Logical inconsistency of "necessary" gods
Duwayne Anderson
There's an interesting discussion going on, under one of those odd
subject headers (it's in the thread titled "bunny trails multiply").
I thought I post it over here, under a more descriptive subject
header, so those interested in the subject will see it.
Recently there's been quite a discussion about "necessary beings." In
response, to that, I posted the following abstract "proof:"
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Bret:
a being "is something possessing the state or quality of having
existence."
According Scott Marquardt:
"A necessary being is a being whose non-existence is
impossible….Necessary being's existence cannot be contingent."
Let's see if "necessary being" as defined by Scott and Bret is
logically consistent:
Define: ENB = The set of existing necessary beings
Define: NENB = The set of non-existing necessary beings
NENB must exist if it exists, and it cannot exist if it does not
exist. Its existence is not contingent, given the fact that it
contains only necessary beings, whose existence is not contingent.
Even if there are no existing necessary beings, NENB exists as the
null set. Thus, NENB is a necessary being, and NENB exists.
Since NENB is a necessary being, and it exists, it is a subset of the
set ENB.
Now some review of set theory. If "a" is an element of set A, and set
A is a complete subset of set B, then "a" is also an element of set B
Therefore: all non-existing necessary beings are in the set of ENB.
But this is a logical contradiction, since ENB is defined as the set
of existing necessary beings. Therefore, the definition of necessary
being is not logically consistent.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response, Brett replied thus:
> Your demonstration is almost identical to an old and well-known set
> theory trick. I have elsewhere referred to it as a paradox, but
> technically I don't think it is -- it just looks like a paradox until
> you sort it out.
>
> You can use your argument to make any claim of "existence" or "being"
> look suspect. To get a taste of it, try reading your argument, but
> disregard "According to Scott" and omit references to the word
> "necessary."
No, Bret. That's not true. It only works when using your definition
of "exist" where there are no required characteristics for entry into
the set.
For example, I can write mathematical proofs about the existence of
integers. You can't apply the same problem to that proof of existence
because there are requirements for something to be an integer. Go
ahead, try it.
The problem really lies in the nature of the word "exist" as you have
defined it. You don't require any defining characteristics to
"exist." It's just willy nilly putting someing in either the "exist"
set or the "non-exist" set. But, as I showed, if you strip exist down
to no requirements, then I can easily define a set that contains all
the "non-existing" things, and that set exists, and so does everything
inside it. The "paradox" is that you end up making an argument with a
meaningless word ("exist" as you have defined it).
Same with "real" cats and "real" dogs. If I define something as
existing as a cat because it has cat DNA, then you can't use the
argument (the one I posted showing the logical inconsistency of
"necessary being") to arrive at any paradox. It only happens when you
gut the word "exist" so that it has no meaning.
Indeed, when you gut the word "exist" so that there are NO defining
characteristics for the stuff in the set, then everything really
*does* exist by that definition. It's impossible for anything to be
out of the set of existing things, as my proof shows.
But it's all contingent on using your definition of "exist:" a being
"is something possessing the state or quality of having existence."
I've raised this issue many times (do a google search on "defining
characteristics.")
Bret went on to say:
> And, if you remove the word "necessary" and clean up the grammar, we can
> conclude that the set "all existent things" includes the "all non-
> existent things."
That's true, but only if we stick with your definition of "exist"
which requires no defining characteristics for the elements of the
set. It's not true if we are talking about the set of numbers that
are a solution to a particular polynomial equation, for example,
because existence in that case requires defining characteristics. If
a number doesn't have the defining characteristics, it doesn't get
into the set. Same with observational proofs in real life.
The problem shows up in purely abstract arguments where you have a
definition of exist that has no requirements for defining
characteristics. Then, literally, anything gets into the set, as my
proof shows.
What my argument shows (and you are illustrating, though, I suspect,
not really understanding) is how stripping the elements of the set
"exist" of any defining characteristics results in contradictions and
weird conclusions up the wazzoo. That should be a clue that the
definition is seriously lacking.
Which should be a further clue as to why I've focused so much on the
definitions of the words you are using.
Instead of rescuing the ontological proof from my illustration of
logical inconsistency, you have actually made the problem worse by
making it applicable to a broader class of argument.
Recently, in another thread, Kevin Simonson said something to the
effect that he didn't accept many of the gods as defined by organized
religion, but thought he could get to a definition of a god that
exists if he reduced the number attributes enough.
I replied with something to the effect that if you reduce the
attributes for existence *enough* it's a virtual certainty.
Kevin caught on right away. It seems it's taking you and Scott a
little longer. The problem is, if the elements of "exist" have no
defining characteristics, then membership in the set is a forgone
conclusion. Everything is in it.
I think Scott knows it -- it was in his blooper. Remember, Scott said
that the set of non-existing things is null. He's right, of course,
when speaking strictly about existence in the abstract. Everything
exists as something in the abstract -- even my green-eyed slobbering
monsters under the bed. So the conclusion really is valid -- in the
abstract (that the set of non-existing things is null). It only
*looks* like a paradox because of the naked form of the word "exist"
that you are using.
Duwayne Anderson
American Quarter Horse: The ultimate all-terrain vehicle.
Bret Ripley
> Folks:
>
> There's an interesting discussion going on, under one of those odd
> subject headers (it's in the thread titled "bunny trails multiply").
> I thought I post it over here, under a more descriptive subject
> header, so those interested in the subject will see it.
>
> Recently there's been quite a discussion about "necessary beings." In
> response, to that, I posted the following abstract "proof:"
As I noted earlier, your "proof" is a variation of an old false-paradox.
The confusion it causes is due to an uneven (inconsistent) notions of
"exist" and "thing."
Before we look at your version, it may be interesting to see how the
original usually works. Let's say we have a set labelled "non-existing
things". We can do one of two things:
1) Non-existing things = null set. This choice regards "things"
to mean objects that do, by definition, exist as "beings" in a real,
observable, or material sense. Therefore, the set must be populated by
"Non-existing existing objects" -- an oxymoron, thus the null set.
2) Non-existing things = set populated by (an infinite set of?)
imaginary objects. This choice regards "things" not as "beings" but as
objects that exist only in an "idealized" state -- this existence is
markedly NOT real, observable, or material. Therefore, the respondent
may choose to populate the set of "Non-existing things" with an army of
heffalumps and woozles.
The last step of the false-paradox, then, takes one of two forms:
1) In response to someone choosing #1, we claim that if there are
no things that don't exist, everything exists, and there is no
difference between things that exist and things that don't exist. In
doing so, however, we have violated the respondent's understanding of
what precisely is meant by "non-existent thing".
2) In response to someone choosing #2, we do the opposite. We
take this set that is populated by things that "exist" only as ideas or
fictions, and then use this set in an equation where it is treated as if
it contained things that existed in a "real" sense of the word (as you
have done below). Once again, we have changed the definition of "non-
existent thing" from that used by the respondent.
You provide a customized example, here:
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
> According to Bret:
>
> a being "is something possessing the state or quality of having
> existence."
>
> According Scott Marquardt:
>
> "A necessary being is a being whose non-existence is
> impossible….Necessary being's existence cannot be contingent."
>
> Let's see if "necessary being" as defined by Scott and Bret is
> logically consistent:
>
> Define: ENB = The set of existing necessary beings
>
> Define: NENB = The set of non-existing necessary beings
>
> NENB must exist if it exists, and it cannot exist if it does not
> exist. Its existence is not contingent, given the fact that it
> contains only necessary beings, whose existence is not contingent.
> Even if there are no existing necessary beings, NENB exists as the
> null set. Thus, NENB is a necessary being,
In the original version of this conundrum, this paragraph is not
included. While it does contribute a superficial sense of relevance, it
should be noted that it doesn't affect the proof in a meaningful way.
We can substitute *any* quality (or no quality at all) in place of
"necessary" and the proof yields the same result. For example, if we
posit a set of Existing Green Beings along with the set NEGB, as long as
we are willing to grant "existence" to the set NEGB (which is, after all
populated by Green Beings), as Duwayne does with NENB . . .
> and NENB exists.
. . . we must conclude that "Green Beings" is logically inconsistent.
The "punchline" of Duwayne's version of the conundrum is that the set
NENB does not actually possess "being" according to the criteria by
which sets ENB and NENB are populated in the first place. The
definition of "being" has changed.
> Since NENB is a necessary being, and it exists, it is a subset of the
> set ENB.
>
> Now some review of set theory. If "a" is an element of set A, and set
> A is a complete subset of set B, then "a" is also an element of set B
>
> Therefore: all non-existing necessary beings are in the set of ENB.
> But this is a logical contradiction, since ENB is defined as the set
> of existing necessary beings. Therefore, the definition of necessary
> being is not logically consistent.
>
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> In response, Brett replied thus:
>
> > Your demonstration is almost identical to an old and well-known set
> > theory trick. I have elsewhere referred to it as a paradox, but
> > technically I don't think it is -- it just looks like a paradox until
> > you sort it out.
> >
> > You can use your argument to make any claim of "existence" or "being"
> > look suspect. To get a taste of it, try reading your argument, but
> > disregard "According to Scott" and omit references to the word
> > "necessary."
>
> No, Bret. That's not true. It only works when using your definition
> of "exist" where there are no required characteristics for entry into
> the set.
First of all, I think you may be confused -- I have not defined "exist"
in this manner.
Secondly, you have just (correctly, I think) contradicted your thesis:
the problem does not lie in the definition of "necessary being", but
with the word "being." However, the problem isn't even the clearly
inadequate definition of exist (that you mistakenly attribute to me),
but with using the word in an inconsistent manner. If you use "exist"
and "being" consistently, you will find that either NENB is populated
but cannot have "being", NENB is the null set and still impotent to
contribute to a contradiction, or ENB and NENB are identical (the null
set).
> For example, I can write mathematical proofs about the existence of
> integers. You can't apply the same problem to that proof of existence
> because there are requirements for something to be an integer. Go
> ahead, try it.
According to Bret:
a thing "is something possessing the state or quality of having
existence."
Define: ET = The set of all existing things
Define: NET = The set of all non-existing things
If NET is not the null set, it is populated by non-existing things
(like, say, Clovis Lark). However, NET is itself a thing, and therefore
included in ET. Therefore, "existing thing" is logically inconsistent.
> The problem really lies in the nature of the word "exist" as you have
> defined it.
If you will recall, I agreed to the dictionary definition, which
includes:
1. To be as a fact and not as a mode; to have an actual or real being,
whether material or spiritual.
2. To be manifest in any manner
> You don't require any defining characteristics to
> "exist."
You're shadow boxing, amigo.
<snip>
> But it's all contingent on using your definition of "exist:" a being
> "is something possessing the state or quality of having existence."
That was a definition of "being" -- not "exist."
> I've raised this issue many times (do a google search on "defining
> characteristics.")
Right. Remember when you asked me all those questions (does a one-
dollar bill exist? Does a three-dollar bill exist?) Did my answers
give you the impression that I attributed no meaning to "exist"?
> Bret went on to say:
>
> > And, if you remove the word "necessary" and clean up the grammar, we can
> > conclude that the set "all existent things" includes the "all non-
> > existent things."
>
> That's true, but only if we stick with your definition of "exist"
It's also true if we use 2 different (valid or not) definitions. We can
start out using "exist" in a material, observable sense and switch to
"exist" in an idealised sense. As I said before, it's a Three Card
Monte.
> which requires no defining characteristics for the elements of the
> set. It's not true if we are talking about the set of numbers that
> are a solution to a particular polynomial equation, for example,
> because existence in that case requires defining characteristics. If
> a number doesn't have the defining characteristics, it doesn't get
> into the set. Same with observational proofs in real life.
>
> The problem shows up in purely abstract arguments where you have a
> definition of exist that has no requirements for defining
> characteristics. Then, literally, anything gets into the set, as my
> proof shows.
Once again, I agree -- your proof depends upon sloppy definitions. It
does not, unfortunately, demonstrate that "necessary being" is logically
inconsistent. If you consistently apply any of the definitions of
"exist" and "being" that we have agreed on, you avoid any problems.
> What my argument shows (and you are illustrating, though, I suspect,
> not really understanding) is how stripping the elements of the set
> "exist" of any defining characteristics results in contradictions and
> weird conclusions up the wazzoo.
Where do you see me "stripping the elements of the set "exist""?
> That should be a clue that the definition is seriously lacking.
At the very least, your conundrum demonstrates the importance of being
internally consistent with definitions. Now, can you demonstrate that
"necessary being" is logically inconsistent without resorting to
chimeric definitions?
> Which should be a further clue as to why I've focused so much on the
> definitions of the words you are using.
>
> Instead of rescuing the ontological proof from my illustration of
> logical inconsistency, you have actually made the problem worse by
> making it applicable to a broader class of argument.
Eh?
I don't think anyone is interesting in rescuing the proof (Hartshorne)
-- it's a dead end, remember?
How can pointing out the fallacy of your proof make it apply to a
"broader class of argument"? It's still bollocks.
> Recently, in another thread, Kevin Simonson said something to the
> effect that he didn't accept many of the gods as defined by organized
> religion, but thought he could get to a definition of a god that
> exists if he reduced the number attributes enough.
>
> I replied with something to the effect that if you reduce the
> attributes for existence *enough* it's a virtual certainty.
>
> Kevin caught on right away. It seems it's taking you and Scott a
> little longer.
>
> The problem is, if the elements of "exist" have no
> defining characteristics, then membership in the set is a forgone
> conclusion. Everything is in it.
Uh huh. I'm with you there. That's why we looked at different
definitions of "exist," or have you forgotten?
> I think Scott knows it -- it was in his blooper. Remember, Scott said
> that the set of non-existing things is null. He's right, of course,
> when speaking strictly about existence in the abstract. Everything
> exists as something in the abstract -- even my green-eyed slobbering
> monsters under the bed. So the conclusion really is valid -- in the
> abstract (that the set of non-existing things is null). It only
> *looks* like a paradox because of the naked form of the word "exist"
> that you are using.
It *looks* like a paradox because we use the word "exist" to mean
different things. You must start with a consistent application of any
given word, whether your definition is correct or not.
Now, would you like to qualify this "naked form of the word "exist"" you
claim I am using?
Bret
Duwayne Anderson
> Also sprach Duwayne Anderson:
> > Folks:
> >
> > There's an interesting discussion going on, under one of those odd
> > subject headers (it's in the thread titled "bunny trails multiply").
> > I thought I post it over here, under a more descriptive subject
> > header, so those interested in the subject will see it.
> >
> > Recently there's been quite a discussion about "necessary beings." In
> > response, to that, I posted the following abstract "proof:"
>
> As I noted earlier, your "proof" is a variation of an old false-paradox.
Bret, the proof is rock solid. It only looks like a paradox when you
try to compare the results to your real-world experience. In the
abstract, though, the logic is solid.
What the proof does is illustrate exactly how your "necessary being"
definition lacks logical consistency.
> The confusion it causes is due to an uneven (inconsistent) notions of
> "exist" and "thing."
There's nothing "uneven" about it at all. Sheesh. I'm using your
definition, Bret. I even quoted it. Point to the exact step where
the definition is changed or made uneven.
> Before we look at your version, it may be interesting to see how the
> original usually works.
Don't try using the strawman. I'm discussing *my* version. Not
someone elses.
<snip strawman>
> You provide a customized example, here:
>
> > -------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > According to Bret:
> >
> > a being "is something possessing the state or quality of having
> > existence."
> >
> > According Scott Marquardt:
> >
> > "A necessary being is a being whose non-existence is
> > impossible?.Necessary being's existence cannot be contingent."
> >
> > Let's see if "necessary being" as defined by Scott and Bret is
> > logically consistent:
> >
> > Define: ENB = The set of existing necessary beings
> >
> > Define: NENB = The set of non-existing necessary beings
> >
> > NENB must exist if it exists, and it cannot exist if it does not
> > exist. Its existence is not contingent, given the fact that it
> > contains only necessary beings, whose existence is not contingent.
> > Even if there are no existing necessary beings, NENB exists as the
> > null set. Thus, NENB is a necessary being,
>
> In the original version of this conundrum, this paragraph is not
> included.
Bret, cut it out with the strawman, okay? I'm talk'n about the proof
I posted.
> While it does contribute a superficial sense of relevance, it
> should be noted that it doesn't affect the proof in a meaningful way.
> We can substitute *any* quality (or no quality at all) in place of
> "necessary" and the proof yields the same result.
And this is exactly what I'm talking about. YOU produced a definition
of "exist" that has no exclusionary terms, so the fact that the proof
leads to a contradiction is due to your naked definition.
Let's simplify to make things a little more clear. The proof goes
something like this:
----------------------------------------------------------------------
1) Define what it means for a thing to "exist."
2) Define E as the set of all the things that exist.
3) Define NE as the set of all the things that don't exist.
4) Characterize NE as a thing that exists
5) Put NE into E
6) Show a logical contradiction by showing that E contains things that
don't exist, which contradicts its definition.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Now notice that the logical inconsistency exists if step 1) contains a
definition of "exist" that is:
1) Incomplete or ambiguous
2) Self referencing.
For example, if the definition of "exist" is "possessing the state or
quality of having existence," the definition is self referencing and
the logical contradiction persists.
However, if the definition of "exist" is "to have two arms, two legs,
and two eyes," then the logical contradiction disappears. The reason
for this is found in steps 4 and 5. Since the definition of "exist"
is no longer satisfied by the set NE, you can't put NE into E.
In general, the logical inconsistency is avoided when the definition
of "exist" has exclusionary terms that block steps 4 and 5. However,
there are no exclusionary terms in the definition of "exist" as it
applies to "necessary being," and so the definition of "necessary
being" (along with its special-use definition of "exist") has the
logical inconsistency.
> For example, if we
> posit a set of Existing Green Beings along with the set NEGB, as long as
> we are willing to grant "existence" to the set NEGB (which is, after all
> populated by Green Beings), as Duwayne does with NENB . . .
If you assert that NENB doesn't exist in the abstract sense, then list
the contingency in your definition of "exist" that prevents it.
> > and NENB exists.
>
> . . . we must conclude that "Green Beings" is logically inconsistent.
>
> The "punchline" of Duwayne's version of the conundrum is that the set
> NENB does not actually possess "being" according to the criteria by
> which sets ENB and NENB are populated in the first place.
It most certainly does. The set has "... the state or quality of
having
existence."
What you fail to realize, Bret, is that your definition of exist is
self referencing. That's the source of the logical problem. It's
common in self-referencing statements.
Consider the following statement:
"This sentence is false."
The statement is neither true or false. It's logically inconsistent.
In the same way, when you define existence in terms of existence you
are establishing a self-referencing statement and the resulting
logical inconsistency is a direct result.
> The
> definition of "being" has changed.
Not true. What you say is simply false, Bret. You defined "being" in
a self-referencing way. Let me repeat your own definition for you:
A being is something that has "the state or quality of having
existence."
In an abstract sense (and you DID say the proof applies only to the
abstract) a set certainly has existence. It has that quality, and by
your own definition, it is a "being."
> > Since NENB is a necessary being, and it exists, it is a subset of the
> > set ENB.
> >
> > Now some review of set theory. If "a" is an element of set A, and set
> > A is a complete subset of set B, then "a" is also an element of set B
> >
> > Therefore: all non-existing necessary beings are in the set of ENB.
> > But this is a logical contradiction, since ENB is defined as the set
> > of existing necessary beings. Therefore, the definition of necessary
> > being is not logically consistent.
> >
> > -------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > In response, Brett replied thus:
> >
> > > Your demonstration is almost identical to an old and well-known set
> > > theory trick. I have elsewhere referred to it as a paradox, but
> > > technically I don't think it is -- it just looks like a paradox until
> > > you sort it out.
> > >
> > > You can use your argument to make any claim of "existence" or "being"
> > > look suspect. To get a taste of it, try reading your argument, but
> > > disregard "According to Scott" and omit references to the word
> > > "necessary."
> >
> > No, Bret. That's not true. It only works when using your definition
> > of "exist" where there are no required characteristics for entry into
> > the set.
>
> First of all, I think you may be confused -- I have not defined "exist"
> in this manner.
Once more, I quote Bret: A being is something that has "the state or
quality of having existence."
> Secondly, you have just (correctly, I think) contradicted your thesis:
> the problem does not lie in the definition of "necessary being", but
> with the word "being."
Oh, gawd. Is the definition of "necessary being" totally divorced
from "being?"
Bret, the logical problem here is very simple. The problem is one of
a self-referencing definition that allows NENB to be put back into
ENB. To avoid the problem, you have to have some discriminator that
prevents the set NENB from qualifying as existing. But it clearly
DOES exist, and since the only requirement for a being is to have the
quality of existence, it slips right in, thus creating the logical
inconsistency.
If you want to fix the problem, you have to add some discrimination to
the definition of "exist."
> However, the problem isn't even the clearly
> inadequate definition of exist (that you mistakenly attribute to me),
> but with using the word in an inconsistent manner.
Not true, Bret. I've used the word consistently.
> If you use "exist"
> and "being" consistently, you will find that either NENB is populated
> but cannot have "being",
Quoting Bret again: A being is something that has "the state or
quality of having existence."
The set NENB clearly has the abstract quality of existence.
> NENB is the null set and still impotent to
> contribute to a contradiction, or ENB and NENB are identical (the null
> set).
Hah! You have repeated Scotts blooper! If the set NENB is null, then
it's impossible for necessary being to not exist (because the ste NENB
is null) so the argument is now CIRCULAR.
Stop chasing your tail, Bret? I'm dying here. This is just tooooo
funny!
> > For example, I can write mathematical proofs about the existence of
> > integers. You can't apply the same problem to that proof of existence
> > because there are requirements for something to be an integer. Go
> > ahead, try it.
>
> According to Bret:
>
> a thing "is something possessing the state or quality of having
> existence."
Not for integers. Remember, the definition of exist is now changed,
because I'm talking about a proof for integers. To be an integer, the
number must have specific mathematical properties. Pi isn't an
integer, and cannot be in the set. Neither can 2.1, or root(2), etc.
> Define: ET = The set of all existing things
Should be "set of all integers."
> Define: NET = The set of all non-existing things
Should be "set of all non-integers"
> If NET is not the null set, it is populated by non-existing things
> (like, say, Clovis Lark). However, NET is itself a thing, and therefore
> included in ET. Therefore, "existing thing" is logically inconsistent.
Notice how the proof no longer works. You can't put the set of
non-integers into the set of integers. No matter how hard you try, it
doesn't fit. The REASON is that there are specific CONTINGENCIES for
being in the set of integers, and the set of non-integers doesn't have
e'm.
But the way YOU defined a being, the problem DOES exist, and it's
directly related to the fact that you don't have any defining
characteristics for being in or out of the set of existing beings.
Consequently -- using your definition consistently -- the set of NENB
can be called "necessary being" and stuffed right back into ENB, thus
resulting in the logical inconsistency.
So the problem is *not* universal. There are *easy* ways around it,
and they all use specific contingencies to limit what is in the set in
question. With contingencies the logical problem goes away. Without
contingencies (using self-referencing defintions of exist, for
example) the logical inconsistencies remain.
> > The problem really lies in the nature of the word "exist" as you have
> > defined it.
>
> If you will recall, I agreed to the dictionary definition,
Quoting Bret again: A being is something that has "the state or
quality of having existence."
> which
> includes:
>
> 1. To be as a fact and not as a mode; to have an actual or real being,
> whether material or spiritual.
>
> 2. To be manifest in any manner
>
> > You don't require any defining characteristics to
> > "exist."
>
> You're shadow boxing, amigo.
Bret, do try to understand the logical issues here. They really are
not that difficult. Just take a deep breath, imagine the
possibilities, and try to look at the issues from a fresh perspective.
> <snip>
>
> > But it's all contingent on using your definition of "exist:" a being
> > "is something possessing the state or quality of having existence."
>
> That was a definition of "being" -- not "exist."
Quoting Bret again: A being is something that has "the state or
quality of having existence."
The problem is the self-referencing nature of your definitions. It
leaves the definition ambiguous, and wide open to stuffing something
into ENB that is logically inconsistent with it.
> > I've raised this issue many times (do a google search on "defining
> > characteristics.")
>
> Right. Remember when you asked me all those questions (does a one-
> dollar bill exist? Does a three-dollar bill exist?) Did my answers
> give you the impression that I attributed no meaning to "exist"?
Okay, Bret. In the case of necessary being, what are the limitations,
contingencies, and defining characteristics associated with "exist."
Be carefull here, or you will end up destroying the concept of not
contingent, you know.
Didj'a catch yer tail yet?
> > Bret went on to say:
> >
> > > And, if you remove the word "necessary" and clean up the grammar, we can
> > > conclude that the set "all existent things" includes the "all non-
> > > existent things."
> >
> > That's true, but only if we stick with your definition of "exist"
>
> It's also true if we use 2 different (valid or not) definitions.
It's not true if the definition of exist has contingencies that don't
allow NENB to be stuffed back into ENB.
