>>tell what is myth and what is reality.
>
> Teaching language to apes has been tried for the last couple of
>decades, with poor results. The first attempts involved teaching human
>sounds, but apes cannot produces most of these. There has been better luck
>teaching chimpanzees sign language, though even there, the results are not
>very good. They can learn a sizable number of signs, but they are not good
>at combining them into sentences -- two-sign phrases seems to be their
>maximium. And there has been some controversy as to whether the apes are
>simply acting like Clever Hans, a horse who picked up inadvertent cues
>from those around him.
>
> So the extent of ape language skills is still very much up in the air.
>
> However, they do other sorts of interesting social behavior, such
>as deception. A chimpanzee who wants to keep other chimps away from some
>bananas may try to create deceptive hints that the bananas are somewhere
>else.
>
>--
>Loren Petrich Happiness is a fast Macintosh
>pet...@netcom.com And a fast train
>My home page: http://www.petrich.com/home.html
**********************************************************
"If they offered their President up for resignation, we might
have thought differently of it."
-- noted Republican strategist
Rush Limbaugh on the CTBT,
Oct. 15th, 1999.
**********************************************************
Not dead, in jail or a slave?
Thank a liberal!
Liberalism Resurgent, Steve's brilliant
and well-documented page, is mirrored at
the following locations:
http://www.huppi.com/kangaroo
http://home.att.net/~jbvm/Resurgent
http://www.wtrt.net/~blarson/institute.htm
http://www.aliveness.com/kangaroo
http://resurgent.virtualave.net
Warning: Contains ideas
************************************************************
Pay your taxes so the rich don't have to.
Adrian
Your argument as I see it is as follows:
1) Conservatives, by definition, do something like "stick to
tradition". They are always pushing "traditional values".
2) Such a political philosophy promotes particular cultural values for
their own sake.
3) Therfore, conservatives could have a strong tie to cultural
relativism.
The first premise is okay for the purpoeses of this discussion. I have
some reservations about the second assertion, though, and I think the
third one misrepresents cultural relativism. On the second point,
there are some conservatives that promote traditional values for their
own sake -- actually _because_ they are the _traditional_ values.
There is a certain argument there -- perhaps one based on the idea of
an evolving set of values, the traditional set being a highly refined
evolved set that should not be discarded. However, despite the
propensity of some conservatives toward a similar sort of line of
reasoning, I would even say that most conservatives (at least
explicitly) do not endorse traditional values for their own sake. They
actually are more inclined to say something like "Everybody knows that
such and such is wrong," perhaps under the premise that Christian mores
define morality. They adhere to the traditional values not because
they are the traditional values, but instead the values they adhere to
are the traditional ones because according to them we had it all
figured out a long time ago. So, I would even say that most
conservatives (whether you think they are mistaken or not) do not
actually endorse traditional values for their own sake -- that in fact
their values just happen to be traditional as far as their basis for
their political philosophy is concerned.
Nonetheless, even if we accept the second assertion, I think you may be
missing the whole point of cultural relativism to assume that such a
position is inherently cultural _relativist_. While I think you have
correctly picked up on a point that pursuit of such a position as
reflected in 2 would ultimately lead to a certain subjectivism or
relativism, such implications are more due to the fact that those
adhering to 2 are wrong than really what that whole view is about. In
other words, you sort of have to implicitly start with the idea that
conservativism is fundamentally flawed to reach 3, and in fact starting
on conservative permises and reaching 3 almost refutes conservativism.
The whole idea of cultural relativism is that we must preserve and
tolerate alternative cultures. The whole idea of 2 is to eliminate all
other alternative cultures in favor of a particular one and not even
consider new ideas. Cultural realitivsm sort of rests on an attitude
like perhaps the aborigines of Australia are on to something while the
views in 2 take more of an attitude that there are no alternatives --
we figured it all out already. (So, if the aborigines are on to
something then it is because they agree with us.)
A conservative would, for instance, send missionaries to indoctrinate
natives into Christianity. They would establish western law in
primitive cultures, perhaps trying to stamp out the slavery or feuding
that was ingrained in the African cultures when the Brits colonized. A
cultural relativist would permit even extreme practices, such as that
of clitoridectomy of girls coming of age in primitive african tribes,
on the grounds that such practice is perfectly acceptable in their
culture. In fact, (a cultural relativist might argue) it is equally
obscene to them that we do not engage in such a practice. Since there
is no way to choose between cultures, then we have no grouns imposing
our culture on them, and so have failed to meet a burden of proof on
our part to justify our own intervention into the practice. A
conservative would argue in just the opposite way, by saying that all
of this cultural relativism is spurious at best. Don't be fooled!
Don't be conned! Come one! We all know what to do -- now do it! This
practice is ridiculous, and all it shows that an entire culture
practices it is how gullible and in need of strict oversight people
are. Let's face it, this just shows that only the strong and righteous
few should be leading the masses to make them moral; otherwise, we sink
into a morass of sin and decadence. (Or so a conservative would argue.)
>
> > 2) Nonetheless, the entire field almost seems like a construction to
> > justify certian (liberal) political positions. I say this after
having
> > all of my beliefs systematically debunked by my wife -- an
experience
> > that is charming at first, but almost humiliating and shameful to
the
> > extent that it happened. Almost everything I "learned" from
cultural
> > anthropology was a myth -- everything from the Eskimos having how
ever
> > many different names for snow to "monkies can talk".
>
> Hell, in Minnesota I counted over ten words for snow in English :)
I've
> been following actually interesting research in the popular science
> magazines about animals, and how animals and humans are in many ways
more
> similar than people used to suspect (biologists doing this, not
> anthropologists). I agree myths should be debunked. Its often hard
to
> tell what is myth and what is reality.
I don't know if I mentioned this earlier, but what is shocking about it
all is that it isn't just some urban legend. It was textbook
material. That academia is susceptable to that sort of thing is,
suffice it to say, not something many of those that value academia or
education in general would like to believe.
>
> > Anyway, that is a
> > somewhat biased perspective on a field and some of its tenents that
> > have had a large influence in moral phislophy. Ethical relativism,
> > though not big among philosophers, has a wide following and is
> > certainly addressed by philsophers.
>
> I'll be upfront with my view:
>
> 1. I think that almost everyone recognizes the epistemological
issue; how
> can we know what the "right" ethical system is. From my analysis, I
don't
> think it is possible (though I can't rule it out) for us to ever
develop a
> system that will provide a true set of ethics without having to make
> unprovable (unfalsifiable) assumptions.
Now when you say falsifiable, I take that to mean through empirical
verification much the same as facts in science are falsifiable. What
if it all follows from the nature of ethical discussions. Certainyl we
can come up with axiomatic systems that are consistent, but some are
obviously not about ethics. For instance, if I wer to ask you what you
thought was right and wrong, and you started listing Euclids
Postulates, then I would wonder if you heard the question. So
obviously, Euclidean Geometry as a _moral_ system doesn't even make
sense although it is a completely coherent axiomatic system. Is it
possible that there would be more ambiguous options that also don't
make sense, but that finding such a thing out would take some thinking -
- possibly a lot of thinking?
> Thus, all claims on ethics and
> morality are subject for questioning, none can be asserted (as far as
I can
> tell) as certain.
>
> Now, a lot of people jump from that to ethical relativism. But
ethical
> relativism suggests that there IS no one set of ethics or absolute
> morality. That does not follow from the above. It is certainly
possible
> that there is one set of absolute ethics (I actually think it is
probable),
> but that we can't know for certain we have it, and if someone
questions the
> assumptions we make, they can come to a very different conclusions.
Its
> like cosmologists fighting over the big bang, string theory and other
issues
> -- the theories all make sense in their own right, but we can't know
at this
> point which is right. Yet that doesn't mean that they are all right;
there
> is a right answer, and maybe none of the current theories hit it.
So you are just sort of saying that we don't actually have the answers -
- not that the answers don't exist. This line of reasoning would still
have it that some things are nonsense and obviously wrong, but there
still may be issues that we have not ironed out completely yet for
which several plausible mutually exclusive alternatives exist.
>
> So I disagree with the relativists in jumping from skepticism to a
claim
> that there is no absolute ethic, but agree with them that claims of
ethical
> absolutism can all be questioned and rejected if assumptions are
dropped or
> different assumptions made.
Well, that cannot be completely true given your first statement.
Actually, whether its proponents truly have what would consistitute
real knowledge or if they just got lucky and guessed the right answer,
one position is thoroughly absolute and could never be rationally
rejected. Not even on the basis of rejecting assumptions
>
> That to me is a challenge in life; to try to determine the "right"
ethical
> system and live by it, even if we can't KNOW for certain it is the
right
> system.
Can we know for certain that if p implies q then not q implies not p?
> I don't see a need to try to claim certainty (indeed, religious
> views and some secular views like Randism seem geared towards trying
to give
> the individual a sense of certitude, which strikes me as more a
> psychological crutch than anything based in reality). But I do try
to find
> what is right and live by it.
Therein lies the need for certainty. You have to be "right". That
means that those that contradict you must be "wrong" (or at least
not "right"). You seek to know the answer, so that entails certainty.
Even if you have to make a guess, you should want to be absolutely
certain that it is the best guess.
> The epistemological skepticism has a profound
> impact on my politics, however. If I can't know one system is
right, I can
> act on my own, but what "right" do I have to try to force others to
live
> according to my beliefs.
This subtly begs the question. You have every right to expect justice
whether you are certain you know what it is or not. If you just
arbitrarily guess and get lucky, you would by construction have every
right to bend the universe to your irrational will. If you thought
long and hard about it and still ended up with the wrong answer, you
would have no right to bend so much as a gnat to your will.
> And if others deny an individualist ontology for a
> structural one (where you can't simply posit a right to be left along
since
> it is holistic), who am I to say one particular system is best? I
think
> there are answers to those questions, but they are really tough in
> politics. Thats what I mean when I say that the issue of what is
ethical is
> sometimes different than what is political.
A holistic system makes the fundamental error of thinking that ethics
is not based on individuals. That is, it does so unless it manages to
address any concerns of an individualist. The error is not an error
because it results in bad ends or something like that, but rather
because it is simply mistaken in its presumptions about the nature of
morality.
>
> My ethics lead me to anti-war pacifism. I think killing in war is
akin to
> murder in most cases. Yet I respect and am friends with soldiers who
think
> very differently.
But you disagree with them. That is all that matters. The interplay
between your emotions and your beliefs is irrelevant. In other words,
whether or not you have certain feelings for people of a different
belief is not an issue except for possibly how you intend to actually
treat them or something like that.
> They live by a different ethic. I can accept that
> without being a relativist in philosophy (I believe there is one
ethical
> truth, and I live by what I believe it to be), but have to be
tolerant in
> practice (I cannot prove my belief and thus have to respect the
beliefs of
> others). The challenge for politics is how far does that respect go
(should
> I respect the person who believes it is ethical to kill other
races?), and
> what happens when such differing worldviews collide.
>
> I'm sorry. I have to stop now because of pressing demands. I know I
just
> got started, but I'll finish responding to your post a bit later.
Sorry to
> keep breaking this up into smaller posts...
> -scott
>
>
Adrian
scot...@maine.edu wrote:
>
>
> Adrian wrote:
>
> >Well, look into logical positivism. Look more broadly into moral
>
> > philosophy and at the political philosophy that has a base to it. I
> > don't know. I would say that skepticism for the validity of
objective
> > morality has played a major role in modern moral and political
> > philosophy and has pushed in the liberal direction. Granted, a
> > utilitarian would have an objective basis for morality and a grounds
> > for socialism, maybe. But, one cannot also deny the influence of
those
> > that try to promote science over philosophy in this matter. It is
> > necessary to reject objective morality to do so and replace it with
> > something more scientific.
>
> OK, but I think the two can inform each other. Philosophy is not
separate
> from reality, it wouldn't make sense without refering to reality.
On the contrary, I think it is one way. Philosophy informs all other
fields as it is foundational to them. The other fields cannot inform
philosophy meaningfully without begging the question. For instance,
physics cannot come to profound meta-physical results. You must
presume these meta-physical results in order to do physics in the first
place.
No -- the other direction. Are those that really adhere to science
more prone to be liberal? Yes they are. That does not mean that you
have to be liberal to be a scientist. It just means that those with
certain views tend toward liberalism and that skews the ratios of
scientists to liberals liberals of one stripe to another and so on.
Well, not being sure if there even is an ethical standard is a partial
rejection of the possibility of knowledge within ethics. In other
words, it isn't just admitting to one's ignorance on a matter, but
suspecting the "matter" doesn't really exist in the first place.
Well, let us compare this to knowledge in general. So we say we cannot
be terribly sure of much and must admit to the possibility of our
error. All this is fine and good, but what does it mean when we say
get into a debate? What would it mean to then go on and say that we
should tolerate dissenting views? I contend that it would mean
nothing. We have no _added_ requirement toward tolerance. We should
express our views the same whether or not we are really sure not just
not quite sure. Perhaps we should also accurately describe our other
views about the certainty of the original views. The bottom line is
that we cannot coherently say that we think one thing but accept the
validity of another.
I know you don't think you are saying something like that (or maybe you
do?), but that is what your point boils down to. You are saying that
we should be tolerant based on the fact that we might be in error in
the first place. I won't even start on the criticisms along the lines
of being tolerant of intolernce or that sort of thing. The point is
that you seem to be manufacturing an extra amount of tolerance out of
thin air here. We should be more tolerant on the issues we are less
certain of than the ones that we are more certain of perhaps, but a
general tolerance based on a general uncertainty begs the question. Do
you have your moral views or not? What ever your most stongly held
conviction is, you should adhere to it with a no tolerance attitude.
Actually, it is precisely a restatement of moral subjectivism to say
that there is no clear test to determine which are right. I would
respond to this by saying that the test is coherence (i.e. conformity
to the rules of logic) and comparison to language. The latter point
about language is just in the sense that we can discard Euclidean
Geometry as a "moral" system on the grounds of it being non sequitur to
the basic issues we are inquiring about in ethics.
Social reality is an artificial construction not because it is a real
artificially manufactured object whos existence is independent of all
else. It is artificial because it is only "real" under a certain
perspective. It is like saying that my mind is "real". I guess you
might think I have some sort of a soul, but according to me what is
real is just the physical state of my brain. My mind is actually an
abstract description of a physical phenomenon. There is an
equivocation on "real" to confuse entities whos existince is
independent and entities that only exist under the presumtion or
depending on the existence of something else. Society is an abstract
phenomenon and no more real than mathematics is for instance. Just as
you cannot get in a space ship and fly to some point inthe universe to
see first hand the giant "2" out there (as if it _really_ existed) you
cannot see the society sitting out there on the court house steps
(say). "Society" is a sophisticated abstract description or reference
to particular arrangement of concrete items -- it does not have an
independent existence of its own.
> > You have just expressed the major tenent of cultural anthropology --
> > that norms are subjective (or learned within some cultural or
societal
> > context). In fact, that term -- "norm" -- is sort of an
> > anthropological term. There are a lot of interesting and extremely
> > subtle issues here about whether language provides meaning or if it
> > just articulates it and that sort of thing. These sorts of
questions
> > were only asked a century ago to begin with and are still being very
> > carefully considered.
>
> I see norms as being a shared set of principles; in other wrods, they
are
> not reflective of any natural or correct ethical system, but
represent the
> ethical system we have constructed.
Ids that like knowledge in general? Our knowledge does not reflect and
natural or correct knowledge -- just the knowledge we have created.
What is your reaction to that statement? Isn't it to say that while
each of us must acquire our own knowledge (in that sense subjectively),
what is or isn't knowledge is supposed to be (by definition) universal
adn "correct"? How would we rephrase that about ethics?
> We construct ethical systems whether or
> not there is one right objective ethical view -- that seems
undeniable.
> Anthropologists are I believe correct to note that, and I think that
> commonalities between cultures point to things more likely to be
natural or
> relate to a common ethic, while things that vary greatly are more
likely to
> be just our human construct or whim. But of course it could be that
even
> widely shared norms across cultures are simply misguided human
constructs,
> taking us away from a correct ethical system. I know it sounds like
I'm
> getting way into the relativist framework here, but I twist it back --
IF we
> all construct ethics in our cultures, THEN given the nature of ethics
and
> shared norms as providing the framework of a society, that
construction is
> the most important social endeavor of a society.
That is not a twist back. That is just what any cultural relativist
would say to keep from just degenerating into an emotivist. I suppose
that you are careful to make sure that you reject the possibility of
_acquiring_ knowledge rather than the possibility of knowledge actually
existing. Nonetheless, the differences seem more like a new argument
for relativism than a different out look altogether. You might call it
the argument from agnosticism.
It has nothign to do with human nature or nature at all. It is just a
logical realtionship between these hypothetical things we
call "beings". A dichotomy is formed by saying that any two beings are
related to each other either "justly" or not "justly".
> > Actually, I have to confess, I am interested in this cultural
> > anthropology/logical positivism thing. I don't know about the stuff
> > about the the history of socialism and Hitler -- that stuff is more
for
> > agitated rebukes than discussion. I think this modern philosophy
might
> > be sort of interesting, though. I am 99% certain we have serious
> > disagreements about the foundation of moral philosophy. I am
certainly
> > no leftist, so there is the political philosophy.
>
> I can't really pin myself on the left, but I'm also definitely not the
> right. I'm not really a materialist, so that puts me outside both
> capitalism and communism. And while I am not religious, I tend to
believe
> that the whole of human existence reaches beyond the realm of the
material,
> even though we don't have any sort of direct access to that. That is
why
> these questions remain riddles, our data is uncertain, and we are
challenged
> to do the best we can with what we understand. Frustrating at times,
but a
> fascinating existence!
Well, I will not comment on the metaphysical issues....
>
> > But, what I find
> > especially interesting is the fact that you act almost oblivious to
> > trends/movements that seem real and significant to me (and that I
don't
> > even agree with so its not like it is my pet movement or
anything). It
> > even looks as if a lot of it might be right there in your own
outlook.
>
> Thanks for the interesting and thought provoking post!
> -scott
>
>
Thank you...
Adrian
Well, we just have to examine the nature of "freedom" more closely.
Freedom is an inherently passive thing. What ramifications might that
have? Just because we are social creatures, that does not mean we are
not free.
>
> >> Or maybe I'm reading too much into it :)
> >
> >I don't think you are. I think that you are mistaken about a false
> >compromise that you see as being "called for". For instance,
suppose I
> >have ten dollars. You walk up and demand ten dollars from me. We
> >argue, then you say "Okay lets compromise." And now under the
pretense
> >of "being reasonable", you demand five dollars. All things being
> >equal, there should be no compromise. Morality is about volitional
> >individual beings not about societies.
>
> But what if you have ten dollars because you took something I
considered mine,
> and that you considered yours.
Then not all things would be equal.
> What if, in fact, we each had valid claims to
> that thing (we each constructed part of it or something like that).
Thats a
> simplification for a deeper issue of whether or not the fact someone
has
> something means its just. In Brazil you have 2% of the population
with 98% of
> the land. You have landless peasants who are descendents of slaves
and are
> shot in the city and wander in poverty, while the descendents of
plantation
> owners live in luxury. Is that just?
The difference between me and a leftists is that a leftists thinks that
with no further information we may draw conclusions about the justness
of the distribution. I think it may be a horrible situation, but with
this information alone we cannot formulate any conclusions about the
justice of the situation except to presume that it is just.
> Do the landless peasants have a right
> to demand something? Does the fact that social structures privileged
one
> group make it right that they retain that privilege?
>
Social structures are irrelevant to morality. Morality is not about
the relationship of a being to other inanimate objects such as "sociali
structures" or about the relationship of inanimate objects to each
other. Morality is about a certain type of relationship between two
beings.
> > It is far mroe general and
> >fundamental than anything that relies on a society for its validity.
> >There may be exploitation or trends in society that have some moral
> >relevance, but such exploitation or trend must not rely on its social
> >nature to be related to morality. It must be related independently
of
> >all that.
>
> How would that relate, for instance, to the above example?
In the end the principles on which our moral philosophy is based is
independent of even the existence of society since moral dilemmas need
not concern themsleves with such a thing as a society. We could ask if
the actions of a particular person were moral with respect to another
person whether they both exist in society or are stranded on a deserted
island together. Perhaps the context of the actions (and so what the
action really is) might change some in such a shift and so end in
different conclusions; however, the principle on which such conclusions
are based must universally apply to either scenario. But, our
political philosophy is just a particular application of our moral
philosophy, and if our moral philosophy is founded independently of
society, so must our political philosophy be. So you can talk about
social structures all you want to, but the whole point is that you are
going to ultimately come back to some principle that generally has
nothign to do with those social structures. If not, then you aren't
done yet.
>
> >So, while possibly "everything it connected" may have something to
it,
> >it alone is not sufficient to be compelling on any moral grounds.
All
> >it can do is suggest a direction of exploration that will yield a
> >different argument, that will bring to bear the real _details_ of the
> >actual _moral_ significance of acts. To say something like "he did
> >this and they suffered over there" is not at all sufficient -- you
have
> >to show how his actions _caused_ their sufferring (without glossing
> >over any details).
>
> But if its structural -- as in the above example, maybe you can't
point to a
> precise action taken by the rich descendents of plantation owners,
even though
> you can point to the institution of slavery as a cause of the current
> condition.
Okay, then blame slavery. Morality is about how one being treats
another being.
> You don't have records of all slaves and their births, so you
> can't even try to go back painstakingly individual by individual. In
short,
> the power relations are more complex and indeed omnipresent in
society in a
> way that defies such traditional analysis.
Well, if you have an argument on which you may redistribute wealth then
you are all set. If you lack such an argument then I cannot fault
someone for not believing such a redistribution is morally
permissible. You wish to act against the wishes of other beings ina
way that affects them. The burden of justifying those actions is on
you. Saying something like "I know something is wrong, but I can't put
my finger on it" is not sufficient.
>
> >It is that last part and sometimes even the very
> >idea that there must be an identifiable causality at all that is
always
> >inadequately addressed.
>
> But sometimes you can't identify a direct causality, because the
causality may
> not be identifiable with methods we have, or the impact is still felt
long
> after the identifiable marks of the event have faded. That impact
may in fact
> structure relations that empower some at the expense of others.
Thats the
> difficult part.
Well, I understand what you are saying, but you have not satisfied your
burden of proof if you basically are saying something like "I know I'm
right, but I just can't say why quite yet." Let me pose a hypothetical
scenario that is a bit easier to get one's hands around. Suppose you
are working on a burglary case and have narrowed it down to two
suspects. You know wiht absolute certainty that one of these two
suspects committed the burglary and the other is completely innocent of
it. Do you make them split the cost of restitution to the owner?
Well, read Kant -- what can I say. I suppose that proving it right to
anyone is sort of the issue in the discussion. (So, the way to show
that it can be is probably to produce such a proof.) One thing that
almost every moral philosopher agrees to these days is Kants principle
of universality. So progress is being made....
The ambiguity has more to do with the ambiguous nature of an informal
language. The concepts that we articulate with this language are not
ambiguous.
> >> Politics, even to create a system
> >> which prohibits intervention in the economy (laissez-faire
> >capitalism), is
> >> potentially an act of forcing people to do things they wouldn't
> >normally want
> >> to do, or prohibit them from acts they would want to do.
> >
> >I don't know about the first one. However, force is necessary in any
> >case.
> >
> >> That is active, that
> >> isn't passive.
> >
> >Not true. The former is active and the latter is passive (or at
least
> >it can be). In any case, let's suppose we try to have a purely
passive
> >society. What result do we get? Is it a simple one? Could you just
> >blurt out the answers to any dilemma based on the rule of passivity?
> >Could you at least figure it out, say, in a lifetime of studying it -
-
> >all the subtle logical ramifications?
>
> But the question is loaded -- you can't suppose a purely passive
society, that
> variable along says nothing. You need to know how the society is
structured,
> what passivity means, etc.
You need to know what passivity means. You do not need to know
anything about the structure of society to simply ask the hypothetical
question of what would a purely passive society be like? What are the
ramifications of such an idea? It is a simple question...
>For instance, a society of passivity where slavery
> is the norm might be seen as bad, with people accepting violations of
their
> human rights in the name of an ethic of passivity. In a society of
relative
> equals in status where passivity is simply letting each other live
the way
> they want, it may be seen as good.
You are equivocating on the term "passivity". I am not talking about
whatever dominant notion in one society and another that is associated
with the term uttered or disclosed with the symbols p-a-s-s-i-v-i-t-y.
I am talking about _our_ understanding of the term. I am not talking
about "passivity" but rather passivity (without the quotes). I am
talking about _one_ concept not the formal representation associated
with several different concepts.
> One thing about true libertarians and even
> anarchists, they often imagine society at its least complex (small
towns,
> voluntary exchanges) where one can imagine choices easily turned into
the
> structuring principles of life. That would make a direct connection
between
> choices one makes and the results. The trouble is that kind of
situation is
> easier to imagine in a simplified model of reality than in the real
world
> where complexity dominates, and causes contention about defintions,
measures,
> etc.
>
We cannot end at just contentions. We have to eventually be able to
reduce and untangle it all to things independent of such complexity.
Leaving it as an enigma is just begging the question.
> >I very highly recommend Kant's authoritative book on the matter, _The
> >Metaphysics of Morals_. I bet it might put a unique spin on Kant
that
> >you wouldn't get from those of us that claim to interpret him. Even
I
> >am giving my own view of what he said or meant. I promise you won't
> >regret it. I doubt you will agree very much with him, but he does
seem
> >to at least raise some interesting issues.
>
> I will read it. Maybe not this week -- this time is hectic at work --
but
> I'll get to it sometime next month.
> -scott
>
>
Duane K. Kelly
>
> On 1 Dec 1999 09:22:00 GMT, pet...@netcom.com (Loren Petrich) wrote:
>
> >In article <38441D53...@maine.edu>,
> >Scott D. Erb <scot...@maine.edu> wrote:
> >
> >>> anthropology was a myth -- everything from the Eskimos having how ever
> >>> many different names for snow to "monkies can talk".
> >
> >>Hell, in Minnesota I counted over ten words for snow in English :)
>
> has more phrases for killing people than any other country in the
> world. Versatility in language reflects emphasis on ideas.
It's called cultural diversity... the Unitized States has a far greater
blend of nationalities from more nations than any other nation in the
world, therefore we have more words for anything one wishes to talk
about than any other, including the sample given. Versatility in
language reflects this multi-cultured nation. So what was your point.
> > In both cases, all these snow words are words for different kinds
> >of snow; if one lives in a snowy place, one will eventually have to have
> >names these. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (language->thought) may be bogus,
> >but the inverse Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (thought->language) is *very*
> >well-supported.
> >
> >... I've
> >>been following actually interesting research in the popular science
> >>magazines about animals, and how animals and humans are in many ways more
> >>similar than people used to suspect (biologists doing this, not
> >>anthropologists). I agree myths should be debunked. Its often hard to
> >>tell what is myth and what is reality.
> >
--
========================================================
Milt explains his concept of ballistics...
"Wanna bet? I was hit by buckshot by accident once when I was a kid. I
have a scar to show for it. But no matter where it would have hit me, it
wouldn't have killed me, because I was running away from it.
"It's called basic physics, boyz..."
-- mi...@law.com (Milt)
Wed, 24 Nov 1999 00:56:01 GMT
http://www.deja.com/getdoc.xp?AN=552303882&fmt=text
Zepp explains his concept of the First Amendment...
"The first amendment means that you are protected by law from haters."
ze...@snowcrest.net (Zepp)
Thu, 28 Oct 1999 02:48:04 GMT
http://www.deja.com/getdoc.xp?AN=541474719&fmt=text
========================================================
Scott D. Erb
>Your argument as I see it is as follows:
>
>1) Conservatives, by definition, do something like "stick to
>tradition". They are always pushing "traditional values".
>2) Such a political philosophy promotes particular cultural values for
>their own sake.
>3) Therfore, conservatives could have a strong tie to cultural
>relativism.
Yes, added to the fact that many conservatives respect that other states have
the sovereign right to do the same, and often defend their values in terms of
that society's traditions, or the society's organic value.
>The first premise is okay for the purpoeses of this discussion. I have
>some reservations about the second assertion, though, and I think the
>third one misrepresents cultural relativism. On the second point,
>there are some conservatives that promote traditional values for their
>own sake -- actually _because_ they are the _traditional_ values.
>There is a certain argument there -- perhaps one based on the idea of
>an evolving set of values, the traditional set being a highly refined
>evolved set that should not be discarded.
Definitely.
> However, despite the
>propensity of some conservatives toward a similar sort of line of
>reasoning, I would even say that most conservatives (at least
>explicitly) do not endorse traditional values for their own sake. They
>actually are more inclined to say something like "Everybody knows that
>such and such is wrong," perhaps under the premise that Christian mores
>define morality. They adhere to the traditional values not because
>they are the traditional values, but instead the values they adhere to
>are the traditional ones because according to them we had it all
>figured out a long time ago. So, I would even say that most
>conservatives (whether you think they are mistaken or not) do not
>actually endorse traditional values for their own sake -- that in fact
>their values just happen to be traditional as far as their basis for
>their political philosophy is concerned.
Well, again, if we start looking at the "most people" scenario, we have to say
most liberals and most conservatives are probably not complete ethical
relativists. But when an ideology or philosophy is defined by its adherence
to tradition and cultural values, and when (as true conservatives usually do)
they assert the right of sovereign states to follow their own culture, with
them neither interfering in the affairs of others, or others being allowed to
interfer with their society, its hard not to see that as a type of relativism,
regardless of the personal beliefs of many conservatives. Liberals who argue
for human rights, argue against the death penalty, a woman's right to choose,
etc., are all espousing what they believe to be absolute rights. I'm not sure
how we'll define an ideology and its relation to moral relativism -- through
what most members believe, or the nature of the ideological system of thought?
>Nonetheless, even if we accept the second assertion, I think you may be
>missing the whole point of cultural relativism to assume that such a
>position is inherently cultural _relativist_. While I think you have
>correctly picked up on a point that pursuit of such a position as
>reflected in 2 would ultimately lead to a certain subjectivism or
>relativism, such implications are more due to the fact that those
>adhering to 2 are wrong than really what that whole view is about. In
>other words, you sort of have to implicitly start with the idea that
>conservativism is fundamentally flawed to reach 3, and in fact starting
>on conservative permises and reaching 3 almost refutes conservativism.
????? I really don't know what you mean there. I'm not assuming conservatism
to be wrong, I'm looking at what it is -- a defense of cultural and
traditional values, originally even against capitalism and democracy (though
its evolved from there), with a strong defense of elitism, and noting that its
basis is not in philosophical pursuit of a true ethic, but in protecting the
existing system. In that case, it seems self-evident that conservatism is
inherently relativist.
>The whole idea of cultural relativism is that we must preserve and
>tolerate alternative cultures. The whole idea of 2 is to eliminate all
But if thats the case, then its awfully hard to put very many of anyone in the
cultural relativist class. Even those I know who seem very relativist, still
argue that we have the right to try to communicate, educate, and convince
people to change by their own choice. I don't know anyone at all who says we
must preserve all alternate cultures. Also I don't think anyone I know says
we have to "tolerate" them in any active sense. They just say we shouldn't go
in and actively try to alter them -- but we can choose not to trade with them,
or simply ignore them. But that definition, I don't think hardly any liberals
or conservatives could be called cultural relativist.
>other alternative cultures in favor of a particular one and not even
>consider new ideas. Cultural realitivsm sort of rests on an attitude
>like perhaps the aborigines of Australia are on to something while the
>views in 2 take more of an attitude that there are no alternatives --
>we figured it all out already. (So, if the aborigines are on to
>something then it is because they agree with us.)
I don't think its at all conservative to say that other alternative cultures
must be eliminated! In fact, many like De Gaulle respected other cultures,
promoted French culture, but didn't believe any state should force its culture
down the throats of others. Its actually liberal ideals of universal rights
and freedoms which are more likely to be forced upon others.
>A conservative would, for instance, send missionaries to indoctrinate
>natives into Christianity. They would establish western law in
Not necessarily. Some would, but first, not all conservatives are Christian,
and not all religions rely on converstions. Jewish conservatives certainly
don't try to to change people to Judiasm.
>primitive cultures, perhaps trying to stamp out the slavery or feuding
>that was ingrained in the African cultures when the Brits colonized. A
I don't see that as conservatism at all. In fact, that reflects to me the
growth of classical liberal ideals.
>cultural relativist would permit even extreme practices, such as that
>of clitoridectomy of girls coming of age in primitive african tribes,
>on the grounds that such practice is perfectly acceptable in their
>culture. In fact, (a cultural relativist might argue) it is equally
>obscene to them that we do not engage in such a practice. Since there
>is no way to choose between cultures, then we have no grouns imposing
>our culture on them, and so have failed to meet a burden of proof on
>our part to justify our own intervention into the practice. A
Yes, quite often they will argue indeed that we should not impose our culture
on them. Few would argue that we can't try to convince them peacefully to
choose a different path, and few would argue that we have to trade or work
with them if we really hate what they do. In fact, since most efforts for
human rights, such as amnesty international, come from liberals, it seems to
me that classical liberalism, and by extension many aspects of modern
liberalism, are based on the idea of universal human rights. Conservatism is
not, its based on preserving a given status quo (though many modern
conservatives have adopted a lot of ideas of classical liberalism, and even
modern liberalism -- few conservatives want to eliminate social welfare
programs and the like, very few!)
>conservative would argue in just the opposite way, by saying that all
>of this cultural relativism is spurious at best. Don't be fooled!
>Don't be conned! Come one! We all know what to do -- now do it! This
Only within ones own soceity, and often it would be defended by appealing to
the traditions, not to any since of an absolute universal truth.
>practice is ridiculous, and all it shows that an entire culture
>practices it is how gullible and in need of strict oversight people
>are. Let's face it, this just shows that only the strong and righteous
No, I think that comes more from classical liberalism and its belief in
universal natural rights.
>few should be leading the masses to make them moral; otherwise, we sink
>into a morass of sin and decadence. (Or so a conservative would argue.)
>> > 2) Nonetheless, the entire field almost
>I don't know if I mentioned this earlier, but what is shocking about it
>all is that it isn't just some urban legend. It was textbook
>material. That academia is susceptable to that sort of thing is,
>suffice it to say, not something many of those that value academia or
>education in general would like to believe.
I'd have to see all the material to know exactly what was said and why it was
rejected, but the quest for knowledge always is prone to error and mistake.
We are humans.
>Now when you say falsifiable, I take that to mean through empirical
>verification much the same as facts in science are falsifiable. What
>if it all follows from the nature of ethical discussions. Certainyl we
>can come up with axiomatic systems that are consistent, but some are
>obviously not about ethics. For instance, if I wer to ask you what you
>thought was right and wrong, and you started listing Euclids
>Postulates, then I would wonder if you heard the question. So
>obviously, Euclidean Geometry as a _moral_ system doesn't even make
>sense although it is a completely coherent axiomatic system. Is it
>possible that there would be more ambiguous options that also don't
>make sense, but that finding such a thing out would take some thinking -
>- possibly a lot of thinking?
But with ethics it seems to me there are many such systems possible, depending
on your starting point.
I'm not saying there is no way to figure it out, but what do you do to the
person who says, "hell, life is just a mistake of biology, it doesn't matter,
we all die, ethics is for fools." Is he or she wrong objectively? Only if
you make some assumptions that can be questioned or rejected. That is an
inherent starting point of any building of an ethical system, it seems to me,
and unless one can convince me that the beginning assumptions are inherently
true, there is always doubt.
>So you are just sort of saying that we don't actually have the answers -
>- not that the answers don't exist. This line of reasoning would still
>have it that some things are nonsense and obviously wrong, but there
>still may be issues that we have not ironed out completely yet for
>which several plausible mutually exclusive alternatives exist.
Yeah, that's more or less it. Its like science in that sense. We can't prove
we aren't a brain on a space ship being fed data, but we can make a strong
argument that such a belief is unlikely and doesn't make much sense. Such an
argument ultimately gets based on pragmatism of a sort, and I suspect ethical
conclusions on what is likely true and proper comes down to that sort of a
call. Pragmatism in science (I'm not thinking so much of Dewey and Pierce
here, but philosophy of science) basically notes that we can't prove anything,
and that relativists have a point that there are many interpretations. Yet we
can choose to make distinctions, and these distinctions make sense.
>> So I disagree with the relativists in jumping from skepticism to a
>claim
>> that there is no absolute ethic, but agree with them that claims of
>ethical
>> absolutism can all be questioned and rejected if assumptions are
>dropped or
>> different assumptions made.
>
>Well, that cannot be completely true given your first statement.
>Actually, whether its proponents truly have what would consistitute
>real knowledge or if they just got lucky and guessed the right answer,
>one position is thoroughly absolute and could never be rationally
>rejected. Not even on the basis of rejecting assumptions
But the point is that while one position may be the absolutely right answer,
if we don't have the tools to rationally prove it right vis-a-vis other
answers, we can never know for sure it is the absolutely right answer. That
doesn't mean we can't believe it is and work as if it is, but doubt is always
inherently there. To me, thats part of being human -- the quest for a truth
we can never fully get in this life.
>Can we know for certain that if p implies q then not q implies not p?
We can know for certain a lot of things within a context we construct
(mathetmatical system, definitions of terms, etc.) Thats my point, we can
make internally consistent systems that work, but we can't know for sure if
they are valid outside our humanely constructed frame of reference and
context. Math and language are human constructs, symbolic representations and
abstractions of our perceptions of reality. If I define the word "implies"
differently, if I change "p" to mean something that is in a constant state of
flux, then all bets are off.
>Therein lies the need for certainty. You have to be "right". That
>means that those that contradict you must be "wrong" (or at least
>not "right"). You seek to know the answer, so that entails certainty.
>Even if you have to make a guess, you should want to be absolutely
>certain that it is the best guess.
I have no need for certainty. I think that the biggest problem humans have
is that they seem unable to accept the apparent inherent uncertainty that this
life entails. We have to do our best, make our best calls, and live with
them. We bet our lives with our choices. But certainty? Nah, I don't think
thats possible in this world. We can be certain within our own frameworks,
but in terms of objective reality outside our social and linguistic
constructions, that doesn't seem possible to me. But thats OK.
>This subtly begs the question. You have every right to expect justice
>whether you are certain you know what it is or not. If you just
>arbitrarily guess and get lucky, you would by construction have every
>right to bend the universe to your irrational will. If you thought
>long and hard about it and still ended up with the wrong answer, you
>would have no right to bend so much as a gnat to your will.
You seem to be assuming your conclusion here. I suspect I have a "right" to
do whatever I want. I just have to deal with the consequences of my choices.
>A holistic system makes the fundamental error of thinking that ethics
>is not based on individuals. That is, it does so unless it manages to
>address any concerns of an individualist. The error is not an error
>because it results in bad ends or something like that, but rather
>because it is simply mistaken in its presumptions about the nature of
>morality.
That is your belief, but its certainly not an unquestionable belief. For
instance, holism might change the way individual ethics are calculated. You
might ethically be required to deal with the fact you are structurally
advantaged over another human in a way that denies them their natural rights.
(I'm thinking of the Brazil example I gave earlier)
>But you disagree with them. That is all that matters. The interplay
>between your emotions and your beliefs is irrelevant. In other words,
>whether or not you have certain feelings for people of a different
>belief is not an issue except for possibly how you intend to actually
>treat them or something like that.
I have ethical beliefs and live by them. I disagree with people who think
differently. I also recognize that I might be wrong.
That is perhaps one of the most important sentences in the human language: My
beliefs might be wrong. That doesn't mean I shouldn't act confidently upon
them, and try to persuade others I'm right. It does mean I shouldn't assume
I'm right and thus believe that all others should bow to my wishes of what
should be because they are wrong. Humans are fallible, even if certain
knowledge is right, there is always the chance our minds came up with the
wrong answer.
So we bet our lives. We gather information, we decide what we believe and
why, we act on that, and we recognize that since we may be wrong, we have to
keep looking at new information and arguments, assessing our conclusions,
altering them if evidence or logic warrants, and moving forward -- always
knowing that its unlikely we'll come up with a final definitive conclusion
about life, morality and all of that which we can know is right.
ciao, scott
Scott D. Erb
I hope I'm understanding your points correctly. I am planning to read the
Kant piece you suggested, maybe that will help me better figure out where
you're coming from on some of these points. Anyway, here goes!
>On the contrary, I think it is one way. Philosophy informs all other
>fields as it is foundational to them. The other fields cannot inform
>philosophy meaningfully without begging the question.
But philosophy is useless and non-existent without reference to the outside
world. Philosophy relies on a human constructed language, reflecting concepts
which are abstractions of human experience. Philosophy is a human construct,
our effort to try to make sense of the world.
> For instance,
>physics cannot come to profound meta-physical results. You must
>presume these meta-physical results in order to do physics in the first
>place.
You must experience and perceive, and then want to understand your
perceptions. You have to think and be curious. From there philosophy and
science go hand in hand.
>No -- the other direction. Are those that really adhere to science
>more prone to be liberal? Yes they are. That does not mean that you
>have to be liberal to be a scientist. It just means that those with
>certain views tend toward liberalism and that skews the ratios of
>scientists to liberals liberals of one stripe to another and so on.
OK
>Well, not being sure if there even is an ethical standard is a partial
>rejection of the possibility of knowledge within ethics. In other
>words, it isn't just admitting to one's ignorance on a matter, but
>suspecting the "matter" doesn't really exist in the first place.
But there is a big difference between accepting uncertainty and saying no
knowledge is possible. ALL scientific knowledge rests on an assumption that
conclusions and beliefs could be changed if new evidence or a better theory
develops. But no one says that possibility of scientific knowledge is
rejected! Also, you said cultural relativism (in the last post) meant that
other cultures should be preserved and tolerated. There is nothing within an
acceptance that it is POSSIBLE that there is no ethical standard which
necessitates coming to the conclusion that there is no ethical standard.
Again, it is POSSIBLE that we are all brains in some space ship being fed
information and sensations to test our reactions and all of this is an
illusion. Its possible this is some big dream and you don't exist. But its
not very likely, and I'd never turn that possibility into a rule for living.
>Well, let us compare this to knowledge in general. So we say we cannot
>be terribly sure of much and must admit to the possibility of our
>error.
Yes, that's knowledge -- scientific and otherwise.
> All this is fine and good, but what does it mean when we say
>get into a debate? What would it mean to then go on and say that we
>should tolerate dissenting views?
What do you mean by tolerate? We accept that other people have views and we
listen to them. We don't have to consider their views valid, we can and do
try to change their opinions with evidence and the power of our argument, and
we can act totally contrary to their views of how we should act. Whether we
should silence them or stop them from promulgating their views is a political
question.
> I contend that it would mean
>nothing. We have no _added_ requirement toward tolerance. We should
>express our views the same whether or not we are really sure not just
>not quite sure.
Except accepting the possibility of error means the need to reassess our own
position, constantly putting it to scrutiny as we hear and learn of other
alternates. We have no need to accept them and I agree completely that the
uncertainty which I consider necessary in life should NOT stop us from acting
with confidence and will in our daily lives. We place our bets, we go with
what we believe, even if we know we may be wrong. Anything else would be
limiting, even debilitating.
>Perhaps we should also accurately describe our other
>views about the certainty of the original views. The bottom line is
>that we cannot coherently say that we think one thing but accept the
>validity of another.
We can coherently say that we think one thing, but recognize that our opinion
is fallible and we'll consider another position, but not accept it unless we
are convinced. I think we also can coherently say that since the other person
is in the same boat we are in, we are not in a position to actively try to
prevent that person from living by his or her beliefs, all other things being
equal. If beliefs conflict (say, the other person thinks all blacks should be
slaves), then you enter the realm of politics, where conflicting values and
beliefs about ethics are fought out. There, you should, in my opinion, to
come up with a process to work through this, otherwise its just a power game
-- whoever wins enforces what he thinks right on others.
>I know you don't think you are saying something like that (or maybe you
>do?), but that is what your point boils down to. You are saying that
>we should be tolerant based on the fact that we might be in error in
>the first place. I won't even start on the criticisms along the lines
>of being tolerant of intolernce or that sort of thing.
You really need to define tolerant. OF COURSE we should be "tolerant" if that
means allowing others to express their opinions and beliefs. That doesn't
mean we should always agree that everyone can do everything they want. That's
why I say our inherent uncertainty necessitates a type of pragmatic approach
to social relations, why the social construction of ethics and the search for
a true ethical belief are not mutually incompatable, but necessary given the
fact that multiple individuals approach the problem of determining ethics
differently, with no clear way to distinguish who is right without making
assumptions which can't be proven. I'm not sure if you mean tolerant to mean
we should just listen politely, or if you think it means we should accept
without objection. One can "tolerate" nazis exercising free speech and
holding their opinions while at the same time fighting against their views.
> The point is
>that you seem to be manufacturing an extra amount of tolerance out of
>thin air here. We should be more tolerant on the issues we are less
>certain of than the ones that we are more certain of perhaps, but a
>general tolerance based on a general uncertainty begs the question. Do
>you have your moral views or not? What ever your most stongly held
>conviction is, you should adhere to it with a no tolerance attitude.
I disagree completely. In fact, I find what to describe as being irrational,
as it creates a closed system where you can't even question your own view. No
matter how certain or convicted you may be, the evidence strongly indicates
that we are all fallible humans and each of us may be wrong. People with
strong convictions have been wrong many times.
Now, that doesn't mean you should not ACT on your convictions with all your
effort and all your soul. It only means: 1) you shouldn't simply try to
silence those with different view points; and 2) you shouldn't avoid
questioning your own beliefs and taking into account other points of view.
>Actually, it is precisely a restatement of moral subjectivism to say
>that there is no clear test to determine which are right.
In the other post, though, you said that it meant preserving other cultures.
Nothing in saying that there is no clear test to determine what is right
necessitates we actually preserve every possibility that exists. In science
there is no clear test to determine the absolute truth of scientific
propositions, all might be replaced (and most probably will be) down the line.
But there is no reason to preserve alchemy. Science has the benefit of at
least being able to falsify some hypotheses, I'm not sure we can do that in
moral philosophy, except to falsify them within a framework of assumptions
(which themselves might be questioned).
>I would
>respond to this by saying that the test is coherence (i.e. conformity
>to the rules of logic) and comparison to language. The latter point
Language is a human construction, it is not 'natural.' It is our invention.
Conforming our beliefs on ethics to our invention (logic is as well), only
means that, as you say, we have a coherent set of beliefs. I suspect a
multitude of belief systems are coherent, within logic and language, depending
on the initial assumptions. And since language is changable, well...
>about language is just in the sense that we can discard Euclidean
>Geometry as a "moral" system on the grounds of it being non sequitur to
>the basic issues we are inquiring about in ethics.
But you still can't get around the fact your test only verifies your own
constructed ethical beliefs by virtue of using your own constructed system of
symbols and logic. That may be a good test, I certainly use it, but it is not
a certain or perfect test. That's my only point. No matter how you slice it,
there is a gulf between objective or true reality and our ability to perceive
and understand it, especially in the field of ethics, that seems
insurrmountable. Sure, I'll keep an open mind that I may be wrong -- as much
as my conviction says that certitude is impossible, my own logic requires me
to tolerant and consider a view that says it is possible. I just haven't seen
it.
>Social reality is an artificial construction not because it is a real
>artificially manufactured object whos existence is independent of all
>else.
OK... Language is also such a manufactured object too, right? Language refers
to our perceptions of objects. Math refers to our perceptions of relations
between objects. Social construction refers to our communication and shared
beliefs about those two issues, as well as ethics, morals, etc. If social
reality is artificial, it is no more artificial than math or language.
> It is artificial because it is only "real" under a certain
>perspective. It is like saying that my mind is "real". I guess you
>might think I have some sort of a soul, but according to me what is
>real is just the physical state of my brain. My mind is actually an
>abstract description of a physical phenomenon. There is an
OK, but right there you're making a statement of opinion that cannot be
tested. It may be a rational point of view to hold, but you can't be certain
there is no soul, even scientists studying the brain often come to a different
conclusion than you have. In fact, there are real problems with the
assumption of pure materialism, which is where that seems to lead.
>equivocation on "real" to confuse entities whos existince is
>independent and entities that only exist under the presumtion or
>depending on the existence of something else. Society is an abstract
>phenomenon and no more real than mathematics is for instance. Just as
>you cannot get in a space ship and fly to some point inthe universe to
>see first hand the giant "2" out there (as if it _really_ existed) you
>cannot see the society sitting out there on the court house steps
>(say). "Society" is a sophisticated abstract description or reference
>to particular arrangement of concrete items -- it does not have an
>independent existence of its own.
OK, but neither does language. Neither does philosophy. Neither does math.
All such things are social constructions, human inventions.
>Ids that like knowledge in general? Our knowledge does not reflect and
>natural or correct knowledge -- just the knowledge we have created.
>What is your reaction to that statement?
Thats usually how scientific knowledge is defined. One could posit a pure
concept of knowledge which is correct or natural knowledge, but I prefer the
scientific perspective which considers knowledge claims to be inherently
questionable. Knowledge is the sum of our current beliefs about reality,
based on scientific testing and rational discernment.
>Isn't it to say that while
>each of us must acquire our own knowledge (in that sense subjectively),
>what is or isn't knowledge is supposed to be (by definition) universal
>adn "correct"? How would we rephrase that about ethics?
I really don't disagree with you about universality, but I'm noting that even
such claims have a smidgeon of doubt which can't be ignored. Scientific
knowledge is presumed to be universally correct, though much of science is
designed to test what we now consider knowledge, perhaps replacing it if we
find out we were wrong. No scientist would presume to say "today's knowledge
(what we consider knowledge) is universally correct and cannot be challenged."
You might want to keep the modifier "scientific" in front of knowledge there
to keep the abstract concept of "knowledge" as an ideal notion that may not be
achievable in the material world...or if we have it, we can't know for sure we
have it -- though presumably it would withstand the various tests we put it to
over time, making it pragmatically rational to live by the assumption we have
it right.
>That is not a twist back. That is just what any cultural relativist
>would say to keep from just degenerating into an emotivist. I suppose
Cultural relativism obviously exists in weak and strong forms. The definition
you used in the last post -- a belief we should preserve all different
cultures -- certainly does not follow from any claim I made. That would be
the "strongest" form of relativism. The choice obviously isn't just between
pure certitude of ones own beliefs on the one hand and pure "anything goes" on
the other hand.
Now, if you're suggesting that dismissing the possibility of certitude leads
to a pure anything goes position, ultimately, I disagree. But I don't dismiss
the possibility of certitude either, I simply see nothing to make me think it
is possible, and absent evidence to the contrary, my conviction is that human
life is by nature uncertain on these issues, and that is something we have to
live with. That is what leads me to think there has to be a pragmatic
resolution to social issues of ethical rules in society, while each individual
in my opinion should make their own subjective call and live by their
convictions, even if they allow themselves to question those convictions
should a good argument or new evidence present itself.
>that you are careful to make sure that you reject the possibility of
>_acquiring_ knowledge rather than the possibility of knowledge actually
>existing. Nonetheless, the differences seem more like a new argument
>for relativism than a different out look altogether. You might call it
>the argument from agnosticism.
I certainly think that a fundamental aspect of existence is the uncertainty
factor (not meaning to sound like Heissenberg there). To me that is even a
defining aspect of what human life is; life is dealing with uncertainty, and
trying to get along with others and make our own judgements without an "answer
book" to give us a satisfaction we are right. People yearn for the answer
book -- hence the popularity of religions or dogmatic philosophies. I just
don't think one is there, and in fact I rather enjoy the challenge of going
through without the answers being given.
I do think that human nature, behavior, and ideas create a lot of evidence
through which we can draw conclusions and discern between different ideas. I
tend to think that they do provide clues to proper ethical behavior, and I
think my beliefs are getting closer to finding that proper ethic. It doesn't
matter if I can't have an answer key to check my findings, I'll just live by
them and see what happens.
>It has nothign to do with human nature or nature at all. It is just a
>logical realtionship between these hypothetical things we
>call "beings". A dichotomy is formed by saying that any two beings are
>related to each other either "justly" or not "justly".
I'm not sure where you are to get the concept of just or unjust from just the
logical relationship between two beings. I mean, you can make assumptions of
justice and build from them, but then all one needs do is question the
assumptions or alter them, and the whole thing changes.
I'm stressing the uncertainty here, so I'll restate that I do believe there is
a proper absolute ethic, and I do think that human behavior, ideals, history,
etc. all provide clues as to what it is. I do believe we can analyze these
clues and potentially come up with the right answer. I don't believe we can
no for sure its right if we have it, and I suspect that few if anyone really
gets a 100% on this (i.e., hits it exact). But I also note that I may be
wrong, and its possible my quest to understand what the right and just way to
act is might be sort of an illusion. But if I'm wrong, what the hell -- this
quest gives some meaning and purpose to life, and that is something I want.
So being wrong about the existence of a true ethic wouldn't be a disaster;
still, I don't think I'm wrong, so I continue. :)
BTW, in my "World Law" class one student gave an excellent presentation on
Kant (comparing his essay on Perpetual Peace to the United Nations charter and
UN ideals). It was pretty interesting; I really do think Kant's arguments
make a lot of sense. In epistemology he does seem to have intriguing answers
to the gulf between rationalists and empiricists. I'm waiting to get the book
you recommended and will let you know what I think.
--scott
Scott D. Erb
>Well, we just have to examine the nature of "freedom" more closely.
>Freedom is an inherently passive thing. What ramifications might that
>have? Just because we are social creatures, that does not mean we are
>not free.
But wait -- if every act one undertakes in some way has an impact on others,
then every single act potentially limits freedom. In other words, no one is
truly free, at least to the point of choosing their circumstances or limiting
the acts of others. We are free only to the extent that we have to accept the
fact that the world around us has constrained or limited us through the
accumulated acts of others. Every act we undertake adds to that set of
accumulated acts -- in other words, like it or not, any act we take
contributes to some kind of limitation on someone else's ability to act.
So freedom at best is limited. But limited to what?
>> But what if you have ten dollars because you took something I
>considered mine,
>> and that you considered yours.
>
>Then not all things would be equal.
That I guess is my point -- in a social system all things are NEVER equal.
Or, if never is too strong, they hardly ever seem to be equal. Contexts are
not defined by precise limits, we have a multivariate, multicausal world with
no simple limitations. Thats why economics as a science has problems, the
simplifying "all other things equal" assumption is always wrong. It still
might be useful for theory building, but all things are almost never always
equal.
(on Brazil example)
>The difference between me and a leftists is that a leftists thinks that
>with no further information we may draw conclusions about the justness
>of the distribution. I think it may be a horrible situation, but with
>this information alone we cannot formulate any conclusions about the
>justice of the situation except to presume that it is just.
Why would you presume that it is just? Isn't that just as much a conclusion
about the justness of the situation as a presumption that it is unjust? How
is one presumption different than another? Don't you have to have some basis
to make that presumption?
