Why Did Baldwin Diesels Fail In The Market?
Neutrodyne
problem (especially in road service). Was this a reliability problem, high
maintainence costs or heavy fuel consumption? Given the much larger
displacement, smaller number of moving parts, and general design details it
would seem to be viable against GM's 2-cycle V-16's. It certainly wasn't near
the GM in the horsepower/cubic inch ratio which implies less stress on the
engine.
The sketchy pricing information I've seen implies the Baldwins were a
bargain to purchase. Any firsthand experience with them?
I've been reading everthing I can (afford to) find & I'm fascinated with
the early generation of diesels. One other question - it isn't clear but do
GM's "naturally aspirated" 2 cycle engines all have a supercharger on them?
Most everywhere else, "naturally aspirated" means no asistance to atmospheric
pressure at all (2 cycle or 4 cycle), but the stuff I've read about locomotives
is conflicting at best.
I hope these questions don't sound too silly or basic. Thanks.
Neutrodyne
James Robinson
>
> Given the number that were repowered, it seems the prime mover was the big
> problem (especially in road service). Was this a reliability problem, high
> maintainence costs or heavy fuel consumption? Given the much larger
> displacement, smaller number of moving parts, and general design details it
> would seem to be viable against GM's 2-cycle V-16's. It certainly wasn't near
> the GM in the horsepower/cubic inch ratio which implies less stress on the
> engine.
You might like to get hold of a copy of "Dawn of the Diesel Age" by John
Kirkland. He was head of production for Baldwin locomotives, and the
book crinkles the development of the major locomotive builders and the
evolution of the diesel locomotive.
In short, it appears that Baldwin, and later Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton made
a strategic error in not developing a higher horsepower engine to
compete with General Motors and Alco. As a result, they found
themselves behind in the horsepower race, and unable to compete in the
main line locomotive business. The result was that railroads would have
needed to sustain an extra inventory of parts, which were probably
becoming more difficult and expensive to obtain, to sustain the Baldwin
fleet. The company's decision to exit the locomotive business sealed
the fate of the locomotives then running.
> One other question - it isn't clear but do
> GM's "naturally aspirated" 2 cycle engines all have a supercharger on them?
No, they have a Roots blower, which is a gear-driven positive
displacement air pump. A Roots blower does not provide the same
pressure boost as a turbosupercharger at higher engine power output, but
is a simpler device requiring less maintenance.
> Most everywhere else, "naturally aspirated" means no asistance to atmospheric
> pressure at all (2 cycle or 4 cycle), but the stuff I've read about locomotives
> is conflicting at best.
The engines are usually described as "normally aspirated" rather that
"naturally aspirated", since a two stroke engine requires that inlet air
be under pressure to scavenge the spent charge from the cylinder. GM
most engines that GM supplies today will have a turbo on them. Since
there is a requirement for pressure boost at low engine power settings,
and since an exhaust-driven turbo would not normally provide a
sufficient boost, GM developed a gear-driven arrangement that drives the
turbo at low power and at idle. When the power output by the engine
increases, the exhaust energy also builds with the higher power output.
The gear drive therefore incorporates a clutch that releases the turbo
and allows it to run at higher RPM than the gear drive would permit, and
it therefore provides a higher boost than a simple blower would.
Chuck Till
the Dolzall brothers. Lots of reasons. One, quality was poor. Two,
fuel consumption was high, in part because of the saturation
characteristics of the Westinghouse generator. Three, they never
developed a truly successful and complete replacement for the de la
vergne engine; instead, there were only incremental improvements.
Four, they sunk a lot of money into the ill-fated 6000 hp locomotive.
Five, corporate structure was unstable. Six, the operational expenses
of the Eddystone facility were high in the later years when they had
far too much space.
John Barry
news:20001107153300...@ng-fi1.aol.com...
> Given the number that were repowered, it seems the prime mover was
the big
> problem (especially in road service). Was this a reliability problem, high
> maintainence costs or heavy fuel consumption? Given the much larger
> displacement, smaller number of moving parts, and general design details
it
> would seem to be viable against GM's 2-cycle V-16's. It certainly wasn't
near
> the GM in the horsepower/cubic inch ratio which implies less stress on the
> engine.
> bargain to purchase. Any firsthand experience with them?
