Debunking the Hoax of False Memory Syndrome and the Pseudo-Science and Unethical conduct of Elizabeth Loftus, PhD
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ETHICS COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST PROMINENT FMSF BOARD MEMBER
APA DECLINES TO INVESTIGATE
In December 1995, two women filed ethics complaints with the
American Psychological Association (APA) against Elizabeth
Loftus, PhD, regarding her published statements about two legal
cases involving delayed memories of sexual abuse. Citing
procedural considerations, however, the APA has declined to
investigate the women's ethics complaints.
Jennifer Hoult (a concert harpist living in New York) and Lynn
Crook (a Washington State consultant) each filed separate
complaints with the APA, alleging that Loftus mischaracterized
the facts of their legal cases in published articles. Both women
brought successful civil suits because of the sexual abuse that
the fathers (and the mother, in Crook's case) perpetrated
against them during their childhoods. At their trials, they
presented corroborative evidence that met the requirements for
judicial proof of their allegations.
Loftus serves on the Scientific and Professional Advisory Board
of the False Memory Syndrome Foundation, Inc (FMSF). She also
had been an active member of the APA since 1973, but she
resigned in January 1996, shortly after the filing of the
complaints. In a brief telephone interview with TREATING ABUSE
TODAY, Loftus confirmed her resignation from the APA, but she
denied any knowledge of the ethics complaints. She also
cautioned that TREATING ABUSE TODAY should not state or imply
that she resigned from the APA to avoid investigation of the
ethics complaints.
When the ethic complaints were filed against Loftus, Jeffrey N.
Younggren, PhD chaired the APA Ethics Committee. During his
tenure in this position, Younggren appeared as an expert witness
in many trials involving so-called "false memory syndrome,"
generally as a witness for accused perpetrators or against
therapists accused of implanting "false memories." At the time
Hoult and Crook filed their complaints, Younggren and Loftus
were both working as expert witnesses on the same side of the
same case. When asked about this coincidence, however, Loftus
stated that she had no knowledge of the fact, because she worked
on many cases simultaneously and didn't always know which expert
witnesses were scheduled to testify in any particular case.
Responding to a query from Crook regarding the relations between
Loftus and Younggren, Marguerite Schroeder, a senior
investigator in the APA Ethics Office, stated that, if Younggren
had faced such a conflict of interest, he would have recused
himself from the matter. She further stated that Younggren
hadn't been made aware of the ethics complaints against Loftus,
and so had played no role in the decisions regarding them.
According, however, to the Rules and Procedures of the APA
Ethics Office, "complaints are evaluated initially by the Chair
of the Ethics Committee [Younggren] and Director of the Ethics
Office" ("Rules," 1992, p. 1614). Crook and Hoult filed their
complaints on or before December 18, 1995, and Loftus submitted
her resignation on January 16, 1996. In her response to Crook's
query, Schroeder offered no explanation as to why Younggren
hadn't been informed of the two complaints, even though they
were filed nearly a month before Loftus's resignation.
According to both Crook and Hoult, Schroeder stated that APA
policy generally bars the resignation of members when they're
under the scrutiny of the Ethics Committee. Schroeder, however,
further stated that Loftus hadn't yet come under the Committee's
scrutiny, and that she hadn't been informed of the complaints
against her, even though Crook and Hoult filed their complaints
nearly a month before Loftus submitted her resignation.
Based on these procedural considerations, the APA Office of
Ethics declined to investigate the ethics charges. Schroeder
told Crook and Hoult that it's "unusual" for a member to resign
in the timeframe between receipt of a complaint and a committee
decision regarding appropriate action. When such a resignation
does occur, however, Schroeder indicated that the APA no longer
has any authority to pursue ethics complaints against the member.
Both Hoult and Crook have contested the APA's decision. In a
strongly worded letter of objection to Schroeder, Crook argued
that APA policy clearly bars the resignation of a member under
the scrutiny of the Committee. She asked that the APA
immediately rescind Loftus's resignation and proceed with an
investigation of her complaint. Hoult asked for the same
actions, as well as asking the Ethics Office to send her the
procedures for filing an ethics complaint against the Ethics
Committee.
A review of the APA's published guidelines regarding
investigation of ethics complaints seems to bear out the
objections lodged by Hoult and Crook. Information provided to
complainants states that "the date of filing is the date on
which we [staff of the Ethics Office] receive the correctly
complete APA [ethics complaint] form" (APA, 1995, p. 2, emphasis
added). The Rules and Procedures further state, "Plenary ethics
proceedings against a member are initiated by the filing of a
complaint" (APA, 1992, p. 1 622, emphasis added). These two
statements taken together would seem to indicate that Loftus
came under the scrutiny of the Ethics Committee on the date of
the filing of the complaints, and thus the APA should have
barred her resignation, as stated in the Rules and Procedures.
REMEMBERING DUBIOUSLY
In her complaint, Hoult alleges that Loftus used distortion and
misstatement of fact to seriously misrepresent Hoult's legal
case. In 1988 Hoult brought a civil suit against her father,
alleging that he had raped and otherwise sexually abused her
throughout her childhood. After several years of legal
wrangling, the case finally went to trial in June 1993. On July
1, 1993, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Jennifer Hoult,
awarding her $500,000 for the suffering caused by her father's
incestuous abuse. All higher courts have upheld the jury's
decision, including the first circuit appellate court. When
Hoult's father petitioned the US Supreme Court, his petition was
rejected as untimely. At some point during all these
proceedings, Hoult's father joined the FMSF.