> We can
> start out using "exist" in a material, observable sense and switch to
> "exist" in an idealised sense. As I said before, it's a Three Card
> Monte.
Switching definitions in mid proof isn't allowed.
> > which requires no defining characteristics for the elements of the
> > set. It's not true if we are talking about the set of numbers that
> > are a solution to a particular polynomial equation, for example,
> > because existence in that case requires defining characteristics. If
> > a number doesn't have the defining characteristics, it doesn't get
> > into the set. Same with observational proofs in real life.
> >
> > The problem shows up in purely abstract arguments where you have a
> > definition of exist that has no requirements for defining
> > characteristics. Then, literally, anything gets into the set, as my
> > proof shows.
>
> Once again, I agree -- your proof depends upon sloppy definitions.
No. YOUR proof is logically inconsistent *because* of
self-referencing definitions, and my argument illustrates it.
> It
> does not, unfortunately, demonstrate that "necessary being" is logically
> inconsistent.
Keep repeating that to yourself, Bret. Perhaps you can induce a trace
where you really believe it.
> If you consistently apply any of the definitions of
> "exist" and "being" that we have agreed on, you avoid any problems.
You are back into your naked assertion mode. The argument I posted
uses your self-referencing definition consistently.
Quoting Bret again: A being is something that has "the state or
quality of having existence."
The set NENB is a being by your definition, and it certainly is not
contingent, so it is a necessary being.
> > What my argument shows (and you are illustrating, though, I suspect,
> > not really understanding) is how stripping the elements of the set
> > "exist" of any defining characteristics results in contradictions and
> > weird conclusions up the wazzoo.
>
> Where do you see me "stripping the elements of the set "exist""?
Quoting Bret again: A being is something that has "the state or
quality of having existence."
See how it's a self-referencing definition, Bret?
> > That should be a clue that the definition is seriously lacking.
>
> At the very least, your conundrum demonstrates the importance of being
> internally consistent with definitions.
Bret, the argument I used *is* consistent in it's use of your
definition. That's why the problem pops up. If we use a definition
of exist that is exclusionary, the problem goes away.
> Now, can you demonstrate that
> "necessary being" is logically inconsistent without resorting to
> chimeric definitions?
Oh, good grief.
> > Which should be a further clue as to why I've focused so much on the
> > definitions of the words you are using.
> >
> > Instead of rescuing the ontological proof from my illustration of
> > logical inconsistency, you have actually made the problem worse by
> > making it applicable to a broader class of argument.
>
> Eh?
You made it apply to "beings" in general (as you defined them) and not
just "necessary beings." Look at what you wrote, Bret. You said it
yourself.
> I don't think anyone is interesting in rescuing the proof (Hartshorne)
> -- it's a dead end, remember?
That old strawman -- again?
> How can pointing out the fallacy of your proof make it apply to a
> "broader class of argument"? It's still bollocks.
My "proof" shows that when we use *your* definition:
Quoting Bret again: A being is something that has "the state or
quality of having existence."
that a logical inconsistency results. That means any proof of
existence that uses your definition will be bogus from the start.
> > Recently, in another thread, Kevin Simonson said something to the
> > effect that he didn't accept many of the gods as defined by organized
> > religion, but thought he could get to a definition of a god that
> > exists if he reduced the number attributes enough.
> >
> > I replied with something to the effect that if you reduce the
> > attributes for existence *enough* it's a virtual certainty.
> >
> > Kevin caught on right away. It seems it's taking you and Scott a
> > little longer.
> >
> > The problem is, if the elements of "exist" have no
> > defining characteristics, then membership in the set is a forgone
> > conclusion. Everything is in it.
>
> Uh huh. I'm with you there. That's why we looked at different
> definitions of "exist," or have you forgotten?
Tell me the contingencies, and discriminating factors that affect the
existence of necessary beings. Make sure you don't inadvertently turn
your necessary beings into contingent ones in the process.
> > I think Scott knows it -- it was in his blooper. Remember, Scott said
> > that the set of non-existing things is null. He's right, of course,
> > when speaking strictly about existence in the abstract. Everything
> > exists as something in the abstract -- even my green-eyed slobbering
> > monsters under the bed. So the conclusion really is valid -- in the
> > abstract (that the set of non-existing things is null). It only
> > *looks* like a paradox because of the naked form of the word "exist"
> > that you are using.
>
> It *looks* like a paradox because we use the word "exist" to mean
> different things.
No, Bret. I'm using your definition:
Quoting Bret again: A being is something that has "the state or
quality of having existence."
The logical inconsistency results from the consistent application of
your definition. If you want to avoid the logical inconsistency, you
have to put restrictions on "exist" and you have to do it without
turning your necessary beings into contingent ones.
<snip to end>
Scott Marquardt
> Bret Ripley <rip...@olywa.net> wrote in message news:<MPG.1a5cf50e5...@news.ywave.com>...
>> Also sprach Duwayne Anderson:
>>> Folks:
>>>
>>> There's an interesting discussion going on, under one of those odd
>>> subject headers (it's in the thread titled "bunny trails multiply").
>>> I thought I post it over here, under a more descriptive subject
>>> header, so those interested in the subject will see it.
>>>
>>> Recently there's been quite a discussion about "necessary beings." In
>>> response, to that, I posted the following abstract "proof:"
>>
>> As I noted earlier, your "proof" is a variation of an old false-paradox.
>
> Bret, the proof is rock solid.
Question.
Is this "rock solid" refutation of 1000 years of ontological arguments
original with you, or has anyone else identified it?
If this is not original with you, please cite sources who concur with you.
Inasmuch as you have not adequately answered our questions, though (you
continue to post the same thing over and over, as if sheer repetition could
compensate for failure to adequately defend your "proof"), it's hard to
imagine that someone who has never demonstrated that he can even tell the
difference between analytic and synthetic propositions, could pull off such
a feat.
I'll grant that it's possible, but it seems far more likely that the great
number of atheologians (and others) who have invested much time in taking
ontological arguments seriously over the centuries, have simply failed to
be as naive as your "proof" seems.
- Scott
Bret Ripley
duwa...@hotmail.com says...
> > > Folks:
> > >
> > > There's an interesting discussion going on, under one of those odd
> > > subject headers (it's in the thread titled "bunny trails multiply").
> > > I thought I post it over here, under a more descriptive subject
> > > header, so those interested in the subject will see it.
> > >
> > > Recently there's been quite a discussion about "necessary beings." In
> > > response, to that, I posted the following abstract "proof:"
> >
> > As I noted earlier, your "proof" is a variation of an old false-paradox.
>
> try to compare the results to your real-world experience. In the
> abstract, though, the logic is solid.
No, it really isn't, Duwyane. At the very least it's enthymematic.
> What the proof does is illustrate exactly how your "necessary being"
> definition lacks logical consistency.
>
> > The confusion it causes is due to an uneven (inconsistent) notions of
> > "exist" and "thing."
>
> There's nothing "uneven" about it at all. Sheesh. I'm using your
> definition, Bret.
You most certainly are not. You quote one phrase from me -- my
response to one of a list of questions ("What is a being?"). That
phrase did not emerge from a vacuum, Duwayne. It was part of a
discussion regarding the definition of "exist". You have discarded
the rest of the discussion regarding the definition of "exist", and
ceased on my definition of "being".
> I even quoted it.
Patently false. In fact, you did not include *any* definition of
"exist" at all -- only "being".
> Point to the exact step where
> the definition is changed or made uneven.
I've already pointed it out several times, Duwayne. It's the step
where you attribute "being" to NENB.
> > Before we look at your version, it may be interesting to see how the
> > original usually works.
>
> Don't try using the strawman.
It's not a strawman, Duwayne. I'm not presenting it as yours,
although you are quite happy to adopt it below.
> I'm discussing *my* version. Not
> someone elses.
>
> <snip strawman>
> > You provide a customized example, here:
> >
> > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > According to Bret:
> > >
> > > a being "is something possessing the state or quality of having
> > > existence."
> > >
> > > According Scott Marquardt:
> > >
> > > "A necessary being is a being whose non-existence is
> > > impossible?.Necessary being's existence cannot be contingent."
> > >
> > > Let's see if "necessary being" as defined by Scott and Bret is
> > > logically consistent:
> > >
> > > Define: ENB = The set of existing necessary beings
> > >
> > > Define: NENB = The set of non-existing necessary beings
> > >
> > > NENB must exist if it exists, and it cannot exist if it does not
> > > exist. Its existence is not contingent, given the fact that it
> > > contains only necessary beings, whose existence is not contingent.
> > > Even if there are no existing necessary beings, NENB exists as the
> > > null set. Thus, NENB is a necessary being,
> >
> > In the original version of this conundrum, this paragraph is not
> > included.
>
> Bret, cut it out with the strawman, okay? I'm talk'n about the proof
> I posted.
>
> > While it does contribute a superficial sense of relevance, it
> > should be noted that it doesn't affect the proof in a meaningful way.
> > We can substitute *any* quality (or no quality at all) in place of
> > "necessary" and the proof yields the same result.
>
> And this is exactly what I'm talking about. YOU produced a definition
> of "exist"
Yes, but you seem to have forgotten it. I here quote part of our
conversation:
Bret: "Exist (The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English
Language):
To have actual being; be real.
To have life; live.
To continue to be.
To be present under certain circumstances or in a specified place.
(Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary):
To be as a fact and not as a mode; to have an actual or real being,
whether material or spiritual.
To be manifest in any manner; to continue to be."
Duwayne: "This is certainly a good definition, and one I'm happy to
work with."
Do you remember asking me questions about the meaning of exist?
Please allow me to refresh your memory:
Duwayne: Does the set of all things existing include things that are
indistinguishable from the set of things that don't exist at all?
Bret: No
Duwayne: Can a necessary being exist, if the necessary being has no
influence on the universe at all?
Bret: No
Duwayne: What is a "being"?
Bret: A "being" is something possessing the state or quality of
having
existence.
You will also recall that we didn't stop there. You continued:
Duwayne: Next, if you don't mind (because I'm a little slow) I'd like
you to
give some examples of the sorts of beings that go into the various
categories of "Exist," [or] "Non-exist":
Duwayne: A being that has no effect on the universe, now, in the past,
or anytime in the future.
Bret: Non-exist.
Duwayne: The character Cheshire cat of Alice In Wonderland
Bret: Non-exist.
Duwayne: The mammal commonly known as "dog"
Bret: Exist.
Duwayne: President of the United States, George W. Bush
Bret: Exist.
Duwayne: President of the United States, Alice Cooper
Bret: Non-exist
Duwayne: A one-dollar bill
Bret: Exist
Duwayne: A 123.25 dollar bill
Bret: Non-exist
> that has no exclusionary terms,
Of course it does. I don't think I can be held responsible for your
decision to ignore them.
> so the fact that the proof
> leads to a contradiction is due to your naked definition.
Duwayne: "This is certainly a good definition, and one I'm happy to
work with."
> Let's simplify to make things a little more clear. The proof goes
> something like this:
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 1) Define what it means for a thing to "exist."
> 2) Define E as the set of all the things that exist.
> 3) Define NE as the set of all the things that don't exist.
> 4) Characterize NE as a thing that exists
> 5) Put NE into E
> 6) Show a logical contradiction by showing that E contains things that
> don't exist, which contradicts its definition.
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
LOL! You have just described the "strawman" that you snipped at the
beginning of this post.
> Now notice that the logical inconsistency exists if step 1) contains a
> definition of "exist" that is:
> 1) Incomplete or ambiguous
You are just paraphrasing my objection to the proof, Duwayne. The
definition is ambiguous -- it means one thing in one part of the
argument and something else in another.
> 2) Self referencing.
>
> For example, if the definition of "exist" is "possessing the state or
> quality of having existence,"
That's part of the definition of "being" -- not "exist". We had
already established "exist" before addressing "being".
Pretending that "possessing the state or quality of having existence"
was my definition of "exist" is either very mistaken or very
dishonest, Duwayne.
> the definition is self referencing
If that was my definition, you would be correct.
> and the logical contradiction persists.
>
> However, if the definition of "exist" is "to have two arms, two legs,
> and two eyes," then the logical contradiction disappears. The reason
> for this is found in steps 4 and 5. Since the definition of "exist"
> is no longer satisfied by the set NE, you can't put NE into E.
>
> In general, the logical inconsistency is avoided when the definition
> of "exist" has exclusionary terms that block steps 4 and 5.
You mean, something like "to be as a fact, and not as a mode, etc.
ect." as we had already established?
> However,
> there are no exclusionary terms in the definition of "exist" as it
> applies to "necessary being,"
>
> and so the definition of "necessary
> being" (along with its special-use definition of "exist") has the
> logical inconsistency.
>
> > For example, if we
> > posit a set of Existing Green Beings along with the set NEGB, as long as
> > we are willing to grant "existence" to the set NEGB (which is, after all
> > populated by Green Beings), as Duwayne does with NENB . . .
>
> If you assert that NENB doesn't exist in the abstract sense, then list
> the contingency in your definition of "exist" that prevents it.
To be as a fact and not as a mode. To have actual being.
> > > and NENB exists.
> >
> > . . . we must conclude that "Green Beings" is logically inconsistent.
> >
> > The "punchline" of Duwayne's version of the conundrum is that the set
> > NENB does not actually possess "being" according to the criteria by
> > which sets ENB and NENB are populated in the first place.
>
> It most certainly does. The set has "... the state or quality of
> having
> existence."
Not if you are using a consistent definition. If you are consistently
using a definition of "exist" that is broad enough to include NENB,
NENB will be the null set to begin with -- that's a rather different
kind of problem.
> What you fail to realize, Bret, is that your definition of exist is
> self referencing.
Are we talking about some strawman definition, or the "this is
certainly a good definition, and one I'm happy to work with" one?
> That's the source of the logical problem. It's
> common in self-referencing statements.
<snip>
> > The
> > definition of "being" has changed.
>
> Not true.
Look again. If you determine that NENB is a "being" using the same
criteria for population ENB and NENB, you have defined "being" so
broadly that NENB will be the null set -- any conceivable NB would be
in set ENB. Your proof would still be a mess, but for a different
reason.
<snip>
> In an abstract sense (and you DID say the proof applies only to the
> abstract)
Eh?
> a set certainly has existence.
Not according to the definition we discussed, and quoted above.
> It has that quality, and by
> your own definition, it is a "being."
I'm now second-guessing one of my answers: Can I trade NENB for the
Cheshire Cat?
> > > Since NENB is a necessary being, and it exists, it is a subset of the
> > > set ENB.
> > >
> > > Now some review of set theory. If "a" is an element of set A, and set
> > > A is a complete subset of set B, then "a" is also an element of set B
> > >
> > > Therefore: all non-existing necessary beings are in the set of ENB.
> > > But this is a logical contradiction, since ENB is defined as the set
> > > of existing necessary beings. Therefore, the definition of necessary
> > > being is not logically consistent.
> > >
> > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > >
> > > In response, Brett replied thus:
> > >
> > > > Your demonstration is almost identical to an old and well-known set
> > > > theory trick. I have elsewhere referred to it as a paradox, but
> > > > technically I don't think it is -- it just looks like a paradox until
> > > > you sort it out.
> > > >
> > > > You can use your argument to make any claim of "existence" or "being"
> > > > look suspect. To get a taste of it, try reading your argument, but
> > > > disregard "According to Scott" and omit references to the word
> > > > "necessary."
> > >
> > > No, Bret. That's not true. It only works when using your definition
> > > of "exist" where there are no required characteristics for entry into
> > > the set.
> >
> > First of all, I think you may be confused -- I have not defined "exist"
> > in this manner.
>
> Once more, I quote Bret: A being is something that has "the state or
> quality of having existence."
>
> > Secondly, you have just (correctly, I think) contradicted your thesis:
> > the problem does not lie in the definition of "necessary being", but
> > with the word "being."
>
> Oh, gawd. Is the definition of "necessary being" totally divorced
> from "being?"
Don't be silly -- of course not. However, "necessary" isn't the
culprit --"necessary" is simply along for the ride.
> Bret, the logical problem here is very simple. The problem is one of
> a self-referencing definition that allows NENB to be put back into
> ENB.
>
> To avoid the problem, you have to have some discriminator that
> prevents the set NENB from qualifying as existing. But it clearly
> DOES exist, and since the only requirement for a being is to have the
> quality of existence, it slips right in, thus creating the logical
> inconsistency.
>
> If you want to fix the problem, you have to add some discrimination to
> the definition of "exist."
I guess it's a good thing we already did that, huh?
Duwayne: "This is certainly a good definition, and one I'm happy to
work with."
> > However, the problem isn't even the clearly
> > inadequate definition of exist (that you mistakenly attribute to me),
> > but with using the word in an inconsistent manner.
>
> Not true, Bret. I've used the word consistently.
>
> > If you use "exist"
> > and "being" consistently, you will find that either NENB is populated
> > but cannot have "being",
>
> Quoting Bret again: A being is something that has "the state or
> quality of having existence."
>
> The set NENB clearly has the abstract quality of existence.
>
> > NENB is the null set and still impotent to
> > contribute to a contradiction, or ENB and NENB are identical (the null
> > set).
>
> Hah! You have repeated Scotts blooper! If the set NENB is null, then
> it's impossible for necessary being to not exist (because the ste NENB
> is null) so the argument is now CIRCULAR.
Yes, that's right. That's one of the pitfalls of a bad definition. I
am suggesting that if you use a meaningless, strawman definition of
"exist" consistently you will end up with the null set (nothing will
qualify as NENB)and your argument will be circular. You avoid the
null set by applying "exist" inconsistently, and instead end up with
an apparent logical contradiction.
Are you with me?
> Stop chasing your tail, Bret? I'm dying here. This is just tooooo
> funny!
I'm glad you enjoyed it -- I guess I didn't succeed in making my
point, however. I hope I have done a better job of explaining it this
time through.
> > > For example, I can write mathematical proofs about the existence of
> > > integers. You can't apply the same problem to that proof of existence
> > > because there are requirements for something to be an integer. Go
> > > ahead, try it.
> >
> > According to Bret:
> >
> > a thing "is something possessing the state or quality of having
> > existence."
>
> Not for integers.
I purposely avoided using integers in my example, because (as you
note) they are clearly defined and difficult to use them in an
ambiguous manner.
<snip excellent "integer" example>
> You can't put the set of
> non-integers into the set of integers. No matter how hard you try, it
> doesn't fit. The REASON is that there are specific CONTINGENCIES for
> being in the set of integers, and the set of non-integers doesn't have
> e'm.
Right. Integers are well-defined, and trying to fudge their
definitions won't fly -- it's too obvious.
> But the way YOU defined a being, the problem DOES exist, and it's
> directly related to the fact that you don't have any defining
> characteristics for being in or out of the set of existing beings.
> Consequently -- using your definition consistently -- the set of NENB
> can be called "necessary being" and stuffed right back into ENB, thus
> resulting in the logical inconsistency.
>
> So the problem is *not* universal. There are *easy* ways around it,
> and they all use specific contingencies to limit what is in the set in
> question. With contingencies the logical problem goes away. Without
> contingencies (using self-referencing defintions of exist, for
> example) the logical inconsistencies remain.
>
> > > The problem really lies in the nature of the word "exist" as you have
> > > defined it.
> >
> > If you will recall, I agreed to the dictionary definition,
>
> Quoting Bret again: A being is something that has "the state or
> quality of having existence."
>
> > which
> > includes:
> >
> > 1. To be as a fact and not as a mode; to have an actual or real being,
> > whether material or spiritual.
> >
> > 2. To be manifest in any manner
> >
> > > You don't require any defining characteristics to
> > > "exist."
> >
> > You're shadow boxing, amigo.
>
> Bret, do try to understand the logical issues here.
I do understand them, Duwayne. In fact, my understanding is probably
closer to yours than you guess.
<snip>
> Okay, Bret. In the case of necessary being, what are the limitations,
> contingencies, and defining characteristics associated with "exist."
I can still live with the definition of "exist" that you found so
excellent.
> Be carefull here, or you will end up destroying the concept of not
> contingent, you know.
What an odd thing to say. How do you imagine the definition of
"exist" could destroy the concept of "not contingent"? Or are you
using "not contingent" informally (in which case it wouldn't matter)?
Ohmygod -- are you still messed up about "contingent"? Fitting a
definition --what you may call being "contingent" (informal use) on
fitting a definition -- is not the same as the formal definition of
"contingent". There is nothing to prevent "necessary being" (if there
is such a thing) from having characterstics or fitting a definition.
Because you can say that the qualifications for being a necessary
being are *contingent* (informal use) on fitting the definition is a
red herring -- the informal definition is rather different than the
formal definition.
> Didj'a catch yer tail yet?
False assumption: my tail fell off years ago. I keep it in a jar
under the stairs.
<snip>
> Tell me the contingencies, and discriminating factors that affect the
> existence of necessary beings.
If there are such things, they must fit the definition of "exist" (by
the same criteria that any "thing" can be said to exist), and their
existence must be such that their non-existence is impossible (that's
the necessary bit -- it seems rather a tall order, don't you think?)
> Make sure you don't inadvertently turn
> your necessary beings into contingent ones in the process.
Hey, no prob. Make sure you don't inadvertantly invest too much
mental capital in the informal definition of "contingent."
And don't take any wooden nickels.
Late night sophistry: In a literalist's QM model where nothing exists
without being observed, in what manner (if any) does the mind of the
observer approach or parallel "necessary being"?
Goodnight.
Bret
Duwayne Anderson
Bret:
Here's another look at how "necessary being" is logically
inconsistent:
1) Set of all things (AT) is necessary being (it exists, and its
existence is not contingent)
2) AT is proper subset of set of existing necessary beings (AT is
proper subset of ENB).
3) If there are contingent beings, they are in AT.
4) Therefore, if there are contingent beings they are in the set of
ENB.
The conclusion 4) is a contradiction, however, since necessary beings
are not contingent.
Unruly Human
Bret Ripley <rip...@olywa.net> wrote:
> According to Bret:
>
> a thing "is something possessing the state or quality of having
> existence."
>
> Define: ET = The set of all existing things
>
> Define: NET = The set of all non-existing things
>
> If NET is not the null set, it is populated by non-existing things
> (like, say, Clovis Lark).
Clovie isn't a NET, altho he is walking a fine line in that regard.
He's visiting in Utah.
Here's hoping you guys can hopefully finish one or two of these threads
THIS year.
Cheers,
Don Marchant
Dangerous1 dot com
UH at Dangerous1 etc. etc.
Think global, act loco
Scott Marquardt
> In article <MPG.1a5cf50e5...@news.ywave.com>,
> Bret Ripley <rip...@olywa.net> wrote:
>
>> According to Bret:
>>
>> a thing "is something possessing the state or quality of having
>> existence."
>>
>> Define: ET = The set of all existing things
>>
>> Define: NET = The set of all non-existing things
>>
>> If NET is not the null set, it is populated by non-existing things
>> (like, say, Clovis Lark).
>
> Clovie isn't a NET, altho he is walking a fine line in that regard.
> He's visiting in Utah.
>
> Here's hoping you guys can hopefully finish one or two of these threads
> THIS year.
The Hartshorne thread was technically finished when Bret met the challenge
and refuted Hartshorne.
I think the reason the current one is so long is because Duwayne claims
he's doing something which, as it turns out, has been done by no one else
in a thousand years of ontological arguments being treated by hordes of
theologians and atheologians.
This year, you say? ;-)
- Scott
Unruly Human
Scott Marquardt <wasREM...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> The Hartshorne thread was technically finished when Bret met the challenge
> and refuted Hartshorne.
>
> I think the reason the current one is so long is because Duwayne claims
> he's doing something which, as it turns out, has been done by no one else
> in a thousand years of ontological arguments being treated by hordes of
> theologians and atheologians.
>
> This year, you say? ;-)
>
> - Scott
I become a hopeless romantic and optimist whenever I drink, which is
more and more frequently the longer I stay on this group.
Is that a hubcap on your head?
Mike W
> -------------------------------------------------------------------
> 1) Define what it means for a thing to "exist."
> 2) Define E as the set of all the things that exist.
> 3) Define NE as the set of all the things that don't exist.
> 4) Characterize NE as a thing that exists
> 5) Put NE into E
> 6) Show a logical contradiction by showing that E contains
> things that don't exist, which contradicts its definition.
> -------------------------------------------------------------------
They're hyper-sets and mundane things. When you try to characterize NE as
mundane, it stops being hyper and confuses.
Just like introducing the necessary evil -- mundane hyper-existence.
Mike
Scott Marquardt
> In article <cbk30oq4...@marquardts.org>,
> Scott Marquardt <wasREM...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
>> The Hartshorne thread was technically finished when Bret met the challenge
>> and refuted Hartshorne.
>>
>> I think the reason the current one is so long is because Duwayne claims
>> he's doing something which, as it turns out, has been done by no one else
>> in a thousand years of ontological arguments being treated by hordes of
>> theologians and atheologians.
>>
>> This year, you say? ;-)
>>
>> - Scott
>
> I become a hopeless romantic and optimist whenever I drink, which is
> more and more frequently the longer I stay on this group.
