While I sympathize with only some of the above,
I am adding crossposts to two newsgroups more
appropriate than a.t.r.
-=-=-
The World Trade Center towers MUST rise again,
at least as tall as before...or terror has triumphed.
13 of 15 people found the following review helpful:
The Right of Revolution Vindicated..., April 29, 2002
By Ryan Setliff "InternetPundit.com" (VA, USA)
~Vindiciae, Contra Tyrannos~ is best translated to "A Vindication of
Opposition to Tyrants." It was written in response to French
monarchy's slaughter of French Huguenots. As it best translates from
Latin, it is a vindication of opposition to tyrants and a Biblical
defense of the right of revolution or rebellion to a corrupt king/
leader. If you want to understand the covenant origins of the American
polity and the influence of Biblical, Puritanical or Calvinistic
political thought on the American founders than this book is worth
exploring.
This is a very valuable historical piece in the struggle for
liberty... Secularists have deemphasized the signficance of this
tract's influence in the American Revolution, because of an affinity
for the humanistic enlightenment.
http://www.amazon.com/Brutus-Vindiciae-Concerning-Legitimate-Cambridge/dp/0521342090
In Forty-four Questions
by the
Rev. Samuel Rutherford
sometime Professor of Divinity in the University of St. Andrews
London: Printed for John Field, and are to be sold at his house
upon Addle-hill, near Baynards-Castle. Octob. 7, 1644.
Edited by Jon Roland
2002
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contents
Introduction by Jon Roland
Sketch of the life of Rutherford
Author's Preface
Question I
Whether government be by a divine law,
How government is from God. — Civil power, in the root, immediately
from God.
Question II
Whether or no government be warranted by the law of nature,
Civil society natural in radice, in the root, voluntary in modo, in
the manner. — Power of government, and power government by such and
such magistrates, different. — Civil subjection not formally from
nature's laws. — Our consent to laws penal, not antecedently natural.
— Government by such rulers, a secondary law of nature. — Family
government and politic different. — Civil government, by consequent,
natural.
Question III
Whether royal power and definite forms of government be from God,
That kings are from God, understood in a fourfold sense. — The royal
power hath warrant from divine institution. — The three forms of
government not different in specie and nature. — How every form is
from God. — How government is an ordinance of man, 1 Pet. ii.13.
Question IV
Whether or no the king be only and immediately from God, and not from
the people,
How the king is from God, how from the people. — Royal power three
ways in the people. — How royal power is radically in the people. —
The people maketh the king. — How any form of government is from God.
— How government is a human ordinance, 1 Pet. ii. 3. — The people
create the king. — Making a king, and choosing a king, not to be
distinguished. — David not a king formally, because anointed by God.
Question V
Whether or no the P. Prelate proveth that sovereignty is immediately
from God, not from the people,
Kings made by the people, though the office, in abstracto, were
immediately from God. — The people have a real action, more than
approbation, in making a king. — Kinging of a person ascribed to the
people. — Kings in a special manner are from God, but it followeth
not; therefore, not from the people. — The place, Prov viii. 15,
proveth not but kings are made by the people. — Nebuchadnezzar, and
other heathen kings, had no just title before God to the kingdom of
Judah, and divers other subdued kingdoms.
Question VI
Whether or no the king be so allenarly from both, in regard of
sovereignty and designation of his person, as he is noway from the
people, but only by mere approbation,
The forms of government not from God by an act of naked providence,
but by his approving will. — Sovereignty not from the people by sole
approbation. — Though God have peculiar acts of providence in creating
kings, it followeth not hence that the people maketh not kings. — The
P. Prelate exponeth prophecies true only of David, Solomon, and Jesus
Christ, as true of profane heathen kings. — The P. Prelate maketh all
the heathen kings to be princes, anointed with the holy oil of saving
grace.
Question VII
Whether the P. Prelate conclude that neither constitution nor
designation of kings is from the people,
The excellency of kings maketh them not of God's only constitution and
designation. — How sovereignty is in the people, how not. — A
community doth not surrender their right and liberty to their rulers,
so much as their power active to do, and passive to suffer, violence.
— God's loosing of the bonds of kings, by the mediation of the
people's despising him, proveth against the P. Prelate that the Lord
taketh away, and giveth royal majesty mediately, not immediately. —
The subordination of people to kings and rulers, both natural and
voluntary; the subordination of beasts and creatures to man merely
natural. — The place, Gen ix. 5, He that sheddeth man's blood &c.
discussed.