In the March/April 1995 issue of SKEPTICAL INQUIRER (a
publication of the Committee for the Investigation of Claims of
the Paranormal, or CSICOP), Loftus published an article
titled "Remembering Dangerously." Subsequently, this article
appeared as a resource document on separate Internet home pages
maintained for CSICOP, for the FMSF, and for Loftus at the
Department of Psychology, University of Washington. In the
article, Loftus reviews a number of high-profile cases involving
delayed memories of child abuse. The introduction to the
article, giving a cartoon view of the legal process, indicates
Loftus's general approach to the cases she reviews.
We live in a strange and precarious time that resembles at its
heart the hysteria and superstitious fervor of the witch trials
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Men and women are
being accused, tried, and convicted with no proof or evidence of
guilt other than the word of the accuser. Even when the
accusations involve numerous perpetrators, inflicting grievous
wounds over many years, even decades, the accuser's pointing
finger of blame is enough to make believers of judges and
juries. (p. 20)
Of the several cases reviewed in the article, Loftus
includes "the case of Jennifer H" (p. 26). Though Loftus
ostensibly offers Hoult a degree of anonymity by using an
initial for her last name, she actually identifies Hoult by
citing the case (Hoult v. Hoult) in the article. In an interview
with TREATING ABUSE TODAY, Hoult stated that Loftus's article
distorts her case through a broad range of unethical practices.
Among others, Hoult asserts that Loftus misrepresents her
competence, expertise, and personal motivation to speak as an
expert on trauma and abuse. As many others have already pointed
out, Loftus has never worked as a clinician and thus lacks
training or clinical experience in child psychology, trauma, the
processes of traumatic memory, the evaluation of alleged sex
offenders, and child sexual abuse generally. In this regard,
Hoult alleges that Loftus violated a number of APA ethics
guidelines, including the need for truthfulness and candor,
misuse of influence, and making claims outside the area of her
expertise.
Hoult also alleges that Loftus used mischaracterization and
omission of facts to misconstrue Hoult's legal case against her
father. She pointed out many inaccuracies that support this
allegation. In the article, for instance, Loftus claims
that "Jennifer was a 23-year-old musician who recovered memories
in therapy of her father raping her from the time she was 4"
(1995, p. 26). Actually, Hoult began to remember the abuse at
24, at which time she was an artificial intelligence software
engineer. Records in the case show that the bulk of her memories
emerged outside of therapy. Furthermore, Hoult never stated that
the rapes began when she was four, a "fact" apparently created
by Loftus for the purposes of her article.
In another passage, Loftus claims that Hoult "remembered one
time when she was raped in the bathroom and went to her mother
wrapped in a towel with blood dripping" (1995, p. 27). A review
of court records, however, shows that Loftus has added two
elements of her own making: the memory of the rape itself (the
trial transcript shows that Hoult never claimed to remember
a "rape") and the blood-soaked towel (again the transcript shows
that Hoult only reported a small amount of blood between her
legs, which wasn't visible to the mother until Hoult dropped the
towel from around her body). Hoult argues that these
misstatements by Loftus put her in violation of several APA
ethics guidelines, among them ethics in media presentations and
ethics regarding matters of law.
IT'S MAGICAL. IT'S MALLEABLE. IT'S . . . MISREPRESENTATION.
In October 1991, Lynn Crook brought a civil suit against her
parents based on her delayed memories of childhood sexual abuse
perpetrated by her parents. Loftus testified as an expert
witness for the defense. On March 4, 1994, the judge in the case
ruled in Crook's favor, awarding her $149,580 in damages against
her parents, who chose not to appeal the case to any higher
court.
In the January/February 1995 issue of PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Jill
Neimark published an article titled "It's Magical. It's
Malleable. It's . . . Memory." In her article, Neimark quotes
Loftus, who gives an abridged and (according to Crook) seriously
distorted account of her case against her father. In this part
of the article, at the heart of Crook's ethics complaint, Loftus
summarizes the legal case as follows:
Sometimes [Neimark states, summarizing Loftus] the memories
become so seemingly fantastical that they lead to court cases
and ruined lives. [Quoting Loftus] "I testified in a case
recently in a small town in the State of Washington," Loftus
recalls, "where the memories went from 'Daddy made me play with
his penis in the shower' to 'Daddy made me stick my fist up the
anus of a horse,' and they were bringing in a veterinarian to
talk about just what a horse would do in that circumstance. The
father is ill and will be spending close to $100,000 to defend
himself." (Neimark, 1995, p. 80)
In an interview with TREATING ABUSE TODAY, Crook stated that
Loftus's 79-word direct quote describing her case contained nine
misstatements. "Loftus reworded events I recalled, and
incorrectly claimed that a 'fantastical' memory had resulted in
my filing this case." Crook pointed out, for instance, that
Loftus contradicted her father's own sworn testimony that his
health was "excellent." Crook also argues that Loftus should
have pointed out that she (Crook) won the case, after presenting
evidence that included testimony from two of her sisters who
also remembered incestuous abuse perpetrated against them by
their father.