>
> Is that a hubcap on your head?
See how Don pretends this diaper is an automotive item. Typical ad hominem.
- Scott
Duwayne Anderson
Y'know, Scott, I don't know the history of the ontological proof at
all. I have no idea where it came from (it looks like something a
monk would think up) or what group of "intellectuals" has spent their
lives playing with it.
But what is rather clear is that the term "necessary being" that you
and Bret are using is logically inconsistent. If that's something
nobody else has ever demonstrated, I can only conclude it's because
better minds than mine have found the subject not worth wasting their
time on.
Duwayne Anderson
> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
>
> > Bret Ripley <rip...@olywa.net> wrote in message news:<MPG.1a5cf50e5...@news.ywave.com>...
> >> Also sprach Duwayne Anderson:
> >>> Folks:
> >>>
> >>> There's an interesting discussion going on, under one of those odd
> >>> subject headers (it's in the thread titled "bunny trails multiply").
> >>> I thought I post it over here, under a more descriptive subject
> >>> header, so those interested in the subject will see it.
> >>>
> >>> Recently there's been quite a discussion about "necessary beings." In
> >>> response, to that, I posted the following abstract "proof:"
> >>
> >> As I noted earlier, your "proof" is a variation of an old false-paradox.
> >
> > Bret, the proof is rock solid.
>
> Question.
>
> Is this "rock solid" refutation of 1000 years of ontological arguments
> original with you, or has anyone else identified it?
Scott, you know better than to start an argument from authority. Deal
with the issues I brought up.
'K?
Duwayne Anderson
Mike, the problem is a trivial one that any child can understand. It
has to do with the self-referencing nature of "exist." If "exist" is
self referencing, or ambiguous, then there is nothing that prevents
putting NE into E. That's the source of the logical inconsistency.
To prevent the logical inconsistency requires no more than applying
the normative meaning of "exist" that we use in our everyday lives.
Normally, we apply defining characteristics to the word "exist."
For examle, A prime number "exists" if it is not an integral multiple
of any number except "1" and itself. If you run the argument for
prime numbers, it breaks down and there is no logical inconsistency.
Watch:
-------------------------------------------------------------------
1) A prime number exists if it is not a multiple of any other number
except 1 and itself.
2) Define E as the set of all the prime numbers.
3) Define NE as the set of all the non-prime numbers.
4) Characterize NE as a prime number
Ooooops! You can't *do* that because neither NE or its elements
"exist" as prime numbers according to the definition in 1)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
See how it works, Mike? If the definition of "exist" has
contingencies that limit what gets into the set of "exist" then the
logical inconsistencies evaporate. But if the definition of "exist"
has no contingencies that limit what gets in (saying things get in by
having the quality of "existence" is self-referencing, and doesn't
help) then the logical inconsistencies return.
The proof is simply an abstract way of showing what any child would
realize right off the bat: if there are no requirements for existing,
then everything exists. That's really what the proof is showing.
This sort of logical inconsistency is found in whole classes of
self-referencing statements. Consider the following:
"This sentence is false."
The statement is self referencing, and that's the reason it can be
neither true or false.
Duwayne Anderson
<snip>
> > Bret, the proof is rock solid. It only looks like a paradox when you
> > try to compare the results to your real-world experience. In the
> > abstract, though, the logic is solid.
>
> No, it really isn't, Duwyane. At the very least it's enthymematic.
See below for demonstration that what you are saying is false.
> > What the proof does is illustrate exactly how your "necessary being"
> > definition lacks logical consistency.
> >
> > > The confusion it causes is due to an uneven (inconsistent) notions of
> > > "exist" and "thing."
> >
> > There's nothing "uneven" about it at all. Sheesh. I'm using your
> > definition, Bret.
>
> You most certainly are not.
Not true. Let's look at the proof again. I've added comments in
brackets:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Bret:
a being "is something possessing the state or quality of having
existence." [Your really did say that, Bret]
According Scott Marquardt:
"A necessary being is a being whose non-existence is
impossible….Necessary being's existence cannot be contingent." [Scott
really did say this, too]
Let's see if "necessary being" as defined by Scott and Bret is
logically consistent:
Define: ENB = The set of existing necessary beings [In the abstract,
a set has the quality of existence, so I'm using your definition
consistently here.]
Define: NENB = The set of non-existing necessary beings [In the
abstract, a set has the quality of existence, so I'm using your
definition consistently here.]
NENB must exist if it exists, and it cannot exist if it does not
exist. Its existence is not contingent, given the fact that it
contains only necessary beings, whose existence is not contingent.
Even if there are no existing necessary beings, NENB exists as the
null set. Thus, NENB is a necessary being, and NENB exists. [In the
abstract, a set has the quality of existence, so I'm using your
definition consistently here.]
Since NENB is a necessary being, and it exists, it is a subset of the
set ENB. [In the abstract, a set has the quality of existence, so I'm
using your definition consistently here.]
Now some review of set theory. If "a" is an element of set A, and set
A is a complete subset of set B, then "a" is also an element of set B
Therefore: all non-existing necessary beings are in the set of ENB.
But this is a logical contradiction, since ENB is defined as the set
of existing necessary beings. Therefore, the definition of necessary
being is not logically consistent.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
As you can see, I've used your definitions consistently throughout,
and it's the self-referencing nature of your definition that causes
the problem of logical inconsistency.
> You quote one phrase from me -- my
> response to one of a list of questions ("What is a being?"). That
> phrase did not emerge from a vacuum, Duwayne. It was part of a
> discussion regarding the definition of "exist". You have discarded
> the rest of the discussion regarding the definition of "exist", and
> ceased on my definition of "being".
Bret, if you want to add discriminating characteristics to your
definition of "exist," that can fix the problem. I'm interested in
how you will do that without destroying the notion of "not contingent"
for necessary beings.
<snip>
> > Point to the exact step where
> > the definition is changed or made uneven.
>
> I've already pointed it out several times, Duwayne. It's the step
> where you attribute "being" to NENB.
NENB has existence in the abstract. It's a real, existing set.
Having the quality of existence, it exists as a "being" using your
definition.
<snip>
> > And this is exactly what I'm talking about. YOU produced a definition
> > of "exist"
>
> Yes, but you seem to have forgotten it. I here quote part of our
> conversation:
>
> Bret: "Exist (The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English
> Language):
>
> To have actual being; be real.
> To have life; live.
> To continue to be.
> To be present under certain circumstances or in a specified place.
Bret, the present discussion is in the *ABSTRACT.* That's where the
ontological proof belongs.
Remember? You agreed with that.
If you want to take it back to the "REAL" world -- out of the abstract
-- then QM is waiting for you.
It's checkmate, o'l buddy.
<snip>
> > Let's simplify to make things a little more clear. The proof goes
> > something like this:
> >
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > 1) Define what it means for a thing to "exist."
> > 2) Define E as the set of all the things that exist.
> > 3) Define NE as the set of all the things that don't exist.
> > 4) Characterize NE as a thing that exists
> > 5) Put NE into E
> > 6) Show a logical contradiction by showing that E contains things that
> > don't exist, which contradicts its definition.
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> LOL! You have just described the "strawman" that you snipped at the
> beginning of this post.
No, Bret, I've shown the basic logica structure of the problem. It
revolves around whether or not "exist" is ambiguous or
self-referencing.
> > Now notice that the logical inconsistency exists if step 1) contains a
> > definition of "exist" that is:
> > 1) Incomplete or ambiguous
>
> You are just paraphrasing my objection to the proof, Duwayne.
But what you don't realize is that the problem originates in a
self-referencing definition of "exist." If exist has defining
characteristics associated with it, the problem goes away. But then
your necessary beings become contingent on those defining
characteristics, too.
There's no way out, Bret.
<snip to end>
Scott Marquardt
>Scott Marquardt wrote:
>> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
>>>> As I noted earlier, your "proof" is a variation of an old false-paradox.
>>>
>>> Bret, the proof is rock solid.
>>
>> Question.
>>
>> Is this "rock solid" refutation of 1000 years of ontological arguments
>> original with you, or has anyone else identified it?
>
> Scott, you know better than to start an argument from authority. Deal
> with the issues I brought up.
Have I failed to reply to your issues? No. I'm asking for something
further.
First, recall that much of what I've been doing this past month has been
applying your own polemical ethics as a categorical imperative. Thus,
I'll now point out that you're adopting a double standard. I'm only asking
-- quite reasonably -- whether your "proof" has been vetted by experts in
this field. You've requested that others do as much (see below), so I'm
merely requesting that you do so as well.
Pretending that our disputes in this forum are not part of broader
conversations in the culture, in academe, and in history seems odd to me.
Perhaps this is one reason I've offered you dozens more links in this
conversation (to independent material) than you've provided. I've even
offered links to material friendly to your position (most relevantly,
Quine). That's reasonable.
What's not reasonable is that you demand of others what you won't provide
yourself -- evidence of independent attestation. Here're some instances
where you've recognized the importance of implicating material which has
been vetted:
: 1) Find a single degreed Egyptologist who is recognized as an expert
: in the field (you can show this by pointing to papers he/she has
: authored in peer-reviewed science magazines on the subject of
: Egyptology) who thinks Smith got the translation even half right.
Find someone well-versed in ontological arguments who recognizes the
concerns you (someone obviously not well-versed in ontological arguments)
raise. I'm not asking that you find someone who cites *you*, of course.
Neither you nor I are cited in journals germane in this thread, I'll
warrant. I'm asking, though, whether your viewpoint even finds
representation among experts.
: 1) List, here, all the references from peer-reviewed science journals
: that cite FARMS articles. I asked FARMS for that information, and
: they couldn't cite a single case. Perhaps you can help them out.
So offer some references, Duwayne, which cite the argument in question. If
it's original to yourself, you're welcome to claim that it is.
Is your argument original, Duwayne? If not, please cite others -- expert in
the field -- who have recognized or posed it.
: Please do. Be sure your "evidence" is from the scientific community.
: I'm most interested in articles from peer-reviewed science journals.
So please, by all means, provide evidence from some source as capable of
validating your definitions and claims as the scientific community was
capable of validating your interlocutor's claims in that post.
More quotes from various posts, demonstrating your expectations of others:
: Support responses to both questions with evidence and papers from
: peer-reviewed papers.
: Did I make this claim? No. I simply asked you to cite the peer-review
: sources that support your claim. Obviously no such sources exist, or
: you would simply list them. Why is this such a difficult admission?
: Then stop snipping the questions I've posted regarding it, and answer
: them. Use references from peer-reviewed science journals, too.
: Actually, Kerry, what is required is verifiability. Publishing in a
: peer-review journal is one way to do that, based on their standards
: and the critical eye of the reviewers.
: Post your evidence. Make sure it's scientific evidence from
: peer-reviewed science journals, and that it supports non-trivial
: claims of the Book of Mormon.
: Lots of people confuse "peer review" with "buddy" review, but they are
: not the same thing. Scientific peer review looks for technical merit
: by other researchers in the field of interest. This is to make sure
: that the work follows accepted protocol such as double blind tests,
: corrections for known artifacts. Scientific peer review must *also*
: be critical and skeptical in nature.
Be reasonable, Duwayne. If your argument is original, claim as much. If
not, cite some sources which have vetted it.
- Scott
Scott Marquardt
oblige.
Duwayne said:
>Bret said:
>> "NENB is a necessary being" wasn't true in the first place. That's
>> where the definitional cheating occurs. For NENB to qualify as ENB
>> requires a definitional aberration.
>
> Not true. NENB exists,
??
Where? Verifiably? Objectively?
In all seriousness, Duwayne, you're equivocating on the meaning of
"existence." It's hugely ironic that you've criticized an a priori argument
because it's not empirical, but now you purport to refute it by eschewing
empirical verification of the "existence" of NENB. Special pleading for
non-empirically verifiable "existence?"
Or are you merely attempting a reductio?
Please be more clear. Your continuing equivocation on "exist" is not
helpful.
- Scott
Scott Marquardt
bring it up here instead.
Duwayne said:
>Scott said:
> I said that you were using your words in a way that did not
> allow for the non-existence of necessary beings.
You were far more specific than that. What you were actually claiming was
that the argument was circular:
: There it is -- right in the very *first* step. "God is necessary
: being." Remember how I asked what a "necessary being" is? You said a
: necessary being is one whose non-existence is impossible. That means
: a necessary being exists.
:
: Right there, in step one, you said the logical equivalent of "god
: exists."
:
: Now look down at the conclusion of your proof, Scott. It says "god
: exists."
:
: Your argument is circular. It's circular if you claim step 1 is a
: definition. It's circular if you claim step 1 is a proposition. It's
: just plain circular.
And what was the "*first* step" (emphasis yours)?
: 1) "God is necessary being.
Your unwillingness to listen to people is evident, because half a day
earlier I offered the following succinct explanation (you bizarrely claimed
my explanation was a "lie"), before you posted the above in what can only
be described as willful ignorance of my remarks.
: >"A necessary being is a being whose non-existence is impossible."
: >
: >So Scott's proposition is that "god exists."
:
: No, not the case. The argument doesn't begin with the assertion that
: necessary being exists. It's saying that necessary being, by definition,
: must exist if it does exist.
:
: Duwayne, I sure hope you don't get off on another of your assinine dozens
: of posts that waste time arguing over what people said, instead of getting
: down to the substance at issue.
Interesting how easy it is to be prescient in conversations with you, isn't
it Duwayne? I only lament that I underestimated your capacity for bad faith
argument by literally hundreds of posts, at this point.
> And you went on and
> on and on and on with your ad hominem attacks -- telling me how I
> didn't understand the words.
It's a common observation, of late, Duwayne. It's not just me.
But it's remarkable is that you like to draw much attention to your
interlocutors' epithets while snipping the substantive responses that
sufficiently explain what you refuse to understand. You're not interested
in understanding, Duwayne. This is why I've said you merit the epithets.
You continue to believe that your own mind better understands what people
mean by their words, than they do themselves. It's arrogant and rude. That
you whine when people match wits with you only shows that you feel out of
place when your interlocutors don't roll over and pee when you bark.
> And then, oh blessed gawd, you give me this blooper of yours to quote,
> where you assert that the set of non-existing beings is null. It's
> sort of like that court seen where the racist skin head asserts he's
> no racist, but then accidently blurts out the "N" word in court. He
> can retract is, but it's no good -- people can clearly see what he's
> been thinking all along.
LOL
Please show where the blooper was latent in anything preceding, Duwayne.
Please show that I believed all along that nothing is non-existent (that's
how bad the blooper was -- which kind of explains its retraction, don't ya
think? ;-)
Dude.
>> If it's not my position, isn't this a straw
>> man?
>
> It was your position a few days ago, and apparently your position when
> you were busy lambasting me for saying it was your position during the
> original debate on your silly "proof."
When was that, Duwayne? Please be specific. I see you're couching your
language very carefully -- it was "apparently" my position when [whatever].
What grounds do you have for alleging this appearance, Duwayne?
>> Duwayne, why do you do this kind of thing?
>
> Unable to deal with the issues, Scott goes back to the ad hominem.
When Scott alleges Duwayne is burning straw men, it's ad hominem. When
Duwayne does so, it's doubtless the polemical Ubermensch in action.
>> You did something like this the
>> last time you took a few days off from posting. You returned and started
>> blaming Bret and I for dragging the ontological argument into empirical
>> concerns,
>
> Are you going to deny that you said "exist" meant to be "real?" Are
> you going to deny that Brett tried to apply the term "necessary being"
> to such things as electrons?
LOL!
Are you going to deny that it was *after* I did so that *you* defined
"real" in strictly empirical terms -- with no compulsion to do so -- and
pretended that your definition was happily acknowledged by interlocutors
who continued to criticize your venture into empirical concerns the entire
time?
Tell me, Duwayne -- *who* defined "real" as "objective" and "verifiable?"
Was it me? Bret, maybe? Paula? Guy?
Or was it you?
And when was it, Duwayne? Was it before, or *after*, my reference to
"real."
You continue to believe that your own mind better understands what people
mean by their words, than they do themselves. It's arrogant and rude. That
you whine when people match wits with you only shows that you feel out of
place when your interlocutors don't roll over and pee when you bark.
> What we have here are a pair who talk out of both sides of their
> mouths.
What we have is a disingenuous interlocutor who interminably draws the
thinnest possible inferences and foists them as straw men.
> When it's convenient, you claim the ontological proof is only
> abstract.
It's as abstract as the Cogito.
> But then you keep applying it to the "real" world when
> asked to define terms like "exist."
Who defined the word "real" in empirical terms (two of them), Duwayne? Was
it you, or was it me?
> You CLAIM that it's possible for necessary beings to not exist,
A priori that's certainly true -- contrary to your claim that a definition
of necessary being requires otherwise. Bret's refutation of Hartshorne
requires this postulate (which you oddly find inconsistent with necessary
being). You may recall, Duwayne, that I introduced Hartshorne's formal
proof with the specific challenge to identify it's classical refutation.
> but
> then you ACT like it's not, and you even busted yourself with a great
> big blooper in which you actually said the set of non-existing things
> is null.
What do you mean I "act" like it's not? If you recall, I've almost nonstop
berated you for contradicting Bret's refutation of Hartshorn. And now you
have it that it was my passion to belie the refutation myself, all along?
Duwayne, this is akin to your claiming that Bret and I are responsible for
the level of empirical clutter in this thread concerned with an a priori
argument. Why you do this isn't clear, but I chalk it up as more of your
rheotorical gamesmanship.
> Don't blame me if you can't keep your story straight, Scott.
I only blame it on you that you can't keep yours straight, Duwayne.
- Scott
Mike W
>> Unruly Human wrote:
>>> Bret Ripley wrote:
>>> According to Bret:
>>>
>>> a thing "is something possessing the state or quality of having
>>> existence."
>>>
>>> Define: ET = The set of all existing things
>>>
>>> Define: NET = The set of all non-existing things
>>>
>>> If NET is not the null set, it is populated by non-existing things
>>> (like, say, Clovis Lark).
>> Clovie isn't a NET, altho he is walking a fine line in that regard.
>> He's visiting in Utah.
>>
>> Here's hoping you guys can hopefully finish one or two of these
>> threads THIS year.
> The Hartshorne thread was technically finished when Bret met the
> challenge and refuted Hartshorne.
>
> I think the reason the current one is so long is because Duwayne
> claims he's doing something which, as it turns out, has been done
> by no one else in a thousand years of ontological arguments being
> treated by hordes of theologians and atheologians.
>
> This year, you say? ;-)
I swear it's gone on so long because it has something to do with Clinton and
what "is" is. Hartshorne died (1897-2000) knowing his saving grace (per
DA's locutions on circularity) had been captured and presented on the
international stage. Hmm...
Mike
Bret Ripley
say...
> rip...@olywa.net (Bret Ripley) wrote in message news:<27c8971c.03123...@posting.google.com>...
> <snip>
> > > try to compare the results to your real-world experience. In the
> > > abstract, though, the logic is solid.
> >
> > No, it really isn't, Duwyane. At the very least it's enthymematic.
>
>
> > > definition lacks logical consistency.
> > >
> > > > The confusion it causes is due to an uneven (inconsistent) notions of
> > > > "exist" and "thing."
> > >
> > > There's nothing "uneven" about it at all. Sheesh. I'm using your
> > > definition, Bret.
> >
> > You most certainly are not.
>
> brackets:
>
> According to Bret:
>
> a being "is something possessing the state or quality of having
I'm not denying that, Duwayne. Why are you ignoring the rest of the
definition? You agreed with it at the time, and now you discard it
without comment.
> According Scott Marquardt:
>
> "A necessary being is a being whose non-existence is
> impossible….Necessary being's existence cannot be contingent." [Scott
> really did say this, too]
Yes, I know he did. And you *still* haven't grasped that "contingent"
is simply the opposite of "necessary". You keep attaching baggage to
"contingent" that you derive from an informal definition of that term.
> Let's see if "necessary being" as defined by Scott and Bret is
> logically consistent:
And you propose to do this by pretending that the two phrases you cite
adequately represent the definition of "necessary being". Why are you
ignoring our discussion of "exist", including our little Q&A session
that clarifies the matter?
> Define: ENB = The set of existing necessary beings [In the abstract,
> a set has the quality of existence, so I'm using your definition
> consistently here.]
You are ignoring my definition of "exist", Duwayne. You really should
be ashamed of yourself.
Precisely *how* does the set ENB possess the quality of existence? To
use your examples, does it exist in the same way as a one-dollar bill
exists? Or The Cheshire Cat (which I defined as not existing)?
> Define: NENB = The set of non-existing necessary beings [In the
> abstract, a set has the quality of existence, so I'm using your
> definition consistently here.]
Submit this statement to the same test as above. (If you use a
definition of "exist" that includes NENB as existing, I still maintain
that this will be the null set -- an indication that your definitions
are porked).
> NENB must exist if it exists, and it cannot exist if it does not
> exist. Its existence is not contingent, given the fact that it
> contains only necessary beings, whose existence is not contingent.
>
> Even if there are no existing necessary beings, NENB exists as the
> null set.
And using your strawman and meaningless definiton of "exist", I think
NENB must be the null set. If you use my definition of "exist", it
will have no more existence than the Cheshire Cat.
> Thus, NENB is a necessary being, and NENB exists. [In the
> abstract, a set has the quality of existence, so I'm using your
> definition consistently here.]
Simply repeating it doesn't make it so, Duwayne. Until you
acknowledge my definition of "exist", you are addressing a strawman.
> Since NENB is a necessary being, and it exists, it is a subset of the
> set ENB. [In the abstract, a set has the quality of existence, so I'm
> using your definition consistently here.]
NENB cannot have being according to my definition of "exist".
> Now some review of set theory. If "a" is an element of set A, and set
> A is a complete subset of set B, then "a" is also an element of set B
>
> Therefore: all non-existing necessary beings are in the set of ENB.
> But this is a logical contradiction, since ENB is defined as the set
> of existing necessary beings. Therefore, the definition of necessary
> being is not logically consistent.
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> As you can see, I've used your definitions consistently throughout,
> and it's the self-referencing nature of your definition that causes
> the problem of logical inconsistency.
As you can see, you continue to ignore my definition of exist.
> > You quote one phrase from me -- my
> > response to one of a list of questions ("What is a being?"). That
> > phrase did not emerge from a vacuum, Duwayne. It was part of a
> > discussion regarding the definition of "exist". You have discarded
> > the rest of the discussion regarding the definition of "exist", and
> > ceased on my definition of "being".
>
> Bret, if you want to add discriminating characteristics to your
> definition of "exist," that can fix the problem. I'm interested in
> how you will do that without destroying the notion of "not contingent"
> for necessary beings.
Already done, Duwayne. And don't you think it's about time you
wrapped your brain around "necessary" and "contingent"?
> <snip>
> > > Point to the exact step where
> > > the definition is changed or made uneven.
> >
> > I've already pointed it out several times, Duwayne. It's the step
> > where you attribute "being" to NENB.
>
> NENB has existence in the abstract. It's a real, existing set.
Not according to the definition of "exist" we started out with
(assuming we were using my definition).
> Having the quality of existence, it exists as a "being" using your
> definition.
No, not according to my definition. It's the Cheshire Cat.
> <snip>
> > > And this is exactly what I'm talking about. YOU produced a definition
> > > of "exist"
> >
> > Yes, but you seem to have forgotten it. I here quote part of our
> > conversation:
> >
> > Bret: "Exist (The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English
> > Language):
> >
> > To have actual being; be real.
> > To have life; live.
> > To continue to be.
> > To be present under certain circumstances or in a specified place.
>
> Bret, the present discussion is in the *ABSTRACT.* That's where the
> ontological proof belongs.
By abstract you mean analytic. Right?
> Remember? You agreed with that.
Did you ever answer Scott's question about the difference between
analytic and synthetic propositions?
> If you want to take it back to the "REAL" world -- out of the abstract
> -- then QM is waiting for you.
You're a lot of fun, you know that? I'm serious -- this thread would
have been dead boring if you hadn't thrown your hat in.
I hope that you'll take the time to try to follow this -- I think this
is a summary of your position (please correct me if I stray):
The "abstract" definition of "exist/being" (that you attribute to me)
used in your proof must result in NENB = the null set -- the
wishy-washy definition it is impossible for anything you can imagine
to *not* exist (I don't think you have acknowledged this yet, but it
may be important). This tells us that the definition is (as you have
correctly pointed out) is useless and results in a circular argument.
If onotological arguments define "exist" in this pathetic manner,
ontological arguments cannot address existence in what you call
'"REAL" world' (which remains undefined, I believe -- I have asked you
if RW refers specifically to QM, but I haven't seen your response).
Is this about right, Duwayne?
If I'm wrong, then I am about to address a strawman. In this case,
please just correct my mistakes above and ignore the following.
Here are some random comments about the position I have sketched
above:
That Ontological arguments use this definition of exist is
unsupported.
This definition of "exist" has no value anywhere -- abstract or
otherwise.
It carries a hidden (and unsupported) assumption that a meaningful
definition of "exist" must address RW (or QM, or whatever).