>Social structures are irrelevant to morality. Morality is not about
>the relationship of a being to other inanimate objects such as "sociali
>structures" or about the relationship of inanimate objects to each
>other. Morality is about a certain type of relationship between two
>beings.
Social structures are the relationships between entities. So in essence your
last sentence contradicts your first. (Following Giddens and
structurationists, social structures represent the relationship; slavery is a
structure that results from the empowering or constraining that takes place in
a slave-master relationship; that relationship is itself a structure).
Relationships are structured, and their very essence is NOT just of two equal
autonomous beings, but beings already constrained or limited by power
relations in society. Trying to make a moral judgement while remaining
oblivious to this seems to me to be misguided; its pushing aside a lot of
relevant information simply because it complicates the equation, or leads to a
result one doesn't wish to consider.
>In the end the principles on which our moral philosophy is based is
>independent of even the existence of society since moral dilemmas need
>not concern themsleves with such a thing as a society.
You assert these things, but they are assumptions or opinions that aren't
self-evident -- in this case, I think you are completely wrong. Without
society, there would be no moral principles. Any time two entities interact,
that creates some kind of society. By definition, morality is societal in
nature. Moral dilemmas concern themselves, then, ONLY with issues that are
societal, not with any issue outside society.
> We could ask if
>the actions of a particular person were moral with respect to another
>person whether they both exist in society or are stranded on a deserted
>island together.
But if they are stranded on a desert island, they are in society -- society is
anytime relationships exist between two or more entities. Depending on your
level of analysis, you can describe society writ large (the nation or world)
or very small (a family, a couple, a club).
> Perhaps the context of the actions (and so what the
>action really is) might change some in such a shift and so end in
>different conclusions; however, the principle on which such conclusions
>are based must universally apply to either scenario. But, our
But how do you apply something universally. Consider the classic example of
lying to nazis to protect Jews in the basement. Is it immoral to lie to Nazis
to protect Jews you're hiding? Of course not! Why not? Is it just the
consequence? Or is the act different because the impact of the moral choice
goes beyond just the two people. In other words, lying in a social context of
just two people with no one else affected may be wrong; lying in a social
context in which more than two people are involved and the lie actually
protects one from harm may not be wrong. The universal principle involved
could be the same in each case -- it isn't just "lying is immoral", but it
deals with the larger issue of preventing unjust harm to an individual or
something like that (or even Kant's categorical imperative). But the way it
is applied depends on the social structure involved, and goes beyond just the
two people involved.
Extrapolate beyond that, and soon you can get to examples like the Brazil
example.
>political philosophy is just a particular application of our moral
>philosophy, and if our moral philosophy is founded independently of
>society, so must our political philosophy be. So you can talk about
>social structures all you want to, but the whole point is that you are
>going to ultimately come back to some principle that generally has
>nothign to do with those social structures. If not, then you aren't
>done yet.
But again, since our moral philosophy by definition can not be independent of
society, then our political philosophy must not be. Indeed, it is impossible
to have a moral or political philosophy outside society because the issue of
politics concerns how you mediate disputes about moral (and material) issues
in society, and morality concerns social relations. By definition society is
a necessary part of these (just by their use of language, which is a social
construction, that would be the case anyway).
>Well, if you have an argument on which you may redistribute wealth then
>you are all set. If you lack such an argument then I cannot fault
>someone for not believing such a redistribution is morally
>permissible. You wish to act against the wishes of other beings ina
>way that affects them. The burden of justifying those actions is on
>you. Saying something like "I know something is wrong, but I can't put
>my finger on it" is not sufficient.
Oh, I certainly have an argument which says you may redistribute wealth. You
try to deny that possibility by ignoring the social relations that create a
given wealth distribution, and assert we have to look at it as if you just
have two people in a general all other things equal situation, and then if its
not moral there, its never moral because its not universal. My point is the
moral principle is not just the act of redistributing wealth, but the act
itself, its very nature, has to include the structural and social positions of
the actors and the meaning of the act in a given context.
>Well, I understand what you are saying, but you have not satisfied your
>burden of proof if you basically are saying something like "I know I'm
>right, but I just can't say why quite yet." Let me pose a hypothetical
>scenario that is a bit easier to get one's hands around. Suppose you
>are working on a burglary case and have narrowed it down to two
>suspects. You know wiht absolute certainty that one of these two
>suspects committed the burglary and the other is completely innocent of
>it. Do you make them split the cost of restitution to the owner?
No. But a burglary is different than the type of structural discrimination
and constraints on liberty that exist in society, and those structures alter
the essential nature of the acts undertaken. It is literally a different act
to redistribute wealth from those who are structurally advantaged at the
expense of others than it is to redistribute wealth from those who are not, in
an all other things equal category.
>Well, read Kant -- what can I say. I suppose that proving it right to
>anyone is sort of the issue in the discussion. (So, the way to show
>that it can be is probably to produce such a proof.) One thing that
>almost every moral philosopher agrees to these days is Kants principle
>of universality. So progress is being made....
But, of course, that doesn't mean that every single act has to be moral in
every single circumstance unless you deny that the nature of the act involves
the nature of the relationship itself. Otherwise, how could one determine
whether or not lying was wrong? Or even stealing? If you try to apply Kant's
imperative to every mundane act without seeing how the act gets part of its
essence from its social position, you're left, for instance, saying its
immoral to lie to a Nazi in order to protect a Jew you're hiding in the
basement, etc. That may be the case, but one certainly can make a strong
argument that your definition of what an act is relies on an artificially
limited scope, that acts are defined more broadly (after all, you could go
into infinite reduction, a lie is a sum of many other smaller acts on a
smaller scope, etc.) Pacifists have dealt with this issue a lot. Extremists
would say all violence or aggression is always wrong, but then others might
point out that giving birth is an act of aggression, pushing someone out of
the way of a falling rock an act of violence. The answer: acts are more than
just the direct action that is taking place, they get their MEANING from the
social context.
>The ambiguity has more to do with the ambiguous nature of an informal
>language. The concepts that we articulate with this language are not
>ambiguous.
That's an interesting assertion, but I have my doubts on whether or not its
true, or whether concepts even exist absent language.
>You need to know what passivity means. You do not need to know
>anything about the structure of society to simply ask the hypothetical
>question of what would a purely passive society be like? What are the
>ramifications of such an idea? It is a simple question...
What do you think passivity means?
>You are equivocating on the term "passivity". I am not talking about
>whatever dominant notion in one society and another that is associated
>with the term uttered or disclosed with the symbols p-a-s-s-i-v-i-t-y.
>I am talking about _our_ understanding of the term. I am not talking
>about "passivity" but rather passivity (without the quotes). I am
>talking about _one_ concept not the formal representation associated
>with several different concepts.
OK, explain what you mean, because it is a term that can be defined so many
different ways (I've studied pacifists and the various forms of pacifism from
minimal force or anti-war pacifists to hard core no aggression ever
pacifists...there are numerous definitions and conceptions, I need to know
what definition you're thinking about).
>We cannot end at just contentions. We have to eventually be able to
>reduce and untangle it all to things independent of such complexity.
>Leaving it as an enigma is just begging the question.
Actually, why can't we end at contentions? We solve them politically, then
new ones arise, and old ones get re-debated. Why do you think anything beyond
an enigma is necessary?
ciao, scott
Paleo
says...
> >So the attempted extinction of the Jews had nothing to do with Naziism?
> >It was just the acts of power-hungry individuals?
> Nazism was the brainchild of power-hungry individuals. It rested on fear of
> the other, and bigotry, as well as extreme nationalism and social darwinism.
This is like saying that Naziism was the consequence of fallen human
nature. True, but unhelpful. It was the ideology of Naziism that led
directly to the attempted extinction of Jews, just as the ideology of
communism led to the extinction of scores of millions of other
individuals.
> >In excusing the genocide of the communists,
> Who is excusing anything -- though you probably need to recheck the word
> genocide to apply to communists. That word often gets abused.
When you consider what they did to the Ukrainians and the kulaks, it
seems justifiable.
> >task ahead of you. Communist regimes all over the world have engaged in
> >brutal mass murder and genocide to a degree witnessed nowhere else. The
> >common factor is the ideology of communism. And you seriously suggest
> >that communism is not at fault?
> You're treating "communism" as a vague vessel including a lot of different
> regimes...
By no means. I'm using "communist" to describe those states that were,
by their own admission, communist.
> But far right nazism and far left communism show that extremism
> combined with power create the tools of death...
Quite apart from the fact that Naziism belongs on the left with
communism, this is true but unhelpful. The relevant point is that
communism has been reliably associated with horrific mass murder.
Period.
> Religious fundamentalism does
> the same thing -- the crusades, the Spanish inquisition, the Salem witch
> trials, the genocide by the Spanish in the new world...any extremist thought
> can lead to killing, its just that this century has seen the technology to do
> it on a massive scale.
Untrue. The communists killed their victims with old technology:
starvation, concentration camps, shootings, etc. The hard fact that the
progressive leftist doesn't want to face is that religious intolerance,
for all his attempts to portray it as the ne plus ultra of human
wickedness, accounts for only the tiniest percentage of the deaths which
are chalked up to the socialist workers' paradises. There is a clear
connection between communism and mass murder on a hitherto undreamed-of
scale, and you can't use the "technology" excuse.
> >Look. The premiere example of centralized power in the 20th century has
> >been communist states. Nothing like it existed in the democracies, and
> >you'll find it very difficult to maintain that the Nazi state was, in any
> >sense a traditionalist would recognize, "traditionalist." I don't think
> >you clearly have in mind a point you want to make. I keep drawing your
> >attention back to the original proposition: American fundamentalists were
> >justified in their fear of communists, and they saw nothing remotely
> >comparable to it on the global scene. You have yet to put forward any
> >counter, so far as I can see, that this fear on their part was in any way
> >unrealistic.
> The fundies were not justified to fear Communism because it was not a threat
> to them...
This is simply contrary to fact. Communism consistently portrayed itself
as the wave of the future which would engulf the entire world. This
evangelizing, outward focus was there from the beginning with Marx, and
reached its height in the Cold War: Kruschev's "We will bury you" line.
The Christian fear of communism was a rational response to an ideology
that portrayed itself as world-dominating.
> ...in fact, if you look at history, you'll see Genghis Kahn, Alexander,
> and many empires were built on a lot of blood, the twentieth century had more
> technology to kill more...
The technology excuse fails totally, unless you want to bring in the use
of atomic weapons on the Japanese, which is a different question. The
communists murdered their victims with distinctly old technology.
> Also, after Stalin the Soviet Empire, while still
> evil, did not engage in the acts of mass killing, proving that it was more
> based on Stalin's abuse of power. Some Communist leaders like Castro,
> Gorbachev, and others were actually rather humanistic.
Gorbachev was head of the KGB at the time the agency was placing bombs in
dolls that were responsible for blowing off the hands of numerous Afghani
children--he personally signed off on this scheme. Castro brutally
tortured and imprisoned anyone he suspected of Thought Crime, as
documented abundantly in Armando Valladares' "Against All Hope" and in
many other places. The Soviet Union continued to imprison dissidents,
drug them in insane asylums, and kill them in the Gulag until right
before the Soviet Empire dissolved. This is fact.
> >With the exception that there have been no totalitarian regimes on the
> >right, of course. The very concept of totalitarianism is foreign to the
> >true right.
> Except nazism, which is definitely, as I have shown (and as I teach, coming
> directly from all texts I know of on political philosophy) is a right wing
> ideology. You are conveniently trying to pretend that only the other side is
> bad. Sorry, that's a nice illusion, but its NOT TRUE.
I'm sorry, but you can only maintain this illusion based on a taxonomy
that flatters the American left. All intellectual taxonomies are based
on certain axioms which must be compared to reality as we know it and to
the history of ideas. There is next to nothing in Naziism that is
congenial to the Right, either in Europe or America. Contrast Nazi
assumptions and beliefs with those of Edmund Burke, the intellectual
father of Western conservatism--you'll find almost nothing that Burke and
his conservative descendents could stomach, much less admire.
> >Please. I hope you're joking. It was precisely his scholarship that was
> >almost unbelievably shoddy and indeed knowingly dishonest. He had zero
> Marx's scholarship is the most impressive of the era...
Marx's "scholarship," in fact, was dishonest and shoddy from the outset,
and it was recognized as such and publicly exposed by careful scholars on
any number of occasions. See "Intellectuals" by Paul Johnson for a
comprehensive, albeit truncated, indictment of his method.
> A lot of it was wrong
> and shoody, but compared to others at the time, and looking at the scope of
> his project, it was truly impressive. His work is required reading to anyone
> trying to understand modern political philosophy, and his economic insights
> inform even modern economists...
Please tell us a few of his "insights" which "inform" modern economists.
I studied Marx under David Friedman, and it was clear that the man was a
laughingstock to modern economists.
> People who hate Marx nitpick errors and points
> that do look dishonest, but ignore the massive work he did which was truly
> ingenious. You again seem to want to pretend that only your side (the
> "right") has good scholarship, and the Left is shoody or dishonest. That is
> convenient, but simply NOT true.
I'm sorry, but Marx's sloppiness and dishonesty have been documented
thoroughly, and it most emphatically does NOT consist of "nitpicking."
The man was simply fundamentally dishonest and self-deluded. He dreamed
up his ideas in the study and his "research" was nothing more than the
attempt to find factoids that appeared to support his claims, and he was
contemptuous of anyone who attempted to bring reality into the picture.
> >experience of agriculture or industry--so far as anybody knows, he never
> >set foot in a mine, a factory or a mill in his entire life. And he
> >contemptuously rejected the advice of those who actually DID have some
> >experience of the lives of working men.
> No. His main advisor was Friedrich Engels, a very successful business man who
> actually corrected Marx's work when he went into economic issues involving
> business. Marx was a scholar, Engels did the business, knew how the
> factories worked. I actually really think Engels is underrated for the impact
> he had; without him, Marx would not have been able to put together such an
> impressive (if ultimately misguided) theory.
The Engels book that Marx relied upon most heavily, "The Condition of the
Working Class in England," has been comprehensively demonstrated to be a
farrago of outdated statistics and mendaciously organized factoids. W.H
Challoner and W.O Henderson demolished the scholarly pretensions of this
book once and for all in their 1958 OUP translation. They examined all
of the sources Engels used. It is a tract, a work of political polemic,
not scholarship.
> >I had History of Economics under the remarkable David Friedman, the son
> >of Milton Friedman, and we actually read "Capital" from start to finish.
> See, its required reading even from people who don't like him.
Sure. And in the best of the history of science courses that I took, we
also read several treatises on phrenology, which was influential for a
time in the last century, and of equal scientific validity with Engels'
and Marx's work.
> >I have never encountered another person, conservative or liberal, even in
> >university circumstances, who has similarly plowed through this farrago
> >of lies and nonsense as I did, from first page to last.
> Argument by ridicule is a logical fallacy.
It's merely an observation. And maybe a point of personal pride. I
actually have read the damned thing, thanks to David. I've never
encountered anybody else who has.
> >His so-called scientific treatment of the conditions of the working class
> >in England in based entirely on a book by Engels which he knew to be
> >based solely on out-of-date secondary sources whose age is consistently
> >misrepresented. The book is pockmarked with errors and distortions which
> >were discovered and publicized in 1848 in a work that Marx himself was
> >familiar with, so he can't plead ignorance. Marx himself used quotations
> >in a dishonest way and misrepresented their date and/or source. He
> >selectively used facts chosen solely because they supported his
> >preconceived notions and ignored all disconfirmatory information. His
> >refusal to investigate conditions as they actually were, and his contempt
> >for those who did was boundless.
> Those are assertions that are contrary to almost everything I've read and
> studied about Marx...
I don't doubt it, given that you're a liberal. Hard facts like these are
uncongenial to the denizens of American academia, which, until only a
decade or so back, was the last haven of Marxism in the world.
> He and Engels worked closely together, one can nitpick
> his work (or any work), and his social science was mid-19th century, an era
> where the scientific method that we know today hadn't really permeated the
> field. But such broadsides only show bias.
You're not getting the point here. Their "scholarship" was dishonest and
polemical from the get-go. It was NOT "scientific" in any sense of that
word that makes sense today.
> >For a short but thorough precis of his dishonesties, see the chapter on
> >Marx in "Intellectuals" by Paul Johnson, which utterly annihilates the
> >fantasy that Marx was a scholar.
> Did you read all the attacks on Johnson on similar charges? I defended
> Johnson too (for his most recent book). Sure, Johnson is a biased historian,
> and he often twists things to his point of view, but his is an interpretation.
When it comes to Marx, he is merely reporting the concensus of careful
investigators.
> You can read Hobsbawm and get a different interpretation. You can't simply
> choose to believe the one that suits your biases. Johnson has his opinion,
> but you seem to assume its true, and all those who think differently are
> wrong. You are assuming whatever supports your argument to be right, and
> whatever opposes it to be wrong. That is not rational.
Look. We know that Marxism is a complete and total failure in its
"scientific" pretensions. We don't need to read a single scholar, pro or
con, to arrive at this conclusion. We need merely compare Marx's
predictions and reasoning with the history that followed. Marx was as
"scientific" a "scholar" as the frauds who travelled the countryside
"healing" people with magnets or diagnosing personality traits via the
shape of your skull. Given what we can see with our own eyes, the
conclusions of the likes of Challoner and Henderson look stronger and
more convincing with each passing year.
> >> He was committed to science and rationality and falsely
> >> believed he had uncovered laws of history through reason and evidence.
> >This is simply untrue, and it's not merely untrue. It's so utterly the
> >opposite of his actual method that it's a surreal description of his
> >method. It is literally impossible to find another "scholar" who was as
> >irrationalist as this one.
> You are simply wrong. He was disdainful of irrationality...
Sure he was. And his contemporaries, the phrenologists, claimed to be
"scientists." It takes very few pages of first-person accounts of Marx's
behavior to realize that he was a megalomaniacal bully with a prophet
complex, about as scientific as Freud. His estimate of your rationality
depended entirely on whether or not you agreed with him.
> There is no way
> for you defend the charge you make above -- for the first time I'm really
> wondering about your honesty here, Marx was committed to applying the Hegelian
> dialectic within a program of historical materialism in a desire to find out
> the laws of economics that guide social life. I think his theory was wrong,
> but your attack on him is pure garbage, it has no basis in reality.
This is simply untrue. Go back and read the apparatus to Challoner and
Henderson, paying particular attention to their discoveries about how
Engels treated primary sources. There are so many first-person
contemporary accounts of Marx's intolerance for those who dared to
compare his theories with the reality of the outside world that there's
really no argument anymore on this question. He took the airy-fairy
Hegelian dialect, as he understood it, arrived at what he assumed MUST be
the truth of the human condition, and thereafter picked and chose among
the data to get factoids that supported his preconceived opinions. In
"Marx und Freud," the eminent philosopher Karl Jaspers wrote, "The style
of Marx's writings is not that of the investigator...he does not quote
examples or adduce facts which run counter to his own theory but only
those which clearly support or confirm that which he considers the
ultimate truth." He was a religious crank running a con as a
disinterested "scientist." If it's truly possible that you're unaware of
all this, you've simply insulated yourself from legitimate criticism of
the man's work.
> >"Opposite," indeed. It shared many features in common with communism.
> >It is literally impossible, of course, to get any more irrational than
> >Marx.
> You are wrong. I think you know it, you're just being contrary.
I'm sorry, but the facts support me, not you. Marx was as "scientific"
and "rational" as the phrenologists and mesmerists and spiritualists who
were running their cons in Europe at approximately the same time. The
utter inability of his theories to conform to reality is the cherry on
the whipped cream.
> >Fascism was intially supported by any number of leftists, who correctly
> >perceived it to be socialist in nature.
> No, fascism tried to appeal to leftists, but once they got power, they dumped
> all socialists from their party and embraced the right wing nationalist
> extremism. Right wing extremism is as antithetical to traditional
> conservatism as Stalinist Communism is antithetical to social democracy...
At least you concede that Naziism had little or nothing in common with
traditional conservatism (and there IS no such thing as "non-traditional
conservatism, needless to say). As for social democrats, they share
certain presuppositions with the communists, as Solzhenitsyn so astutely
pointed out in his Harvard speech.
> You
> can't demonize one side and say the other side is good. Thats simply a
> convenient way to protect your own ideas from being associated with anything
> bad. Reality doesn't allow it, nor does the history of political philosophy.
The problem is that you're attempting to connect Naziism with
conservatism somehow, and the attempt simply fails. If you stretch a
point here and there nearly out of recognition, you can claim a family
resemblance on one or two items. But Naziism is alien to the spirit of
Western conservatism. This is simply a fact. Try to show us where Burke
would have embraced it.
> I've had this debate before, I've posted quotes from political philosophers,
> historians, given examples from Weimar on how Hitler was supported by the
> right, used the name "socialist" dishonestly to woe workers, but hated
> communism, and was even seen by British conservatives like Chamberlain as a
> bulwark against communism. No, the small bits of work that try to claim Marx
> was not a scholar and fascism is really left wing is a marginalized
> tendentious attempt to rewrite history as something it isn't, and deny the
> ideological basis for these thoughts. I recognize a few people will stick to
> that, and theres nothing I can do except, as a teacher, try to make sure that
> students learn reality, and don't fall into such biases. I doubt I can
> convince you, and I've studied the issue and in fact as a specialist on
> Germany really dug into the history of Nazism, and I know that you won't
> convince me. So on this point we simply will probably have to disagree.
If you're actually correct, you can do the sensible thing: you can show
us how Naziism actually resembles anything a conservative might admire.
Thus far you've made dubious claims about communism's "rationality." You
have not demonstrated a family kinship between Hitler and anything a
Western conservative could tolerate, much less admire.
> >Liberalism, in the final analysis, is based on a single self-destroying
> >assumption: that nobody can be in final possession of the truth. Of
> Uh, quite the opposite. Locke argued that there are natural human rights that
> can be discovered with reason, and that these include life, liberty and
> property. Liberalism is based on the belief that reason can lead to truth,
> focused on individual rights.
This claim dissolves on further inspection. But it encounters the more
pressing difficulty that what goes by the name of "liberalism" today is
embodied by conservatives and libertarians, not those who are currently
denominated "liberals."
> >course, this insight is itself presented as a final truth, which is self-
> >contradictory. This is why liberalism is unalterably opposed to
> Oh, come on. Thats the simplistic thing used against relativists by those who
> don't understand relativism. Relativists respond to that by simply noting
> that it may be possible to find final truth, but so far nothing has been able
> to show the capacity to do so, so its rational to believe that there is a
> final truth that one can uncover. They then dig into new truth claims to see
> if it can be defended as final truth, and usually...
always
> ...show that it cannot be. But
> they don't claim it as an absolute truth that final truth is impossible. You
> fell for the most simplistic and easily dismissed attack on relativism.
I merely describe it as it actually exists, rather than accept the word
of its publicists. Liberalism as it exists today believes that ultimate
value is founded on human desire. This does not correspond with the
world as it's been experienced by humans throughout history.
> But liberals are almost never relativists, you're mixing that up with
> post-modernism and other forms of relativist thought.
To the extent that they're self-deluded and incoherent, you're correct.
But the acids of contemporary liberalism can easily be used to corrode
whatever a given liberal posits as ultimate truth, so it's a moot
question.
> >Christianity: Christianity makes certain truth claims which are presented
> >as final and irrevocable. Liberalism cannot live with a system like this
> >in its midst.
> Most liberals I know are Christians. In any event, people can choose their
> beliefs and live by them, they just can't force others to live according to
> their whims.
Which is not the question anyway. Liberals loathe Christianity in its
pure, unadulterated form because it makes truth claims that liberalism
simply can't stomach.
> > It must be progressively marginalized and pushed back into
> >the status of private hobby, its consequences and assumptions forbidden
> >from making an appearance in the public square. Liberalism finds it
> No, as long as you don't create laws and rules that force me to live by your
> religious whims and deny my individual rights, then you can have and act on
> whatever beliefs you want in your private life, or as you act in public.
Which is merely another way of saying the same thing. Believers, even a
majority of believers, must not be allowed to enact laws which conform
with their understanding of human nature and the good life. Because they
are founded on a moral vision which liberalism cannot abide.
> >impossible to make real moral distinctions. Which is why all moral
> >standards are eventually eroded, the most recent being the prohibition
> >against sex with children. Psychologists are making the first tentative
> >moves toward removing the stigma against this practice. In a generation
> No liberal I know thinks sex with children is good...
Wait a decade or so. It'll then occupy roughly the same position that
homosexual ideology does today.
> No liberal I know lacks a belief in morals....
Sure. It's merely an incoherent moral calculus which assumes that human
desire is the fountainhead of right and wrong.
> I personally have a strong moral absolutism in my beliefs,
> which I live by. It includes fidelity to my wife, and a belief that many acts
> are evil and immoral. Yet I am not just a liberal, I'm a leftist.
If you truly believe that some things are right and wrong and not subject
to debate, then you can't be a liberal or a leftist either one. And you
will have no objection to a society formed along such lines.
> See, your stereotypes are wrong! You seem compelled to paint the other side
> as pure evil and irrational, while your side is goodness and light. Such
> simple conclusions are convenient to one's own ability to hold on to his or
> her beliefs, but they are rarely accurate.
I'm doing no such thing. I'm merely describing liberalism as it actually
exists. Human nature always has been and always will be flawed.
Conservatives as well as liberals will be wicked people. I'm merely
showing you that the assumptions that underlie the conservative worldview
are more consonant with reality as we know it.
> >or two it will have the same status as homosexual behavior does today.
> >So far from searching for truth, liberalism is essentially nihilistic.
> If you want to try to infringe on the rights of homosexuals to be who they
> are, then you are violating their rights.
By no means. If you attempt to allow, for example, homosexual
"marriage," you're engaging in a government-sponsored attack on the
institution of marriage. And you're denying the validity of the moral
insights of those who believe that sexual morality is grounded in a
transcendent order.
> >Not if they conflict with those of the left. Which is why Christianity
> >is so feared by the left.
> Again, most liberals I know are religious, including some clergy people.
> Reality doesn't fit into your stereotypes here.
It's almost always a trivial procedure to demonstrate that religion as
experienced by such people exists as a species of hobby, or a private
enthusiasm, or a program of high-minded social meddling. It bears little
or no resemblance to the religion of Abraham and Moses and Paul.
> >Most leftists are unconscious of why they do what they do. In any case,
> >it's the ruling elite that's liberal.
> So now you're even saying that those who think differently than you aren't
> conscious of what they are doing?...
I'm putting forth, in fact, an unremarkable proposition: that most people
don't bother to examine their motives and ground assumptions closely.
It's a commonplace of intellectual history. The most fundamental
assumptions of your own era are nearly always the ones of which you're
unaware. This comes as a surprise to you?
> Don't you see how you paint stark pictures
> of the left being so irrational, evil, relativist, unable to think, etc., that
> you lose the ability to rationally consider their arguments?...
You are assuming that I have never considered their arguments. I used to
be a leftist myself. Been there, done that, got the T-shirt.
> Some on the left
> do that with conservatives too. People like me who have conservative and
> liberal friends (and some conservatives I know are atheist)...
Can a conservative really be an atheist? I don't know. I used to think
of myself as a conservative atheist. I suspect I had simply not
considered the question deeply enough.
> ...and recognize
> both sides as being moral and honest, have to shake our heads and wonder why
> people like you have to demonize the other side so.
You claim I am "demonizing" the other side when I am simply engaging in a
bit of intellectual diagnosis. You further assume that the categories of
"right" and "wrong" must be more or less evenly distributed in disputes
like this. Why do you make such an odd assumption?
> >What they in fact do is transfer income from one class to another by
> >means of confiscatory taxation. This does the precise opposite of
> >"expanding individual liberty." Where property rights don't exist,
> >neither does political liberty.
> So anyone who favors taxation is a liberal? Most conservatives in America
> favor taxation. Conservatives in Germany STARTED the modern social welfare
> state in the 1870's. And ALL liberals I know strongly favor property rights.
I simply claim that the modern, post-FDR regime of income transfer is
unlikely to appeal to a genuine conservative.
> >What? VMI was destroyed at the behest of liberals. Because they loathe
> >diversity.
> VMI was destroyed? Because they loathe diversity? You're statements are
> getting bizarre, almost all liberals and leftists I know love diversity, they
> love hearing new ideas, meeting different people, traveling, eating different
> foods. Again, you demonize the other side so much you discredit your own
> arguments.
I'm sorry, but this is a specimen example, a laboratory-pure, Petri-dish
example, of a liberal who has not seriously been forced to consider the
implications of his own ideas. You claim to be for "diversity." And
yet, you find intolerable the existence of a state whose populace has
historically considered the profession of warrior to be male in
character. To the "diversity"-loving liberal, this is an opinion that is
Thought Crime and must not be permitted to exist. EVERYONE has
to think the same way. Therefore VMI must be destroyed. Similarly,
universities and the elite media claim to be for "diversity," so they
hire witches and homosexuals and people in wheelchairs--and yet,
conservatives find their attitudes and beliefs distinctly unwelcome in
such precincts. Once again, we all love "diversity," but some kinds of
diversity are more equal than others.
> >Then you're not really a liberal. Because any liberal who foreswears the
> >use of centralized power and lets individual communities live as they
> >wish is a conservative, not a liberal.
> Or maybe people don't fit into your view of good vs. evil, where you try to
> define one side in a stereotypical way that does not connect with reality at
> all. I really think you need to rethink your biases, they are simply
> misguided and often plain weird. I don't mean to insult you, but I really
> think you're locked into a belief system that is causing you to interpret
> things through your biases rather than seeing them clearly.
Please do me the favor of showing me how my "biases" are not consonant
with reality.
> >Please show me a "true liberal" who has foresworn the coercive use of
> >centralized power.
> Depends on how you define things -- conservatism has traditionally been a
> statist and paternalist ideology, using coercive power to protect societal
> traditions and often religion...
In other words, enacting the shared beliefs of its citizens.
> ...I think most ideologies agree that some
> coercive use of centralized power is legitimate, only anarchists and radical
> libertarians don't (and they tend to be very anti-religion!) I dislike
> concentrated power, and think BOTH the Left and the Right often underestimate
> its danger.
You haven't answered my question. Show me a "liberal" who is content to
foreswear coercive central power, who is content to let San Francisco be
San Franciso and let Salt Lake be Salt Lake, as Bill Kauffman puts it.
> -snip of minor points -- if I snipped anything you want me to reply to
> specifically, let me know, I'm trying to focus on major issues here.
I barely have enough time to zip through these things as it is. Don't
worry about it.
> >Mill disagreed with himself in so many places it's hard to figure out
> >what he really believed, but over most of his career, he resembled not in
> >the least liberals as they exist today.
> You seem to disregard all the great thinkers who are respected by attacking
> them personally, even Mill now...
I'm not "attacking him personally." I'm merely making the unremarkable
observation that his opinions varied so widely all over the map in his
lifetime that it's difficult to say "Mill believed this." Some thinkers
latch on to a few ideas and spend their lives working out their
implications. Some others change their minds repeatedly. Mill is of the
latter group. This is an "attack"?
> >This is not true. The Church has consistently taught that war is an
> >unavoidable evil that will be with us til the end of time, and indeed
> >that some wars are just. The Bible is the Church's book, as I said. You
> >can't lift out a verse here and there and use it to contradict the
> >Church's teaching.
> Not all Christian sects believe that...
Sure. And not all Christian sects are in full possession of Christian
truth.
> ...and its a logical error to say that the
> church can't be questioned because the church says it can't be questioned.
Uh, I think it's not an error to say that the Church defines what its
dogma is, and not outsiders.
> That's why people like Martin Luther realized that they had to confront the
> church. That's why Orthodox christianity, like in Russia, gets emmeshed in a
> backwards society, while protestantism lead to a growth in culture and
> commerce. It was dynamic, and didn't try to justify a rule by a small elite.
Simplistic, but don't let's get into this.
> >Malcolm Muggeridge was telling the truth about Stalin even during the
> >Ukraine terror/famine. Liberals didn't want to hear it. Liberals
> >continued to idolize various communist regimes up through Daniel Ortega,
> >by which time the truth about communism was old news.
> Many liberals didn't want to hear it in the thirties. They were proven wrong.
> Many conservatives in the US were very high on Hitler...
This is simply untrue. There were probably less conservatives who were
"high" on Hitler than there were leftist supporters of fascism in the
'20s. A few oddball figures here and there. A tiny, tiny, TINY handful
compared to the general idolization of communist states by liberals.
> They were proven
> wrong. C'est la vie. (I know gdy and others have done a lot of research on
> conservatives in America who supported Hitler, and he's posted it). Ortega
> was certainly better than the right wing thug Somoza who robbed his people
> blind; the Sandinist
blind; the Sandinist
In fact, the Sandinist
pigs you can imagine.
children, so far as an
ildren, so far as an
> ...Somoza stole
an
> money meant as earth
> other things. He de
other things. He de
Sure. As P.J. O'Rourk
were "pre-wrecked." T
the north.
ecked." T
e north.
ecked." T
> >A statesman is resp
>A statesman is resp
> But is still an indi
> as the situation you
> has to act according
has to act according
This is a simple disti
Why you're having diff
that the moral duties
Not a complex concept.
t a complex concept.
> >What is appropriate
> >is by no means appr
> >countries overrun a
>countries overrun a
> OK, situational ethi
> from you, but that's
from you, but that's
No. It's NOT "situati
common sense in a fall
a manual of statecraft
manual of statecraft
> Ooops, but I see bel
Ooops, but I see bel
> >But it's NOT "situa
> >nation is not an in
> >individual people a
> >like national defen
>like national defen
> No, you're saying th
> or she is in a diffe
> changes for individu
> example of situation
example of situation
I can easily deny it,
himself recognized tha
legitimate in this fal
ethics at a child's le
hics at a child's le
> >I think you simply
> >in this context.
y
>in this context.
y
> I think I do. I thi
> belief system.
I thi
belief system.
I thi
You simply don't under
wrong for you. We are
life. Only a simpleto
potential savage enemy
elementary point.
emy
ementary point.
emy
> >It is NOT "situatio
> >recognition that th
> >individual Christia
> >basic fact.
hristia
>basic fact.
hristia
> Most defenses of sit
> circumstances, but n
> others. Most relati
> seems to be. Why do
seems to be. Why do
Because you're misusin
cause you're misusin
> >Because your moral
> >upon your position
>upon your position
> So rather than situa
> absolute.
than situa
absolute.
than situa
puh-LEEZ. Shall we co
because they lied to t
portray such behavior
rtray such behavior
> > Jesus himself rec
> >always seem to come
> >never suggested tha
> >wicked.
ggested tha
>wicked.
ggested tha
> He did suggest they
> enemy as oneself, be
> to evil with kindnes
to evil with kindnes
This is not true. The
of soldier is inherent
soldier is inherent
> >The essential point
> >statecraft, nor wer
> >be by orthodox Chri
> >indication of moral
>indication of moral
> I don't see how you
> set of teachings bec
> encounter...
gs bec
encounter...
gs bec
Because they were not
cause they were not
> Either you have to s
> things, or you have
> situational -- in so
> other check, etc...
other check, etc...
This is, of course, tr
teachings "relativist.
achings "relativist.
> I, as a non-Christia
> moral philosophy is
> don't buy his theolo
> a God they also find
> they aren't convenie
they aren't convenie
Because to do so in th
texture of lived reali
xture of lived reali
> I don't know...our w
> and I want to unders
> the other side as by
> communicate.
e as by
communicate.
e as by
And you, by contrast,
on reason and correspo
You apparently assume
on fundamental questio
side to be fundamental
will for others. This
the analysis of ideas.
Scott D. Erb
I fear our perspectives may be too different to allow really useful
conversation on the remaining issues...if so, its been interesting, thanks for
the conversation.
In article
<5CDA54A484F79E3F.F7183E48...@lp.airnews.net>,
pale...@operamail.com says...
>This is like saying that Naziism was the consequence of fallen human
>nature. True, but unhelpful. It was the ideology of Naziism that led
>directly to the attempted extinction of Jews, just as the ideology of
>communism led to the extinction of scores of millions of other
>individuals.
And the ideology of capitalism that led to the exinction of many Indian tribes
and genocide? And what about the crusades, and many other religiously
motivated slaughters? No, you are using bad logic. You draw mostly from two
cases -- the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Then you defy all traditional
analysis to try to claim they are both leftist (I think I've demonstrated
pretty conclusively that such a claim is misguided), and then claim therefore
the Left or communism is the cause of mass murder.
Yet my argument remains stronger: any centralization of power creates the
propensity for abuse of power and human rights, and communism and fascism both
centralized power in a system where the leadership could rule by their own
whim. That explains why centralized power systems, be they left, right,
religious, or authoritarian in nature all share the attributes of attacking
human rights. Trying to come up with a rationalization that the side one
doesn't see oneself on represents all the bad guys, and one's own side is good
is shoddy logic, focused more on propaganda than truth.
-snip-
>Untrue. The communists killed their victims with old technology:
>starvation, concentration camps, shootings, etc. The hard fact that the
No, most all of the methods of communism relied on new 20th century
technology; better weapons, communication, bureaucracy, planning,
transportation, etc. The impact was to create famines and gulags were the
direct cause of death may be hunger or being shot, which may be similar to
direct causes of death in the past hundreds of years, but the scope and style
were a result of a new modern way to organize power and death.
Look, we agree in the danger of centralized unaccountable rule. I just think
you're erring in trying to classify all the bad guys as being on the left, and
making it seem like a "left-right" thing, when really its much more
fundamental than that. Your rhetoric sounds almost like a type of irrational
demonization, where one says "Stalin was on the left, American liberals are on
the left, therefore they are similar to Stalin while American conservatives
are not." That is not a rational or honest argument. Its also interesting
how then one has to try to shove the nazis to the right to maintain that sort
of argument by demonization (and some on the Left try to shove Stalin to the
right for the same reason, both sides do it). But the truth is more complex,
and less convenient for anyone's ideology.
>progressive leftist doesn't want to face is that religious intolerance,
>for all his attempts to portray it as the ne plus ultra of human
>wickedness, accounts for only the tiniest percentage of the deaths which
>are chalked up to the socialist workers' paradises. There is a clear
>connection between communism and mass murder on a hitherto undreamed-of
>scale, and you can't use the "technology" excuse.
I actually put religious intolerance in the same category as ideological
intolerance, I don't see much of a difference. You're just trying to compare
different forms of wickedness.
>This is simply contrary to fact. Communism consistently portrayed itself
>as the wave of the future which would engulf the entire world. This
Only a fool thought that was anything more than silly propaganda. Look at
what drunken assholes like Joe McCarthy did to American freedoms all in the
name of paranoia. The only good thing about that guy is that he got
discredited, drank himself to death, and has become a symbol of evil.
>evangelizing, outward focus was there from the beginning with Marx, and
>reached its height in the Cold War: Kruschev's "We will bury you" line.
Which, by the way, was meant as saying they would outproduce and peacefully
outperform the US. Khruschev believed it too. He was naive, didn't
understand economics, and wrong. But he also publicized Stalin's crimes, and
moved the Soviet Union away from such extreme evil.
>The Christian fear of communism was a rational response to an ideology
>that portrayed itself as world-dominating.
Only as much as the fear people have of right wing Christians is a rational
response to Christian desires to spread their teaching and ideals around the
world and promote their own versions of morality.
But again, the world is full of empires based on blood, and massive killings
and deaths from long before Communism.
>Gorbachev was head of the KGB at the time the agency was placing bombs in
>dolls that were responsible for blowing off the hands of numerous Afghani
>children--he personally signed off on this scheme. Castro brutally
Yeah, the US did a lot of shit like that too, especially in Vietnam. If you
learn about American cold war policy, its not that much better in its covert
activities than Soviet policy. Both countries behaved crappy and immorally,
in my opinion.
>tortured and imprisoned anyone he suspected of Thought Crime, as
>documented abundantly in Armando Valladares' "Against All Hope" and in
>many other places. The Soviet Union continued to imprison dissidents,
>drug them in insane asylums, and kill them in the Gulag until right
>before the Soviet Empire dissolved. This is fact.
Yeah, centralized power is dangerous, I agree with that. But right wing
authoritarian governments allied with the US did the same sorts of things, at
the same level if not more. Again, my explanation better explains the problem
than your attempt to make it a right-left sort of thing.
>Please tell us a few of his "insights" which "inform" modern economists.
>I studied Marx under David Friedman, and it was clear that the man was a
>laughingstock to modern economists.
David Friedman is hardly a mainstream economist. Anyway, you seem to want to
demonize everyone on the "other side," I don't think you're being rational
about this. Marx was a 19th century social scientist or social thinker who
made tremendous insights for his time, even though since then a lot of
advances have made his work obsolete and (as with other scientists of the 19th
century) even laughable. But many of the concepts and ideas he developed
informed later thinkers, who built on his shoulders. He'll be remembered much
longer than, say, this Friedman guy.
>The Engels book that Marx relied upon most heavily, "The Condition of the
>Working Class in England," has been comprehensively demonstrated to be a
>farrago of outdated statistics and mendaciously organized factoids.
Again, my point was that Marx was friends with Engels. He collaborated with
him. He didn't just rely on a "book." Engels was a very successful German
businessman who later became a political leader of the early German SPD (the
only party, by the way, to stand against Hitler when all the conservative
parties pledged their support to him in 1933).
>Challoner and W.O Henderson demolished the scholarly pretensions of this
>book once and for all in their 1958 OUP translation. They examined all
>of the sources Engels used. It is a tract, a work of political polemic,
>not scholarship.
Funny how you attack one of Engels books, and claim Marx "relied" on it, when
the FACT is Marx and Engels worked together and he relied on the council of
Engels, a successful businessman. I'm sure Engels, also a politician, wrote
some polemics. That doesn't deny that he understood economics and business,
and gave Marx good advice.
-snip rest about Marx-
We simply disagree, and your seem to rely on a few tendentious sources, while
I go by a much broader set of literature, plus realization that just because
someone is wrong (look at all the science of 19th century since disproved) it
was dishonest or bad. I think you're arguing from bias, and interpreting
everything through your bias. Thats OK, but it doesn't convince me.
>The problem is that you're attempting to connect Naziism with
>conservatism somehow, and the attempt simply fails. If you stretch a
>point here and there nearly out of recognition, you can claim a family
>resemblance on one or two items. But Naziism is alien to the spirit of
>Western conservatism. This is simply a fact. Try to show us where Burke
>would have embraced it.
Again, my point was that the far right and far left often went against what
the moderate right or moderate left wanted. The extremes deny the very ideals
they are based on, thats what makes them extremes.
>If you're actually correct, you can do the sensible thing: you can show
>us how Naziism actually resembles anything a conservative might admire.
No more than Stalinism represents something a social democrat might admire.
The extremes are not admired by the moderates of Left or Right. That's my
point!!!!!!!!!!!
-snip-
>I merely describe it as it actually exists, rather than accept the word
>of its publicists. Liberalism as it exists today believes that ultimate
>value is founded on human desire. This does not correspond with the
>world as it's been experienced by humans throughout history.
Where do you get that claim? It has no basis in reality, as far as I can
tell. It sounds again like you're arguing from bias.
>To the extent that they're self-deluded and incoherent, you're correct.
>But the acids of contemporary liberalism can easily be used to corrode
>whatever a given liberal posits as ultimate truth, so it's a moot
>question.
That again is an assertion that seems more like a demonization rather than a
rational argument. You are arguing from bias, simply using rhetorical
assertions rather than real logic.
>Which is not the question anyway. Liberals loathe Christianity in its
>pure, unadulterated form because it makes truth claims that liberalism
>simply can't stomach.
Most liberals I know are Christians, and they do not loathe their own
religion. You're making no sense at all here.
>Which is merely another way of saying the same thing. Believers, even a
>majority of believers, must not be allowed to enact laws which conform
>with their understanding of human nature and the good life. Because they
>are founded on a moral vision which liberalism cannot abide.
No, because the United States constitution is founded on a notion that tyranny
of the majority must be avoided if it denies people the rights guaranteed by
the Constitution. If religious folk want to enact their whims and it violates
the constitution, the courts will stop them. Otherwise, its perfectly
legitimate for those who disagree to act politically to stop those who would
want to impose their moral whims. That's politics.
>> No liberal I know thinks sex with children is good...
>
>Wait a decade or so. It'll then occupy roughly the same position that
>homosexual ideology does today.
You're being silly, using the rhetoric of demonization again, rather than real
arguments.
>> No liberal I know lacks a belief in morals....
>
>Sure. It's merely an incoherent moral calculus which assumes that human
>desire is the fountainhead of right and wrong.
You're being silly, using the rhetoric of demonization, rather than real
arguments. Come on, you can do better than that, it sounds like a rant
against some group you categorize as "bad," and which you then assert
everything bad you can about them, without substantiation or reason. Its not
rational. Its silly. Come on, you can do better!
>If you truly believe that some things are right and wrong and not subject
>to debate, then you can't be a liberal or a leftist either one. And you
>will have no objection to a society formed along such lines.
Everything is subject to debate, but the debate would have to use logic and
evidence to sway me that my conclusion is wrong. Anyone who would lock up
their moral beliefs and not change them even when confronted with logic and
evidence is not rational, they are acting on the bases of protecting a bias
rather than trying to understand the world and figure out how to live within
it.
>I'm doing no such thing. I'm merely describing liberalism as it actually
>exists.
No, you're trying to assert its bad and evil, in a way that is too much like
the way, say, Stalin tried to describe Capitalism, Himmler described Jews, or
the Ayatollah described the West. Such rhetoric of demonization leads bad
places, and is based on argument by labeling, rather than argument from
reality. I think you should take a deep look inside, you sound a bit kooky
when you go to such extremes. (People who go to extremes against
conservatives or Christians in a similar manner are of course similarly
silly).
>Human nature always has been and always will be flawed.
>Conservatives as well as liberals will be wicked people. I'm merely
>showing you that the assumptions that underlie the conservative worldview
>are more consonant with reality as we know it.
So far you've done no such thing. You've not really explained the
conservative world view, and you've just asserted nasty things about liberals
that seems contrary to everything I've experienced in life. You need to make
a more cogent argument that talks about the assumptions, provides evidence,
and makes a real case. Yours sounds more like the rhetoric of demonization.
>By no means. If you attempt to allow, for example, homosexual
>"marriage," you're engaging in a government-sponsored attack on the
>institution of marriage. And you're denying the validity of the moral
>insights of those who believe that sexual morality is grounded in a
>transcendent order.
That's ridiculous. No one is forcing you to marry someone of your own sex.
If you can't stand other people doing that, that's your problem. Why should
you care if people of the same sex want to get married? Why should you stick
your nose in their lives, and try to stop them? Doesn't that seem a tad, uh,
totalitarian? It sounds like something Stalin or Hitler might want to do!
(And, of course, the Nazis brutally murdered homosexuals, seeing them as evil
and immoral. By your logic, that proves the nazis weren't on the Left).
-snip-
>Can a conservative really be an atheist? I don't know. I used to think
>of myself as a conservative atheist. I suspect I had simply not
>considered the question deeply enough.
I think you need to recognize that there are many ways people to think, you
tend to try to paint the possibilities as neat boxes, just a couple of them,
that all people fit in. Life is more diverse.
-snip-
>I simply claim that the modern, post-FDR regime of income transfer is
>unlikely to appeal to a genuine conservative.
But social welfare programs started from conservative governments, and most
conservatives support them. You seem to say only people who think like you
are genuine conservatives, and genuine Christians. You seem to want to say
those who think differently aren't really what they claim to be. That sounds
more like a defense of bias than a rational argument.
>I'm sorry, but this is a specimen example, a laboratory-pure, Petri-dish
>example, of a liberal who has not seriously been forced to consider the
>implications of his own ideas. You claim to be for "diversity." And
>yet, you find intolerable the existence of a state whose populace has
>historically considered the profession of warrior to be male in
>character. To the "diversity"-loving liberal, this is an opinion that is
>Thought Crime and must not be permitted to exist. EVERYONE has
>to think the same way. Therefore VMI must be destroyed.
You're making no sense here. Was VMI destroyed? Or are you just mad about
policy changes and ranting?
> Similarly,
>universities and the elite media claim to be for "diversity," so they
>hire witches and homosexuals and people in wheelchairs--and yet,
>conservatives find their attitudes and beliefs distinctly unwelcome in
>such precincts. Once again, we all love "diversity," but some kinds of
>diversity are more equal than others.
I think you're projecting. You don't seem to like any diversity from you own
viewpoints, and seem to imagine some kind of persecution -- even though you
don't seem to mind if you could persecute those who act and think against your
moral beliefs. I really think you need to sit down and analyze that. I don't
think you're a bad person, but your tendency to demonize and attack, and then
not realize that your ideas seem to be set to justify the type of persecution
you don't like should give you pause.
-numerous snips-
>Sure. And not all Christian sects are in full possession of Christian
>truth.
Do you think you are? How convenient if you do.
>> ...and its a logical error to say that the
>> church can't be questioned because the church says it can't be questioned.
>Uh, I think it's not an error to say that the Church defines what its
>dogma is, and not outsiders.
Sure, the church defines what its dogma is. That doesn't make its dogma
correct.
The rest of the post somehow got garbled on my server. I'll try to see if I
can find it and respond to it.
take care, scott
Loren Petrich
Paleo <pale...@operamail.com> wrote:
>In article <81sq4d$qmg$1...@rupert.unet.maine.edu>, scot...@maine.maine.edu
>says...
>By no means. I'm using "communist" to describe those states that were,
>by their own admission, communist.
But what kind of democracy was the German Democratic Republic? Or the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea?
>Quite apart from the fact that Naziism belongs on the left with
>communism, this is true but unhelpful. ...
Left-wing: anything Paleo wants to vilify.
The Nazis opposed the Left, and they had a coalition with more
mainstream conservatives. Their ideology was Buchananism taken to rather
grotesque extremes -- extreme nationalism, wanting to purge Germany of
those who were not Real Germans, etc. Economically, they were little more
than opportunists; for Hitler, "socialist" was a vote-getting slogan only.
The relevant point is that
>communism has been reliably associated with horrific mass murder.
>Period.
True, orthodox Communists have tended to murder large numbers of
people they had disliked, but I wonder what those who wail about
Communist mass murder would say if it large numbers of people were killed
for supposedly being Communists, as had happened in Indonesia in the late
1960's.
>This is simply contrary to fact. Communism consistently portrayed itself
>as the wave of the future which would engulf the entire world. ...
Just like many capitalism groupies do.
... There is next to nothing in Naziism that is
>congenial to the Right, either in Europe or America. ...
Counterexamples:
Nationalism
Love of Armed Force
"Family Values"
...
Contrast Nazi
>assumptions and beliefs with those of Edmund Burke, the intellectual
>father of Western conservatism--you'll find almost nothing that Burke and
>his conservative descendents could stomach, much less admire.
True, Nazism is far from Burkean conservatism, but many
present-day American right-wingers are far from that also. As Michael
Lind has pointed out, Newt Gingrich has been more Robespierre than Burke.
[Lots of attacks on Marx's work...]
None of the attempts to debunk accounts of the horrors of the
early Industrial Revolution have provided any contrary narrative, for
example, that early factory workers lived in nice fake country estates.
Furthermore, if capitalism is an absolute good, then pornography
must be an absolute good, since 99.99% of all porn is produced in
capitalist fashion. Porn was supposedly a major driver of early
videocassette sales, and Internet porn has been a pioneering genre of
e-commerce.
I'm mentioning porn because it is one of the hot buttons of the
more moralistic right-wingers. If capitalism is so great, then why
haven't porn makers all gone broke?
>I don't doubt it, given that you're a liberal. Hard facts like these are
>uncongenial to the denizens of American academia, which, until only a
>decade or so back, was the last haven of Marxism in the world.
For Paleo, Marxism is a dirty word.
[Marx's personality...]
I don't think that he was any more of a jerk than many
right-wingers here are (for some reason, they are much more common than
left-wing jerks here).
... As for social democrats, they share
>certain presuppositions with the communists, as Solzhenitsyn so astutely
>pointed out in his Harvard speech.
Pure demonization. What does he have in mind?
>Which is not the question anyway. Liberals loathe Christianity in its
>pure, unadulterated form because it makes truth claims that liberalism
>simply can't stomach.
Such as selling all one has and giving the money to the poor?
Turning the other cheek?
The right wing would dismiss JC's teachings as Commie hippie tripe
if they had appeared outside of the Bible.
>By no means. If you attempt to allow, for example, homosexual
>"marriage," you're engaging in a government-sponsored attack on the
>institution of marriage.
What's the "institution" of marriage? What's legitimate marriage,
anyway? In the Bible, several men had had many wives, without ever being
criticized for that -- is that legitimate or not?
Imagine President Clinton being married to Hillary Rodham,
Gennifer Flowers, and Monica Lewinsky -- at the same time.
And you're denying the validity of the moral
>insights of those who believe that sexual morality is grounded in a
>transcendent order.
However, if the "transcendent order" has no comment about
marriage, or thinks that homosexual marriage is OK, ...
>You are assuming that I have never considered their arguments. I used to
>be a leftist myself. Been there, done that, got the T-shirt.
Sinner-turned-saint. Sheesh. I wonder when someone is going to
turn the sinner-turned-saint routine on its head and claim to have once
been a hard-boiled right-winger who has seen the light.
>Can a conservative really be an atheist? I don't know. ...
It's indeed possible to be a right-wing atheist.
Ken Kinser
"Scott D. Erb" wrote:
<snip>
> Yet my argument remains stronger: any centralization of power creates the
> propensity for abuse of power and human rights, and communism and fascism both
> centralized power in a system where the leadership could rule by their own
> whim. That explains why centralized power systems, be they left, right,
> religious, or authoritarian in nature all share the attributes of attacking
> human rights. Trying to come up with a rationalization that the side one
> doesn't see oneself on represents all the bad guys, and one's own side is good
> is shoddy logic, focused more on propaganda than truth.
>
> -snip-
>
Hallelujah!
The above paragraph is SO important to our situation today. So many of us have
bought into the rubbish of left, right, religious, fascist or others being the
root of all bad things that power in the United States is getting more and more
concentrated without us noticing it. We are so busy hating one group or the other
that we make asses of ourselves trying to prove how bad they are.
talk.politics.misc is a perfect example. One group defends Clinton on everything
because they hate Newt. Another groups bashes everything Clinton does just because
he is the one who does it. All the while, our rights are being eroded, more and
more things are coming under control of the Government and the wealthiest
individuals and corporations who influence it. Power in the US is getting more
centralized every day and that power will eventually crush us unless we work
together to keep the beast at bay.
But we are too busy trying to direct someone elses life or see to it that someone
else doesn't get more than his fair share to notice that we are edging ever closer
to the failure of the great experiment in liberty.
Ken
Paleo
> >> I agree there is truth, but that NO religion has the whole truth...
> >But how can you so confidently put forward such a proposition? It sounds
> Confident, but not certain, based on my study, logic, reason, and the evidence I
> see. Its POSSIBLE that one religion has the whole truth. Its possible that I
> might be a brain in a petry dish on some alien space ship and all I perceive is an
> illusion for their study. But those are to me very improbable.