Among other ethical concerns, Crook alleges that Loftus
introduces the idea of memory progression ("from . . . to"),
even though this claim had failed to hold up during the trial
itself. During Crook's trial, Richard Ofshe, PhD, another
prominent FMSF board member who testified for the defense,
claimed to see a "progression" in her memories that called them
into doubt. The judge in the case specifically dismissed Ofshe's
attempt to cry "false memory" based on memory progression:
Finally, Dr. Ofshe characterizes plaintiff's memories as a
progress toward ritual, satanic cult images, which he states
fits a pattern he has observed of false memories. It appears to
the Court, however, that in this regard, he is engaging in the
same exercise for which he criticizes therapists dealing with
repressed memory. Just as he accuses them of resolving at the
outset to find repressed memories of abuse and then constructing
them, he has resolved at the outset to find a macabre scheme of
memories progressing toward satanic cult ritual and then creates
them. (Lynn Crook v. Bruce Murphy and Lucille Murphy, Superior
Court of the State of Washington In and For the County of
Benton, #91-2-0011-2-5)
Despite the judge's statement, rendered from the bench, Loftus
resurrected the "progression theory" in the PSYCHOLOGY TODAY
article. According to Crook, Loftus should have indicated that
her opinion had been rejected by the court, and that her failure
to do so constitutes a violation of APA ethics guidelines
dealing with truth and candor.
According to Crook, Loftus also transformed another memory, her
recollection of the event involving the horse. In the quoted
passage, Loftus does seem to imply that the memory involving the
horse emerged as an elaboration and distortion of Crook's
earlier memory involving her father, an implication that Crook
denies. Crook also points out that Loftus omitted important
information given by the veterinarian who testified during the
trial. Though Loftus chose to present the possibility of anal
penetration of the horse as a wholly fantastical absurdity, the
veterinarian (who testified for the defense) pointed out that
it's a common practice in veterinary medicine.
JUST TO BE BELIEVED
Crook told TREATING ABUSE TODAY that she hopes Loftus will be
asked to corroborate all cases that she reports to the
media. "I'm dismayed," she stated, "that Loftus would use her
position as an expert witness in my case to try to prove to the
public that I was yet another victim of 'repressed memory'
therapy." Crook further stated that PSYCHOLOGY TODAY should have
contacted her to check the facts of the case before they
published Neimark's article.
While researching this story, TREATING ABUSE TODAY contacted the
magazine's editor, Hara Moreno, to ask about the magazine's
formal fact-checking policies. Oddly, Moreno became extremely
hostile. She demanded to know "on whose authority" we had
undertaken our investigation. She further stated that we
didn't "know anything about anything," and that she would only
speak with the APA about the ethics complaint. We tried in vain
to get Moreno to understand that we didn't want her to discuss
Crook's complaint, that we only wanted to know the formal fact-
checking policy of PSYCHOLOGY TODAY. We never did get an answer.
The editor of SKEPTICAL INQUIRER never returned our call to
discuss that magazine's fact-checking policies, despite a
promise from Brian Karr, the executive director of CSICOP, that
the editor would speak with us.
In "Remembering Dangerously," Loftus warns that "supposedly de-
repressed" memories could "trivialize the genuine memories of
abuse and increase the suffering of real victims who wish and
deserve, more than anything else, just to be believed" (1995, p.
29). Hoult argues that Loftus used her scientific credentials in
an unscientific effort to trivialize her memories of violent
abuse. "I've proven the charges against my father in a court of
law," Hoult stated, "before a jury of his peers. I am believed,
by my family and my friends." Hoult went on to say that she
expects ethical treatment from people who call themselves
scientists, including Loftus.
Loftus in fact cites scientific considerations as the reason for
her resignation from the APA. In her letter of resignation, she
claims that the organization had "moved away from scientific and
scholarly thinking." Loftus further stated that she had decided
to resign "to devote her energies to the numerous other
professional organizations that value science more highly and
more consistently." During her tenure as an APA member, Loftus
served "as President of two distinguished divisions
(Experimental Psychology and Psychology/Law)," a fact she points
out in her letter of resignation.
Alice Eagly, PhD, who presently chairs the APA Board of
Scientific Affairs, expressed puzzlement over Loftus's abrupt
resignation from the APA. Eagly dismissed Loftus's attempt to
draw a "global judgment" regarding APA's commitment to science.
She pointed out that the APA fosters a great many scientific
endeavors, and that it publishes the premiere scientific
journals in psychology.
Loftus stated in her resignation letter that she resigned
largely because of the increasing drift of the APA "away from
scientific and scholarly thinking and . . . towards therapeutic
and professional guild interests." The APA, however, recently
approved the FMSF as a continuing education sponsor, [for more
information on the APA's action, please see "APA Approves FMSF
as CE Sponsor" in the same issue of TREATING ABUSE TODAY (Vol 5
No 6/Vol 6 No 1).] and one of Loftus's colleagues on the FMSF
Scientific and Professional Advisory Board (Ulric Neisser, PhD)
also serves on the APA Board of Scientific Affairs. Neisser
declined to comment on Loftus's resignation. TREATING ABUSE
TODAY sent written requests for comment to the other members of
the Board of Scientific Affairs; with the exception of Eagly,
none responded.