It carries the hidden (and unsupported) assumption that a
meaningful, abstract definition of "exist" must be inconsistent with
QM. This has been the subject of some discussion in other threads,
but so far Duwayne has treated it as written.
These issues (and perhaps others) need to be addressed.
> It's checkmate, o'l buddy.
I'm not even sure we're playing on the same board, amigo.
> <snip>
> > > Let's simplify to make things a little more clear. The proof goes
> > > something like this:
> > >
> > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > 1) Define what it means for a thing to "exist."
> > > 2) Define E as the set of all the things that exist.
> > > 3) Define NE as the set of all the things that don't exist.
> > > 4) Characterize NE as a thing that exists
> > > 5) Put NE into E
> > > 6) Show a logical contradiction by showing that E contains things that
> > > don't exist, which contradicts its definition.
> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > LOL! You have just described the "strawman" that you snipped at the
> > beginning of this post.
>
> No, Bret, I've shown the basic logica structure of the problem. It
> revolves around whether or not "exist" is ambiguous or
> self-referencing.
LOL again! You say "No", but then go on to agree with me!
> > > Now notice that the logical inconsistency exists if step 1) contains a
> > > definition of "exist" that is:
> > > 1) Incomplete or ambiguous
> >
> > You are just paraphrasing my objection to the proof, Duwayne.
>
> But what you don't realize is that the problem originates in a
> self-referencing definition of "exist."
Right, and this corresponds to "Resonse #1" in the example I provided.
The other option (which you have also already acknowledged) is an
ambiguous definition.
Do you realize you have completely agreed to my criticism of your
proof? What it *really* boils downs to is using a strawman definition
of "exist".
> If exist has defining
> characteristics associated with it, the problem goes away.
If the definition is clear and unambiguous, there is no problem.
That's what I said back on the 29th.
> But then
> your necessary beings become contingent on those defining
> characteristics, too.
And this is your folly, Duwayne. The fact of having defining
characteristics does not contradict the idea of "necessary being".
You have repeatedly committed this error for over a month, now. You
are confusing an informal definition of "contingent" with its formal
definition.
I've tried (and tried and tried) to get you to see this. Ironically,
you repeatedly quoted my statement about the importance of
definitions, but completely ignored the specific object of my
statement: "contingent".
> There's no way out, Bret.
The walls! The walls! The walls are closing in all around me!
Happy New Year, my friend.
Bret
Duwayne Anderson
<snip>
> > Scott, you know better than to start an argument from authority. Deal
> > with the issues I brought up.
>
> Have I failed to reply to your issues? No.
Yes.
> I'm asking for something
> further.
Your "further" is a strawman argument from authority.
Deal with the issues, Scott. I've posted my argument as to why
"necessary being" isn't logically consistent. Each and every step of
the logic is laid out for you. I'm not asking you to take my word
that "necessary being" is logically inconsistent -- I'm showing in
detail how it is.
Deal with the issues, if you can.
AnthonyPaul
>> exist. Its existence is not contingent, given the fact that it
>> contains only necessary beings, whose existence is not contingent.
The proper rendition would be:
Non-existing Necessary Beings must *NOT* exist if it *DOES NOT* exist.
NENB cannot *NOT* exist if it does not *NOT* exist.
NENB existence is not contingent (which is why it is considered to be
"necessary" instead of "contingent").
NENB contains only *NON-EXISTING* necessary beings, whose *NON*existence is not
contingent (a tautalogy).
The set of NENB has existence only because it is the container that is holding
all the nothingness (No-Things) that is supposed to contained in it.
The substance within the container is still void of any existence - and
necessarily so.
Anthony
Scott Marquardt
I put their history within a mouse click for you, Duwayne, way back on
12/2:
: Duwyane, ontological arguments have a huge, huge history.
: http://snurl.com/380u
: No one that I'm aware of has ever raised the issues you're raising about
: the fundamental definition of God as necessary being. Not even academic
: atheologians, Duwayne. Why? I don't know -- maybe it's because they don't
: invest their egos so much in their arguments, so they're free to be honest.
A google search for "ontological argument" yields the following hits:
web: 13,900
groups: 5430
directory: 101
Of course, the 'net hasn't been around for the 1000 years that the
ontological argument has, so needless to say most texts remain in print
form only. So bibliographies are helpful:
http://snipurl.com/3m49
http://snipurl.com/3m4c
(The numerous print sources listed will, of course, have their own more
exhaustive bibliographies)
> But what is rather clear is that the term "necessary being" that you
> and Bret are using is logically inconsistent.
It's not clear to Bret, nor to I. I think you're confused. Citing sources
that concur with you would give me some pause, some reason to avoid rolling
my eyes again when you repost your "proof" as if repetition is a great
substituted for more careful explanation.
And anyway, you've shown your willingness to equivocate and apply "exist"
differently to abstract things than to concrete things, within a single
argument. So even if your point were sound, it would enervate much of your
own argument as well.
Perhaps a neutral way of stating this would be to aver that we're on tricky
territory, and be more accommodating of each other's varying pace in
catching up on the subject matter's peculiarities. I'm perfectly willing to
tolerate ignorance on the issue, just as I've been grateful when others
have tolerated my own ignorance on issues I've sought to learn about. But
your knee-jerk thin inferences, mistakenly (or intentionally) misattributed
definitions, and so forth have not helped the conversation along, and I
don't apologize for being intolerant of your arrogance.
> If that's something
> nobody else has ever demonstrated, I can only conclude it's because
> better minds than mine have found the subject not worth wasting their
> time on.
I trust you might want to "verify" whether that "conclusion" is warranted
on the basis of empirical evidence.
Be sure to mark which renowned academic atheologians -- published in peer
reviewed journals (see my post elsewhere regarding the importance of that
to you) -- have found the subject well worth their investment of time.
You don't need to agree with, like, believe, lend credence to, or otherwise
respect a priori arguments, Duwayne. No one is foisting this on you. That
said, I admire your tenacity and willingness to take polemical risks.
However, I'd have preferred more light than heat, myself.
- Scott
Scott Marquardt
migrating my response.
_________________________
Duwayne Anderson wrote:
>Scott Marquardt wrote:
>> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
>>> Bret Ripley wrote:
>>>> Also sprach Duwayne Anderson:
>>
>>> Let's simplify to make things a little more clear. The proof goes
>>> something like this:
>>>
>>> 1) Define what it means for a thing to "exist."
>>> 2) Define E as the set of all the things that exist.
>>> 3) Define NE as the set of all the things that don't exist.
>>> 4) Characterize NE as a thing that exists
>>
>> Does E exist as well?
>
> In an abstract sense. This whole proof is in the abstract.
>
>>
>>> 5) Put NE into E
>>> 6) Show a logical contradiction by showing that E contains things that
>>> don't exist, which contradicts its definition.
>>
>> Are you claiming that NE is a *subset* of E?
>
> Yes, that's what happens. But it can only happen if the definition of
> E has no discriminating requirements.
??
Your argot is not endemic to this kind of conversation, Duwayne.
I'll have to ask that you better explain what you mean. So few people use
such locutions -- and none in discussions like this, apparently -- that I
don't think I could in good faith be blamed for requesting clarification.
What is a "discriminating requirement?"
How do definitions "have" discriminating requirements?
> Here's another look at how "necessary being" is logically
> inconsistent:
>
> 1) Set of all things (AT) is necessary being (it exists, and its
> existence is not contingent)
??
Why not? If the entire universe is contingent, the set certainly is as
well. The universe might not have been, therefore any set containing it
might not have been (if the set is defined as containing it). In the case
that the universe didn't exist, this set would be your NE.
I don't know how you can claim that AT is not contingent. You seem to be
mistaking "that a thing exists" (or for that matter, that all things exist)
as an argument that they're necessary. But you're merely assuming the
consequent -- a common fallacy.
Necessary being -> existence (for any entity of which we predicate it).
Modus Tollens,
~existence -> ~necessary being
But not
existence -> necessary being (assume the consequent)
Please provide a form that doesn't commit this fallacy -- or explain how
I've misunderstood, if that's not what you're falling into.
- Scott
Scott Marquardt
Scott Marquardt
> Your "further" is a strawman argument from authority.
Explain why it's a straw man when other people make such requests, but it's
apparently proper polemics when you do so.
Scott Marquardt
Duwayne, it's not the only ontological argument that he's concerned with --
he's trying to show that "necessary being" is incomprehensible, I believe.
Upon re-examining the argument, however, it seems unlikely that it's
vulnerable to Duwayne's critique -- and not only because Duwayne's critique
itself appears to be flawed (see Bret's many recent posts).
1) g --> []g
2) []g v ~[]g or <>g
3) ~[]g --> []~[]g Becker's postulate ([]p-->[][]p, <>p-->[]<>p)
applied to ~[]p
4) []g v []~[]g 2,3 substitution (pvq,qvr;pvr)
5) []~[]g --> []~g 1, modal modus tollens
6) []g v []~g 4,5 substitution (pvq, q-->r; pvr)
7) ~[]~g
8) []g 6,7 disjunctive syllogism
9) []g --> g modal axiom
10) g 8, 9 modus ponens
Or, if you prefer:
1) If God exists, then God's existence must be necessary.
2) If God does not exist, then God's non-existence must be necessary (i.e.,
God's existence is impossible.)
3) Either God exists or God does not exist. (excluded middle)
4) God's existence is either necessary or impossible. (from 1,2,3)
5) God's existence is not impossible (i.e., it is possible).
6) Therefore God's existence is necessary.
I would appreciate it if Duwayne would frame his argument less in the
abstract, and use terms and locutions in the proof itself. That probably
wouldn't be necessary for Duwayne to establish anything (provided that's
possible), but I suggest that it would be helpful.
Meanwhile, I'll be posting new ontological arguments in new threads.
Duwayne's thread may serve us well, since I imagine he will continue
wishing to discuss the intelligibility of necessary being as new proofs are
posted.
- Scott
Bret Ripley
>
> If you want to take it back to the "REAL" world -- out of the abstract
> -- then QM is waiting for you.
Speaking of QM:
Just for kicks, take your proof and substitute "observed existing
being" for "necessary being":
Define: OEB = The set of observed existing beings
Define: UOEB = The set of unobserved existing beings
Lather, rinse, repeat.
Cheers,
Bret
Duwayne Anderson
> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
> >Scott Marquardt wrote:
> >> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
> >>> Bret Ripley wrote:
>
> >>>> As I noted earlier, your "proof" is a variation of an old false-paradox.
> >>>
> >>> Bret, the proof is rock solid.
> >>
> >> Question.
> >>
> >> Is this "rock solid" refutation of 1000 years of ontological arguments
> >> original with you, or has anyone else identified it?
> >
> > Scott, you know better than to start an argument from authority. Deal
> > with the issues I brought up.
>
> Have I failed to reply to your issues? No. I'm asking for something
> further.
>
> First, recall that much of what I've been doing this past month has been
> applying your own polemical ethics as a categorical imperative. Thus,
> I'll now point out that you're adopting a double standard.
> What's not reasonable is that you demand of others what you won't provide
> yourself -- evidence of independent attestation. Here're some instances
> where you've recognized the importance of implicating material which has
> been vetted:
>
> : 1) Find a single degreed Egyptologist who is recognized as an expert
> : in the field (you can show this by pointing to papers he/she has
> : authored in peer-reviewed science magazines on the subject of
> : Egyptology) who thinks Smith got the translation even half right.
Scott, the issue there was the accuracy of translation. I don't
translate Egyptian. Neither do you, or Guy R. Briggs. The issue
there WAS the opinion of scholars.
But the issue here is my proof that your necessary god is logically
inconsistent. I've posted the proof. Posted the logic. Walked you
through step by step. Pretending that the argument isn't sound unless
someone else has discussed it somewhere else is just the fallacy of
appealing to authority.
Deal with the issues, Scott.
<snip to end>
Duwayne Anderson
> >> NENB must exist if it exists, and it cannot exist if it does not
> >> exist. Its existence is not contingent, given the fact that it
> >> contains only necessary beings, whose existence is not contingent.
>
> The proper rendition would be:
>
> Non-existing Necessary Beings must *NOT* exist if it *DOES NOT* exist.
You are bringing in some confusion from the "real" world here.
Remember, the definition of exist is only what set it's in. In the
abstrace, everything "exists" in the sense that it can be described,
discussed, and debated. It only gets the quality "exist" when it goes
into the set "exist."
Of course, if we are talking about the "real" world, then "exist"
means something different. But Bret already agreed the ontological
proof can't be taken into the "real" world. It's an abstract
argument, and should be carried out in the abstract.
If you want to take it into the "real" world, then you have problems
right off the bat because "necessary being" is inconsistent with
quantum mechanics, which says that everything is contingent.
> NENB cannot *NOT* exist if it does not *NOT* exist.
Again, the word "exist" here has nothing to do with what you normally
regard it in the "real" world. Indeed, that's where the problem of
logical inconsistency derives from. If the word "exist" is given
defining characteristics, the logical inconsistency goes away. But
then the necessary beings become contingent on those defining
characteristics -- so they are either non-existent or logically
inconsistent.
> NENB existence is not contingent (which is why it is considered to be
> "necessary" instead of "contingent").
Again, true only in the abstract.
> NENB contains only *NON-EXISTING* necessary beings, whose *NON*existence is not
> contingent (a tautalogy).
The whole damned definition of "exist" being those things with the
quality of "existence" is a tautalogy. That's the origin of the
problem with logical inconsistency.
> The set of NENB has existence only because it is the container that is holding
> all the nothingness (No-Things) that is supposed to contained in it.
It's existence is not contingent. It makes no sense within the proof
or definition of terms to say it has existence "only because...." It
either has existence, or it doesn't.
> The substance within the container is still void of any existence - and
> necessarily so.
True, and the logical inconsistency is that all that non-existence is
a proper subset of existing things.
Thus the logical inconsistency. But if you apply defining
characteristics to the word "exist" all the problems with logical
inconsistency go away. So do the existing necessary beings, though,
because their existence becomes contingent on the defining
characteristics of "exist," so they are no longer non-contingent (a
violation of "necessary being)."
> Anthony
Thanks for your thoughts, Anthony.
Duwayne Anderson
> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
>
> > Your "further" is a strawman argument from authority.
>
> Explain why it's a straw man when other people make such requests, but it's
> apparently proper polemics when you do so.
Scott, if the issue here was what the experts say (as it was in the
discussion about the translation of the Book of Abraham) then it would
be relevant. But that's not the case. I've posted a proof showing
that your "necessary being" is logically inconsistent. You need to
deal with the issue (if you can).
Duwayne Anderson
<snip>
> >> I think the reason the current one is so long is because Duwayne claims
> >> he's doing something which, as it turns out, has been done by no one else
> >> in a thousand years of ontological arguments being treated by hordes of
> >> theologians and atheologians.
> >
> > Y'know, Scott, I don't know the history of the ontological proof at
> > all. I have no idea where it came from (it looks like something a
> > monk would think up) or what group of "intellectuals" has spent their
> > lives playing with it.
>
> I put their history within a mouse click for you, Duwayne, way back on
> 12/2:
Nice, but not the point. The issue here is the proof I posted,
showing your "necessary being" is logically inconsistent.
Try dealing with the issue, Scott.
<snip>
> > But what is rather clear is that the term "necessary being" that you
> > and Bret are using is logically inconsistent.
>
> It's not clear to Bret, nor to I.
It's not? Let me repost it for you. Try going through it line by
line
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Bret:
a being "is something possessing the state or quality of having
existence."
According Scott Marquardt:
"A necessary being is a being whose non-existence is
impossible….Necessary being's existence cannot be contingent."
Let's see if "necessary being" as defined by Scott and Bret is
logically consistent:
Define: ENB = The set of existing necessary beings
Define: NENB = The set of non-existing necessary beings
NENB must exist if it exists, and it cannot exist if it does not
exist. Its existence is not contingent, given the fact that it
contains only necessary beings, whose existence is not contingent.
Even if there are no existing necessary beings, NENB exists as the
null set. Thus, NENB is a necessary being, and NENB exists.
Since NENB is a necessary being, and it exists, it is a subset of the
set ENB.
Now some review of set theory. If "a" is an element of set A, and set
A is a complete subset of set B, then "a" is also an element of set B
Therefore: all non-existing necessary beings are in the set of ENB.
But this is a logical contradiction, since ENB is defined as the set
of existing necessary beings. Therefore, the definition of necessary
being is not logically consistent.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
>I think you're confused.
Of course you do, Scottie. You also think I'm an idiot, a fatuous
ass, etc. Try to constrain your ad hominem nature, and deal with the
issues.
'K?
<snip to end>
Duwayne Anderson
one of Scott's ad hominem stabs currently being used by his associate
Christian (paula). I think it applies in this case:
Paula
"Duwayne, you're living proof that when a man who has no idea what
he's doing redoubles his efforts, there's no end to what you can't
do." ---Scott Marquardt
Scott Marquardt <wasREM...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<35vuhcguk7j4$.d...@marquardts.org>...
> I thought I'd post the argument we've been discussing. According to
> Duwayne, it's not the only ontological argument that he's concerned with --
> he's trying to show that "necessary being" is incomprehensible, I believe.
Depends on the definition that's used for "exist." It's not clear
what definition is being used for "exist" below. How about spelling
it out, nice and clear (in your own words, please).
> Upon re-examining the argument, however, it seems unlikely that it's
> vulnerable to Duwayne's critique -- and not only because Duwayne's critique
> itself appears to be flawed (see Bret's many recent posts).
>
> 1) g --> []g
> 2) []g v ~[]g or <>g
> 3) ~[]g --> []~[]g Becker's postulate ([]p-->[][]p, <>p-->[]<>p)
> applied to ~[]p
> 4) []g v []~[]g 2,3 substitution (pvq,qvr;pvr)
> 5) []~[]g --> []~g 1, modal modus tollens
> 6) []g v []~g 4,5 substitution (pvq, q-->r; pvr)
> 7) ~[]~g
> 8) []g 6,7 disjunctive syllogism
> 9) []g --> g modal axiom
> 10) g 8, 9 modus ponens
>
> Or, if you prefer:
>
> 1) If God exists, then God's existence must be necessary.
What's the definition of "exist" Scott. You know that's key. Are you
using a circular or self-referencing definition?
> 2) If God does not exist, then God's non-existence must be necessary (i.e.,
> God's existence is impossible.)
What's the definition of "exist" Scott. You know that's key. Are you
using a circular or self-referencing definition?
> 3) Either God exists or God does not exist. (excluded middle)
What's the definition of "exist" Scott. You know that's key. Are you
using a circular or self-referencing definition?
> 4) God's existence is either necessary or impossible. (from 1,2,3)
What's the definition of "exist" Scott. You know that's key. Are you
using a circular or self-referencing definition?
> 5) God's existence is not impossible (i.e., it is possible).
What's the definition of "exist" Scott. You know that's key. Are you
using a circular or self-referencing definition?
> 6) Therefore God's existence is necessary.
What's the definition of "exist" Scott. You know that's key. Are you
using a circular or self-referencing definition?
> I would appreciate it if Duwayne would frame his argument less in the
> abstract,
Oh, necessary gawd. You want to take it back into the real world,
Scott? Sheesh. Make up your mind.
Now, if you don't mind, how about that definition of "exist." Be sure
you give it in your own words. Be clear, and be complete.
Duwayne Anderson
> You indicated that my reply was more germane in this thread. Happily
> migrating my response.
> _________________________
>
> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
> >Scott Marquardt wrote:
> >> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
> >>> Bret Ripley wrote:
> >>>> Also sprach Duwayne Anderson:
>
> >>> Let's simplify to make things a little more clear. The proof goes
> >>> something like this:
> >>>
> >>> 1) Define what it means for a thing to "exist."
> >>> 2) Define E as the set of all the things that exist.
> >>> 3) Define NE as the set of all the things that don't exist.
> >>> 4) Characterize NE as a thing that exists
> >>
> >> Does E exist as well?
> >
> > In an abstract sense. This whole proof is in the abstract.
> >
> >>
> >>> 5) Put NE into E
> >>> 6) Show a logical contradiction by showing that E contains things that
> >>> don't exist, which contradicts its definition.
> >>
> >> Are you claiming that NE is a *subset* of E?
> >
> > Yes, that's what happens. But it can only happen if the definition of
> > E has no discriminating requirements.
>
> ??
I thought it was pretty clear, Scott. The logical inconsistencies
fall apart if "exist" means to have two arms.
Duwayne Anderson
> You indicated that my reply was more proper to this thread. Happy to
> oblige.
>
> Duwayne said:
> >Bret said:
>
> >> "NENB is a necessary being" wasn't true in the first place. That's
> >> where the definitional cheating occurs. For NENB to qualify as ENB
> >> requires a definitional aberration.
> >
> > Not true. NENB exists,
>
> ??
>
> Where? Verifiably? Objectively?
The present discussion is in the abstract, Scott. Sets have the
quality of existence in the abstract, you know. Ask any
mathematician. Don't go dragging the discussion back to the "real"
world, you baaaaaad boy!
Duwayne Anderson
> You indicated that this material was more germane in this thread. Happy to
> bring it up here instead.
>
> Duwayne said:
> >Scott said:
>
> > I said that you were using your words in a way that did not
> > allow for the non-existence of necessary beings.
>
> You were far more specific than that. What you were actually claiming was
> that the argument was circular:
It is, if you *define* the set of non-existing things as null, Scott.
Defining things that way leaves no possibility of anything not
existing. Sure, it took a while for you to blurt it out, that's
clearly how you were using the terms, as the following bloopers of
yours illustrate:
Scott Marquardt <wasREM...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<19u7lecc...@marquardts.org>...
<snip>
> The set of things that don't exist is empty.
<snip>
>>> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Scott Marquardt <wasREM...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<6s7vkjlaua5n$.d...@marquardts.org>...
<snip>
"The set of things that don't exist" is a null set, so comparisons
between that null set and things included in "the set of all things
existing" would indeed point up a difference.
<snip>
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sure. You withdrew your blooper. In that case, perhaps the argument
isn't circular. It's hard to tell, though, because you keep seeming
to drift back to the old ways.
As long as the set of non-existing things isn't empty or null (as you
have said, but retracted) then the argument's circularity may go away.
The logial inconsistency, however, remains.
Duwayne Anderson
> The substance within the container is still void of any existence - and
> necessarily so.
>
> Anthony
Anthony:
I hope you don't mind two replies. See my other reply regarding the
legitimacy of the set NENB in an *abstract* sense. However, if you
don't like the idea of sets of non-existing things, there's another
way to view the logical inconsistency of "necessary beings" that does
not require the use of sets of non-existing things. See below:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) Set of all things [note: you could even restrict this to the set of
all existing things] (AT) is necessary being (it exists, and its
existence is not contingent)
2) AT is proper subset of set of existing necessary beings (AT is
proper subset of ENB). [note that everything here exists]
3) If there are contingent beings, they are in AT. [Note that this
can be restricted to existing contingent beings with no loss of
generality]
4) Therefore, if there are contingent beings they are in the set of
ENB.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The conclusion 4) is a contradiction, however, since necessary beings
are not contingent. [Technically, it's only a contradiction if there
are some contingent beings that exist. But asserting there are no
contingent beings would mean there are only necessary beings, making
any proof of existence for necessary beings redundant.]
This is a shorter and possibly more obvious way to see the logical
inconsistency in the notion of "necessary being."
Scott Marquardt
>Scott Marquardt wrote:
>> You indicated that my reply was more germane in this thread. Happily
>> migrating my response.
>>> Yes, that's what happens. But it can only happen if the definition of
>>> E has no discriminating requirements.
>>
>> ??
>
> I thought it was pretty clear, Scott. The logical inconsistencies
> fall apart if "exist" means to have two arms.
>
> <snip to end>
LOL!
First you reply to me outside this thread to let me know that my concerns
would be more relevant in this thread. So I repost my questions and
comments here, and you snip everything but two question marks!
Oh this is getting interesting.
Let's see if you can address the issues, Duwayne. I've claimed you're
guilty of a specific logical fallacy. I could be wrong, but how will we
know unless you address the issue?
Stand by, folks. Duwayne will shortly demand that I "stop ignoring the
issues." This from a guy who doesn't address substantive allegations of
specific formal fallacies in his argument.
LOL
Here it is again.
________________________
Duwayne Anderson wrote:
>Scott Marquardt wrote:
>> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
>>> Bret Ripley wrote:
>>>> Also sprach Duwayne Anderson:
>>
>>> Let's simplify to make things a little more clear. The proof goes
>>> something like this:
>>>
>>> 1) Define what it means for a thing to "exist."
>>> 2) Define E as the set of all the things that exist.
>>> 3) Define NE as the set of all the things that don't exist.
>>> 4) Characterize NE as a thing that exists
>>
>> Does E exist as well?
>
> In an abstract sense. This whole proof is in the abstract.
>
>>
>>> 5) Put NE into E
>>> 6) Show a logical contradiction by showing that E contains things that
>>> don't exist, which contradicts its definition.