It seems to me that the Christian religion's account of human nature and
reality correspond well to reality as we experience it. I can't say much
more than that.
> >as if you consider yourself to be in possession of an absolute truth--
> >namely, that no religion comprehends all truth.
> Yet I am not stating it as an absolute truth, only a well grounded conclusion
> based on reason, evidence, and logic.
Minus the element of faith, needless to say. And yet, I would contend
that to be an atheist or agnostic requires a degree of faith as well. In
fact, the mere assumption that we can communicate with words requires a
kind of faith, as George Steiner demonstrates in "Real Presences."
> >By this you simply mean that it claims to be in possession of a number of
> >ultimate truths. You're free to disagree. But to make such a claim is
> >NOT to treat believers as children. It's simply to propose that there
> >has been divine revelation, and here it is.
> If the church tries to dissuade people from thinking on their own and questioning
> Church teachings, then I think the church is acting a bit arrogant, and I would
> urge thinking humans to reject it, at least long enough to pose their questions
> and consider things on their own. If they find that after personal and honest
> reflection they believe in what the church teaches, then cool. If not, then I
> think its time for them to grow beyond the confines of someone else's dogma and
> dream.
Life is short. Too short for every human being to arrive at his own
philosophy of reality starting from scratch. We all assign axiomatic
status to certain propositions. You included. We just differ on which
propositions are accorded that status.
> >For some reason it seems to offend you that some entities believe
> >themselves to be in possession of truths that are, finally, not subject
> >to change. Why, I have no idea.
> I'm like Socrates in that sense, a gadfly who wants to make those who appear
> certain to recognize the problems in their world view, question their beliefs, and
> think about the fact they might be wrong. The unexamined life is not worth
> living. In my opinion, the unquestioned belief is not worth believing.
And Christianity most certainly does NOT require you to abandon the habit
of questioning.
> >I can almost bet the farm that this is NOT what you really believe. You
> >don't REALLY believe that you'd be happy if one of your kids wound up
> >buying into, say, the KKK's vision of humanity. I suspect you'd be
> >willing to teach them that the KKK is, beyond doubt and question,
> >completely wrong. This kind of teaching partakes of precisely the same
> >kind absolute quality you profess to dislike coming from the Church.
> Kids are not private property. Sure, I'd be disappointed if they choose a KKK
> belief style. I honestly believe that if they learn about reality and learn
> critical thinking, its almost impossible they would choose something that
> irrational...
Presuming, of course, that you have with perfect rationality deciphered
the data of existence and constructed the only possible
rational philosophy out of it. Not, on its surface, a totally convincing
claim.
> But as children grow, they decide what to believe. I truly believe
> that self-discovery, not programming, is the key to understanding values and
> ethics...
In other words, that all value originates in human desire. This is
precisely what the story of Eve and the apple is about.
> If I had some kid turn to nazism, I'd keep trying to get him or her to
> question their beliefs, hoping to convince them that they are wrong -- and, of
> course, that is also part of every discourse. You want to convince me that I'm
> wrong in my views, which is wholly legitimate (and I don't get mad at you for
> that, though some apparently do!) I'm doing the same in reverse. Thats how one
> learns, I think.
But if they finally decide that Naziism is the most authentic way to
live, then you'd behave as if they'd simply found a truth you don't agree
with?
> >> ...My beef with organized
> >> religion is it often neglects the idea that humans can and should think for
> >> themselves, acting more like an ideology than a search for the truth.
> >The Church, at different times and places, has been guilty of this. But
> >it's not hardwired into its doctrine. I hope you're not suggesting, for
> >example, that Flannery O'Connor couldn't "think for herself." We all
> >have to operate on certain axiomatic propositions whose truth we can't
> >demonstrate. You most certainly do yourself. The Church merely proposes
> >a certain set of axioms. That is, it's not putting you in an existential
> >situation that is one whit different than the one you already and of
> >necessity MUST occupy.
> Some chruches do better than others, in my opinion...
There is, in the last analysis, only one Church.
> ...Organized religion is too
> often prone to make the error of demanding conformity to a norm that often simply
> reflects what the past generation believed, which reflects what the generation
> before that believed, etc...
In other words, it commits the sin--from your point of view--of having a
set of axiomatic propositions different from yours. Not that you can
prove yours are any better.
> >OK. Show me an ideology that outdid communism in mass murder.
> I don't think you can blame an ideology for murder...
That you can say this at the end of this bloody century suggests to me
that you haven't thought seriously about it. This century was turned
into an abbatoir by a certain progressive, atheist philosophy. Mass
murder in hitherto undreamed-of proportions is reliably associated with
the coming to power of that regime. This is mere brute fact. That you
can't concede this fact suggests that you're refusing to allow yourself
to see the world as it is. It would seem that you have no right to
accuse religionists of blind faith.
> You're over categorizing and simplifying...
Please demonstrate that this is so. I'm merely making the most obvious
of obvious empirical observations.
> After all, after Stalin left, the Soviet Union's mass murders
> dropped dramatically, as people realized that this dicatator had abused the system
> and grabbed complete power...
First, the regime still brutally suppressed dissent and murdered tens of
thousands in its gulags. Second, the genocidal regimes of Mao and Pol
Pot were still to come.
> Lenin's ideas made that possible/likely, but it
> wasn't a part of communist ideology. It showed that any ideology which advocates
> extreme centralization of power is dangerous. That includes communism,
> theocracies, and any other such system.
Except that you're left with the uncomfortable fact that mass murder on
such a barbaric scale happened ONLY with communist states.
> >If all you're saying is that the princes of the Church have screwed up on
> >many occasions, welcome to the club. Old news. Dante pictured a hell
> >whose floor was paved with the skulls of bad popes. This is in no way
> >incompatible with the notion of the Church as the Spotless Bride of
> >Christ, nor does it mean that the Church qua Church has compromised the
> >teaching of its Master.
> What is the church, then? How can you criticize acts done in the name of the
> church by individuals leading the church, from the church itself?
The Church is simultaneously a mystical body of believers on earth and in
heaven. It is the entity founded by Christ and ruled by bishops in
direct line of descent from the original twelve apostles. Orthodoxy has
the best claim to being THE Church. Rome has departed somewhat from the
original teaching, but is still closer to the truth than Protestantism.
> >I am aware of no changes in doctrine coming from Russia. In fact, the
> >Russian Orthodox are the most hidebound in the world. They make American
> >fundamentalists look like bubble-headed trend-hounds.
> Yeah, but its causing them problems since they're stuck in a past era, and even in
> the late 19th century they were part of Russia's inability to become part of the
> modern world. But I've only heard rumors that they might try to change,
> especially to battle the baptists and others who are moving en masse with a lot of
> money to offer Russians a new religion. Most Russians are suspicious of religion
> these days.
I can assure you that the Russian Orthodox will alter dogma not in the
least. If you think they're doing so, please show me where. And there's
no evidence that sticking to Christ's original teachings has "caused them
problems," unless you refer to the regular martyrdom of Christians
everywhere.
> >Look. You're merely saying that, without faith, we can know nothing.
> >This ain't exactly front-page news. Paul repeated it over and over
> >again. It may be that faith ain't for you. But you can't understand a
> >religion if you insist on analyzing it with alien categories.
> Without faith we can know nothing? Can you explain what you mean by that. Does
> it mean only Christians with faith know anything, and everyone else is ignorant
> about EVERYTHING? I know my computer is on. I'm not sure what the
> epsitemological implications are of what you're stating here.
"Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things
not seen." It is the sine qua non of the Way of the Lord Jesus. It is
the admission that we are not privy to the true nature of reality.
> >"Master, we would see a sign from thee." You ain't the first guy to ask
> >this question. You appear to be saying that the only good Christian is a
> >bad Christian. I.e., one who doubts his Church.
> No, I'm saying it is irrational to accept something just on faith because someone
> or some book tells you that you have to accept it on faith...
While the Church teaches that you STILL can't get a handle of ultimate
reality without faith.
> Unless there is a
> real reason, it doesn't make sense. Now, I think there can be good reasons that
> are subjective rather than objective, and reflect values that people simply have.
> But for someone who doesn't have those subjective experiences or desire to
> believem, there is no reason they should simply believe because a book or another
> person tells them they should.
It may be that faith isn't for you.
> >The problem here is that you in fact believe yourself to be in possession
> >of a number of ground truths. I simply don't think you're aware of it.
> >And you would deny to others what you assume for yourself.
> No, I simply have a lot of grounded opinions and beliefs that I will dismiss if
> evidence and argumentation/logic convince me I should, but until I do, they are my
> working principles by which I live and act in the world.
But the axiomatic propositions of Christianity are perfectly congruent
with life as we experience it. They make at least as much empirical
sense as do yours.
Michael M Bates
Loren Petrich <pet...@netcom.com> wrote in message
news:826sk3$egr$1...@nntp8.atl.mindspring.net...
> The right wing would dismiss JC's teachings as Commie hippie tripe
> if they had appeared outside of the Bible.
Specifically, which teachings are you talking about?
Loren Petrich
Michael M Bates <mike...@prodigy.net> wrote:
>Loren Petrich <pet...@netcom.com> wrote in message
>news:826sk3$egr$1...@nntp8.atl.mindspring.net...
>> if they had appeared outside of the Bible.
>Specifically, which teachings are you talking about?
Love your enemies, turn the other cheek, be soft on crime, etc.
Sell everything you have and give the money to the poor, because a rich
person can no more enter the Kingdom of Heaven than a thick rope or camel
can pass through the eye of a needle.
I have come not to bring peace, but with a sword [how he is going to set
family members against each other, and how those who love their families
more than him are not worthy of him]
Michael M Bates
Loren Petrich <pet...@netcom.com> wrote in message
news:826v38$alp$1...@nntp9.atl.mindspring.net...
> Love your enemies, turn the other cheek, be soft on crime, etc.
You must use the same Bible as the Most Reverend Jesse Louis Jackson.
I didn't think you had anything relevant. And I was right.
Dan Moore
That would be one point for Loren Petrich and no
points for Michael Bates.
Dan
Adrian
scot...@maine.maine.edu (Scott D. Erb) wrote:
<snip>
> But with ethics it seems to me there are many such systems possible,
depending
> on your starting point.
>
> I'm not saying there is no way to figure it out, but what do you do
to the
> person who says, "hell, life is just a mistake of biology, it doesn't
matter,
> we all die, ethics is for fools." Is he or she wrong objectively?
Yes
> Only if
> you make some assumptions that can be questioned or rejected. That
is an
> inherent starting point of any building of an ethical system, it
seems to me,
> and unless one can convince me that the beginning assumptions are
inherently
> true, there is always doubt.
They are inherently true. That is the _true_ assumptions are. If you
happen to run accross some questionable assumptions then either they
are not waht is really presumed in ethics or you are kidding yourself
about how questionable they are. Kant, for instance built his career
on the gimmick of extrapolating what must be the case given the
possibility of knowledge. The way this sort of thing plays out in
ethics is "For the possibility of knowledge with regard to
ethics, .... And so we have any unconditional imperative must have
this principle of universality." Now, you can say that that is not
what is meant by ethics, or you could say that some assumptions were
implicitly made that may not be true, and in that way dispute this sort
of conclusion. However, you cannot say that it ostensibly rests on
some hypotheses since it is constructed not to.
>
> >So you are just sort of saying that we don't actually have the
answers -
> >- not that the answers don't exist. This line of reasoning would
still
> >have it that some things are nonsense and obviously wrong, but there
> >still may be issues that we have not ironed out completely yet for
> >which several plausible mutually exclusive alternatives exist.
>
> Yeah, that's more or less it. Its like science in that sense. We
can't prove
> we aren't a brain on a space ship being fed data, but we can make a
strong
> argument that such a belief is unlikely and doesn't make much sense.
Such an
> argument ultimately gets based on pragmatism of a sort, and I suspect
ethical
> conclusions on what is likely true and proper comes down to that sort
of a
> call. Pragmatism in science (I'm not thinking so much of Dewey and
Pierce
> here, but philosophy of science) basically notes that we can't prove
anything,
> and that relativists have a point that there are many
interpretations. Yet we
> can choose to make distinctions, and these distinctions make sense.
>
Let me give you an example. Suppose we have two men. One steals from
the other. Suppose that we aren't sure that such a theft occured. Now
there is some inherent uncertainty about the theft, for that matter
about whether or not we are even just disembodied brains with any
actual property to be stolen in the first place. However, what there
is not uncertainty about is with regard to the truth or falsity of the
idea that IF we are right about the theft, THEN the theft was immoral
(say). In other words, the inherently uncertain empirical part of
ethics does not exist. There is no ethics out there (like a mountain
in the Andes) to be observed and scientifically understood. The actual
_ethical_ matters are purely a priori. The uncertainty comes in
knowing whether the conditional statements of ethics actually apply to
a given scenario (that is are about the scenario that actually
happened). That uncertainty is just a fact of life and does not really
affect what we have to assume is the case or cannot assume for that
matter. It really is not relevant to ethics (except for possibily in
particular cases).
> >> So I disagree with the relativists in jumping from skepticism to a
> >claim
> >> that there is no absolute ethic, but agree with them that claims of
> >ethical
> >> absolutism can all be questioned and rejected if assumptions are
> >dropped or
> >> different assumptions made.
> >
> >Well, that cannot be completely true given your first statement.
> >Actually, whether its proponents truly have what would consistitute
> >real knowledge or if they just got lucky and guessed the right
answer,
> >one position is thoroughly absolute and could never be rationally
> >rejected. Not even on the basis of rejecting assumptions
>
> But the point is that while one position may be the absolutely right
answer,
> if we don't have the tools to rationally prove it right vis-a-vis
other
> answers, we can never know for sure it is the absolutely right
answer. That
> doesn't mean we can't believe it is and work as if it is, but doubt
is always
> inherently there. To me, thats part of being human -- the quest for
a truth
> we can never fully get in this life.
>
Well, I guess objectivity is relative then. Would you say the same
about the theorems of mathematics? If so, then I do not think there is
really an issue about the objectivity in ethics. In other words, if
your argument applies just as well to something like mathematics (as
far as both the possibility of knowledge and the possibility of
acquiring such knowledge), then I have doen my job in showing that
ethics is objective and knowledge of it attainable with certainty. If
you dislike this way of saying it, then lets just say it is like math
and leave it at that.
> >Can we know for certain that if p implies q then not q implies not p?
>
> We can know for certain a lot of things within a context we construct
> (mathetmatical system, definitions of terms, etc.) Thats my point,
we can
> make internally consistent systems that work, but we can't know for
sure if
> they are valid outside our humanely constructed frame of reference
and
> context. Math and language are human constructs, symbolic
representations and
> abstractions of our perceptions of reality. If I define the
word "implies"
> differently, if I change "p" to mean something that is in a constant
state of
> flux, then all bets are off.
Not exactly. Language is a social construct. The concepts language
refer to are not. Mathematics as so many symbols on a dry-erase board
is a matter of convention. The concepts that are associated with those
symbols are not. For, just as you say we could change the symbols all
around and the concepts would remain the same (just identified by
different symbols or possibily lacking any symbols to idenitify them).
So, I have to confess, there is a certain amount of uncertainty in my
positions with regard to ethics because I cannot be too sure I am
saying it right (i.e. using the right terms). Perhaps I should be
using "fair" when I use "just" or "utility" where I use "morality", but
the point is that we understand this inherent ambiguity exists as a
matter of _communication_ and focus on the concepts we wish to
communicate. I cannot over emphasize here (in true Kantian fashion)
that the issue is the POSSIBILITY of knowledge not what knowledge
actually exists or its formal presentation. And it is the mere
possibility that forces what Kant usually claims to be true.
>
> >Therein lies the need for certainty. You have to be "right". That
> >means that those that contradict you must be "wrong" (or at least
> >not "right"). You seek to know the answer, so that entails
certainty.
> >Even if you have to make a guess, you should want to be absolutely
> >certain that it is the best guess.
>
> I have no need for certainty. I think that the biggest problem
humans have
> is that they seem unable to accept the apparent inherent uncertainty
that this
> life entails. We have to do our best, make our best calls, and live
with
> them. We bet our lives with our choices. But certainty? Nah, I
don't think
> thats possible in this world. We can be certain within our own
frameworks,
> but in terms of objective reality outside our social and linguistic
> constructions, that doesn't seem possible to me. But thats OK.
>
How can we be certain within our own frameworks if we are not certain
outside them. For instance, consider the proposition "I am certain
within my own framework." Could it be true within your own framework
and false outside your own framework? What would it mean if that were
the case? (Really, I don't know what that would mean.)
> >This subtly begs the question. You have every right to expect
justice
> >whether you are certain you know what it is or not. If you just
> >arbitrarily guess and get lucky, you would by construction have every
> >right to bend the universe to your irrational will. If you thought
> >long and hard about it and still ended up with the wrong answer, you
> >would have no right to bend so much as a gnat to your will.
>
> You seem to be assuming your conclusion here. I suspect I have
a "right" to
> do whatever I want. I just have to deal with the consequences of my
choices.
>
Nope. You _can_ do whatever you are capable of and you _will_ be
subjected to the consequences of those actions. However, that is all
about what _will_ happen and does not at all evaluate it. Morality is
completely independent of what actually will happen and has only to do
with various hypothetical events, including what will happen but very
thing else as well. Saying you do or do not have a right to do
something is an _evaluation_ of the action not a prediction of whether
or not it will happen.
> >A holistic system makes the fundamental error of thinking that ethics
> >is not based on individuals. That is, it does so unless it manages
to
> >address any concerns of an individualist. The error is not an error
> >because it results in bad ends or something like that, but rather
> >because it is simply mistaken in its presumptions about the nature of
> >morality.
>
> That is your belief, but its certainly not an unquestionable belief.
For
> instance, holism might change the way individual ethics are
calculated. You
> might ethically be required to deal with the fact you are
structurally
> advantaged over another human in a way that denies them their natural
rights.
> (I'm thinking of the Brazil example I gave earlier)
I am saying that you cannot question the fact that ethics is about
individual beings and not structures. Doing so renders your argument
meaningless (literally) and is a misuse of the language. Ethical terms
simply do not refer to that directly. What the yrefer to directly is
individual beings. Perhaps there are some global facts about groups as
a result of the peculiar reference ethics makes to individuals, but
those facts are to be derived not presumed. Presuming them, is roughly
the same as assuming that ethics is completely determined by Euclids
Postulates. You would say, well a coherent system is completely
determined by Euclids Postulates, but that is called "Euclidean
Gemoetry" not "Morality". The term "morality" actually refers to
something else.
>
> >But you disagree with them. That is all that matters. The interplay
> >between your emotions and your beliefs is irrelevant. In other
words,
> >whether or not you have certain feelings for people of a different
> >belief is not an issue except for possibly how you intend to actually
> >treat them or something like that.
>
> I have ethical beliefs and live by them. I disagree with people who
think
> differently. I also recognize that I might be wrong.
>
> That is perhaps one of the most important sentences in the human
language: My
> beliefs might be wrong. That doesn't mean I shouldn't act
confidently upon
> them, and try to persuade others I'm right. It does mean I shouldn't
assume
> I'm right and thus believe that all others should bow to my wishes of
what
> should be because they are wrong. Humans are fallible, even if
certain
> knowledge is right, there is always the chance our minds came up with
the
> wrong answer.
Okay, what about your beliefs about the use of logic? Could you
be "wrong"? What about your beliefs in the conclusions you are
deriving immediately above? Could you be wrong? You simply cannot say
meaningfully what you are trying to say. As I have read elsewhere, you
are looking for a stick with only one end. It doesn't exist -- no such
things are possible.
>
> So we bet our lives. We gather information, we decide what we
believe and
> why, we act on that, and we recognize that since we may be wrong, we
have to
> keep looking at new information and arguments, assessing our
conclusions,
> altering them if evidence or logic warrants, and moving forward --
always
> knowing that its unlikely we'll come up with a final definitive
conclusion
> about life, morality and all of that which we can know is right.
> ciao, scott
>
>
So what about a case of self defense? Could you kill someone even
though you are uncertain of the necessity of such a fatal response?
What about being emotional and angry when "wronged"? Are you saying
that such a reaction is unwarranted under such inherent uncertainty?
If you are not saying that this behavior is inherently excluded, then
what are you saying? If you are saying that this behavior is just not
possibly justified, then how do you know you aren't wrong about that
(and with this question I am in YOUR framework)? In other words, based
on what you say, how do you decide what to argue for in any given
scenario (tolerance or intolerance) since you must always act on the
possibility of your own error?
Adrian
scot...@maine.maine.edu (Scott D. Erb) wrote:
<snip>
>
> You really need to define tolerant. OF COURSE we should
be "tolerant" if that
> means allowing others to express their opinions and beliefs. That
doesn't
> mean we should always agree that everyone can do everything they
want. That's
> why I say our inherent uncertainty necessitates a type of pragmatic
approach
> to social relations, why the social construction of ethics and the
search for
> a true ethical belief are not mutually incompatable, but necessary
given the
> fact that multiple individuals approach the problem of determining
ethics
> differently, with no clear way to distinguish who is right without
making
> assumptions which can't be proven. I'm not sure if you mean tolerant
to mean
> we should just listen politely, or if you think it means we should
accept
> without objection. One can "tolerate" nazis exercising free speech
and
> holding their opinions while at the same time fighting against their
views.
>
You must have a strictly _absolute_ moral reason for this.
> > The point is
> >that you seem to be manufacturing an extra amount of tolerance out of
> >thin air here. We should be more tolerant on the issues we are less
> >certain of than the ones that we are more certain of perhaps, but a
> >general tolerance based on a general uncertainty begs the question.
Do
> >you have your moral views or not? What ever your most stongly held
> >conviction is, you should adhere to it with a no tolerance attitude.
>
> I disagree completely. In fact, I find what to describe as being
irrational,
> as it creates a closed system where you can't even question your own
view. No
> matter how certain or convicted you may be, the evidence strongly
indicates
> that we are all fallible humans and each of us may be wrong. People
with
> strong convictions have been wrong many times.
>
> Now, that doesn't mean you should not ACT on your convictions with
all your
> effort and all your soul. It only means: 1) you shouldn't simply try
to
> silence those with different view points; and 2) you shouldn't avoid
> questioning your own beliefs and taking into account other points of
view.
>
The points you have here call for a certain action. The argument you
present for this prescription must be a moral one. This argument and
these conclusions you are drawing seem as absolute and immutable as it
gets.
> >Actually, it is precisely a restatement of moral subjectivism to say
> >that there is no clear test to determine which are right.
>
> In the other post, though, you said that it meant preserving other
cultures.
> Nothing in saying that there is no clear test to determine what is
right
> necessitates we actually preserve every possibility that exists. In
science
> there is no clear test to determine the absolute truth of scientific
> propositions, all might be replaced (and most probably will be) down
the line.
> But there is no reason to preserve alchemy. Science has the benefit
of at
> least being able to falsify some hypotheses, I'm not sure we can do
that in
> moral philosophy, except to falsify them within a framework of
assumptions
> (which themselves might be questioned).
>
And so we see the path a moral relative follows to become an emotivist.
<snip>
>
> OK... Language is also such a manufactured object too, right?
Language refers
> to our perceptions of objects. Math refers to our perceptions of
relations
> between objects. Social construction refers to our communication and
shared
> beliefs about those two issues, as well as ethics, morals, etc. If
social
> reality is artificial, it is no more artificial than math or language.
>
They refer not just to perceptions but beliefs in general, some of
which we know with certainty. What we lack certainty about are
empirical matters. As Kant would say, we may only ever know of the
phenomenon of external objects and not of the objects in themselves.
That does not mean we cannot be certain of the phenomenon as we
experience it or of other abstract relationships that must be the case
independently of an external world even existing.
> > It is artificial because it is only "real" under a certain
> >perspective. It is like saying that my mind is "real". I guess you
> >might think I have some sort of a soul, but according to me what is
> >real is just the physical state of my brain. My mind is actually an
> >abstract description of a physical phenomenon. There is an
>
> OK, but right there you're making a statement of opinion that cannot
be
> tested. It may be a rational point of view to hold, but you can't be
certain
> there is no soul, even scientists studying the brain often come to a
different
> conclusion than you have. In fact, there are real problems with the
> assumption of pure materialism, which is where that seems to lead.
>
Indeed I am a materialist. You are entitled to your belief in the
matter. I wonder though if my beliefs in morality might have affected
my beliefs in metaphysics by way of the fact that I try to consitently
apply the same type of scrutiny to them both. Or perhaps there is th
other direction my metaphysical views being related to my ethics
because I make the same error in both for consistency sake. Perhaps I
have this belief that I am especially fond of independently of its
actually validity. Perhaps such a fondness has promoted certain errors
in logic or biases in perception to support this belief. Then since I
am obviously concerned about coherence -- a necessary condition for
having my beliefs be correct -- perhpas I have perpetuated this error.
> >equivocation on "real" to confuse entities whos existince is
> >independent and entities that only exist under the presumtion or
> >depending on the existence of something else. Society is an abstract
> >phenomenon and no more real than mathematics is for instance. Just
as
> >you cannot get in a space ship and fly to some point inthe universe
to
> >see first hand the giant "2" out there (as if it _really_ existed)
you
> >cannot see the society sitting out there on the court house steps
> >(say). "Society" is a sophisticated abstract description or
reference
> >to particular arrangement of concrete items -- it does not have an
> >independent existence of its own.
>
> OK, but neither does language. Neither does philosophy. Neither
does math.
> All such things are social constructions, human inventions.
>
The languge is but the concepts referred to are not (necessarily).
> >Ids that like knowledge in general? Our knowledge does not reflect
and
> >natural or correct knowledge -- just the knowledge we have created.
> >What is your reaction to that statement?
>
> Thats usually how scientific knowledge is defined. One could posit a
pure
> concept of knowledge which is correct or natural knowledge, but I
prefer the
> scientific perspective which considers knowledge claims to be
inherently
> questionable. Knowledge is the sum of our current beliefs about
reality,
> based on scientific testing and rational discernment.
>
What about the scientific (?) knowledge claim that knowledge claims are
inherently questionable? Or is that a scientific knowledge claim or
more of a pure concept of knowlegde
> >Isn't it to say that while
> >each of us must acquire our own knowledge (in that sense
subjectively),
> >what is or isn't knowledge is supposed to be (by definition)
universal
> >adn "correct"? How would we rephrase that about ethics?
>
> I really don't disagree with you about universality, but I'm noting
that even
> such claims have a smidgeon of doubt which can't be ignored.
No -- they may be disputed, but not rationally. Once you know it you
know it with absolute certainty. The only thing that might be doubtful
is what terminology I use to talk about the same concepts.
<snip>
> >It has nothign to do with human nature or nature at all. It is just
a
> >logical realtionship between these hypothetical things we
> >call "beings". A dichotomy is formed by saying that any two beings
are
> >related to each other either "justly" or not "justly".
>
> I'm not sure where you are to get the concept of just or unjust from
just the
> logical relationship between two beings. I mean, you can make
assumptions of
> justice and build from them, but then all one needs do is question
the
> assumptions or alter them, and the whole thing changes.
>
So what if I assume that the essential nature of "persons" is that they
are basically "points". They may be related to each other at least
under some circumstances by being on the same thing called a "line".
Suppose further that given a set of people all related to each other
this way and some person not related to the group in that way, then
there is only one relationship possible between that person and yet
others such that no one from the original relationship is related in
this new way to the person not in the original relationship. (This
last statement would be like saying "Cosnider a line and a point not on
that line. There is only one line going through the point that does
not intersect the line." -- the so called "Parallel Postulate") And so
on.
Your reaction should be that I am not talking about ethics. What I am
doing is just redefining terms in order to use the terminology
associated with ethics to talk about Euclidean Geometry. What I am
saying is that this sort of thing can be done always (i.e. there is
inherent uncertainty in what terms of an informal language mean --
inherent ambiguity). But, there is no uncertainty about the concepts
involved becuase on the presumption that knowledge is possible _at all_
(even just a smidgeon of knoweldge that we are not too sure of at
that), we must make these inherently ambiguous statements in an effort
to discuss what are actually mathematically precise concepts. And that
goes even if we do not have a mathematicall precise understanding of
the concepts.
> I'm stressing the uncertainty here, so I'll restate that I do believe
there is
> a proper absolute ethic, and I do think that human behavior, ideals,
history,
> etc. all provide clues as to what it is. I do believe we can analyze
these
> clues and potentially come up with the right answer. I don't believe
we can
> no for sure its right if we have it, and I suspect that few if anyone
really
> gets a 100% on this (i.e., hits it exact).
I think the real difference here, is that you are treating morality
sort of like the sun (say). What is the nature of the sun? Well it is
this ball of plasma at the center of our solar system with all sorts of
properties -- of a certain diameter, the equator does not revovle as
fast as the poles, there are these things calle "Solar Flares", and so
on. However, we cannot be absolutely sure that the sun even exists let
alone have all these properties just the way we think it does. We
certainly could be wrong and likely are not quite right about some
things. It seems like we are almost surely right about amny other
things. It seems nearly absurd to think that it, say, revolves around
the Earth and not the other way around, but there are those that adhere
to that position. And so on.
In the same way, you might argue, morality exists and is comprehensible
to man. Like the sun, its presence has been felt all through the
history of humankind and even animalkind. We have had precious little
understanding of it in the past, it seems, as we had once thought
absurd things like that the sun revolved around the Earth. We probably
have a lot of things sort of worked out about morality even if
(possibily unlike the sun) only in an informal and sort of non-academic
way. But, just like the sun, we will always have to tolerate a certain
amount of skepticism about what we think we know. There will always
lack a certain amount of precision. And we will always be faced with
the fact that everything we think is true is actually an illusion (i.e.
in Kantian terms, that the thing in itself is nothing like its
phenomenon as we have been experiencing it for some reason).
The problem with this analogy is that the sun is an object we observe
empirically. All our insight into the nature of the sun is a
posteriori. Ethics, however, is a priori. It is not emirically
based. What is truly an ethical issue is just brought under our
consideration as a result of empirical observations -- never defined
byt he observations themselves. For instance, two men come befoer you
the king. The one's cow knocked down the others fence. All of these
events and ultimately your course of action are events in an external
material world the nature of which is empirical and a posteriori.
However, the idea of justice with regard to what seems empirically to
be the case is itself a priori and I would even argue ultimately
analytic. Whereas you could be hallucinating about the men and your
status as king, your conclusions as king are still as valid a moral
evaluation and constitute moral knowledge.
Another example might be a glass of water. You decide it is half
full. It turns out you are wandering the Saharah Desert and are
actually hallucinating that this glass of water even exists, let alone
is "half full of water". So there is no glass of water after all.
That does not mean that the concept of "half full" is rendered
meaningless. You still have that concept and are certain of its
meaning in the context of your hallucination or any other similar
hypothetical scenario. Such a concept is a priori and not subject to
the same uncertainty that the actual existence of the glass of water is.
> But I also note that I may be
> wrong, and its possible my quest to understand what the right and
just way to
> act is might be sort of an illusion. But if I'm wrong, what the
hell -- this
> quest gives some meaning and purpose to life, and that is something I
want.
> So being wrong about the existence of a true ethic wouldn't be a
disaster;
> still, I don't think I'm wrong, so I continue. :)
>
> BTW, in my "World Law" class one student gave an excellent
presentation on
> Kant (comparing his essay on Perpetual Peace to the United Nations
charter and
> UN ideals). It was pretty interesting; I really do think Kant's
arguments
> make a lot of sense. In epistemology he does seem to have intriguing
answers
> to the gulf between rationalists and empiricists. I'm waiting to get
the book
> you recommended and will let you know what I think.
> --scott
>
>
Well, since you mention Empiricism versus Rationalism, you would likely
be interested in reading _Critique of Pure Reason_. It has nothing
really to do with moral or political philosophy per se. However, he
does attempt to see what the limits of the application of pure reason
are -- what such a method can conclude. This is possibly one of the
most profound things possible to discuss in philosophy. And I would
say Kant is a giant among philosophers past and present. Many would
argue that Kant finished philosophy (much the same as physicists once
thought that physics was pretty much "done").
Adrian
says...
>
> >Well, we just have to examine the nature of "freedom" more closely.
> >Freedom is an inherently passive thing. What ramifications might
that
> >have? Just because we are social creatures, that does not mean we
are
> >not free.
>
> But wait -- if every act one undertakes in some way has an impact on
others,
> then every single act potentially limits freedom. In other words, no
one is
> truly free, at least to the point of choosing their circumstances or
limiting
> the acts of others. We are free only to the extent that we have to
accept the
> fact that the world around us has constrained or limited us through
the
> accumulated acts of others. Every act we undertake adds to that set
of
> accumulated acts -- in other words, like it or not, any act we take
> contributes to some kind of limitation on someone else's ability to
act.
>
Is that relevant? Freedom according to Kant is _independence_ of
action not complete disjointness of action. So to pick up a Lockean
example. If you went into the woods and made a home out of natural
resources there, then you would certainly limit anyone else doing the
same with _those same natural resources you used_. however, supposing
an abundance of forest, you would not limit someone else form doing the
same _in principle_. This sort of distinction, I think, is what Kant
is sort of getting at. Freedom is one's ability to act independently
of another if they so choose -- not the total lack of adverse effect by
anothers actions.
I think it must be reconstrued to be an active thing, for freedom to
possibly mean what you are saying. I think it is truly a misuse of the
word, though, possibly not obviously so.
> So freedom at best is limited. But limited to what?
>
> >> But what if you have ten dollars because you took something I
> >considered mine,
> >> and that you considered yours.
> >
> >Then not all things would be equal.
>
> That I guess is my point -- in a social system all things are NEVER
equal.
> Or, if never is too strong, they hardly ever seem to be equal.
Contexts are
> not defined by precise limits, we have a multivariate, multicausal
world with
> no simple limitations. Thats why economics as a science has
problems, the
> simplifying "all other things equal" assumption is always wrong. It
still
> might be useful for theory building, but all things are almost never
always
> equal.
>
> (on Brazil example)
But the burden of proof is on those that would claim they are not, even
in Brazil.
>
> >The difference between me and a leftists is that a leftists thinks
that
> >with no further information we may draw conclusions about the
justness
> >of the distribution. I think it may be a horrible situation, but
with
> >this information alone we cannot formulate any conclusions about the
> >justice of the situation except to presume that it is just.
>
> Why would you presume that it is just? Isn't that just as much a
conclusion
> about the justness of the situation as a presumption that it is
unjust? How
> is one presumption different than another? Don't you have to have
some basis
> to make that presumption?
Well, I suppose that all depends. Suppose your plan is to redistribute
the wealth some. You must argue for the justness of an apparently
unjust act. We can just sit here and say you are going to take from
some to give to others. Those that do not wish to be taken from are
being mistreated, all else being equal. Now the ball is in your
court. But, remember, you cannot just say anything like "but, a point
not on a line has only ONE point that goes through it and does not
intersect the line." It has to be relevant.
Then you must have an argument for its relevance. Social structures
are necessarily relationships that surpass the simple relationship
between one being and another being, but rather are a relationship
between one group of beings and another being or group of beings. If
it is just a uniques relationship between to beings, then it is
generally not a "social structure" but just a relationship.
The point is that you are trying to draw a conclusion based on the
relationship that blacks (say) have to whites about the relationship a
particular black man has with a particular white man. Not only is that
a fallacy of division, but it is as yet to be seen how this
relationship matters in the particular moral context.
>
> >In the end the principles on which our moral philosophy is based is
> >independent of even the existence of society since moral dilemmas
need
> >not concern themsleves with such a thing as a society.
>
> You assert these things, but they are assumptions or opinions that
aren't
> self-evident -- in this case, I think you are completely wrong.
Without
> society, there would be no moral principles. Any time two entities
interact,
> that creates some kind of society.
I see two men are wandering the desert. The one sneaks up on the other
and steals his water. Their paths never cross again. That point where
the water was stolen, according to you is a "soceity"?
> By definition, morality is societal in
> nature. Moral dilemmas concern themselves, then, ONLY with issues
that are
> societal, not with any issue outside society.
>
> > We could ask if
> >the actions of a particular person were moral with respect to another
> >person whether they both exist in society or are stranded on a
deserted
> >island together.
>
> But if they are stranded on a desert island, they are in society --
society is
> anytime relationships exist between two or more entities. Depending
on your
> level of analysis, you can describe society writ large (the nation or
world)
> or very small (a family, a couple, a club).
Okay, well, then society reduces to a matter of individuals inreacting
and it is just a fallacy of division to assume that two consituents of
a group have the same relationship as the two groups have in general.
It is a fallacy of composition to go the other way which seems possibly
necessary.
That is not true. It always was about the two people involved -- or
the particular people involved. The nazi, the jew and the german. If
the german tells a lie then he saves the jew from the nazi. Based on
this circumstance we conclude that it is okay to tell the lie. Under
different circumstances (perhaps the police, the murderer and the
citizen), the results might be completely different. At no point is it
about something like power relationships in society. It is just a
question of what the actions are as they relate to individuals.
What would be an example of the kind of conclusions based on
structuralism you are talking about (that are different from what I am
talking about) would be more like blacks were severly oppressed once
and now as a group are worse off generally because of that historical
oppression. Whites benefitted from this oppression as a group. The
causes are pretty certain (in other words, we do not doubt these
general trends). So then whenever dealing with a particular black man
(say in a hiring situation) in relation to some white guy, we ought to
favor this black guy that is a victim of society over a benefactor of
society like the white guy. This argument truly applies the kind of
group structure you are taliking about in a novel way that it would not
otherwise come to bear. It also commits the fallacy of division and
composition. It assumes that moral agency -- a quality of individuals -
- is also had by groups of individuals when it assumes that the someone
can be a "victim of society". (Fallacy of Composition) And then it
assumes that the same relationship that holds generally between two
groups in society also holds between two specific members of those
groups. (Fallacy of Division)
>
> Extrapolate beyond that, and soon you can get to examples like the
Brazil
> example.
>
Not without a few fallacies along the way.
> >political philosophy is just a particular application of our moral
> >philosophy, and if our moral philosophy is founded independently of
> >society, so must our political philosophy be. So you can talk about
> >social structures all you want to, but the whole point is that you
are
> >going to ultimately come back to some principle that generally has
> >nothign to do with those social structures. If not, then you aren't
> >done yet.
>
> But again, since our moral philosophy by definition can not be
independent of
> society, then our political philosophy must not be. Indeed, it is
impossible
> to have a moral or political philosophy outside society because the
issue of
> politics concerns how you mediate disputes about moral (and material)
issues
> in society, and morality concerns social relations. By definition
society is
> a necessary part of these (just by their use of language, which is a
social
> construction, that would be the case anyway).
It is not a use of language they use. They do not relate specifically
to uses of language. We use language to understand them. Moral facts
exist indepedently of the language that we use to consider them. They
are the same facts when referred to in Chinese as they are in English.
If you define society so that it can refer to the interactions of any
two beings, then I suppose that would tie morality inexorably to
society _conceptually_. However, it would also make society inexorably
based on individuals and not groups. So, you are jist
misunderstanmding society in such a case when applying structuralism.
You are not going to get around the fallacies of composition and
division because you are twisting the nature of morality.
>
> >Well, if you have an argument on which you may redistribute wealth
then
> >you are all set. If you lack such an argument then I cannot fault
> >someone for not believing such a redistribution is morally
> >permissible. You wish to act against the wishes of other beings ina
> >way that affects them. The burden of justifying those actions is on
> >you. Saying something like "I know something is wrong, but I can't
put
> >my finger on it" is not sufficient.
>
> Oh, I certainly have an argument which says you may redistribute
wealth. You
> try to deny that possibility by ignoring the social relations that
create a
> given wealth distribution, and assert we have to look at it as if you
just
> have two people in a general all other things equal situation, and
then if its
> not moral there, its never moral because its not universal.
That's not true at all. What I am saying is that you cannot commit the
fallacy of division by assuming that something that might be said of a
group must aslo apply to all of its constituents. Even if you can say
that white men oppress black men in general, in order to rectify this
oppression in some particular case, you must show hopw that particular
white man oppressed that particular black man. Otherwise you are just
guessing and almost surely acting immorally.
> My point is the
> moral principle is not just the act of redistributing wealth, but the
act
> itself, its very nature, has to include the structural and social
positions of
> the actors and the meaning of the act in a given context.
You are right about the meaning of the act in a given context.
>
> >Well, I understand what you are saying, but you have not satisfied
your
> >burden of proof if you basically are saying something like "I know
I'm
> >right, but I just can't say why quite yet." Let me pose a
hypothetical
> >scenario that is a bit easier to get one's hands around. Suppose you
> >are working on a burglary case and have narrowed it down to two
> >suspects. You know wiht absolute certainty that one of these two
> >suspects committed the burglary and the other is completely innocent
of
> >it. Do you make them split the cost of restitution to the owner?
>
> No. But a burglary is different than the type of structural
discrimination
> and constraints on liberty that exist in society, and those
structures alter
> the essential nature of the acts undertaken. It is literally a
different act
> to redistribute wealth from those who are structurally advantaged at
the
> expense of others than it is to redistribute wealth from those who
are not, in
> an all other things equal category.
Why? You have to show this don't you? Why are they inherently
different morally?
>
> >Well, read Kant -- what can I say. I suppose that proving it right
to
> >anyone is sort of the issue in the discussion. (So, the way to show
> >that it can be is probably to produce such a proof.) One thing that
> >almost every moral philosopher agrees to these days is Kants
principle
> >of universality. So progress is being made....
>
> But, of course, that doesn't mean that every single act has to be
moral in
> every single circumstance unless you deny that the nature of the act
involves
> the nature of the relationship itself. Otherwise, how could one
determine
> whether or not lying was wrong? Or even stealing? If you try to
apply Kant's
> imperative to every mundane act without seeing how the act gets part
of its
> essence from its social position, you're left, for instance, saying
its
> immoral to lie to a Nazi in order to protect a Jew you're hiding in
the
> basement, etc.
Well, Kant certianly thought so. I think like so many other things
that Kant seemed to conclude from this principle, this sort of lying is
always wrong thing is spuriously justified at best. In fact, one of
the big problems I have with Kant's moral philosophy is that he has it
that one might have a duty to themselves. He even admits that such a
thing sounds somewhat paradoxical, but quickly argues that such a
distinction on the basis of applying moral princples makes sense. From
this sort of thing he seems to conclude all sorts (possibly even most)
of the types of things I would have to disagree with. Not the least of
which is the lying thing -- the ultimate reason to not lie to the nazi
is because you have a duty to yourself to treat yourself with respect.
It is not your responsibility that the nazi kills the jew (as Kant
would point out and I would even agree as heinous an act of telling the
truth might seem). It is your responsibility to not cause yourself to
break from virtue in telling lies in general. Therefore, all else
being equal, you should tell the truth. Nonsense.
In any case, you break up this dichotomy of moral self and human self,
and you get a different answer. The answer is that all else being
equal you can do whatever you want from the stand point of justice. It
definitely lacks virtue to tell the truth by most people's standards.
So, you would not be wrong to tell the truth, strictly speaking, but
would be morally bankrupt if you did. It would seem likely that you
would have no qualms about becoming one of the nazis yourself.
> That may be the case, but one certainly can make a strong
> argument that your definition of what an act is relies on an
artificially
> limited scope, that acts are defined more broadly (after all, you
could go
> into infinite reduction, a lie is a sum of many other smaller acts on
a
> smaller scope, etc.) Pacifists have dealt with this issue a lot.
Extremists
> would say all violence or aggression is always wrong, but then others
might
> point out that giving birth is an act of aggression, pushing someone
out of
> the way of a falling rock an act of violence. The answer: acts are
more than
> just the direct action that is taking place, they get their MEANING
from the
> social context.
No. You are right they are more than what is happpening in the
isolated context (usually), but that doesn't mean that it is a _social_
context that they get additional meaning from. For instance, I save
someone's life by pushing them from under a falling rock. Now assuming
this person wanted to live, even though I committed an act of violence,
it was more than justified by the fact that the person welcomed it.
That is not a social context that added meaning to the act -- it was
just the extenuating circumstances that individual was in. That fact --
his wanting to be saved -- would exist even if there was no other
being in existence in the entire universe. It certainly had nothing to
do with power structures in society.
>
> >The ambiguity has more to do with the ambiguous nature of an informal
> >language. The concepts that we articulate with this language are not
> >ambiguous.
>
> That's an interesting assertion, but I have my doubts on whether or
not its
> true, or whether concepts even exist absent language.
You think that language is necessary for concepts? Are concepts
necessary for language? What do the linguists have to say about all
this?
>
> >You need to know what passivity means. You do not need to know
> >anything about the structure of society to simply ask the
hypothetical
> >question of what would a purely passive society be like? What are
the
> >ramifications of such an idea? It is a simple question...
>
> What do you think passivity means?
I bet even if we started with a good working definition and just tried
to faithfully apply it we would start getting really complicated
ramifications. Forget about the fact that we would start to have to
explore what it really means to be "passive". Even without
encountering such difficulties, there would be arbitrarily complex
ramifications.
>
> >You are equivocating on the term "passivity". I am not talking about
> >whatever dominant notion in one society and another that is
associated
> >with the term uttered or disclosed with the symbols p-a-s-s-i-v-i-t-
y.
> >I am talking about _our_ understanding of the term. I am not talking
> >about "passivity" but rather passivity (without the quotes). I am
> >talking about _one_ concept not the formal representation associated
> >with several different concepts.
>
> OK, explain what you mean, because it is a term that can be defined
so many
> different ways (I've studied pacifists and the various forms of
pacifism from
> minimal force or anti-war pacifists to hard core no aggression ever
> pacifists...there are numerous definitions and conceptions, I need to
know
> what definition you're thinking about).
>
Well, those kinds of things are not intended to redefine passivism with
each different ideology. They all have different takes on what the
word truly entails. In any case, they are all likely referring to the
same concept albeit ambiguously, but certainly not ambivalently. What
do I think passiveness really means and fully entails is a good
question. I am certainly not prepared to answer it in a few short
sentences. Nonetheless, the point is that even without pusing the
issue to much about what the terms is really supposed to refer to, you
still encounter a great deal of complexity and ambiguity in applying in
just a straight forward way -- even without encountering the ambiguity
in the term itself.
> >We cannot end at just contentions. We have to eventually be able to
> >reduce and untangle it all to things independent of such complexity.
> >Leaving it as an enigma is just begging the question.
>
> Actually, why can't we end at contentions? We solve them
politically, then
> new ones arise, and old ones get re-debated. Why do you think
anything beyond
> an enigma is necessary?
> ciao, scott
>
>
I see -- you are just being contentious. You have no desire to
actually draw conclusions.
Loren Petrich
Michael M Bates <mike...@prodigy.net> wrote:
>Loren Petrich <pet...@netcom.com> wrote in message
>news:826v38$alp$1...@nntp9.atl.mindspring.net...
>> Love your enemies, turn the other cheek, be soft on crime, etc.
>You must use the same Bible as the Most Reverend Jesse Louis Jackson.
Which would seem to be everybody else's Bible -- read the Sermon
on the Mount.
>I didn't think you had anything relevant. And I was right.
Read the Sermon on the Mount once again.
Scott D. Erb
Adrian wrote:
> In article <825u8a$qc5$1...@rupert.unet.maine.edu>,
> scot...@maine.maine.edu (Scott D. Erb) wrote:
> >
> > I'm not saying there is no way to figure it out, but what do you do
> to the
> > person who says, "hell, life is just a mistake of biology, it doesn't
> matter,
> > we all die, ethics is for fools." Is he or she wrong objectively?
>
> Yes
Why do you say that?
> They are inherently true. That is the _true_ assumptions are. If you
> happen to run accross some questionable assumptions then either they
> are not waht is really presumed in ethics or you are kidding yourself
> about how questionable they are.
Or maybe you're wrong in thinking they are true. Can you prove they are
true without begging the question or relying on tautologies? Could you
please do so for me?
> Kant, for instance built his career
> on the gimmick of extrapolating what must be the case given the
> possibility of knowledge. The way this sort of thing plays out in
> ethics is "For the possibility of knowledge with regard to
> ethics, .... And so we have any unconditional imperative must have
> this principle of universality." Now, you can say that that is not
> what is meant by ethics, or you could say that some assumptions were
> implicitly made that may not be true, and in that way dispute this sort
> of conclusion. However, you cannot say that it ostensibly rests on
> some hypotheses since it is constructed not to.
I can say a house designed to rest on water that is sitting on a lake
doesn't rest on ground, even if it wasn't constructed to rest on ground. If
someone designs a coherent ethical system by its own standards thats fine --
religions do so all the time. That certainly doesn't give anyone a reason
to believe them unless they share agreement with the assumptions.
> Let me give you an example. Suppose we have two men. One steals from
> the other. Suppose that we aren't sure that such a theft occured. Now
> there is some inherent uncertainty about the theft, for that matter
> about whether or not we are even just disembodied brains with any
> actual property to be stolen in the first place. However, what there
> is not uncertainty about is with regard to the truth or falsity of the
> idea that IF we are right about the theft, THEN the theft was immoral
> (say). In other words, the inherently uncertain empirical part of
> ethics does not exist. There is no ethics out there (like a mountain
> in the Andes) to be observed and scientifically understood. The actual
> _ethical_ matters are purely a priori. The uncertainty comes in
> knowing whether the conditional statements of ethics actually apply to
> a given scenario (that is are about the scenario that actually
> happened).
Again, I have to disagree. You can't make that claim without just assuming
it to be true, it is similar to a religion in that regard. You can be
certain you have an ethical system. You can't be certain it is superior to
a different ethical system which rests on different grounds. Lets say you
had someone who was poor, worked in a mine, barely got paid by the wealthy
mine owner who was exploiting the workers who had no other real option.
Let's say a worker stole bread from the owner to feed his sick wife. Was
his act immoral? Let's say a nazi owns a well and a Jew is dying of
thirst. He finds the Nazi well, but the Nazi says, "no Jew drinks my
water." Then a servant of the Nazi, realizing that his employers act was
immoral, steals water and gives it to the Jew so he can make it to town.
Was that immoral? Its clear that theft occurred, the facts are clear. To
me the morality is clear -- the theft was NOT immoral; in fact in the latter
case, I think the servant would have been acting immorally if he did NOT
steal, the life of the Jew takes precedence over the property claims of the
Nazi.
> That uncertainty is just a fact of life and does not really
> affect what we have to assume is the case or cannot assume for that
> matter. It really is not relevant to ethics (except for possibily in
> particular cases)
Why do you say that?
> Well, I guess objectivity is relative then. Would you say the same
> about the theorems of mathematics? If so, then I do not think there is
> really an issue about the objectivity in ethics.
Ethics is not math. You assume a congruence and similarity, but it may be
that there is none, that there is no geometry of human social relations that
correspond to geometry in math. The reason is the issue of MEANING which I
get into with much more depth below.
> In other words, if
> your argument applies just as well to something like mathematics (as
> far as both the possibility of knowledge and the possibility of
> acquiring such knowledge), then I have doen my job in showing that
> ethics is objective and knowledge of it attainable with certainty. If
> you dislike this way of saying it, then lets just say it is like math
> and leave it at that.
I don't think its like math, again, below I get into the importance of
meaning.
> Not exactly. Language is a social construct. The concepts language
> refer to are not.
That isn't self-evident. Language is a creative invention by humans, and
many concepts come simply from the human imagination, perhaps a subjective
creation first. Do they all refer to something outside the mind? That
question has no clear answer amongst philosophers and linguistics.
> Mathematics as so many symbols on a dry-erase board
> is a matter of convention. The concepts that are associated with those
> symbols are not. For, just as you say we could change the symbols all
> around and the concepts would remain the same (just identified by
> different symbols or possibily lacking any symbols to idenitify them).
The symbols are a way of interpreting what we perceive as reality in a
manner pragmatically useful. But you assume math and langauge to be the
same thing; that isn't necessarily so (and in math when you have concepts
like infinity squared, and negative numbers, you have to wonder if all math
concepts have correlates in reality as well!)
> So, I have to confess, there is a certain amount of uncertainty in my
> positions with regard to ethics because I cannot be too sure I am
> saying it right (i.e. using the right terms). Perhaps I should be
> using "fair" when I use "just" or "utility" where I use "morality", but
> the point is that we understand this inherent ambiguity exists as a
> matter of _communication_ and focus on the concepts we wish to
> communicate. I cannot over emphasize here (in true Kantian fashion)
> that the issue is the POSSIBILITY of knowledge not what knowledge
> actually exists or its formal presentation. And it is the mere
> possibility that forces what Kant usually claims to be true.
OK, that does clarify things...but I still think that the possibility of
knowledge does not mean a possibility of certain knowledge. It means we can
get it right, it does not mean that we can be certain we have it right,
partially for the reasons you say. You see, I do agree that there is a
possibility of knowledge, and that the pursuit of ethical truth is the most
noble endeavor of human kind. I simply think that in this world we have an
inherent barrier between us and the truth, and that the best we can do is
try to understand and develop our best shot, living by it. But the way you
state it above is much more agreeable to me.
> How can we be certain within our own frameworks if we are not certain
> outside them. For instance, consider the proposition "I am certain
> within my own framework." Could it be true within your own framework
> and false outside your own framework? What would it mean if that were
> the case? (Really, I don't know what that would mean.)
Only that within a framework of assumptions act X might have meaning Y (it
might be immoral, friendly, etc.) If you change the framework, the act
might have a different meaning. Since human acts are all imbued with
meaning, any universality requires both universality of the act and of the
meaning to be exactly the same. If the same act has a different meaning
(again, lying to a nazi vs. lying to your spouse) then the act is
essentially different. I think this is a very fundamental point.
> Nope. You _can_ do whatever you are capable of and you _will_ be
> subjected to the consequences of those actions. However, that is all
> about what _will_ happen and does not at all evaluate it. Morality is
> completely independent of what actually will happen and has only to do
> with various hypothetical events, including what will happen but very
> thing else as well. Saying you do or do not have a right to do
> something is an _evaluation_ of the action not a prediction of whether
> or not it will happen.
OK, so you are defining right as meaning that ones act is not immoral (if
the act is not immoral, then one has a right to do it; if it is immoral one
does not have the right)? I see.
>I am saying that you cannot question the fact that ethics is about
> individual beings and not structures. Doing so renders your argument
> meaningless (literally) and is a misuse of the language.
No it does not, based on the point I made above -- structures give the same
act different meanings by changing the context and the conditions. Thus if
the meaning of the same act is different, the morality of the act might be
different. Universality has to apply to meaning as well as physical action.
> Ethical terms
> simply do not refer to that directly. What the yrefer to directly is
> individual beings. Perhaps there are some global facts about groups as
> a result of the peculiar reference ethics makes to individuals, but
> those facts are to be derived not presumed. Presuming them, is roughly
> the same as assuming that ethics is completely determined by Euclids
> Postulates. You would say, well a coherent system is completely
> determined by Euclids Postulates, but that is called "Euclidean
> Gemoetry" not "Morality". The term "morality" actually refers to
> something else.