Peter Freyd, PhD, co-founder of the FMSF, issued a puzzling
Internet statement (February 8, 1996) regarding Loftus's
resignation. Under the subject heading, "It's their stupidity,
stupid," Freyd stated:
The RMT ["recovered memory therapy"] people certainly go in for
believing whatever rumors they like. For the record: there are
no ethics complaints against Elizabeth Loftus. She resigned from
the APA because it has moved too far from science.
From his brief statement, Freyd appears to endorse Loftus's
claim that the APA no longer holds a strong, consistent
commitment to science. The APA, however, recently recognized
Freyd's organization as a continuing education sponsor, a move
that many see as evidence of Loftus's claim that the APA has
indeed moved away from science by entering into a partnership
with an organization (the FMSF) that promulgates pseudoscience.
Pamela Freyd, PhD, the FMSF executive director, declined to
comment on the ethics charges filed against Loftus and her
resignation from the APA.
REFERENCES
American Psychological Association. (1995). INFORMATION FOR
INDIVIDUALS FILING APA ETHICS COMPLAINTS [Brochure]. Washington,
DC: Author.
American Psychological Association. (1992). Rules and
procedures. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST, 47, 1612-1628.
Loftus, E. (1995, March/April). Remembering dangerously.
SKEPTICAL INQUIRER, 19, 20-29.
Neimark, J. (1995, January/February). It's magical. It's
mystical. It's . . . memory. PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, 28, p. 44-85.
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APA APPROVES FMSF AS CE SPONSOR
In a move that left many APA members puzzled and angry, the
American Psychological Association (APA) recently approved the
False Memory Syndrome Foundation, Inc (FMSF) as a provider
organization able to offer continuing education for
psychologists. This approval indicates that the APA recognizes
the FMSF as an organization capable of planning and implementing
educational programs for psychologists at the post-doctoral
level. The APA approved this status despite its own earlier
warning that the legislative agendas of many state FMS
organizations posed a serious threat to the mental health
professions, and to the general availability of quality mental
health services. [1]
In a recent interview, Rhea Farberman of the APA's Public
Affairs Office justified the APA's decision as "non-political,"
based solely on the merits of the FMSF's application for
continuing education (CE) provider status. She characterized
FMSF stances, including the debated existence of "false memory
syndrome" itself, as "unpopular science." She stressed, however,
that the APA would not deny CE provider status to any
organization simply because its science proved unpopular with
most practitioners. She further stated that the APA felt "a real
responsibility" to protect "research, data, and science."
Farberman stressed, however, that people shouldn't confuse the
CE sponsor approval with any kind of general or specific APA
endorsement of the FMSF. She pointed out that, in fact, the APA
found many FMSF positions, practices, and actions "troubling."
She also stated that many FMSF board members espoused positions
and acted in ways unacceptable to the APA.
CRITERIA OF FORM, WITHOUT CONTENT
According to Jill Reich, PhD (the Executive Director of the APA
Education Directorate), CE sponsors must offer educational
resources that improve professional competence, make available
new skills and knowledge, and encourage critical inquiry and
balanced judgment. Reich further stated, however, that the APA's
Committee for the Approval of Continuing Education Sponsors
(CACES) doesn't consider program content during the approval
process; rather, the Committee considers only the formal
elements of an organization (structure, management, instructors,
and so on).
When asked how the APA, without looking at program content,
could possibly know whether or not a particular organization met
the above criteria, Farberman indicated that an organization's
past educational activity and the presence of reputable
specialists on the organization's board offered sufficient
assurance that it would meet the criteria. In a published
statement, Reich confirmed this view when she indicated that the
FMSF application "provided ample evidence that the organization
is capable of offering continuing education that benefits
psychologists and has, in fact, done so in conjunction with
another organization, Johns Hopkins University." [2]
The FMSF, however, apparently takes a much more rigorous view
regarding the need for oversight of CE program content. In a
recent fundraising letter (dated November 1, 1995),
representatives of the FMSF stated:
Professional organizations still do not hold their members
accountable. Too many continuing education programs still
continue to disseminate unscientific information about memory,
repression and therapeutic techniques that destroy families.
Assuming that the FMSF includes the APA among
these "professional organizations," it appears that the FMSF
faults the APA for not scrutinizing the content of CE programs.
The FMSF, however, has now taken advantage of the very
weaknesses of a system that it earlier condemned. When asked
about the apparent contradiction, the APA's Farberman
characterized it as "ironic."
Many outraged APA members argue that the FMSF would fail the
scientific scrutiny it once called for, because (the members
maintain) this advocacy organization regularly participates in
activities that make a mockery of the scientific endeavor. Other
observers argue that the FMSF fails to meet all three of the APA
criteria for approving a CE sponsor, especially regarding the
need to encourage critical inquiry and balanced judgment.
Charles Whitfield, MD, for instance, stated that "the FMSF's
conferences and other educational offerings have always been
greatly unbalanced in favor of promulgating their one-sided
claims." Other APA members argue that the FMSF goes beyond bias
to push a pseudoscience based on a "syndrome" that no reputable
medical or psychological body recognizes; yet the very same
organization regularly cries "bad science" against researchers,
clinicians, and organizations (the APA included) who take a
skeptical view of FMSF claims.