>>
>> Are you claiming that NE is a *subset* of E?
>
> Yes, that's what happens. But it can only happen if the definition of
> E has no discriminating requirements.
??
Your argot is not endemic to this kind of conversation, Duwayne.
Scott Marquardt
> Sure. You withdrew your blooper. In that case, perhaps the argument
> isn't circular. It's hard to tell, though, because you keep seeming
> to drift back to the old ways.
??
How does wether an argument is circular depend on a mistake I happen to
make?
It sounds to me as if you're applying your obsession with QM here as well.
"What a thing is depends on how Marquardt observes it."
The question, I think, is what Hartshorne supposed when he contrived the
argument in the first place, Duwayne.
> As long as the set of non-existing things isn't empty or null (as you
> have said, but retracted) then the argument's circularity may go away.
> The logial inconsistency, however, remains.
On the strength of your need to quote a retracted gaffe? Please.
But I note that you're being disingenuous again. When I made the preceding
post elsewhere, you replied and informed me that it would be more germane
in this thread. So I posted it. And now you've snipped it without response.
This is becoming more common of late, Duwayne.
Repasting, of course.
_____________________________
Duwayne said:
>Scott said:
> I said that you were using your words in a way that did not
> allow for the non-existence of necessary beings.
You were far more specific than that. What you were actually claiming was
that the argument was circular:
: There it is -- right in the very *first* step. "God is necessary
Scott Marquardt
>Scott Marquardt wrote:
> According to Google, it looks like Scott posted this 5 times.
All on Dec 1 and 2, yes. The relevance of this would be?
> Here's
> one of Scott's ad hominem stabs currently being used by his associate
> Christian (paula). I think it applies in this case:
> Paula
> "Duwayne, you're living proof that when a man who has no idea what
> he's doing redoubles his efforts, there's no end to what you can't
> do." ---Scott Marquardt
??
All I'm doing is reposting the argument -- after a full month of it's
nonappearance in a conversation supposedly concerned with it?
>> I thought I'd post the argument we've been discussing. According to
>> Duwayne, it's not the only ontological argument that he's concerned with --
>> he's trying to show that "necessary being" is incomprehensible, I believe.
>
> Depends on the definition that's used for "exist." It's not clear
> what definition is being used for "exist" below. How about spelling
> it out, nice and clear (in your own words, please).
Back on 12/11, you selected your own definition from "Websters" and from
"another online dictionary," Duwayne.
Yet another example of your double standards.
Duwayne's free to arbitrarily select empirically freighted terms from
dictionaries of his own choice. Others, however, must provide "their own
words."
Your reply to Bret (above URL) is where much of your confusion began. It
started when you were not satisfied with definitions provided by Bret and
myself, and you decided to extend our definitions and attribute your
"empiricized" definition to us. You even went on to blame us -- often --
for /your/ act of introducing empirical concerns.
Here's what you said:
: Thanks so much for your reply. I believe we are at the brink of
: making some progress here.
:
: Per your post of 2003-12-10 14:10:37 PST in the thread "Re: A new
: topic!" you said (in reply to my question for a definition of "exist")
:
: ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
: "Exist (The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language):
:
: To have actual being; be real.
: To have life; live.
: To continue to be.
: To be present under certain circumstances or in a specified place.
:
: (Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary):
:
: To be as a fact and not as a mode; to have an actual or real being,
: whether material or spiritual.
: To be manifest in any manner; to continue to be.
: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
:
: This is certainly a good definition, and one I'm happy to work with.
: Indeed, Scott agreed with that definition. When I asked the question:
: "what it means to "exist" in the context of Hawthorn's proof," Scott
: replied: "A sane question. The most helpful answer might be the most
: naive one, "to be real."
You then said:
: Anyway, let's take your definition of "real" and Scott's first reply
: of "to be real." Now, let's look at the meaning of the word "real."
: From Webster, I found this:
You then went through a process of selecting your own arbitrary meaning for
"real," ending up with an empirically freighted result that was not in the
least implicit in Bret's or my remarks, nor relevant to Hartshorne's proof.
You have since made *your* definition normative, and much of the dispute
has involved Bret and I objecting to your dishonest attribution of your
definition to us, as well as its impertinence in a conversation concerned
with an a priori argument.
It's not clear why you needed to do this. It appears that there just wasn't
anything in Bret's definition that you could use to make rhetorical hay --
or straw.
It seems to me that Bret's choice of definition is much more portable -- it
stands a better chance of escaping equivocation in our use of the term
"real." I've recently called to your attention that you've been
equivocating on "exist," for example in your current putative proof of the
"inconsistency" of necessary being (it's not surprising you'd find
inconsistency when you're engaging in equivocal uses of "exist").
Do you believe we should be using the term "exist" as univocally as
possible, Duwayne?
- Scott
Scott Marquardt
>Scott Marquardt wrote:
>> I would appreciate it if Duwayne would frame his argument less in the
>> abstract,
>
> Oh, necessary gawd. You want to take it back into the real world,
> Scott? Sheesh. Make up your mind.
If you wouldn't decontextualize so much, you'd understand what's being
said. I said:
: I would appreciate it if Duwayne would frame his argument less in the
: abstract, and use terms and locutions in the proof itself. That probably
: wouldn't be necessary for Duwayne to establish anything (provided that's
: possible), but I suggest that it would be helpful.
What I meant -- if you look past the comma to everything you snipped -- was
that your argument is abstracting from "the proof itself." As I said, I
believe this abstraction has been a liability for your proof:
: Upon re-examining the argument, however, it seems unlikely that it's
: vulnerable to Duwayne's critique -- and not only because Duwayne's critique
: itself appears to be flawed (see Bret's many recent posts).
If you had read my paragraph instead of merely employing it as fodder for
your rhetorical gamesmanship, you'd have seen that I was referring the
degree to which your "proof" is abstracted from Hartshorne -- *not* the
extent to which it is abstracted from empirical concerns.
- Scott
Scott Marquardt
> Scott Marquardt <wasREM...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<i6ouw34srib6$.d...@marquardts.org>...
> <snip>
>>>> I think the reason the current one is so long is because Duwayne claims
>>>> he's doing something which, as it turns out, has been done by no one else
>>>> in a thousand years of ontological arguments being treated by hordes of
>>>> theologians and atheologians.
>>>
>>> Y'know, Scott, I don't know the history of the ontological proof at
>>> all. I have no idea where it came from (it looks like something a
>>> monk would think up) or what group of "intellectuals" has spent their
>>> lives playing with it.
>>
>> I put their history within a mouse click for you, Duwayne, way back on
>> 12/2:
>
> Nice, but not the point. The issue here is the proof I posted,
> showing your "necessary being" is logically inconsistent.
Why did you raise the issue of your relative ignorance of the ontological
argument's history, if it's not relevant?
> Try dealing with the issue, Scott.
You snipped my responses elsewhere concerning your "proof" -- without
comment. This is typical. Based on the post lengths now, I observe that
Bret has far more patience with you than I. ;-)
> <snip>
>>> But what is rather clear is that the term "necessary being" that you
>>> and Bret are using is logically inconsistent.
>>
>> It's not clear to Bret, nor to I.
>
> It's not? Let me repost it for you. Try going through it line by
> line
Aaack! "Repetition as substitute for dealing with issues people raise,"
again.
In response to two of my replies to your "proof" in the old thread, you
commended this thread to my attention. I've reposted those replies
verbatim, along with a couple others. I'll be pleased to have your
engagement with my concerns.
<snip>
- Scott
Scott Marquardt
> Scott Marquardt <wasREM...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<1l2l6rw1184ek$.d...@marquardts.org>...
>> You indicated that my reply was more proper to this thread. Happy to
>> oblige.
>>
>> Duwayne said:
>>>Bret said:
>>
>>>> "NENB is a necessary being" wasn't true in the first place. That's
>>>> where the definitional cheating occurs. For NENB to qualify as ENB
>>>> requires a definitional aberration.
>>>
>>> Not true. NENB exists,
>>
>> ??
>>
>> Where? Verifiably? Objectively?
>
> The present discussion is in the abstract, Scott. Sets have the
> quality of existence in the abstract, you know. Ask any
> mathematician. Don't go dragging the discussion back to the "real"
> world, you baaaaaad boy!
I had thought that from this argument, you end up with a conclusion about
whether a thing can "exist" in the empirical world. Is your use of "exist"
univocal in the conclusion, as in your argument? If so, then you've only
determined that something cannot exist in the abstract in your "real
world." You haven't determined whether something can have concrete
existence, if you're being univocal on "exist" between your conclusion and
the argument.
If, OTOH, you're equivocating between the argument and the conclusion in
your meaning of "exist," then you're guilty of -- well, of equivocation.
And you can't prove anything by equivocation. Four-term syllogisms and all
that.
http://snipurl.com/3m9h "This fallacy is perhaps the most simple and
obvious of the fallacies of ambiguity. Here, a single term is used with two
or more meanings in the same argument."
Is your conclusion about whether a particular thing can "exist" univocal
with its meaning throughout the argument, Duwayne?
- Scott
Scott Marquardt
> antho...@aol.com (AnthonyPaul) wrote in message news:<20040101165257...@mb-m28.aol.com>...
>>>> NENB must exist if it exists, and it cannot exist if it does not
>>>> exist. Its existence is not contingent, given the fact that it
>>>> contains only necessary beings, whose existence is not contingent.
>>
>> The proper rendition would be:
>>
>> Non-existing Necessary Beings must *NOT* exist if it *DOES NOT* exist.
>
> You are bringing in some confusion from the "real" world here.
LOL
The irony abounds.
> Remember, the definition of exist is only what set it's in. In the
> abstrace, everything "exists" in the sense that it can be described,
> discussed, and debated.
Which of the many definitions of "exist" that you've foisted on us is
*this* one? I admit that I haven't heard it explicated yet.
If this is not the sense of "exist" that's apropos of a priori ontological
arguments, then how can anything you prove using this definition relate to
an argument that doesn't use this definition?
> It only gets the quality "exist" when it goes
> into the set "exist."
Duwayne, you'd do well to heed us lamer theists sometimes. I've more than
once dropped hints that you should be attending to Kant.
Did you know that one historic refutation of many forms of the ontological
argument is that "existence" is not a "quality" of things? If you disagree
with this, it's interesting that you side with Alvin Plantinga (!).
Kant's objection to the ontological argument is that existence is not a
property that can be attributed to beings like we can attribute other
properties such as being blue, hard, or round. When we talk about entities
existing, Kant contends that we do not mean to add existence as a property
to their beings. In other words, the objection seems to be that one cannot
go around adding existence as a property to God (or anything else for that
matter) in order to define God (or anything else) into existence. Just as
defining my bedroom as such a place that contains millions of dollars
would not mean that a careful understanding of that definition of my room
would really make it so. In order to see if that definition is true, we
should go look at my room and see if it is accurate. Similarly, a
definition of God must be checked with reality to see if it is correct.
Although Kant's objection has been influential and receives credence to
this very day, it has been found unsatisfactory by some philosophers. For
example, some thinkers controversially believe that existence can be
thought of as a unique property. Alvin Plantinga has forcefully argued
that Kant's objection does not conflict with anything in Anselm's
argument. For Anselm does not contingently add existence as a property to
God and define him into existence. Naturally these objections are
contentious, which adds to the intrigue of the ontological argument.
- Scott
Scott Marquardt
>Scott Marquardt wrote:
>> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
>>>> Is this "rock solid" refutation of 1000 years of ontological arguments
>>>> original with you, or has anyone else identified it?
>>>
>>> Scott, you know better than to start an argument from authority. Deal
>>> with the issues I brought up.
>>
>> Have I failed to reply to your issues? No. I'm asking for something
>> further.
>>
>> First, recall that much of what I've been doing this past month has been
>> applying your own polemical ethics as a categorical imperative. Thus,
>> I'll now point out that you're adopting a double standard.
> <snip>
>> What's not reasonable is that you demand of others what you won't provide
>> yourself -- evidence of independent attestation. Here're some instances
>> where you've recognized the importance of implicating material which has
>> been vetted:
>>
>>: 1) Find a single degreed Egyptologist who is recognized as an expert
>>: in the field (you can show this by pointing to papers he/she has
>>: authored in peer-reviewed science magazines on the subject of
>>: Egyptology) who thinks Smith got the translation even half right.
>
> Scott, the issue there was the accuracy of translation. I don't
> translate Egyptian. Neither do you, or Guy R. Briggs. The issue
> there WAS the opinion of scholars.
You just reply to the single example, above? I notice you snipped some of
the more strongly analogous examples. Interesting.
You've also admitted that the ontological argument isn't your specialty --
just as Egyptian isn't mine:
: Y'know, Scott, I don't know the history of the ontological proof at
: all. I have no idea where it came from (it looks like something a
: monk would think up) or what group of "intellectuals" has spent their
: lives playing with it.
You've also expressed antipathy for a priori argument, and you've not
engaged in discussion of Descartes -- though I've frequently raised
questions and made observations that anyone familiar with the issues could
have answered with dispatch.
Yet you are claiming to have contrived a "proof" which, had it been known
1000 years ago, would have made an important difference in subsequent
philosophical and theological history. That's quite a claim.
So if you think it's important for LdS laymen to cite vetted material in
support of their claims (apparently because you don't credit their amateur
knowledge with sufficient credibility), I don't understand why it wouldn't
be important for you to do so when you consent that you possess amateur
knowledge concerning the topic at hand.
I'll repost examples of where you've expected of others what you're now
imagining is improper for others to ask of you. Also, I note you missed a
couple questions, below.
_____________________
Scott Marquardt
> Scott Marquardt <wasREM...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<e3gh3fe2...@marquardts.org>...
>> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
>>
>>> Your "further" is a strawman argument from authority.
>>
>> Explain why it's a straw man when other people make such requests, but it's
>> apparently proper polemics when you do so.
>
> Scott, if the issue here was what the experts say (as it was in the
> discussion about the translation of the Book of Abraham) then it would
> be relevant. <snip>
How about if the issue was anything like the examples you preferred to
avoid?
: Support responses to both questions with evidence and papers from
: peer-reviewed papers.
: Did I make this claim? No. I simply asked you to cite the peer-review
: sources that support your claim. Obviously no such sources exist, or
: you would simply list them. Why is this such a difficult admission?
: Then stop snipping the questions I've posted regarding it, and answer
: them. Use references from peer-reviewed science journals, too.
: Actually, Kerry, what is required is verifiability. Publishing in a
: peer-review journal is one way to do that, based on their standards
: and the critical eye of the reviewers.
: Post your evidence. Make sure it's scientific evidence from
: peer-reviewed science journals, and that it supports non-trivial
: claims of the Book of Mormon.
: Lots of people confuse "peer review" with "buddy" review, but they are
: not the same thing. Scientific peer review looks for technical merit
: by other researchers in the field of interest. This is to make sure
: that the work follows accepted protocol such as double blind tests,
: corrections for known artifacts. Scientific peer review must *also*
: be critical and skeptical in nature.
- Scott
Scott Marquardt
seriously. Given our current controversies about terms and definitions,
that's unfortunate.
Bret Ripley wrote:
> duwa...@hotmail.com says...
>> Bret Ripley wrote:
> Positing that God is contingent being is simply denying a premise:
> nothing more, nothing less.
BTW, I found some sites that offer a pedestrian explanation of many terms
that have been in dispute, or which have obviously been misunderstood in
much of the conversation in these parts.
http://snipurl.com/3d4a
http://snipurl.com/3d46
http://snipurl.com/3d47
The explanations are generic, and do not specifically address ontological
arguments. But good reading, with some introductory material addressing the
boundaries of concern over unresolved issues.
- Scott
Mike W
>> Mike W
>>> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>> 1) Define what it means for a thing to "exist."
>>> 2) Define E as the set of all the things that exist.
>>> 3) Define NE as the set of all the things that don't exist.
>>> 4) Characterize NE as a thing that exists
>>> 5) Put NE into E
>>> 6) Show a logical contradiction by showing that E contains
>>> things that don't exist, which contradicts its definition.
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> They're hyper-sets and mundane things. When you try to
>> characterize NE as mundane, it stops being hyper and confuses.
>>
>> Just like introducing the necessary evil -- mundane hyper-existence.
> Mike, the problem is a trivial one that any child can understand. It
> has to do with the self-referencing nature of "exist." If "exist" is
> self referencing, or ambiguous, then there is nothing that prevents
> putting NE into E. That's the source of the logical inconsistency.
Well you seemed to be following a pattern up to 4 that was consistent. The
sets were abstract and the things were empirical. In 4 you ask us to
characterize going against your pattern, you ask us to categorize an
abstract as an empirical. So,
God is necessary being.
It is not true that necessary being cannot exist.
Necessary being's existence cannot be contingent.
Therefore, if a necessary being may exist, a necessary being must exist.
God exists.
There's something wrong in there but where's the fallacy of ambiguity?
http://snipurl.com/3m9h
> To prevent the logical inconsistency requires no more than applying
> the normative meaning of "exist" that we use in our everyday lives.
> Normally, we apply defining characteristics to the word "exist."
>
> For examle, A prime number "exists" if it is not an integral multiple
> of any number except "1" and itself. If you run the argument for
> prime numbers, it breaks down and there is no logical inconsistency.
> Watch:
>
>
> -------------------------------------------------------------------
> 1) A prime number exists if it is not a multiple of any other number
> except 1 and itself.
> 2) Define E as the set of all the prime numbers.
> 3) Define NE as the set of all the non-prime numbers.
> 4) Characterize NE as a prime number
>
> Ooooops! You can't *do* that because neither NE or its elements
> "exist" as prime numbers according to the definition in 1)
> -------------------------------------------------------------------
More fallacy of ambiguity, in 4. http://snipurl.com/3m9h
Mike
> See how it works, Mike? If the definition of "exist" has
> contingencies that limit what gets into the set of "exist"
> then the logical inconsistencies evaporate. But if the
> definition of "exist" has no contingencies that limit what
> gets in (saying things get in by having the quality of
> "existence" is self-referencing, and doesn't help) then
> the logical inconsistencies return.
>
> The proof is simply an abstract way of showing what any child
> would realize right off the bat: if there are no requirements
> for existing, then everything exists. That's really what the
> proof is showing.
>
> This sort of logical inconsistency is found in whole classes
> of self-referencing statements. Consider the following:
>
> "This sentence is false."
>
> The statement is self referencing, and that's the reason it can
> be neither true or false.
Duwayne Anderson
<snip>
> >>> Your "further" is a strawman argument from authority.
> >>
> >> Explain why it's a straw man when other people make such requests, but it's
> >> apparently proper polemics when you do so.
> >
> > Scott, if the issue here was what the experts say (as it was in the
> > discussion about the translation of the Book of Abraham) then it would
> > be relevant. <snip>
>
> How about if the issue was anything like the examples you preferred to
> avoid?
Says Scott, as he avoids the issues.
Duwayne Anderson
In the real world, in QM, defining UOEB is nonsensical. But it's not
in the abstract.
This is part of the split personality I was talking about. The
ontological proof SHOULD be done in the abstract, but it has problems
there. So when folks run into the abstract problems, they try
sneaking back into the "real" world. Then, when they have problems in
the "real" world, they try sneaking back into the abstract.
Note also that, using definitions from QM, you can't stick UOEB into
QEB.
This is why Scott says the definition of "exist" is to be "real" on
one day, and why on the next day he's barking up a tree that says the
set of non-existing things is empty.
> Lather, rinse, repeat.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Bret
Duwayne Anderson
Duwayne Anderson
> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
>
> > antho...@aol.com (AnthonyPaul) wrote in message news:<20040101165257...@mb-m28.aol.com>...
> >>>> NENB must exist if it exists, and it cannot exist if it does not
> >>>> exist. Its existence is not contingent, given the fact that it
> >>>> contains only necessary beings, whose existence is not contingent.
> >>
> >> The proper rendition would be:
> >>
> >> Non-existing Necessary Beings must *NOT* exist if it *DOES NOT* exist.
> >
> > You are bringing in some confusion from the "real" world here.
>
> LOL
>
> The irony abounds
Scott, do try and deal with the issues here. 'K?
> > Remember, the definition of exist is only what set it's in. In the
> > abstrace, everything "exists" in the sense that it can be described,
> > discussed, and debated.
>
> Which of the many definitions of "exist" that you've foisted on us is
> *this* one? I admit that I haven't heard it explicated yet.
I'm using the definitions that you and Bret provided, Scott. Since
you are in your mode of responding without reading, allow me to post
the proof for you again:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Bret:
a being "is something possessing the state or quality of having
existence."
According Scott Marquardt:
"A necessary being is a being whose non-existence is
impossible….Necessary being's existence cannot be contingent."
Let's see if "necessary being" as defined by Scott and Bret is
logically consistent:
Define: ENB = The set of existing necessary beings
Define: NENB = The set of non-existing necessary beings
NENB must exist if it exists, and it cannot exist if it does not
exist. Its existence is not contingent, given the fact that it
contains only necessary beings, whose existence is not contingent.
Even if there are no existing necessary beings, NENB exists as the
null set. Thus, NENB is a necessary being, and NENB exists.
Since NENB is a necessary being, and it exists, it is a subset of the
set ENB.
Now some review of set theory. If "a" is an element of set A, and set
A is a complete subset of set B, then "a" is also an element of set B
Therefore: all non-existing necessary beings are in the set of ENB.
But this is a logical contradiction, since ENB is defined as the set
of existing necessary beings. Therefore, the definition of necessary
being is not logically consistent.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Here's another way of looking at the problem of logical inconsistency:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
1) Set of all things (AT) is necessary being (it exists, and its
existence is not contingent)
2) AT is proper subset of set of existing necessary beings (AT is
proper subset of ENB).
3) If there are contingent beings, they are in AT.
4) Therefore, if there are contingent beings they are in the set of
ENB.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The conclusion 4) is a contradiction, however, since necessary beings
are not contingent.
Now, try dealing with the issues here, Scott.
<snip to end>
Duwayne Anderson
<snip>
> >>> Y'know, Scott, I don't know the history of the ontological proof at
> >>> all. I have no idea where it came from (it looks like something a
> >>> monk would think up) or what group of "intellectuals" has spent their
> >>> lives playing with it.
> >>
> >> I put their history within a mouse click for you, Duwayne, way back on
> >> 12/2:
> >
> > Nice, but not the point. The issue here is the proof I posted,
> > showing your "necessary being" is logically inconsistent.
>
> Why did you raise the issue of your relative ignorance of the ontological
> argument's history, if it's not relevant?
Good point, Scott. I shouldn't have responded to your non-issues.
Moving to bring the discussion back to the issue at hand, here are two
proofs showing that your necessary god is logically inconsistent:
I'm using the definitions that you and Bret provided:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Bret:
According Scott Marquardt:
Here's another way of looking at the problem of logical inconsistency:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
1) Set of all things (AT) is necessary being (it exists, and its
existence is not contingent)
2) AT is proper subset of set of existing necessary beings (AT is
proper subset of ENB).
3) If there are contingent beings, they are in AT.
4) Therefore, if there are contingent beings they are in the set of
ENB.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The conclusion 4) is a contradiction, however, since necessary beings
are not contingent.
Now, try dealing with the issues here, Scott.
<snip to end>
Duwayne Anderson
> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
>
> > Scott Marquardt <wasREM...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<1l2l6rw1184ek$.d...@marquardts.org>...
> >> You indicated that my reply was more proper to this thread. Happy to
> >> oblige.
> >>
> >> Duwayne said:
> >>>Bret said:
>
> >>>> "NENB is a necessary being" wasn't true in the first place. That's
> >>>> where the definitional cheating occurs. For NENB to qualify as ENB
> >>>> requires a definitional aberration.
> >>>
> >>> Not true. NENB exists,
> >>
> >> ??
> >>
> >> Where? Verifiably? Objectively?
> >
> > The present discussion is in the abstract, Scott. Sets have the
> > quality of existence in the abstract, you know. Ask any
> > mathematician. Don't go dragging the discussion back to the "real"
> > world, you baaaaaad boy!
>
> I had thought that from this argument, you end up with a conclusion about
> whether a thing can "exist" in the empirical world. Is your use of "exist"
> univocal in the conclusion, as in your argument?
The present discussion is in the abstract, Scott. And I'm using the
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Bret:
According Scott Marquardt:
<snip to end>
Duwayne Anderson
> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
>
> > Sure. You withdrew your blooper. In that case, perhaps the argument
> > isn't circular. It's hard to tell, though, because you keep seeming
> > to drift back to the old ways.
>
> ??
>
> How does wether an argument is circular depend on a mistake I happen to
> make?
A mistake you made more than once? An assertion you made multiple
times?
Since you snipped them, let's look at your "mistakes" again:
Scott Marquardt <wasREM...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<19u7lecc...@marquardts.org>...
<snip>
> The set of things that don't exist is empty.
<snip>
>>> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Scott Marquardt <wasREM...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<6s7vkjlaua5n$.d...@marquardts.org>...
<snip>
"The set of things that don't exist" is a null set, so comparisons
between that null set and things included in "the set of all things
existing" would indeed point up a difference.