> I've been reading everthing I can (afford to) find & I'm fascinated
with
do
> GM's "naturally aspirated" 2 cycle engines all have a supercharger on
them?
atmospheric
> pressure at all (2 cycle or 4 cycle), but the stuff I've read about
locomotives
> is conflicting at best.
> Neutrodyne
Hi.
GM 2-strokes are "mechanically scavenged" rather than supercharged. The
only valves (in the head) are exhausts, and the only ports, uncovering near
bdc, are the scavenge ports. Depending on capacity and gearing of the
blower, among other things, you could actually supercharge the engine.
Interestingly, there are marine diesels that are turbocharged 2-stroke.
With huge squirrel-cage blowers to initiate things.
Regards,
Jon
HBrown5216
have no experience with Baldwin road diesels, I can say I never handled a
better switch engine that the S12. For my money, the S12 was the best diesel
switcher ever built. These machines were tough!
Bear
Chuck Till
Yes, the most damning anecdotes in the book were for road locomotives.
mikell
Baldwin because I liked the design .It's nice to hear good things about the
S-12. I won't receive my engine until April and any other info would be
greatly appreciated. By summer I should be riding it around on about 2000 ft
of track in my yard..
Thanks
mikell
"Chuck Till" <ct...@nc.rr.com> wrote in message
news:3a0a4928.32145669@news-server...
Ron
manufacturers by the War Production board during World War 2. I think this
gave GM a big head start, at least for road engines when the war ended.
Rich
GM diesels have a roots "blower" that pushes air under
some, probably low,
pressure into the intake ports and out the exhaust
valves. That blower has been a roots type in the past
but others could be used. Not saying they were. When
the ports and valves close the cylinder is full of air
which is then compressed and the fuel is sprayed in at
the right time, etc. The roots type is a positive
displacement type meaning that it pumps the same amount
of air for each revolution.
It could force air under pressure into the cylinder if
it had the capability.
It probably does not pump more than a few psi though.
It you want real pressure like a Top Fuel dragster (42
psi as I have heard) then the seals on the rotors have
to be replaced after each 1/4 mile run. Not a good plan
for a RR. Also I assume that the exhaust valves close
before the intake ports. Otherwise there could be no
pressure at all. Since the pressure is low there is
probably a lot of internal clearance in the blower
resulting in low maintenance.
In my view the scavenging blower on a GM diesel is
exactly the same thing as a supercharger. I think a
supercharger refers to the device itself, not the
pressure it operates under. Also "normally aspirated"
means not turbocharged. But there is still a scavenging
blower there.
Now, did any loco manufacturer ever build a 2 cycle
diesel that did not have a scavenging blower?
How about the common Detroit Diesel 6 cylinder
turbocharged truck engine?
Does it have a scavenging blower?
Anyone remember the GM 4-71, 6-71, and 8-71 diesel
truck engines? 71 cubic inches per cylinder and with a
roots blower. That is where the drag racers got their
superchargers.
Rich
"The more I learn the more I realize how little I
really know."
Wolf Kirchmeir
=> "Free Enterprise" hasn't
=>ever been all that free when the government gets involved.
True.
But government gets involved because some self-styled free entrepreneur wants
to corner the market. Or a bunch of the guys think a particular entrepreneur
is pissing in their patch.
Governments have always rewarded their frinds, and to hell with free
enterprise.
Wolf Kirchmeir
If you didn't want to go to Chicago,
why did you get on the train? (Anon.)
James Robinson
> I also recall reading that one of the
> manufacturers used a unique "amplidyne" based arrangement to provide
> generator excitation - was this perhaps Baldwin, and one more case of being
> odd man out?
Amplidyne was used on Alco/GE products. Baldwin used Westinghouse, as
did some of the Fairbanks products.
Neutrodyne
>From: "Ron" ronpa...@msn.com
>Date: 11/9/2000 11:58 AM Central Standard Time
>Message-id: <OftrrXnSAHA.316@cpmsnbbsa09>
>
>I wonder if another factor was limitations placed on locomotive
>manufacturers by the War Production board during World War 2. I think this
>gave GM a big head start, at least for road engines when the war ended.
what companies survived into and beyond the 1950's.
I know with some familiarity that actions the government made with regard
to radio and electronic companies surrounding both WWI and WWII were totally
amazing in their complete disreguard for competition, patents and basic
freedoms. RCA was created as a government monopoly and awarded patents
unilaterally during and after WWI and then was basically given free reign to
control all the important patents in TV after WWII. "Free Enterprise" hasn't
ever been all that free when the government gets involved.