Question VIII
Whether or no the P. Prelate proveth, by force of reason, that the
people cannot be capable of any power of government,
In any community there is an active and passive power to government. —
Popular government is not that wherein the whole people are governors.
— People by nature are equally indifferent to all the three
governments, and are not under any one by nature. — The P. Prelate
denieth the Pope his father to be the antichrist. — The bad success of
kings chosen by people proveth nothing against us, because kings
chosen by God had bad success through their own wickedness. — The P.
Prelate condemneth king Charles' ratifying (Parl. 2, an. 1641) the
whole proceedings of Scotland in this present reformation. — That
there be any supreme judges is an eminent act of divine providence,
which hindereth not but that the king is made by the people. — The
people not patients in making a king, as is water in the sacrament of
baptism, in the act of production of grace.
Question IX
Whether or no sovereignty is so in and from the people, that they may
resume their power in time of extreme necessity,
How the people is the subject of sovereignty. — No tyrannical power is
from God. — People cannot alienate the natural power of self-defence.
— The power of parliaments. — The Parliament hath more power than the
king. — Judges and kings differ. — People may resume their power, not
because they are infallible, but because they cannot so readily
destroy themselves as one man may do. — That the sanhedrim punished
not David, Bathsheba, Joab, is but a fact, not a law. — There is a
subordination of creatures natural, government must be natural; and
yet this or that form is voluntary.
Question X
Whether or not royal birth be equivalent to divine unction,
Impugned by eight arguments. — Royalty not transmitted from father to
son. — The throne by special promise, made to David and his seed, by
God Psal. lxxxix., no ground to make birth, in joro dei, a just title
to the crown. — A title by conquest to a throne must be unlawful if
birth be God's lawful title. — Royalists who hold conquest to be a
just title to the crown each manifest treason against king Charles and
his royal heirs. — Only bona fortunæ not honor or royalty properly
transmitable from father to son. — Violent conquest cannot regulate
the consciences of people to submit to a conqueror as their lawful
king. — Naked birth is inferior to that very divine unction, that made
no man a king without the people's election. — If a kingdom were by
birth the king might sell it. — The crown is the patrimony of the
kingdom, not of him who is king, or of his father. — Birth a typical
designment to the crown in Israel. — The choice of a family to the
crown, resolveth upon the free election of the people as on the
fountain cause. — Election of a family to the crown lawful.
Question XI
Whether or no he be more principally a king who is a king by birth, or
he who is a king by the free election of the people,
The elective king cometh nearer to the first king. (Deut. xvii..) — If
the people may limit the king, they give him the power. — A community
have not power formally to punish themselves. — The hereditary and the
elective prince in divers considerations, better or worse, each one
than another.
Question XII
Whether or no a kingdom may lawfully be purchased by the sole title of
conquest,
A Twofold right of conquest. — Conquest turned in an after-consent of
the people, becometh a just title. — Conquest not a signification to
us of God's approving will. — Mere violent domineering contrary to the
acts of governing. — Violence hath nothing in it of a king. — A bloody
conqueror not a blessing, per se, as a king is. — Strength as
prevailing is not law or reason. — Fathers cannot dispose of the
liberty of posterity not born. — A father, as a father, hath not power
of life and death. — Israel and David's conquests of the Canaanites,
Edomites, Ammonites not lawful, because conquest, but upon a divine
title of God's promise.
Question XIII
Whether or no royal dignity have its spring from nature, and how it is
true Every man is born free, and how servitude is contrary to nature,
Seven sorts of superiority and inferiority. — Power of life and death
from a positive law. — A dominion antecedent and consequent. — Slavery
not natural from four reasons. — Every man born free in regard of
civil subjection (not in regard of natural, such as of children and
wife, to parents and husband) proved by seven arguments. — Politic
government how necessary, now natural. — That parents should enslave
their children not natural.