<snip>
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Within the context of your "mistakes" your argument was circular. If
you are now withdrawing your "mistakes" your argument may no longer be
circular.
It is, however, still based on a "necessary" being that is logically
inconsistent.
I'm using the definitions that you and Bret provided:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Bret:
a being "is something possessing the state or quality of having
existence."
According Scott Marquardt:
"A necessary being is a being whose non-existence is
<snip to end>
Scott Marquardt
> Scott Marquardt <wasREM...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<gbspysr0ng7s$.d...@marquardts.org>...
> <snip>
>>>>> Your "further" is a strawman argument from authority.
>>>>
>>>> Explain why it's a straw man when other people make such requests, but it's
>>>> apparently proper polemics when you do so.
>>>
>>> Scott, if the issue here was what the experts say (as it was in the
>>> discussion about the translation of the Book of Abraham) then it would
>>> be relevant. <snip>
>>
>> How about if the issue was anything like the examples you preferred to
>> avoid?
>
> Says Scott, as he avoids the issues.
Duwayne, why do you pretend that because people aren't bowing to your
lordship's concerns in *every* post, that they're not attending to them in
any posts at all? We have numerous subthreads going, Duwayne.
Your rhetorical gamesmanship is *not* effective.
Your arrogance is also breathtaking. When Duwayne raises issues, all must
acknowledge their supremacy. When others raise issues, they're justly
snipped and ignored by his lordship.
Nah.
Duwayne Anderson wrote:
>Scott Marquardt wrote:
>> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
>>> Bret Ripley wrote:
>>>> As I noted earlier, your "proof" is a variation of an old false-paradox.
>>>
>>> Bret, the proof is rock solid.
>>
>> Question.
>>
>> Is this "rock solid" refutation of 1000 years of ontological arguments
>> original with you, or has anyone else identified it?
>
> Scott, you know better than to start an argument from authority. Deal
> with the issues I brought up.
Have I failed to reply to your issues? No. I'm asking for something
further.
First, recall that much of what I've been doing this past month has been
applying your own polemical ethics as a categorical imperative. Thus,
I'll now point out that you're adopting a double standard. I'm only asking
-- quite reasonably -- whether your "proof" has been vetted by experts in
this field. You've requested that others do as much (see below), so I'm
merely requesting that you do so as well.
Pretending that our disputes in this forum are not part of broader
conversations in the culture, in academe, and in history seems odd to me.
Perhaps this is one reason I've offered you dozens more links in this
conversation (to independent material) than you've provided. I've even
offered links to material friendly to your position (most relevantly,
Quine). That's reasonable.
What's not reasonable is that you demand of others what you won't provide
yourself -- evidence of independent attestation. Here're some instances
where you've recognized the importance of implicating material which has
been vetted:
: 1) List, here, all the references from peer-reviewed science journals
: that cite FARMS articles. I asked FARMS for that information, and
: they couldn't cite a single case. Perhaps you can help them out.
So offer some references, Duwayne, which cite the argument in question. If
it's original to yourself, you're welcome to claim that it is.
Is your argument original, Duwayne? If not, please cite others -- expert in
the field -- who have recognized or posed it.
: Please do. Be sure your "evidence" is from the scientific community.
: I'm most interested in articles from peer-reviewed science journals.
So please, by all means, provide evidence from some source as capable of
validating your definitions and claims as the scientific community was
capable of validating your interlocutor's claims in that post.
More quotes from various posts, demonstrating your expectations of others:
: Support responses to both questions with evidence and papers from
: peer-reviewed papers.
: Did I make this claim? No. I simply asked you to cite the peer-review
: sources that support your claim. Obviously no such sources exist, or
: you would simply list them. Why is this such a difficult admission?
: Then stop snipping the questions I've posted regarding it, and answer
: them. Use references from peer-reviewed science journals, too.
: Actually, Kerry, what is required is verifiability. Publishing in a
: peer-review journal is one way to do that, based on their standards
: and the critical eye of the reviewers.
: Post your evidence. Make sure it's scientific evidence from
: peer-reviewed science journals, and that it supports non-trivial
: claims of the Book of Mormon.
: Lots of people confuse "peer review" with "buddy" review, but they are
: not the same thing. Scientific peer review looks for technical merit
: by other researchers in the field of interest. This is to make sure
: that the work follows accepted protocol such as double blind tests,
: corrections for known artifacts. Scientific peer review must *also*
: be critical and skeptical in nature.
Be reasonable, Duwayne. If your argument is original, claim as much. If
Scott Marquardt
> This is why Scott says the definition of "exist" is to be "real" on
> one day, and why on the next day he's barking up a tree that says the
> set of non-existing things is empty.
The sweat starting to form on the forehead now is it, Duwayne?
- Scott
Scott Marquardt
> Scott Marquardt <wasREM...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<1xwqfkwkgu2tk$.d...@marquardts.org>...
>> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
>>
>>> antho...@aol.com (AnthonyPaul) wrote in message news:<20040101165257...@mb-m28.aol.com>...
>>>>>> NENB must exist if it exists, and it cannot exist if it does not
>>>>>> exist. Its existence is not contingent, given the fact that it
>>>>>> contains only necessary beings, whose existence is not contingent.
>>>>
>>>> The proper rendition would be:
>>>>
>>>> Non-existing Necessary Beings must *NOT* exist if it *DOES NOT* exist.
>>>
>>> You are bringing in some confusion from the "real" world here.
>>
>> LOL
>>
>> The irony abounds
>
> Scott, do try and deal with the issues here. 'K?
Read on.
>>> Remember, the definition of exist is only what set it's in. In the
>>> abstrace, everything "exists" in the sense that it can be described,
>>> discussed, and debated.
>>
>> Which of the many definitions of "exist" that you've foisted on us is
>> *this* one? I admit that I haven't heard it explicated yet.
>
> I'm using the definitions that you and Bret provided, Scott.
You are?
You said:
> Remember, the definition of exist is only what set it's in. In the
> abstrace, everything "exists" in the sense that it can be described,
> discussed, and debated.
Please cite where Bret and I said that "exist" means "what set it's in."
- Scott
Bret Ripley
> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
>
> > Scott Marquardt <wasREM...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<i6ouw34srib6$.d...@marquardts.org>...
> > <snip>
> >>>> I think the reason the current one is so long is because Duwayne claims
> >>>> he's doing something which, as it turns out, has been done by no one else
> >>>> in a thousand years of ontological arguments being treated by hordes of
> >>>> theologians and atheologians.
> >>>
> >>> Y'know, Scott, I don't know the history of the ontological proof at
> >>> all. I have no idea where it came from (it looks like something a
> >>> monk would think up) or what group of "intellectuals" has spent their
> >>> lives playing with it.
> >>
> >> I put their history within a mouse click for you, Duwayne, way back on
> >> 12/2:
> >
> > Nice, but not the point. The issue here is the proof I posted,
> > showing your "necessary being" is logically inconsistent.
>
> Why did you raise the issue of your relative ignorance of the ontological
> argument's history, if it's not relevant?
>
> > Try dealing with the issue, Scott.
>
> You snipped my responses elsewhere concerning your "proof" -- without
> comment. This is typical. Based on the post lengths now, I observe that
> Bret has far more patience with you than I. ;-)
Yes, but I'm not sure it's worth it. I thought that by trying to
understand his arguments (no matter how irrelevant or leveraged) he
would respond in kind. I have been disappointed thus far. He seems to
have mistaken tolerance for license.
Bret
Duwayne Anderson
> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
> >Scott Marquardt wrote:
>
> >> You indicated that my reply was more germane in this thread. Happily
> >> migrating my response.
>
> >>> Yes, that's what happens. But it can only happen if the definition of
> >>> E has no discriminating requirements.
> >>
> >> ??
> >
> > I thought it was pretty clear, Scott. The logical inconsistencies
> > fall apart if "exist" means to have two arms.
> >
> > <snip to end>
>
> LOL!
I notice you still did not provide a definition of "exist." Let alone
one that solves the problem for your logically inconsistent necessary
god.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Here's another look at how "necessary being" is logically
inconsistent:
1) Set of all things (AT) is necessary being (it exists, and its
existence is not contingent)
2) AT is proper subset of set of existing necessary beings (AT is
proper subset of ENB).
3) If there are contingent beings, they are in AT.
4) Therefore, if there are contingent beings they are in the set of
ENB.
The conclusion 4) is a contradiction, however, since necessary beings
are not contingent.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
> What is a "discriminating requirement?"
One that prevents AT from being put into ENB. See the posts in this
thread that I sent to Mike.
> How do definitions "have" discriminating requirements?
See the posts in this thread that I sent to Mike. I also provided
examples usng prime numbers.
<snip>
> Why not? If the entire universe is contingent, the set certainly is as
> well.
Scott, the present discussion is in the abstract. Control y'er spit
personality, here, and try to stay in one region. Stop trying to drag
the ontological proof back into the "real" world where Bret says it
doesn't belong.
'K?
Duwayne Anderson
> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
> >Scott Marquardt wrote:
>
> >> I would appreciate it if Duwayne would frame his argument less in the
> >> abstract,
> >
> > Oh, necessary gawd. You want to take it back into the real world,
> > Scott? Sheesh. Make up your mind.
>
> If you wouldn't decontextualize so much, you'd understand what's being
> said. I said:
>
> : I would appreciate it if Duwayne would frame his argument less in the
> : abstract, and use terms and locutions in the proof itself.
I'm using YOUR terms, Scott. Read the damned proof before you reply.
'K? Here it is again:
I'm using the definitions that you and Bret provided:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Bret:
a being "is something possessing the state or quality of having
existence."
According Scott Marquardt:
"A necessary being is a being whose non-existence is
impossible….Necessary being's existence cannot be contingent."
Let's see if "necessary being" as defined by Scott and Bret is
logically consistent:
Define: ENB = The set of existing necessary beings
Define: NENB = The set of non-existing necessary beings
NENB must exist if it exists, and it cannot exist if it does not
exist. Its existence is not contingent, given the fact that it
contains only necessary beings, whose existence is not contingent.
Even if there are no existing necessary beings, NENB exists as the
null set. Thus, NENB is a necessary being, and NENB exists.
Since NENB is a necessary being, and it exists, it is a subset of the
set ENB.
Now some review of set theory. If "a" is an element of set A, and set
A is a complete subset of set B, then "a" is also an element of set B
Therefore: all non-existing necessary beings are in the set of ENB.
But this is a logical contradiction, since ENB is defined as the set
of existing necessary beings. Therefore, the definition of necessary
being is not logically consistent.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Here's another way of looking at the problem of logical inconsistency:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
1) Set of all things (AT) is necessary being (it exists, and its
existence is not contingent)
2) AT is proper subset of set of existing necessary beings (AT is
proper subset of ENB).
3) If there are contingent beings, they are in AT.
4) Therefore, if there are contingent beings they are in the set of
ENB.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The conclusion 4) is a contradiction, however, since necessary beings
are not contingent.
Now, try dealing with the issues here, Scott.
<snip to end>
Scott Marquardt
> Scott Marquardt <wasREM...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<10dbnm70...@marquardts.org>...
> <snip>
>>>>> Y'know, Scott, I don't know the history of the ontological proof at
>>>>> all. I have no idea where it came from (it looks like something a
>>>>> monk would think up) or what group of "intellectuals" has spent their
>>>>> lives playing with it.
>>>>
>>>> I put their history within a mouse click for you, Duwayne, way back on
>>>> 12/2:
>>>
>>> Nice, but not the point. The issue here is the proof I posted,
>>> showing your "necessary being" is logically inconsistent.
>>
>> Why did you raise the issue of your relative ignorance of the ontological
>> argument's history, if it's not relevant?
>
> Good point, Scott. I shouldn't have responded to your non-issues.
Apparently you aren't reading what you snip, Duwayne:
: You snipped my responses elsewhere concerning your "proof" -- without
: comment. This is typical. Based on the post lengths now, I observe that
: Bret has far more patience with you than I. ;-)
So you're just continuing the practice of snipping without comment, and
pasting in your "proof" (1) as if it's not being addressed in other
subthreads, and (2) as if merely repeating an argument with several points
in current contention is a great substitute for dealing with critiques
leveled against it.
Your rhetorical gamesmanship continues at an ever more desperate pace.
- Scott
Duwayne Anderson
> Repost from 12/11 that might help us. I don't think anyone took it
> seriously. Given our current controversies about terms and definitions,
> that's unfortunate.
>
> Bret Ripley wrote:
> > duwa...@hotmail.com says...
> >> Bret Ripley wrote:
>
> > Positing that God is contingent being is simply denying a premise:
> > nothing more, nothing less.
>
> BTW, I found some sites that offer a pedestrian explanation of many terms
> that have been in dispute,
The issue is cut and dried, Scott. The logical inconsistency resides
in your use of the word "exist'"
See if you can be a big boy, and describe "exist" in your own words so
that the logical inconsistency goes away. See my post to Mike (in
this thread) for some examples of how to do it.
Scott Marquardt
> Scott Marquardt wrote:
>> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
>>> The present discussion is in the abstract, Scott. Sets have the
>>> quality of existence in the abstract, you know. Ask any
>>> mathematician. Don't go dragging the discussion back to the "real"
>>> world, you baaaaaad boy!
>>
>> I had thought that from this argument, you end up with a conclusion about
>> whether a thing can "exist" in the empirical world. Is your use of "exist"
>> univocal in the conclusion, as in your argument?
>
> The present discussion is in the abstract, Scott. And I'm using the
> definitions that you and Bret provided:
Duwayne, I fear you've hopelessly confused what's meant by "abstract."
Ontological arguments don't attempt to prove that things [exist in an
abstract world]. A material-transcending reality is not the same as the
"abstract" world of sets.
Ontological arguments attempt to prove in an argument abstracted from
empirical concerns (an a priori argument) that something in a real world
defined in non-empirical terms exists (with existence defined as Bret and
Scott offered back when you claimed you were "happy" to work with the
definition).
And secondly, you're not using our definitions, as you've said yourself:
> Remember, the definition of exist is only what set it's in. In the
> abstrace, everything "exists" in the sense that it can be described,
> discussed, and debated.
If existence is different in the "abstrace" world of sets, then how are you
proving anything about existence in the world the ontological argument
claims to be speaking to? That is, a "real" world with "real" merely
defined as broadly as Bret and I defined it before you illicitly
empiricized it (see current post on that issue).
- Scott
Scott Marquardt
> Scott Marquardt <wasREM...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<9lsz1k8800y5$.d...@marquardts.org>...
>> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
>>
>>> Sure. You withdrew your blooper. In that case, perhaps the argument
>>> isn't circular. It's hard to tell, though, because you keep seeming
>>> to drift back to the old ways.
>>
>> ??
>>
>> How does wether an argument is circular depend on a mistake I happen to
>> make?
>
> A mistake you made more than once? An assertion you made multiple
> times?
Sure.
2 + 2 = 5
2 + 2 = 5
2 + 2 = 5
2 + 2 = 5
2 + 2 = 5
2 + 2 = 5
2 + 2 = 5
2 + 2 = 5
2 + 2 = 5
2 + 2 = 5
2 + 2 = 5
2 + 2 = 5
Oops, my bad.
2 + 2 = 4
Likewise, I recanted my error.
Duwayne, you seem to think mistakes are opportunities for rhetorical
gamesmanship.
They're not. They're "mistakes," easily rectified.
- Scott
Scott Marquardt
> Scott Marquardt <wasREM...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<1q4fm136aqmd$.d...@marquardts.org>...
>> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
>>>Scott Marquardt wrote:
>>
>>>> You indicated that my reply was more germane in this thread. Happily
>>>> migrating my response.
>>
>>>>> Yes, that's what happens. But it can only happen if the definition of
>>>>> E has no discriminating requirements.
>>>>
>>>> ??
>>>
>>> I thought it was pretty clear, Scott. The logical inconsistencies
>>> fall apart if "exist" means to have two arms.
>>>
>>> <snip to end>
>>
>> LOL!
>
> I notice you still did not provide a definition of "exist."
Just revisited the occasion when you first claimed you were "happy" with
Bret's and my non-empirical definitions, then proceeded to empiricize them
(conveniently switching from Websters to dictionary.com [I thought
definitions were supposed to be "in your own words?"] to define your
arbitrary selection of "objective," for reasons obvious to anyone who cares
to check definition 1)
I'll be interested to see your response.
- Scott
Scott Marquardt
> Scott Marquardt <wasREM...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<1kj2f25xuu4if$.d...@marquardts.org>...
>> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
>>>Scott Marquardt wrote:
>>
>>>> I would appreciate it if Duwayne would frame his argument less in the
>>>> abstract,
>>>
>>> Oh, necessary gawd. You want to take it back into the real world,
>>> Scott? Sheesh. Make up your mind.
>>
>> If you wouldn't decontextualize so much, you'd understand what's being
>> said. I said:
>>
>>: I would appreciate it if Duwayne would frame his argument less in the
>>: abstract, and use terms and locutions in the proof itself.
>
> I'm using YOUR terms, Scott. Read the damned proof before you reply.
Oh? When did Bret and I define "exist" this way?
Duwayne's words:
: > Remember, the definition of exist is only what set it's in. In the
: > abstrace, everything "exists" in the sense that it can be described,
: > discussed, and debated.
Please cite which post evinces that this use of exist is mine, Duwayne.
- Scott
Scott Marquardt
> Scott Marquardt <wasREM...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<g01yxpmnwp3e$.d...@marquardts.org>...
>> Repost from 12/11 that might help us. I don't think anyone took it
>> seriously. Given our current controversies about terms and definitions,
>> that's unfortunate.
>>
>> Bret Ripley wrote:
>>> duwa...@hotmail.com says...
>>>> Bret Ripley wrote:
>>
>>> Positing that God is contingent being is simply denying a premise:
>>> nothing more, nothing less.
>>
>> BTW, I found some sites that offer a pedestrian explanation of many terms
>> that have been in dispute,
>
> The issue is cut and dried, Scott. The logical inconsistency resides
> in your use of the word "exist'"
??
What does whether you imagine "the logical consistency" exists (I wonder
what definition of "exist" you'd use for that) have to do with the terms in
the links I provided?
Bret has been consistently taking you to task, of late, for your failure to
use "contingent" consistently.
I thought some independent sources of information about what such terms
mean would be helpful.
Guess not.
'scuuuuse me!
> See if you can be a big boy, <snip>
The rhetorical gamesmanship is getting more puerile, I see.
BTW, I found some sites that offer a pedestrian explanation of many terms
Account Holder
***
> This is why Scott says the definition of "exist" is to be "real" on
> one day, and why on the next day he's barking up a tree that says the
> set of non-existing things is empty.
If existence is a quality something might not have, then Scott's God is
nothing, lacking the "necessary existence" Scott requires. Thus Scott
has to argue that everything does exist, including Pan's Tinker Bell. He
asserts things might not exist, but they always do.
But if existence is never contingent, everything is Scott's God.
Pantheism.
Scott Marquardt
thread (message-id paicy4nhhpdv$.d...@marquardts.org)
Duwayne Anderson wrote:
>Scott Marquardt wrote:
>> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
> You need to read what I wrote in response to what you said.
Sure. Here's the whole response from you:
: Let's review Scott's argument again:
:
: -----------------------
: Scott said:
:
: 1) "God is necessary being. [No "if" here. Just a blanket statement]
:
: 2) "It is not true that necessary being cannot exist.
:
: 3) "Necessary being's existence cannot be contingent.
:
: 4) "Therefore, if a necessary being may exist, a necessary being must
: exist.
:
: 5) "God exists.
: --------------------------------------------------------------------------
:
: When I asked Scott what it means to be necessary, Scott replied that
: it means that the non-existence of the thing is impossible. If the
: non-existence is impossible, then it exists.
:
: Scott tried to hide the circular nature of his circular argument in a
: double negative.
:
: Did you get that, Scott? You have the logical equivalent of "god
: exists" as your proposition. And you have "god exists" as your
: CONCLUSION.
:
: Furthermore, wiggling and squirming by trying to backtrack and call it
: a "definition" instead of an "analytical proposition." won't pull your
: fat out of the fire. DEFINING god as existing, and then "proving"
: that god exists is just as circular as stating the proposition that
: god exists, and then "proving" that god exists.
:
: It's just one big circular argument, Scott.
:
: Furthermore, I note that your conclusion doesn't follow from your
: argument at all. For example, you say in step 4 that "if a necessary
: being *may* exist ..."
:
: And then you conclude that a necessary being DOES exist.
Now as I said, Duwayne, I'm not seeing the relation between this and my
gaffe. You've waved your arms about and hollered "boo!" quite a bit, as if
raising alarums were the same as an explanation.
I don't know how making making a gaffe that has all non-existent things
existing, relates to the above.
For that matter, the material above is a great blast from the past, showing
how confused you remain about analytic and synthetic propositions,
showcasing your selective quoting, and so forth. Let's look at your
remarks:
: Let's review Scott's argument again:
And let's recall that Scott didn't post this as a rigorous proof, but in a
humorous post that was carelessly tossed up. Since I claimed it was loosely
Hartshorne's proof, and since I've long since posted Hartshorne, it's
obvious that I was quite straightforward about that. Duwayne, however,
likes to find Enormous Significance such things.
: -----------------------
: Scott said:
:
: 1) "God is necessary being. [No "if" here. Just a blanket statement]
Why would there be an "if?" Why should there be an "if?"
Duwayne, did you offer any "ifs" in your "bigger fish" argument when you
defined your terms? Why not?
:
: 2) "It is not true that necessary being cannot exist.
:
: 3) "Necessary being's existence cannot be contingent.
:
: 4) "Therefore, if a necessary being may exist, a necessary being must
: exist.
:
: 5) "God exists.
: --------------------------------------------------------------------------
:
: When I asked Scott what it means to be necessary, Scott replied that
: it means that the non-existence of the thing is impossible. If the
: non-existence is impossible, then it exists.
Here again, Duwayne, you demonstrate the arrogance of a peculiar conceit --
that your prowess at analyzing usenet posts is more effective at
determining what people mean than listening to what they actually say. You
believe you better understand what people mean, than do the people who are
actually meaning it.
http://snipurl.com/3m09
http://snipurl.com/3m0b
http://snipurl.com/3m0c
And many more: http://snipurl.com/3m0d
: Scott tried to hide the circular nature of his circular argument in a
: double negative.
How does a "double negative" hide things, Duwayne? You've used quite a
number yourself in these threads. They server a necessary purpose in such
discussions. When you deny that something cannot happen, for example,
you're affirming that it may. It's not clear how that's "hiding" that it
may, that's what the double negative *means*.
This is just more rhetorical gamesmanship on your part, as ever. You make
such remarks, but you don't explain them or show how it's true. It's just
gratuitous assertion. There's nothing logically compelling about such
assertions.
: Did you get that, Scott? You have the logical equivalent of "god
: exists" as your proposition. And you have "god exists" as your
: CONCLUSION.
See links above. Obviously -- to anyone but Duwayne -- defining God as
necessary being does not entail his existence.
: Furthermore, wiggling and squirming by trying to backtrack and call it
: a "definition" instead of an "analytical proposition." won't pull your
: fat out of the fire.
LOL
This is the one that gets me the most. In September, Duwayne, we had a huge
thread -- all because you didn't understand the difference between an
analytic and a synthetic proposition, you thought an "if" signified an
argument (instead of a hypothetical syllogism), and you couldn't understand
the difference between the analytic character of a definition (a
proposition) and what it means for an argument (many propositions) to be
circular. I realize your audience matters a lot to you around here Duwayne,
but you insult anyone reading you by hoping they've forgotten what it was
like watching your embarrassing posts at the time.
I've had to repost such material frequently as you've become confused on
the matter. I've reiterated. I've tried to get straight answers from you in
the current argument. Nearly 50 times -- probably more than 50 by this time
-- I've brought this to your attention, seeking an answer from you:
Is this an analytic, or a synthetic proposition: God is necessary being.
Now here's the hilarious part. Above you say that I try "to backtrack" and
call something "a definition" instead of an "analytic proposition." Why
would I do that? An analytic proposition is a definition, for all practical
purposes. "All bachelors are unmarried." And so forth.
There's a huge amount of literature on the web on this topic.
- Scott
Scott Marquardt
was more suited to this thread:
<a42139e3.0401...@posting.google.com>
So I'll repost it here.
_____________________
Yes, Duwayne seems to have forgotten his gaffe. Some of us admit it when we
err -- though Duwayne does a fine job of making hay of such errors long
after they've been recanted.
Duwayne will probably exhibit a double standard -- again -- by claiming
that pointing out his unrepented gaffes is "ad hominem."
Pasting in Duwayne's gaffe, in case he's forgotten it:
: >The set of all dogs that are also cats is another null set.
:
: No, it's not "another" null set, Duwayne. It's identical with the single
: null set.
:
: I note you snipped the definition of null set:
: http://snipurl.com/3l8e
:
: Here are more:
: http://snipurl.com/3lls
: http://snipurl.com/3llv
:
: "We speak of "the empty set" rather than "an empty set": in set theory,
: two sets are equal if they have the same elements; therefore there can be
: only one set with no elements."