But structures are part of creating what an act means -- thats the point.
Thats why it is immoral to steal in most cases, but in some cases it might
be immoral NOT to steal. The act itself is not just a physical act.
Consider: stealing is made up of a number of smaller acts which may or may
not be immoral. Let's say they all are moral...lifting your hand, reaching
into a pocket, picking up a wallet... Now, why are these acts immoral, why
do they have the meaning of stealing? Because of the social structures
involved, ideas of private property, the fact the wallett is not yours,
etc. In other words, physical acts themselves are empty without social
meaning; social meaning is inherently structural.
> Okay, what about your beliefs about the use of logic? Could you
> be "wrong"? What about your beliefs in the conclusions you are
> deriving immediately above? Could you be wrong? You simply cannot say
> meaningfully what you are trying to say. As I have read elsewhere, you
> are looking for a stick with only one end. It doesn't exist -- no such
> things are possible.
I could be wrong. Not within my system of assumptions, even though every
assumption itself might be wrong. I think the assumptions underlying the
use of logic are pretty well tested, and I'm confident that they are
probably close to accurate. I test them pragmatically: do they work in the
world? I think ethics have to be tested somewhat the same way, ultimately.
The stick question really brings home the issue of meaning -- you change the
language so the meaning is different, and then the question is different.
Things exist as they exist. That is objective reality. Our statements
about them are constructs. Within our constructed system, we can define
things to be true (we define what a stick is, its attributes, and given that
definition, a stick cannot have one end). Our social reality is building
ways to try to communicate perceptions of reality in a way to build shared
agreement on meanings. Now, maybe we are brains in a space ship and there
is no such thing as a stick, its part of an illusion that is not real. The
claim about sticks not being able to have one end is still true within the
framework of our definitions.
>So what about a case of self defense? Could you kill someone even
> though you are uncertain of the necessity of such a fatal response?
Probably not. I think my result would be minimal force to escape (or help
others to escape), recognizing that the minimal force might inadvertently
lead to death. I think that would still be ethical. I would have a much
stronger motivation to risk killing someone for other-defense than
self-defense.
> What about being emotional and angry when "wronged"? Are you saying
> that such a reaction is unwarranted under such inherent uncertainty?
Don't forget -- I said we act on the basis of our beliefs about ethics,
confidently despite uncertainty. Uncertainty does not mean not living by
our beliefs, it only means that we recognize we may be wrong, and in times
of reflection and consideration, take that into account. But in life we
place our bets. Since there is uncertainty, we can't know for sure if we're
right, so we may as well live life they way we choose. To me thats better
than, say, religious folk or Randians who in my opinion create an illusion
of certainty in order to justify their choices.
> If you are not saying that this behavior is inherently excluded, then
> what are you saying? If you are saying that this behavior is just not
> possibly justified, then how do you know you aren't wrong about that
> (and with this question I am in YOUR framework)? In other words, based
> on what you say, how do you decide what to argue for in any given
> scenario (tolerance or intolerance) since you must always act on the
> possibility of your own error?
No, you act completely in accord with your beliefs. Consider: a timer is
about to go off with four seconds left, and if it does the bomb will destroy
your city. It'll take you three seconds to cut the wire, but it could be
one of three wires. What do you do? You place your bets, you quickly
decide what you think it is and cut that mother! Now, same scenario, but
the bomb won't go off for two days. What do you do? Even if its you that
has to take the final act, you can consult experts, study schemas of bombs,
and try to make a very informed decision. In life, we have to act like
that. Sometimes there is not time to contemplate, we go with our best
guess. Other times, we can consider and reflect. The way I see it, we
can't be certain, but we have to act with confidence and will in order to
succeed. I don't need certainty to do that, I'm comfortable realizing that
I may be wrong, but I'm going to do it my way nonetheless.
Again, even if we disagree, I enjoy your posts, and it has me thinking about
things in a way which helps me discover more about what I think, and to
question my ideas. Even when I argue, and even after I send a post, I think
through these things more, and reconsider your ideas. So thanks!
ciao, scott
Scott D. Erb
Adrian wrote:
> > without objection. One can "tolerate" nazis exercising free speech
> and
> > holding their opinions while at the same time fighting against their
> views.
> >
>
> You must have a strictly _absolute_ moral reason for this.
Again, the absolute moral reason combines both the act and the meaning of
the act. Meanings change in circumstances, so acts change in their
essential nature. But I was getting more at trying to figure how you were
using the word tolerate.
> The points you have here call for a certain action. The argument you
> present for this prescription must be a moral one. This argument and
> these conclusions you are drawing seem as absolute and immutable as it
> gets.
Of course, despite our differences I believe there is an absolute ethic, and
try to figure it out and live by it. I state my beliefs. However,
immutable is probably a wrong word -- I may change my belief over time as I
learn and understand the world better, talk to wise people, read good books,
etc. It may not change either. Thats the only thing about recognizing
uncertainty, its just a recognition that error is inherently possible in
every human thing I do, including developing an ethical or moral belief
system.
-snip-
On social construction:
> They refer not just to perceptions but beliefs in general, some of
> which we know with certainty. What we lack certainty about are
> empirical matters. As Kant would say, we may only ever know of the
> phenomenon of external objects and not of the objects in themselves.
> That does not mean we cannot be certain of the phenomenon as we
> experience it or of other abstract relationships that must be the case
> independently of an external world even existing.
That makes sense. But I doubt ethics falls within that realm; ethics
requires some kind of external world since it requires social relationships
in a context where these relationships have meaning. Otherwise, there is no
need for ethics.
> Indeed I am a materialist. You are entitled to your belief in the
> matter. I wonder though if my beliefs in morality might have affected
> my beliefs in metaphysics by way of the fact that I try to consitently
> apply the same type of scrutiny to them both. Or perhaps there is th
> other direction my metaphysical views being related to my ethics
> because I make the same error in both for consistency sake. Perhaps I
> have this belief that I am especially fond of independently of its
> actually validity. Perhaps such a fondness has promoted certain errors
> in logic or biases in perception to support this belief. Then since I
> am obviously concerned about coherence -- a necessary condition for
> having my beliefs be correct -- perhpas I have perpetuated this error.
Maybe we don't disagree as much as it seems. I haven't been arguing about
the possibility of error to try to say one can't have ethical knowledge or
pursue the belief in an ethical truth, only that at any time the given
belief system we develop may be wrong and constantly needs to be
rescrutinized. The other issue seems to be how we apply universality. I
read you as applying it only to the physical content of the act, while I
apply it by combining the act with the meaning of the act, a meaning which
can come from the context and the social structures. Changing that changes
the very nature of an act, and thus its ethical content. I believe I can
hold that belief and not deny the universality prinicple, even though I
certainly make things more complicated!
(snip of bits I think were discussed in the last post)
>What about the scientific (?) knowledge claim that knowledge claims are
> inherently questionable? Or is that a scientific knowledge claim or
> more of a pure concept of knowlegde
Its definitional. Within the framework of science and its assumptions,
knowledge claims are inherently questionable. It again is one of those
statements bounded by context which provides its meaning. (That's why I
noted this was 'scientific knowledge' and not necessarily a claim about an
abstract concept of true knowledge.)
> No -- they may be disputed, but not rationally. Once you know it you
> know it with absolute certainty. The only thing that might be doubtful
> is what terminology I use to talk about the same concepts.
I'm really not sure I know what you mean above (we were talking about
universality, but older bits tend to be screwed up on my server so I often
just include the most recent post). Rationality is usually defined within a
given framework or context. I mean, rational choice is dependent on ones
subjective preferences, one action is rational for one person, but may not
be rational for another, it depends on what the act means for someone.
Rationality along depends on meaning, and thus in and of itself is not a
path to pure clarity.
>So what if I assume that the essential nature of "persons" is that they
> are basically "points". They may be related to each other at least
> under some circumstances by being on the same thing called a "line".
> Suppose further that given a set of people all related to each other
> this way and some person not related to the group in that way, then
> there is only one relationship possible between that person and yet
> others such that no one from the original relationship is related in
> this new way to the person not in the original relationship. (This
> last statement would be like saying "Cosnider a line and a point not on
> that line. There is only one line going through the point that does
> not intersect the line." -- the so called "Parallel Postulate") And so
> on.
Then I'd say you're probably over simplifying, since the importance of
meaning, and the complexity it adds to relationship makes that kind of
equation untenable. At the very least, it becomes extremely complex and
multidimensional.
But then again, maybe you are right in your analogy. Geometry gets tough
when you add dimensions, especially when you get to the cosmological
theories which postulate infinite dimensions, question whether there is such
a thing as causality, posit time as dimensional (meaning in essence past,
present and future are simultaneous), etc. Space may be as complex as
social life in ways we can't imagine. Still, I think that since meaning is
a part of the act, I think that at best complicates matters (stealing can be
moral, etc.) and makes chances of error even greater. I think a big error
is to underestimate the importance of meaning.
> Your reaction should be that I am not talking about ethics. What I am
> doing is just redefining terms in order to use the terminology
> associated with ethics to talk about Euclidean Geometry. What I am
> saying is that this sort of thing can be done always (i.e. there is
> inherent uncertainty in what terms of an informal language mean --
> inherent ambiguity). But, there is no uncertainty about the concepts
> involved becuase on the presumption that knowledge is possible _at all_
> (even just a smidgeon of knoweldge that we are not too sure of at
> that), we must make these inherently ambiguous statements in an effort
> to discuss what are actually mathematically precise concepts. And that
> goes even if we do not have a mathematicall precise understanding of
> the concepts.
Applying concepts to real world conditions, or turning that into a real look
at ethics is where the problem comes in. Your statement above, which does
seem quite Kantian, makes sense to me in the abstract.
> I think the real difference here, is that you are treating morality
> sort of like the sun (say). What is the nature of the sun? Well it is
> this ball of plasma at the center of our solar system with all sorts of
> properties -- of a certain diameter, the equator does not revovle as
> fast as the poles, there are these things calle "Solar Flares", and so
> on. However, we cannot be absolutely sure that the sun even exists let
> alone have all these properties just the way we think it does. We
> certainly could be wrong and likely are not quite right about some
> things. It seems like we are almost surely right about amny other
> things. It seems nearly absurd to think that it, say, revolves around
> the Earth and not the other way around, but there are those that adhere
> to that position. And so on.
That's not it -- I recognize that morality and ethics are not empirical
phenomena, and thus we can't simply test and understand it. My point is
that they are also not simply abstract principles with existence outside of
the material world. Ethics is that link between our social constructed
reality and our real essence as humans. It is our attempt to go beyond what
we can know in the limits of our world and understand what our actions
should be. That makes it to me the most essential and difficult task.
Again, the meaning of the acts, and thus the acts themselves, come from in
the world relations between the actors -- what the acts mean in the world.
Thus the ethics cannot be determined as principles outside of experienced
reality. It is a connection between the abstract world of universal
principles and the directly experienced world of context and meaning. That
connection contains a bit of both, with all the potential pitfalls and
uncertainties of each.
> Another example might be a glass of water. You decide it is half
> full. It turns out you are wandering the Saharah Desert and are
> actually hallucinating that this glass of water even exists, let alone
> is "half full of water". So there is no glass of water after all.
> That does not mean that the concept of "half full" is rendered
> meaningless. You still have that concept and are certain of its
> meaning in the context of your hallucination or any other similar
> hypothetical scenario. Such a concept is a priori and not subject to
> the same uncertainty that the actual existence of the glass of water is.
Ok....
> Well, since you mention Empiricism versus Rationalism, you would likely
> be interested in reading _Critique of Pure Reason_. It has nothing
> really to do with moral or political philosophy per se. However, he
> does attempt to see what the limits of the application of pure reason
> are -- what such a method can conclude. This is possibly one of the
> most profound things possible to discuss in philosophy. And I would
> say Kant is a giant among philosophers past and present. Many would
> argue that Kant finished philosophy (much the same as physicists once
> thought that physics was pretty much "done").
You're giving me a lot to read this month :)
have a good weekend, scott
Paleo
says...
> I fear our perspectives may be too different to allow really useful
> conversation on the remaining issues...if so, its been interesting, thanks for
> the conversation.
Look, Scott--it's not our "perspectives" that are causing the problem.
I enjoy batting this stuff back and forth with you because you are one
of the rare ones who can do so without personal abuse. But let's make no
mistake here: it's simple matters of fact which you apparently don't want
to recognize that are the basis of our disagreements. Such as the
indubitable connection between communist states and mass murder, which
nowadays gives no pause even to most liberals, so I'm surprised you're
having so much trouble with it. Or the matter of whether or not Marxism
was "rational" in any sense that ordinary people would recognize. These
are garden-variety matters of judgment and fact, not of "perspective."
> >This is like saying that Naziism was the consequence of fallen human
> >nature. True, but unhelpful. It was the ideology of Naziism that led
> >directly to the attempted extinction of Jews, just as the ideology of
> >communism led to the extinction of scores of millions of other
> >individuals.
> And the ideology of capitalism that led to the exinction of many Indian tribes
> and genocide?...
No. It was mere fallen human nature. It had nothing to do with
capitalism per se. To understand as much, look at the history of Europe
from the fall of Rome til the middle ages. Various tribes and peoples
swept back and forth across the continents, doing their best to
exterminate each other. They didn't need capitalism to do so. It's an
eternal human temptation to want to get rid of the other guy.
> And what about the crusades, and many other religiously
> motivated slaughters?...
I am by no means minimizing such things. They were horrible. They
happened. I'm simply making a plain empirical observation: the most
horrific mass murders in world history happened in officially atheist,
progressive communist states. The scale of the slaughter there dwarfed
that of the Crusades and other religious conflicts, and it had nothing to
do with "modern technology," either. This association between mass
murder and communism is one of the huge, hulking facts of the 20th
century. You can't pretend it away. And it's meaningful.
> No, you are using bad logic. You draw mostly from two
> cases -- the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Then you defy all traditional
> analysis to try to claim they are both leftist (I think I've demonstrated
> pretty conclusively that such a claim is misguided), and then claim therefore
> the Left or communism is the cause of mass murder.
You have demonstrated no such thing. You are quite correct in the claim
that liberal academia doesn't want to be tarred with the brush of
Naziism. And that it has constructed a taxonomy that "proves" that
Naziism was a rightist phenomenon. Fair enough. But you have NOT
demonstrated the workability of this taxonomy, or the truth of these
claims about the "rationality" of the two tendencies, or why the taxonomy
offered by von Kuennelt-Liddihn somehow corresponds less to reality. If
you can do so, I'm willing to listen.
Further, I will concede that the mystic notion of der Volk that the
Hitlerites wallowed was fundamentally irrational. But certainly no more
irrational than, say, communism's cossetted and mistaken belief in the
perfectability of human nature, which is as contrary to empirical reality
as it's possible to be. Please deal with these commonsense objections.
> Yet my argument remains stronger: any centralization of power creates the
> propensity for abuse of power and human rights, and communism and fascism both
> centralized power in a system where the leadership could rule by their own
> whim. That explains why centralized power systems, be they left, right,
> religious, or authoritarian in nature all share the attributes of attacking
> human rights. Trying to come up with a rationalization that the side one
> doesn't see oneself on represents all the bad guys, and one's own side is good
> is shoddy logic, focused more on propaganda than truth.
You don't seem to understand the fact that I and all conservatives and
libertarians agree with you completely. The good life requires personal
responsiblity and freedom; freedom requires that huge concentrations of
government power be eliminated. I have merely made one irrefutable
observation: there is something about communism that is /specially/
homicidal, judging by the record. You don't seem to want to concede this
obvious fact. I think this reluctance of yours is related to the fact
that you do indeed, at some deep level, perceieve a family resemblance
between liberalism and communism.
> >Untrue. The communists killed their victims with old technology:
> >starvation, concentration camps, shootings, etc. The hard fact that the
> No, most all of the methods of communism relied on new 20th century
> technology; better weapons, communication, bureaucracy, planning,
> transportation, etc. The impact was to create famines and gulags were the
> direct cause of death may be hunger or being shot, which may be similar to
> direct causes of death in the past hundreds of years, but the scope and style
> were a result of a new modern way to organize power and death.
I must disagree. I suppose that the "technology" that underlay Victorian
bureaucracy was more advanced than that available to the Romans. (But
maybe not.) In any case, it was more primitive than that in common use
elsewhere in the West. It was certainly no more advanced than what was
the rule in the American civil war. Quite apart from the question as to
whether it counts as "technology" in the first place. And even THAT
objection fails in the case of China, which was utterly primitive under
Mao's rule, and yet which witnessed the slaughter of at least 20 million
people.
> Look, we agree in the danger of centralized unaccountable rule. I just think
> you're erring in trying to classify all the bad guys as being on the left, and
> making it seem like a "left-right" thing, when really its much more
> fundamental than that...
The evidence clearly suggests that there is a close association between
communism and mass murder on a hitherto undreamed-of scale. You deny
this? Or claim that it's not meaningful?
> Your rhetoric sounds almost like a type of irrational
> demonization, where one says "Stalin was on the left, American liberals are on
> the left, therefore they are similar to Stalin while American conservatives
> are not."...
Wait a minute. Solzhenitsyn made this claim, not me. And if you'd
bother to actually read his reasoning, you'd see that there are indeed
family resemblances between the so-called liberalism in the West in the
20th century and communism. I won't rehearse them here, since I assume
you have access to his arguments just as I do.
> That is not a rational or honest argument. Its also interesting
> how then one has to try to shove the nazis to the right to maintain that sort
> of argument by demonization (and some on the Left try to shove Stalin to the
> right for the same reason, both sides do it). But the truth is more complex,
> and less convenient for anyone's ideology.
I'm simply suggesting that Naziism was repugnant--fundamentally
repugnant--to any conservative ideology articulated in the West in the
past two centuries, and that it has pronounced leftist characteristics.
Quite apart from the self-understanding of its practitioners to be
leftists. It's difficult to pretend away all this stuff.
> >progressive leftist doesn't want to face is that religious intolerance,
> >for all his attempts to portray it as the ne plus ultra of human
> >wickedness, accounts for only the tiniest percentage of the deaths which
> >are chalked up to the socialist workers' paradises. There is a clear
> >connection between communism and mass murder on a hitherto undreamed-of
> >scale, and you can't use the "technology" excuse.
> I actually put religious intolerance in the same category as ideological
> intolerance, I don't see much of a difference. You're just trying to compare
> different forms of wickedness.
With one exception: the wickedness of the progressive leftists produced
FAR more corpses than any religious tyrant ever dreamed of. You can't
pretend this fact away. It's meaningful.
> >This is simply contrary to fact. Communism consistently portrayed itself
> >as the wave of the future which would engulf the entire world. This
> Only a fool thought that was anything more than silly propaganda...
This is simply untrue. Communism looked like the wave of the future,
both to liberals and conservatives alike, though one group welcomed it
and the other feared it. Russia, eastern Europe, China, Indo-China,
Cuba, Africa, etc. American academics and supposedly the best and
brightest believed it to be irresistable. For a time, there seemed to be
good reason to agree. This is 20-20 hindsight.
> Look at
> what drunken assholes like Joe McCarthy did to American freedoms all in the
> name of paranoia. The only good thing about that guy is that he got
> discredited, drank himself to death, and has become a symbol of evil.
In fact, he was correct about the general question of Soviet agents of
influence in American government. But the more interesting question is
this: given the most homicidal political philosophy in the history of the
world, FAR worse than Naziism, how was it possible to be "paranoid" about
its stated intentions of world domination? You apparently don't remember
the '50s. I do. I remember the atomic war drills and all the kids in
class getting under the desks. Vividly.
> >evangelizing, outward focus was there from the beginning with Marx, and
> >reached its height in the Cold War: Kruschev's "We will bury you" line.
> Which, by the way, was meant as saying they would outproduce and peacefully
> outperform the US. Khruschev believed it too. He was naive, didn't
> understand economics, and wrong. But he also publicized Stalin's crimes, and
> moved the Soviet Union away from such extreme evil.
He didn't "publicize" Stalin's crimes. His famous speech to the
Politburo a) was intended to be secret, and b) didn't mention at all, for
example, the genocide in Ukraine. The nomenklatura's grudge against
Stalin came down to the fact that the man's insane paranoia was lethal to
them, personally--not that Stalin was a mass murderer.
> >The Christian fear of communism was a rational response to an ideology
> >that portrayed itself as world-dominating.
> Only as much as the fear people have of right wing Christians is a rational
> response to Christian desires to spread their teaching and ideals around the
> world and promote their own versions of morality.
puh-LEEZ. On one side we have the most homicidal, mass-murdering
philosophy in the history of the world. On the other, Billy Graham.
You're joking, right?
> But again, the world is full of empires based on blood, and massive killings
> and deaths from long before Communism.
Sure. Only none of them hold a candle to the good, progressive,
officially atheist communist states.
> >Gorbachev was head of the KGB at the time the agency was placing bombs in
> >dolls that were responsible for blowing off the hands of numerous Afghani
> >children--he personally signed off on this scheme. Castro brutally
> Yeah, the US did a lot of shit like that too, especially in Vietnam. If you
> learn about American cold war policy, its not that much better in its covert
> activities than Soviet policy. Both countries behaved crappy and immorally,
> in my opinion.
Possibly. I think Viet Nam may have been wrong and misconceived
from the outset, though doubtless for reasons different than your
own. Though I believe the evidence shows that our own excesses were the
exception, not the rule as was the case with the communists, and
furthermore that they were undertaken with the purpose of protecting
people from a mass-murdering ideology.
> >tortured and imprisoned anyone he suspected of Thought Crime, as
> >documented abundantly in Armando Valladares' "Against All Hope" and in
> >many other places. The Soviet Union continued to imprison dissidents,
> >drug them in insane asylums, and kill them in the Gulag until right
> >before the Soviet Empire dissolved. This is fact.
> Yeah, centralized power is dangerous, I agree with that...
And LEFTIST centralized power is the most dangerous of all.
> But right wing
> authoritarian governments allied with the US did the same sorts of things, at
> the same level if not more. Again, my explanation better explains the problem
> than your attempt to make it a right-left sort of thing.
This is simply untrue. There is no "right-wing authoritarian government
allied with the US" that approached the homicidal record of the communist
states even in the smallest respect. If you know of one that even
remotely compares with the USSR or China, please enlighten us.
> >Please tell us a few of his "insights" which "inform" modern economists.
> >I studied Marx under David Friedman, and it was clear that the man was a
> >laughingstock to modern economists.
> David Friedman is hardly a mainstream economist...
Sure. He's a libertarian. Or at least he was when I took his class.
And I told him I thought some of his ideas were flaky. But I didn't ask
you about David Friedman. You claimed Marx's "insights" "inform" modern
economists. I've never heard of a single one. The labor theory of value
was science fiction. So were his other claims about the way businessmen
and capitalist states actually behave. So what were these insights? I'm
waiting.
> Anyway, you seem to want to
> demonize everyone on the "other side," I don't think you're being rational
> about this...
Look. Let's don't start characterizing each other. You made a claim of
fact. It contradicts everything I've ever learned about economics. I
asked you to give me some examples. Let's keep it at that level.
> Marx was a 19th century social scientist or social thinker who
> made tremendous insights for his time...
A tremendous insight is a tremendous insight. Please show us one that
wasn't instantly recognized even in Marx's own day as a fairy tale.
> ...even though since then a lot of
> advances have made his work obsolete and (as with other scientists of the 19th
> century) even laughable. But many of the concepts and ideas he developed
> informed later thinkers, who built on his shoulders. He'll be remembered much
> longer than, say, this Friedman guy.
Sure he will. So will Hitler and Stalin. What I'm asking you to show us
are some of the putatively magnificent "insights" of Marx. I contend
they don't exist.
> >The Engels book that Marx relied upon most heavily, "The Condition of the
> >Working Class in England," has been comprehensively demonstrated to be a
> >farrago of outdated statistics and mendaciously organized factoids.
> Again, my point was that Marx was friends with Engels. He collaborated with
> him. He didn't just rely on a "book." Engels was a very successful German
> businessman who later became a political leader of the early German SPD (the
> only party, by the way, to stand against Hitler when all the conservative
> parties pledged their support to him in 1933).
I'm trying to get some specifics out of you about your claim. You're not
helping me here.
> >Challoner and W.O Henderson demolished the scholarly pretensions of this
> >book once and for all in their 1958 OUP translation. They examined all
> >of the sources Engels used. It is a tract, a work of political polemic,
> >not scholarship.
> Funny how you attack one of Engels books, and claim Marx "relied" on it, when
> the FACT is Marx and Engels worked together and he relied on the council of
> Engels, a successful businessman. I'm sure Engels, also a politician, wrote
> some polemics. That doesn't deny that he understood economics and business,
> and gave Marx good advice.
I'm merely stating a fact: Challoner and Henderson, who under no
circumstances may be portrayed as conservatives, discovered that the
Engels work that Marx relied upon most comprehensively was, from a
scholarly standpoint, a disaster. We read their notes in David's class.
They were two English liberal academics, but they were honest. Engels'
work, like that of Marx, falls under the category of political tract and
polemic, not scholarship.
> We simply disagree, and your seem to rely on a few tendentious sources...
Neither Johnson nor Challoner nor Henderson are "tendentious." They are
careful scholars, and the latter two were Laborite professors. We
disagree because you're making unsupportable claims about the validity of
the work produced by these men.
> while I go by a much broader set of literature...
If you can show me from this "literature" that Marx was a careful
scholar, please do so.
> ...plus realization that just because
> someone is wrong (look at all the science of 19th century since disproved) it
> was dishonest or bad. I think you're arguing from bias, and interpreting
> everything through your bias. Thats OK, but it doesn't convince me.
I beg to differ. It's not a matter of "bias" when you uncover statistics
that are out of date and purposely misdated. It's not "bias" when you
note that a supposedly "scientific" investigator systematically ignored
all inconvenient evidence. These are matters of ascertainable fact, not
"bias."
> >The problem is that you're attempting to connect Naziism with
> >conservatism somehow, and the attempt simply fails. If you stretch a
> >point here and there nearly out of recognition, you can claim a family
> >resemblance on one or two items. But Naziism is alien to the spirit of
> >Western conservatism. This is simply a fact. Try to show us where Burke
> >would have embraced it.
> Again, my point was that the far right and far left often went against what
> the moderate right or moderate left wanted. The extremes deny the very ideals
> they are based on, thats what makes them extremes.
I think we can make a yeoman case that there is a strong family
resemblance in the worldview of late-20th-century liberalism and
communism. Rather than have me list them, just read Solzhenitsyn's
Harvard speech.
Re Naziism, the very most you can do is point to nationalistic and mystic
elements and say that such things occur with conservatives too. You're
correct. But there was so much else about fascism that was repugnant to
the very essence of conservatism that the one or two elements that look
similar on the surface pale to unimportance by comparison. You simply
don't find Hitler's hostility to Christianity anywhere in Western
conservatism. Or his totalitarian belief that the state is more
important than the individual. Or his hostility to the free market.
This is why his regime finally failed to interest conservatives in even
small numbers. The same can't be said of communism's attraction for
American liberals, which was widespread.
> >If you're actually correct, you can do the sensible thing: you can show
> >us how Naziism actually resembles anything a conservative might admire.
> No more than Stalinism represents something a social democrat might admire.
> The extremes are not admired by the moderates of Left or Right. That's my
> point!!!!!!!!!!!
Please read Solzhenitsyn at Harvard and tell me what you think.
> >I merely describe it as it actually exists, rather than accept the word
> >of its publicists. Liberalism as it exists today believes that ultimate
> >value is founded on human desire. This does not correspond with the
> >world as it's been experienced by humans throughout history.
> Where do you get that claim? It has no basis in reality, as far as I can
> tell. It sounds again like you're arguing from bias.
No. I'm doing my best to describe honestly what I see. Liberalism
rejects the moral universe of Christianity as a basis for positive law--
as in abortion, for instance--because it doesn't believe that right and
wrong are handed down from a God. Mankind instead must decide for itself
what is right and wrong. Please explain to me how this differs from my
formulation above.
> >To the extent that they're self-deluded and incoherent, you're correct.
> >But the acids of contemporary liberalism can easily be used to corrode
> >whatever a given liberal posits as ultimate truth, so it's a moot
> >question.
> That again is an assertion that seems more like a demonization rather than a
> rational argument. You are arguing from bias, simply using rhetorical
> assertions rather than real logic.
By no means. Let's use a little liberal argumentation right now. Who
are YOU to impose your outdated sexual morality on other people? Suppose
me and my NAMBLA buddies manage to convince little boys that they really
don't mind having sex with us? Who are YOU to tell us that what we have
isn't beautiful, or just as valid as what you have with your wife? As
long as both parties consent, what's the problem?
There is no defense against such argument, needless to say, unless you
posit a locus of right and wrong other than human desire.
> >Which is not the question anyway. Liberals loathe Christianity in its
> >pure, unadulterated form because it makes truth claims that liberalism
> >simply can't stomach.
> Most liberals I know are Christians, and they do not loathe their own
> religion. You're making no sense at all here.
By no means. I believe I can show that that any true liberal can be a
Christian in only the most adulterated sense. Either you're a pretend
liberal and real Christian, or a pretend Christian and a real liberal.
Because Christianity makes certain truth claims which it presents as
final and unalterable. Final and unalterable truths, not open to debate,
are uncongenial to liberals, as we see with abortion, homosexuality,
pedophilia, etc. You yourself are incoherent on this point, in one place
claiming a liberal can be a Christian, in another claiming that all truth
claims must be debatable, which is foreign to Christianity.
> >Which is merely another way of saying the same thing. Believers, even a
> >majority of believers, must not be allowed to enact laws which conform
> >with their understanding of human nature and the good life. Because they
> >are founded on a moral vision which liberalism cannot abide.
> No, because the United States constitution is founded on a notion that tyranny
> of the majority must be avoided if it denies people the rights guaranteed by
> the Constitution. If religious folk want to enact their whims and it violates
> the constitution, the courts will stop them. Otherwise, its perfectly
> legitimate for those who disagree to act politically to stop those who would
> want to impose their moral whims. That's politics.
This is simply contrary to the example of the early Republic. What you
condescendingly denominate "whims," others call bedrock beliefs about
human life and purpose; beliefs which are, moreover, founded on something
considerably more permanent than mutable human desire. What you're doing
is a priori declaring any moral judgment derived from religion to be
illegitimate in the public square. This was utterly contrary to the life
and practice of the early Republic, which was composed of religious
citizens, not to mention being incoherent on its own terms.
> >> No liberal I know thinks sex with children is good...
> >Wait a decade or so. It'll then occupy roughly the same position that
> >homosexual ideology does today.
> You're being silly, using the rhetoric of demonization again, rather than real
> arguments.
Precisely the same thing was said three decades ago about homosexual
issues.
> >> No liberal I know lacks a belief in morals....
> >Sure. It's merely an incoherent moral calculus which assumes that human
> >desire is the fountainhead of right and wrong.
> You're being silly, using the rhetoric of demonization, rather than real
> arguments. Come on, you can do better than that, it sounds like a rant
> against some group you categorize as "bad," and which you then assert
> everything bad you can about them, without substantiation or reason. Its not
> rational. Its silly. Come on, you can do better!
On the contrary, I'm simply telling the truth. If you reject religion as
a source of moral truth--which you clearly do--please explain to me the
putatively more reliable fount where you locate it.
> >If you truly believe that some things are right and wrong and not subject
> >to debate, then you can't be a liberal or a leftist either one. And you
> >will have no objection to a society formed along such lines.
> Everything is subject to debate, but the debate would have to use logic and
> evidence to sway me that my conclusion is wrong. Anyone who would lock up
> their moral beliefs and not change them even when confronted with logic and
> evidence is not rational, they are acting on the bases of protecting a bias
> rather than trying to understand the world and figure out how to live within
> it.
So you're saying, for example, that no moral belief may be regarded as
final and irrevocable. That, for example, we may not say with finality
that all men are created equal, and that racist oppression is, once and
for all, simply wrong?
> >I'm doing no such thing. I'm merely describing liberalism as it actually
> >exists.
> No, you're trying to assert its bad and evil...
No. I'm saying that it's fundamentally mistaken about the nature of the
world and human nature. Mistaken ideas sometimes have horrific
consequences.
> ...in a way that is too much like
> the way, say, Stalin tried to describe Capitalism, Himmler described Jews, or
> the Ayatollah described the West. Such rhetoric of demonization leads bad
> places, and is based on argument by labeling, rather than argument from
> reality. I think you should take a deep look inside, you sound a bit kooky
> when you go to such extremes. (People who go to extremes against
> conservatives or Christians in a similar manner are of course similarly
> silly).
The difference is that I can make a logical and good case for what I
believe, and my diagnosis is founded in reality. You are free to
disagree, but you don't make much headway by refusing to engage my
arguments and going on and on with this "demonization" business.
> >Human nature always has been and always will be flawed.
> >Conservatives as well as liberals will be wicked people. I'm merely
> >showing you that the assumptions that underlie the conservative worldview
> >are more consonant with reality as we know it.
> So far you've done no such thing. You've not really explained the
> conservative world view, and you've just asserted nasty things about liberals
> that seems contrary to everything I've experienced in life. You need to make
> a more cogent argument that talks about the assumptions, provides evidence,
> and makes a real case. Yours sounds more like the rhetoric of demonization.
On the contrary, I've made a number of claims of fact that stand up
better than liberal claims on the same questions. But you're not dealing
with what I say. To name merely the claim above, I think it's simple
truth that human beings are flawed creatures and will always be mixtures
of good and evil. I think I can defend this claim. You don't appear to
like it, but if you want to assert otherwise, then fire away.
> >By no means. If you attempt to allow, for example, homosexual
> >"marriage," you're engaging in a government-sponsored attack on the
> >institution of marriage. And you're denying the validity of the moral
> >insights of those who believe that sexual morality is grounded in a
> >transcendent order.
> That's ridiculous. No one is forcing you to marry someone of your own sex.
That is NOT the point. The point is whether it's just to allow
government to demean the institution that's the root and ground of social
stability by pretending it's something that most people realize is
degrading.
> If you can't stand other people doing that, that's your problem. Why should
> you care if people of the same sex want to get married? Why should you stick
> your nose in their lives, and try to stop them? Doesn't that seem a tad, uh,
> totalitarian? It sounds like something Stalin or Hitler might want to do!
> (And, of course, the Nazis brutally murdered homosexuals, seeing them as evil
> and immoral. By your logic, that proves the nazis weren't on the Left).
Nothing could be more totalitarian than the attempt of a tiny minority to
force their flawed notion of "marriage" on a majority that wants no part
of it. Stable marriages and families are the absolute ground of social
stability and peace. No stable marriage and family, no social peace. I
presume you'd agree that it would demean the institution for the
government to pretend that "marriage" comprehends the union of a man and
his goat. It's no different with two men or two women.
> >Can a conservative really be an atheist? I don't know. I used to think
> >of myself as a conservative atheist. I suspect I had simply not
> >considered the question deeply enough.
> I think you need to recognize that there are many ways people to think, you
> tend to try to paint the possibilities as neat boxes, just a couple of them,
> that all people fit in. Life is more diverse.
I think you need to realize that certain propositions imply other
propositions. He who says A must say B, as a certain liberal hero once
said. Speaking empirically, it appears to be impossible to sustain a
society that is simultaneously atheist and conservative. But feel free
to show me such a thing if you know of it.
> >I simply claim that the modern, post-FDR regime of income transfer is
> >unlikely to appeal to a genuine conservative.
> But social welfare programs started from conservative governments...
FDR was conservative? You're speaking of America?
> ...and most conservatives support them...
Yeah. If you call Newt Gingrich conservative. I don't.
> You seem to say only people who think like you
> are genuine conservatives, and genuine Christians...
No. I DON'T say that. Please show me, if you think you can.
> You seem to want to say
> those who think differently aren't really what they claim to be. That sounds
> more like a defense of bias than a rational argument.
Do you deny the possibility that the adherents of a political tendency
may not have thought very deeply about what they believe? This is
impossible?
> >I'm sorry, but this is a specimen example, a laboratory-pure, Petri-dish
> >example, of a liberal who has not seriously been forced to consider the
> >implications of his own ideas. You claim to be for "diversity." And
> >yet, you find intolerable the existence of a state whose populace has
> >historically considered the profession of warrior to be male in
> >character. To the "diversity"-loving liberal, this is an opinion that is
> >Thought Crime and must not be permitted to exist. EVERYONE has
> >to think the same way. Therefore VMI must be destroyed.
> You're making no sense here. Was VMI destroyed? Or are you just mad about
> policy changes and ranting?
I'm saying that liberals could not tolerate a conception of soldier that
is different from their own. Therefore, VMI must be forced to admit
women. By government coercion. Which, of course, destroyed VMI. What
made the school VMI is now gone.
> > Similarly,
> >universities and the elite media claim to be for "diversity," so they
> >hire witches and homosexuals and people in wheelchairs--and yet,
> >conservatives find their attitudes and beliefs distinctly unwelcome in
> >such precincts. Once again, we all love "diversity," but some kinds of
> >diversity are more equal than others.
> I think you're projecting. You don't seem to like any diversity from you own
> viewpoints, and seem to imagine some kind of persecution -- even though you
> don't seem to mind if you could persecute those who act and think against your
> moral beliefs...
Stop by the NAS website and read some of the accounts there if you think
it's "projecti
to you.
jecti
you.
jecti
> I really thi
> think you're
> not realize
> you don't li
you don't li
Please show me
ideas justify
eas justify
> >Sure. And
> >truth.
And
>truth.
And
> Do you think
Do you think
Not me. But I
t me. But I
> >> ...and it
> >> church ca
> church ca
> >Uh, I think
> >dogma is, a
>dogma is, a
> Sure, the ch
> correct.
ch
correct.
ch
Of course not.
Paleo
says...
> >By no means. I'm using "communist" to describe those states that were,
> >by their own admission, communist.
> But what kind of democracy was the German Democratic Republic? Or the
> Democratic People's Republic of Korea?
I'm merely taking the word of communist states that they were in fact
communist. Nothing else.
> >Quite apart from the fact that Naziism belongs on the left with
> >communism, this is true but unhelpful. ...
> Left-wing: anything Paleo wants to vilify.
Please stick to the point.
> The Nazis opposed the Left...
The Nazis thought of themselves as leftists.
> ...and they had a coalition with more
> mainstream conservatives. Their ideology was Buchananism taken to rather
> grotesque extremes -- extreme nationalism, wanting to purge Germany of
> those who were not Real Germans, etc. Economically, they were little more
> than opportunists; for Hitler, "socialist" was a vote-getting slogan only.
He was a totalitarian, which makes the resemblance rather more than skin
deep.
> The relevant point is that
> >communism has been reliably associated with horrific mass murder.
> >Period.
> True, orthodox Communists have tended to murder large numbers of
> people they had disliked, but I wonder what those who wail about
> Communist mass murder would say if it large numbers of people were killed
> for supposedly being Communists, as had happened in Indonesia in the late
> 1960's.
We would say it's a bad thing, of course. But that is to avoid the point
that no regime has ever approached in blood-thirstiness those of the
communists.
> >This is simply contrary to fact. Communism consistently portrayed itself
> >as the wave of the future which would engulf the entire world. ...
> Just like many capitalism groupies do.
Sure. Except that capitalist states aren't genocidal, as communist ones
are.
> ... There is next to nothing in Naziism that is
> >congenial to the Right, either in Europe or America. ...
> Counterexamples:
> Nationalism
OK.
> Love of Armed Force
Fantasy.
> "Family Values"
Maybe. I don't know. So many of the upper echelon Nazis were
homosexual.
> Contrast Nazi
> >assumptions and beliefs with those of Edmund Burke, the intellectual
> >father of Western conservatism--you'll find almost nothing that Burke and
> >his conservative descendents could stomach, much less admire.
> True, Nazism is far from Burkean conservatism, but many
> present-day American right-wingers are far from that also. As Michael
> Lind has pointed out, Newt Gingrich has been more Robespierre than Burke.
Gingrich is a liberal. Clinton's twin.
> [Lots of attacks on Marx's work...]
> None of the attempts to debunk accounts of the horrors of the
> early Industrial Revolution have provided any contrary narrative, for
> example, that early factory workers lived in nice fake country estates.
Sure it was bad in some places. And yet for some reason, it seemed to be
preferable to agricultural life. The fact is that the most efficient
factory owners preferred decent conditions for their workers and lobbied
for them, believing that the sweatshop owners had an unfair advantage.
In any case, it simply can't compare with the horrors of life under
communism.
> Furthermore, if capitalism is an absolute good...
Capitalism ISN'T an "absolute good," whatever that is. It simply offers
a way to produce more wealth than the alternatives.
> ...then pornography
> must be an absolute good, since 99.99% of all porn is produced in
> capitalist fashion. Porn was supposedly a major driver of early
> videocassette sales, and Internet porn has been a pioneering genre of
> e-commerce.
Incoherent analogy.
> I'm mentioning porn because it is one of the hot buttons of the
> more moralistic right-wingers. If capitalism is so great, then why
> haven't porn makers all gone broke?
Ask yourself, why are human beings imperfect creatures?
> >I don't doubt it, given that you're a liberal. Hard facts like these are
> >uncongenial to the denizens of American academia, which, until only a
> >decade or so back, was the last haven of Marxism in the world.
> For Paleo, Marxism is a dirty word.
Uh, for about a hundred million dead people, it's a dirty word.
> [Marx's personality...]
> I don't think that he was any more of a jerk than many
> right-wingers here are (for some reason, they are much more common than
> left-wing jerks here).
Sure. It's just that HIS particular shitty personality led to mass
murder and genocide.
> ... As for social democrats, they share
> >certain presuppositions with the communists, as Solzhenitsyn so astutely
> >pointed out in his Harvard speech.
> Pure demonization. What does he have in mind?
Suspicion and/hatred of religion, belief that human beings are
perfectable or at least improveable in significant ways, belief that
morality is rooted in human desire, etc.
> >Which is not the question anyway. Liberals loathe Christianity in its
> >pure, unadulterated form because it makes truth claims that liberalism
> >simply can't stomach.
> Such as selling all one has and giving the money to the poor?
> Turning the other cheek?
Don't see many liberals doing either.
> The right wing would dismiss JC's teachings as Commie hippie tripe
> if they had appeared outside of the Bible.
As if the mass-murdering left would do any better?
> >By no means. If you attempt to allow, for example, homosexual
> >"marriage," you're engaging in a government-sponsored attack on the
> >institution of marriage.
> What's the "institution" of marriage? What's legitimate marriage,
> anyway? In the Bible, several men had had many wives, without ever being
> criticized for that -- is that legitimate or not?
Yeah, it's one way to do marriage. Far from the best.
> Imagine President Clinton being married to Hillary Rodham,
> Gennifer Flowers, and Monica Lewinsky -- at the same time.
Sounds like fun. He won't have to worry about Hillary much longer,
anyway.
> And you're denying the validity of the moral
> >insights of those who believe that sexual morality is grounded in a
> >transcendent order.
> However, if the "transcendent order" has no comment about
> marriage, or thinks that homosexual marriage is OK, ...
Yeah. Except it DOES have something to say.
> >You are assuming that I have never considered their arguments. I used to
> >be a leftist myself. Been there, done that, got the T-shirt.
> Sinner-turned-saint. Sheesh. I wonder when someone is going to
> turn the sinner-turned-saint routine on its head and claim to have once
> been a hard-boiled right-winger who has seen the light.
That guy who writes for Harper's. Michael somebody. And Garry Wills.
They're all over the place.
> >Can a conservative really be an atheist? I don't know. ...
> It's indeed possible to be a right-wing atheist.
What I mean is, how sustainable is such a position?
Loren Petrich
Paleo <pale...@operamail.com> wrote:
>In article <826sk3$egr$1...@nntp8.atl.mindspring.net>, pet...@netcom.com
>says...
>I'm merely taking the word of communist states that they were in fact
>communist. Nothing else.
And also that the GDR and the DPRK were/are democracies?
>> The Nazis opposed the Left...
>The Nazis thought of themselves as leftists.
That would not be apparent from Hitler's vilifications of Marxism.
[Nazism...]
>> "Family Values"
>Maybe. I don't know. So many of the upper echelon Nazis were
>homosexual.
Some of the earlier ones certainly had been, but after he took
over, Hitler made homophobia an official policy. One of the remarkable
things about Adolf Hitler's career is his long history of stabbing
friends and associates in the back. The homosexual members of his
movement. The more mainstream German conservatives. Neville Chamberlain.
Joseph Stalin. However, he never stabbed Benito Mussolini or Francisco
Franco in the back.
>Gingrich is a liberal. Clinton's twin.
News to me.
>Capitalism ISN'T an "absolute good," whatever that is. It simply offers
>a way to produce more wealth than the alternatives.
That would not be apparent from all the capitalism-is-good
rhetoric that I see.
>> For Paleo, Marxism is a dirty word.
>Uh, for about a hundred million dead people, it's a dirty word.
"I am not a Marxist" -- Karl Marx
Scott D. Erb
You've found a few sources that agree with your bias, you demonize the other
side, and try to pretend that its a left-right dichotomy with the "right"
being the good side and the "left" always bad. You misinterpret sources to
prove it, and are locked into your biases.
Theres not much I can do in response, I've studied these things my whole life
and know you're wrong, but all you do is throw a few tendentious authors in my
face and make assertions. You don't support your assertions, but you try to
press me to prove them wrong.
You can live with your illusions, friend.
But you do inspire me. In my teaching and my political life I am going to do
everything I can do to make sure that other people have the knowledge,
strength of mind and clarity of thought not to fall for the same trap you fell
for. Thanks at the very least for that! I don't mean to say I think you're a
bad guy -- I actually think you are honest and sincere. I am afraid you've
just got misguided along the way and are locked into a way of thinking that
you don't dare question or put to scrutiny. I'm trying to avoid the flames
others give you, but given your style I can understand why you draw them. It
just might be that all the other educated and active people are right on many
of these points and you're wrong. That is something you should consider.
live well, scott
Paleo
says...
> >I'm merely taking the word of communist states that they were in fact
> >communist. Nothing else.
> And also that the GDR and the DPRK were/are democracies?
No self-proclaimed communist state was a democracy. They were, however,
communist.
> >> The Nazis opposed the Left...
> >The Nazis thought of themselves as leftists.
> That would not be apparent from Hitler's vilifications of Marxism.
Hell, Marx himself vilified every other socialist in sight who dared to
depart in the tiniest way from his own opinions. This means nothing.
> >Gingrich is a liberal. Clinton's twin.
> News to me.
You're not understanding the word "liberal" in the most meaningful way,
then. Nobody who thinks FDR was a great president could be a
conservative.
> >Capitalism ISN'T an "absolute good," whatever that is. It simply offers
> >a way to produce more wealth than the alternatives.
> That would not be apparent from all the capitalism-is-good
> rhetoric that I see.
Nonsense. That's merely a consequence of the fact that freedom is
necessary for human happiness and fulfillment. What you do with freedom
is your own business. You can horrifically misuse it. The free market
is merely the most efficient way to produce wealth. Nothing else.
> >> For Paleo, Marxism is a dirty word.
> >Uh, for about a hundred million dead people, it's a dirty word.
> "I am not a Marxist" -- Karl Marx
Wonder if that line convinced St. Peter.
KurtNicklas
>
>I doubt, Paleo, the discussion is worth continuing.
<superciliousness snipped>
>It
>just might be that all the other educated and active people are right on many
>of these points and you're wrong.
The Boy Perfessor should take his own advice.
Ah, but he so rarely does....
Easier for him to give it than to take it, I suppose.
--
Kurt Nicklas
Weasel Quotes:
'Strange fucking morals you got. Your parents disgraced
themselves by not strangling you.'
-- Bryan Z. Jamieson(ze...@snowcrest.net)
Who gives a shit what these nuts like or don't like.
Koresh them all.
--Gary Roselles(rose...@idt.net)
Face it, I know this stuff better than you. You just can't
stand that, can you?
--Scott Erb(scot...@maine.maine.edu)
http://tiberias.home.sprynet.com/leftwinghate.htm
Loren Petrich
Paleo <pale...@operamail.com> wrote:
>In article <82a60a$uu4$1...@nntp9.atl.mindspring.net>, pet...@netcom.com
>says...
>> That would not be apparent from Hitler's vilifications of Marxism.
>Hell, Marx himself vilified every other socialist in sight who dared to
>depart in the tiniest way from his own opinions. This means nothing.
So what? One of Hitler's grudges against the Jews was that they
had supposedly invented Marxism and Communism.
Paleo
> >It seems to me that the Christian religion's account of human nature and
> > reality correspond well to reality as we experience it. I can't say much
> > more than that.
> I disagree with you, though I can see making a case that on a metaphorical level most
> religions have what could be considered an accurate belief on human nature. I disagree,
> but its a question philosophers have debated for a long time, so I won't quibble on the
> specifics for now.
You don't need to be a philosopher to see the correspondence.
Christianity claims that human beings and the rest of creation are
imperfect and flawed. You can see that with your own eyes. It claims
that we have a God-given sense of right and wrong. Again, obvious. It
claims that we hurt others and ourselves when we sin--i.e., abjure right
and do wrong. Ditto. It claims that a guilty conscience is our signal
that we've done wrong, and that we feel better when we confess and try to
do better--again, simple empirical fact. I could go on, but you get the
idea. It fits human nature like a key fits a lock.
> > Minus the element of faith, needless to say. And yet, I would contend
> > that to be an atheist or agnostic requires a degree of faith as well. In
> > fact, the mere assumption that we can communicate with words requires a
> > kind of faith, as George Steiner demonstrates in "Real Presences."
> I suppose depending on how one defines faith, it requires a type of faith just to act in
> the world. Namely, you have to hold a few assumptions about reality (e.g., the laws of
> physics won't suddenly change, you're not dreaming, etc.) in order to act. Some
> assumptions and beliefs are more rational than others; part of the challenge of life is
> to learn discernment about what assumptions to accept and what ones not to. It is the
> ultimate in relativist logic to say that since some kind of faith is required for all
> action, therefore all faith is equal. Apply that logic to cultures or ethics, and
> you'll see what I mean!
Sure, and I don't say that. I merely say that to contend there is no God
takes real faith, and that the existence of the honest atheist is plagued
by the same kind of doubt that occasionally assails the believer.
> > Life is short. Too short for every human being to arrive at his own
> > philosophy of reality starting from scratch. We all assign axiomatic
> > status to certain propositions. You included. We just differ on which
> > propositions are accorded that status.
> We don't start from scratch, we learn from those who came before. But ultimately we
> place our bets and make our choices. Its too important to simply leave up to others
> unless I perceive a very good reason for doing so. So far, I haven't.
You can't have it both ways. Either we learn from others or we don't.
Christianity seems a good place to learn.
> > Presuming, of course, that you have with perfect rationality deciphered
> > the data of existence and constructed the only possible
> > rational philosophy out of it. Not, on its surface, a totally convincing
> > claim.
> Since that isn't my claim, its irrelevant.
And since that isn't your claim, you'll have no objection to those who
conclude that Christianity offers a convincing account of reality.
> > > But as children grow, they decide what to believe. I truly believe
> > > that self-discovery, not programming, is the key to understanding values and
> > > ethics...
> > In other words, that all value originates in human desire. This is
> > precisely what the story of Eve and the apple is about.
> Your assertion (all value originates in desire) may be true, but that could lead in a
> variety of ways.
In practice, it tends to lead to only one place: hell.
> > But if they finally decide that Naziism is the most authentic way to
> > live, then you'd behave as if they'd simply found a truth you don't agree
> > with?
> No, I'd think they haven't found a truth, I'd say I'm convinced they were wrong. But it
> is their call to make, I can't determine what they believe.> Some chruches do better
> than others, in my opinion...
Wait a minute. You have said elsewhere that no supposed truth should be
immune from challenge. Suppose they decide to challenge your putative
truth that all men are created equal. Given your supposed agnosticism re
ultimate truths, you couldn't criticise them.
> > In other words, it commits the sin--from your point of view--of having a
> > set of axiomatic propositions different from yours. Not that you can
> > prove yours are any better.
> As long as they don't make laws that try to force me to live by theirs, that's cool...
Uh, Scott, there has never BEEN a society that didn't force people to
live by a set of laws, and you may be certain that there are always
people who don't think they should be forced to live by same.
> No
> problem. I shouldn't make them live by my ideals either...
But you're quite willing to do so by laws you believe are right.
> Each of us should accept that
> in this world some people live by different values...
Only you're quite willing to force your beliefs on others re positive
law.
> ...ethics is determining a way to allow
> this to happen without any group acting in a way that creates direct or structural harm
> to other groups, that puts it in the realm of politics.
Your claim here involves another of those axiomatic matters of faith that
you would deny to Christians. Namely, that one group shouldn't be
allowed to harm another. You apparently regard this as beyond dispute.
But needless to say, there are those who would disagree with you and
resent your forcing your morality on them.
> > That you can say this at the end of this bloody century suggests to me
> > that you haven't thought seriously about it. This century was turned
> > into an abbatoir by a certain progressive, atheist philosophy. Mass
> > murder in hitherto undreamed-of proportions is reliably associated with
> > the coming to power of that regime. This is mere brute fact. That you
> > can't concede this fact suggests that you're refusing to allow yourself
> > to see the world as it is. It would seem that you have no right to
> > accuse religionists of blind faith.
> You're being silly. My point made clearly in a number of posts, is that ideology is
> part of a larger process whereby human existence is turned into an abstraction and
> humans can be seen as less than true humans, making killing easier to justify...
This is word salad that desperately attempts to ignore a fact you don't
want to face: that it's been leftist, progressive, officially atheist
states which have been the most horrific mass murderers in human history.
And that somehow the conservative, religious states have not "turned
human existence into an abstraction" on such a nightmarish scale.
> That
> happened in Vietnam (I've spoken to many American soldiers about this), it happened when
> the colonizers conquered Africa and Asia and sold people as slaves...
No, it did NOT happen in Viet Nam, if you're claiming that the slaughter
approached that of the communist states in even a tiny way. Ditto
slavery (which wouldn't have happened, needless to say, if African
potentates hadn't been so willing to sell their own people).
> ...it happened in
> Communist countries, it happened when the US commited genocide against native tribes.
Speaking as someone with a grandfather born on a reservation in Oklahoma,
I can assure you that, as horrific as U.S policy was toward the Indians,
it never approached the scale of leftist slaughter.
> Communism is a part of a larger problem; you want to isolate and blame only the part,
> since that fits your ideological bias.
No. I merely want to make an obvious point and have you concede it: that
no state or religion in the history of the world has committed mass
slaughter that even remotely approached that of the leftist, officially
atheist states. Nobody else compares. Nobody, nowhere. This is plain,
ascertainable fact. It has nothing to do with "technology" and nothing
the Americans did to the Indians or the Vietnamese can compare with it.
Given this unavoidable fact and its obvious implications, the spectacle
of you desperately wiggling as you try to avoid staring it straight in
the face is not edifying. This is not "demonizing" anybody--it's merely
facing facts.