Question XIV
Whether or no the people make a person their king conditionally or
absolutely; and whether the king be tyed by any such covenant,
The king under a natural, but no civil obligation to the people, as
royalists teach. — The covenant civilly tyeth the king proved by
Scriptures and reasons, by eight arguments. — If the condition,
without which one of the parties would never have entered into
covenant, be not performed, that party is loosed from the covenant. —
The people and princes are obliged in their places for justice and
religion, no less than the king. — In so far as the king presseth a
false religion on the people, eatenus, in so far they are understood
not to have a king. — The covenant giveth a mutual co-active power to
king and people to compel each other, though there be not one on earth
higher than both to compel each of them. — The covenant bindeth the
king as king, not as he is a man only. — One or two tyrannous acts
deprive not the king of his royal right. — Though there were no
positive written covenant (which yet we grant not) yet there is a
natural, tacit, implicit covenant tying the king, by the nature of his
office. — The people given to the king as a pledge, not as if they
became his own to dispose of at his absolute will. — The king could
not buy, sell, borrow, if no covenant should tie him to men. — The
covenant sworn by Judah (2 Chron. xv..) tyed the king.
Question XV
Whether the king be univocally, or only analogically and by
proportion, a father,
Adam not king of the whole earth because a father. — The king a father
metaphorically and improperly, proved by eight arguments.
Question XVI
Whether or no a despotical or masterly dominion agree to the king,
because he is king,
The king hath no masterly dominion over the subjects as if they were
his servants, proved by four arguments. — The king not over men as
reasonable creatures to domineer. — The king cannot give away his
kingdom or his people as if they were his proper goods. — A violent
surrender of liberty tyeth not. — A surrender of ignorance is in so
far involuntarily as it oblige not. — The goods of the subjects not
the king's, proved by eight arguments. — All the goods of the subjects
are the king's in a fourfold sense.
Question XVII
Whether or no the prince have properly the fiduciary or ministerial
power of a tutor, husband, patron, minister, head, master of a family,
not of a lord or dominator,
The king a tutor rather than a father as these are distinguished. — A
free community not properly and in all respects a minor and pupil. —
The king's power not properly marital and husbandly. — The king a
patron and servant. — The royal power only from God, immediatione
simplicis constitutionis, et solum solitudine causæ primæ, but not
immediatione applicationis dignitatis ad personam. — The king the
servant of the people both objectively and subjectively. — The Lord
and the people by one and the same act according to the physical
relation maketh the King. — The king head of the people metaphorically
only, not essentially, not univocally, by six arguments. — His power
fiduciary only.
Question XVIII
What is the law or manner of the king (1 Sam. viii. 9, 11) discussed
fully,
The power and the office badly differenced by Barclay. — What is the
manner of the king, by the harmony of interpreters, ancient and
modern, protestants and papists. — Crying out (1 Sam. viii.) not
necessarily a remedy of tyranny, nor a praying with faith and
patience. — Remissive law, as was the law of divorcement. — The law of
the king (1 Sam. xii. 23, 24) not a law of tyranny.
Question XIX
Whether Whether or no the king be in dignity and power above the
people,
In what consideration the king is above the people, and the people
above the king. — A mean, as a mean, inferior to the end, how it is
true. — The king inferior to the people. — The church, because the
church, is of more excellency than the king, because king. — The
people being those to whom the king is given, worthier than the gift.
— And the people immortal, the king mortal. — The king a mean only,
not both the efficient, or author of the kingdom, and a mean: two
necessary distinctions of a mean. — If sin had never been, there
should have been no king. — The king is to give his life for his
people. — The consistent cause more excellent than the effect. — The
people than the king. — Impossible people can limit royal power, but
they must give royal power also. — The people have an action in making
a king, proved by four arguments. — Though it were granted that God
immediately made kings, yet it is no consequent, God only, and not the
people, can unmake him. — The people appointing a king over
themselves, retain the fountain-power of making a king.. — The mean
inferior to the end, and the king, as a king, is a mean. — The king as
a mean, and also as a man, inferior to the people. — To swar non-self-
preservation, and to swear self-murder, all one. — The people cannot
make away their power, 1. Their whole power, nor 2. Irrevocably to the
king. — The people may resume the power they give to the commissioners
of parliament, when it is abused. — The tables in Scotland lawful,
when the ordinary judicatures are corrupt. — Quod efficit tale id
ipsum magis tale discussed, the fountain-power in the people derived
only in the king.. — The king is a fiduciary, a life-renter, not a
lord or heritor. — How sovereignty is in the people. — Power of life
and death, how in a community. — A community void of rulers, is yet,
and may be a politic body. — Judges gods analogically.