In a recent letter of resignation from the APA, for example,
Elizabeth Loftus, PhD [3] (a prominent FMSF board member)
claimed that "APA subgroups and members have moved in directions
that are disturbingly far from scientific thinking." She further
stated that she decided to resign so she could "devote [her]
energies to the numerous other professional organizations that
value science more highly and more consistently" than the APA.
In this statement, of course, Loftus doesn't speak for the FMSF
generally, although her claims echo other FMSF claims made
elsewhere (such as in the fundraising letter cited earlier).
Some observers, however, find themselves struck by the oddity of
the situation: A prominent FMSF board member resigns from the
APA--citing irreconcilable scientific differences--shortly after
the APA grants CE sponsor status to the FMSF, so the
organization can teach its brand of "science."
Other FMSF critics wonder just how closely the APA scrutinized
the FMSF "instructors," presumably the members of the FMSF's
Scientific and Professional Advisory Board. Almost exclusively,
the Board includes members of the academic staff of colleges and
universities, with the odd magician and author thrown in for
spice. Despite the impressive variety in the backgrounds of the
board members, very few of them command clinical or research
expertise in trauma and abuse issues, the very issues that the
organization would teach to psychologists through its CE
offerings.
ASSUMED HELPLESSNESS
In many ways, Reich's published statement regarding the FMSF's
CE sponsor approval suggests that the Committee generally adopts
a position of assumed helplessness within the strictures
of "rules and procedures." At several points in her statement,
Reich explicitly absolves the Committee of any responsibility
for its decisions. She states, for instance, that "the Committee
has no authority to act" as a rational decision-making body;
rather, it can only act as a cogs-and-gears mechanism set in
motion by higher echelons within the APA. In short, the
Committee "follows specific procedures approved by the Council
of Representatives, and deals only with the evidence before it."
In true mechanistic fashion, once the Committee winds the spring
and sets the approval mechanism in motion, it "has no basis on
which to reconsider its decision." In other words, the Committee
has no power to change its collective mind. Those APA members
dissatisfied with a Committee decision can get it changed only
by throwing a wrench into the works. The only acceptable wrench,
according to Reich, must come in the form of a written
complaint. Farberman also stressed the conditional nature of the
CE approval granted to the FMSF, and she stated that the
organization will have to follow a standard cycle of review and
approval. Reich stands by these procedures, despite the feeling
among many APA members that the review and complaint process
amounts to a lengthy bureaucratic shuffle to shut the chicken
coop after the weasel's already inside.
Despite the aggravation inherent in the APA's after-the-fact
approach, a number of APA members have already written letters
of complaint. In two open letters, Kenneth Pope, PhD argues that
FMSF activists use a number of disturbing tactics, such as:
accosting the staff and clients of therapists;
maintaining "picket lines" (really gauntlets that clients must
walk to get to the offices of their therapists); encumbering
resources through legal and administrative ploys; covert
investigations using private investigators to infiltrate therapy
practices; and making repeated in absentia psychological
diagnoses of people (sometimes whole groups of people) who
disagree with FMSF stances. Pope argues that such tactics may
keep some mental health professionals from publicly expressing
disagreement with FMSF stances.
Farberman stated that the APA has no knowledge that the FMSF
uses such tactics. She indicated, however, that the Education
Directorate would act on complaints received from members who
attended an FMSF activity and found any practice objectionable.
She expressed particular concern over the possible development
and distribution of blacklists, though she stressed that the APA
had no evidence that the FMSF had involved itself in such
activities.
At an October 1995 Pennsylvania State FMSF meeting, however,
Pamela Freyd, PhD (the FMSF Executive Director) stated that her
organization's next "big project" involved the development and
distribution of a roster listing "thousands" of clinicians that
FMSF members have identified as therapists "destroying
families." At the meeting, she called for volunteers to help
with the daunting task of data input, to get the roster off and
running. At the same meeting, an attorney discussed ways to
mount media campaigns against "bad" therapists without risking
libel, and ways to encumber the resources of "bad" therapists
through administrative complaints and legal suits.
ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL DISSOCIATION
Early last year, the APA recognized that at least one item on
the FMSF agenda constituted a severe threat to the psychological
profession. In a 1995 APA Action Alert issued under the
authority of Billie Hinnefeld, JD, Director of Legal and
Regulatory Affairs, the APA warned that FMSF-inspired
legislation "threatens to inappropriately curtail psychotherapy
and make needed mental health services inaccessible to the
public." When contacted for a statement regarding the APA's most
recent decision regarding the FMSF, Hinnefeld refused to comment
beyond pointing out that the Practice Directorate and the
Education Directorate make up two entirely separate APA
functions, and that neither has to answer for the decisions of
the other.
A source who requested anonymity also pointed out that Ray
Fowler, PhD, the Chief Executive Officer of the APA, stated that
this controversy amounts only to a "PR" issue with some APA
members. According to Farberman, however, Fowler understands
that the controversy involves issues that go much deeper than
skirmishes in public relations. Fowler didn't return repeated
calls asking for comment.