> > Except that you're left with the uncomfortable fact that mass murder on
> > such a barbaric scale happened ONLY with communist states.
> No. Read your history. Technology may make the numbers higher in the 20th century, but
> such massacres are not uncommon in human history, be it the Mongols, the thirty years
> war, old Balkan wars, the US expanding West, etc.
I'm sorry. This isn't true. Communists have killed at least 100 million
people in this century. This barbaric record is equalled nowhere else,
and "technology" has nothing whatever to do with it.
> And despite your attempt to reclassify to fit your bias, the Nazis were an extreme right
> wing regime, with as much in common with conservatives as communists have in common with
> social democrats.
Not true. And, as witness to this fact, we see that fascism appealed to
almost no American conservatives, while communism was beloved of hordes
of American liberals. Again, this is not "bias" or a difference of
"perspective": it's simply ascertainable fact.
> > The Church is simultaneously a mystical body of believers on earth and in
> > heaven. It is the entity founded by Christ and ruled by bishops in
> > direct line of descent from the original twelve apostles. Orthodoxy has
> > the best claim to being THE Church. Rome has departed somewhat from the
> > original teaching, but is still closer to the truth than Protestantism.
> That just strikes me as silly. You can, of course, believe it and live by it if you
> want to. No problem. I have beliefs that strike other people as silly, so my first
> sentence is not meant as an insult; I can be insulted just as easily. But the moment
> you or I start trying to make everyone else live by exactly our world views, then we
> cross a dangerous line. Thats when politics must come into play.
Of course, anytime you pass a law, you are "making everyone else live by
exactly your world views."
> > I can assure you that the Russian Orthodox will alter dogma not in the
> > least. If you think they're doing so, please show me where. And there's
> > no evidence that sticking to Christ's original teachings has "caused them
> > problems," unless you refer to the regular martyrdom of Christians
> > everywhere.
> No, Russia's simply backward and corrupt. Part of it, I think, reflects the church's
> inability to enter the modern era. I think it ultimately will, though it'll be a
> difficult process. We'll see.
We're not talking about Russia, we're talking about the Deposit of Faith
held by the Russian Orthodox Church.
> > "Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things
> > not seen." It is the sine qua non of the Way of the Lord Jesus. It is
> > the admission that we are not privy to the true nature of reality.
> We aren't. I agree with that. I don't see a reason to accept one particular body of
> religious teaching over another to answer those questions.
> > But the axiomatic propositions of Christianity are perfectly congruent
> > with life as we experience it. They make at least as much empirical
> > sense as do yours.
> That again is very relativist...
By no means. As I illustrated at the top, Christianity is congruent with
human experience at least as much as atheism is, and most people would
say a lot more.
> Doesn't there need to be some way of evaluating and
> distinguishing between world views? Or, since they all can be interpreted to make sense
> with reality, are they all equivalent and equally justifiable? That is a legitimate
> view to take, though I'd disagree -- but it represents the essence of relativism, which
> seems contrary to what I would expect you to argue.
Of course they're not all equally justifiable. It's difficult to justify
atheism, for example.
Paleo
> I doubt, Paleo, the discussion is worth continuing.
If you refuse to face obvious facts, of course it's not.
> You've found a few sources that agree with your bias...
If you think they're wrong, you're free to show how and where.
> ...you demonize the other side...
By no means. I merely engage in a bit of intellectual diagnosis whose
conclusion you don't like. But you're free to illustrate its weakness if
you can.
> and try to pretend that its a left-right dichotomy with the "right"
> being the good side and the "left" always bad. You misinterpret sources to
> prove it, and are locked into your biases.
If you can show us how I've misinterpreted anything, you're free to fire
when ready. And by "locked into my biases," you merely mean I have an
opinion that's different than yours. I, at least, can show you how I
believe it's more congruent with reality than yours. You have been
unable to do the same for your own beliefs.
> Theres not much I can do in response...
You could concede commonly known facts for a start.
> ...I've studied these things my whole life
> and know you're wrong...
Then it should be easy to SHOW how I'm wrong, rather than resort to
status claims about yourself.
> ...but all you do is throw a few tendentious authors in my
> face and make assertions. You don't support your assertions, but you try to
> press me to prove them wrong.
On the contrary, I've supported every assertion I've made. If you think
I've missed something, feel free to point it out.
> You can live with your illusions, friend.
Perhaps you can demonstrate, for example, that it's an "illusion" that
the record for the most horrific mass murder and genocide in the history
of the world belongs to officially atheist, leftist states. If this is
an "illusion," it should be easy to puncture it. If, by contrast, it's
merely a fact you prefer not to face, then the problem is you, not me.
> But you do inspire me. In my teaching and my political life I am going to do
> everything I can do to make sure that other people have the knowledge,
> strength of mind and clarity of thought not to fall for the same trap you fell
> for...
Why don't you start by practicing on this newsgroup?
> Thanks at the very least for that! I don't mean to say I think you're a
> bad guy -- I actually think you are honest and sincere...
Gee, thanks. Coming from a professor, I'm honored.
> I am afraid you've
> just got misguided along the way and are locked into a way of thinking that
> you don't dare question or put to scrutiny...
Uh, given the record of our discussion and your refusal to face certain
huge facts, it would appear to be YOU who is afraid to "question or put
to scrutiny" your cherished ideas.
> I'm trying to avoid the flames
> others give you, but given your style I can understand why you draw them. It
> just might be that all the other educated and active people are right on many
> of these points and you're wrong. That is something you should consider.
If I'm wrong, it should be easy for an educated man such as yourself to
show us where. The fact that you can't seem to do so would seem to be
suggestive.
Scott D. Erb
knic...@NOSPAMrocketmail.com says...
>The Boy Perfessor should take his own advice.
>
>Ah, but he so rarely does....
>
>Easier for him to give it than to take it, I suppose.
Tell me, Kurt, when will actually post something of substance rather than just
silly little attacks?
And when will you admit that your attacks on Zepp for not using his real name
are not a desire of yours to increase civility on the internet (your own style
shows that is not something you value), but simply an attempt to use whatever
means you can to personally go after someone whose opinions you disagree with?
In other words, Knickers, you have to be the most dishonest posters I've seen
around here. Your insults wouldn't be so pathetic if you'd actually post a
comment of substance now and then. Even your attempt to dig up personal
information wouldn't be so bad if you didn't justify it with a lie.
Oh well, I guess yours must be a lonely life...
Scott D. Erb
<16B59BEFAA71F49E.8DA4C4C8...@lp.airnews.net>,
pale...@operamail.com says...
>If you think they're wrong, you're free to show how and where.
I did. It isn't enough for you, and your assertions aren't enough for me.
C'est la vie.
>By no means. I merely engage in a bit of intellectual diagnosis whose
>conclusion you don't like. But you're free to illustrate its weakness if
>you can.
No, you tried to categorize things and assert a strict dichotomy, when I
explained clearly why you were wrong. You ignored that, and went into what
appeared to be silly rhetoric that tried to deny that the nazis were right
wing just so you could keep your strange "all left bad/all right good"
labeling technique, ignored all the evidence I gave to the contrary about the
causes of violence in order to simply attack communism (even though no one I
know of is defending communism, that's obsolete cold war rhetoric you're
using)... No, a wise man once said not to cast ones pearls before swine. I
don't mean that you are a swine, but that its clear that you are not going to
take my words seriously, and you are very set in your ways.
Thats fine. Sometimes no real communication is possible, and it also takes
wise people to realize when world views are just so diverse that trying to
discuss is not profitable for either.
>If you can show us how I've misinterpreted anything, you're free to fire
>when ready. And by "locked into my biases," you merely mean I have an
>opinion that's different than yours. I, at least, can show you how I
>believe it's more congruent with reality than yours. You have been
>unable to do the same for your own beliefs.
That is a lie.
I really can see why you get attacked, why people complain to your employer
and things like that. I really think you ought to stop complaining about the
speck in my eye and look at the log in yours. But if it'll make you feel
better, I will go back to your last post and explaining thoroughly why you are
wrong. If all you do after that is press and reassert the debunked points, I
will ignore you without comment, letting you live in what I believe are your
own illusions. If you show some thoughtful response, and not just an attempt
to defend the edifice of your biases and beliefs, I will continue the
conversation. But I won't engage in something like this, a "you said this/no
you said that" type of personal exchange. One or two is fine, but only
flametrolls like knickers make it a lifetime. You can have the last word in
that regard, for whatever its worth. I'll go back to your long post and give
my reply.
ciao, scott
Scott D. Erb
really leftists:
"Theory was not the strong point of movements devoted to the inadequacies
of reason and rationalism and the superiority of instict and will. They
attracted all kinds of reactionary theorists in countries with an active
conservative intellectual life... as we have seen fascism shared
nationalism, anti-communism, anti-liberalism, etc. with other non-fascist
elements on the right....The major difference between the fascist and the
non-fascist right was that fascism existed by mobilizing masses from
below."
Page 117, "The Age of Extremes" by Eric Hobsbawm
He also points out on the same page how the Nazis stole symbols from the
Communists to try to lure the working class to their right wing cause,
including the term "national SOCIALIST.
For a real dramatic story showing how anti-communist and right wing the
nazis were, see:
"The Nazi Seizure of Power, The Experience of a Single German Town,
1930-1935," by William Sheridan Allen.
For those who doubt that nazis were anti-bolshevik to the extreme, here
are some places to look:
"Political Ideologies" by Thobaben and Funderburk
"Political Ideologies" by Leon Baradat
"A History of Modern Germany," by Hajo Holborn>"European Democracies" by
Juerg Steiner
"The Nightmare Years," by William Shirer (a book everyone should read
sometime in their lives)
"The Weimar Republic," by Detlev J.k. Peukert
The KPD (Communists) were the first party put in the concentration camps
in 1933. The SPD (Socialists, anti-Communist and anti-fascist) were sent
to Dachau in 1933 as well, voting against Hitler extending his powers.
The conservative parties supported Hitler completely.
From "Political Ideologies" by Thobaben and Funderburk, 3rd edition, p.
187:
"Hitler states his hatred of democracy with its 'ridiculous institution'
of parliament and communism with the 'loathsome' doctrines of class
struggle created by 'the jew Karl Marx'....Hermann Goering, commander of
the German force, saw Germany as a bastion against communism. War with
the 'red terror' was viewed as inevitable as national socialism and
Marxism are poles apart. Marxism's doctrines of class struggle,
internationalism, pulbic ownership of property, and atheism, if put into
practice, would destroy Germany as a nation-state."
From: "The Weimar Republic," by Detlev J.K. Peukert. Peukert, who died in
1990 at age 39, was formerly professor of modern history at the University of
Essen, and director of the Research Institute for the history of the nazi
Period:
"Ideologically speaking, on the other hand, the NSDAP stood for a melange of
ideas and grievances that were far from original and indeed were common to
much of the German right; all that was new was the passion and single
mindedness with which the separate ingredients of this ideological mixture
were combined on behalf of a struggle against ‘the system.' This demonized
image of ‘the system' was aprojection of attitudes that were by no means
identical: anti-Semitism, anti-liberalism, and anti-Marxism...some of the
Nazis specific political arguments were certainly borrowed frmo the attacks on
modernization that had been mounted by the conservative Kulturkritiker. But
the Nazis cult of dynamism and the movement's utopian appeal to a future
national community outrivalled the conservatives' attempts to restore the old
order." - p. 237
Note also page 268: anti-fascist movements were mostly from the left, and were
paralyzed by the right. Not also in that chapter how it was conservative
parties which cooperated with Hitler, and helped him gang power (and
ultimately voted to give Hitler total power later in 1933, with only the SPD
standing against him).
Note finally that I don't see the nazis as being any more like modern
conservatives than the communists are like modern leftists or liberals. The
extremes of either left or right are essentially evil, in my opinion.
Scott D. Erb
<E082375B2210BE37.39C4B698...@lp.airnews.net>,
pale...@operamail.com says...
>You don't need to be a philosopher to see the correspondence.
>Christianity claims that human beings and the rest of creation are
>imperfect and flawed. You can see that with your own eyes. It claims
>that we have a God-given sense of right and wrong. Again, obvious. It
>claims that we hurt others and ourselves when we sin--i.e., abjure right
>and do wrong. Ditto. It claims that a guilty conscience is our signal
>that we've done wrong, and that we feel better when we confess and try to
>do better--again, simple empirical fact. I could go on, but you get the
>idea. It fits human nature like a key fits a lock.
So you're saying that humans have developed an interpretation of human nature
which can be defended. You say that because someone developed a religion that
reflects commonly held views that humans are imperfect, that they have a sense
of right and wrong, and that we hurt ourselves when we hurt others (not a
self-evident truth, by the way), or that a guilty conscience is a signal we've
done wrong (not something that seems true for everyone either), or that we
feel better when we confess (definitely not true for everyone), then it
somehow is a great "fits like a lock" description of human nature?
Hell, pop psychology books do better than that!! Real psychology does much
better, and goes into the question of how much is nature, how much is
cultural, and the debates about that. You're simply assuming true that which
you believe true about human nature, fitting it into your pre-existing belief
system. Cool. Go ahead. But your argument certainly is weak.
>Sure, and I don't say that. I merely say that to contend there is no God
>takes real faith, and that the existence of the honest atheist is plagued
>by the same kind of doubt that occasionally assails the believer.
Irrelevant to any point I'm making, since I agree that to do anything in life
takes a modicum of "faith" -- faith the laws of physics won't change, etc.
But some beliefs are more rational and based in experience and observation
than others; some beliefs are irrational, based on wishful thinking or
programing by parents or culture. I think yours seem to be more of the latter
than the former.
>You can't have it both ways. Either we learn from others or we don't.
>Christianity seems a good place to learn.
Nah, it seems a good place to get programming. Or you can get programmed by
Buddhists, either way you're probably just as close to the truth. Or you can
both learn from others and assess and choose exactly what you believe.
Certainly a free thinking individual wouldn't submit himself to the dogma of
some group of humans claiming to represent a "church." What kind of person
would do that?
>And since that isn't your claim, you'll have no objection to those who
>conclude that Christianity offers a convincing account of reality.
I've never objected to people making their own subjective claims on the
matter. I've simply stated that I disagree. I DO have an objection to them
trying to force others to live by their beliefs. Then they deserve to be
defeated politically.
>In practice, it tends to lead to only one place: hell.
Prove it.
>Wait a minute. You have said elsewhere that no supposed truth should be
>immune from challenge. Suppose they decide to challenge your putative
>truth that all men are created equal. Given your supposed agnosticism re
>ultimate truths, you couldn't criticise them.
You are making a huge error here. Saying that all things can be challenged
does not mean all things are equivalent! Saying that all things might be
wrong, doesn't mean we have to accept all propositions as equally valid. Take
science -- it is possible we are disembodied brains on a space ship, being fed
sensations and no reality exists. That can't be dismissed as impossible, but
there is no reason to believe it. If someone states that, I have no reason to
take it seriously or act as if it were true. I have no reason to say I can't
criticize them. You don't need absolute certainty in order to make and live
by distinctions. You don't need absolute certainty in order to criticize
something.
>Uh, Scott, there has never BEEN a society that didn't force people to
>live by a set of laws, and you may be certain that there are always
>people who don't think they should be forced to live by same.
Two wrongs don't make a right. If every society jumped off the empire state
building, would you follow. Sheesh.
Still, if one group, like fundie Christians, try to force me to live by their
moral view, then I will fight against their effort with all my will, intellect
and power. If they don't like it, then perhaps they should realize that they
can live by their ideas without forcing others to live them as well.
If you want people to respect your choices, you'd damn well better respect the
choices other people make. I can totally 100% respect your right to live your
life by your own moral beliefs, and to act in accord with them. Once you try
forcing me to do the same, my respect for you goes out the window; you've
declared war, and you will not get away with it!
>> No
>> problem. I shouldn't make them live by my ideals either...
>
>But you're quite willing to do so by laws you believe are right.
Nope, you're wrong on that count too.
>Only you're quite willing to force your beliefs on others re positive
>law.
Nope, you're wrong there too.
>Your claim here involves another of those axiomatic matters of faith that
>you would deny to Christians. Namely, that one group shouldn't be
>allowed to harm another. You apparently regard this as beyond dispute.
>But needless to say, there are those who would disagree with you and
>resent your forcing your morality on them.
Nope, you're wrong there too. It seems every time you try to tell me what my
view point is, you mess up.
>This is word salad that desperately attempts to ignore a fact you don't
>want to face: that it's been leftist, progressive, officially atheist
>states which have been the most horrific mass murderers in human history.
Nope, you're wrong there too. Communism is no more progressive and leftwing
than fascism was conservative and right wing. The extremes of both left and
right have been evil, but both extremes bear little resemblance to the
moderate and democratic parts of the ideology. You just want to dishonestly
pretend that there is no far right, and define all bad things as on the left,
even though obviously progressive leftism has a hatred of Stalinism and his
kind of actions. Thats why I accuse you of demonization and dishonesty -- you
simply try to define labels in a way that suits your bias. You are wrong.
I've given you references from books on political ideology, I've explained the
differences between right and left, and why fascism was not left wing. That
is something well explored by philosophers, historians and social scientists.
You throw that out the window and assert that your labels are right because
you decide they are right. BZZZZT! That is weak minded, dishonest, and
discredits you. That is the kind of tactic that gets you slammed and insulted
by a bunch of people here. I just feel sorry for you, but realize its
probably not worth wasting much more time on you. You're locked into a
self-serving interpretation of reality to rationalize your biases, and you
probably won't change.
>And that somehow the conservative, religious states have not "turned
>human existence into an abstraction" on such a nightmarish scale.
Cromwell's England. The Spanish inquisition (and Spanish conquest of the new
world). The Crusades. Jihands. Salem witch trials. Wars of reformation. I
could go on and on. History does NOT support you.
>No, it did NOT happen in Viet Nam, if you're claiming that the slaughter
>approached that of the communist states in even a tiny way. Ditto
>slavery (which wouldn't have happened, needless to say, if African
>potentates hadn't been so willing to sell their own people).
You're wrong again. And African potentates are irrelevant to the FACT that
good Christian citizens sold and traded humans with no regard for their life,
treating them as property to be used. These weren't communists with no regard
for life, these were American Christians. Sorry, your bias is showing.
>Speaking as someone with a grandfather born on a reservation in Oklahoma,
>I can assure you that, as horrific as U.S policy was toward the Indians,
>it never approached the scale of leftist slaughter.
I'd say it could be seen as worse. And don't forget, nazism was a right wing
slaughter, despite your attempts to simply argue by labeling that it was not.
You seem to want to say that since totalitarian regimes in the 20th century
actually killed greater numbers of people, their crimes were worse. That is
faulty logic. Slavery, genocide, and killing of innocents in the name of God
is just as bad as in the name of an ideology, left or right, even if the
numers are lower.
Unless you can admit that basic fact, and admit the indisputable claim that
your attempt to whitewash your own "side" and blame everything on leftists is
bogus, you're living in fantasy, an illusion based on illogic and dishonesty
which is why people trash you constantly. Its not because you are a bad
person or the people who trash you are bad people. Its because your use of
rhetoric, argumentation, and logic is dishonest to the core -- even if for
some reason you don't recognize it and believe you are being sincere.
>I'm sorry. This isn't true. Communists have killed at least 100 million
>people in this century. This barbaric record is equalled nowhere else,
>and "technology" has nothing whatever to do with it.
You're making the same errors:
1) You define all mass murders as leftist by definition, even though many
were right wing;
2) You add up the numbers, rather than looking at the acts and recognizing
that the acts are just as bad even if the pre-20th century numbers aren't as
high;
3) You try to suggest that communism as things in common with modern
progressive, democratic leftism. It doesn't. Even in the early 20th century
the Social Democrats and progressive leftists hated and despised Communists
and the Communist system. You can't draw that link, even though you assert
you can.
4) Ironically, you bristle at the FACT that the Nazis were right wing. Your
only defense is that they don't look like other conservatives. GET A CLUE!
Stalin doesn't look at ALL like modern social democrats or American liberals.
You argue by labeling, demonizing, and trying to deny reality. Its bogus.
You fail.
>Of course they're not all equally justifiable. It's difficult to justify
>atheism, for example.
Its at least as justifiable as your view, if not more. I think you know that.
Scott D. Erb
<5C0BA8373E1497AD.41F75DA3...@lp.airnews.net>,
pale...@operamail.com says...
>No. It was mere fallen human nature.
But you seem to blame communism for some abuses, but then a simple fallen
human nature for others. That seems a tad biased. I gave a reason that
covered all, and didn't demonize one side or the other.
> It had nothing to do with capitalism per se.
Then accept that same logic when you deal with communist abuses of power.
Anything else would be hypocritical. Can you see that?
> To understand as much, look at the history of Europe
>from the fall of Rome til the middle ages. Various tribes and peoples
>swept back and forth across the continents, doing their best to
>exterminate each other. They didn't need capitalism to do so. It's an
>eternal human temptation to want to get rid of the other guy.
So you can make the same judgement with communism. Your attempt to split
ideologies between left and right and say one side is better is by your own
logic irrational. If you try to somehow say Communism is different, you're
contracting your argument here.
If your arguments contradict, we can throw both out.
>> And what about the crusades, and many other religiously
>> motivated slaughters?...
>
>I am by no means minimizing such things. They were horrible. They
>happened. I'm simply making a plain empirical observation: the most
>horrific mass murders in world history happened in officially atheist,
>progressive communist states. The scale of the slaughter there dwarfed
The number killed is not relevant, by your own logic above. Also the biggest
numbers killed were by a left wing regime (Stalin) and a right wing regime
(Hitler). Neither extremist regime had much in common with moderates; fascism
was much different than conservatism, Stalinism was much different than Social
Democracy or American liberalism. (Sometimes people correctly point out that
a lot of American liberals wrongly believed Stalin to be doing good for
Russia; but by the end of WWII when the truth was widely known, it was
liberals who led the fight against Communism; even earlier in Europe the
Social Democrats were fighting Communism because they recognized, correctly,
that Stalin was going against EVERY ideal of the Left. By going to extremes,
both Stalin and Hitler went against all other ideologies EVERYWHERE on the
spectrum!
-snip-
>You don't seem to understand the fact that I and all conservatives and
>libertarians agree with you completely. The good life requires personal
>responsiblity and freedom; freedom requires that huge concentrations of
>government power be eliminated.
The fact you don't recognize is that the Left thinks the same way. You want
to try to dismiss all arguments from the left by trying to smear it by
associating it with communism. You try to get around the fact they could do
the same to conservatives by associating it with fascism, so you conveniently
and wrongly try to associate fascism with the Left.
Your error is one some on the Left do when they call Stalin a right wing
fascist. Each side would love to see its own extreme be defined on the other
side.
The reality is that extremes on any side deny the very ideals of both
conservatism and liberalism, and the true conservatives and liberals tend to
agree on basic goals and hopes, and now adays those on the Left and Right both
tend to agree with what you note that we agree on completely. Your error is
you try to pretend the left and liberals don't think that way by simply
demonizing them and trying to associate them with communism. That is not only
wrong, but it disgusts me, it seems intellectually dishonest and designed only
to argue by smearing. It is that kind of tactic which makes me tempted to
simply shrug my shoulders, consider you a kook, and move on to more serious
posters. I don't like doing that, but given the kooks on the internet, one
has to be discerning on who one spends time responding to.
-snip more on communism; I think I've made my point clearly and forcefully in
this and last two posts on why your rhetorical strategy is very, very wrong
and illogical-
Here's a suggestion: stop trying to argue by labeling. Stop trying to
criticize current liberals by associating them with communism, and using the
simplistic left/right argument as a rhetoric device to smear. Stop trying to
say Hitler was a leftist. Start talking about real issues and questions, and
see if there might not be more agreement. Its that kind of labeling and
attacking which gets people frustrated with you. It is not rational, it
appears as if you want to argue by smear. When you do that, you reap what you
sow, smears come back at you.
>> Look at
>> what drunken assholes like Joe McCarthy did to American freedoms all in the
>> name of paranoia. The only good thing about that guy is that he got
>> discredited, drank himself to death, and has become a symbol of evil.
>
>In fact, he was correct about the general question of Soviet agents of
>influence in American government. But the more interesting question is
GACK! He claimed hundreds had infilatrated. He held up a "list." It was not
a list. He had no figures. He was lying. That is all common knowledge. How
can you make such a claim!!!!!!!!!!????????
>this: given the most homicidal political philosophy in the history of the
>world, FAR worse than Naziism, how was it possible to be "paranoid" about
GACK! Far worse than Nazism? Sheesh. That is not even a serious statement,
you're going off into the type of rhetorical extremism I criticize above. Its
things like that which cause people not to take you seriously.
>its stated intentions of world domination? You apparently don't remember
>the '50s. I do. I remember the atomic war drills and all the kids in
>class getting under the desks. Vividly.
No, I don't remember the 50s. I have studied the cold war history closely,
including Soviet Politics. Nixon and Kissinger realized by the late sixties
that world domination was not their game. Most cold war experts realized it
was typical power politics. The rhetoric was used by Truman and Acheson to
scare the country out of its isolationism, that's all.
-snip-
>> Yeah, centralized power is dangerous, I agree with that...
>
>And LEFTIST centralized power is the most dangerous of all.
Nope. Either side has an equal potential for danger. The left/right
dichotomy is probably a fantasy anyway. The American left or social democrats
have no more in common with Stalin than normal conservatives have in common
with Hitler. You're rhetoric of demonization is irrational and the reason why
I'm losing patience with you. You can argue points without getting into that
kind of crap.
>This is simply untrue. There is no "right-wing authoritarian government
>allied with the US" that approached the homicidal record of the communist
>states even in the smallest respect.
All you are saying is that Stalin killed more than people like Somoza. That
is trying to suggest that a quantitative difference is the same as a
qualitative difference. It is not. Do you compare mass murders that way?
Son of Sam killed less than mass murder X, so he wasn't as bad?
And, of course, you conveniently try to define Hitler out of the right wing
camp even though almost all philosophers and historians put him there (only
hard core tendentious right wing scholars don't; most mainstream conservative
philosophers and historians do put Hitler on the far right). You can't even
maintain your illogical claim of trying to associate quantitative difference
with qualitative difference without that kind of dishonest twist. Weak,
Paleo, very weak.
-snip-
>I'm merely stating a fact: Challoner and Henderson, who under no
>circumstances may be portrayed as conservatives, discovered that the
>Engels work that Marx relied upon most comprehensively was
Again, Marx did not rely on one book from Engels. They were friends, they
wrote each other letters, Engels responded to drafts by Marx. Your whole
point was based on a false premise, that Marx relied on a particular book by
Engels. That's wrong. Also all the attacks I see on Marx come in two
categories:
1) tendentious attacks from the far right or libertarians who simply look
for errors and mistakes and then tie them together to try to create the
illusion that this makes Marx totally dishonest and a bad scholar. But if you
take the careers of almost any 19th century social thinker you can come up
with the same kind of list, things at that time were not near today's
standards; and relatedly
2) people who judge Marx's work by today's standards, rather than
recognizing the state of the field at the time.
My view: Marx was wrong. He made a lot of mistakes. He sometimes mixed in
politics with his philosophy, which led to other mistakes. Yet his
development of structural thinking, consideration of problems within
capitalism and how it functions, and much of his style of thinking was
insightful and ingenious, and has had a major impact on scholarship since.
Aristotle was wrong on almost all his claims too, most pioneering scholars
are. It was wrong to worship Marx, like many leftists did, but demonizing and
trying to discredit him is dishonest. Its enough to point out he was wrong
and why, but to recognize the impact he had -- not just on politics, but on
social theory. No serious sociologist or social scientist can ignore Marx's
ideas, they inform a large chunk of what is done today -- and done well,
rigorously, and scientifically.
>No. I'm doing my best to describe honestly what I see. Liberalism
>rejects the moral universe of Christianity as a basis for positive law--
>as in abortion, for instance--because it doesn't believe that right and
>wrong are handed down from a God. Mankind instead must decide for itself
>what is right and wrong. Please explain to me how this differs from my
>formulation above.
Prove that right and wrong are handed down from God. If you can't, then you
have no basis for assuming that we all should accept christianity as a basis
for "positive law." Unless you can prove your point, it is clear that humans
indeed must decide what is right and wrong.
>By no means. Let's use a little liberal argumentation right now. Who
>are YOU to impose your outdated sexual morality on other people? Suppose
>me and my NAMBLA buddies manage to convince little boys that they really
>don't mind having sex with us? Who are YOU to tell us that what we have
>isn't beautiful, or just as valid as what you have with your wife? As
>long as both parties consent, what's the problem?
As with all laws, we have a constitution, built on social norms, and rule of
law. A lot of what happens in this country is against my ideas of morals and
ethics. But that's not my call to make. I will argue for my opinions and
beliefs -- part of being part of a democratic polity is to do so. If you can
get the constitution and laws changed, I simply have to try to convince people
that you are wrong. I have NO PROBLEM with anti-abortion people trying to
convince people as well, as long as they work within a democratic system
governed by the constitution.
Fascism at root is when a small group of people want to impose their ideals on
others, be they religious ideals or irrational ideals of another sort. I
fight against fascism.
>There is no defense against such argument, needless to say, unless you
>posit a locus of right and wrong other than human desire.
Your argument is illogical. You seem to suggest that because one can't prove
something wrong without something like your view, then your view must be
right. That does not follow. Indeed my view -- that you can never PROVE one
thing right or wrong, and that politics is an exercise in determining social
values (not individual ones), and that a liberal constitutional democracy is
the most free way to do so, is much stronger.
Also, scientifically, one can find facts that children aren't able to protect
themselves against adults and can be manipulated, that the behaviors you
describe create psychological harm, and that therefore these laws have a
rational basis, regardless of religious belief. So you're even wrong on the
claim that one needs a religious position to make a strong case that there
should be laws against that kind of stuff.
>By no means. I believe I can show that that any true liberal can be a
>Christian in only the most adulterated sense. Either you're a pretend
>liberal and real Christian, or a pretend Christian and a real liberal.
No, all one has to do is simply reject your point of view on the matter. You
can't define for everyone what a Christian is, or what a liberal is. You're
wrong, you've been proven to abuse labels and try to use them as a rhetorical
device to simply protect your bias. I don't trust your use of labels in
arguments; argument by labeling is inherently suspect anyway.
>Because Christianity makes certain truth claims which it presents as
>final and unalterable. Final and unalterable truths, not open to debate,
>are uncongenial to liberals, as we see with abortion, homosexuality,
>pedophilia, etc. You yourself are incoherent on this point, in one place
>claiming a liberal can be a Christian, in another claiming that all truth
>claims must be debatable, which is foreign to Christianity.
You're simply wrong. Liberals don't claim that final and unalterable truths
are impossible. Many liberals believe, like I do, that there are final and
unalterable truths. We just accept that we can't prove them in the world or
with science, and so therefore we defend our views and argue for them in a
system where others have different views. We recognize that is part of the
reality of this world, and that despite our convictions, we might be wrong in
our view since we are fallible humans and our views can't be assumed right
just because we believe them.
-snip-
>On the contrary, I'm simply telling the truth. If you reject religion as
>a source of moral truth--which you clearly do--please explain to me the
>putatively more reliable fount where you locate it.
We're all part of the same whole. Whatever you do to anyone else you do to a
part of yourself. We are all parts of God, God isn't separate from us.
Is that religious? Probably -- though different from your religion. Its the
basis of my belief. Might I be wrong? Sure. But I'll live by that view,
and use it to determine my moral approach to life. So far, I haven't seen
anyone prove my position wrong, so I stick to it, unless I see a better
argument or more reasonable claim (I started reading Kant today, on the advice
of another poster, perhaps that will lead me to some different conclusions, he
seems to think Kant's ideas show a path to moral truth independent of
religion, perhaps you should check that out as well).
>So you're saying, for example, that no moral belief may be regarded as
>final and irrevocable. That, for example, we may not say with finality
>that all men are created equal, and that racist oppression is, once and
>for all, simply wrong?
You'd have to make a strong argument to convince me that its not wrong. I
don't think you can.
>> That's ridiculous. No one is forcing you to marry someone of your own sex.
>That is NOT the point. The point is whether it's just to allow
>government to demean the institution that's the root and ground of social
>stability by pretending it's something that most people realize is
>degrading.
You're injecting your bias into something I think you have no business doing,
since in my opinion it brings you to violate the rights of others.
Therefore, I'll fight you politically with every means at my disposal. You
can fight for your belief too, of course. That's politics.
-snip-
>Nothing could be more totalitarian than the attempt of a tiny minority to
>force their flawed notion of "marriage" on a majority that wants no part
>of it.
That statement is plain stupid. It is not totalitarian to let people do what
they want. You don't have to have it forced on you, you can live how you
want.
You are trying to define totalitarian in a way that letting people be free to
do what they want is totalitarian. How Orwellian! It does not hurt you one
bit if two people somewhere else in the city have a same sex marriage. Not
one bit. People used to think the way you do about mixed race marriages to.
Your bias will probably go the way of that bias. Its a matter of time.
>I'm saying that liberals could not tolerate a conception of soldier that
>is different from their own. Therefore, VMI must be forced to admit
>women. By government coercion. Which, of course, destroyed VMI. What
>made the school VMI is now gone.
Probably for the better.
But if you don't want liberal ideals deciding society, why should liberals
accept your ideals to decide the rules of society? Would that not be
totalitarianism on your part? At least liberals accept your right to freedom
of speech, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and to act and vote on
what you believe. If you pass a law, it becomes a law. Would you do the
same, or would you prefer a society where most everything was set in stone,
regardless of what people wanted, because you believe you know the moral
truth. If so, then aren't you the one being more totalitarian?
(the rest of the post was garbled, if not by your server, then by mine, and
couldn't be read clearly)
I really don't personally dislike you, I just think you're locked into a
belief system that has you sort of in a trance. I don't like your argument by
labeling, or what appears to be many rhetorical techniques rooted in logical
erorrs.
ciao, scott
KurtNicklas
>
>In article <82b6c0$t4r$5...@nntp3.atl.mindspring.net>,
>knic...@NOSPAMrocketmail.com says...
>>The Boy Perfessor should take his own advice.
>>
>>Ah, but he so rarely does....
>>
>>Easier for him to give it than to take it, I suppose.
>
>Tell me, Kurt, when will actually post something of substance rather than just
>silly little attacks?
Actually, I've posted more substance than you have over the years. Have a look
at deja.com.
>And when will you admit that your attacks on Zepp for not using his real name
>are not a desire of yours to increase civility on the internet
My stand against pseudonyms applies to everyone. If I pick and choose who I decide
to 'out' then that's all part of my 'Performance Art'. Bryan was one of the lucky
ones.
>(your own style
>shows that is not something you value),
Baloney. I've revealed far less about anyone else than I have about myself on my
own webpage. I've probably revealed far less about anyone than that which is
freely available on the web to anyone who looks.
>but simply an attempt to use whatever
>means you can to personally go after someone whose opinions you disagree with?
Whine, whine, whine...
>In other words, Knickers, you have to be the most dishonest posters I've seen
>around here.
There are multiple number of folks that would say you're a pot calling the ketle...
well, you know the rest.
>Your insults wouldn't be so pathetic
Sorry, but I've been far less insulting that you or anyone else with entries
on my Leftwing Hate Page below.
if you'd actually post a
>comment of substance now and then.
Yadayadayada.
>Even your attempt to dig up personal
>information wouldn't be so bad if you didn't justify it with a lie.
>Oh well, I guess yours must be a lonely life...
Oh, Scott, get some new material for heavens sake!
--
Kurt Nicklas
Weasel Quotes:
'Strange fucking morals you got. Your parents disgraced
themselves by not strangling you.'
-- Bryan Z. Jamieson(ze...@snowcrest.net)
Who gives a shit what these nuts like or don't like.
Koresh them all.
--Gary Roselles(rose...@idt.net)
And even if he did rape Ms. Broaddrick,
he was not as bad a(s) Richard Nixon.
Loren Petrich(pet...@netcom.com)
http://tiberias.home.sprynet.com/leftwinghate.htm
Scott D. Erb
knic...@NOSPAMrocketmail.com says...
>
>Actually, I've posted more substance than you have over the years.
Funny, I haven't seen much in the past few months. Perhaps you've just fallen
into the internet trap of just attacking? After all, as Harold pointed out,
putting people's names in headers is bad nettiquette, and though I had done it
in response to someone doing it to me (Harold is right, though, that didn't
justify it), you go out of your way to do it. I've tried to engage you in
friendly discourse, but you attack. Somehow, I've learned not to trust you.
-snip irrelevancies-
To cut to the chase:
>There are multiple number of folks that would say you're a pot calling the
>ketle... well, you know the rest.
Of course. There are "camps" who will attack each side. That is all fun and
good, but real discourse and discussion should rise above that.
I'll watch and see if you have content, or if its all personal stuff. Perhaps
I'm wrong in my conclusion, but the impression I have is that you long ago
left posting of substance behind.
ciao, scott
Kurt Nicklas
>
>On 4 Dec 1999 22:31:27 GMT, knic...@NOSPAMrocketmail.com
>(KurtNicklas) wrote:
>>Sorry, but I've been far less insulting that you or anyone else with entries
>>on my Leftwing Hate Page below.
>
>The forged posts that you won't put full headers up for because you
>know you will be exposed as a lying asshole, KKKnickers? That page?
No.
The page filled with posts that YOU posted and now try to accuse me of
forging with NO EVIDENCE whatsoever.
The page filled with links to your posts contained in the deja.com archive,
Jim Ed.
Sprynet is probably still laughing about your accusations.
You're a hate-filled bigot, Jim Ed.
Is that why you've been through about 4 ISPs in about 4 years?
You don't want people to be able to throw your words back at you, do you?
That's why you have your No-Archive set to 'Yes' on most of your posts isn't it?
I'm happy to show what you're really like.
Folks can have a look at your words at the URL below.
And have a nice Sunday.
Kurt Nicklas
'I should tell you
You have as little honesty as honour..'
---Henry VIII (W. Shakespeare)
Kurt Nicklas
silverback
(KurtNicklas) wrote:
>In article <82buu2$64p$1...@rupert.unet.maine.edu>, scot...@maine.maine.edu opined...
>>
>>In article <82b6c0$t4r$5...@nntp3.atl.mindspring.net>,
>>knic...@NOSPAMrocketmail.com says...
>>>The Boy Perfessor should take his own advice.
>>>
>>>Ah, but he so rarely does....
>>>
>>>Easier for him to give it than to take it, I suppose.
>>
>>Tell me, Kurt, when will actually post something of substance rather than just
>>silly little attacks?
>
>Actually, I've posted more substance than you have over the years. Have a look
>at deja.com.
oh you sure have fooled alot of people then because apparently those
posts never made it to the usenet groups.
The only things I have ever seen you post are insults and mindless
rants from the moonie times. You really should work on getting better
material.
>
>>And when will you admit that your attacks on Zepp for not using his real name
>>are not a desire of yours to increase civility on the internet
>
>My stand against pseudonyms applies to everyone. If I pick and choose who I decide
>to 'out' then that's all part of my 'Performance Art'. Bryan was one of the lucky
>ones.
>
feeling alittle bit embarassed kurt? Oh and you are fibbing again
there kurt? Now just why haven't you exposed benthere or any of the
other right wing loons like pissant?
>>(your own style
>>shows that is not something you value),
>
>Baloney. I've revealed far less about anyone else than I have about myself on my
>own webpage. I've probably revealed far less about anyone than that which is
>freely available on the web to anyone who looks.
>
keep on fibbing kurt. Oh by the way have you found the full headers on
those forged posts?
>>but simply an attempt to use whatever
>>means you can to personally go after someone whose opinions you disagree with?
>
>Whine, whine, whine...
>
>>In other words, Knickers, you have to be the most dishonest posters I've seen
>>around here.
>
>There are multiple number of folks that would say you're a pot calling the ketle...
>well, you know the rest.
>
>>Your insults wouldn't be so pathetic
>
>Sorry, but I've been far less insulting that you or anyone else with entries
>on my Leftwing Hate Page below.
>
now what about those posts that you forged?
> if you'd actually post a
>>comment of substance now and then.
>
>Yadayadayada.
>
>>Even your attempt to dig up personal
>>information wouldn't be so bad if you didn't justify it with a lie.
>
>>Oh well, I guess yours must be a lonely life...
>
>Oh, Scott, get some new material for heavens sake!
>
>--
>Kurt Nicklas
>Weasel Quotes:
>'Strange fucking morals you got. Your parents disgraced
>themselves by not strangling you.'
>-- Bryan Z. Jamieson(ze...@snowcrest.net)
>Who gives a shit what these nuts like or don't like.
>Koresh them all.
>--Gary Roselles(rose...@idt.net)
>And even if he did rape Ms. Broaddrick,
>he was not as bad a(s) Richard Nixon.
>Loren Petrich(pet...@netcom.com)
>http://tiberias.home.sprynet.com/leftwinghate.htm
>
*****************************************************
GDY Weasel
emailers remove the spam buster
For those seeking enlightenment visit the White Rose at
http://www.spiritone.com/~gdy52150/whiterose.htm
Do your patriotic duty and vote for your favorite blithering idiot at
http://www.spiritone.com/~gdy52150/award.html
======================================================
Michael Ejercito's solution to global warming
If the goverment wanted to end global warming, it would use its
nuclear arsenal to put enough dust into the atmoshpere
to reduce sunlight, creating a nuclear winter.
And just to prove to the world that Dan Quayle
has nothing over him, Micheal wrote.
"the problem is not people are not being
paid enough,but the costs of goods and
services are too high."
************************************************
Scott D. Erb
>Is that relevant? Freedom according to Kant is _independence_ of
>action not complete disjointness of action. So to pick up a Lockean
>example. If you went into the woods and made a home out of natural
>resources there, then you would certainly limit anyone else doing the
>same with _those same natural resources you used_. however, supposing
>an abundance of forest, you would not limit someone else form doing the
>same _in principle_. This sort of distinction, I think, is what Kant
>is sort of getting at. Freedom is one's ability to act independently
>of another if they so choose -- not the total lack of adverse effect by
>anothers actions.
OK, but depending on the example you choose, the potential impact is greater
or lesser. If the forest does not have an abundance of resources, or if your
acts truly limit the ability of another to do the same thing might alter how
we look at it. In other words, all acts potentially limit the freedom of
others to do whatever they want. I think thats the problem with the word --
we have definitions of freedom which often work at cross purposes. We are all
free to do what we want within our circumstances and following our capacity to
act. We are not free to control what others do, or to ignore the consequences
of our acts and the acts of others. But once that is accepted, then the
question becomes -- how much should the acts of others be regulated; what
kinds of acts have consequences so great that they unjustly limit the freedom
of people to act? That to me is not a question with a simple answer, or one
provable correct answer.
>I think it must be reconstrued to be an active thing, for freedom to
>possibly mean what you are saying. I think it is truly a misuse of the
>word, though, possibly not obviously so.
>But the burden of proof is on those that would claim they are not, even
>in Brazil.
Obviously. But the burden of proof in my opinion does not require pointing
out the exact acts which put in place this structural disparaity. The
existence of it, along with the knowledge of essentially how it got created
(slavery, wealthy landowners, discrimination, etc.) and why it keeps operating
is enough. Often in a world where the past leaves at best traces (and in this
case records either weren't kept or were destroyed concerning what really
happened in specifics) a demand for exact proof is a convenient way to
rationalize not doing what is right.
>Well, I suppose that all depends. Suppose your plan is to redistribute
>the wealth some. You must argue for the justness of an apparently
>unjust act. We can just sit here and say you are going to take from
>some to give to others. Those that do not wish to be taken from are
>being mistreated, all else being equal. Now the ball is in your
>court. But, remember, you cannot just say anything like "but, a point
>not on a line has only ONE point that goes through it and does not
>intersect the line." It has to be relevant.
Sure its relevant -- there are many ways to justify redistribution of wealth,
especially given how those with more wealth achieved it due to the functioning
of social structures that grant wealth and power to some and constrain it from
others on the basis of past distributions of power and past injustices. Also
people like the landless peasants do not have a true right to life or
property, nor do they have liberty, if those with wealth and power can keep
them in a situation of virtual slavery. There are many ways to justify such
acts, including pragmatic ones of social peace and stability, as well as long
term economic growth.
>Then you must have an argument for its relevance. Social structures
>are necessarily relationships that surpass the simple relationship
>between one being and another being, but rather are a relationship
>between one group of beings and another being or group of beings. If
>it is just a uniques relationship between to beings, then it is
>generally not a "social structure" but just a relationship.
Social structures are reflected in power/wealth differentials which are not
based solely on the acts of individuals, and they provide meaning to
relationships and acts, thus changing the nature of the acts involved. Again,
you can judge acts by a universal principle, but you can't know how to apply
that principle without taking in account the meaning acts have, meaning which
is often granted in part by the structure. (Think of structures as based in
ideas as well as material -- shared beliefs and understandings about reality
are reflected in social structures).
>The point is that you are trying to draw a conclusion based on the
>relationship that blacks (say) have to whites about the relationship a
>particular black man has with a particular white man. Not only is that
>a fallacy of division, but it is as yet to be seen how this
>relationship matters in the particular moral context.
I disagree -- statistics show that you can generalize, and on pragmatic
grounds it would be silly to say "we know there is a lot of injustice, but
each person has to PROVE that injustice in his case..." even though one aspect
of structural power is that those without can't get the evidence, and we lack
time to go through case by case. You can't ignore pragmatic concerns in the
pursuit of an abstract ideal. Well, you can, but I find that to be a rather
dubious attempt, out of touch with the reality of social, political and even
ethical problems.
>I see two men are wandering the desert. The one sneaks up on the other
>and steals his water. Their paths never cross again. That point where
>the water was stolen, according to you is a "soceity"?
Of a sort. It certainly was a relationship.
>Okay, well, then society reduces to a matter of individuals inreacting
>and it is just a fallacy of division to assume that two consituents of
>a group have the same relationship as the two groups have in general.
>It is a fallacy of composition to go the other way which seems possibly
>necessary.
Again, statistics give us the ability to make some assumptions, even though we
can't be certain they apply to everyone (and we can know that in some cases
they do not). But that's OK -- uncertainty is a part of life, and in a messy
material world we have to think pragmatically sometimes, trying to stick
completely to an abstract ideal might be so unrealistic as we can end up
denying the principles we stick to that ideal in order to uphold. We can have
a grossly unethical society because in trying to enforce ethical behavior
through social rules we set up barriers of proof and action which are
practically unreachable. Thus unethical acts go uncorrected, all in the name
of ethics.
>That is not true. It always was about the two people involved -- or
>the particular people involved. The nazi, the jew and the german. If
>the german tells a lie then he saves the jew from the nazi. Based on
>this circumstance we conclude that it is okay to tell the lie. Under
>different circumstances (perhaps the police, the murderer and the
>citizen), the results might be completely different. At no point is it
>about something like power relationships in society. It is just a
>question of what the actions are as they relate to individuals.
The nazi, jew, and person hiding the jew have various powers because of
societal structures. Without the structures, the act wouldn't have those
different meanings, the structures change the situation. You admit the
situation changes the nature of the act; that is actually an admission that
the structure of power changes the nature of the act, and thus is part of what
must be considered.
>What would be an example of the kind of conclusions based on
>structuralism you are talking about (that are different from what I am
Correction: constructivism -- not structuralism; its a bit different...it
recognizes social structures, but not with the determinancy of structural
thought (structural thought errs to one side the same way a belief in pure
agency errs to the other).
>talking about) would be more like blacks were severly oppressed once
>and now as a group are worse off generally because of that historical
>oppression. Whites benefitted from this oppression as a group. The
>causes are pretty certain (in other words, we do not doubt these
>general trends). So then whenever dealing with a particular black man
>(say in a hiring situation) in relation to some white guy, we ought to
>favor this black guy that is a victim of society over a benefactor of
>society like the white guy. This argument truly applies the kind of
No, we have to be pragmatic. We may recognize that blacks will remain outside
of employment opportunities due to these problems, and thus try to enhance
education opportunities for a time, or use a type of affirmative action (which
has also helped the old untouchable class in India). AA does not require you
hire a minority over a better qualified white, only that if all things are
equal, you give the minority more of a chance. You are also supposed to
actively recruit minorities to improve the chances that you find one which is
more qualified than the majorities. Pragmatically you figure out the best way
to overcome structural discrimination, not by dramatically going the reverse
direction, but by figuring out a plan that works without creating negative
disadvantages. If it works, you can phase it out of existence.
>group structure you are taliking about in a novel way that it would not
>otherwise come to bear. It also commits the fallacy of division and
>composition. It assumes that moral agency -- a quality of individuals -
>- is also had by groups of individuals when it assumes that the someone
>can be a "victim of society". (Fallacy of Composition) And then it
>assumes that the same relationship that holds generally between two
>groups in society also holds between two specific members of those
>groups. (Fallacy of Division)
Again, I think I dealt with that above by noting that in a search for abstract
perfection in a world with incomplete and uncertain information, you sometimes
have to deal with pragmatics. You also word this as if it were an extreme
case, rather than recognizing that the way to deal with structural
discrimination is not to go into the reverse discrimination mode, but instead
figure out pragmatic ways to undo the harm -- perhaps assure education, health
care, nutrition, shelter, or something like that.
>It is not a use of language they use. They do not relate specifically
>to uses of language. We use language to understand them. Moral facts
>exist indepedently of the language that we use to consider them. They
>are the same facts when referred to in Chinese as they are in English.
>If you define society so that it can refer to the interactions of any
>two beings, then I suppose that would tie morality inexorably to
>society _conceptually_. However, it would also make society inexorably
>based on individuals and not groups. So, you are jist
>misunderstanmding society in such a case when applying structuralism.
Constructivism is superior to both your individualist approach and to
structuralism in that it privleges NEITHER the structure NOR the agent. It
recognizes that individual actors act and produce structures. It recognizes
that structures (relationships) in turn empower and constrain, and in fact
program incoming agents to live according to the shared beliefs and
understandings that uphold the structures. When neither agent nor structure
is privileged one can better see that it is nonsensical to ignore society and
focus only on individuals, and it is nonsensical to ignore individuals and
focus only on society. Each ignores a big part of reality, and makes logical,
conceptual and factual errors in so doing. It also makes it difficult to deal
with the pragmatic issues I bring up above.
>You are not going to get around the fallacies of composition and
>division because you are twisting the nature of morality.
I believe I dealt with that above. I also don't think I'm twisting the nature
of morality.
>That's not true at all. What I am saying is that you cannot commit the
>fallacy of division by assuming that something that might be said of a
>group must aslo apply to all of its constituents. Even if you can say
Again, no one is making that assumption. One is usuing statistics and studies
of society to see where problems exist, with evidence towards structural
discrimination, and doing the best possible to figure out ways to undo it. I
certainly am not saying we have to assume everyone as a victim and reverse the
discrimination, that would be silly!
>that white men oppress black men in general, in order to rectify this
>oppression in some particular case, you must show hopw that particular
>white man oppressed that particular black man. Otherwise you are just
>guessing and almost surely acting immorally.
I disagree completely, and will act politically on that disagreement. In
philosophical terms, I think you're simply dreaming up an impossible to
fulfill logical condition of action. In human life we have to act on
imperfect information due to the lack of evidence and certainty. That means
acting on moral imperatives even when we aren't sure they apply -- we also are
not sure they don't apply. Your presumption of morality is misguided; you
seem to assume the status quo is "moral," and any one saying that it is
immoral and action must be taken to change it has a very strong burden of
proof, a burden I think is impossible to meet given reality. Thus I reject
your position as unrealistic and misguided.
-snip-
>Well, Kant certianly thought so. I think like so many other things
>that Kant seemed to conclude from this principle, this sort of lying is
>always wrong thing is spuriously justified at best. In fact, one of
>the big problems I have with Kant's moral philosophy is that he has it
>that one might have a duty to themselves. He even admits that such a
>thing sounds somewhat paradoxical, but quickly argues that such a
>distinction on the basis of applying moral princples makes sense. From
>this sort of thing he seems to conclude all sorts (possibly even most)
>of the types of things I would have to disagree with. Not the least of
>which is the lying thing -- the ultimate reason to not lie to the nazi
>is because you have a duty to yourself to treat yourself with respect.
I suspect, based on the discussion so far, taking into account structures of
power, shared understandings, and they create context, which provides meaning
to an act and changes its nature, allows us to salvage universality and much
of Kant's ideas (I am starting to read what you recommended) even in a
different way than intended. I'll let you know as I get further into it. I
did read chunks of a Critique of Practial Reason long ago, as well as snippets
from various bits (and I've read Perpetual Peace quite often). But its been
awhile for all but the last one.
>It is not your responsibility that the nazi kills the jew (as Kant
>would point out and I would even agree as heinous an act of telling the
>truth might seem). It is your responsibility to not cause yourself to
>break from virtue in telling lies in general. Therefore, all else
>being equal, you should tell the truth. Nonsense.
I agree, but I think its only because Kant apparently didn't recognize that
the act of lying is not the moral or immoral act, but the meaning of the act
in the world provided the moral substance. Lying may be moral, it may be
immoral. There is, I believe, a universal principle that can be applied to
decide which is which, I don't think it is whim, but its more fundamental than
simply any one given act.
>In any case, you break up this dichotomy of moral self and human self,
>and you get a different answer. The answer is that all else being
>equal you can do whatever you want from the stand point of justice. It
>definitely lacks virtue to tell the truth by most people's standards.
>So, you would not be wrong to tell the truth, strictly speaking, but
>would be morally bankrupt if you did. It would seem likely that you
>would have no qualms about becoming one of the nazis yourself.
OK, I'll think about that one.
>No. You are right they are more than what is happpening in the
>isolated context (usually), but that doesn't mean that it is a _social_
>context that they get additional meaning from. For instance, I save
>someone's life by pushing them from under a falling rock. Now assuming
>this person wanted to live, even though I committed an act of violence,
>it was more than justified by the fact that the person welcomed it.
>That is not a social context that added meaning to the act -- it was
>just the extenuating circumstances that individual was in. That fact --
> his wanting to be saved -- would exist even if there was no other
>being in existence in the entire universe. It certainly had nothing to
>do with power structures in society.
The social context is not divorced from the physical circumstances, and
remember, constructivism sees the social context as a nexus of the individual
and the strucutre, it privileges neither. The person's desire to live, your
choice of acting, etc., were all part of the social context. Thats the power
of structurationism or constructivism -- it helps us overcome the
agent-structure dilemma. The difficulty is that its not clear exactly how to
do it, some lean more towards agency (I actually do, even if I seem to be
stressing structure here -- I'm just reacting to your denial of its relevance
at all), others more to structure.
>You think that language is necessary for concepts? Are concepts
>necessary for language? What do the linguists have to say about all
>this?
I think linguists are all over the place. I'll put it this way: reality is.
How we interpret it necessitates that we create concepts. Reality doesn't
know our concepts or care, the concepts are our invention. They may precisely
reflect reality, and that might cause us to say that they are "real" even
without the concepts. I can see that being a defensible position, but I still
tend to see concepts as human constructs designed to interpret our perceived
experience of reality. (Concepts can refer to real entities or relations, so
I can see how the ontological issues can get messy...)