Wes Leatherock
On 10 Nov 2000 00:12:38 GMT Neutrodyne <neutr...@aol.com> wrote:
> >I wonder if another factor was limitations placed on locomotive
> >manufacturers by the War Production board during World War 2. I think this
> >gave GM a big head start, at least for road engines when the war ended.
>
> I have read a little about that and it is amazing what WWII did to shape
> what companies survived into and beyond the 1950's.
>
> I know with some familiarity that actions the government made with
> regard to radio and electronic companies surrounding both WWI and WWII
> were totally amazing in their complete disreguard for competition,
> patents and basic freedoms.
> RCA was created as a government monopoly and awarded patents
> unilaterally during and after WWI and then was basically given free
> reign to control all the important patents in TV after WWII.
RCA did not come into existence until 1919, after World War I
was over. Vladamir Zworkyn worked for Westinghouse until 1929;
Philo T. Farnsworth was a 19-year-old loner. Those were the basic
patents for a practical TV system.
> "Free Enterprise" hasn't ever been all that free when the government
> gets involved.
In World War II the very survival of the nation was at stake.
Winning the war took precedence over free enterprise; in fact,
looking back, it is surprising that as much free enterprise
continued during World War II as did.
It is true that government regulations allocated the market
for locomotives; government regulations allocated practically
everything, and I don't recall any particular feeling that it
was not necessary or lacked support among the population.
Clearly the concept of a war for survival, and with virtually
unanimous support by the people, is a concept foreign to many
younger Americans.
Wes Leatherock
wle...@sandbox.dynip.com
Gareth Quale
Neutrodyne <neutr...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20001107153300...@ng-fi1.aol.com...
> Given the number that were repowered, it seems the prime mover was
the big
> problem (especially in road service). Was this a reliability problem, high
> maintainence costs or heavy fuel consumption?
Other respondants have mentioned several factors, but one not mentioned is
that Baldwin used an air-controlled throttle MU scheme, which was not
compatible with the electric schemes used by EMD, Alco, and most FM units.
This required the Baldwins to be segregated, and probably also contributed
to their exit from the market. I also recall reading that one of the
manufacturers used a unique "amplidyne" based arrangement to provide
generator excitation - was this perhaps Baldwin, and one more case of being
odd man out? Gary Q
Neutrodyne
>Date: 11/9/2000 7:43 PM Central Standard Time
>Message-id: <Pine.LNX.4.21.001109...@mail.sandbox.dynip.com>
>
>
> RCA did not come into existence until 1919, after World War I
>was over.
As a real corporation, yes. But it was clear during the war that the government
was going to steamroll the existing patent holders at the first opportunity. To
be fair, radio was the "atomic rocket science" of the day, and the government
did have an interest in insuring a reliable source for themselves.
DeForrest was robbed of almost everything by his own folly and a
considerable helping shove or two by Uncle Sam (inspired by his closeness to
Marconi). Tube development during the 20's was supressed by RCA's monopoly
position and the need for all other tube manufacturers to move their infringing
factories every few weeks.
> Vladamir Zworkyn worked for Westinghouse until 1929;
>Philo T. Farnsworth was a 19-year-old loner. Those were the basic
>patents for a practical TV system.
Farnsworth's and Zworkin's basic patents were somewhat short of practical
production level developments. Some say Zworkin was almost as good as Marconi
at finding ways to infringe patents with cagy wording & cross filing.
Alan Dumont and Farnsworth (working with some savvy Philco engineers),
among others, had some good ideas about the TV standards that should have been
adopted before WWII. Instead RCA was allowed to stall, and then upset the apple
cart & reallocate the TV channels (which just so happened to obsolete the FM
radio band that was being marketed mainly by Major Armstrong and Zenith -
wasn't THAT convenient). A quick look at service literature for the 1946-1951
era shows that 75% or more of all TV sets produced were licensed RCA chassis
with someone else's name stamped on the case.
RCA's tireless and shameless lying about their ability to produce a cost
effective and timely competitor for the superior CBS color system proposed in
the early 50's is well documented. This was a great disservice to the public,
and it did finally wake up the public to the true cost of RCA's unique
sweetheart status.
> In World War II the very survival of the nation was at stake.