Question XX
Whether inferior judges be essentially the immediate viceregents of
God, as kings, not differing in essence and nature from kings,
Inferior judges the immediate vicars of God, no less than the king. —
The consciences of inferior judges, immediately subordinate to God,
not to the king, either mediately or immediately. — How the inferior
judge is the deputy of the king. — He may put to death murderers, as
having God's sword committed to him, no less than the king, even
though the king command the contrary; for he is not to execute
judgment, and to relieve the oppressed conditionally, If a mortal king
give him leave; but whether the king will or no, he is to obey the
King of kings. — Inferior judges are ministri regni, non ministri
regis. — The king doth not make judges as he is a man, by an act of
private good-will; but as he is a king by an act of royal justice, and
by a power that he hath from the people, who made himself a supreme
judge. — The king's making inferior judges hindereth not, but they are
as essentially judges as the king who maketh them, not by fountain-
power, but power borrowed from the people. — The judges in Israel and
the kings differ not essentially. Aristocracy as natural as monarchy,
and as warrantable. — Inferior judges more necessary than a king.
Question XXI
What power the people and states of parliament hath over the king and
in the state,
The elders appointed by God to be judges. — Parliaments may convene
and judge without the king. — Parliaments are essentially judges, and
so their consciences neither dependeth on the king, quoad
specificationem, that is, that they should give out this sentence, not
that, nec quoad exercitium, that they should not in the morning
execute judgment. — Unjust judging, and no judging at all, are sins in
the states. — The parliament co-ordinate judges with the king, not
advisers only; by eleven arguments. — Inferior judges not the king's
messengers or legates, but public governors. — The Jews' monarchy
mixed. — A power executive of laws more in the king, a power
legislative more in the parliament.
Question XXII
Whether the power of the king, as king, be absolute, or dependent and
limited by God's first mould and pattern of a king,
The royalists make the king as absolute as the great Turk. — The king
not absolute in his power, proved by nine arguments. — Why the king is
a living law. — Power to do ill not from God. — Royalists say power to
ill is not from God, but power to do ill, as punishable by man, is
from God.. — A king, actu primo, is a plague, and the people slaves,
if the king, by God's institution, be absolute. — Absoluteness of
royalty against justice, peace, reason, and law. — Against the king's
relation of a brother. — A damsel forced may resist the king. — The
goodness of an absolute prince hindereth not but he is actu primo a
tyrant.
Question XXIII
Whether the king hath a prerogative royal above law,
Prerogative taken two ways. — Prerogative above laws a garland proper
to infinite majesty. — A threefold dispensation, 1. Of power; 2. Of
justice; 3. Of grace. — Acts of mere grace may be acts of blood. — An
oath to the king of Babylon tyed not the people of Juday to all that
absolute power would command. — The absolute prince is as absolute in
acts of cruelty, as in acts of grace. — Servants are not (1 Pet. ii.
18, 19) interdicted of self-defence. — The parliament materially only,
not formally, hath the king for their lord. — Reason not a sufficient
restraint to keep a prince from acts of tyranny. — Princes have
sufficient power to do good, though they have not absolute to do evil.
— A power to shed innocent blood can be no part of any royal power
given of God. — The king, because he is a public person, wanteth many
privileges that subjects have.
Question XXIV
What relation the king hath to the law,
Human laws considered as reasonable, or as penal. — The king alone
hath not a nemothetic power. — Whether the king be above parliaments
as their judge. — Subordination of the king to the parliament and co-
ordination both consistent. — Each one of the three governments hath
somewhat from each other, and they cannot anyone of them be in its
prevalency conveniently without the mixture of the other two. — The
king as a king cannot err, as he erreth in so far, he is not the
remedy of oppression intended by God and nature. — In the court of
necessity the people may judge the king. — Human law not so obscure as
tyranny is visible and discernible. — It is more requisite that the
whole people, church, and religion be secured than one man. — If there
be any restraint by law on the king it must be physical, for a moral
restraint is upon all men. — To swear to an absolute prince as
absolute, is an oath eatenus, in so far unlawful, and not obligatory.
Question XXV
Whether the supreme law, the safety of the people, be above the king,
The safety of the people to be preferred to the king, for the king is
not to seek himself, but the good of the people. — Royalists make no
kings but tyrants. — How the safety of the king is the safety of the
people. — A king, for the safety of the people, may break through the
letter and paper of the law. — The king's prerogative above law and
reasons, not comparable to the blood that has been shed in Ireland and
England. — The power of dictators prove not a prerogative above law.