>I bet even if we started with a good working definition and just tried
>to faithfully apply it we would start getting really complicated
>ramifications. Forget about the fact that we would start to have to
>explore what it really means to be "passive". Even without
>encountering such difficulties, there would be arbitrarily complex
>ramifications.
Yeah, again, studying pacifist thought shows just a snippet of the type of
problems that can arise.
>Well, those kinds of things are not intended to redefine passivism with
>each different ideology. They all have different takes on what the
>word truly entails. In any case, they are all likely referring to the
>same concept albeit ambiguously, but certainly not ambivalently. What
>do I think passiveness really means and fully entails is a good
>question. I am certainly not prepared to answer it in a few short
>sentences. Nonetheless, the point is that even without pusing the
>issue to much about what the terms is really supposed to refer to, you
>still encounter a great deal of complexity and ambiguity in applying in
>just a straight forward way -- even without encountering the ambiguity
>in the term itself.
True.
>> Actually, why can't we end at contentions? We solve them
>politically, then
>> new ones arise, and old ones get re-debated. Why do you think
>anything beyond
>> an enigma is necessary?
>> ciao, scott
>I see -- you are just being contentious. You have no desire to
>actually draw conclusions.
Au contraire, I draw them all the time. But I recognize they can always be
contended. That seems to be a reality we can't ignore or escape from, though
I think its good to keep trying. Especially as context and meaning change,
the way to understand moral acts will always be unclear and in
flux...contention seems unavoidable, at least to some extent.
ciao, scott
Paleo
says...
> >You don't need to be a philosopher to see the correspondence.
> >Christianity claims that human beings and the rest of creation are
> >imperfect and flawed. You can see that with your own eyes. It claims
> >that we have a God-given sense of right and wrong. Again, obvious. It
> >claims that we hurt others and ourselves when we sin--i.e., abjure right
> >and do wrong. Ditto. It claims that a guilty conscience is our signal
> >that we've done wrong, and that we feel better when we confess and try to
> >do better--again, simple empirical fact. I could go on, but you get the
> >idea. It fits human nature like a key fits a lock.
> So you're saying that humans have developed an interpretation of human nature
> which can be defended...
No. I'm saying that the assumptions about reality and human nature of
Christianity correspond perfectly to the world as it is.
> You say that because someone developed a religion that
> reflects commonly held views that humans are imperfect, that they have a sense
> of right and wrong, and that we hurt ourselves when we hurt others (not a
> self-evident truth, by the way)...
Not according to Socrates or Jesus.
> ...or that a guilty conscience is a signal we've
> done wrong (not something that seems true for everyone either), or that we
> feel better when we confess (definitely not true for everyone), then it
> somehow is a great "fits like a lock" description of human nature?
Yes.
> Hell, pop psychology books do better than that!!...
You unerringly chose the PERFECT example that comprehensively refutes
you. In fact, the basic assumptions of most pop psychology over the past
several decades are directly contrary to those of Christianity.
> Real psychology does much
> better, and goes into the question of how much is nature, how much is
> cultural, and the debates about that...
In fact, "real" psychology hasn't been able to touch any of this stuff.
It has thus far been helpless to probe into the wellsprings of human
behavior and motivation. It does OK when it runs rats through mazes,
however.
> You're simply assuming true that which
> you believe true about human nature, fitting it into your pre-existing belief
> system. Cool. Go ahead. But your argument certainly is weak.
No. I'm saying that empirical observation of reality reveals that
Christianity's teachings demonstrate an amazingly close fit with human
nature and the created universe.
> >Sure, and I don't say that. I merely say that to contend there is no God
> >takes real faith, and that the existence of the honest atheist is plagued
> >by the same kind of doubt that occasionally assails the believer.
> Irrelevant to any point I'm making, since I agree that to do anything in life
> takes a modicum of "faith" -- faith the laws of physics won't change, etc.
> But some beliefs are more rational and based in experience and observation
> than others; some beliefs are irrational, based on wishful thinking or
> programing by parents or culture. I think yours seem to be more of the latter
> than the former.
Are you claiming that atheism is more "rational" than theism?
> >You can't have it both ways. Either we learn from others or we don't.
> >Christianity seems a good place to learn.
> Nah, it seems a good place to get programming...
What you call "programming," others call teaching. You are encouraged to
use your mind and think about all of it.
> Or you can get programmed by
> Buddhists, either way you're probably just as close to the truth...
You're claiming that all religions are equally true?
> Or you can
> both learn from others and assess and choose exactly what you believe.
> Certainly a free thinking individual wouldn't submit himself to the dogma of
> some group of humans claiming to represent a "church." What kind of person
> would do that?
Ask Pascal. Or Flannery O'Connor. Or Malcolm Muggeridge. Or Igor
Stravinsky. Or Johann Sebastian Bach. Or any of thousands of others of
the most intelligent and creative persons ever to have lived.
> >And since that isn't your claim, you'll have no objection to those who
> >conclude that Christianity offers a convincing account of reality.
> I've never objected to people making their own subjective claims on the
> matter. I've simply stated that I disagree...
Tell us where you think Christianity's teachings about reality are wrong.
> I DO have an objection to them
> trying to force others to live by their beliefs. Then they deserve to be
> defeated politically.
Christians, like every other group in the world, have a set of beliefs
about the nature of reality, the world, and human purpose. Please
explain to us why they, out of all the rest, must be singled out for
suppression as they attempt to create what they regard as the good
society.
> >In practice, it tends to lead to only one place: hell.
> Prove it.
You can't prove it like you can a calculus proof. But we can look at the
consequences, for example, in the various leftist atheist paradises, and
see that a hell on earth was created. It is, shall we say, suggestive.
> >Wait a minute. You have said elsewhere that no supposed truth should be
> >immune from challenge. Suppose they decide to challenge your putative
> >truth that all men are created equal. Given your supposed agnosticism re
> >ultimate truths, you couldn't criticise them.
> You are making a huge error here. Saying that all things can be challenged
> does not mean all things are equivalent! Saying that all things might be
> wrong, doesn't mean we have to accept all propositions as equally valid...
It's the obvious consequence of your claim.
> Take
> science -- it is possible we are disembodied brains on a space ship, being fed
> sensations and no reality exists. That can't be dismissed as impossible, but
> there is no reason to believe it...
But it's triflingly easy for racialists to say that you can't comprehend
their reasoning because you're inherently inferior, or because you have
been hopelessly contaminated by bad ideas. And if right and wrong are
finally based only on human desire, which is essentially what you claim,
then you are powerless to demonstrate otherwise.
> If someone states that, I have no reason to
> take it seriously or act as if it were true. I have no reason to say I can't
> criticize them. You don't need absolute certainty in order to make and live
> by distinctions. You don't need absolute certainty in order to criticize
> something.
Sure. And racialists don't require absolute certainty to live by their
own beliefs.
> >Uh, Scott, there has never BEEN a society that didn't force people to
> >live by a set of laws, and you may be certain that there are always
> >people who don't think they should be forced to live by same.
> Two wrongs don't make a right. If every society jumped off the empire state
> building, would you follow. Sheesh.
Avoids the point.
> Still, if one group, like fundie Christians, try to force me to live by their
> moral view, then I will fight against their effort with all my will, intellect
> and power. If they don't like it, then perhaps they should realize that they
> can live by their ideas without forcing others to live them as well.
All groups have a conception of life and human nature that informs their
notion of how we should live together. Christians have the same right as
everybody else to attempt to create a society based on this conception.
> If you want people to respect your choices, you'd damn well better respect the
> choices other people make. I can totally 100% respect your right to live your
> life by your own moral beliefs, and to act in accord with them. Once you try
> forcing me to do the same, my respect for you goes out the window; you've
> declared war, and you will not get away with it!
You've totally missed the point. There IS no law that isn't the
codification of somebody's idea of what conduces to the good society.
Law, by definition, "forces" people to behave in a certain way. Think
about it.
> >> No
> >> problem. I shouldn't make them live by my ideals either...
> >But you're quite willing to do so by laws you believe are right.
> Nope, you're wrong on that count too.
Nope. I'm entirely correct. ALL postive law is coercive by its nature,
and all law is the codification of somebody's idea of how we should live.
> >Only you're quite willing to force your beliefs on others re positive
> >law.
> Nope, you're wrong there too.
No, I'm self-evidently right. Think about what law is and what it does.
> >Your claim here involves another of those axiomatic matters of faith that
> >you would deny to Christians. Namely, that one group shouldn't be
> >allowed to harm another. You apparently regard this as beyond dispute.
> >But needless to say, there are those who would disagree with you and
> >resent your forcing your morality on them.
> Nope, you're wrong there too. It seems every time you try to tell me what my
> view point is, you mess up.
By no means. You simply haven't thought carefully about what law means,
what it does, and the assumptions underlying it. In this case, you
accept as axiomatic that one group shouldn't harm another. I happen to
share that belief. But I also realize the axiomatic character of the
assumption, and that others can and do accept different axioms.
> >This is word salad that desperately attempts to ignore a fact you don't
> >want to face: that it's been leftist, progressive, officially atheist
> >states which have been the most horrific mass murderers in human history.
> Nope, you're wrong there too. Communism is no more progressive and leftwing
> than fascism was conservative and right wing...
In the most authentic sense, you are of course, correct, at least about
the "progressive" part. But, in point of fact, it was regarded by
liberals as progressive. And it's certainly leftwing, if the concept has
any meaning at all.
> The extremes of both left and
> right have been evil, but both extremes bear little resemblance to the
> moderate and democratic parts of the ideology. You just want to dishonestly
> pretend that there is no far right...
Nonsense. I have no problem whatever conceding that there is a far
right.
> ...and define all bad things as on the left...
No. That is NOT what I'm doing. I'm simply adverting to a huge fact of
history, one that you don't want to face, and suggesting that it IS a
fact because of faulty assumptions about human nature and reality that it
happens to share with liberalism.
> ...even though obviously progressive leftism has a hatred of Stalinism and his
> kind of actions. Thats why I accuse you of demonization and dishonesty -- you
> simply try to define labels in a way that suits your bias. You are wrong.
If I'm wrong, then you can explain why it's only been leftist, officially
atheist societies that have been the most horrific mass murdering
societies in the history of the world.
> I've given you references from books on political ideology...
You have cited a certain taxonomy that you prefer. I have suggested that
the taxonomy itself doesn't correspond to reality as we know it very
well. I asked you to show us WHY it was better than the alternative that
I offered. You haven't done so yet. You have simply appealed to
authority. That's not very convincing.
> I've explained the
> differences between right and left, and why fascism was not left wing. That
> is something well explored by philosophers, historians and social scientists.
Sure. And recent academics have been overwhelming liberal in the late-
20th-century sense, and understandably balk at being linked to Hitler.
We can sympathize. But we may also be permitted to suspect that a degree
of self-interest operates here that blinds them to realities they'd
prefer not to face, just as you find it impossible to face the
universally accepted fact that the most spectacularly homicidal societies
in the history of the world were leftist and atheist.
> You throw that out the window and assert that your labels are right because
> you decide they are right...
No. What I actually do is offer an alternate taxonomy and explain why I
think it corresponds better to reality as we can see it. You have yet to
offer any counter to my explanation.
> BZZZZT! That is weak minded, dishonest, and
> discredits you...
The fact that you appeal to authority and refuse to deal with my clearly
expressed objections would seem to suggest that the shoe is on the other
foot.
> That is the kind of tactic that gets you slammed and insulted
> by a bunch of people here...
Look. What gets liberals mad is anybody who attempts to get them to look
at facts they find unpleasant. We might offer as a general rule, in
fact, that the vocation of liberalism is the denial of reality. The fact
that you refuse to deal with my points but instead rely on personal
characterization is the perfect illustration of this fact.
> I just feel sorry for you, but realize its
> probably not worth wasting much more time on you...
If you won't take part in the give-and-take of rational disputation, but
instead prefer name-calling, you're probably correct.
> You're locked into a
> self-serving interpretation of reality to rationalize your biases, and you
> probably won't change.
I have most likely undergone a more thoroughgoing changes of worldview
than any liberal on these ng's. But that's beside the point. What I'm
attempting to get you to do is stick to the facts and follow the accepted
rules of rational debate.
> >And that somehow the conservative, religious states have not "turned
> >human existence into an abstraction" on such a nightmarish scale.
> Cromwell's England...
Not even remotely close.
> The Spanish inquisition...
Not even remotely close.
> ...(and Spanish conquest of the new world)...
Certainly a horrific spectacle for a period of time. But in terms of
bloodshed, not even remotely close.
> The Crusades. Jihands. Salem witch trials. Wars of reformation. I
> could go on and on. History does NOT support you.
Look. This is simple. If you think you can demonstrate that any of
these things produced a death toll that approaches even in a small way
that of communism's one-hundred-million plus, you're free to do so. The
risible fact that you're desperate enough to counterpose the Salem witch
trials--what? less than a dozen dead?--with the scores of millions
murdered by progressive atheists, is the PERFECT illustration of your
floundering here. Instead of claiming that "history does NOT support
me," show me with data. You won't do it, because you know, in fact, that
I'm the one with the data on my side.
> >No, it did NOT happen in Viet Nam, if you're claiming that the slaughter
> >approached that of the communist states in even a tiny way. Ditto
> >slavery (which wouldn't have happened, needless to say, if African
> >potentates hadn't been so willing to sell their own people).
> You're wrong again. And African potentates are irrelevant to the FACT that
> good Christian citizens sold and traded humans with no regard for their life,
> treating them as property to be used. These weren't communists with no regard
> for life, these were American Christians. Sorry, your bias is showing.
OK. Show me how the slaughter in either place approached over a hundred
million.
> >Speaking as someone with a grandfather born on a reservation in Oklahoma,
> >I can assure you that, as horrific as U.S policy was toward the Indians,
> >it never approached the scale of leftist slaughter.
> I'd say it could be seen as worse...
I guess if you think tens of thousands of casualities are "worse" than
over a hundred million, then you're right. But that's fantasy, of
course.
> And don't forget, nazism was a right wing
> slaughter, despite your attempts to simply argue by labeling that it was not.
In fact, it wasn't. But even if we, for the sake of argument, say that
it was, that's still only six million compared to over a hundred million.
No comparison.
> You seem to want to say that since totalitarian regimes in the 20th century
> actually killed greater numbers of people, their crimes were worse...
You're proposing with a straight face that it's not worse to kill ten
people than one? Or a hundred people than ten? Or ten thousand than a
hundred? Or a hundred million versus a hundred thousand? puh-LEEZ.
> That is faulty logic...
I think the mathematical realities here are all the logic we need.
> Slavery, genocide, and killing of innocents in the name of God
> is just as bad as in the name of an ideology, left or right, even if the
> numers are lower.
So, say, a serial killer who methodically and with malice
aforethought murders 200 people over a 20-year period is not more
culpable than, say, somebody who kills a single person in a moment of
passion? You're serious?
> Unless you can admit that basic fact, and admit the indisputable claim that
> your attempt to whitewash your own "side" and blame everything on leftists is
> bogus, you're living in fantasy, an illusion based on illogic and dishonesty
> which is why people trash you constantly...
Uh, Scott. Let's dispose of one thing right now. I couldn't care less
how many liberals I piss off. Merely telling the truth to a liberal
infallibly pisses him off, and, deprived as he is of facts and logic, his
predictable recourse is to call names. Big deal. As you can see from my
record, I abjure personal abuse and stick to logic and the facts. And
that in itself engenders more name-calling. It's funny.
As for the other point, I have by no means "whitewashed" my "side" nor
blamed everything on leftists. I have merely adverted to a few
unpleasant facts. That they are unpalatable to leftists is not my worry.
It's more important to me that we attempt to see the world as it is,
without blinders.
> Its not because you are a bad
> person or the people who trash you are bad people. Its because your use of
> rhetoric, argumentation, and logic is dishonest to the core -- even if for
> some reason you don't recognize it and believe you are being sincere.
If I've been dishonest, then it should be easy to point to it. Have at
it.
> >I'm sorry. This isn't true. Communists have killed at least 100 million
> >people in this century. This barbaric record is equalled nowhere else,
> >and "technology" has nothing whatever to do with it.
> You're making the same errors:
> 1) You define all mass murders as leftist by definition, even though many
> were right wing;
No. I'm NOT "defining all mass murders as leftist." I'm simply making
the irrefutable point that communists killed over a hundred million
people in this century, a record unequalled by any other philosophy in
the history of the world. I have given you ample opportunity to show
otherwise, and you have failed to do so. Instead, you laughably haul out
the Inquisition, which killed a thousand or two, tops, and the Salem
witch trials, less than a dozen. This is authentic desperation.
> 2) You add up the numbers, rather than looking at the acts and recognizing
> that the acts are just as bad even if the pre-20th century numbers aren't as
> high;
I have by no means done so. I am fully prepared to concede that other
abuses have been horrific. Nonetheless, I stick to the commonsense view
that mass murder and genocide on this unparalleled a scale may be assumed
to suggest a degree of barbarity absent elsewhere. If you can show us
otherwise, be my guest.
> 3) You try to suggest that communism as things in common with modern
> progressive, democratic leftism. It doesn't...
In point of fact, I have listed several things that both have in common.
So far as I know, you have made no attempt to refute this observation.
Which was made most memorably by the great Solzhenitsyn at Harvard, of
course.
> Even in the early 20th century
> the Social Democrats and progressive leftists hated and despised Communists
> and the Communist system. You can't draw that link, even though you assert
> you can.
The various leftisms all hated each other. They were squabbling
religious sects. The mere fact that they competed for power with each
other doesn't disguise the things they had in common.
> 4) Ironically, you bristle at the FACT that the Nazis were right wing...
I don't "bristle" at it; I merely advert to the fact that they had almost
nothing in common with conservatives, while having a great deal in common
with socialists, including their own understanding and description of
themselves.
> Your
> only defense is that they don't look like other conservatives. GET A CLUE!
> Stalin doesn't look at ALL like modern social democrats or American liberals.
In fact, the communists of Stalin's era shared certain important
presuppositions about reality and human nature with modern liberals, a
fact suggested by the outspoken admiration they engendered among American
liberals. Nazis, by contrast, had almost no supporters among
conservative Americans, most of whom supported a war against them that
wasn't necessary for self-protection.
> You argue by labeling, demonizing, and trying to deny reality. Its bogus.
> You fail.
Then it should be easy for you to show me how.
> >Of course they're not all equally justifiable. It's difficult to justify
> >atheism, for example.
> Its at least as justifiable as your view, if not more. I think you know that.
Is it? It's more rational to assume that this amazingly, improbably
complex and ordered universe came into being...for no reason at all?
Paleo
says...
> >If you think they're wrong, you're free to show how and where.
> I did. It isn't enough for you, and your assertions aren't enough for me.
> C'est la vie.
You haven't done so. You've merely appealed to authority.
> >By no means. I merely engage in a bit of intellectual diagnosis whose
> >conclusion you don't like. But you're free to illustrate its weakness if
> >you can.
> No, you tried to categorize things and assert a strict dichotomy, when I
> explained clearly why you were wrong...
No, what you did was appeal to authority and offer a taxonomy that
appears to correspond less to reality than the one I suggested. You're
free to show why the one I offered is faulty, but you haven't done so.
> You ignored that, and went into what
> appeared to be silly rhetoric that tried to deny that the nazis were right
> wing just so you could keep your strange "all left bad/all right good"
> labeling technique...
In fact, I offered several reasons why the Nazis were leftwing, as they
in fact claimed they were. You're free to show how these reasons are
faulty, but you haven't done so.
> ...ignored all the evidence I gave to the contrary about the
> causes of violence in order to simply attack communism (even though no one I
> know of is defending communism, that's obsolete cold war rhetoric you're
> using)...
No. I merely adverted to the single huge fact that the worse mass murder
and genocide in history has been perpetrated by communist states. There
IS no "evidence to the contrary" here, but if you think you know of it,
feel free to offer it.
> No, a wise man once said not to cast ones pearls before swine. I
> don't mean that you are a swine, but that its clear that you are not going to
> take my words seriously, and you are very set in your ways.
I try always to let facts be paramount. If a theory doesn't correspond
to reality as we can see it, I prefer to ditch the theory and find a
better one. You can characterize this as being "set in my ways," but I
think it's a better way to arrive at the truth than blind appeal to
authority or pretending away unpleasant facts.
> Thats fine. Sometimes no real communication is possible, and it also takes
> wise people to realize when world views are just so diverse that trying to
> discuss is not profitable for either.
And, by contrast, it's easy to see when a lovely theory has been slain by
brute fact. It requires no recourse to "world views" whatever. And this
is what I prefer.
> >If you can show us how I've misinterpreted anything, you're free to fire
> >when ready. And by "locked into my biases," you merely mean I have an
> >opinion that's different than yours. I, at least, can show you how I
> >believe it's more congruent with reality than yours. You have been
> >unable to do the same for your own beliefs.
> That is a lie.
Uh, when you, with a straight face, attempt to counterpose the Salem
witch trials and the Inquisition with communist genocide, let's just say
that reasonable people may suppose that you're reduced to desperate
measures.
> I really can see why you get attacked, why people complain to your employer
> and things like that...
Sure. The vocation of the liberal consists of denying reality. Given
this fact, personal abuse and attempts to silence truth-tellers are all
that's left.
> I really think you ought to stop complaining about the
> speck in my eye and look at the log in yours. But if it'll make you feel
> better, I will go back to your last post and explaining thoroughly why you are
> wrong...
Have at it. But please confine yourself to facts and let's avoid blind
appeal to authority.
> If all you do after that is press and reassert the debunked points, I
> will ignore you without comment, letting you live in what I believe are your
> own illusions. If you show some thoughtful response, and not just an attempt
> to defend the edifice of your biases and beliefs, I will continue the
> conversation. But I won't engage in something like this, a "you said this/no
> you said that" type of personal exchange. One or two is fine, but only
> flametrolls like knickers make it a lifetime. You can have the last word in
> that regard, for whatever its worth. I'll go back to your long post and give
> my reply.
This time, stick to facts and the points I made.
Scott D. Erb
<C7AB532B687ECBC2.BAEBC247...@lp.airnews.net>,
pale...@operamail.com says...
>You haven't done so. You've merely appealed to authority.
No, I've made an argument with sources. The sources I use are evidence. You
simply asserted, with sources worse than mine.
>No, what you did was appeal to authority and offer a taxonomy that
>appears to correspond less to reality than the one I suggested.
My taxonomy is accurate, and I explained why. What you call an appeal to
authority is simply your recognition that my view corresponds with the
predominant view by experts. But that isn't appeal to authority, that is the
use of evidence. Absent any good evidence on your part (and I haven't seen
anything other than your assertion), my argument is stronger. You simply are
defending your biases with assertions that cannot be supported.
>In fact, I offered several reasons why the Nazis were leftwing, as they
>in fact claimed they were. You're free to show how these reasons are
>faulty, but you haven't done so.
I have, making very precise, supported arguments. You ignore them, and assert
that you're right. That is not only weak argumentation, but it appears rather
dishonest. Apparently you can't stand to have your biases questioned, though
you must know that your view is very contrary to almost all of what experts
say. And noting expert opinion as evidence is not the logical fallacy of
appeal to authority.
You ignore facts, you ignore argument, and you assert. That is weak. I
suspect you've got very tightly held beliefs, and you'll interpret reality to
fit your biases no matter what. Don't be surprised if you are ridiculed,
marginalized, and made irrelevant by those who think differently. You'll
likely imagine some kind of persecution complex, or say its those evil
liberals who want to deny truth, or some such illusion to protect your ego.
Its a delusion, Paleo. You're avoiding real argument, you're avoiding truth.
All to protect your ego. Think about it. I'm stating this not as an attack,
but actually in a friendly manner. You're going down a path it saddens me to
see, especially since I think you're basically probably a good person. Once
you get so locked into a belief that all you can do is interpret reality into
your own set of perspectives, you've lost the ability to think clearly.
Turn back! Open your eyes! That route only leads to frustration and a
persecution complex!
Scott D. Erb
<04F76AC59DAA1132.E3DF5297...@lp.airnews.net>,
pale...@operamail.com says...
>You unerringly chose the PERFECT example that comprehensively refutes
>you. In fact, the basic assumptions of most pop psychology over the past
>several decades are directly contrary to those of Christianity.
They do better with human nature than you do though. So you refute yourself.
>No. I'm saying that empirical observation of reality reveals that
>Christianity's teachings demonstrate an amazingly close fit with human
>nature and the created universe.
Nope, you're wrong. Your just interpreting a few things into Christian
thinking, but pop psychology can do that better than you. You again are
interpreting reality to fit within your framework rather than critically
thinking.
That is weak, and will assure that you feel marginalized and persecuted, even
though you'll likely imagine yourself to see a truth others are missing or
refusing to see. So it is with people who use your strategy.
-snip-
>> You are making a huge error here. Saying that all things can be challenged
>> does not mean all things are equivalent! Saying that all things might be
>> wrong, doesn't mean we have to accept all propositions as equally valid...
>
>It's the obvious consequence of your claim.
No, its not! You pretend it is, without thinking about it, since otherwise
you'll have to realize your pat responses to people who disagree with you are
based on irrationality and illogic. Then your precious world view would be
challenged, and you won't allow that!
-snip-
>No, I'm self-evidently right. Think about what law is and what it does.
Been there, done that. Law codifies social norms and principles. If laws
don't reflect norms and principles, force is needed. If it does, minimal
force is needed to deal with the aberrations. Thats why democracies and
liberal societies on the average are more free and use less force, law
reflects the cultural shared norms of that society. Totalitarian systems and
theocracies tend to drift the other direction.
>By no means. You simply haven't thought carefully about what law means,
Sure, I even teach about it. There are may conceptions of law, etc.
But if you try to make laws that I believe limit me unfairly, I will do
everything in my power to fight politically against you. If you try to push
your laws through in an anti-democratic manner contrary to the constitution
and succeed, I will be a revolutionary against you. If you work within the
system and convince people to vote for your laws, I'll congratulate you, and
work to change them back to my preference.
-snip-
>Look. What gets liberals mad is anybody who attempts to get them to look
>at facts they find unpleasant.
On the contrary, you're trying to avoid the obvious fact that Hitler was far
right because you find that fact unpleasant. You dishonestly try to simply
categorize all the bad guys on what you perceive as the other side form
yourself. That's weak argumentation, and obviously does not work. It makes
you look dogmatic and silly, and at the very least helps assure that it
remains easy to keep you on the margins ;)
>Look. This is simple. If you think you can demonstrate that any of
>these things produced a death toll that approaches even in a small way
Irrational argument. You're trying to compare things qualitatively via a
number count. I've explained by that doesn't work, especially since the 20th
century had the technology, which was used, to make a larger number count.
But in percentage terms (percentage of population), you can look through
history and find many examples which compare even quantitatively. Add that to
the fact you have to dishonestly try to label Hitler far left just to make
your point, and it turns out to be a very weak point indeed, one apparently
designed just to rationalize a world view that is contrary to reality.
I doesn't work.
>Uh, Scott. Let's dispose of one thing right now. I couldn't care less
>how many liberals I piss off.
Obviously. But what you do that angers people is not your view -- but your
dishonest style of rhetoric and your irrational arugment by labeling and
recategorization. The attempt to say that all of the Left is like Communism
is wrong, they aren't even close -- no closer than conservatism to nazism.
Your attempt to say communism caused worse horrors than other wrong and evil
ideas is based solely on two errors: 1) an attempt to use a quantitative
measure to make a qualitative judgement; and 2) a false attempt to
recateogorize the case that makes even the quantitative measure fail in order
to simply protect a failed hypothesis. Its as weak as an argument can get,
friend. You won't convince anyone but those who already think like you with
that kind of stuff.
Again, you can keep asserting that somehow your arguments are true and real,
but I'm disapointed that you rely on such irrational arguments to make your
point. I strongly suggest you rethink your position. You seem to be the type
of person that strongly needs something to believe in, something to throw
yourself into. When you find it, you do so with all your heart, and that can
be respected. But you seem unable to reflect on the errors you're making, you
seem to require a real conversion to do that. That puts you in a position
where you're probably doomed to either go through major life changing
revelations and conversions a few times in life, or believe you have the
truth, and become convinced all others are either misguided, blind, or
unwilling to see what you think obvious.
Have fun, but unless you come up with something of more substance, its not
worth me spending too much time on.
ciao, scott
Scott D. Erb
http://violet.umf.maine.edu/~erb/adv2.h1.jpg
-scott
Adrian Durham
It has one provable answer, but not a simple one. It is a matter of
what it means to be independent in this context. Two things can affect
each other and still be independent. We generally would say for
instance that I am independent of the government of California since I
do not live there. However, the very existence of a government in
California limits what is possible for me in this world. Now what does
it mean then to say that I am “independent” or that I act
“independently” of California? Saying something like “that statement
is not true in the strictest sense” is not relevant. Saying something
that basically means “independence” is actually meaningless is just
impoverishing the language. Clearly this word has some meaning here
and it seems to be fundamentally tied to the notion of freedom.
> >I think it must be reconstrued to be an active thing, for freedom to
> >possibly mean what you are saying. I think it is truly a misuse of
the
> >word, though, possibly not obviously so.
>
> >But the burden of proof is on those that would claim they are not,
even
> >in Brazil.
>
> Obviously. But the burden of proof in my opinion does not require
pointing
> out the exact acts which put in place this structural disparaity.
The
> existence of it, along with the knowledge of essentially how it got
created
> (slavery, wealthy landowners, discrimination, etc.) and why it keeps
operating
> is enough. Often in a world where the past leaves at best traces
(and in this
> case records either weren't kept or were destroyed concerning what
really
> happened in specifics) a demand for exact proof is a convenient way
to
> rationalize not doing what is right.
How do you know what is right without knowing who the victims are and
at the very least who has benefited from the aggression if not the
aggressors, themselves?
Yes, but I want a non-specious moral justification. Your saying they
do not have rights is spurious and just wrong. Their rights have
nothing to do with their lot in life. We both know that such a line is
misspoken at the very least the way you are saying it. Besides that
issue of rights, there are the other ones of peace or structuralist
reasoning. The point is that you have to tie these ideas to morality.
That burden is on you.
>
> >Then you must have an argument for its relevance. Social structures
> >are necessarily relationships that surpass the simple relationship
> >between one being and another being, but rather are a relationship
> >between one group of beings and another being or group of beings. If
> >it is just a uniques relationship between to beings, then it is
> >generally not a "social structure" but just a relationship.
>
> Social structures are reflected in power/wealth differentials which
are not
> based solely on the acts of individuals, and they provide meaning to
> relationships and acts, thus changing the nature of the acts
involved. Again,
> you can judge acts by a universal principle, but you can't know how
to apply
> that principle without taking in account the meaning acts have,
meaning which
> is often granted in part by the structure. (Think of structures as
based in
> ideas as well as material -- shared beliefs and understandings about
reality
> are reflected in social structures).
The _universal_ relevance of social structures to moral issues is what
you must show.
>
> >The point is that you are trying to draw a conclusion based on the
> >relationship that blacks (say) have to whites about the relationship
a
> >particular black man has with a particular white man. Not only is
that
> >a fallacy of division, but it is as yet to be seen how this
> >relationship matters in the particular moral context.
>
> I disagree -- statistics show that you can generalize,
On the contrary, statistics are used to generalize. As any
statistician will tell you, one must have an additional argument to
apply statistics correctly.
> and on pragmatic
> grounds it would be silly to say "we know there is a lot of
injustice, but
> each person has to PROVE that injustice in his case..." even though
one aspect
> of structural power is that those without can't get the evidence, and
we lack
> time to go through case by case. You can't ignore pragmatic concerns
in the
> pursuit of an abstract ideal. Well, you can, but I find that to be a
rather
> dubious attempt, out of touch with the reality of social, political
and even
> ethical problems.
Prove it. You certainly might make some generalizations. Obviously, I
am questioning their relevance to moral issues. The idea that it is
okay to broadly victimize innocent people because you think there are
injustices that you cannot detect seems far fetched.
Shifting the burden of proof. Show that since society has oppressed
blacks, we should be biased against some particular white guy.
> >That is not true. It always was about the two people involved -- or
> >the particular people involved. The nazi, the jew and the german.
If
> >the german tells a lie then he saves the jew from the nazi. Based on
> >this circumstance we conclude that it is okay to tell the lie. Under
> >different circumstances (perhaps the police, the murderer and the
> >citizen), the results might be completely different. At no point is
it
> >about something like power relationships in society. It is just a
> >question of what the actions are as they relate to individuals.
>
> The nazi, jew, and person hiding the jew have various powers because
of
> societal structures. Without the structures, the act wouldn't have
those
> different meanings, the structures change the situation. You admit
the
> situation changes the nature of the act; that is actually an
admission that
> the structure of power changes the nature of the act, and thus is
part of what
> must be considered.
No – it has nothing to do with the structure. If it were muderer,
victim, and citizen, the act would be the same. The structure of
society isn’t the issue there.
You still have to show that a particular victim deserves restitution
from a particular aggressor. Failing to do so commits the fallacy of
division.
It is difficult to deal with those pragmatic issues. I would be highly
suspicious of any view that makes that out to be easy. You still have
to show how any of what you are saying is relevant actually is
relevant. Start with some particular case – perhaps one in which is
the worst case in applying your rules – and show how it is morally
permissible to act in the way you would prescribe.
>
> >You are not going to get around the fallacies of composition and
> >division because you are twisting the nature of morality.
>
> I believe I dealt with that above. I also don't think I'm twisting
the nature
> of morality.
>
> >That's not true at all. What I am saying is that you cannot commit
the
> >fallacy of division by assuming that something that might be said of
a
> >group must aslo apply to all of its constituents. Even if you can
say
>
> Again, no one is making that assumption. One is usuing statistics
and studies
> of society to see where problems exist, with evidence towards
structural
> discrimination, and doing the best possible to figure out ways to
undo it. I
> certainly am not saying we have to assume everyone as a victim and
reverse the
> discrimination, that would be silly!
That is what adopting a policy to effect structural change without
specifically applying it correctly to every individual is doing. What
you have to show is that it is okay to victimize some for the greater
good or some such thing.
>
> >that white men oppress black men in general, in order to rectify this
> >oppression in some particular case, you must show hopw that
particular
> >white man oppressed that particular black man. Otherwise you are
just
> >guessing and almost surely acting immorally.
>
> I disagree completely, and will act politically on that
disagreement. In
> philosophical terms, I think you're simply dreaming up an impossible
to
> fulfill logical condition of action. In human life we have to act on
> imperfect information due to the lack of evidence and certainty.
That means
> acting on moral imperatives even when we aren't sure they apply -- we
also are
> not sure they don't apply. Your presumption of morality is
misguided; you
> seem to assume the status quo is "moral," and any one saying that it
is
> immoral and action must be taken to change it has a very strong
burden of
> proof, a burden I think is impossible to meet given reality. Thus I
reject
> your position as unrealistic and misguided.
I am saying that one is innocent until proven guilty -- nothing more
nor less. It has nothing to do with the status quo. You would seem to
take action against people you cannot show are guilty.
Well, then by all means show its relevance. How is it that encoded in
ethical terms is this reference to structure? How is it that ethics
refers to these concepts?
In article <38482F13...@maine.edu>,
scot...@maine.edu wrote:
>
>
> Adrian wrote:
>
> > > without objection. One can "tolerate" nazis exercising free
speech
> > and
> > > holding their opinions while at the same time fighting against
their
> > views.
> > >
> >
> > You must have a strictly _absolute_ moral reason for this.
>
> Again, the absolute moral reason combines both the act and the
meaning of
> the act. Meanings change in circumstances, so acts change in their
> essential nature. But I was getting more at trying to figure how
you were
> using the word tolerate.
>
> > The points you have here call for a certain action. The argument
you
> > present for this prescription must be a moral one. This argument
and
> > these conclusions you are drawing seem as absolute and immutable as
it
> > gets.
>
> Of course, despite our differences I believe there is an absolute
ethic, and
> try to figure it out and live by it. I state my beliefs. However,
> immutable is probably a wrong word -- I may change my belief over
time as I
> learn and understand the world better, talk to wise people, read good
books,
> etc. It may not change either. Thats the only thing about
recognizing
> uncertainty, its just a recognition that error is inherently
possible in
> every human thing I do, including developing an ethical or moral
belief
> system.
>
> -snip-
>
> On social construction:
>
> > They refer not just to perceptions but beliefs in general, some of
> > which we know with certainty. What we lack certainty about are
> > empirical matters. As Kant would say, we may only ever know of the
> > phenomenon of external objects and not of the objects in themselves.
> > That does not mean we cannot be certain of the phenomenon as we
> > experience it or of other abstract relationships that must be the
case
> > independently of an external world even existing.
>
> That makes sense. But I doubt ethics falls within that realm; ethics
> requires some kind of external world since it requires social
relationships
> in a context where these relationships have meaning. Otherwise,
there is no
> need for ethics.
Only hypothetically. If I have p implies q, then notwithstanding the
truth of p, the statement may be plenty true. More particularly,
regardless of whether or not pink elephants exist, it is necessarily
true that pink elephants are pink.
>
> > Indeed I am a materialist. You are entitled to your belief in the
> > matter. I wonder though if my beliefs in morality might have
affected
> > my beliefs in metaphysics by way of the fact that I try to
consitently
> > apply the same type of scrutiny to them both. Or perhaps there is
th
> > other direction my metaphysical views being related to my ethics
> > because I make the same error in both for consistency sake.
Perhaps I
> > have this belief that I am especially fond of independently of its
> > actually validity. Perhaps such a fondness has promoted certain
errors
> > in logic or biases in perception to support this belief. Then
since I
> > am obviously concerned about coherence -- a necessary condition for
> > having my beliefs be correct -- perhpas I have perpetuated this
error.
>
> Maybe we don't disagree as much as it seems. I haven't been arguing
about
> the possibility of error to try to say one can't have ethical
knowledge or
> pursue the belief in an ethical truth, only that at any time the given
> belief system we develop may be wrong and constantly needs to be
> rescrutinized. The other issue seems to be how we apply
universality. I
> read you as applying it only to the physical content of the act,
while I
> apply it by combining the act with the meaning of the act, a meaning
which
> can come from the context and the social structures. Changing that
changes
> the very nature of an act, and thus its ethical content. I believe I
can
> hold that belief and not deny the universality prinicple, even though
I
> certainly make things more complicated!
Certainly context matters to define what the morally relevant act is,
but to what extent? You must show the relevance of structuralism.
>
> (snip of bits I think were discussed in the last post)
>
> >What about the scientific (?) knowledge claim that knowledge claims
are
>
> > inherently questionable? Or is that a scientific knowledge claim or
> > more of a pure concept of knowlegde
>
> Its definitional. Within the framework of science and its
assumptions,
> knowledge claims are inherently questionable. It again is one of
those
> statements bounded by context which provides its meaning. (That's
why I
> noted this was 'scientific knowledge' and not necessarily a claim
about an
> abstract concept of true knowledge.)
>
> > No -- they may be disputed, but not rationally. Once you know it
you
> > know it with absolute certainty. The only thing that might be
doubtful
> > is what terminology I use to talk about the same concepts.
>
> I'm really not sure I know what you mean above (we were talking about
> universality, but older bits tend to be screwed up on my server so I
often
> just include the most recent post). Rationality is usually defined
within a
> given framework or context. I mean, rational choice is dependent on
ones
> subjective preferences, one action is rational for one person, but
may not
> be rational for another, it depends on what the act means for someone.
> Rationality along depends on meaning, and thus in and of itself is
not a
> path to pure clarity.
You are talking about rational self-interest. I am saying that the
principle of universality may not be rationally disputed.
>
> >So what if I assume that the essential nature of "persons" is that
they
>
> > are basically "points". They may be related to each other at least
> > under some circumstances by being on the same thing called a "line".
> > Suppose further that given a set of people all related to each other
> > this way and some person not related to the group in that way, then
> > there is only one relationship possible between that person and yet
> > others such that no one from the original relationship is related in
> > this new way to the person not in the original relationship. (This
> > last statement would be like saying "Cosnider a line and a point
not on
> > that line. There is only one line going through the point that does
> > not intersect the line." -- the so called "Parallel Postulate")
And so
> > on.
>
> Then I'd say you're probably over simplifying, since the importance of
> meaning, and the complexity it adds to relationship makes that kind of
> equation untenable. At the very least, it becomes extremely complex
and
> multidimensional.
>
> But then again, maybe you are right in your analogy. Geometry gets
tough
> when you add dimensions, especially when you get to the cosmological
> theories which postulate infinite dimensions, question whether there
is such
> a thing as causality, posit time as dimensional (meaning in essence
past,
> present and future are simultaneous), etc. Space may be as complex as
> social life in ways we can't imagine. Still, I think that since
meaning is
> a part of the act, I think that at best complicates matters (stealing
can be
> moral, etc.) and makes chances of error even greater. I think a big
error
> is to underestimate the importance of meaning.
Your idea of “social life” is just an oversimplification of the
physical reality.
>
> > Your reaction should be that I am not talking about ethics. What I
am
> > doing is just redefining terms in order to use the terminology
> > associated with ethics to talk about Euclidean Geometry. What I am
> > saying is that this sort of thing can be done always (i.e. there is
> > inherent uncertainty in what terms of an informal language mean --
> > inherent ambiguity). But, there is no uncertainty about the
concepts
> > involved becuase on the presumption that knowledge is possible _at
all_
> > (even just a smidgeon of knoweldge that we are not too sure of at
> > that), we must make these inherently ambiguous statements in an
effort
> > to discuss what are actually mathematically precise concepts. And
that
> > goes even if we do not have a mathematicall precise understanding of
> > the concepts.
>
> Applying concepts to real world conditions, or turning that into a
real look
> at ethics is where the problem comes in. Your statement above, which
does
> seem quite Kantian, makes sense to me in the abstract.
>
> > I think the real difference here, is that you are treating morality
> > sort of like the sun (say). What is the nature of the sun? Well
it is
> > this ball of plasma at the center of our solar system with all
sorts of
> > properties -- of a certain diameter, the equator does not revovle as
> > fast as the poles, there are these things calle "Solar Flares", and
so
> > on. However, we cannot be absolutely sure that the sun even exists
let
> > alone have all these properties just the way we think it does. We
> > certainly could be wrong and likely are not quite right about some
> > things. It seems like we are almost surely right about amny other
> > things. It seems nearly absurd to think that it, say, revolves
around
> > the Earth and not the other way around, but there are those that
adhere
> > to that position. And so on.
>
> That's not it -- I recognize that morality and ethics are not
empirical
> phenomena, and thus we can't simply test and understand it. My point
is
> that they are also not simply abstract principles with existence
outside of
> the material world. Ethics is that link between our social
constructed
> reality and our real essence as humans. It is our attempt to go
beyond what
> we can know in the limits of our world and understand what our actions
> should be. That makes it to me the most essential and difficult task.
>
They are either physical objects or abstractions. Are you saying that
is a false dichotomy?
> > In the same way, you might argue, morality exists and is
comprehensible
> > to man. Like the sun, its presence has been felt all through the
> > history of humankind and even animalkind. We have had precious
little
> > understanding of it in the past, it seems, as we had once thought
> > absurd things like that the sun revolved around the Earth. We
probably
> > have a lot of things sort of worked out about morality even if
> > (possibily unlike the sun) only in an informal and sort of non-
academic
> > way. But, just like the sun, we will always have to tolerate a
certain
> > amount of skepticism about what we think we know. There will always
> > lack a certain amount of precision. And we will always be faced
with
> > the fact that everything we think is true is actually an illusion
(i.e.
> > in Kantian terms, that the thing in itself is nothing like its
> > phenomenon as we have been experiencing it for some reason).
> >
> > The problem with this analogy is that the sun is an object we
observe
> > empirically. All our insight into the nature of the sun is a
> > posteriori. Ethics, however, is a priori. It is not emirically
> > based. What is truly an ethical issue is just brought under our
> > consideration as a result of empirical observations -- never defined
> > byt he observations themselves. For instance, two men come befoer
you
> > the king. The one's cow knocked down the others fence. All of
these
> > events and ultimately your course of action are events in an
external
> > material world the nature of which is empirical and a posteriori.
> > However, the idea of justice with regard to what seems empirically
to
> > be the case is itself a priori and I would even argue ultimately
> > analytic. Whereas you could be hallucinating about the men and your
> > status as king, your conclusions as king are still as valid a moral
> > evaluation and constitute moral knowledge.
>
> Again, the meaning of the acts, and thus the acts themselves, come
from in
> the world relations between the actors -- what the acts mean in the
world.
> Thus the ethics cannot be determined as principles outside of
experienced
> reality.
The ethics can be determined which deal only with the hypothetical
evaluation of the actions. What cannot be determined independently is
what actually happened.
> It is a connection between the abstract world of universal
> principles and the directly experienced world of context and
meaning. That
> connection contains a bit of both, with all the potential pitfalls and
> uncertainties of each.
>
> > Another example might be a glass of water. You decide it is half
> > full. It turns out you are wandering the Saharah Desert and are
> > actually hallucinating that this glass of water even exists, let
alone
> > is "half full of water". So there is no glass of water after all.
> > That does not mean that the concept of "half full" is rendered
> > meaningless. You still have that concept and are certain of its
> > meaning in the context of your hallucination or any other similar
> > hypothetical scenario. Such a concept is a priori and not subject
to
> > the same uncertainty that the actual existence of the glass of
water is.
>
> Ok....
>
> > Well, since you mention Empiricism versus Rationalism, you would
likely
> > be interested in reading _Critique of Pure Reason_. It has nothing
> > really to do with moral or political philosophy per se. However, he
> > does attempt to see what the limits of the application of pure
reason
> > are -- what such a method can conclude. This is possibly one of the
> > most profound things possible to discuss in philosophy. And I would
> > say Kant is a giant among philosophers past and present. Many would
> > argue that Kant finished philosophy (much the same as physicists
once
> > thought that physics was pretty much "done").
>
> You're giving me a lot to read this month :)
> have a good weekend, scott
>
Well, _Critiques of Pure Reason_ is just a nice work in philosophy. I
doubt it has much direct relevance to politics.
>
In article <384821B5...@maine.edu>,
scot...@maine.edu wrote:
>
>
> Adrian wrote:
>
> > In article <825u8a$qc5$1...@rupert.unet.maine.edu>,
> > scot...@maine.maine.edu (Scott D. Erb) wrote:
> > >
> > > I'm not saying there is no way to figure it out, but what do you
do
> > to the
> > > person who says, "hell, life is just a mistake of biology, it
doesn't
> > matter,
> > > we all die, ethics is for fools." Is he or she wrong objectively?
> >
> > Yes
>
> Why do you say that?
>
> > They are inherently true. That is the _true_ assumptions are. If
you
> > happen to run accross some questionable assumptions then either they
> > are not waht is really presumed in ethics or you are kidding
yourself
> > about how questionable they are.
>
> Or maybe you're wrong in thinking they are true. Can you prove they
are
> true without begging the question or relying on tautologies? Could
you
> please do so for me?
Ethics is a tautology. It is one big tautology. That is what it means
for it to be a priori. It is like Euclidean Geometry.
>
> > Kant, for instance built his career
> > on the gimmick of extrapolating what must be the case given the
> > possibility of knowledge. The way this sort of thing plays out in
> > ethics is "For the possibility of knowledge with regard to
> > ethics, .... And so we have any unconditional imperative must have
> > this principle of universality." Now, you can say that that is not
> > what is meant by ethics, or you could say that some assumptions were
> > implicitly made that may not be true, and in that way dispute this
sort
> > of conclusion. However, you cannot say that it ostensibly rests on
> > some hypotheses since it is constructed not to.
>
> I can say a house designed to rest on water that is sitting on a lake
> doesn't rest on ground, even if it wasn't constructed to rest on
ground. If
> someone designs a coherent ethical system by its own standards thats
fine --
> religions do so all the time.
Religions at best design coherent axiomatic systems – not ethical
one’s. Generally, they aren’t even coherent – not even close.
> That certainly doesn't give anyone a reason
> to believe them unless they share agreement with the assumptions.
>
> > Let me give you an example. Suppose we have two men. One steals
from
> > the other. Suppose that we aren't sure that such a theft occured.
Now
> > there is some inherent uncertainty about the theft, for that matter
> > about whether or not we are even just disembodied brains with any
> > actual property to be stolen in the first place. However, what
there
> > is not uncertainty about is with regard to the truth or falsity of
the
> > idea that IF we are right about the theft, THEN the theft was
immoral
> > (say). In other words, the inherently uncertain empirical part of
> > ethics does not exist. There is no ethics out there (like a
mountain
> > in the Andes) to be observed and scientifically understood. The
actual
> > _ethical_ matters are purely a priori. The uncertainty comes in
> > knowing whether the conditional statements of ethics actually apply
to
> > a given scenario (that is are about the scenario that actually
> > happened).
>
> Again, I have to disagree. You can't make that claim without just
assuming
> it to be true, it is similar to a religion in that regard. You can be
> certain you have an ethical system. You can't be certain it is
superior to
> a different ethical system which rests on different grounds. Lets
say you
> had someone who was poor, worked in a mine, barely got paid by the
wealthy
> mine owner who was exploiting the workers who had no other real
option.
> Let's say a worker stole bread from the owner to feed his sick wife.
Was
> his act immoral? Let's say a nazi owns a well and a Jew is dying of
> thirst. He finds the Nazi well, but the Nazi says, "no Jew drinks my
> water." Then a servant of the Nazi, realizing that his employers act
was
> immoral, steals water and gives it to the Jew so he can make it to
town.
> Was that immoral? Its clear that theft occurred, the facts are
clear. To
> me the morality is clear -- the theft was NOT immoral; in fact in the
latter
> case, I think the servant would have been acting immorally if he did
NOT
> steal, the life of the Jew takes precedence over the property claims
of the
> Nazi.
>
That does not show that different systems are all equally valid. It
just shows that the over-riding principle is not something like the ten
commandments. Incidentally, I am not sure of the immorality of the
acts, but they are certainly incredibly mean. If someone were to act
this way it would certainly lack virtue.
> > That uncertainty is just a fact of life and does not really
> > affect what we have to assume is the case or cannot assume for that
> > matter. It really is not relevant to ethics (except for possibily
in
> > particular cases)
>
> Why do you say that?
>
> > Well, I guess objectivity is relative then. Would you say the same
> > about the theorems of mathematics? If so, then I do not think
there is
> > really an issue about the objectivity in ethics.
>
> Ethics is not math. You assume a congruence and similarity, but it
may be
> that there is none, that there is no geometry of human social
relations that
> correspond to geometry in math. The reason is the issue of MEANING
which I
> get into with much more depth below.
Meaning is an issue in math, too. It just isn’t as important most of
the time. Incidentally, I did not say that ethics corresponds to
geometry – just drew an analogy.
>
> > In other words, if
> > your argument applies just as well to something like mathematics (as
> > far as both the possibility of knowledge and the possibility of
> > acquiring such knowledge), then I have doen my job in showing that
> > ethics is objective and knowledge of it attainable with certainty.
If
> > you dislike this way of saying it, then lets just say it is like
math
> > and leave it at that.
>
> I don't think its like math, again, below I get into the importance of
> meaning.
>
> > Not exactly. Language is a social construct. The concepts language
> > refer to are not.
>
> That isn't self-evident. Language is a creative invention by humans,
and
> many concepts come simply from the human imagination, perhaps a
subjective
> creation first. Do they all refer to something outside the mind?
That
> question has no clear answer amongst philosophers and linguistics.
Whether they refer to something outside the mind is irrelevant. They
exist independently of language (except for possibly the ones that deal
specifically with language e.g. this very discussion which is about
language). Language is certainly useful in having them but not
logically necessary.
>
> > Mathematics as so many symbols on a dry-erase board
> > is a matter of convention. The concepts that are associated with
those
> > symbols are not. For, just as you say we could change the symbols
all
> > around and the concepts would remain the same (just identified by
> > different symbols or possibily lacking any symbols to idenitify
them).
>
> The symbols are a way of interpreting what we perceive as reality in a
> manner pragmatically useful. But you assume math and langauge to
be the
> same thing; that isn't necessarily so (and in math when you have
concepts
> like infinity squared, and negative numbers, you have to wonder if
all math
> concepts have correlates in reality as well!)
On the contrary, I think that math is the concepts that correspond to
the symbols on the dry-erase board, not the symbols themselves.
>
> > So, I have to confess, there is a certain amount of uncertainty in
my
> > positions with regard to ethics because I cannot be too sure I am
> > saying it right (i.e. using the right terms). Perhaps I should be
> > using "fair" when I use "just" or "utility" where I use "morality",
but
> > the point is that we understand this inherent ambiguity exists as a
> > matter of _communication_ and focus on the concepts we wish to
> > communicate. I cannot over emphasize here (in true Kantian fashion)
> > that the issue is the POSSIBILITY of knowledge not what knowledge
> > actually exists or its formal presentation. And it is the mere
> > possibility that forces what Kant usually claims to be true.
>
> OK, that does clarify things...but I still think that the possibility
of
> knowledge does not mean a possibility of certain knowledge. It means
we can
> get it right, it does not mean that we can be certain we have it
right,
> partially for the reasons you say. You see, I do agree that there is
a
> possibility of knowledge, and that the pursuit of ethical truth is
the most
> noble endeavor of human kind. I simply think that in this world we
have an
> inherent barrier between us and the truth, and that the best we can
do is
> try to understand and develop our best shot, living by it. But the
way you
> state it above is much more agreeable to me.
The mere possibility has further a priori consequences that we can know
with certainty.
>
> > How can we be certain within our own frameworks if we are not
certain
> > outside them. For instance, consider the proposition "I am certain
> > within my own framework." Could it be true within your own
framework
> > and false outside your own framework? What would it mean if that
were
> > the case? (Really, I don't know what that would mean.)
>
> Only that within a framework of assumptions act X might have meaning
Y (it
> might be immoral, friendly, etc.) If you change the framework, the
act
> might have a different meaning. Since human acts are all imbued with
> meaning, any universality requires both universality of the act and
of the
> meaning to be exactly the same. If the same act has a different
meaning
> (again, lying to a nazi vs. lying to your spouse) then the act is
> essentially different. I think this is a very fundamental point.
>
I agree. However, there is a wide gulf between the fact that ethics is
situational and the further assumptions about the relevance of social
structures you seem to be making.
> > Nope. You _can_ do whatever you are capable of and you _will_ be
> > subjected to the consequences of those actions. However, that is
all
> > about what _will_ happen and does not at all evaluate it. Morality
is
> > completely independent of what actually will happen and has only to
do
> > with various hypothetical events, including what will happen but
very
> > thing else as well. Saying you do or do not have a right to do
> > something is an _evaluation_ of the action not a prediction of
whether
> > or not it will happen.
>
> OK, so you are defining right as meaning that ones act is not immoral
(if
> the act is not immoral, then one has a right to do it; if it is
immoral one
> does not have the right)? I see.