:
: Some interesting google searches:
:
: "There is only one null set" http://snipurl.com/3llo
:
: "There are many null sets" http://snipurl.com/3llq
:
: I notice that the last search is identical to the null set.
:
: ;-)
:
: But let's return to what you said above:
:
: : The set NG is defined to be the null set, and it is defined to contain
: : all the gods in existence.
:
: How can you define the null set to contain anything existent, Duwayne?
:
: Some searches just to see if anyone else out there thinks like you:
:
: "let the null set contain" http://snipurl.com/3llx
: (search results are the null set)
:
: "defined to be the null set" http://snipurl.com/3lly
: (hey! A hit! Not supporting you, but a hit ;-)
:
: C'mon, Duwayne. In two posts you've committed three gaffes today. Let's
: just 'fess up all of 'em -- you and me both. It'd be cathartic, don't you
: think?
> It just seems a liiiiiittttlllle too convenient for you to try and
> backtrack now, Scott. It looks a liiiiitttttlllleee too much like the
> skin head who slips in court and uses the "N" word while trying to
> convince everyone he's really no racist.
It looks a liiiiiiitle too little like Duwayne has graduated from the
puerile rhetorical gamesmanship that has done so well by him whenever he's
found interlocutors dumb enough to roll over and pee when he blusters.
>> Are you seriously posing
>> that I greedily wanted to believe that everything that doesn't exist
>> exists?
>
> I'd expect nothing less from you, Scott.
Which seems to vindicate my claim that it's difficult to have reasonable
conversations with you in large measure because you argue in bad faith, and
you consider theists to be dumber than dirt.
>> Just wondering:
>>
>> A. Why you're freighting your remarks with such subjective connotations
>>
>> B. Why (you still haven't answered) you continue to imply that I did not
>> recant my gaffe?
>
> Scott's lying. I've said many times that you took it back. And I've
> pointed out several times how it's like the racist taking back the "N"
> word. Google it, Scott.
I haven't denied that you have said I took it back. To the contrary, I've
insisted upon it, and here you are again lying by saying that I'm lying.
I'm not denying that you have said as much, Duwayne. Look at (B) again:
B. Why (you still haven't answered) you continue to imply that I did not
recant my gaffe?
Does that deny that you have said I didn't recant? No. It only affirms that
you continued to credit the gaffe's viewpoint to me as if I had not
recanted.
This is easily demonstrated (which demonstrates that those who are
reasonable enough to not reject a priori classes of argument are not
unempirical ;-)
I'll post as much in a parallel response.
>>> Meanwhile, I notice definite silence on your part, and Bret's,
>>> regarding my demonstration that "necessary being" is logically
>>> inconsistent.
>>
>> LOL
>>
>> We've both responded, Duwayne.
>
> I saw where you snipped it without even noting that you snipped it. I
> saw where Bret changed the words, and then argued it doesn't hold up.
For an empiricist, you do poorly by snipping follow-up questions and
observations, then reposting incessantly. It seems you want more for others
to hear you, than to hear others yourself.
- Scott
Mike W
> news:vvbao1s...@corp.supernews.com...
> > Duwayne Anderson wrote:
Scott is as imaginary as you're suggesting Scott's God is, IMHO. I've
reiterated the "simpler" Hartshorne in another thread but for your purposes,
here it is again:
God is necessary being.
It is not true that necessary being cannot exist.
Necessary being's existence cannot be contingent.
Therefore, if a necessary being may exist, a necessary being must exist.
God exists.
Graciously donated to ARM by Scott Marquardt back in November of this year.
If I've got it right, Duwayne asserts the first line hinges on one's
definition of exist. Claiming Scott & Bret are using an empirical
definition, while Scott & Bret protest their definition is in no way
empirical. There's supposed to be circularity going on there but it's over
my head. Scott has commented there's a flaw in this proof but neither
circularity nor the definition of exist are it. Last I read, Scott is
throwing in with Descartes' Cogito.
Mike
Scott Marquardt
> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
> ***
>> This is why Scott says the definition of "exist" is to be "real" on
>> one day, and why on the next day he's barking up a tree that says the
>> set of non-existing things is empty.
>
> If existence is a quality something might not have,
Bear in mind that we are treating two modalities for "existence" --
necessary and contingent.
If necessary being "has existence," it could not possibly "not have" that.
If contingent being "has existence," it could possibly "not have" that.
Also, you're raising another issue -- whether existence is a "quality"
something can "have." Anselm affirms this, and Kant denies that existence
is a "quality" (property). Although I've brought this to Duwayne's
attention, it has not yet entered into dispute; I won't dispute it here.
I don't know if you've parsed the original argument from Hartshorne, or if
you saw Bret's refutation of it. If not, though, you've perhaps (you're
being a bit ambiguous, read on) struck on the refutation of the argument.
> then Scott's God is nothing, lacking the "necessary existence" Scott requires.
It sounds as if you're equivocating, though. You're drawing a conclusion
about one modality (necessary existence), while using "existence"
simpliciter (no modality specified) in your premise. But your comment is
also enthymematic (missing something), so I'll await clarification.
- Scott
Bret Ripley
> rip...@olywa.net (Bret Ripley) wrote in message news:<27c8971c.0401...@posting.google.com>...
> > duwa...@hotmail.com (Duwayne Anderson) wrote in message news:<a42139e3.0401...@posting.google.com>...
> > >
> > > If you want to take it back to the "REAL" world -- out of the abstract
> > > -- then QM is waiting for you.
> >
> > Speaking of QM:
> >
> > Just for kicks, take your proof and substitute "observed existing
> > being" for "necessary being":
> >
> > Define: OEB = The set of observed existing beings
> >
> > Define: UOEB = The set of unobserved existing being
>
> In the real world, in QM, defining UOEB is nonsensical. But it's not
> in the abstract.
So you can live with QM being analytically untenable?
> This is part of the split personality I was talking about. The
> ontological proof SHOULD be done in the abstract,
And it was (your use of the definite article leads me to to conclude we
are still talking about Hartshorne).
> but it has problems
> there.
Your strawman definition of "exist" and your sloppy application of set
logic has been pointed out multiple times already -- you really should
address these issues.
> So when folks run into the abstract problems, they try
> sneaking back into the "real" world.
And you define "real" world as an exclusively QM model -- or don't you?
Either way, I think you'll find that the proof works (or, as it happens,
doesn't work) just fine without invoking QM.
> Then, when they have problems in
> the "real" world, they try sneaking back into the abstract.
>
> Note also that, using definitions from QM, you can't stick UOEB into
> QEB.
LOL! And why is that, Duwayne? It wouldn't be because UOEB is the null
set now, would it?
> This is why Scott says the definition of "exist" is to be "real" on
> one day,
To which you kindly supplied a self-serving definition . . .
> and why on the next day he's barking up a tree that says the
> set of non-existing things is empty.
Which you have already acknowledged that he retracted.
If you ever had any shame, you're about due for a refill.
Bret
Duwayne Anderson
> > Duwayne Anderson wrote:
> >> Mike W
> >>> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
>
> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------
> >>> 1) Define what it means for a thing to "exist."
> >>> 2) Define E as the set of all the things that exist.
> >>> 3) Define NE as the set of all the things that don't exist.
> >>> 4) Characterize NE as a thing that exists
> >>> 5) Put NE into E
> >>> 6) Show a logical contradiction by showing that E contains
> >>> things that don't exist, which contradicts its definition.
> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>
> >> They're hyper-sets and mundane things. When you try to
> >> characterize NE as mundane, it stops being hyper and confuses.
> >>
> >> Just like introducing the necessary evil -- mundane hyper-existence.
>
> > Mike, the problem is a trivial one that any child can understand. It
> > has to do with the self-referencing nature of "exist." If "exist" is
> > self referencing, or ambiguous, then there is nothing that prevents
> > putting NE into E. That's the source of the logical inconsistency.
>
> Well you seemed to be following a pattern up to 4 that was consistent. The
> sets were abstract and the things were empirical. In 4 you ask us to
> characterize going against your pattern, you ask us to categorize an
> abstract as an empirical. So,
No. It's all abstract. In mathematics, a set "exists" when you
define it.
<snip>
> > To prevent the logical inconsistency requires no more than applying
> > the normative meaning of "exist" that we use in our everyday lives.
> > Normally, we apply defining characteristics to the word "exist."
> >
> > For examle, A prime number "exists" if it is not an integral multiple
> > of any number except "1" and itself. If you run the argument for
> > prime numbers, it breaks down and there is no logical inconsistency.
> > Watch:
> >
> >
> > -------------------------------------------------------------------
> > 1) A prime number exists if it is not a multiple of any other number
> > except 1 and itself.
> > 2) Define E as the set of all the prime numbers.
> > 3) Define NE as the set of all the non-prime numbers.
> > 4) Characterize NE as a prime number
> >
> > Ooooops! You can't *do* that because neither NE or its elements
> > "exist" as prime numbers according to the definition in 1)
> > -------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> More fallacy of ambiguity, in 4. http://snipurl.com/3m9h
Mike, in this example #4 can't be defined because doing so would break
the rules for how a prime number is defined.
That's the point. If there are defining characteristics, then you
can't put NE into E. But if there are no defining characterisitcs,
you can.
The proof is simply a way of showing that, if "exist" doesn't mean
anything, then everything exists. Scott admitted as much when he said
the set of non-existing things is null. Then he realized he'd
accidently agreed with my point, and retracted it all.
Bret Ripley
>
> The proof is simply a way of showing that, if "exist" doesn't mean
> anything, then everything exists.
I don't think anyone disagrees with this, Duwayne. However, "exist"
hasn't been without meaning throughout our discussion, and it is not
without meaning in Hartshorne.
Unfortunately for Hartshorne, it doesn't ultimately matter.
Bret
Account Holder
>>"Account Holder" <us...@example.net> wrote in message
>> news:vvbao1s...@corp.supernews.com...
>>
>>>Duwayne Anderson wrote:
>
>
>>>This is why Scott says the definition of "exist" is to be "real" on
>>>one day, and why on the next day he's barking up a tree that says
>>>the set of non-existing things is empty.
>
>
>>If existence is a quality something might not have, then Scott's God
>>is nothing, lacking the "necessary existence" Scott requires. Thus
>>Scott has to argue that everything does exist, including Pan's Tinker
>>Bell. He asserts things might not exist, but they always do.
>>But if existence is never contingent, everything is Scott's God.
>>Pantheism.
>
>
> Scott is as imaginary as you're suggesting Scott's God is, IMHO. I've
Both are Tinks?
> reiterated the "simpler" Hartshorne in another thread but for your purposes,
> here it is again:
>
> God is necessary being.
But Why? If there be necessity, it precedes God; yet nothing can
precede. Contradiction.
> It is not true that necessary being cannot exist.
Nonsense. Necessity infers cause, yet "necessary being" has none.
Contradiction.
> Necessary being's existence cannot be contingent.
> Therefore, if a necessary being may exist, a necessary being must exist.
> God exists.
God-as-contradiction does exist.
> Graciously donated to ARM by Scott Marquardt back in November of this year.
> If I've got it right, Duwayne asserts the first line hinges on one's
> definition of exist. Claiming Scott & Bret are using an empirical
> definition, while Scott & Bret protest their definition is in no way
Existence may be posited on evidence, but not logical contradiction.
> empirical. There's supposed to be circularity going on there but it's over
> my head. Scott has commented there's a flaw in this proof but neither
A disguised appeal to faith, the "proof" assumes existence may depend on
logical necessity.
> circularity nor the definition of exist are it. Last I read, Scott is
> throwing in with Descartes' Cogito.
Descartes did keep a personal revelation in his coat, but I've forgotten
what his Cogito has to do with God.
Bret Ripley
> Mike W wrote:
> >>"Account Holder" <us...@example.net> wrote in message
> >> news:vvbao1s...@corp.supernews.com...
> >>
> >>>Duwayne Anderson wrote:
> >
> >
> >>>This is why Scott says the definition of "exist" is to be "real" on
> >>>one day, and why on the next day he's barking up a tree that says
> >>>the set of non-existing things is empty.
> >
> >
> >>If existence is a quality something might not have, then Scott's God
> >>is nothing, lacking the "necessary existence" Scott requires. Thus
> >>Scott has to argue that everything does exist, including Pan's Tinker
> >>Bell. He asserts things might not exist, but they always do.
> >>But if existence is never contingent, everything is Scott's God.
> >>Pantheism.
> >
> >
> > Scott is as imaginary as you're suggesting Scott's God is, IMHO. I've
>
>
> Both are Tinks?
>
> > reiterated the "simpler" Hartshorne in another thread but for your purposes,
> > here it is again:
> >
> > God is necessary being.
>
>
> But Why? If there be necessity, it precedes God; yet nothing can
> precede. Contradiction.
Heh. Necessary as contingent on necessity.
"Necessary" (formal definition) doesn't imply a preceding "necessity."
No worries, though: even if you accept the definitions at face value
the proof falls apart quite nicely.
> > It is not true that necessary being cannot exist.
>
> Nonsense. Necessity infers cause, yet "necessary being" has none.
> Contradiction.
Necessary (no need to slide over to "necessity") being, (if it exists)
has no cause by definition. It is either mandatory or impossible.
> > Necessary being's existence cannot be contingent.
> > Therefore, if a necessary being may exist, a necessary being must exist.
> > God exists.
>
>
> God-as-contradiction does exist.
You may be running parallel to the "classical" refutation of the proof,
here.
> > Graciously donated to ARM by Scott Marquardt back in November of this year.
> > If I've got it right, Duwayne asserts the first line hinges on one's
> > definition of exist. Claiming Scott & Bret are using an empirical
> > definition, while Scott & Bret protest their definition is in no way
>
>
> Existence may be posited on evidence, but not logical contradiction.
Despite Duwayne's protests to the contrary, "necessary being" has not
been shown to be a logical contradiction. In fact, in the lengthy
history of discussions about "necessary being", this claim is apparently
original to Duwayne.
Atheists (such as Bertrand Russell) will say that the term "necessary
being" is meaningless -- "necessary" makes sense when applied to a
proposition (e.g. A=A is a necessary proposition), but becomes
unintelligible when applied to a being. However, Russell also observes
that it is technically impossible to *disprove* necessary being --
science and mathematics must remain agnostic towards the notion.
There is nothing wrong with seeing no reason to posit "necessary being"
in the fist place: To paraphrase Russell (at least, I think it was
Russell), "I am firmly convinced that the old gods do not exist, even
though it is impossible to prove that the old gods do not exist."
Still, the proof falls apart even if we consent to the terms at face
value.
Bret
Scott Marquardt
A fait accompli as of 1990.
- Scott
Scott Marquardt
> Nonsense. Necessity infers cause, yet "necessary being" has none.
> Contradiction.
I think you mean necessity "implies."
Are you using "necessity" in the sense germane to this discussion?
How do you define "necessary being?"
- Scott
Guy R. Briggs
<snip>
>>> What's not reasonable is that you demand of others what
>>> you won't provide yourself -- evidence of independent
>>> attestation. Here're some instances where you've
>>> recognized the importance of implicating material which
>>> has been vetted:
>>>
>>>: 1) Find a single degreed Egyptologist who is recognized as an
expert
>>>: in the field (you can show this by pointing to papers he/she has
>>>: authored in peer-reviewed science magazines on the subject of
>>>: Egyptology) who thinks Smith got the translation even half right.
>>
>> Scott, the issue there was the accuracy of translation. I don't
>> translate Egyptian. Neither do you, or Guy R. Briggs. The issue
>> there WAS the opinion of scholars.
>
> You just reply to the single example, above? I notice you
> snipped some of the more strongly analogous examples.
> Interesting.
>
Even more interesting: I gave him John Gee, PhD in Egyptology from
Yale, published in several-peer-reviewed journals, thinks the
translation is right. Anderson rejected him /because/ he thinks the
translation is right.
IOW, DA's unstated yet implicit requirement is that any empirical
evidence you use /must/ agree with his point of view.
bestRegards, Guy.
Duwayne Anderson
> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
>
> > Scott Marquardt <wasREM...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<g01yxpmnwp3e$.d...@marquardts.org>...
> >> Repost from 12/11 that might help us. I don't think anyone took it
> >> seriously. Given our current controversies about terms and definitions,
> >> that's unfortunate.
> >>
> >> Bret Ripley wrote:
> >>> duwa...@hotmail.com says...
> >>>> Bret Ripley wrote:
>
> >>> Positing that God is contingent being is simply denying a premise:
> >>> nothing more, nothing less.
> >>
> >> BTW, I found some sites that offer a pedestrian explanation of many terms
> >> that have been in dispute,
> >
> > The issue is cut and dried, Scott. The logical inconsistency resides
> > in your use of the word "exist'"
>
> ??
>
> What does whether you imagine "the logical consistency" exists (I wonder
> what definition of "exist" you'd use for that) have to do with the terms in
> the links I provided?
Better yet, what do the terms you linked have to do with the argument
I posted?
Sheesh, Scott. Can't you stick to the issues here, and deal with it
in your *own* words.
> Bret has been consistently taking you to task, of late, for your failure to
> use "contingent" consistently.
Scott, here's a challenge. Take the proof I posted and - line by line
-- show where the problem is.
<snip to end>
Waiting....
Duwayne Anderson
American Quarter Horse: The ultimate alla-terrain vehicle.
Duwayne Anderson
<snip>
> > I'm using YOUR terms, Scott. Read the damned proof before you reply.
>
> Oh? When did Bret and I define "exist" this way?
Here's the proof again, Scott. Do an advanced google search on the terms:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Bret:
According Scott Marquardt:
<snip to end>
Mike W
Perhaps the point of this whole month of cross-talk has been to drive home
that even if Hartshorne had proved God exists, he's really proved nothing at
all. God's existence is in the abstract and pales before the almighty
empirical. As Duwayne has been fond of asking, "If you're not thinking
logically, how are you thinking?" His logic, I'm guessing, is of the
empirical kind (if I can say it that way).
Mike
Duwayne Anderson
The rhetorical gamesmanship is all yours, Scott. My claims about your
argument being circular were *before* you retracted your goof. Now
that you have retracted your comical claim that the set of
non-existing things is empty, the argument has changed. Now my
observation is that your necessary god is logically inconsistent.
If you change your definition of "exist" you may get rid of the
logical inconsistency. Why don't you give it a try?
Duwayne Anderson
> Also sprach Duwayne Anderson:
> > rip...@olywa.net (Bret Ripley) wrote in message news:<27c8971c.0401...@posting.google.com>...
> > > duwa...@hotmail.com (Duwayne Anderson) wrote in message news:<a42139e3.0401...@posting.google.com>...
> > > >
> > > > If you want to take it back to the "REAL" world -- out of the abstract
> > > > -- then QM is waiting for you.
> > >
> > > Speaking of QM:
> > >
> > > Just for kicks, take your proof and substitute "observed existing
> > > being" for "necessary being":
> > >
> > > Define: OEB = The set of observed existing beings
> > >
> > > Define: UOEB = The set of unobserved existing being
> >
> > In the real world, in QM, defining UOEB is nonsensical. But it's not
> > in the abstract.
>
> So you can live with QM being analytically untenable?
Abstract reasoning can easily have nothing to do with reality, Bret.
Indeed, there are many branches of mathematics that have nothing at
all to do with reality.
QM isn't logically inconsistent (like your necessary god) but it's not
consistent with many abstract thoughts. Indeed, all abstract thoughts
are not self consistent -- as my proof of the logical inconsistency of
your god has shown.
> > This is part of the split personality I was talking about. The
> > ontological proof SHOULD be done in the abstract,
>
> And it was (your use of the definite article leads me to to conclude we
> are still talking about Hartshorne).
There you go again --- reading things that are not there.
> > but it has problems
> > there.
>
> Your strawman definition of "exist" and your sloppy application of set
> logic has been pointed out multiple times already -- you really should
> address these issues.
It's not my definition of exist, Bret. It's yours and Scott's. Here,
let's look at it again:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Bret:
According Scott Marquardt:
Your definition of "exist" is used consistently through the entire
post. If you now want to propose a better/different definition of
"exist" that takes care of the problem, then do it. But spare your
reputation of the insult you do it by claiming I've done something
inconsistent with your definition.
> > So when folks run into the abstract problems, they try
> > sneaking back into the "real" world.
>
> And you define "real" world as an exclusively QM model -- or don't you?
Not here. We both agreed that the whole discussion belongs in the
abstract -- not in the real world.
Remember? In the real world, with QM, your necessary god is already
dead because he's totally inconsistent with QM.
The discussion here is in the abstract -- where your necessary god is
STILL no good, because he/she/it is logically inconsistent.
So stop trying to drag it back to the "real" world, Bret.
<snip to end>
Duwayne Anderson
> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
>
> > Scott Marquardt <wasREM...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<10dbnm70...@marquardts.org>...
> > <snip>
> >>>>> Y'know, Scott, I don't know the history of the ontological proof at
> >>>>> all. I have no idea where it came from (it looks like something a
> >>>>> monk would think up) or what group of "intellectuals" has spent their
> >>>>> lives playing with it.
> >>>>
> >>>> I put their history within a mouse click for you, Duwayne, way back on
> >>>> 12/2:
> >>>
> >>> Nice, but not the point. The issue here is the proof I posted,
> >>> showing your "necessary being" is logically inconsistent.
> >>
> >> Why did you raise the issue of your relative ignorance of the ontological
> >> argument's history, if it's not relevant?
> >
> > Good point, Scott. I shouldn't have responded to your non-issues.
>
> Apparently you aren't reading what you snip, Duwayne:
Yes, Scott, I am. But like you said, it's not relevant.
>
> : You snipped my responses elsewhere concerning your "proof" -- without
> : comment. This is typical. Based on the post lengths now, I observe that
> : Bret has far more patience with you than I. ;-)
>
> So you're just continuing the practice of snipping without comment,
This obsessive/compulsive behavior is weird, Scott.
> and
> pasting in your "proof"
Hoping you will deal with the issues there -- but apparently not.
Bret Ripley
>
> Scott, here's a challenge. Take the proof I posted and - line by line
> -- show where the problem is.
And don't just copy my answer, Scott. It is apparently invisible to
Google.
Bret
Duwayne Anderson
> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
>
> > Scott Marquardt <wasREM...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<1xwqfkwkgu2tk$.d...@marquardts.org>...
> >> Duwayne Anderson wrote:
> >>
> >>> antho...@aol.com (AnthonyPaul) wrote in message news:<20040101165257...@mb-m28.aol.com>...
> >>>>>> NENB must exist if it exists, and it cannot exist if it does not
> >>>>>> exist. Its existence is not contingent, given the fact that it
> >>>>>> contains only necessary beings, whose existence is not contingent.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Non-existing Necessary Beings must *NOT* exist if it *DOES NOT* exist.
> >>>
> >>> You are bringing in some confusion from the "real" world here.
> >>
> >> LOL
> >>
> >> The irony abounds
> >
> > Scott, do try and deal with the issues here. 'K?
>
> Read on.
I did, you didn't.
>
> >>> Remember, the definition of exist is only what set it's in. In the
> >>> abstrace, everything "exists" in the sense that it can be described,
> >>> discussed, and debated.
> >>
> >> Which of the many definitions of "exist" that you've foisted on us is
> >> *this* one? I admit that I haven't heard it explicated yet.
> >
> > I'm using the definitions that you and Bret provided, Scott.
>
> You are?
>
> You said:
> > Remember, the definition of exist is only what set it's in. In the
> > abstrace, everything "exists" in the sense that it can be described,
> > discussed, and debated.
>
> Please cite where Bret and I said that "exist" means "what set it's in."
According to Bret:
a being "is something possessing the state or quality of having
existence."
That's true of a defined set, Scott. Remember, the proof here is in
the abstract. If you think you have a new definition of "exist" then
by all means, post it here.
Duwayne Anderson
<snip>
> >>: 1) Find a single degreed Egyptologist who is recognized as an expert
> >>: in the field (you can show this by pointing to papers he/she has
> >>: authored in peer-reviewed science magazines on the subject of
> >>: Egyptology) who thinks Smith got the translation even half right.
> >
> > Scott, the issue there was the accuracy of translation. I don't
> > translate Egyptian. Neither do you, or Guy R. Briggs. The issue
> > there WAS the opinion of scholars.
>
> You just reply to the single example, above?
Because it is sufficient to illustrate your obsessive/compulsive
behavior in dodging the issues.
<snip to end>
Mike W
>> Mike W wrote:
>>>>Duwayne Anderson wrote:
>>>>This is why Scott says the definition of "exist" is to be "real" on
>>>>one day, and why on the next day he's barking up a tree that says
>>>>the set of non-existing things is empty.
>>>If existence is a quality something might not have, then Scott's God
>>>is nothing, lacking the "necessary existence" Scott requires. Thus
>>>Scott has to argue that everything does exist, including Pan's
>>>Tinker Bell. He asserts things might not exist, but they always do.