Question XXVI
Whether the king be above the law,
The law above the king in four things, 1. in constitution; 2.
direction; 3. limitation; 4. co-action. — In what sense the king may
do all things. — The king under the morality of laws; under
fundamental laws, not under punishment to be inflicted by himself nor
because of the eminency of his place, but for the physical incongruity
thereof. — If, and how, the king may punish himself. — That the king
transgressing in a heinous manner, is under the co-action of law,
proved by seven argumants. — The coronation of a king, who is supposed
to be a just prince, yet proveth after a tyrant, is conditional and
from ignorance, and so involuntary, and in so far not obligatory in
law. — Royalists confess a tyrant in exercise may be dethroned. — How
the people is the seat of the power of sovereignty. — The place, Psal
li., Against the only have I sinned, &c. discussed. — Israel's not
rising in arms against Pharaoh examined. — And Judah's not working
their own deliverance under Cyrus. — A covenant without the king's
concurrence lawful.
Question XXVII
Whether or no the king be the sole, supreme, and final interpreter of
the law,
He is not the supreme and peremptory interpreter. — Nor is his will
the sense of the law. — Nor is he the sole and only judicial
interpreter of the law.
Question XXVIII
Whether or no wars raised by the estates and subjects for their own
just defence against the king's bloody emissaries be lawful,
The state of the question. — If kings be absolute, a superior judge
may punish an inferior judge, not as a judge but an erring man. — By
divine institution all covenants to restrain their power must be
unlawful. — Resistance in some cases lawful. — Six arguments for the
lawfulness of defensive wars. — Many others follow.
Question XXIX
Whether, in the case of defensive wars, the distinction of the person
of the king as a man, who may and can commit hostile acts of tyranny
against his subjects, and of the office and royal power that he hath
from God and the people, can have place,
The king's person in concreto, and his office in abstracto, or which
is all one, the king using his power lawfully to be distinguished
(Rom. xiii.). — To command unjustly maketh not a higher power. — The
person may be resisted and yet the office cannot be resisted, proved
by fourteen arguments. — Contrary objections of royalists and of the
P. Prelate answered. — What we mean by the person and office in
abstracto in this dispute; we do not exclude the person in concreto
altogether, but only the person as abusing his power; we may kill a
person as a man, and love him as a son, father, wife, according to
Scripture. — We obey the king for the law, and not the law for the
king. — The losing of habitual and actual royalty different. — John
xix. 10, Pilate's power of crucifying Christ no law-power given to him
of God, is proved against royalists, by six arguments.
Question XXX
Whether or no passive obedience be a mean to which we are subjected in
conscience by virtue of a divine commandment; and what a mean
resistance is. That flying is resistance,
The place, 1 Pet. ii. 18, discussed. — Patient bearing of injuries and
resistance of injuries compatible in one and the same subject. —
Christ's non-resistance hath many things rare and extraordinary, and
is no leading rule to us. — Suffering is either commanded to us
comparatively only, that we rather choose to suffer than deny the
truth; or the manner only is commanded, that we suffer with patience.
— The physical act of taking away the life, or of offending when
commanded by the law of self-defence, is no murder. — We have a
greater dominion over goods and members, (except in case of
mutilation, which is a little death,) than over our life. — To kill is
not of the nature of self-defence, but accidental thereunto. —
Defensive war cannot be without offending. — The nature of defensive
and offensive wars. — Flying is resistance.
Question XXXI
Whether self-defence, by opposing violence to unjust violence, be
lawful, by the law of God and nature,
Self-defence in man natural, but modus, the way, must be rational and
just. — The method of self-defence. — Violent re-offending in self-
defence the last remedy. — It is physically impossible for a nation to
fly in the case of persecution for religion, and so they may resist in
their own self-defence. — Tutela vitæ proxima and remota. — In a
remote posture of self-defence, we are not to take us to re-offending,
as David was not to kill Saul when he was sleeping, or in the cave,
for the same cause. — David would not kill Saul because he was the
Lord's anointed. — The king not lord of chastity, name, and
conscience, and so may be resisted. — By universal and particular
nature, self-defence lawful, proved by divers arguments. — And made
good by the testimony of jurists. — The love of ourselves, the measure
of the love of our neighbours, and enforceth self-defence. — Nature
maketh a private man his own judge and magistrate, when the magistrate
is absent, and violence is offered to his life, as the law saith. —
Self-defence, how lawful it is. — What presumption is from the king's
carriage to the two kingdoms, are in law sufficient grounds of
defensive wars. — Offensive and defensive wars differ in the event and
intentions of men, but not in nature and specie, nor physically. —
David's case in not killing Saul nor his men, no rule to us, not in
our lawful defence, to kill the king's emissaries, the cases far
different.