How else could one define “right”. We aren’t talking about legal
rights here. We are talking about something like “human rights” or the
moral right which refers to moral permissibility.
>
> >I am saying that you cannot question the fact that ethics is about
>
> > individual beings and not structures. Doing so renders your
argument
> > meaningless (literally) and is a misuse of the language.
>
> No it does not, based on the point I made above -- structures give
the same
> act different meanings by changing the context and the conditions.
Thus if
> the meaning of the same act is different, the morality of the act
might be
> different. Universality has to apply to meaning as well as physical
action.
>
I dispute this assertion. Structure adds no additional _morally
relevant_ meaning to the acts.
> > Ethical terms
> > simply do not refer to that directly. What the yrefer to directly
is
> > individual beings. Perhaps there are some global facts about
groups as
> > a result of the peculiar reference ethics makes to individuals, but
> > those facts are to be derived not presumed. Presuming them, is
roughly
> > the same as assuming that ethics is completely determined by Euclids
> > Postulates. You would say, well a coherent system is completely
> > determined by Euclids Postulates, but that is called "Euclidean
> > Gemoetry" not "Morality". The term "morality" actually refers to
> > something else.
>
> But structures are part of creating what an act means -- thats the
point.
> Thats why it is immoral to steal in most cases, but in some cases it
might
> be immoral NOT to steal. The act itself is not just a physical act.
> Consider: stealing is made up of a number of smaller acts which may
or may
> not be immoral. Let's say they all are moral...lifting your hand,
reaching
> into a pocket, picking up a wallet... Now, why are these acts
immoral, why
> do they have the meaning of stealing? Because of the social
structures
> involved, ideas of private property, the fact the wallett is not
yours,
> etc. In other words, physical acts themselves are empty without
social
> meaning; social meaning is inherently structural.
You are assuming that the notion of property is a social construct. It
is a moral one. Or more generally, you are assuming that the right to
property simply does not exist if you do not acknowledge it as a moral
right. In other words, stealing is not wrong unless property is a
moral right.
>
> > Okay, what about your beliefs about the use of logic? Could you
> > be "wrong"? What about your beliefs in the conclusions you are
> > deriving immediately above? Could you be wrong? You simply cannot
say
> > meaningfully what you are trying to say. As I have read elsewhere,
you
> > are looking for a stick with only one end. It doesn't exist -- no
such
> > things are possible.
>
> I could be wrong. Not within my system of assumptions, even though
every
> assumption itself might be wrong. I think the assumptions underlying
the
> use of logic are pretty well tested, and I'm confident that they are
> probably close to accurate. I test them pragmatically: do they work
in the
> world?
What is the principle of “work”? Is this like some sort of principle
of verification? Exactly how does one go about finding out if an idea
“works”? What does that mean?
> I think ethics have to be tested somewhat the same way, ultimately.
> The stick question really brings home the issue of meaning -- you
change the
> language so the meaning is different, and then the question is
different.
> Things exist as they exist. That is objective reality. Our
statements
> about them are constructs.
Our statements may be constructs, but the concepts they refer to which
correspond to that objective reality (or not) are not constructs.
> Within our constructed system, we can define
> things to be true (we define what a stick is, its attributes, and
given that
> definition, a stick cannot have one end). Our social reality is
building
> ways to try to communicate perceptions of reality in a way to build
shared
> agreement on meanings. Now, maybe we are brains in a space ship and
there
> is no such thing as a stick, its part of an illusion that is not
real. The
> claim about sticks not being able to have one end is still true
within the
> framework of our definitions.
>
> >So what about a case of self defense? Could you kill someone even
>
> > though you are uncertain of the necessity of such a fatal response?
>
> Probably not. I think my result would be minimal force to escape (or
help
> others to escape), recognizing that the minimal force might
inadvertently
> lead to death. I think that would still be ethical. I would have a
much
> stronger motivation to risk killing someone for other-defense than
> self-defense.
>
> > What about being emotional and angry when "wronged"? Are you saying
> > that such a reaction is unwarranted under such inherent uncertainty?
>
> Don't forget -- I said we act on the basis of our beliefs about
ethics,
> confidently despite uncertainty. Uncertainty does not mean not
living by
> our beliefs, it only means that we recognize we may be wrong, and in
times
> of reflection and consideration, take that into account. But in life
we
> place our bets. Since there is uncertainty, we can't know for sure
if we're
> right, so we may as well live life they way we choose. To me thats
better
> than, say, religious folk or Randians who in my opinion create an
illusion
> of certainty in order to justify their choices.
Well what is the point of even mentioning this uncertainty if it has no
effect? All it seems to be is something we pay some lip service to and
act the same way we would without such a consideration with regard to
_inherent_ uncertainty.
>
> > If you are not saying that this behavior is inherently excluded,
then
> > what are you saying? If you are saying that this behavior is just
not
> > possibly justified, then how do you know you aren't wrong about that
> > (and with this question I am in YOUR framework)? In other words,
based
> > on what you say, how do you decide what to argue for in any given
> > scenario (tolerance or intolerance) since you must always act on the
> > possibility of your own error?
>
> No, you act completely in accord with your beliefs. Consider: a
timer is
> about to go off with four seconds left, and if it does the bomb will
destroy
> your city. It'll take you three seconds to cut the wire, but it
could be
> one of three wires. What do you do? You place your bets, you quickly
> decide what you think it is and cut that mother! Now, same scenario,
but
> the bomb won't go off for two days. What do you do? Even if its you
that
> has to take the final act, you can consult experts, study schemas of
bombs,
> and try to make a very informed decision. In life, we have to act
like
> that. Sometimes there is not time to contemplate, we go with our best
> guess. Other times, we can consider and reflect. The way I see it,
we
> can't be certain, but we have to act with confidence and will in
order to
> succeed. I don't need certainty to do that, I'm comfortable
realizing that
> I may be wrong, but I'm going to do it my way nonetheless.
>
> Again, even if we disagree, I enjoy your posts, and it has me
thinking about
> things in a way which helps me discover more about what I think, and
to
> question my ideas. Even when I argue, and even after I send a post,
I think
> through these things more, and reconsider your ideas. So thanks!
> ciao, scott
>
>
Well, that is what philosophical discussion is all about. I never
expect to change the minds of those I engage in debate with. I do
think that Kant really figured something out. I disagree with a lot of
what he has to say about moral and political philosophy; however, I
still think he managed to apprehend some things that very few
philosophers ever have both before him and after.
Adrian
Scott D. Erb
Adrian Durham wrote:
> In article <82dq1q$ili$1...@rupert.unet.maine.edu>,
> scot...@maine.maine.edu (Scott D. Erb) wrote:
(as usual snips are mostly bits from previous posts) There are sections
with other snips, designed to try to stick to main issues of contention. It
may be best to figure out what issues we disagree about, refine that to a
list, and take some time and think about it -- I fear I am too busy to put
the thought into the replies that they deserve!)
> > act. We are not free to control what others do, or to ignore the
> consequences
> > of our acts and the acts of others. But once that is accepted, then
> the
> > question becomes -- how much should the acts of others be regulated;
> what
> > kinds of acts have consequences so great that they unjustly limit the
> freedom
> > of people to act? That to me is not a question with a simple answer,
> or one
> > provable correct answer.
> >
>
> It has one provable answer, but not a simple one. It is a matter of
> what it means to be independent in this context. Two things can affect
> each other and still be independent. We generally would say for
> instance that I am independent of the government of California since I
> do not live there. However, the very existence of a government in
> California limits what is possible for me in this world. Now what does
> it mean then to say that I am “independent” or that I act
> “independently” of California? Saying something like “that statement
> is not true in the strictest sense” is not relevant. Saying something
> that basically means “independence” is actually meaningless is just
> impoverishing the language. Clearly this word has some meaning here
> and it seems to be fundamentally tied to the notion of freedom.
Words represent conventional usage, and freedom has many various
definitions. As long as we agree on one way to use it, we're probably OK.
In terms of what the best way to use it in moral philosophy might be, I'd
say that freedom represents the universal desire of humans to be able to do
as they wish without constraints. That universal desire causes us to seek
norms and principles of political and moral behavior which give us the
maximum leeway to act with that freedom. Yet the reality of the world --
the challenge of living in this world, I'd say -- makes it clear that since
we share a reality and are interdependent, pure freedom is an unobtainable
ideal. Therefore, we develop norms to regulate the actions that most
directly affect others so as to try to assure that freedom is only
constrained in a just and "moral" manner.
> How do you know what is right without knowing who the victims are and
> at the very least who has benefited from the aggression if not the
> aggressors, themselves?
Remember, I accept uncertainty as inevitable. Dealing with uncertainty is a
part of life. Seeing the results, reading the history, and theorizing about
how the situation got where it is provides evidence that structural
discrimination is real, and unjust. It provides evidence that others
benefit from the structural disparity. For me, thats enough to judge the
act as needing correction if people are to live with the maximum freedom,
and I don't need to try to figure out who did what to whom at an individual
level. That's impossible.
This is important: there is nothing more that the powerful and wealthy would
LOVE than to have people say that as long as you can't prove a specific
unjust act, you can do nothing, and you have to assume the current situation
as just and proper. That is a way to keep the status quo in force, and
allow those with power and advantage to keep it, and even enhance the
structural disparity. To me, your demand actually leads to unethical
political consequences.
> Yes, but I want a non-specious moral justification. Your saying they
> do not have rights is spurious and just wrong. Their rights have
> nothing to do with their lot in life. We both know that such a line is
> misspoken at the very least the way you are saying it. Besides that
> issue of rights, there are the other ones of peace or structuralist
> reasoning. The point is that you have to tie these ideas to morality.
> That burden is on you.
But the burden is on me politically, not on me to convince you personally.
If you and I have different assumptions about how to determine morality,
then we'll probably not convince each other. If I reject the claim I have
to meet your burden of proof, then I'm free from that obligation, whether
you think so or not. That becomes a social/political issue, where we each
have a burden if we want things done the way we consider superior. Now,
given the above, and given the inherent uncertainty in the world about
causality and specific acts, I read your demand as unrealistically setting
so high a standard for approving acts to go against injustice so as to
actually aid injustice and hurt the cause of justice. You seem so focused
on logical justification that you ignore the practical problems of life in
this world which requires making the best call on imperfect evidence and
going with it.
> The _universal_ relevance of social structures to moral issues is what
> you must show.
Structural relationships are what gives meaning and context to all social
acts, and thus it is universally valid and essential to consider them when
making moral judgements.
> Prove it. You certainly might make some generalizations. Obviously, I
> am questioning their relevance to moral issues. The idea that it is
> okay to broadly victimize innocent people because you think there are
> injustices that you cannot detect seems far fetched.
But that's not what I'm doing, I'm saying that when a study of social
conditions, history, and theory make a strong case that structural
discrimination exists to the benefit of some and disadvantage of others, and
that this unfairly constrains and limits the freedom of some at the expense
of others, then one can act even without certain proof (proof which is
impossible in the world). The wealthy and powerful would love to create a
high burden of proof because the nature of life means that most such
evidence is lost and perhaps unobtainable. Demanding such a high burden of
proof is not something which I can accept, and hence the issue becomes
political. That political aspect is necessary in a world where we can agree
there is one universal ethic, but disagree on what it is and how to apply
it. Politics is necessary, it cannot be avoided.
> Shifting the burden of proof. Show that since society has oppressed
> blacks, we should be biased against some particular white guy.
Ah, but the point is that the white guy is benefited because of his
privilege in society at the expense of some minorities. If that can be
shown, then some kind of action (taxation to create equal opportunities for
others, etc.) is easily justified.
> No – it has nothing to do with the structure. If it were muderer,
> victim, and citizen, the act would be the same. The structure of
> society isn’t the issue there.
The structure of society is always involved. Is the death penalty murder?
Is war murder? These are all acts of killing people, why do some acts get
defined as murder, and others in different ways? The reason: the meaning of
the acts. Social structure is where meaning comes from, it provides the
context.
> You still have to show that a particular victim deserves restitution
> from a particular aggressor. Failing to do so commits the fallacy of
> division.
I disagree, I don't think that is necessary to do, and I don't accept that
the fallacy is relevant here (only if I take your assumptions would it
matter).
> It is difficult to deal with those pragmatic issues. I would be highly
> suspicious of any view that makes that out to be easy. You still have
> to show how any of what you are saying is relevant actually is
> relevant. Start with some particular case – perhaps one in which is
> the worst case in applying your rules – and show how it is morally
> permissible to act in the way you would prescribe.
Brazil is an example. Taxation to provide education. Laws to protect
people from discrimination. Taxation to provide adequate health care.
There are many examples.
> That is what adopting a policy to effect structural change without
> specifically applying it correctly to every individual is doing. What
> you have to show is that it is okay to victimize some for the greater
> good or some such thing.
That kind of reductionism is not only illogical in a society where people
are intertwined and connected by power relations and structures which
provide context, but creates an impossible to achieve burden of proof, given
the nature of the world. It benefits those who are structurally
advantaged, by presuming the structural inequitites to be just, unless
specific acts are pointed to. That does not seem reasonable, rational, or
in line with current theory and evidence on the issues at hand.
> I am saying that one is innocent until proven guilty -- nothing more
> nor less. It has nothing to do with the status quo. You would seem to
> take action against people you cannot show are guilty.
No one is punishing people for being guilty. And I'm arguing that a
legitimate authority (in my case a constitutional democracy) must be the way
to make these pragmatic determinations -- if you leave it up to an elite
alone, they'll probably become corrupt.
> Well, then by all means show its relevance. How is it that encoded in
> ethical terms is this reference to structure? How is it that ethics
> refers to these concepts?
Again, acts get their social meaning via structure. Without taking
structure into account, you miss the very essence of what social action is,
you get a outer shell of an act out of real context, a reductionist view
that misses more than it shows.
> Only hypothetically. If I have p implies q, then notwithstanding the
> truth of p, the statement may be plenty true. More particularly,
> regardless of whether or not pink elephants exist, it is necessarily
> true that pink elephants are pink.
Again, thats only true because we've created a linguistic context within
which we define it as true.
> Certainly context matters to define what the morally relevant act is,
> but to what extent? You must show the relevance of structuralism.
Structure is what gives context. It is universally relevant. I think I've
answered that above.
> You are talking about rational self-interest. I am saying that the
> principle of universality may not be rationally disputed.
OK, but of course if one goes on an irrational path, they can dispute it. :)
And even remaining rational there are significant questions as to what
exactly it means when applied in the world we experience.
-snips, I think the above responds to the few points of relevance snipped-
> Ethics is a tautology. It is one big tautology. That is what it means
> for it to be a priori. It is like Euclidean Geometry.
So all one needs is to either accept its assumptions and act on it, or
simply reject it, or use different assumptions as a starting point. The
only reason Euclidian geometry is taken seriously is that it works in the
world. It can be tested practically. Ethics are much trickier, and
tautologies can usually be denied by simply stepping outside that set of
core beliefs and assumptions.
> That does not show that different systems are all equally valid. It
> just shows that the over-riding principle is not something like the ten
> commandments. Incidentally, I am not sure of the immorality of the
> acts, but they are certainly incredibly mean. If someone were to act
> this way it would certainly lack virtue.
I don't think different systems are all equally valid, though I do think you
can probably define different ethical systems which are coherent.
A number of snips, about math, concepts, etc. I have no major disagreements
with the points snipped.
> I dispute this assertion. Structure adds no additional _morally
> relevant_ meaning to the acts.
I think the act has no meaning without considering structure for the reasons
stated above.
> You are assuming that the notion of property is a social construct. It
> is a moral one. Or more generally, you are assuming that the right to
> property simply does not exist if you do not acknowledge it as a moral
> right. In other words, stealing is not wrong unless property is a
> moral right.
Property is indeed a social construct, at least as we understand it.
Certainly the idea of individual property rights in a capitalist system is a
recent social construct; there are various different ways property rights
(ranging from simply use-privileges to a range of different levels of
rights) can be defined. And, of course, the core issue of many socialists
is that property rights of workers are abused because the fruits of their
work goes to the capitalist. This is a tricky issues. At some level I
think we do have a moral right to property, but that right isn't unlimited,
based only on what we can acquire, regardless of the social consequences. I
reject the way libertarian capitalists try to almost make "property" a
pseudo-religious concept whereby anyting "consensually" acquired is property
for which one has a moral right.
> What is the principle of “work”? Is this like some sort of principle
> of verification? Exactly how does one go about finding out if an idea
> “works”? What does that mean?
At base its subjective for the person, intersubjective for society. I
decide if any idea works in the world for me. As a society we test, debate,
explore ideas and theories, and then choices are made. In a legitimate
system of self-rule (something like a constitutional democracy) there are
processes in place for making that intersubjective call. Science is also an
intersubjective process, based on testing and finding out what works.
> Our statements may be constructs, but the concepts they refer to which
> correspond to that objective reality (or not) are not constructs.
Perhaps not always. Ones conclusions on this depend on the assumptions one
chooses to make.
-snip-
> Well, that is what philosophical discussion is all about. I never
> expect to change the minds of those I engage in debate with. I do
> think that Kant really figured something out. I disagree with a lot of
> what he has to say about moral and political philosophy; however, I
> still think he managed to apprehend some things that very few
> philosophers ever have both before him and after.
Certainly. I think its too easy to forget the pragmatic issue of connecting
principles with real world situations, recognizing that uncertainty requires
making calls without proof, even when there is almost unavoidable inherent
contestation. Thats why politics cannot come from philosophy. Philosophy
can inform it, various philosophical schools can add insights and arguments,
but ultimately there are too many things that are unprovable outside ones
assumptions, and thus politics itself deals more with mediating disputes and
developing social norms. I accept that, even if my personal moral
viewpoints are absolute -- after all, I may be wrong.
ciao, scott
Adrian
scot...@maine.edu wrote:
>
>
> Adrian Durham wrote:
>
> > In article <82dq1q$ili$1...@rupert.unet.maine.edu>,
> > scot...@maine.maine.edu (Scott D. Erb) wrote:
>
> (as usual snips are mostly bits from previous posts) There are
sections
> with other snips, designed to try to stick to main issues of
contention. It
> may be best to figure out what issues we disagree about, refine that
to a
> list, and take some time and think about it -- I fear I am too busy
to put
> the thought into the replies that they deserve!)
>
Freedom is what I want to discuss with you. It is not the only isue,
but it seems the most important one. What is the nature of freedom as
it relates to morality?
I think property is probably just as important. However, I have
already discussed that to my hearts content (and more). Suffice it to
say, that it is indiputable that the idea that property of the
capitalist variety having just been a recent social construct is at the
very least disputable. To just baldly say that private property is a
phenomenon of the 19th century is a bit much. In any case, this is all
I care to comment on that particular issue...
I would say that freedom means "unconstrained" as you have noted
above. It does not mean "able". In other words, one is free to flap
their arms and fly away if they can, though no one is capable of such a
thing. On the other hand if I were to attach a ball and chain around
your ankle, then while you might be capabel of walking with difficulty
-- you would not be generally thought of as "free" to do so.
I would also note that I am not an adherent of "free" will. We have a
term that describes a phenomenon that is undisputable that we call
"will". We all seem to have wills. This alone is enough for my
position in moral and political philosophy. However, a "free" will
must be different from simply a will and so must refer to a will that
is somehow free of reality. To me this means that the will is
disconnected or loose like a wheel might become free of the axle. I
don't believe in such disconnected wills (spirits perhaps).
In any case, morality is about wills and the conflict thereof. It is a
hypothetical evaluation of the resolutions of such conflicts. A
conflict is either resolved "morally" or not and not both. Any attempt
to deconstruct a being's will in the case of a moral dilemma is nothing
more than a digression. The beings must have wills for there to be a
moral issue -- to even be able to pose one. As long as a will is
_possible_ then a moral issue is possible.
Kant seemed to explicitly think freedom (as relevant to his Universal
Principle of Freedom, say) was "the independence of the compulsory will
of another." What do you think?
Adrian
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
Scott D. Erb
>Freedom is what I want to discuss with you. It is not the only isue,
>but it seems the most important one. What is the nature of freedom as
>it relates to morality?
Sounds good.
>I think property is probably just as important. However, I have
>already discussed that to my hearts content (and more). Suffice it to
>say, that it is indiputable that the idea that property of the
>capitalist variety having just been a recent social construct is at the
>very least disputable. To just baldly say that private property is a
>phenomenon of the 19th century is a bit much. In any case, this is all
>I care to comment on that particular issue...
I certainly don't go that far, I just note that while private property of a
sort has always been around, the particular conceptions we have of property
rights, especially liberal capitalist conceptions, are much more recent. A
lot of people take those and assume them to be the natural expression of
property rights, which I think is a stretch at best. But we can save that
discussion for another day :)
>I would say that freedom means "unconstrained" as you have noted
>above. It does not mean "able". In other words, one is free to flap
>their arms and fly away if they can, though no one is capable of such a
>thing. On the other hand if I were to attach a ball and chain around
>your ankle, then while you might be capabel of walking with difficulty
>-- you would not be generally thought of as "free" to do so.
OK, though that raises the question of what constrains. Constraints can be
through direct force, structural force, or lack of ability. Constraints are
also associated to some extent with the idea of empowerment. That is allowing
people to achieve freedom that is possible for them by overcoming unjust
constraints, or developing new abilities (expanding what they are able to do,
which may not fit in the definition of freedom as you describe).
>I would also note that I am not an adherent of "free" will. We have a
>term that describes a phenomenon that is undisputable that we call
>"will". We all seem to have wills. This alone is enough for my
>position in moral and political philosophy. However, a "free" will
>must be different from simply a will and so must refer to a will that
>is somehow free of reality. To me this means that the will is
>disconnected or loose like a wheel might become free of the axle. I
>don't believe in such disconnected wills (spirits perhaps).
I think as its usually used "free will" refers to volition. We have volition.
We can act in the world with volition. I think it usually refers to the fact
that many do not think that biology or social experience programs the will to
react to stimuli automatically -- at least not all the time. Rather we can
reflect and make a conscious choice, excerising volition that comes from our
will, not simply from an automatic response to stimuli. I think thats how
most people use the term, though I agree it sounds a bit screwy.
>In any case, morality is about wills and the conflict thereof. It is a
>hypothetical evaluation of the resolutions of such conflicts. A
>conflict is either resolved "morally" or not and not both. Any attempt
>to deconstruct a being's will in the case of a moral dilemma is nothing
>more than a digression. The beings must have wills for there to be a
>moral issue -- to even be able to pose one. As long as a will is
>_possible_ then a moral issue is possible.
OK...though I'm not sure intentions are totally irrelevant, and I would not
limit morality ONLY to a conflict of wills. I would say morality is broader,
dealing with how people interact with others. Also the claim that a conflict
is either resolved morally or not is accurate, though it could be that there
is a range of "moral" resolutions (not just one right answer), some which may
be what you would call "virtuous," and others simply not immoral (ergo moral).
>Kant seemed to explicitly think freedom (as relevant to his Universal
>Principle of Freedom, say) was "the independence of the compulsory will
>of another." What do you think?
I think thats too narrow, which you probably guessed! I think that freedom
goes beyond simply the interaction of wills, but instead deals with the right
of an individual to be able to act without unjust constraint from the outside.
Morality is to figure out what kind of constraint is unjust, and what acts
are legitimate to try to correct the matter. Constraints can be structural;
the acts of individuals can create differences in power and meanings of
actions that can have the impact of creating hierarchies where some are
privileged and others are not. The impact is the same as if an individual
constrained another in a conflict of wills, but the mechanism is more diffuse,
spread out over time and involving many actors. Its reinforcement may even
become part of the culture. Complexity means that we can't simply look for
the very direct violations of freeom, we have to see that freedom can be
constrained unjustly in ways that aren't easy to trace or understand. That
makes the moral question more difficult, and ultimately requires that we give
up a sense of absolute application of moral principles in a complex world,
instead trying to apply them as well as possible in a messy world, relying on
pragmatism as a guide. Call it "pragmatic idealism" perhaps.
ciao, scott
Adrian
scot...@maine.maine.edu (Scott D. Erb) wrote:
<snip>
>
> OK, though that raises the question of what constrains. Constraints
can be
> through direct force, structural force, or lack of ability.
Constraints are
> also associated to some extent with the idea of empowerment. That is
allowing
> people to achieve freedom that is possible for them by overcoming
unjust
> constraints, or developing new abilities (expanding what they are
able to do,
> which may not fit in the definition of freedom as you describe).
>
Construing constraints cannot be lack of ability. Or they can only be
construed that way poetically -- metaphorically. Constraints _mean_
hinderance to do something one is otherwise capable of doing.
<snip>
> >Kant seemed to explicitly think freedom (as relevant to his Universal
> >Principle of Freedom, say) was "the independence of the compulsory
will
> >of another." What do you think?
>
> I think thats too narrow, which you probably guessed! I think that
freedom
> goes beyond simply the interaction of wills, but instead deals with
the right
> of an individual to be able to act without unjust constraint from the
outside.
Well what does "unjust" mean? I wish to travel forward but this rock
is in my way. Lets suppose I am the only being that exists. Is this
an "injustice"?
> Morality is to figure out what kind of constraint is unjust, and
what acts
> are legitimate to try to correct the matter. Constraints can be
structural;
> the acts of individuals can create differences in power and meanings
of
> actions that can have the impact of creating hierarchies where some
are
> privileged and others are not. The impact is the same as if an
individual
> constrained another in a conflict of wills, but the mechanism is more
diffuse,
> spread out over time and involving many actors. Its reinforcement
may even
> become part of the culture.
So I agree with this, I think. For instance, a lynch mob is not a
lynch mob without the orhcestrated actions of all the members of the
mob. They all participate in the resulting action. Also, injustices
can become institutionalized and ingrained into society. So I think
that the institution of slavery (say) is an example of what you are
saying above where a child of a slave is also a slave, for instance.
The problem usually occurs with something like refusal to do business
with. Perhpas I own a grocery store and refuse to do business with
whites. This refusal is not itself unjust unless every other grocer
feels the same way. That kind of logic does not make sense to me.
> Complexity means that we can't simply look for
> the very direct violations of freeom, we have to see that freedom can
be
> constrained unjustly in ways that aren't easy to trace or
understand. That
> makes the moral question more difficult, and ultimately requires that
we give
> up a sense of absolute application of moral principles in a complex
world,
> instead trying to apply them as well as possible in a messy world,
relying on
> pragmatism as a guide. Call it "pragmatic idealism" perhaps.
> ciao, scott
>
>
Well, that is sort of along the lines of Kant. He uses practical
reason in applying the categorical imperative. However, what happens
when we eventually find out using regular reason that the answer is
different than what our expedient practical reason showed us
originally? Why can't we just stick to regular reason and not demand
that all be uncovered right this minute?
Paleo
says...
> Some bits disproving Paleo's bizarre attempt to claim that the fascists are
> really leftists:
Eric Hobsbawn, may I point out, was a notorious leftist and supporter of
the USSR and other leftist causes. He had for reasons of self-interest
every motive to distance himself from Naziism.
> "Theory was not the strong point of movements devoted to the inadequacies
> of reason and rationalism and the superiority of instict and will. They
> attracted all kinds of reactionary theorists in countries with an active
> conservative intellectual life... as we have seen fascism shared
> nationalism, anti-communism, anti-liberalism, etc. with other non-fascist
> elements on the right....The major difference between the fascist and the
> non-fascist right was that fascism existed by mobilizing masses from
> below."
>
> Page 117, "The Age of Extremes" by Eric Hobsbawm
> He also points out on the same page how the Nazis stole symbols from the
> Communists to try to lure the working class to their right wing cause,
> including the term "national SOCIALIST.
Fascism tended to be nationalistic. We may concede this to be generally
a right-wing trait. Is this enough to transform a movement characterized
by its hostility to Christianity and its devotion to centralized state
power--both anathema to conservatives and both characteristic of the
left--into a conservative or right-wing phenomenon? I don't think so.
By the way, I am currently reading Francois Furet's "The Passing of an
Illusion," translated by his wife, and I note that he attributes a hatred
of the bourgeois to be at the root of both communism and fascism.
> For a real dramatic story showing how anti-communist and right wing the
> nazis were, see:
> "The Nazi Seizure of Power, The Experience of a Single German Town,
> 1930-1935," by William Sheridan Allen.
Give us the main points.
> For those who doubt that nazis were anti-bolshevik to the extreme, here
> are some places to look:
Hell, there were umpteen leftist factions that were anti-bolshevik.
Please.
> The KPD (Communists) were the first party put in the concentration camps
> in 1933. The SPD (Socialists, anti-Communist and anti-fascist) were sent
> to Dachau in 1933 as well, voting against Hitler extending his powers.
> The conservative parties supported Hitler completely.
In this move, probably. Did they regard Hitler as one of them? Of
course not.
> From "Political Ideologies" by Thobaben and Funderburk, 3rd edition, p.
> 187:
> "Hitler states his hatred of democracy with its 'ridiculous institution'
> of parliament and communism with the 'loathsome' doctrines of class
> struggle created by 'the jew Karl Marx'....Hermann Goering, commander of
> the German force, saw Germany as a bastion against communism. War with
> the 'red terror' was viewed as inevitable as national socialism and
> Marxism are poles apart. Marxism's doctrines of class struggle,
> internationalism, pulbic ownership of property, and atheism, if put into
> practice, would destroy Germany as a nation-state."
Probably correct. To the extent that it was nationalistic, fascism could
not have universalist pretensions.
> From: "The Weimar Republic," by Detlev J.K. Peukert. Peukert, who died in
> 1990 at age 39, was formerly professor of modern history at the University of
> Essen, and director of the Research Institute for the history of the nazi
> Period:
>
> "Ideologically speaking, on the other hand, the NSDAP stood for a melange of
> ideas and grievances that were far from original and indeed were common to
> much of the German right; all that was new was the passion and single
> mindedness with which the separate ingredients of this ideological mixture
> were combined on behalf of a struggle against ‘the system.' This demonized
> image of ‘the system' was aprojection of attitudes that were by no means
> identical: anti-Semitism, anti-liberalism, and anti-Marxism...some of the
> Nazis specific political arguments were certainly borrowed frmo the attacks on
> modernization that had been mounted by the conservative Kulturkritiker. But
> the Nazis cult of dynamism and the movement's utopian appeal to a future
> national community outrivalled the conservatives' attempts to restore the old
> order." - p. 237
To say that some conservatives saw Hitler as a bulwark against communism
is not to say that Hitler was a conservative. Almost nothing about his
program was congenial to conservatives.
> Note also page 268: anti-fascist movements were mostly from the left, and were
> paralyzed by the right. Not also in that chapter how it was conservative
> parties which cooperated with Hitler, and helped him gang power (and
> ultimately voted to give Hitler total power later in 1933, with only the SPD
> standing against him).
> Note finally that I don't see the nazis as being any more like modern
> conservatives than the communists are like modern leftists or liberals. The
> extremes of either left or right are essentially evil, in my opinion.
You merely say that conservatives believed an alliance with Hitler
against communists was politically prudent. Buchanan and Fulani have
formed a similar alliance against the two big parties, while having
almost nothing in common with each other--happens all the time in
politics.
Your task is to show how elements of fascism were congenial to the right.
Except for nationalism, an almost impossible project.
Paleo
says...
> >No. It was mere fallen human nature.
> But you seem to blame communism for some abuses, but then a simple fallen
> human nature for others. That seems a tad biased. I gave a reason that
> covered all, and didn't demonize one side or the other.
After having been unavoidably away from the keyboard for a long time, I'm
trying to remember what came before in this discussion. I think the
distinction is this: what needs to be explained, over and above the
customary degree of human slaughter present in all times and places
throughout our sorry history, is something entirely new. Namely, the
unprecendented barbarity and scope and degree of the leftist slaughter.
Humans have killed each other all through recorded history. In no time
or place, however, have they done it with the profligacy of the left in
the 20th century. This, I propose, is a huge fact that requires an
explanation over and above mere garden-variety human wickedness. In the
same way, for example, that we needed to search for a special cause when
peregrine falcons and bald eagles began dying off in record numbers a few
decades back. (There was indeed a special cause, and it was DDT.)
Was there a spiritual or political DDT at work in this century? I would
say yes, and I would identify it as communism and other leftist
progressive nostrums which refused to locate the source of good and evil
in God's order but instead arrogated to themselves the right to define
good and evil. The result was the most massive slaughter ever witnessed
in the history of the world. So much for the tender mercies of atheist
states.
> > It had nothing to do with capitalism per se.
> Then accept that same logic when you deal with communist abuses of power.
> Anything else would be hypocritical. Can you see that?
No, I can't, because we have a degree of slaughter so spectacularly
beyond anything that went before that it demands a special explanation.
> > To understand as much, look at the history of Europe
> >from the fall of Rome til the middle ages. Various tribes and peoples
> >swept back and forth across the continents, doing their best to
> >exterminate each other. They didn't need capitalism to do so. It's an
> >eternal human temptation to want to get rid of the other guy.
> So you can make the same judgement with communism. Your attempt to split
> ideologies between left and right and say one side is better is by your own
> logic irrational. If you try to somehow say Communism is different, you're
> contracting your argument here.
I'm not "trying to say" that Communism is different, I'm merely adverting
to the fact that its slaughter dwarfed anything else in the history of
the world and requires a special explanation.
> >> And what about the crusades, and many other religiously
> >> motivated slaughters?...
> >I am by no means minimizing such things. They were horrible. They
> >happened. I'm simply making a plain empirical observation: the most
> >horrific mass murders in world history happened in officially atheist,
> >progressive communist states. The scale of the slaughter there dwarfed
> The number killed is not relevant, by your own logic above...
Nonsense. That's like saying, when peregrine falcon populations plunge
to extinction levels, that mortality isn't relevant. When we witness a
degree of slaughter unprecedented in world history, we are justified in
searching for some special circumstance that made it possible. Obviously
it wasn't "technology," as you claim, since the communists were mostly
stuck at the same technological level as the American Civil War, or
before.
> Also the biggest
> numbers killed were by a left wing regime (Stalin) and a right wing regime
> (Hitler)....
Even if you buy the claim that Hitler is somehow right-wing, which is
specious, his six million can't compare with the over 100 million of the
communists.
> Neither extremist regime had much in common with moderates; fascism
> was much different than conservatism, Stalinism was much different than Social
> Democracy or American liberalism....
On the contrary, you can see clear and unmistakeable similarities between
what is now called "liberalism" and communism: the admiration for
centralized power, the worship of experts, the hostility to religion and
specifically Christianity and the location of all value in human desire,
etc. etc. About the only thing you can cite re the right and Naziism is
nationalism.
> (Sometimes people correctly point out that
> a lot of American liberals wrongly believed Stalin to be doing good for
> Russia; but by the end of WWII when the truth was widely known, it was
> liberals who led the fight against Communism...
And in the '50s turned against anyone who was against communism.
> ...even earlier in Europe the
> Social Democrats were fighting Communism because they recognized, correctly,
> that Stalin was going against EVERY ideal of the Left. By going to extremes,
> both Stalin and Hitler went against all other ideologies EVERYWHERE on the
> spectrum!
You are faced with the problem that there are clear and obvious
similarities between American liberalism and communism, and few
similarities between conservatism and fascism.
> >You don't seem to understand the fact that I and all conservatives and
> >libertarians agree with you completely. The good life requires personal
> >responsiblity and freedom; freedom requires that huge concentrations of
> >government power be eliminated.
> The fact you don't recognize is that the Left thinks the same way...
A claim refuted by the practice of the left, as opposed to its rhetoric.
> You want
> to try to dismiss all arguments from the left by trying to smear it by
> associating it with communism. You try to get around the fact they could do
> the same to conservatives by associating it with fascism, so you conveniently
> and wrongly try to associate fascism with the Left.
No. I'm stating the obvious fact that there is a far closer resemblance
between the liberalism and communism than between Naziism and
conservatism.
> The reality is that extremes on any side deny the very ideals of both
> conservatism and liberalism, and the true conservatives and liberals tend to
> agree on basic goals and hopes, and now adays those on the Left and Right both
> tend to agree with what you note that we agree on completely. Your error is
> you try to pretend the left and liberals don't think that way by simply
> demonizing them and trying to associate them with communism. That is not only
> wrong, but it disgusts me, it seems intellectually dishonest and designed only
> to argue by smearing...
You would make more headway if you could demonstrate that the
similarities that Solzhenitsyn and others have noted are not really
there. Instead of whining about "smears," just deal with the points at
issue.
> Here's a suggestion: stop trying to argue by labeling...
Here's a suggestion: stop trying to deprive others of the right to make
legitimate distinctions. If you think a comparison is wrong, then show
why. Don't whine about "smears."
> >> Look at
> >> what drunken assholes like Joe McCarthy did to American freedoms all in the
> >> name of paranoia. The only good thing about that guy is that he got
> >> discredited, drank himself to death, and has become a symbol of evil.
> >In fact, he was correct about the general question of Soviet agents of
> >influence in American government. But the more interesting question is
> GACK! He claimed hundreds had infilatrated. He held up a "list." It was not
> a list. He had no figures. He was lying. That is all common knowledge. How
> can you make such a claim!!!!!!!!!!????????
He may (or may not) have been wrong about his numbers. But the case of
Alger Hiss demonstrates that he was right about Soviet agents of
influence being in place. I hope you're not one of those Hiss holdouts.
> >this: given the most homicidal political philosophy in the history of the
> >world, FAR worse than Naziism, how was it possible to be "paranoid" about
> GACK! Far worse than Nazism? Sheesh. That is not even a serious statement,
> you're going off into the type of rhetorical extremism I criticize above. Its
> things like that which cause people not to take you seriously.
Tell it to the relatives of the over hundred million people slaughtered
by communist regimes. By any sane measurement, communism was a far worse
plague than Naziism. Read "The Black Book of Communism," just published
by Harvard University Press. And Furet's "The Passing of an Illusion."
> >its stated intentions of world domination? You apparently don't remember
> >the '50s. I do. I remember the atomic war drills and all the kids in
> >class getting under the desks. Vividly.
> No, I don't remember the 50s. I have studied the cold war history closely,
> including Soviet Politics. Nixon and Kissinger realized by the late sixties
> that world domination was not their game. Most cold war experts realized it
> was typical power politics. The rhetoric was used by Truman and Acheson to
> scare the country out of its isolationism, that's all.
They realized no such thing. Read Kissinger's memoirs. He was terrified
that they would use the demoralization induced by the end of the Viet Nam
war as cover to expand into Africa and other places, and he was entirely
correct.
> >> Yeah, centralized power is dangerous, I agree with that...
> >And LEFTIST centralized power is the most dangerous of all.
> Nope. Either side has an equal potential for danger...
Dead wrong judged by the facts of history. Leftist centralized power has
slaughtered more people than any other force in the history of the world.
> The left/right
> dichotomy is probably a fantasy anyway. The American left or social democrats
> have no more in common with Stalin than normal conservatives have in common
> with Hitler. You're rhetoric of demonization is irrational and the reason why
> I'm losing patience with you. You can argue points without getting into that
> kind of crap.
If you care to dispute the points of similarity I adduced, have at it.
Otherwise quit complaining.
> >This is simply untrue. There is no "right-wing authoritarian government
> >allied with the US" that approached the homicidal record of the communist
> >states even in the smallest respect.
> All you are saying is that Stalin killed more than people like Somoza...
Uh, yeah. Somehow, one hundred million versus a few thousand is the kind
of comparison that tends to get my interest.
> That
> is trying to suggest that a quantitative difference is the same as a
> qualitative difference. It is not. Do you compare mass murders that way?
> Son of Sam killed less than mass murder X, so he wasn't as bad?
I think we may take it as given that Son of Sam, considered as a world
historical disaster, wasn't in Stalin's or Mao's league.
> And, of course, you conveniently try to define Hitler out of the right wing
> camp even though almost all...
leftist
> ...philosophers and historians put him there (only
> hard core tendentious right wing scholars don't; most mainstream conservative
> philosophers and historians do put Hitler on the far right). You can't even
> maintain your illogical claim of trying to associate quantitative difference
> with qualitative difference without that kind of dishonest twist. Weak,
> Paleo, very weak.
I'm waiting for you to deal with my points directly instead of
complaining that I made them.
> >I'm merely stating a fact: Challoner and Henderson, who under no
> >circumstances may be portrayed as conservatives, discovered that the
> >Engels work that Marx relied upon most comprehensively was
> Again, Marx did not rely on one book from Engels...
He relied mostly on this one for his most telling points. And the fact
that it was so dishonest is a measure of how much we may trust either
Engels or Marx on other points.
By the way, I'm waiting for you to show us which "insight" of Marx's is
still used by modern economists.
> They were friends, they
> wrote each other letters, Engels responded to drafts by Marx. Your whole
> point was based on a false premise, that Marx relied on a particular book by
> Engels. That's wrong. Also all the attacks I see on Marx come in two
> categories:
> 1) tendentious attacks from the far right or libertarians who simply look
> for errors and mistakes and then tie them together to try to create the
> illusion that this makes Marx totally dishonest and a bad scholar. But if you
> take the careers of almost any 19th century social thinker you can come up
> with the same kind of list, things at that time were not near today's
> standards; and relatedly
This is not true. We're not talking about a few isolated mistakes.
We're talking about a pattern of dishonesty that pervades the work from
start to finish.
> 2) people who judge Marx's work by today's standards, rather than
> recognizing the state of the field at the time.
Please show me how standards in honest scholarship have changed.
> My view: Marx was wrong. He made a lot of mistakes. He sometimes mixed in
> politics with his philosophy, which led to other mistakes. Yet his
> development of structural thinking, consideration of problems within
> capitalism and how it functions, and much of his style of thinking was
> insightful and ingenious, and has had a major impact on scholarship since.
We may concede he's had a "major impact." Just look at the mountain of
corpses. Please show us some aspect of his thinking that was both
correct and ingenious.
> Aristotle was wrong on almost all his claims too, most pioneering scholars
> are...
He was wrong on many of his scientific claims. But his political and
ethical thinking remains germane. We can't say the same of Marx.
> It was wrong to worship Marx, like many leftists did, but demonizing and
> trying to discredit him is dishonest...
No, it's only "dishonest" if it's not true. The problem, from your point
of view, is that his shoddy scholarship and dishonesty was a clear fact.
> Its enough to point out he was wrong
> and why, but to recognize the impact he had -- not just on politics, but on
> social theory. No serious sociologist or social scientist can ignore Marx's
> ideas, they inform a large chunk of what is done today -- and done well,
> rigorously, and scientifically.
Like what, for example?
> >No. I'm doing my best to describe honestly what I see. Liberalism
> >rejects the moral universe of Christianity as a basis for positive law--
> >as in abortion, for instance--because it doesn't believe that right and
> >wrong are handed down from a God. Mankind instead must decide for itself
> >what is right and wrong. Please explain to me how this differs from my
> >formulation above.
> Prove that right and wrong are handed down from God. If you can't, then you
> have no basis for assuming that we all should accept christianity as a basis
> for "positive law." Unless you can prove your point, it is clear that humans
> indeed must decide what is right and wrong...
We may test this proposition by its results. And the first and only
regimes officially to adopt it instantly became the most horrific mass
murderers in the history of the world. As a bit of experimental science,
it would seem to suggest that locating good and evil in human desire is a
strategy that backfires horrifically.
> >By no means. Let's use a little liberal argumentation right now. Who
> >are YOU to impose your outdated sexual morality on other people? Suppose
> >me and my NAMBLA buddies manage to convince little boys that they really
> >don't mind having sex with us? Who are YOU to tell us that what we have
> >isn't beautiful, or just as valid as what you have with your wife? As
> >long as both parties consent, what's the problem?
> As with all laws, we have a constitution, built on social norms, and rule of
> law. A lot of what happens in this country is against my ideas of morals and
> ethics. But that's not my call to make. I will argue for my opinions and
> beliefs -- part of being part of a democratic polity is to do so. If you can
> get the constitution and laws changed, I simply have to try to convince people
> that you are wrong. I have NO PROBLEM with anti-abortion people trying to
> convince people as well, as long as they work within a democratic system
> governed by the constitution.
You haven't addressed my test case. I presume you'd say it's wrong for
men to have sex with little boys under any circumstances. But when
others quite convincingly say that this is merely your own prejudice, and
their's is different, what are you left with? In the short- and medium
term, "social norms" can vary all over the map. You're seriously
suggesting that, if it's a social norm, it's OK? You have no stronger a
foundation for your ethics than your own opinions?
> Fascism at root is when a small group of people want to impose their ideals on
> others, be they religious ideals or irrational ideals of another sort. I
> fight against fascism.
I think even the authorities you prefer to cite would say this is not a
definition of fascism. For one thing, it perfectly fits the left in most
places where it's in power.
> >There is no defense against such argument, needless to say, unless you
> >posit a locus of right and wrong other than human desire.
> Your argument is illogical. You seem to suggest that because one can't prove
> something wrong without something like your view, then your view must be
> right. That does not follow. Indeed my view -- that you can never PROVE one
> thing right or wrong, and that politics is an exercise in determining social
> values (not individual ones), and that a liberal constitutional democracy is
> the most free way to do so, is much stronger.
Then, if you can't say definitively that something is right or wrong, it
all comes down to personal opinion, huh? Please be specific in your
reply.
> Also, scientifically, one can find facts that children aren't able to protect
> themselves against adults and can be manipulated, that the behaviors you
> describe create psychological harm, and that therefore these laws have a
> rational basis, regardless of religious belief. So you're even wrong on the
> claim that one needs a religious position to make a strong case that there
> should be laws against that kind of stuff.
You can just as easily find children who say they're NOT being
manipulated, and using your kind of argumentation, the other side can
rightfully ask, Who are YOU to impose your own values on others? It was
only a year or two ago that there was a move in the APA to reclassify
certain types of adult/child sex as not necessarily harmful. As a
liberal, you are helpless against such things, since it's all personal
opinion anyway.
> >By no means. I believe I can show that that any true liberal can be a
> >Christian in only the most adulterated sense. Either you're a pretend
> >liberal and real Christian, or a pretend Christian and a real liberal.
> No, all one has to do is simply reject your point of view on the matter. You
> can't define for everyone what a Christian is, or what a liberal is. You're
> wrong, you've been proven to abuse labels and try to use them as a rhetorical
> device to simply protect your bias. I don't trust your use of labels in
> arguments; argument by labeling is inherently suspect anyway.
I'm not wrong, and I haven't abused labels. I'm merely describing
reality as we know it. Christianity says that some things are good, and
some things are bad, and always will be, and that it's not up to human
beings to set themselves up as the ultimate arbiters of good and bad.
Homosexual behavior, for example, is always bad. Any true liberal must
disagree with this judgment. Either you reject the teachings of the
Church and are a bad Christian, or you're not a real liberal.
> >Because Christianity makes certain truth claims which it presents as
> >final and unalterable. Final and unalterable truths, not open to debate,
> >are uncongenial to liberals, as we see with abortion, homosexuality,
> >pedophilia, etc. You yourself are incoherent on this point, in one place
> >claiming a liberal can be a Christian, in another claiming that all truth
> >claims must be debatable, which is foreign to Christianity.
> You're simply wrong. Liberals don't claim that final and unalterable truths
> are impossible...
Then why are they so hostile to religions which make this claim?
> Many liberals believe, like I do, that there are final and
> unalterable truths. We just accept that we can't prove them in the world or
> with science...
You can't "prove" ethical propositions like you can a calculus theorem.
Using science, you can never bridge the gap between "is" and "ought."
> ...and so therefore we defend our views and argue for them in a
> system where others have different views. We recognize that is part of the
> reality of this world, and that despite our convictions, we might be wrong in
> our view since we are fallible humans and our views can't be assumed right
> just because we believe them.
The weasel phrase is "we might be wrong in our view." In other words,
you don't REALLY believe in unchangeable truths, because there's no
functional difference between an outright nihilist and a liberal who
claims that truth exists but we can't know what it is.
> >On the contrary, I'm simply telling the truth. If you reject religion as
> >a source of moral truth--which you clearly do--please explain to me the
> >putatively more reliable fount where you locate it.
> We're all part of the same whole. Whatever you do to anyone else you do to a
> part of yourself. We are all parts of God, God isn't separate from us.
That's a religious claim. Which, like all religious claims, you can't
prove, of course.
> Is that religious? Probably -- though different from your religion. Its the
> basis of my belief. Might I be wrong? Sure. But I'll live by that view,
> and use it to determine my moral approach to life. So far, I haven't seen
> anyone prove my position wrong, so I stick to it, unless I see a better
> argument or more reasonable claim (I started reading Kant today, on the advice
> of another poster, perhaps that will lead me to some different conclusions, he
> seems to think Kant's ideas show a path to moral truth independent of
> religion, perhaps you should check that out as well).
The question here isn't what individuals believe. It's whether or not
people may know what's right and wrong with enough assurance to construct
a society in which those ethical beliefs are incarnated in laws which all
must observe. The liberal quails at such a prospect, of course.
> >So you're saying, for example, that no moral belief may be regarded as
> >final and irrevocable. That, for example, we may not say with finality
> >that all men are created equal, and that racist oppression is, once and
> >for all, simply wrong?
> You'd have to make a strong argument to convince me that its not wrong. I
> don't think you can.
You didn't answer the question. Either some truths are final AND may be
known by us, or they're not final, or we can't know which ones are final.
You can't have it both (or all three) ways.
> >> That's ridiculous. No one is forcing you to marry someone of your own sex.
> >That is NOT the point. The point is whether it's just to allow
> >government to demean the institution that's the root and ground of social
> >stability by pretending it's something that most people realize is
> >degrading.
> You're injecting your bias into something I think you have no business doing,
> since in my opinion it brings you to violate the rights of others.
> Therefore, I'll fight you politically with every means at my disposal. You
> can fight for your belief too, of course. That's politics.
While you are attempting to enlist massive state power to demean an
institution which is prior to the state itself. That's tyranny.
> >Nothing could be more totalitarian than the attempt of a tiny minority to
> >force their flawed notion of "marriage" on a majority that wants no part
> >of it.
> That statement is plain stupid. It is not totalitarian to let people do what
> they want. You don't have to have it forced on you, you can live how you
> want.
Nobody is saying that homosexuals can't engage in whatever perversions
get them off. We draw the line when they attempt to use the apparatus of
state power to demean and to redefine a social institution which is prior
to and independent of the state.
> You are trying to define totalitarian in a way that letting people be free to
> do what they want is totalitarian. How Orwellian!...
You seriously expect us to regard a state attack on the institution of
marriage as anything other than totalitarian?
> It does not hurt you one
> bit if two people somewhere else in the city have a same sex marriage...
It may not hurt the rest of society if they engage in sodomy. But it
DOES hurt the rest of society when they use the massive power of the
state to demean an institution which they have no use for.
> Not
> one bit. People used to think the way you do about mixed race marriages to.
> Your bias will probably go the way of that bias. Its a matter of time.
Like saying the law of gravity will be repealed one day. Matter of time.
> >I'm saying that liberals could not tolerate a conception of soldier that
> >is different from their own. Therefore, VMI must be forced to admit
> >women. By government coercion. Which, of course, destroyed VMI. What
> >made the school VMI is now gone.
> Probably for the better.
It goes without saying that the liberal regards the existence of any
opinion other than his own as better off dead.
> But if you don't want liberal ideals deciding society, why should liberals
> accept your ideals to decide the rules of society? Would that not be
> totalitarianism on your part?...
You mean, say, the notion of federalism? Best expressed in Bill
Kauffman's memorable phrase, "Let San Francisco be San Francisco and Salt
Lake be Salt Lake"? If a locality wants to legalize certain toxic
practices, fine. Just so long as they permit other localities, where
people think differently, to incarnate their OWN idea of the good
society.
> At least liberals accept your right to freedom
> of speech, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and to act and vote on
> what you believe...
This is patently untrue. Liberals are notorious suppressors of free
speech, they want to banish religion from the public square, and they
hate democracy, preferring to enact their agenda via the courts.
> If you pass a law, it becomes a law. Would you do the
> same, or would you prefer a society where most everything was set in stone,
> regardless of what people wanted, because you believe you know the moral
> truth. If so, then aren't you the one being more totalitarian?
Let's just say I prefer the notion of constitutional government.
> I really don't personally dislike you, I just think you're locked into a
> belief system that has you sort of in a trance. I don't like your argument by
> labeling, or what appears to be many rhetorical techniques rooted in logical
> erorrs.
Please show me where I'm in error. I contend that the problem is that
you have never been forced to think outside the box yourself and are
flummoxed when you encounter ideas that challenge your own
preconceptions.
Scott D. Erb
<5F1DA6397D2D4444.3353DE97...@lp.airnews.net>,
pale...@operamail.com says...
>
>In article <82c1b2$6jm$2...@rupert.unet.maine.edu>, scot...@maine.maine.edu
>says...
>
>> Some bits disproving Paleo's bizarre attempt to claim that the fascists are
>> really leftists:
>
>Eric Hobsbawn, may I point out, was a notorious leftist and supporter of
>the USSR and other leftist causes. He had for reasons of self-interest
>every motive to distance himself from Naziism.
Also a very respected historian.
Argumentum ad hominem doesn't cut it in my book.
>Fascism tended to be nationalistic.
By definition. And the Nazis had their allies on the far right, especially
amongst the anti-Communists and anti-bolsheviks.
> We may concede this to be generally
>a right-wing trait. Is this enough to transform a movement characterized
>by its hostility to Christianity and its devotion to centralized state
Hostility to Christianity is irrelevant. The far left, the far right, and
even the moderates can be hostile to Christianity.
>power--both anathema to conservatives and both characteristic of the
>left--into a conservative or right-wing phenomenon? I don't think so.
Conservatism is a statist ideology at base, looking at the collective as being
more important than the individual (individualism is associated with classical
liberalism, which rose against conservatism).
>By the way, I am currently reading Francois Furet's "The Passing of an
>Illusion," translated by his wife, and I note that he attributes a hatred
>of the bourgeois to be at the root of both communism and fascism.
Neither liked the bourgeois. The extremes tend to never like the center, be
they extreme left or extreme right.
-snip-
>To say that some conservatives saw Hitler as a bulwark against communism
>is not to say that Hitler was a conservative. Almost nothing about his
>program was congenial to conservatives.
Again, I did not call him a conservative. I said he was a right wing
extremist. A right wing extremist is to a conservative what a left wing
extremist is to a Social Democrat.
>You merely say that conservatives believed an alliance with Hitler
>against communists was politically prudent. Buchanan and Fulani have
>formed a similar alliance against the two big parties, while having
>almost nothing in common with each other--happens all the time in
>politics.
Are you comparing Buchanan with Hitler? In any event, the left hated Hitler,
the far right liked him, including some conservatives who didn't realize that
the far right was not pro-conservative.
>Your task is to show how elements of fascism were congenial to the right.
>Except for nationalism, an almost impossible project.
No, your task is to show that political philosophers are wrong to put fascism
on the far right. You haven't done anything except assert that since they
liked centralized power and didn't like Christians they must be left. But the
far right liked centralized power (though the fascists tended to be
corporatist, which is more in line with the right) and didn't like Christians.