The "organizational dissociation" inherent in the APA's stance
reflects the inevitable "professional dissociation" in a field
as complex as psychology. Some psychologists, for instance,
strongly support the APA's decision despite the fact that the
FMSF teaches about a "syndrome" that has no clinical or academic
underpinnings, and that the profession itself hasn't recognized.
Ira E. Hyman, Jr, PhD, for instance, argues that "the FMSF [can]
put together an educational program concerning repressed
memories and false memories that would be useful to academics
and clinicians" (Internet posting, November 26, 1995). [See note
from Dr. Ira Hyman.] After briefly discussing an FMSF conference
held at Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions in December 1994, a
conference that included an "impressive" list of presenters,
Hyman concludes, "If the FMSF can put together such programs,
then my view is that they are an appropriate group to offer
credits for APA members."
Hyman fails to point out, however, that the presenters at this
conference came almost exclusively from FMSF ranks, a fact that
hardly bodes well for a rounded treatment of clinical issues. He
also doesn't mention that, shortly before the Johns Hopkins
conference, the FMSF failed to gain state CE credit for a
Washington State (US) FMSF conference, even though this
conference featured many of the same presenters as the Johns
Hopkins conference. In announcing the failure, John Cannell, MD
(the conference organizer) stated that "the Medical Association
here commented on the quality of the presenters." Hyman, who
lives in Washington State, serves as a faculty member in the
Psychology Department of Western Washington University.
According to Farberman, the APA recognizes the shortcomings of
current CE approval procedures, and she stated that the
organization would undertake a detailed review of the
procedures. She stressed, however, that the APA remains
committed to an ideal of open inquiry and non-censorship in
scientific endeavors.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
To directly express your views on this or any other matter
involving the American Psychological Association, call or write:
APA
750 First Street, NE
Washington, DC 20002-4242
(202) 336-5500 (voice) (202) 336-5708 (fax) (202) 336-6123 (TDD)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
NOTES
[1] For a fuller discussion of this earlier APA warning, please
see "APA Speaks Out Against Bureaucracy and Barriers to Service"
in Vol 5, No 2 of TREATING ABUSE TODAY.
[2] Reich appears unaware of the controversy surrounding the odd-
bedfellows relationship between Johns Hopkins, a venerable
medical institution, and the FMSF, a media-savvy advocacy
organization. A great many mental health professionals were
astounded when Johns Hopkins apparently embraced "false memory
syndrome," when no psychological or medical organization has yet
recognized its existence. In fact, Paul McHugh, MD--a prominent
Johns Hopkins psychiatrist--orchestrated the partnership between
the FMSF and Johns Hopkins. McHugh also serves on the Scientific
and Professional Advisory Board of the FMSF.
[3] For more information on Loftus's resignation from the APA,
please see "Ethics Charges Filed Against Prominent FMSF Board
Member," in the same issue of TREATING ABUSE TODAY (Vol 5 No
6/Vol 6 No 1).
-----------------------------------------------------------
Son_of_Chive_Mynde
recovered memory debate and how to obtain each of them.
The first source is the 1995 American Psychological Association
(APA) Award Address: "Memory, Abuse, and Strange Science:
Therapy, Forensics, and New Research." This address was
delivered by Ken Pope at APA's 103rd annual convention when he
received the Award for Distinguished Contributions to Public
Service (see below). This address may be ordered as Audiotape
#APA95-245 from Sound Images, Inc.; telephone order line is :
303-649-1811.
The second source is an updated version of his address which
appeared as "Memory, Abuse, and Science: Questioning Claims
About the False Memory Syndrome Epidemic" in American
Psychologist, September, 1996, vol. 51, #9, pp. 957-974. To see
an outline of this article, click "here".
The third source is Ken Pope's response to comments he received
about his 1995 and 1996 works (described above). The title
is "Science As Careful Questioning: Are Claims of a False Memory
Syndrome Epidemic Based on Empirical Evidence." It appears in
American Psychologist, September, 1997, vol. 52, #9, pp. 997-
1006. This is a brand new article that is well worth reading.
If you would like a reprint of one or both of the latter two
American Psychologist articles, send a request to: Ken Pope.
Please be sure that your request: (a) specifies which reprint(s)
you wish to receive, and (b) provides a complete snailmail
address to which the reprint(s) will be mailed.
[NOTE: The reprints will *not* be emailed but rather sent via
postal service].
The fourth source is the book Recovered Memories of Abuse:
Assessment, Therapy, Forensics by Kenneth S. Pope and Laura S.
Brown, published by the American Psychological Association
(APA), 1996. It may be ordered from APA at (202) 336-5500 or at
their toll-free number (800) 374-2721. The authors waived all
royalties from this book, and thus the price is very reasonable.
For a description of the book, click here.
To help convince you that these are informative, important
works, here's some background information about Ken Pope and his
work.