Question XXXII
Whether or no the lawfulness of defensive wars can be proved from the
Scripture, from the examples of David, the people's rescuing Jonathan,
Elisha, and the eighty valiant priests who resisted Uzziah,
David warrantably raised an army of men to defend himself against the
unjust violence of his prince Saul. — David's not invading Saul and
his men, who did not aim at arbitrary government, at subversion of
laws, religion, and extirpation of those that worshipped the God of
Israel and opposed idolatry, but only pursuing one single person, far
unlike to our case in Scotland and England now. — David's example not
extraordinary. — Elisha's resistance proveth defensive wars to be
warrantable. — Resistance made to king Uzziah by eighty valiant
priests proveth the same. — The people's rescuing Jonathan proveth the
same. — Libnah's revolt proveth this. — The city of Abel defended
themselves against Joab, king David's general, when he came to destroy
a city for one wicked conspirator, Sheba's sake.
Question XXXIII
Whether or no Rom. xiii. 1 make any thing against the lawfulness of
defensive wars,
The king not only understood, Rom. xiii. — And the place, Rom. xiii.,
discussed.
Question XXXIV
Whether royalists prove, by cogent reasons, the unlawfulness of
defensive wars,
Objections of royalists answered. — The place, Exod. 22:28, Thou shalt
not revile the gods, &c. answered. — And Eccles 10:20. — The place,
Eccles. 8:3, 4, Where the word of a king is, &c. answered. — The
place, Job. 34:18, answered. — And Acts 23:3, God shall smite thee,
thou whited wall, &c. — The emperors in Paul's time not absolute by
their law. — That objection, that we have no practice for defensive
resistance, and that the prophets never complain of the omission of
the resistance of princes, answered. — The prophets cry against the
sin of non-resistance, when they cry against the judges, because they
execute not judgment for the oppressed. — Judah's subjection to
Nebuchadnezzar, a conquering tyrant, no warrant to us to subject
ourselves to tyrannous acts. — Christ's subjection to Cæsar nothing
against defensive wars.
Question XXXV
Whether the sufferings of the martyrs in the primitive church militant
be against the lawfulness of defensive wars,
Tertullian neither ours nor theirs in this question of defensive wars.
Question XXXVI
Whether the king have the power of war only,
Inferior judges have the power of the sword no less than the king. —
The people tyed to acts of charity and to defend themselves, the
church, and their posterity against a foreign enemy, though the king
forbid. — Flying unlawful to the states of Scotland and England now,
God's law tying them to defend their country. — Parliamentary power a
fountain-power above the king.
Question XXXVII
Whether the estates of Scotland are to help their brethren, the
protestants of England, against cavaliers, proved by argument 13,
Helping of neighbour nations lawful, divers opinions concerning the
point. — The law of Egypt against those that helped not the oppressed.
Question XXXVIII
Whether monarchy be the best of governments,
Whether monarchy be the best of governments hath divers
considerations, in which eash one may be less or more convenient. —
Absolute monarchy is the worst of governments. Better want power to do
ill as have it. — A mixture sweetest of all governments. — Neither
king nor parliament have a voice against law and reason.
Question XXXIX
Whether or no any prerogative at all above the law be due to the king.
Or if jura majestatis be any such prerogative,
A threefold supreme power. — What be jura regalia. — Kings confer not
honours from their plenitude of absolute power, but according to the
strait line and rule of law, justice, and good observing. — The law of
the king, 1 Sam 8:9, 11. — Difference of kings and judges. — The law
of the king, (1 Sam. 8:9, 11,) no permissive law, such as the law of
divorce. — What dominion the king hath over the goods of the subjects.
Question XL
Whether or no the people have any power over the king, either by his
oath, covenant, or any other way,
The people have power over the king by reason of his covenant and
promise. — Covenants and promises violated, infer co-action, de jure,
by law, though not de facto. — Mutual punishments may be where there
is no relation of superiority and inferiority. — Three covenants made
by Arnisæus. — The king not king while he swear the oath and be
accepted as king by the people. — The oath of the kings of Grance. —
Hugo Grotius setteth down seven cases in which the people may accuse,
punish, or dethrone the king. — The prince a noble vassal of the
kingdom upon four grounds. — The covenant had an oath annexed to it. —
The prince is but a private man in a contract. — How the royal power
is immediately from God, and yet conferred upon the king by the
people.