Certainly it was, but you have to wonder why some auto makers got to keep
making the same stuff they made before the war and others were made to scrap
their production lines and make items completely different from their normal
products. Why was Ford made to make huge special V-8 engines for tanks that
were a liability in the postwar market while Chrysler & GM were allowed to
kludge together standard car engines to achive the same power output?
>Winning the war took precedence over free enterprise; in fact,
>looking back, it is surprising that as much free enterprise
>continued during World War II as did.
>
> It is true that government regulations allocated the market
>for locomotives; government regulations allocated practically
>everything, and I don't recall any particular feeling that it
>was not necessary or lacked support among the population.
>
> Clearly the concept of a war for survival, and with virtually
>unanimous support by the people, is a concept foreign to many
>younger Americans.
>
>
>Wes Leatherock
>wle...@sandbox.dynip.com
What puzzled me were some of the actions that took place after the war
ended. A lot more could have been done to insure the companies that were set up
to make war material had a fair chance to convert back to civilian production.
Raw material allocations were anything but fair.
Disposal of war surplus materials & products literally bankrupted hundreds
of companies (which had made the winning of the war possible), they could not
compete against years of government sales of their own products at pennies on
the dollar. It puzzled me that all this stuff wasn't left behind or shipped to
Europe where it might have done more good. Keeping it here made little sense to
me. The glut of surplus made some great things (like Heathkits) possible, but
it did seem to hurt some good people.
Neutrodyne
Neutrodyne
>Date: 11/9/2000 6:12 PM Central Standard Time
>Message-id: <3A0B3D7E...@erols.com>
I know more now than I did before I asked the question, thanks to all who
have jumped in the thread.
Neutrodyne
Charles Piercy
Neutrodyne wrote:
>
> >Subject: Re: Why Did Baldwin Diesels Fail In The Market?
>snip
> >"The more I learn the more I realize how little I
> >really know."
>
> I know more now than I did before I asked the question, thanks to all who
> have jumped in the thread.
> Neutrodyne
Could not pass up the chance to add the following URL, both from a
curiosity and engine application angle.
http://www.lexcie.zetnet.co.uk/deltic.htm
Interesting usage of a 2 cycle diesel.
Thanks for an very informative thread.
Ted Piercy
James T. Rex King of the Monsters
>effective and timely competitor for the superior CBS color system proposed in
>the early 50's is well documented. This was a great disservice to the public,
Sound like Mocrosoft!
>Certainly it was, but you have to wonder why some auto makers got to keep
>making the same stuff they made before the war and others were made to scrap
>their production lines and make items completely different from their normal
In the US, the only automobile produced were for the war dept. All civilain
production was converted to military output. The engine used in the sherman
tank was a radial design built up from 5 Crysler truk engines. Some Tank
Destroyers were equipted with obsolete aircraft engines for speed. Not or very
limited civialian auto were built after 1942. And the Pershin Tank, which saw
service at the very end of the war was powered by a Allison engine (GM)
Note of intrests: What was the first post war car company to resume civilian
production? Volkswagon! They could only build cars when it was not raining as
the roof had been bombed off the plant! They built cars to barter for food,
fuel, materials.
>Raw material allocations were anything but fair.
Raw material allocation was based upon the needs at that time. At the start of
the war, alunimum was scarce. so it was allocated to the aircraft industry,
this was also the period when the big aluminum drives were set up. Since the
U-boats were operating off the US coast and almost all of the alunimum ore
comes from over seas, there was a lag from demand to icreased mine output to
the ore getting to a "secure port"
>Disposal of war surplus materials & products literally bankrupted hundreds
>of companies
Most of the war surplus material were given away to the former allied nations.
France rbuilt her army with a mix of Sherman and German Panther tanks.
Lot of the weapons/material were stockpiled and given away as aid in up to the
60's. The weapons used in the bay of pigs invasion were old wwII vintage.
At the end of the war, the military had more ammo in storage then it used in
the actual war! When I was in the army in 1978-1982, we still used .50 cal ammo
with lot dates form 1944 & 1945 on the ranges!
>It puzzled me that all this stuff wasn't left behind or shipped to
>Europe where it might have done more good.
Most of the stuff was not sutable for civiain use, a duece and half was an
excellent military truck, but civilian trucks were more fuel efficient
MSHOTZ: The Post Post Modern Man
"Hard work good, hard work fine, but first take care of head!"