>>>But if existence is never contingent, everything is Scott's God.
>>>Pantheism.
>>Scott is as imaginary as you're suggesting Scott's God is, IMHO.
>Both are Tinks?
I guess if you didn't know much about Duwayne's Scott or what you might
imagine about Scott's God then, yes. Not much more than Tinker Bell. In
fact probably less since I assume you've recently caught the movie.
<snip stuff Bret has a better grasp of>
>>Last I read, Scott is throwing in with Descartes' Cogito.
>Descartes did keep a personal revelation in his coat, but I've
>forgotten what his Cogito has to do with God.
Perhaps it's something to do with a need to understand one's own existence
before being able to understand God's existence. From existence to math to
God?
Mike
Duwayne Anderson
<snip>
> > Scott, you know better than to start an argument from authority. Deal
> > with the issues I brought up.
>
> Have I failed to reply to your issues? No.
Yes. Tell me, Scott, how does your definition of "exist" prevent me
from putting the set of everyting (a necessary being) into the set of
existing necessary beings? And when that happens, the contingent
beings in the set of everything go in, too. So the set of existing
necessary beings has contingent beings in it.
That's a logical inconsistency, Scott. How does your definition of
exist prevent the problem? Please be specific.
> I'm asking for something
> further.
You are dodging the issue with appeals to authority.
> First, recall that much of what I've been doing this past month has been
> applying your own polemical ethics as a categorical imperative.
Scott, your obsessive/compulsive problem with ad hominem arguments is
your problem. But don't expect me to entertain them.
Duwayne Anderson
> say...
> > rip...@olywa.net (Bret Ripley) wrote in message news:<27c8971c.03123...@posting.google.com>...
> > <snip>
> > > > Bret, the proof is rock solid. It only looks like a paradox when you
> > > > try to compare the results to your real-world experience. In the
> > > > abstract, though, the logic is solid.
> > >
> > > No, it really isn't, Duwyane. At the very least it's enthymematic.
> >
> > See below for demonstration that what you are saying is false.
> >
> > > > What the proof does is illustrate exactly how your "necessary being"
> > > > definition lacks logical consistency.
> > > >
> > > > > The confusion it causes is due to an uneven (inconsistent) notions of
> > > > > "exist" and "thing."
> > > >
> > > > There's nothing "uneven" about it at all. Sheesh. I'm using your
> > > > definition, Bret.
> > >
> > > You most certainly are not.
> >
> > Not true. Let's look at the proof again. I've added comments in
> > brackets:
> >
> > -------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > According to Bret:
> >
> > a being "is something possessing the state or quality of having
>
> I'm not denying that, Duwayne. Why are you ignoring the rest of the
> definition? You agreed with it at the time, and now you discard it
> without comment.
If you think that you have some "rest of" the definition that solves
the problem, why do you end with a naked assertion, and not explain
what the "rest of" the explanation is, and how it solves the problem.
> > According Scott Marquardt:
> >
> > "A necessary being is a being whose non-existence is
> > impossible?.Necessary being's existence cannot be contingent." [Scott
> > really did say this, too]
>
> Yes, I know he did. And you *still* haven't grasped that "contingent"
> is simply the opposite of "necessary". You keep attaching baggage to
> "contingent" that you derive from an informal definition of that term.
And here Bret does it *AGAIN.* The naked assertion, without so much
as a wisper about how he can solve the problem.
Go ahead, Bret, explain how you can define "exist" and "contingent" so
the problem goes away.
> > Let's see if "necessary being" as defined by Scott and Bret is
> > logically consistent:
>
> And you propose to do this by pretending that the two phrases you cite
> adequately represent the definition of "necessary being". Why are you
> ignoring our discussion of "exist", including our little Q&A session
> that clarifies the matter?
Bret does it *AGAIN.* The naked assertion -- the veiled implication
-- but no explanation.
> > Define: ENB = The set of existing necessary beings [In the abstract,
> > a set has the quality of existence, so I'm using your definition
> > consistently here.]
>
> You are ignoring my definition of "exist", Duwayne. You really should
> be ashamed of yourself.
Bret does it *AGAIN* The naked assertion -- the veiled implication --
but no explanation.
> Precisely *how* does the set ENB possess the quality of existence?
In the mathematical (abstract) sense it exists as soon as it's
defined. We are in the abstract here, Bret. Are you now going to
assert that sets don't exist in the abstract, using your definition?
> To
> use your examples, does it exist in the same way as a one-dollar bill
> exists? Or The Cheshire Cat (which I defined as not existing)?
They all exist in the abstract, Bret. They can all be defined and
discussed. Are you asserting that sets of things can't "exist" in
your definition? Then you need to modify your definition.
> > Define: NENB = The set of non-existing necessary beings [In the
> > abstract, a set has the quality of existence, so I'm using your
> > definition consistently here.]
>
> Submit this statement to the same test as above.
They all exist in the abstract, Bret. They can all be defined and
discussed. Are you asserting that sets of things can't "exist" in
your definition? Then you need to modify your definition.
>(If you use a
> definition of "exist" that includes NENB as existing, I still maintain
> that this will be the null set -- an indication that your definitions
> are porked).
Clueless. Totally clueless. The problem, Bret, is that your
definition of exist is self referencing. In the abstract, your
definition doesn't deny anything the property of existence.
You certainly DO need to modify your definition of exist. Let's see
you try it without turning your necessary beings into contingent ones.
> > NENB must exist if it exists, and it cannot exist if it does not
> > exist. Its existence is not contingent, given the fact that it
> > contains only necessary beings, whose existence is not contingent.
> >
> > Even if there are no existing necessary beings, NENB exists as the
> > null set.
>
> And using your strawman and meaningless definiton of "exist",
Bret, spare your reputation the indignity of lying about which
definition of "exist" is being used here.
> I think
> NENB must be the null set. If you use my definition of "exist", it
> will have no more existence than the Cheshire Cat.
In the abstract the set exists. If you deny that, then modify your
definition of exist to specifically state what is excluded -- IN THE
ABSTRACT.
> > Thus, NENB is a necessary being, and NENB exists. [In the
> > abstract, a set has the quality of existence, so I'm using your
> > definition consistently here.]
>
> Simply repeating it doesn't make it so, Duwayne.
You should listen to yourself, Bret.
> Until you
> acknowledge my definition of "exist", you are addressing a strawman.
I've quoted it. Until you replace the one I quoted, you are ignoring
the issues and calling them strawmen.
> > Since NENB is a necessary being, and it exists, it is a subset of the
> > set ENB. [In the abstract, a set has the quality of existence, so I'm
> > using your definition consistently here.]
>
> NENB cannot have being according to my definition of "exist".
Tell me why. Mathematically, in the abstract, sets can/do exist.
What part of your definition of "exist" prevents a set from being a
"being" and existing. Here, I'll quote you for yourself:
According to Bret:
a being "is something possessing the state or quality of having
existence." [Your really did say that, Bret]
Point to the words that you used, that say a set cannot exist as a
being.
<snip rest of absurd thinking>
Duwayne Anderson
Here's another look at how "necessary being" is logically
inconsistent:
1) Set of all things (AT) is necessary being (it exists, and its
existence is not contingent)
2) AT is proper subset of set of existing necessary beings (AT is
proper subset of ENB).
3) If there are contingent beings, they are in AT.
4) Therefore, if there are contingent beings they are in the set of
ENB.
The conclusion 4) is a contradiction, however, since necessary beings
are not contingent.
Scott Marquardt
> No. It's all abstract. In mathematics, a set "exists" when you
> define it.
So how can you nave a set that's a necessary being, if its existence is
contingent on being defined by someone?
You said:
: NENB must exist if it exists, and it cannot exist if it does not
: exist. Its existence is not contingent, given the fact that it
: contains only necessary beings, whose existence is not contingent.
: Even if there are no existing necessary beings, NENB exists as the
: null set. Thus, NENB is a necessary being, and NENB exists.
Yet now you're saying that a set "exists" when you define it.
How is the noncontingence of a set ("Its existence is not contingent") be
possible if "a set 'exists' when you define it."
The irony, Duwayne, that in attempting to disprove the intelligibility of
necessary existence, you become guilty of Anselm's fallacy in the most
famous (and easily refuted) ontological argument of all.
- Scott
Duwayne Anderson
> > This is why Scott says the definition of "exist" is to be "real" on
> > one day,
>
> To which you kindly supplied a self-serving definition . . .
>
> > and why on the next day he's barking up a tree that says the
> > set of non-existing things is empty.
>
> Which you have already acknowledged that he retracted.
>
> If you ever had any shame, you're about due for a refill.
Bret, if you had any shame you'd note that the issue here is the
tricky-dicky way the definition of "exist" keeps sliding all over the
place. Including yours. And you'd also note that Scott keeps making
his earlier goof an issue becasuse he keeps bringing up my claims of
circularity, which were based on his rather transparent point of view
that everything exists.
Duwayne Anderson
American Quarte Horse: The ultimate all-terrain vehicle.
Scott Marquardt
>Scott Marquardt wrote:
> <snip>
>>> Scott, you know better than to start an argument from authority. Deal
>>> with the issues I brought up.
>>
>> Have I failed to reply to your issues? No.
>
> Yes. Tell me, Scott,
Ah yes. The man who just snipped a hundred lines of response, demands "tell
me." This is the typical Duwayne method. Reply not, but demand replies.
Bret and I have just agreed that good faith argument with you is pointless.
We've followed your red herrings into the wild. We've weathered your
bizarre attribution of an empirical definition to us (you don't like that
first definition of "objective" in Websters, do you Duwayne?). It gets old.
Why should we continue to reply?
> how does your definition of "exist" prevent me
> from putting the set of everyting (a necessary being) into the set of
> existing necessary beings?
Elsewhere, you recently said "It's all abstract. In mathematics, a set
'exists' when you define it."
If that's the case, the existence of the set is contingent on someone
defining it. And how can a contingent set be a necessary set?
LOL
Duwayne, you really need to give it up.
How can you have a set that's a necessary being, if its existence is
contingent on being defined by someone?
> And when that happens, the contingent
> beings in the set of everything go in, too. So the set of existing
> necessary beings has contingent beings in it.
You might as well hop about on one leg hollering "diddle, diddle, diddle,"
Duwayne. It would make more sense. "When that happens" can't happen,
because your "set of everything" ("a necessary being") is contingent on
being defined by someone, it "exists when you define it."
Your words, Duwayne.
LOL
Your definitions.
> That's a logical inconsistency, Scott. How does your definition of
> exist prevent the problem? Please be specific.
Mutatis mutandis, Duwayne. By all means be specific.
Which definition would you like to change this time?
>> I'm asking for something
>> further.
>
> You are dodging the issue with appeals to authority.
What was it when you did the same in your conversations with Mormons,
Duwayne?
I think that's called "sharpening your petard."
Reposting Duwayne's hypocrisy.
_________________________
First, recall that much of what I've been doing this past month has been
applying your own polemical ethics as a categorical imperative. Thus,
I'll now point out that you're adopting a double standard. I'm only asking
-- quite reasonably -- whether your "proof" has been vetted by experts in
this field. You've requested that others do as much (see below), so I'm
merely requesting that you do so as well.
Pretending that our disputes in this forum are not part of broader
conversations in the culture, in academe, and in history seems odd to me.
Perhaps this is one reason I've offered you dozens more links in this
conversation (to independent material) than you've provided. I've even
offered links to material friendly to your position (most relevantly,
Quine). That's reasonable.
What's not reasonable is that you demand of others what you won't provide
yourself -- evidence of independent attestation. Here're some instances
where you've recognized the importance of implicating material which has
been vetted:
: 1) List, here, all the references from peer-reviewed science journals
: that cite FARMS articles. I asked FARMS for that information, and
: they couldn't cite a single case. Perhaps you can help them out.
So offer some references, Duwayne, which cite the argument in question. If
it's original to yourself, you're welcome to claim that it is.
Is your argument original, Duwayne? If not, please cite others -- expert in
the field -- who have recognized or posed it.
: Please do. Be sure your "evidence" is from the scientific community.
: I'm most interested in articles from peer-reviewed science journals.
So please, by all means, provide evidence from some source as capable of
validating your definitions and claims as the scientific community was
capable of validating your interlocutor's claims in that post.
More quotes from various posts, demonstrating your expectations of others:
: Support responses to both questions with evidence and papers from
: peer-reviewed papers.
: Did I make this claim? No. I simply asked you to cite the peer-review
: sources that support your claim. Obviously no such sources exist, or
: you would simply list them. Why is this such a difficult admission?
: Then stop snipping the questions I've posted regarding it, and answer
: them. Use references from peer-reviewed science journals, too.
: Actually, Kerry, what is required is verifiability. Publishing in a
: peer-review journal is one way to do that, based on their standards
: and the critical eye of the reviewers.
: Post your evidence. Make sure it's scientific evidence from
: peer-reviewed science journals, and that it supports non-trivial
: claims of the Book of Mormon.
: Lots of people confuse "peer review" with "buddy" review, but they are
: not the same thing. Scientific peer review looks for technical merit
: by other researchers in the field of interest. This is to make sure
: that the work follows accepted protocol such as double blind tests,
: corrections for known artifacts. Scientific peer review must *also*
: be critical and skeptical in nature.
Be reasonable, Duwayne. If your argument is original, claim as much. If
not, cite some sources which have vetted it.
- Scott
Scott Marquardt
> Scott Marquardt <wasREM...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<kxkp0kcbg5yp$.d...@marquardts.org>...
> <snip>
>>>>: 1) Find a single degreed Egyptologist who is recognized as an expert
>>>>: in the field (you can show this by pointing to papers he/she has
>>>>: authored in peer-reviewed science magazines on the subject of
>>>>: Egyptology) who thinks Smith got the translation even half right.
>>>
>>> Scott, the issue there was the accuracy of translation. I don't
>>> translate Egyptian. Neither do you, or Guy R. Briggs. The issue
>>> there WAS the opinion of scholars.
>>
>> You just reply to the single example, above?
>
> Because it is sufficient to illustrate your obsessive/compulsive
> behavior in dodging the issues.
So...showcasing dodging the issues yourself, is a way of proving that I'm
dodging the issues?
Reposting, of course. Showcase my dodging the issues again, Duwayne, by
dodging the issues.
_________________
You've also admitted that the ontological argument isn't your specialty --
just as Egyptian isn't mine:
: Y'know, Scott, I don't know the history of the ontological proof at
: all. I have no idea where it came from (it looks like something a
: monk would think up) or what group of "intellectuals" has spent their
: lives playing with it.
You've also expressed antipathy for a priori argument, and you've not
engaged in discussion of Descartes -- though I've frequently raised
questions and made observations that anyone familiar with the issues could
have answered with dispatch.
Yet you are claiming to have contrived a "proof" which, had it been known
1000 years ago, would have made an important difference in subsequent
philosophical and theological history. That's quite a claim.
So if you think it's important for LdS laymen to cite vetted material in
support of their claims (apparently because you don't credit their amateur
knowledge with sufficient credibility), I don't understand why it wouldn't
be important for you to do so when you consent that you possess amateur
knowledge concerning the topic at hand.
I'll repost examples of where you've expected of others what you're now
imagining is improper for others to ask of you. Also, I note you missed a
couple questions, below.
_____________________
Scott Marquardt
>> Bret Ripley wrote:
>>> Also sprach Duwayne Anderson:
>
>>> The proof is simply a way of showing that, if "exist" doesn't mean
>>> anything, then everything exists.
>
>> I don't think anyone disagrees with this, Duwayne. However, "exist"
>> hasn't been without meaning throughout our discussion, and it is not
>> without meaning in Hartshorne.
>>
>> Unfortunately for Hartshorne, it doesn't ultimately matter.
>
> Perhaps the point of this whole month of cross-talk has been to drive home
> that even if Hartshorne had proved God exists, he's really proved nothing at
> all. God's existence is in the abstract
::sigh::
Mike, that Duwayne's smoke and mirrors is this effective even with you is
discouraging.
Don't mistake an /argument/ that *abstracts from* empirical epistemological
concerns ("verification")...
...for a /being/ who is said to *transcend* material reality.
Descartes a priori Cogito is 100% abstract, but it proves the existence of
something -- and it doesn't prove the existence of something immanent! It
only proves that something exists. The mind that it proves exists could be
transcendent, it could be immanent. The Cogito is agnostic on that.
> and pales before the almighty
> empirical. As Duwayne has been fond of asking, "If you're not thinking
> logically, how are you thinking?" His logic, I'm guessing, is of the
> empirical kind (if I can say it that way).
"Logic" isn't empirical. Logic is axioms and rules. There's not a single
bloomin' empirical thing about logic.
Empirical reality would have no meaning without the mind's application of
reason to the data. Read up on it in Locke.
- Scott
Duwayne Anderson
> > NENB has existence in the abstract. It's a real, existing set.
>
> Not according to the definition of "exist" we started out with
> (assuming we were using my definition).
Well, you are free to toss out sets, if you want. That tosses out
mathematics, too, you know. Number theory is based on sets, so if
sets don't "exist" in the abstract, then neither do numbers.
You really want to go on record making that assertion?
> > Having the quality of existence, it exists as a "being" using your
> > definition.
>
> No, not according to my definition. It's the Cheshire Cat.
Cheshire Cat exists in the abstract. Are you trying to drag the
discussion back to the "real" world with that example?
<snip>
> > Bret, the present discussion is in the *ABSTRACT.* That's where the
> > ontological proof belongs.
>
> By abstract you mean analytic. Right?
Mathematical.
> > Remember? You agreed with that.
>
> Did you ever answer Scott's question about the difference between
> analytic and synthetic propositions?
Bret, tell you what. Since you are proping Scott's strawman up here,
you tell me what difference it would make, and if it makes a
difference, I'll address the issue.
'K?
> > If you want to take it back to the "REAL" world -- out of the abstract
> > -- then QM is waiting for you.
>
> You're a lot of fun, you know that? I'm serious -- this thread would
> have been dead boring if you hadn't thrown your hat in.
Glad you are having fun, too.
> I hope that you'll take the time to try to follow this -- I think this
> is a summary of your position (please correct me if I stray):
>
> The "abstract" definition of "exist/being" (that you attribute to me)
> used in your proof must result in NENB = the null set -- the
> wishy-washy definition it is impossible for anything you can imagine
> to *not* exist (I don't think you have acknowledged this yet, but it
> may be important). This tells us that the definition is (as you have
> correctly pointed out) is useless and results in a circular argument.
No. The NENB is not the null set, unless there are no non-existing
beings. You keep letting your mind wander back into the "real" world.
Think mathematics.
The set of all prime numbers divisible by 3 (without remainder) is
null. The set of all numbers that are prime is not.
In the abstract, "exist" can only be defined in terms of
characteristics. A number is "in" the set of primes because it has
certain characteristics, and it's "out" because it has certain
characteristics.
To discuss things in the abstract (and remember, we all agreed the
concept of necessary god belongs there -- not in the "real" world
where it violates QM) you have to agree on the characteristics that
put things in various sets. In your case, you only applied the
characteristic of having the quality of "exist." A definition that --
in the abstract -- includes everything. And that's the source of the
logical inconsistency.
> If onotological arguments define "exist" in this pathetic manner,
> ontological arguments cannot address existence in what you call
> '"REAL" world' (which remains undefined, I believe -- I have asked you
> if RW refers specifically to QM, but I haven't seen your response).
Real world is the one scientists play in.
> Is this about right, Duwayne?
See comments above.
> If I'm wrong, then I am about to address a strawman. In this case,
> please just correct my mistakes above and ignore the following.
>
> Here are some random comments about the position I have sketched
> above:
>
> That Ontological arguments use this definition of exist is
> unsupported.
Then define what "exist means." You can dig yourself out of this mess
if you modify "exist" but let's see if you can apply the definition to
"necessary being" without making them contingent.
> This definition of "exist" has no value anywhere -- abstract or
> otherwise.
If you are talking about your self-referencing definition, I agree!
> It carries a hidden (and unsupported) assumption that a meaningful
> definition of "exist" must address RW (or QM, or whatever).
No. Only for the "real" world. In the abstract there are lots of
definitions of exist that are interesting.
> It carries the hidden (and unsupported) assumption that a
> meaningful, abstract definition of "exist" must be inconsistent with
> QM.
Not "must." Abstract, by definition, is not in the "real" world. You
keep trying to flip flop between the abstract and real worlds.
Why?
> This has been the subject of some discussion in other threads,
> but so far Duwayne has treated it as written.
>
> These issues (and perhaps others) need to be addressed.
>
> > It's checkmate, o'l buddy.
>
> I'm not even sure we're playing on the same board, amigo.
That's been obvious for some time. Scott, too.
>
> > <snip>
> > > > Let's simplify to make things a little more clear. The proof goes
> > > > something like this:
> > > >
> > > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > 1) Define what it means for a thing to "exist."
> > > > 2) Define E as the set of all the things that exist.
> > > > 3) Define NE as the set of all the things that don't exist.
> > > > 4) Characterize NE as a thing that exists
> > > > 5) Put NE into E
> > > > 6) Show a logical contradiction by showing that E contains things that
> > > > don't exist, which contradicts its definition.
> > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > >
> > > LOL! You have just described the "strawman" that you snipped at the
> > > beginning of this post.
> >
> > No, Bret, I've shown the basic logica structure of the problem. It
> > revolves around whether or not "exist" is ambiguous or
> > self-referencing.
>
> LOL again! You say "No", but then go on to agree with me!
"No" applies to the "strawman." If you have a better definition of
"exist" in the real world, post it. Since there is so much clutter,
email it to me directly, so I don't miss it.
> > > > Now notice that the logical inconsistency exists if step 1) contains a
> > > > definition of "exist" that is:
> > > > 1) Incomplete or ambiguous
> > >
> > > You are just paraphrasing my objection to the proof, Duwayne.
> >
> > But what you don't realize is that the problem originates in a
> > self-referencing definition of "exist."
>
> Right, and this corresponds to "Resonse #1" in the example I provided.
Where's that new definition of "exist" in the abstract, Brett? Try to
give me one that doesn't destroy all of mathematics in the process!
> The other option (which you have also already acknowledged) is an
> ambiguous definition.
>
> Do you realize you have completely agreed to my criticism of your
> proof? What it *really* boils downs to is using a strawman definition
> of "exist".
Then you must agree the problem is with the word "exist" as you have
given it to me. If you want to use a different definition for exist
in the abstract, then post it. Be sure I don't miss it, by emailing
it to me directly.
> > If exist has defining
> > characteristics associated with it, the problem goes away.
>
> If the definition is clear and unambiguous, there is no problem.
So give us the "clear and unambiguous" definition, already. Make sure
it doesn't destroy the contingent nature of your necessary beings.
> That's what I said back on the 29th.
>
> > But then
> > your necessary beings become contingent on those defining
> > characteristics, too.
>
> And this is your folly, Duwayne. The fact of having defining
> characteristics does not contradict the idea of "necessary being".
Then you should have no problem providing the definition. I'm
waiiiiiting.
> You have repeatedly committed this error for over a month, now.
What error? You haven't submitted a new definition of "exist" yet,
that I've seen.
> You
> are confusing an informal definition of "contingent" with its formal
> definition.
Well then, Bret, o'l buddy. What are you so afraid of? Give us a nice
complete definition of existence and let's see where I can go with it.
> I've tried (and tried and tried) to get you to see this.
If only you would just try and try to post the definition. Make sure
it's applicable to the abstract world.
> Ironically,
> you repeatedly quoted my statement about the importance of
> definitions, but completely ignored the specific object of my
> statement: "contingent".
Then here's your chance to clear it all up. Post your complete
definition of "exist."
> > There's no way out, Bret.
>
> The walls! The walls! The walls are closing in all around me!
>
> Happy New Year, my friend.
>
> Bret
You, too. And where the hell is that definition? Be careful how much
rope you give me, pard'ner. I'm aim'n t'a hang ya with it.
Duwayne Anderson
American Quarter Horse: The ultimate all-terrain vehicle.
Scott Marquardt
Much ado about nothing, Duwayne:
> NENB must exist if it exists, and it cannot exist if it does not
> exist. Its existence is not contingent, given the fact that it
> contains only necessary beings, whose existence is not contingent.
> Even if there are no existing necessary beings, NENB exists as the
> null set. Thus, NENB is a necessary being, and NENB exists.
Duwayne's definition of what it means for a set to exist in the first
place, much less necessarily:
You told Mike:
> No. It's all abstract. In mathematics, a set "exists" when you
> define it.
So how can you have a set that's a necessary being, if the existence of all
these sets is contingent on being defined by someone?
What's your definition of "exist" in that phrase above, Duwayne?
Which definition are you using this time?
How is the noncontingence of a set ("Its existence is not contingent") be
possible if "a set 'exists' when you define it."
The irony, Duwayne, that in attempting to disprove the intelligibility of
necessary existence, you become guilty of Anselm's fallacy in the most
famous (and easily refuted) ontological argument of all.
> Now some review of set theory.
I'm not sure why anyone should trust your review.
- Scott