Question XLI
Whether doth the P. Prelate with reason ascribe to us doctrine of
Jesuits in the question of lawful defence,
The sovereignty is originally and radically in the people, as in the
fountain, was taught by fathers, ancient doctors, sound divines,
lawyers, before there was a Jesuit or a prelate whelped, in verum
natura. — The P. Prelate holdeth the Pope to be the vicar of Christ. —
Jesuits' tenets concerning kings. — The king not the people's deputy
by our doctrine, it is only the calumny of the P. Prelate. — The P.
Prelate will have power to set the bloodiest tyrannies on earth upon
the church of Christ, the essential power of a king.
Question XLII
Whether all Christian kings are dependent from Christ, and may be
called his vicegerents,
Why God, as God, hath a man a vicegerent under him, but not as
mediator. — The king not head of the church. — The king a sub-
mediator, and an under-redeemer, and a sub-priest to offer sacrifices
to God for us if he be a vicegerent. — The king no mixed person. —
Prelates deny kings to be subject to the gospel. — By no prerogative
royal may the king prescribe religious observances and human
ceremonies in God's worship. — The P. Prelate giveth to the king a
power arbitrary, supreme, and independent, to govern the church. —
Reciprocation of subjections of the king to the church, and of the
church to the king, in divers kinds, to wit, of ecclesiastical and
civil subjection, are no more absurd than for Aaron's priest to teach,
instruct and rebuke Moses, if he turn a tyrannous Achab, and Moses to
punish Aaron if he turn an obstinate idolator.
Question XLIII
Whether the king of Scotland be an absolute prince, having a
prerogative above laws and parliaments,
The king of Scotland subject to parliaments by the fundamental laws,
acts, and constant practices of parliaments, ancient and late in
Scotland. — The king of Scotland's oath at his coronation. — A
pretended absolute power given to James VI. upon respect of personal
endowments, no ground of absoluteness to the king of Scotland. — By
laws and constant practices the kings of Scotland subject to laws and
parliaments, proved by the fundamental law of elective princes, and
out of the most partial historians, and our acts of parliament of
Scotland. — Coronation oath. — And again at the coronation of James
VI. that oath sworn; and again, 1 Parl. James VI. ibid and seq. — How
the king is supreme judge in all causes. — The power of the
parliaments of Scotland. — The Confession of the faith of the church
of Scotland, authorised by divers acts of parliament, doth evidently
hold forth to all the reformed churches the lawfulness of defensive
wars, when the supreme magistrate is misled by wicked counsel. — The
same proved from the confessions of faith in other reformed churches.
— The place, Rom. 13., exponed in our Confession of faith. — the
confession, not only Saxonic, exhibited to the Council of Trent, but
also of Helvetia, France, England, Bohemia, prove the same. — William
Laud and other prelates, enemies to parliaments, to states, and to the
fundamental laws of the three kingdoms of England, Scotland, and
Ireland. — The parliament of Scotland doth regulate, limit, and set
bounds to the king's power. — Fergus the first king not a conqueror. —
The king of Scotland below parliaments, considerable by them, hath no
negative voice.
Question XLIV
General results of the former doctrine in some few corollaries, in
twenty-two questions,
Concerning monarchy, compared with other forms. — How royalty is an
issue of Nature. — And how magistrates, as magistrates, be natural. —
How absoluteness is not a ray of God's majesty. — And resistance not
unlawful, because Christ and his apostles used it not in some cases. —
Coronation is no ceremony. — Men may limit the power that they gave
not. — The commonwealth not a pupil or minor properly. — Subjects not
more obnoxious to a king than clients, vassals, children, to their
superiors. — If subjection passive be natural. — Whether king Uzziah
was dethroned. — Idiots and children not complete kings, children are
kings in destination only. — Denial of passive subjection in things
unlawful, not dishonourable to the king, more than denial of active
obedience in the same things. — The king may not make away or sell any
part of his dominions. — People may in some cases without the king. —
How, and in what meaning subjects are to pay the king's debts. —
Subsidies the kingdom's due, rather than the king's. — How the seas,
ports, forts, castles, militia, magazine, are the king's, and how they
are the kingdom's.
Proving once again you can use the bible to support just about any
view you want to adopt.