Sublime
John Barry
news:3A0C04A4...@sympatico.ca...
>
>
> Neutrodyne wrote:
> >
> > >Subject: Re: Why Did Baldwin Diesels Fail In The Market?
> > >"The more I learn the more I realize how little I
> > >really know."
> >
> > I know more now than I did before I asked the question, thanks to
all who
> > have jumped in the thread.
> > Neutrodyne
> curiosity and engine application angle.
> http://www.lexcie.zetnet.co.uk/deltic.htm
> Interesting usage of a 2 cycle diesel.
> Thanks for an very informative thread.
> Ted Piercy
Hi, Ted.
Do check out Fairbanks-Morse opposed-piston diesels also. Rather common in
US subs, powered some early US road diesel locomotives. Similar to deltic
engine, but much less complicated.
Overall engine-generator package was very compact, with engine stacked above
generator. Problem was oil leaks onto generator.
NYC just didn't get the results with these units that they got with EMD and
Alco, for one thing.
Regards,
John
Douglas Smith
> The engine used in the sherman
> tank was a radial design built up from 5 Crysler truk engines.
And Smitty replies:
Actually, the Sherman in various models had the 5 radially mounted 6-cylinder
truck engines, or a radial aircraft engine, or a 12-cylinder Allison.
> Most of the stuff was not sutable for civiain use, a duece and half was an
> excellent military truck, but civilian trucks were more fuel efficient
>
My dad recalls them dumping brand new equipment in the ocean off France at the
war's end.
John Wilson
Well, a major reason for this action was that pre-RCA, the radio
industry was a set of entrepreneurial companies, each of which
controlled some of the basic patents needed to put a radio system
together, and none of whom owned enough intellectual property to legally
do the whole job. The industry was severely tied in knots by
infringement suits and patent challenges, and a lot of good ideas were
going nowhere because of it. Nobody wanted to play the game by
gentlemen's rules (for patent holders, licensing use of their technology
to others for a reasonable royalty; for non-patent holders, paying
royalties instead of either suing to invalidate critical patents or just
going ahead with infringing systems). Things got so ridiculous that
companies were advertising tubes that were not covered by patents,
showing the only circuit the tube would work in, which was covered by
somebody elses's patent, and noting on the ad, "Use of our tube in the
circuit shown is against Federal law." Wink wink, nudge, nudge. With
all this going on, it's no wonder that the government decided that it
was in the national interest to break the stalemate.
RCA used the resulting power to kill, delay, or dilute several key
advances; for example, their early FM systems used their brain-damaged
"ratio detector" scheme instead of E. H. Armstrong's patented
limiter-discriminator detection system, which limited RCA's FM
capabilities to mainly low-fi audio for TV sets. David Sarnoff, the RCA
chairman, used his political pull with the FCC to keep true hi-fi FM
broadcasting, which needed the Armstrong system, from starting up for a
long time, greatly reducing the market for licenses of Armstrong's
system. RCA would have had to license the Armstrong patents, and
Sarnoff was not about to do this, nor would they license any of their
patents to anybody trying to start up the Armstrong system. It was only
after Armstrong's suicide that his widow settled the many suits and
countersuits between Armstrong and RCA, finally allowing FM to go
forward in something like good form. With the money and rights she got
out of this deal, she successfully went after a number of infringing
small-time operators who didn't have the infinite legal resources of
RCA, and became a very rich woman. When Sarnoff was told of his
ex-friend Armstrong's death, Sarnoff is reported to have said, "I didn't
kill Ed Armstrong." Large monopoly keeps superior technology away from
the market and drives radio's most creative engineer to suicide; why
does this sound familiar? OTOH, the technology wasn't getting into the
market pre-RCA when it was all a multidimensional lawyers' catfight,
either.
There's an interesting book about this called "Empire of the Air", which
is very pro-Armstrong The book paints DeForest as something of a
charlatan and Sarnoff as an ultimate big-business operator. No doubt
the tale could be told from other points of view, but from whatever
perspective it is one of the great stories of American industry.