You are the one saying the experts are wrong. You need to do more if you want
to prove it. I teach what I'm saying to about a hundred students a year. If
you want me to teach it differently, you gotta do a lot more to persuade me!
ciao, scott
Loren Petrich
Paleo <pale...@operamail.com> wrote:
> ... Namely, the
>unprecendented barbarity and scope and degree of the leftist slaughter.
Leftist? There you go again.
One interesting question is proportion of people killed to total
population. There are simply more people to kill nowadays. In centuries
past, conquering armies would sometimes kill the entire adult male
population of conquered towns and would enslave the remaining population.
> ... So much for the tender mercies of atheist
>states.
While Communists have believed that religion is the opium of the
people, the Nazis did not. They were a mixed bag here, with some
proposing a Nazified version of Christianity ("Christ with a sword",
Jesus Christ as a noble Nordic crucified by the Jews), and some proposed
various alternative religions. Alfred Rosenberg proposed a National
Church that had Adolf Hitler as its messiah, Mein Kampf as its sacred
book, Reich orators as its clergy, Horst Wessel Lied and other Nazi songs
as its hymns, and so forth. A bit like Auguste Comte's Religion of
Humanity, which was essentially Catholicism without Christianity.
>On the contrary, you can see clear and unmistakeable similarities between
>what is now called "liberalism" and communism: the admiration for
>centralized power, the worship of experts, the hostility to religion and
>specifically Christianity and the location of all value in human desire,
>etc. etc. About the only thing you can cite re the right and Naziism is
>nationalism.
The Communists had been anti-religion, true; but they tended to
create pseudo-religious personality cults. Stalin had pushed himself as
some sort of Great National Hero, and his successors referred someone
safer -- Lenin. Also, admiration for centralized power is common among
theocrats.
[a lot of Paleo's bleating about Karl Marx...]
Some people would not know what to do without villains.
[a lot of stuff on child molestation...]
[Scott Erb:]
>> We're all part of the same whole. Whatever you do to anyone else you do to a
>> part of yourself. We are all parts of God, God isn't separate from us.
>That's a religious claim. Which, like all religious claims, you can't
>prove, of course.
This kind of "God" has long been considered heretical in
Christendom -- consider the fate of Giordano Bruno and Baruch Spinoza,
who had had similar beliefs.
>This is patently untrue. Liberals are notorious suppressors of free
>speech, they want to banish religion from the public square, and they
>hate democracy, preferring to enact their agenda via the courts.
Be careful of what you wish for, because you might find those who
wish to implement in law "Sell everything you have and give the money to
the poor". Or those who push some sort of Erbian pantheism.
--
Loren Petrich Happiness is a fast Macintosh
pet...@netcom.com And a fast train
My home page: http://www.petrich.com/home.html
Scott D. Erb
<67BF2BC9971A46DE.E3E0D467...@lp.airnews.net>,
pale...@operamail.com says...
Our views are too different to warrant much worthwhile exchange. But I'll
comment on a few points, and explain why I feel you're making a big mistake
going with your ideological view.
>After having been unavoidably away from the keyboard for a long time, I'm
>trying to remember what came before in this discussion. I think the
>distinction is this: what needs to be explained, over and above the
>customary degree of human slaughter present in all times and places
>throughout our sorry history, is something entirely new. Namely, the
>unprecendented barbarity and scope and degree of the leftist slaughter.
Your error, caused by your tendancy to divide the world into Left (bad) and
Right (good) is not to see the true cause (modernism, changes in technology,
alienation caused by the industrial revolution, destruction of a sense of
community, etc.) of the barbarity, as well as the fact it has a double face.
Not just the bad I mentioned, but the good (medicine, rational thinking,
prosperity, material well being beyond anything humans ever experienced). You
aren't seeing reality, you're interpreting things into a simplistic left-right
schema, where you define all bad things as left. It is very, very, misguided
and simplsitic.
>Humans have killed each other all through recorded history. In no time
>or place, however, have they done it with the profligacy of the left in
>the 20th century.
The right has been just as bad. And, in fact, if you look at recorded history
its not really that much worse then this century if you take into account
technology and population gains.
>Was there a spiritual or political DDT at work in this century? I would
>say yes, and I would identify it as communism and other leftist
>progressive nostrums which refused to locate the source of good and evil
>in God's order but instead arrogated to themselves the right to define
>good and evil. The result was the most massive slaughter ever witnessed
>in the history of the world. So much for the tender mercies of atheist
>states.
You have a right to your opinion, but it seems more like you have this point
of view (based on your religious beliefs) and you're simply defining all
reality to fit into your pre-existing categories and beliefs. That is very
common, and very UNpersuasive.
>I'm not "trying to say" that Communism is different, I'm merely adverting
>to the fact that its slaughter dwarfed anything else in the history of
>the world and requires a special explanation.
Right wing fascism and other slaughters, even the US low tech slaughter and
genocide of native tribes is similar. In fact, in a "spiritual" sense you
should be attacking capitalism as well, since it is materialist and based on
anti-Christian ideals. One could argue that it has driven more exploitation
and suffering than communism. One could also argue that it has created more
prosperity and material gain. One could compare first and third world.
Its shades of grey, friend, not the black and white simplistic good vs evil,
god vs the left that you want to see.
>Even if you buy the claim that Hitler is somehow right-wing, which is
>specious, his six million can't compare with the over 100 million of the
>communists.
Besides the fact that comparing numbers is irrelevant in looking at acts, I
reject your numbers, and reject your unproven claim that communism is causal,
especially when it was often an excuse for many people who didn't care about
ideology. You're assuming a causal link you cannot prove.
>> Neither extremist regime had much in common with moderates; fascism
>> was much different than conservatism, Stalinism was much different than
Social
>> Democracy or American liberalism....
>
>On the contrary, you can see clear and unmistakeable similarities between
>what is now called "liberalism" and communism: the admiration for
>centralized power, the worship of experts, the hostility to religion and
>specifically Christianity and the location of all value in human desire,
>etc. etc. About the only thing you can cite re the right and Naziism is
>nationalism.
Nope, I do NOT see that from modern liberals, especially not hostility to
religion. Again, you are wrong, you are either engaged in selective
perception or simply interpreting everything into your simplistic world view
of good vs. evil. All liberals I know HATE Stalinism, FEAR a too powerful
state, and MOST liberals I know are CHRISTIAN (though I guess you want to be
able to interpret who the "real" Christians are too -- say, those who simply
share your beliefs, eh?) Don't you see how you're locked in a set of
perceptions which just cause you to see what you want, and interpret what you
don't into a way that fits what you want.
You might feel secure that way, but its NOT truth!
>No. I'm stating the obvious fact that there is a far closer resemblance
>between the liberalism and communism than between Naziism and
>conservatism.
Funny, many liberals compare Republicans and conservatives to Nazis. I
disagree with them too. You guys mirror each other, its amusing. But you're
each either playing rhetorical games or simply interpreting things
simplisticly.
-snip-
On McCarthy:
>He may (or may not) have been wrong about his numbers.
He waved a paper and claimed it was a list. He lied. Not only was it not a
list, he had no list. Research has proven he was a drunken liar who drank
himself to death after the Senate came to its senses and rebuked him, turning
him into a symbol of where right wing extremism can go. Face it: extremism
from the right or the left is not pretty!
-snip-
>They realized no such thing. Read Kissinger's memoirs. He was terrified
>that they would use the demoralization induced by the end of the Viet Nam
>war as cover to expand into Africa and other places, and he was entirely
>correct.
You're wrong in saying that Kissinger and Nixon didn't realize that they could
work with the Soviet Union. I have read Kissinger's memoirs, and in fact have
studied the foreign policy of the time. Sure, Kissinger was worried about the
demoralization, and saw the third world as the "chessboard" for power
politics, but as a realist, he wanted to work with the Soviets to maintain
systemic stability, and did so quite effectively for awhile (though totally
ignoring real problems in the third world, and often supporting killer right
wing dictators while doing so). Still, Nixon-Kissinger had a more rational
foreign policy than Kennedy-Johnson.
-snip-
>> Again, Marx did not rely on one book from Engels...
>
>He relied mostly on this one for his most telling points.
NO!!!!!!!! He was in constant contact with Engels, spounging off Engels,
bouncing ideas off him, he did not rely on "one book." And almost ALL books
of that time (and even of the current time) can be criticized for having
holes.
-snip-
>The weasel phrase is "we might be wrong in our view."
Like it or not, you always might be wrong. You are fallible. Deal with it.
> In other words,
>you don't REALLY believe in unchangeable truths, because there's no
>functional difference between an outright nihilist and a liberal who
>claims that truth exists but we can't know what it is.
Yet unless you want to claim that you hold the infallible ultimate truth, even
if you can't prove it, you are subject to the same conundrum.
That's probably why you try to interpret everything into your simplistic
little world view. You need to! If you didn't your whole belief system would
crash down around itself, you have to hold on to it to protect your sense of
self, your own identity, your certainty that you have the right belief, that
you are going to heaven, that right is "good" and left is "bad."
Friend, live in your illusions. They don't hurt me. Sure, I'll spend my
life trying to convince people otherwise, since I think you're wrong, but if I
can't convince you, thats fine. Its not worth trying, since I think you're
locked into your belief system, you're not looking at this with an eye to
learn, only to pontificate or preach. Cool. Live well.
>The question here isn't what individuals believe. It's whether or not
>people may know what's right and wrong with enough assurance to construct
>a society in which those ethical beliefs are incarnated in laws which all
>must observe. The liberal quails at such a prospect, of course.
Here's you're simply dead wrong. Liberals tend to believe that there rights
of life, liberty and property, and that a constitutional democracy is the best
way to work through the conflicts in a society. You demonize so much that I
suspect you really imagine liberals to be nihilistic would be Stalinists with
no ethics and just "do whatever I feel" beliefs. You're simply wrong, and if
you stick with that kind of stereotype of the "other side," you'll find
yourself marginalized, ignored, and ultimately quite frustrated. Your "faith"
might give you a powerful enough illusion of being "right" so that you can
handle the rest, but I suspect it is just an illusion.
But hey, if its good enough for you, go with it. No skin off my back.
>You didn't answer the question. Either some truths are final AND may be
>known by us, or they're not final, or we can't know which ones are final.
>You can't have it both (or all three) ways.
I answered it. There is always uncertainty, but with rational thinking,
evidence, and communication we individually and as a society give it our best
shot and try to learn and develop better systems of norms and ethics. We
always might be wrong, but that doesn't mean its not worth trying. If you
believe you need an answer key to have any sense of ethics, you're fooling
yourself.
(on homosexual marriage):
>While you are attempting to enlist massive state power to demean an
>institution which is prior to the state itself. That's tyranny.
Oh, you can think its tyranny to allow other people to do what they want.
That makes you look rather silly to make such a claim though! Tyranny is
allowing freedom to people who aren't hurting anyone to have the relationship
they want! You're doing a good job of Orwellian newspeak in that type of
claim.
But you really can't see it, can you? You're locked into a world view that
determines everything for you.
>It goes without saying that the liberal regards the existence of any
>opinion other than his own as better off dead.
Funny, you seem the more intolerant and unable to accept that any opinion
other than your own might be right.
(attacks on liberals, etc., deleted)
You're locked in a point of view that is too distant from my own to be worth
much discussion. If I thought it had a chance of convincing a large number,
I'd argue with you and spend time on it to show how you're wrong. I think
you'll convince no one, so my time is probably better spent on other things.
I certainly do not think you shouldn't live as you wish. I consider it
misguided, but if it gives you a sense of happiness and purpose in life, hey,
go with it. Its your life.
ciao, scott
Paleo
says...
> >You haven't done so. You've merely appealed to authority.
> No, I've made an argument with sources. The sources I use are evidence. You
> simply asserted, with sources worse than mine.
By no means. I've listed a number of characteristics which most
reasonable people would agree are associated with "left" and "right," and
asked whether or not they characterize fascism or communism. On a single
one--the appeal to nationalism--fascism might be described as "right-
wing." On all the others, it is clearly left-wing. I have yet to see
you address this point.
> >No, what you did was appeal to authority and offer a taxonomy that
> >appears to correspond less to reality than the one I suggested.
> My taxonomy is accurate, and I explained why. What you call an appeal to
> authority is simply your recognition that my view corresponds with the
> predominant view by experts...
By leftist experts who clearly have an ax to grind. By the British
Marxist Hobsbawm, for example.
> >In fact, I offered several reasons why the Nazis were leftwing, as they
> >in fact claimed they were. You're free to show how these reasons are
> >faulty, but you haven't done so.
> I have, making very precise, supported arguments. You ignore them, and assert
> that you're right...
No, you haven't. When you get around to addressing the point I made at
the top, let me know.
> Turn back! Open your eyes! That route only leads to frustration and a
> persecution complex!
"You may have the brave country alone." OK.
Paleo
says...
> >You unerringly chose the PERFECT example that comprehensively refutes
> >you. In fact, the basic assumptions of most pop psychology over the past
> >several decades are directly contrary to those of Christianity.
> They do better with human nature than you do though. So you refute yourself.
Please show us how the pop psychologists' claims are more accurate than
the traditional Western estimate of human nature.
> >> You are making a huge error here. Saying that all things can be challenged
> >> does not mean all things are equivalent! Saying that all things might be
> >> wrong, doesn't mean we have to accept all propositions as equally valid...
> >It's the obvious consequence of your claim.
> No, its not! You pretend it is, without thinking about it, since otherwise
> you'll have to realize your pat responses to people who disagree with you are
> based on irrationality and illogic. Then your precious world view would be
> challenged, and you won't allow that!
You didn't quote enough context to let me remember the point at hand.
> >No, I'm self-evidently right. Think about what law is and what it does.
> Been there, done that. Law codifies social norms and principles. If laws
> don't reflect norms and principles, force is needed. If it does, minimal
> force is needed to deal with the aberrations. Thats why democracies and
> liberal societies on the average are more free and use less force, law
> reflects the cultural shared norms of that society. Totalitarian systems and
> theocracies tend to drift the other direction.
You didn't quote enough again, but in general we may say that if there is
no commonly agreed-upon notion of the good, and the only criterion for
same is human desire, then we have chaos which must be adminstered by
dictatorship. Which is where we're going, needless to say.
> >Look. What gets liberals mad is anybody who attempts to get them to look
> >at facts they find unpleasant.
> On the contrary, you're trying to avoid the obvious fact that Hitler was far
> right because you find that fact unpleasant...
On almost every count, he looks like a leftist. Deal with the original
point and we can move on.
> >Look. This is simple. If you think you can demonstrate that any of
> >these things produced a death toll that approaches even in a small way
> Irrational argument. You're trying to compare things qualitatively via a
> number count...
Uh, yeah--I'll concede that I DO believe that genocidal, mass-murdering
dictators ARE worse than, say, Son of Sam.
> I've explained by that doesn't work, especially since the 20th
> century had the technology, which was used, to make a larger number count.
False. The communist dictators killed people with old technology.
> >Uh, Scott. Let's dispose of one thing right now. I couldn't care less
> >how many liberals I piss off.
> Obviously. But what you do that angers people is not your view -- but your
> dishonest style of rhetoric and your irrational arugment by labeling and
> recategorization...
In other words, by striving for clarity and for language that is
consistent.
> The attempt to say that all of the Left is like Communism
> is wrong, they aren't even close -- no closer than conservatism to nazism.
Which reminds me, you haven't attempted to deal with the points of
similarity I noted.
> Again, you can keep asserting that somehow your arguments are true and real,
> but I'm disapointed that you rely on such irrational arguments to make your
> point. I strongly suggest you rethink your position. You seem to be the type
> of person that strongly needs something to believe in, something to throw
> yourself into. When you find it, you do so with all your heart, and that can
> be respected. But you seem unable to reflect on the errors you're making, you
> seem to require a real conversion to do that. That puts you in a position
> where you're probably doomed to either go through major life changing
> revelations and conversions a few times in life, or believe you have the
> truth, and become convinced all others are either misguided, blind, or
> unwilling to see what you think obvious.
On the contrary, I'm an independent thinker who prefers to be guided by
the truth rather than fads and what's trendy. If you want to deal with
any of the points I made, let me know.
Paleo
says...
> >Eric Hobsbawn, may I point out, was a notorious leftist and supporter of
> >the USSR and other leftist causes. He had for reasons of self-interest
> >every motive to distance himself from Naziism.
> Also a very respected historian.
> Argumentum ad hominem doesn't cut it in my book.
And this is not an ad hominem argument. It is merely to show the
obvious: that Hobsbawm himself was a hardcore leftist and for reasons of
self-interest wished to portray Naziism as right-wing.
> > We may concede this to be generally
> >a right-wing trait. Is this enough to transform a movement characterized
> >by its hostility to Christianity and its devotion to centralized state
> Hostility to Christianity is irrelevant. The far left, the far right, and
> even the moderates can be hostile to Christianity.
It is most certainly relevant in the context of European history and
culture, which is founded on Christianity.
> >power--both anathema to conservatives and both characteristic of the
> >left--into a conservative or right-wing phenomenon? I don't think so.
> Conservatism is a statist ideology at base, looking at the collective as being
> more important than the individual (individualism is associated with classical
> liberalism, which rose against conservatism).
You have it, as usual, precisely backwards. You have just described the
typical liberal view.
> >To say that some conservatives saw Hitler as a bulwark against communism
> >is not to say that Hitler was a conservative. Almost nothing about his
> >program was congenial to conservatives.
> Again, I did not call him a conservative. I said he was a right wing
> extremist. A right wing extremist is to a conservative what a left wing
> extremist is to a Social Democrat.
Your task is to show us how the putative right-wing elements of his
ideology outweighed the left-wing elements. You have a single point in
your favor, nationalism. Everything else about his program was leftist.
> >You merely say that conservatives believed an alliance with Hitler
> >against communists was politically prudent. Buchanan and Fulani have
> >formed a similar alliance against the two big parties, while having
> >almost nothing in common with each other--happens all the time in
> >politics.
> Are you comparing Buchanan with Hitler? In any event, the left hated Hitler,
> the far right liked him, including some conservatives who didn't realize that
> the far right was not pro-conservative.
I'm making the obvious point that politics makes strange bedfellows and
produces the occasional odd alliance.
> >Your task is to show how elements of fascism were congenial to the right.
> >Except for nationalism, an almost impossible project.
> No, your task is to show that political philosophers are wrong to put fascism
> on the far right...
No, my task is NOT to accept at face value the claims of self-interested
leftist scholars, but to examine facts first-hand. You have one point in
your favor and quite a few others against you. Naziism looks very
leftist, judging by the facts that we know and not by the ukases of
leftist professors.
> You are the one saying the experts are wrong. You need to do more if you want
> to prove it. I teach what I'm saying to about a hundred students a year. If
> you want me to teach it differently, you gotta do a lot more to persuade me!
What I suggest is that you examine the facts themselves and try to square
same with your claims.
Paleo
says...
> > ... Namely, the
> >unprecendented barbarity and scope and degree of the leftist slaughter.
> Leftist? There you go again.
You mean using words truthfully? Yeah.
> One interesting question is proportion of people killed to total
> population. There are simply more people to kill nowadays. In centuries
> past, conquering armies would sometimes kill the entire adult male
> population of conquered towns and would enslave the remaining population.
You're suggesting that the scope of the slaughter is irrelevant? That
wiping out a village is somehow equivalent to murdering 100 million
people? I guess Hitler can rest easy then.
> > ... So much for the tender mercies of atheist
> >states.
> While Communists have believed that religion is the opium of the
> people, the Nazis did not. They were a mixed bag here, with some
> proposing a Nazified version of Christianity ("Christ with a sword",
> Jesus Christ as a noble Nordic crucified by the Jews), and some proposed
> various alternative religions. Alfred Rosenberg proposed a National
> Church that had Adolf Hitler as its messiah, Mein Kampf as its sacred
> book, Reich orators as its clergy, Horst Wessel Lied and other Nazi songs
> as its hymns, and so forth. A bit like Auguste Comte's Religion of
> Humanity, which was essentially Catholicism without Christianity.
Right. And we may note that nothing resembling plain, orthodox
Christianity was approved by the Nazis.
> >On the contrary, you can see clear and unmistakeable similarities between
> >what is now called "liberalism" and communism: the admiration for
> >centralized power, the worship of experts, the hostility to religion and
> >specifically Christianity and the location of all value in human desire,
> >etc. etc. About the only thing you can cite re the right and Naziism is
> >nationalism.
> The Communists had been anti-religion, true; but they tended to
> create pseudo-religious personality cults. Stalin had pushed himself as
> some sort of Great National Hero, and his successors referred someone
> safer -- Lenin. Also, admiration for centralized power is common among
> theocrats.
Who are about as common as flat-earthers, needless to say.
> [a lot of Paleo's bleating about Karl Marx...]
> Some people would not know what to do without villains.
It is wrong to speak plainly about wicked people?
> >This is patently untrue. Liberals are notorious suppressors of free
> >speech, they want to banish religion from the public square, and they
> >hate democracy, preferring to enact their agenda via the courts.
> Be careful of what you wish for, because you might find those who
> wish to implement in law "Sell everything you have and give the money to
> the poor". Or those who push some sort of Erbian pantheism.
Sure.
Timothy Sutter
> scot...@maine.maine.edu says...
> > >To say that some conservatives saw Hitler as a bulwark against communism
> > >is not to say that Hitler was a conservative. Almost nothing about his
> > >program was congenial to conservatives.
> > Again, I did not call him a conservative. I said he was a right wing
> > extremist. A right wing extremist is to a conservative what a left wing
> > extremist is to a Social Democrat.
> Your task is to show us how the putative right-wing elements of his
> ideology outweighed the left-wing elements. You have a single point in
> your favor, nationalism. Everything else about his program was leftist.
just one thing;
"national socialism" was not your run-of-the-mill socialism.
the stated goals of the national socialists
was only a socialism for the nazis,
and world domination under their thumb.
if you were in the party, after the goal of world
takeover had been accomplished, you were guaranteed
a seat on the dictator's bench.
that's different from any idea that the Nazi's planned
to take over the world government and then usher in some
"socialist" state where "egalitarianism" was the point of order.
and for your information, in case it matters,
*I* personally am not a "leftist" just making
a comment about the Nazis.
oh, and "fascism" is rather strictly
defined as "right wing" (read another post of yours)
but an interesting note, (albeit poloticks ain'y my fave thing)
is the definite similarity between a
"federal system" and a "fascist state"
and the similarity is in their very nature of construction,
the term "league" comes to mind,
as both are a "binding" together of various
governmental political and commercial enterprises.
in fact a "fascita" is a bundle of sticks,
and a federal is also something of a
"binding" treaty of union.
and this is where "religion" or
the "tie that binds" comes in to play.
these are both, by their very nature,
very strictly ordered societies.
maybe this has nothing to do with your discussion,
but I thought I'd toss it in anyway.
well, because in the "idealized" communist state,
the notion of "government" sort of drops
out of the picture.
why most people suggest that one doesn't confuse the
Soviet military dictatorship with communism.
cuz they ain't the same thing.
Paleo
says...
> Our views are too different to warrant much worthwhile exchange...
Given a common devotion to clarity and consistency with language, NO
views are "too different" to warrant discussion.
> >After having been unavoidably away from the keyboard for a long time, I'm
> >trying to remember what came before in this discussion. I think the
> >distinction is this: what needs to be explained, over and above the
> >customary degree of human slaughter present in all times and places
> >throughout our sorry history, is something entirely new. Namely, the
> >unprecendented barbarity and scope and degree of the leftist slaughter.
> Your error, caused by your tendancy to divide the world into Left (bad) and
> Right (good) is not to see the true cause (modernism, changes in technology,
> alienation caused by the industrial revolution, destruction of a sense of
> community, etc.) of the barbarity, as well as the fact it has a double face.
> Not just the bad I mentioned, but the good (medicine, rational thinking,
> prosperity, material well being beyond anything humans ever experienced). You
> aren't seeing reality, you're interpreting things into a simplistic left-right
> schema, where you define all bad things as left. It is very, very, misguided
> and simplsitic.
You have got it, as usual, precisely backwards. I advert to a huge fact
of 20th-century history, one from which liberals, for understandable
reasons, wish to avert their gaze. In other words, I am dealing with
reality. You, by contrast, refuse to deal with it and accept its
implications, and you resent others who attempt to use language carefully
and honestly.
> >Humans have killed each other all through recorded history. In no time
> >or place, however, have they done it with the profligacy of the left in
> >the 20th century.
> The right has been just as bad...
Utterly and obviously and demonstrably untrue. No right-wing regime has
even approached the scale of leftist slaughter. A telling fact.
I've been birding for many years, and I especially like hawk-watching.
Hawk populations have been under pressure for all of this century for
manifold reasons. Peregrine falcon and bald eagle populations were
decreasing at a slow but worrisome rate in the first half of the century.
Then, something happened. Populations crashed over the course of four or
five years. Clearly something NEW and different, over and beyond the
usual causes of mortality, was at work. A few years' research
demonstrated this suspicion correct: it was DDT.
The principle re leftist utopias is precisely the same. Slaughter on an
unprecedented scale was happening. Something new had entered the scene,
and that something was ideological DDT--atheist communist states. Your
problem is that you dislike other people a) first, merely noticing the
difference, and then b) attempting to account for it. I'm sorry, but
people who prefer clarity and logic will do such irksome things.
> ...its not really that much worse then this century if you take into account
> technology and population gains.
As many have noted, technology has precisely nothing to do with it. The
communists were operating at about the level of technology available in
the American Civil War.
> >Was there a spiritual or political DDT at work in this century? I would
> >say yes, and I would identify it as communism and other leftist
> >progressive nostrums which refused to locate the source of good and evil
> >in God's order but instead arrogated to themselves the right to define
> >good and evil. The result was the most massive slaughter ever witnessed
> >in the history of the world. So much for the tender mercies of atheist
> >states.
> You have a right to your opinion, but it seems more like you have this point
> of view (based on your religious beliefs) and you're simply defining all
> reality to fit into your pre-existing categories and beliefs. That is very
> common, and very UNpersuasive.
On the contrary, I'm looking at undeniable historical facts and
attempting to make logical connections of cause and effect. You may
disagree with my reasoning, but you haven't gotten that far. You're
still complaining at my chutzpah when it comes to using language
carefully.
> >I'm not "trying to say" that Communism is different, I'm merely adverting
> >to the fact that its slaughter dwarfed anything else in the history of
> >the world and requires a special explanation.
> Right wing fascism and other slaughters, even the US low tech slaughter and
> genocide of native tribes is similar...
Sorry. A few hundred or a few thousand is NOT remotely comparable to a
hundred million. Slaughter and torture on that scale requires a special
explanation, given the fact that it only occurred in leftist states.
> In fact, in a "spiritual" sense you
> should be attacking capitalism as well, since it is materialist and based on
> anti-Christian ideals. One could argue that it has driven more exploitation
> and suffering than communism. One could also argue that it has created more
> prosperity and material gain. One could compare first and third world.
You are entirely correct that capitalism doesn't have a Christian
imprimatur. But you are entirely wrong that it has created misery on the
communist scale. The fact that all third-world people want to emigrate
here tells the story.
> Its shades of grey, friend, not the black and white simplistic good vs evil,
> god vs the left that you want to see.
You're the one claiming that the mere fact of recognizing historical
facts is "simplistic good vs. evil." It's not. It's just facing reality
as it happened.
> >Even if you buy the claim that Hitler is somehow right-wing, which is
> >specious, his six million can't compare with the over 100 million of the
> >communists.
> Besides the fact that comparing numbers is irrelevant in looking at acts...
No, it is NOT irrelevant, when it surpasses a certain point, just as
hawk mortality resulting from DDT was similarly relevant.
> I
> reject your numbers, and reject your unproven claim that communism is causal,
> especially when it was often an excuse for many people who didn't care about
> ideology. You're assuming a causal link you cannot prove.
You can't "prove" ANYTHING in history the way you can a calculus theorem.
You can only note suggestive links. If you disagree, you're free to show
why the causal chain I adduce is faulty.
> >On the contrary, you can see clear and unmistakeable similarities between
> >what is now called "liberalism" and communism: the admiration for
> >centralized power, the worship of experts, the hostility to religion and
> >specifically Christianity and the location of all value in human desire,
> >etc. etc. About the only thing you can cite re the right and Naziism is
> >nationalism.
> Nope, I do NOT see that from modern liberals, especially not hostility to
> religion...
Then you're not using your eyes. Liberals have perverted the First
Amendment into something that would have been totally unrecognizable by
the Founders, and all in the name of banishing religion from the public
square.
> Again, you are wrong, you are either engaged in selective
> perception or simply interpreting everything into your simplistic world view
> of good vs. evil...
Once again I'm right, and I'm doing nothing more than looking at the
world around me and searching for chains of cause and effect.
> All liberals I know HATE Stalinism...
But they praised it when it was in operation.
> ...FEAR a too powerful > state...
Except that they've created a monster state that invades and bombs other
nations around the world on flimsy pretexts, is almost incredibly
intrusive, and now operates almost totally beyond the bounds of
constitutional law.
> ...and MOST liberals I know are CHRISTIAN (though I guess you want to be
> able to interpret who the "real" Christians are too -- say, those who simply
> share your beliefs, eh?) Don't you see how you're locked in a set of
> perceptions which just cause you to see what you want, and interpret what you
> don't into a way that fits what you want.
I interpret the word "Christian" in the historically accurate way, and I
repeat that you can't be both a good Christian and a good liberal. If
you care to show how liberalism can actually abide the absolute truth
claims of Christianity, fire away.
> >No. I'm stating the obvious fact that there is a far closer resemblance
> >between the liberalism and communism than between Naziism and
> >conservatism.
> Funny, many liberals compare Republicans and conservatives to Nazis. I
> disagree with them too. You guys mirror each other, its amusing. But you're
> each either playing rhetorical games or simply interpreting things
> simplisticly.
You'd be more convincing if you dealt with the points of resemblance I
adduced.
> On McCarthy:
> >He may (or may not) have been wrong about his numbers.
> He waved a paper and claimed it was a list. He lied. Not only was it not a
> list, he had no list. Research has proven he was a drunken liar who drank
> himself to death after the Senate came to its senses and rebuked him, turning
> him into a symbol of where right wing extremism can go. Face it: extremism
> from the right or the left is not pretty!
Then, on the other hand, he was correct about Soviet agents of influence.
> >They realized no such thing. Read Kissinger's memoirs. He was terrified
> >that they would use the demoralization induced by the end of the Viet Nam
> >war as cover to expand into Africa and other places, and he was entirely
> >correct.
> You're wrong in saying that Kissinger and Nixon didn't realize that they could
> work with the Soviet Union...
I said no such thing. I made the correct observation that they were
afraid that communism's aspirations for world power would reassert
themselves after Viet Nam, and they in fact did.
> >> Again, Marx did not rely on one book from Engels...
> >He relied mostly on this one for his most telling points.
> NO!!!!!!!! He was in constant contact with Engels, spounging off Engels,
> bouncing ideas off him, he did not rely on "one book." And almost ALL books
> of that time (and even of the current time) can be criticized for having
> holes.
Not true. The standards of honest scholarship haven't changed. And the
scholarship of both men has been demonstrated to be abundantly dishonest-
-and the icing on the cake is that the best case made for this fact came
from a couple of liberal English dons.
> >The weasel phrase is "we might be wrong in our view."
> Like it or not, you always might be wrong. You are fallible. Deal with it.
You didn't quote enough for me to remember what the point was.
> > In other words,
> >you don't REALLY believe in unchangeable truths, because there's no
> >functional difference between an outright nihilist and a liberal who
> >claims that truth exists but we can't know what it is.
> Yet unless you want to claim that you hold the infallible ultimate truth, even
> if you can't prove it, you are subject to the same conundrum.
But this is precisely what Christians have always claimed. To wit, that
they possess certain infallible truths that do not alter with the passage
of time. Which is why liberals can't be consistent Christians.
> That's probably why you try to interpret everything into your simplistic
> little world view. You need to! If you didn't your whole belief system would
> crash down around itself, you have to hold on to it to protect your sense of
> self, your own identity, your certainty that you have the right belief, that
> you are going to heaven, that right is "good" and left is "bad."
> Friend, live in your illusions...
Instead of the incessant ad hominems, please stick to the points I make.
Either you can handle them or you can't. But at least try.
> >The question here isn't what individuals believe. It's whether or not
> >people may know what's right and wrong with enough assurance to construct
> >a society in which those ethical beliefs are incarnated in laws which all
> >must observe. The liberal quails at such a prospect, of course.
> Here's you're simply dead wrong. Liberals tend to believe that there rights
> of life, liberty and property, and that a constitutional democracy is the best
> way to work through the conflicts in a society...
Except that they have broken almost totally free of the one constitution
they have in this country, justifying their abandonment of the rule of
law with weasel phrases like "the living Constitution."
> You demonize so much that I
> suspect you really imagine liberals to be nihilistic would be Stalinists with
> no ethics and just "do whatever I feel" beliefs. You're simply wrong, and if
> you stick with that kind of stereotype of the "other side," you'll find
> yourself marginalized, ignored, and ultimately quite frustrated. Your "faith"
> might give you a powerful enough illusion of being "right" so that you can
> handle the rest, but I suspect it is just an illusion.
Instead of the personal characterizations, try to deal with the points I
make.
> >You didn't answer the question. Either some truths are final AND may be
> >known by us, or they're not final, or we can't know which ones are final.
> >You can't have it both (or all three) ways.
> I answered it. There is always uncertainty, but with rational thinking,
> evidence, and communication we individually and as a society give it our best
> shot and try to learn and develop better systems of norms and ethics. We
> always might be wrong, but that doesn't mean its not worth trying. If you
> believe you need an answer key to have any sense of ethics, you're fooling
> yourself.
You have conceded that you are a functional nihilist. Because if "there
is always uncertainty," what we are left with is personal preference.
> (on homosexual marriage):
> >While you are attempting to enlist massive state power to demean an
> >institution which is prior to the state itself. That's tyranny.
> Oh, you can think its tyranny to allow other people to do what they want.
Yes, if "what they want" is to destroy an institution that isn't meant
for them.
> That makes you look rather silly to make such a claim though! Tyranny is
> allowing freedom to people who aren't hurting anyone to have the relationship
> they want! You're doing a good job of Orwellian newspeak in that type of
> claim.
Maybe you can explain why it's "Orwellian newspeak" to protest a
government attack on the institution of marriage.
> But you really can't see it, can you? You're locked into a world view that
> determines everything for you.
And you, it appears, when you're incapable of dealing with an opponent's
argumentation, resort to ad hominem arguments.
> >It goes without saying that the liberal regards the existence of any
> >opinion other than his own as better off dead.
> Funny, you seem the more intolerant and unable to accept that any opinion
> other than your own might be right.
Another illustration of the same point.
> You're locked in a point of view that is too distant from my own to be worth
> much discussion. If I thought it had a chance of convincing a large number,
> I'd argue with you and spend time on it to show how you're wrong. I think
> you'll convince no one, so my time is probably better spent on other things.
I think you should try to deal with the argument, not the person. Then--
possibly--you wouldn't feel the urge to run away.
Paleo
> > Your task is to show us how the putative right-wing elements of his
> > ideology outweighed the left-wing elements. You have a single point in
> > your favor, nationalism. Everything else about his program was leftist.
> just one thing;
> "national socialism" was not your run-of-the-mill socialism.
I agree. It had a nationalistic element, which most other socialist
movements lacked.
> the stated goals of the national socialists
> was only a socialism for the nazis,
> and world domination under their thumb.
>
> if you were in the party, after the goal of world
> takeover had been accomplished, you were guaranteed
> a seat on the dictator's bench.
>
> that's different from any idea that the Nazi's planned
> to take over the world government and then usher in some
> "socialist" state where "egalitarianism" was the point of order.
>
> and for your information, in case it matters,
> *I* personally am not a "leftist" just making
> a comment about the Nazis.
I don't know what your point is re world government or Nazi plans. My
sole point was that he looked more left-wing than right-wing.
> oh, and "fascism" is rather strictly
> defined as "right wing" (read another post of yours)
Yeah, according to leftist professors.
> but an interesting note, (albeit poloticks ain'y my fave thing)
> is the definite similarity between a
> "federal system" and a "fascist state"
> and the similarity is in their very nature of construction,
Fascist states were resolute centralized and nationalist, and the kind of
federalism advocated by the American Founders was anathema to them.
Timothy Sutter
> tim_s...@yahoo.com says...
> > > Your task is to show us how the putative right-wing elements of his
> > > ideology outweighed the left-wing elements. You have a single point in
> > > your favor, nationalism. Everything else about his program was leftist.
> > just one thing;
> > "national socialism" was not your run-of-the-mill socialism.
> I agree. It had a nationalistic element, which most other socialist
> movements lacked.
> > the stated goals of the national socialists
> > was only a socialism for the nazis,
> > and world domination under their thumb.
> > if you were in the party, after the goal of world
> > takeover had been accomplished, you were guaranteed
> > a seat on the dictator's bench.
> > that's different from any idea that the Nazi's planned
> > to take over the world government and then usher in some
> > "socialist" state where "egalitarianism" was the point of order.
> > and for your information, in case it matters,
> > *I* personally am not a "leftist" just making
> > a comment about the Nazis.
> I don't know what your point is re world government or Nazi plans. My
> sole point was that he looked more left-wing than right-wing.
well, maybe you have a personal political
ideology that redefines things somehow,
_generally_ left wing refers to
commies and right wing refers to fascists.
where "socialism" would be left of center,
and "free market" capitalism maybe would be
slightly right of center.
if you have some new definitions,
I haven't heard of them.
what exactly is "right wiing" left wing" to you?
> > oh, and "fascism" is rather strictly
> > defined as "right wing" (read another post of yours)
> Yeah, according to leftist professors.
actually not, the original "black shirts" of Mussolini
were what would be called these days, *very* much
"social conservative"
and seeing that they define the original sense
you figure fascism in a strict sense is "right wing"
now, you are free to quibble over the separation
of "fiscal conservatism" vs. strict "social conservatism"
but then the waters get muddy.
but, the fascists were both
fiscally and socially conservative.
> > but an interesting note, (albeit poloticks ain'y my fave thing)
> > is the definite similarity between a
> > "federal system" and a "fascist state"
> > and the similarity is in their very nature of construction,
> Fascist states were resolute centralized and nationalist, and the kind of
> federalism advocated by the American Founders was anathema to them.
but it's the same thing, nothing more than an
organization bound by treaties and some common
ideological referrence.
and the federal government has at times
exerted centralized authority over the states.
seems to me that the "civil war" was fought over such issues.
and the "fascist" ideal was sort of a corporate utopia.
with some very strange dictums like "work makes you free"
not to worry,
I'd probably lean towards referring to both
fascism and communism as debased and bastardized
forms of the christian ideology.
Paul speaks of the common good
and sharing wealth so that "none
shall have excess and none shall have lack,"
but he also seems to claim that
"whosoever shall not work shall not eat."
schism these and you get those.
no, I am *not* saying these folks (hitler and stalin)
were christians, in case that's not clear.
but you have hitler and stalin
in near diametric opposition
so where does england and france fit in?
in the middle of these jokers?
france left of center and england right of center?
so why was everybody fighting?
Timothy Sutter
> Paleo wrote:
> >By no means. I've listed a number of characteristics which most
> >reasonable people would agree are associated with "left" and "right," and
> >asked whether or not they characterize fascism or communism. On a single
> >one--the appeal to nationalism--fascism might be described as "right-
> >wing." On all the others, it is clearly left-wing. I have yet to see
> >you address this point.
> nope fascism====corporatism, you can't have fascism without
> corporatism and that makes it a right wing ideology.
you have to filter in the notions of
"fiscal conservativism" / "social conservatism"
and you'll find that you could have a
right wing social ideology with a liberal fiscal policy,
(which was probably tried and failed some time in America)
and/or a fiscally conservative / socially liberal ideology
(which best describes the present american side show carnival)
fascism would be both fiscally and socially conservative
and communism would be both fiscally and socially "liberal"
in theory.
silverback
wrote:
>In article <82el6c$ofa$1...@rupert.unet.maine.edu>, scot...@maine.maine.edu
>says...
>
>> >You haven't done so. You've merely appealed to authority.
>
>> No, I've made an argument with sources. The sources I use are evidence. You
>> simply asserted, with sources worse than mine.
>
>By no means. I've listed a number of characteristics which most
>reasonable people would agree are associated with "left" and "right," and
>asked whether or not they characterize fascism or communism. On a single
>one--the appeal to nationalism--fascism might be described as "right-
>wing." On all the others, it is clearly left-wing. I have yet to see
>you address this point.
nope fascism====corporatism, you can't have fascism without
corporatism and that makes it a right wing ideology.
>
>> >No, what you did was appeal to authority and offer a taxonomy that
>> >appears to correspond less to reality than the one I suggested.
>
>> My taxonomy is accurate, and I explained why. What you call an appeal to
>> authority is simply your recognition that my view corresponds with the
>> predominant view by experts...
>
>By leftist experts who clearly have an ax to grind. By the British
>Marxist Hobsbawm, for example.
>
>> >In fact, I offered several reasons why the Nazis were leftwing, as they
>> >in fact claimed they were. You're free to show how these reasons are
>> >faulty, but you haven't done so.
>
>> I have, making very precise, supported arguments. You ignore them, and assert
>> that you're right...
>
>No, you haven't. When you get around to addressing the point I made at
>the top, let me know.
>
>> Turn back! Open your eyes! That route only leads to frustration and a
>> persecution complex!
>
>"You may have the brave country alone." OK.
*****************************************************
GDY Weasel
emailers remove the spam buster
For those seeking enlightenment visit the White Rose at
http://www.spiritone.com/~gdy52150/whiterose.htm
Do your patriotic duty and vote for your favorite blithering idiot at
http://www.spiritone.com/~gdy52150/award.html
======================================================
Michael Ejercito's solution to global warming
If the goverment wanted to end global warming, it would use its
nuclear arsenal to put enough dust into the atmoshpere
to reduce sunlight, creating a nuclear winter.
And just to prove to the world that Dan Quayle
has nothing over him, Micheal wrote.
"the problem is not people are not being
paid enough,but the costs of goods and
services are too high."
************************************************
silverback
<tim_s...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>silverback wrote:
>
>> Paleo wrote:
>
>> >By no means. I've listed a number of characteristics which most
>> >reasonable people would agree are associated with "left" and "right," and
>> >asked whether or not they characterize fascism or communism. On a single
>> >one--the appeal to nationalism--fascism might be described as "right-
>> >wing." On all the others, it is clearly left-wing. I have yet to see
>> >you address this point.
>
>> nope fascism====corporatism, you can't have fascism without
>> corporatism and that makes it a right wing ideology.
>
>you have to filter in the notions of
>
>"fiscal conservativism" / "social conservatism"
>
>and you'll find that you could have a
>right wing social ideology with a liberal fiscal policy,
>(which was probably tried and failed some time in America)
>
>and/or a fiscally conservative / socially liberal ideology
I would hardly call today's climate socially liberal. geesh
>
>(which best describes the present american side show carnival)
>
>fascism would be both fiscally and socially conservative
>
>and communism would be both fiscally and socially "liberal"
>
>in theory.
*****************************************************
Timothy Sutter
> Timothy Sutter wrote:
> >silverback wrote:
> >> Paleo wrote:
> >> >By no means. I've listed a number of characteristics which most
> >> >reasonable people would agree are associated with "left" and "right," and
> >> >asked whether or not they characterize fascism or communism. On a single
> >> >one--the appeal to nationalism--fascism might be described as "right-
> >> >wing." On all the others, it is clearly left-wing. I have yet to see
> >> >you address this point.
> >> nope fascism====corporatism, you can't have fascism without
> >> corporatism and that makes it a right wing ideology.
> >you have to filter in the notions of
> >"fiscal conservativism" / "social conservatism"
> >and you'll find that you could have a
> >right wing social ideology with a liberal fiscal policy,
> >(which was probably tried and failed some time in America)
> >and/or a fiscally conservative / socially liberal ideology
> I would hardly call today's climate socially liberal. geesh
you must be kidding.
based on what scale?
it would have been socially unacceptible
for a woman to wear pants in the work place
not 40 years ago.
and I mean just clothing.
maybe you think XXX movies on network television
would be the mark of a liberal society.
well, in comparison to less than a century back in time,
when it wasn't correct to even mention VD in polite conversation,
well...things are more liberaller.
sheesh.
silverback
<tim_s...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>silverback wrote:
>
>> Timothy Sutter wrote:
>
>> >silverback wrote:
>
>> >> Paleo wrote:
>
>> >> >By no means. I've listed a number of characteristics which most
>> >> >reasonable people would agree are associated with "left" and "right," and
>> >> >asked whether or not they characterize fascism or communism. On a single
>> >> >one--the appeal to nationalism--fascism might be described as "right-
>> >> >wing." On all the others, it is clearly left-wing. I have yet to see
>> >> >you address this point.
>
>> >> nope fascism====corporatism, you can't have fascism without
>> >> corporatism and that makes it a right wing ideology.
>
>> >you have to filter in the notions of
>
>> >"fiscal conservativism" / "social conservatism"
>
>> >and you'll find that you could have a
>> >right wing social ideology with a liberal fiscal policy,
>> >(which was probably tried and failed some time in America)
>
>> >and/or a fiscally conservative / socially liberal ideology
>
>> I would hardly call today's climate socially liberal. geesh
>
>you must be kidding.
nope
>
>based on what scale?
>
>it would have been socially unacceptible
>for a woman to wear pants in the work place
>not 40 years ago.
>
yup we changed that but yer right wing buddies still think the place
for a women is barefoot and pregnant in the kitchen.
>and I mean just clothing.
>
>maybe you think XXX movies on network television
>would be the mark of a liberal society.
>
actually it shows how socially conservative we are, after all France
has full frontal nudity on game shoes and topless beaches abound in
Europe .
>well, in comparison to less than a century back in time,
>
>when it wasn't correct to even mention VD in polite conversation,
>
>well...things are more liberaller.
>
oh we have made advances but the republiCONs want to revert society to
their mistaken views of the 50s and Ozzie and Harriet.
>sheesh.
>
>> >(which best describes the present american side show carnival)
>> >fascism would be both fiscally and socially conservative
>> >and communism would be both fiscally and socially "liberal"
>> >in theory.
*****************************************************
Paleo
> > I don't know what your point is re world government or Nazi plans. My
> > sole point was that he looked more left-wing than right-wing.
> well, maybe you have a personal political
> ideology that redefines things somehow,
> _generally_ left wing refers to
> commies and right wing refers to fascists.
It's true that academics, most of them leftists, prefer to see it this
way. I simply observe that, quite apart from the fact that the Nazis
considered themselves socialists, their ideology looked more left-wing
than right-wing. The sole element that might be considered right-wing is
their nationalism or Aryan folk-mysticism. Everything else about them
looks socialist.
> > > oh, and "fascism" is rather strictly
> > > defined as "right wing" (read another post of yours)
> > Yeah, according to leftist professors.
> actually not, the original "black shirts" of Mussolini
> were what would be called these days, *very* much
> "social conservative"
By the standards of today's liberals, nearly anybody born before 1930 was
a radical member of the religious right.
> > Fascist states were resolute centralized and nationalist, and the kind of
> > federalism advocated by the American Founders was anathema to them.
> but it's the same thing, nothing more than an
> organization bound by treaties and some common
> ideological referrence.
No, it's NOT the same thing. It's nearly its diametrical opposite.
> but you have hitler and stalin
> in near diametric opposition
No, you don't. Subtract the nationalism and they look quite similar.
Timothy Sutter
> tim_s...@yahoo.com says...
> > > I don't know what your point is re world government or Nazi plans. My
> > > sole point was that he looked more left-wing than right-wing.
> > well, maybe you have a personal political
> > ideology that redefines things somehow,
> > _generally_ left wing refers to
> > commies and right wing refers to fascists.
> It's true that academics, most of them leftists, prefer to see it this
> way. I simply observe that, quite apart from the fact that the Nazis
> considered themselves socialists, their ideology looked more left-wing
> than right-wing. The sole element that might be considered right-wing is
> their nationalism or Aryan folk-mysticism. Everything else about them
> looks socialist.
then _please_, give the preferred usage.
what exactly constitutes "right wing" ideology?
just a brief 25 word manifesto,
economic, political, social, and anything else you can think of.
what constitutes "right wing" ideology?
if I don't like it, I'll tell you,
but I'd be interested to hear your opinion,
seeing that you seem to use the terms as
if they should be obvious to me
which they aren't.
does willingness to allow the populace
direct its own course have anything to do with it?
can you be conservative and still open
to a public discussion of traffic regulations?
partly, do you feel that the terms
"conservative" and "liberal" are truly opposed?
in all aspects?
can't you be cautious and free at the same time?
> > > > oh, and "fascism" is rather strictly
> > > > defined as "right wing" (read another post of yours)
> > > Yeah, according to leftist professors.
> > actually not, the original "black shirts" of Mussolini
> > were what would be called these days, *very* much
> > "social conservative"
> By the standards of today's liberals, nearly anybody born before 1930 was
> a radical member of the religious right.
are these people, "liberals", any more free than you are?
or are they maybe simply obsessed in a paranoid way with the law?
like they think that anything that any law prohibits,
they should be allowed?
simply, is there anyway that you could be besmirching
a perfectly good word by casting these people who are
merely obsessed with prohibitions as "liberal"?
understand me at all?
> > > Fascist states were resolute centralized and nationalist, and the kind of
> > > federalism advocated by the American Founders was anathema to them.
> > but it's the same thing, nothing more than an
> > organization bound by treaties and some common
> > ideological referrence.
> No, it's NOT the same thing. It's nearly its diametrical opposite.
why? exactly how?
how is the political ideology different?
and this would speak to your plaints about
what exactly constitutes "right wing" ideology.
is "conservative" nearly the same thing as "cautious"
and does caution indicate severe dogmatic rigidity or
more of a, maybe, "the good of the majority" first,
all the while considering the good of the individual?
where as "wreckless" would better
be the opposite of conservative.
where "wrecklessness" is best shown as
a catering to the whims of any fringe
element with a loud enough voice to be heard?
> > but you have hitler and stalin
> > in near diametric opposition
> No, you don't. Subtract the nationalism and they look quite similar.
to be sure, if you subtract the "presumed" ideologies,
they are more like the bobsie twins.
megalomaniacal dictators with very large standing armies.
a perfect case of a rabble fringe with a very large voice
wresting control of dictatorial power.
where human wrecklessness allowed itself
to be tied in a web of deceit _again_.
all I'm suggesting is that the "dichotomy" here may be false,
and in pursuing things through this particular lens,
"conservative opposes liberal"
you could miss the fact that
"conservative opposes wrecklessness"
is that too vague?
Ted Kegebein
Paleo wrote:
>
> In article <3866DF4A...@yahoo.com>, tim_s...@yahoo.com says...
>
> > > I don't know what your point is re world government or Nazi plans. My
> > > sole point was that he looked more left-wing than right-wing.
>
> > well, maybe you have a personal political
> > ideology that redefines things somehow,
>
> > _generally_ left wing refers to
> > commies and right wing refers to fascists.
>
> It's true that academics, most of them leftists, prefer to see it this
> way. I simply observe that, quite apart from the fact that the Nazis
> considered themselves socialists, their ideology looked more left-wing
> than right-wing. The sole element that might be considered right-wing is
> their nationalism or Aryan folk-mysticism. Everything else about them
> looks socialist.
>
> > > > oh, and "fascism" is rather strictly
> > > > defined as "right wing" (read another post of yours)
>
> > > Yeah, according to leftist professors.
>
> > actually not, the original "black shirts" of Mussolini
> > were what would be called these days, *very* much
> > "social conservative"
>
> By the standards of today's liberals, nearly anybody born before 1930 was
> a radical member of the religious right.
>
> > > Fascist states were resolute centralized and nationalist, and the kind of
> > > federalism advocated by the American Founders was anathema to them.
>
> > but it's the same thing, nothing more than an
> > organization bound by treaties and some common
> > ideological referrence.
>
> No, it's NOT the same thing. It's nearly its diametrical opposite.
>
> > but you have hitler and stalin
> > in near diametric opposition
>
> No, you don't. Subtract the nationalism and they look quite similar.
You are correct. They were partners in crime until Hitler thought
he had the upper hand.
History, dictionaries, and political science is and was written by
the folks who think that FDR was America's greatest President.
Is it any wonder they paint Socialism through rose colored glasses?
silverback
wrote:
>In article <3866DF4A...@yahoo.com>, tim_s...@yahoo.com says...
>
>> > I don't know what your point is re world government or Nazi plans. My
>> > sole point was that he looked more left-wing than right-wing.
>
>> well, maybe you have a personal political
>> ideology that redefines things somehow,
>
>> _generally_ left wing refers to
>> commies and right wing refers to fascists.
>
>It's true that academics, most of them leftists, prefer to see it this
>way. I simply observe that, quite apart from the fact that the Nazis
>considered themselves socialists, their ideology looked more left-wing
their ideology was completely hard right, they were corporatist, you
can't have fascism without a capitalistic economy goof ball.
>than right-wing. The sole element that might be considered right-wing is
>their nationalism or Aryan folk-mysticism. Everything else about them
>looks socialist.
>
>> > > oh, and "fascism" is rather strictly
>> > > defined as "right wing" (read another post of yours)
>
>> > Yeah, according to leftist professors.
>
>> actually not, the original "black shirts" of Mussolini
>> were what would be called these days, *very* much
>> "social conservative"
>
>By the standards of today's liberals, nearly anybody born before 1930 was
>a radical member of the religious right.
>
>> > Fascist states were resolute centralized and nationalist, and the kind of
>> > federalism advocated by the American Founders was anathema to them.
>
>> but it's the same thing, nothing more than an
>> organization bound by treaties and some common
>> ideological referrence.
>
>No, it's NOT the same thing. It's nearly its diametrical opposite.
>
>> but you have hitler and stalin
>> in near diametric opposition
>
>No, you don't. Subtract the nationalism and they look quite similar.
>
*****************************************************
Steve Canyon
wrote:
>On Mon, 27 Dec 1999 18:09:09 -0500, Paleo <pale...@operamail.com>
>wrote:
>
>>In article <3866DF4A...@yahoo.com>, tim_s...@yahoo.com says...
>>
>>> > I don't know what your point is re world government or Nazi plans. My
>>> > sole point was that he looked more left-wing than right-wing.
>>
>>> well, maybe you have a personal political
>>> ideology that redefines things somehow,
>>
>>> _generally_ left wing refers to
>>> commies and right wing refers to fascists.
>>
>>It's true that academics, most of them leftists, prefer to see it this
>>way. I simply observe that, quite apart from the fact that the Nazis
>>considered themselves socialists, their ideology looked more left-wing
>
>their ideology was completely hard right, they were corporatist, you
>can't have fascism without a capitalistic economy goof ball.
As opposed to a socialist economy goof ball like Gdy.
Ace