As an aside I would note: The Declaration of Independende was, I
believe, written by the SECOND Continental Congress, which would not
make them the "first convention" in the new world as the writer
asserts. But, that would be picky to point out so I will withdraw it.
70 of 70 people found the following review helpful:
Challenging Classic will blow you away, March 17, 2000
By Dial911book (Rockin, ON)
In the 1600's, the world shattering issue was whether kings ruled by
"divine right." Lex, Rex brilliantly and comprehensively demolishes
the idea that rulers are above the law. This book figured prominently
in moving the British to a civil war that resulted in a kingdom under
law ... with the law emanating largely from the will of the people
expressed through representatives in Parliament.
Old news? Ancient History? That's where you'll be surprised. In all
ages we as citizens must face these crucial questions: Is our
government legitimate? Does our government have moral authority to
rule? Must we obey evil rulers and unjust laws?
The 20th Century featured the rise of totalitarian governments --
rulers with absolute power. These modern "kings" did not claim to rule
in the name of God -- they claimed to rule in the name of "the
people." Except that the people were routinely enslaved, oppressed and
murdered by these rulers who answered to no one but themselves. The
ideas in Lex, Rex still shine as beacons of self-government 350 years
after the book's first publication.
Lex, Rex rigorously analyzes more arguments for divine right of kings
than I ever knew existed. In the process of reading it, however, you
find issues raised that bother us today: Is the ruler ever above the
law? [Think of certain U.S. presidents and federal judges] Do the
people have a right of self-defense against their own government?
[Think of the Branch Davidians]
To be frank, Lex, Rex is rather difficult to read for a few reasons.
First, it is written in the English of the mid 1600's. An Oxford
dictionary is handy for a few of the words whose meanings have changed
over the centuries. Don't worry, it's not "olde English" ... but there
are a few challenges.
Second, the book constantly answers arguments made by others. You
probably haven't read those other arguments, so you might not know
exactly what the discussion is about. Rutherford was methodical and
complete, however, and did provide at least short summaries for nearly
every opposing argument. With persistence you can follow the
discussion more easily as you progress.
Third, at least in the Sprinkle Publications 1982 reprint edition I
have, the print is small and densely packed. Rutherford broke his
arguments down into parts and numbered or lettered them, but the old-
fashioned typesetting jams most of the text together as tightly as
possible. A modern reprint could easily enlarge the type, add white
space, and employ outline indents and spacing to make the logic easier
to follow and the whole book easier to read. To ice the cake, a
scholar could help readers by adding little footnotes or comments to
explain unusual terms and translate into modern English the occasional
passages currently printed in Hebrew, Greek and Latin.
How did Rutherford demolish the "divine right" of kings, and the
kings' claim to absolute unquestionable power? By referring first and
primarily to Old Testament Bible analysis. Jews and Christians
especially will find fascinating analyses of Bible texts that show
God's plan for individual liberty under a limited government. Keep a
Bible handy while reading, so that you can fully grasp and explore
Rutherford's logic.
Rutherford's other key sources of political understanding were Greek
and Roman sources. There are footnotes to these references, although
you have to understand the abbreviations he used if you want to check
them out in a library.
Lex, Rex transports you into the world of classical political thinking
informed by Judeo-Christian morality. You see the roots of modern
Western political civilization being formed and applied in the cause
of human freedom.
Here's a good way to enjoy the book. It is organized into 44
questions. Pick one of the questions that interests you, and read that
chapter slowly. I found nuggets of insight in each one. I gained also
an awe-filled respect for those thinkers and writers who marshaled so
much solid reasoning ... in the face of the king's raw power ... and
ultimately won for us a radically different world view -- individual
rights and autonomy under the rule of law -- a world view we
automatically assume and take for granted under the U.S. Constitution
and Bill of Rights.
Get the book, at least for reference and the Biblical applications.
Rutherford's bottom line: no ruler is above the law. Law comes from
God's fixed fundamental precepts, and is implemented by government
that rules with the citizens' general consent. When the government
breaks the law, or operates outside of the bounds of citizens'
consent, then the people may resist or abolish it.
A lesson for all humanity ... a warning to all would-be tyrants.
http://www.amazon.com/Lex-Rex-Law-Prince-Prerogative/dp/0873779517
> In the 1600's, the world shattering issue was whether kings ruled by
> "divine right."
The major global issue of the 17th century was really whether the
world's oceans would be controlled by the Spaniards or the Dutch.