73,
JohnW
Stan Rothwell
due to numerous factors; not necessarily due to deficiencies in
its prime mover:
(1) Baldwin waited until too late in the game to fully embrace
dieselization,
hedging its bets with conventional steam designs as well as a few one-off
hybrids. By the time it fully committed (1947-1948), EMD and Alco had
already made inroads with thousands of road freight (EMD F3/7, Alco
FA), road switcher (EMD GP/SD, Alco RS/RSD) and yard swicher
(EMD SW/NW, Alco S series) units. Part of this was due to the fact that
both EMD and Alco had developed road units (EMD FT, Alco DL-109)
that could be used in either freight or passenger use, before War Dept
restrictions forbid further new unit development in 1942. From 1942-1945,
EMD was ordered to built road units only, giving it a huge head start by
the time the war ended. Alco was instructed to build primarily S2
switchers,
but was permitted to build some "dual-service" (freight and passenger use)
DL-109 units for the New Haven during the war. BLW, GE, Whitcomb,
and newcomer Fairbanks-Morse (1944) were permitted to build switchers
only. Some individuals have considered this to be an unfair advantage given
to EMD, but in all honesty they were the only company with a heavy-duty
road freight unit with a reliable history. By the time the war ended, those
who had FT's (Sante Fe, NP, WP, Burlington) liked what they had, and
wanted more.
(2) The crunch to replace worn out steamers in the immediate postwar
period (1945-1949) ensured that just about anyone who could build diesels
would have a buyer, but after that, roads weren't too anxious to continue
the "candy shop" approach, and tried to minimize new purchases to a
couple of builders when possible. For a railroad to acquire locomotives
from a new manufacturer is not just a matter of ordering units (i.e.; 25
each
1500 HP road switchers - but of ordering spare parts, special tools,
and investing in training for operating AND mechanical personnel. For the
true giants - systems like the Southern Pacific, Union Pacific, Santa Fe,
the Pennsylvania Railroad, and the New York Central - this was not as
much of an issue. These roads owned locomotives in the thousands, and
rostered locomotives from 6 or 7 builders due to the fact that 1 or 2 firms
often couldn't keep up with their demands (SP and AT&SF alone acquired
over 1500 F units from EMD). On the other hand, smaller roads with only
100-200 units could not afford to roster 30-40 models from 4 or 5 builders,
so they tended to stick with 1 or 2 favorites, and only buy elsewhere when
the preferred buildr couldn't deliver what they needed.
(3) For those railroads who did choose to purchase Baldwins (or FMs, for
that matter) after acquiring (and gaining familiarity with EMD and Alco
units),
being the latecome put them at a numerical disadvantage which affected their
service reliablilty. Are you familiar with the old "Ford vs. Chevy"
debate/feud
which is going on at least 3 generations now? Amongst the car/truck nuts
whose idea of fun is crawling under the hoods of their favorite toys, you
will
find those who swear by Chevys, and at Fords, or vice versa. Is it
necessarily
that one make is inherently better than the other? Or is it that some people
have
more experience with one make than the other? If you know the intricacies
of Chevys, as opposed to Fords (or VW's, Honda's, Mazda rotaries, for that
matter), what type of vehicle do you prefer to work on?
Now imagine yourself as a mechanic on one of the major roads circa
1950. You work in one of the major shop facilities, and your task is
to get as many units through their maintenance cycles, and fix as many
BO (bad order) units as possible. Your railroad probably has a few
hundred EMD F units and/or GP models, which you see every day.
It probably has a 50-100 Alco cab or RS units, maybe a couple of
dozen Baldwin (or FM) road switchers, and a few "oddball" units that
were ordered as part of an experiment a few years back, but never
repeated. If you got 10-12 road switchers in the dead line, what gets
fixed first? The 5 or 6 GP7's that even the newbies can get rolling,
because they see dozens of them every day and are quite familiar
with them (and can readily swipe parts back and forth)? The 2 or 3
Alco RS2's that show up steadily, albeit in smaller numbers? Or that
lone DRS-44-1500 from that handful of units they purchased a few
years ago when EMD couldn't book the order, that isn't as familiar
to the boys on the shop floor? Admittedly, this is a very simplistic
(and possibly misleading) scenario, but hopefully you get the point. In
addition, when traffic is high, anything they can turn over and lash to the
head end is up and running; when traffic slow downs, the less reliable
stuff and the oddballs are put into storage. And just like any other
sophisticated piece of heavy metal (airplanes, military vehicles, etc.),
the stuff pushed off into storage develops all the funny leaks, noises,
and strage quirks - it's never as reliable as the stuff where the moving
parts are kept lubricated and the seals are kept warm by being run
day in and day out (want to see an airplane leak like a sieve? Shut it
down for 3-4 days).