Kenneth S. Pope, Ph.D., ABPP, received graduate degrees from
Harvard and Yale, is a charter fellow of the American
Psychological Society (APS), and has authored or co-authored
over 100 articles and chapters in peer-reviewed scientific and
professional journals and books. The latest of his 10 books is
Recovered Memories of Abuse: Assessment, Therapy, Forensics (co-
authored with Laura Brown; published by the American
Psychological Association, 1996). A psychologist in independent
practice, he has served as chair of the Ethics Committees of the
American Psychological Association (APA) and the American Board
of Professional Psychology (ABPP), and received the APA Division
of Clinical Psychology Award for Distinguished Professional
Contributions to Clinical Psychology. He received the American
Psychological Association Award for Distinguished Contributions
to Public Service, which included the following citation
(American Psychologist, 1995, vol. 50, pp. 241-243):
"For rigorous empirical research, landmark articles and books,
courageous leadership, fostering the careers of others, and
making services available to those with no means to pay. His
works include 9 books and over 100 other publications on topics
ranging from treating victims of torture to psychometrics to
memory to ethics. His pioneering research has increased our
understanding of therapist-patient sex, especially in the areas
of effects on patients, tendencies to deny or discount risks,
factors enabling known perpetrators to continue or resume not
only practicing but also abusing patients, and approaches to
prevention. As the title "What Therapists Don't Talk About and
Why" of his acceptance talk for the Division 12 Award for
Distinguished Professional Contributions to Clinical Psychology
suggests, Pope's research frequently addresses concerns that are
relatively neglected because they tend to cause anxiety, such as
therapists feelings of anger, hate, fear, or sexual attraction
toward patients, or therapists own histories of sexual or
physical abuse. He frequently declines compensation for his work
to advance psychology in the public interest. This is evident in
his recent book, Sexual Involvement with Therapists: Patient
Assessment, Subsequent Therapy, Forensics, published by the
American Psychological Association. Pope waived all royalties
for the volume in order that it might be sold at reduced price
and be more readily available and useful. His integrity, good
will, humor, and tireless work in the public interest represent
the finest ideals of our profession."
He delivered his APA Award Address at the 1995 annual convention
of the American Psychological Association. That address has now
been published as the article described below.
Memory, abuse, and science: Questioning claims about the False
Memory Syndrome epidemic.
by K.S. Pope
If you would like to receive a reprint of this article, please
email your *snailmail* address to ksp...@home.com.
N.B. Send your *real world* address, not your email address.
Pope, K.S. (1996). Memory, abuse, and science: Questioning
claims about the False Memory Syndrome epidemic. American
Psychologist, vol. 51, issue #9 (September), pp. 957-974.
ABSTRACT: Careful assessment of purported scientific discoveries
and the resulting interpretations is a responsibility of every
scientist. The area of memory, particularly memory for abuse,
has recently seen new, highly publicized claims. These include
the proposal of a new diagnostic category, the false memory
syndrome; claims about the ease with which extensive
autobiographical memories can be implanted; and estimates of the
extent therapists use risky practices likely to cause false
memory syndrome. This article suggests questions to evaluate
these claims and the methods used to promote them. Implications
for clinical standards and malpractice are discussed.
Outline:
Introduction
1) Review of the Literature: Memory Theory Prior to the False
Memory Syndrome Foundation & False Memory Syndrome (FMS)
2) FMS: Claims of a Scientifically Validated Syndrome & Epidemic
a) Methodology for Determining that Memories are Objectively
False
b) Methodology for Assessing an "Entire Personality and
Lifestyle"
c) Claims of FMS's Similarity to Personality Disorders
d) Thousands of Empirically Documented Cases
e) Informed Consent Issues in Research Validating FMS
f) Independent Examination of the Primary Data & Methodology
g) The Cause of FMS: Trauma Memories Implanted in Therapy
h) Therapists as Perpetrators of FMS
3) Redefining Malpractice and the Standard of Care
a) Should therapists be required to seek external validation?
b) Behavioral and pharmacological therapies & Directing feelings
c) Not suspecting child abuse
d) Unacceptable books & ideas
e) Checklists for assessing incompetence & other forms of
malpractice
4) Careful Examination: The Scientific Process
a) Picketing
b) Describing and Diagnosing Individuals who disagree
i) Paranoid
ii) Cult & sect
iii) True Believers
iv) Use of Holocaust imagery
c) Obtaining & revealing disclosures to therapists
5) Conclusion
Recovered Memories of Abuse: Assessment, Therapy, Forensics
by Ken Pope and Laura Brown
All author royalties were waived to allow a lower price so that
the book would be more affordable for survivors, therapists-in-
training, and others with limited funds.
Publisher: American Psychological Association
Phone orders within U.S.: (800) 374-2721
Phone orders outside U.S.: 1-202-336-5500
Chapter 1: Sexual Abuse, Delayed Memories, And Therapy: An
Introduction
Chapter 2: Science, Memory, And Trauma
Chapter 3: Clinical and Forensic Work as Questioning:
Considering Claims about False Memories
Chapter 4: Practicing Safely and Competently: What Therapists
Must Know
Chapter 5: Clinical Work With People Who Report Recovered
Memories
Chapter 6: Forensic Issues For Therapists and Expert Witnesses
Appendix A: Useful Resources
Appendix B: States With Delayed Discovery Laws
Appendix C: Sample Informed Consent Form For Forensic Assessment
When Recovered Memories Are At Issue
Appendix D: Informed Consent Issues For Providing Therapy To A
Patient When Recovered Memories Are An Issue
Appendix E: Therapist's Outline For Frequent Review of Treatment
And Treatment Plan For A Patient When Recovered Memories Are An
Issue
Appendix F: Outline of Topics For Forensic Preparation
Appendix G: Therapist's Outline For Review Prior To Deposition
And Cross-Examination
Appendix H: Cross-Examination Questions For Therapists Who
Testify About Recovered Memories of Abuse
Table 4-1: Percent of Male and Female Participants Reporting
Abuse
Table 4-2: Events, Experiences, or Circumstances that Triggered
Recovery of Memories of Abuse
Table 4-3: Sources that Support, Corroborate, or Confirm the
Memory of the Abuse
Table 4-4: Therapists' Experiences in Their Own Therapy
Table 4-5: Experiencing and Expressing Intense Emotion in
Therapy
References
Comments from Reviewers
"This is a book that a clinician, researcher, or trainee cannot
afford to miss. . . . Only with this type of comprehensive
information can we begin to appreciate the complexities of
therapeutic and legal issues surrounding child sexual abuse."