(3) Due to it's steam locomotive heritage, Baldwin never really
understood the 2 major paradigm shifts of the Diesel Era: parts
standardization and the "building block" approach embraced
fully by EMD. Thanks to the automotive heritage of EMD's
parent company General Motors, EMD embraced the concept
of parts standardization early on. With just 4 different basic prime
movers (V-6, V-8, V-12, and V-16) using a standard power
assembly (piston and cylinder displacing 567 cubic inches), 4 basic
truck (bogie) styles - 2 powered axles (B), 3 powered axles (C),
and 2 powered separated by an idler to spread weight (A1A),
5 different body/frame styles often using common components
(E,F,GP,SD,SW) in either cab or booster configurations, EMD
was able to put them together several dozen different
combinations in the early 1950's to give the customer the ideal
package for a particular application. So, even with many different
models, the powerplant in the F7 was identical to the one in the
GP7 or SD7, traction motors and generators could be "swiped or
swapped" as necessary. In addition, forward/backward capability
made upgrades and rebuilds often as easy as dropping in a new
engine in an older unit, or pulling a nose off and old FT or F3 to
fix an E9 that has a nasty grade crossing encounter with a truck.
The Baldwin situation, however, was a nightmare; not only were
there radical differences between successive models, but even
different orders of the same "model" weren't necessarily identical,
and at times might be of a completely different design (the design
designations tended to vary as well). For example, the DS44-1000
switcher (also known as the "DS-4-4-10" and the "S-10") had two
different prime movers - one an 8-cylinder normally aspirated
(608NA), and the other a 6-cylinder supercharged model (606SC?).
Units of the same model might be built with cast or welded frames,
GE or Westinghouse electrical components, or even different
truck (bogie) designs. A classic example of this would be with
the 2 ex-SP "AS-616" 6-axle road swichers the Trona Railway
owned and operated for almost 20 years. One had a cast frame,
one was welded. Each one had different trucks - one was a rigid
unsprung design with equal axle spacing, the other was a sprung
design with uneven spacing similar to Alco RSD models. There
was more mechanical and electrical compatibility with EMD designs
built 10 years apart than there was with orders of the same Baldwin
"model" built 2 years apart. This type of non-standardization drove
the mechanical departments batty, and did not make Balwin real
popular in the shops.
(4) The other side of essentially the same coin was Baldwin's
failure to exploit the revolutionary potential of multiple unit
(MU) operation - the ability to operate 2 or more units from a
single control stand. EMD intuitively understood this, and
embraced the "building block" concept - add or subtract as
many units needed to get the right power for your particular
speed/tonnage requirements. This would allow the railroads
to set up an "engine" by lashing up the appropriate number
of F units, GP's, SD's (or even SW's) as necessary for a
particular need. EMD presented this as a fait accompli to the
railroads when it sold the models; they would be happy to add
accessories such as steam generators (for passenger service),
MU receptacles, extra fuel/water tanks, or extra booster units
as desired, but weren't going to build a measly few custom units
from the frame up for a stubborn customer, as was done in steam
days. Baldwin, however, would. They build 6 double-ended
A1A-A1A units for the CNJ, some double engined, mid-cab
2000 HP transfer units for the PRR, MN&S and the Santa Fe,
and the "Centipede" - a 12-axle rigid frame monstrosity for the
Pennsy, N de M, and the SCL that did offered no more capability
than an A-B set of F3's, but was much more expensive to maintain -
and rougher on curved track. They even started an 8 engined
rigid-frame monstrosity that they never finshed (mercifully).
Instead of streamlining their production and standarizing
their offerings to control costs, they were hell-bent on building
more oddballs!
Even with the more conventional offerings, Baldwin still didn't
quite get it. They used a pneumatic MU system on the earlier
models that was completely incompatible with the electrical
MU systems used by EMD, Alco, and FM - as well as their later
models. As the 1950's progressed, the railroads started not only
MU-ing different models from the same manufacturer, but even
different manufacturers as well. While the EMd and Alco models
could be rewired to use the same type if MU receptacle, the
earlier Baldwins could only be MU-ed with themselves - provided
they even had MU. In addition, Baldwin failed to anticipate the
increase in freight train speeds possible with dieselization, as their
units were typically geared for lower speed operation. When it
came to sheer pulling capability, Baldwin road units were second
to none. A given Baldwin developed its maximum tractive effort at
a lower speed than a comparable (same HP and # of axles) Alco
or EMD unit, and therefore had a higher TE rating than the
competition. For that reason, roads that had a need for absolute
maximum pulling power due to heavy trains in mountainous terrain
(SP, C&O, PRR) loved the 6-axle DRS-66-1500 and AS-616
models for these specialized applications. However, the engine
crews did NOT like the notoriously rough ride that the poorly
spring trucks provided. These units typically were banished to
low-speed yard service where they performed adequately, but
weren't seen much on the road. In contrast, EMD's 6-axle
SD7 and SD9 units had an excellent riding truck, and earned
the nickname "Cadillacs" for the smooth ride. On the SP, the
SD9's were considered the absolutely best riding freight units
the road ever had, and the Baldwins the worst!
Hope that helps a bit...
"Neutrodyne" <neutr...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20001107153300...@ng-fi1.aol.com...
> Given the number that were repowered, it seems the prime mover was
the big
> problem (especially in road service). Was this a reliability problem, high
> maintainence costs or heavy fuel consumption? Given the much larger
> displacement, smaller number of moving parts, and general design details
it
> would seem to be viable against GM's 2-cycle V-16's. It certainly wasn't
near
> the GM in the horsepower/cubic inch ratio which implies less stress on the
> engine.
> The sketchy pricing information I've seen implies the Baldwins were a
> bargain to purchase. Any firsthand experience with them?
> I've been reading everthing I can (afford to) find & I'm fascinated
with
Earle Knorr
"Stan Rothwell" <roth...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message
news:8uj3tb$gvf$1...@nntp9.atl.mindspring.net...
> Balwin's failure to make it big in the diesel locomotive market was
> due to numerous factors; not necessarily due to
Boy! Thanks to everyone for such an interesting thread! Makes me glad I
have a computer.
Stan Rothwell
"John Barry" <j...@zedak.com> wrote in message
news:VVVO5.85$1g3....@dca1-nnrp2.news.digex.net...
> "Charles Piercy" <cepi...@sympatico.ca> wrote in message
> news:3A0C04A4...@sympatico.ca...
> >
> >
> > Neutrodyne wrote:
> > >
> > > >"The more I learn the more I realize how little I
> > > >really know."
> > >
> > > I know more now than I did before I asked the question, thanks to
> all who
> > > have jumped in the thread.
> > > Neutrodyne
> > curiosity and engine application angle.
> > http://www.lexcie.zetnet.co.uk/deltic.htm
> > Interesting usage of a 2 cycle diesel.
> > Thanks for an very informative thread.
> > Ted Piercy
>
> Hi, Ted.
>
> Do check out Fairbanks-Morse opposed-piston diesels also. Rather common
in
> US subs, powered some early US road diesel locomotives. Similar to deltic
> engine, but much less complicated.
>
> Overall engine-generator package was very compact, with engine stacked
above
> generator. Problem was oil leaks onto generator.
>
> NYC just didn't get the results with these units that they got with EMD
and
> Alco, for one thing.
SP had better luck than most, but they had 2 distinct advantages.
First of all, they assigned all their F-M units (H24-66 Trainmasters
and H12-44 switchers) to the SF bay area, where they operated
near sea level, with the marine environment (moist, dense, cool
air) that the OP prime mover was designed for. Secondly, the fact
that SF was home to a lot of Navy-trained OP mechanics didn't hurt.
Stan Rothwell
> Another source on Baldwin's diesel locomotives is the Kalmbach book by
> the Dolzall brothers. Lots of reasons. One, quality was poor.
My understanding was that it wasn't so much an issue
of overall quality of construction as it was of parts
availability and standardization. The fact that every
order was slightly different created more headaches
in terms of parts inventory and idiosyncracies that
didn't endear them to the boys in the back shop...
ASmith3314
understood to be a big part of the demise of Baldwin was their business plan.
Corporate leaders attempted to create more individual locomotives for each
customer. Unique products would be offered based on each customer's orders
much like steam engines were built.
This was a noble idea, but it meant that EMD could capitolize on the
efficiencies of mass production. When RR customers learned that their own
individual preferences were not cost effective, the demise of Baldwin became a
certainty.