Gail Elizabeth Wyatt, Ph.D., Department of Psychiatry, UCLA
"An essential text of science and therapy, this unsurpassed
resource for senior and seasoned professionals should be
required reading in graduate programs. Pope and Brown's wise,
rigorous, exceptionally well-written guide to research and
practice represents the highest scientific, clinical, and
ethical values."
Onno van der Hart, Ph.D., Utrecht University, The Netherlands
"Essential reading for lawyers and expert witnesses, this
landmark book is scientifically grounded, carefully researched,
and--thankfully!--of great practical use. The consent forms,
deposition and cross-examination questions, outlines for
reviewing treatment plans, and scrupulously fair examinations of
the major controversies are major contributions. Avoiding the
polarizing polemics and limited points of view that mar so much
of the work in this area, this is the best book on this topic."
Gary Sampley, Esq., Attorney at Law
"Pope and Brown provide a vital safe passage through the
clinical and ethical minefield created by controversies
associated with recovered memories of abuse. . . . Reading this
book is the best way to avoid clinical and forensic pitfalls in
the arena of recovered memories."
Gerald Koocher, Ph.D., ABPP, Harvard Medical School
"Skillfully bringing together empirical science and clinical
sensitivity, this landmark text should be on every therapist's
bookshelf and in every training program's curriculum."
Melba Vasquez, Ph.D., Diplomate in Counseling Psychology;
Chair, APA Board for the Advancement of Psychology in the Public
Interest
(1991-92)
Chair, APA Board of Professional Affairs (1996-97)
"The topic of memory in general, and recovered memories in
particular, has of late become controversial in the extreme for
both lay and professionals audiences, Into this maelstrom, Pop
and Brown's have written a clear and well reasoned and
researchedvolume to examine the issues in depth. The volume is
an important contribution to the field. Not only scientifically
up to date, but also a thoughtful and practical guide to the
area for clinicians that will improve therapeutic and avoid
unnecessary difficulties"
Eliezer Witztum, MD
Beer-Sheva Mental Health Center
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel
"Pope and Brown have presented a careful review of memoryscience
that both appreciates complexity and cautions against over
generalization. . . . The book presents very pragmatic
guidelines for clinicians that serve to improve
the standard of care and decrease liability risk. . . . This is
a very sane, ethical, and compassionate approach to a very
controversial and often irrational debate."
Daniel Brown, Ph.D., ABPH, Harvard Medical School
Son_of_Chive_Mynde
of "false memory syndrome": Construct validity and incidence.
The Journal of Psychiatry and Law, pp. 299-338.
Abstract
False memory syndrome (FMS) is described as a serious form of
psychopathology characterized by strongly believed
pseudomemories of childhood sexual abuse. A literature review
revealed four clusters of symptoms underlying the syndrome
regarding victims' belief in their memories of abuse and their
identity as survivors, their current interpersonal
relationships, their trauma symptoms across the lifespan, and
the characteristics of their therapy experiences. The validity
of these clusters was examined using data from a community
sample of 113 women who identified themselves as survivors of
girlhood sexual abuse. Examining the discriminant validity of
these criteria revealed that participants who had recovered
memories of their abuse (n = 51), and who could therefore
potentially have FMS, generally did not differ from participants
with continuous memories (n = 49) on indicators of these
criteria. Correlational analyses also indicated that these
criteria typically failed to converge. Further, despite frequent
claims that FMS is occurring in epidemic proportions, only 3.9%
to 13.6% of the women with a recovered memory satisfied the
diagnostic criteria, and women with continuous memories were
equally likely to meet these criteria. The implications of these
findings for FMS theory and the delayed memory debate more
generally are discussed.
Son_of_Chive_Mynde
Proceedings
Overview: All of the cases in this file involve claims in legal
proceedings. Some cases are criminal, some are civil, and a few
are administrative or involve an estate. The criminal cases all
resulted in either a guilty verdict or a guilty plea. The civil
cases all resulted in either a civil judgment or a civil
settlement. The cases included pre-trial discovery on the facts,
and often full-blown adjudication. In short, the corroboration
in these cases has been scrutinized and in many cases verified
through a legal proceeding.
K.B.’s recovered memories of child sexual abuse by a neighbor
and close family friend. K.B. v. Mathes (U.S. District Court,
Eastern District of Washington). Filed in 1982 (Docket No. C-82-
56), decided January 5, 1984 by Judge Justin L. Quackenbush.
Judgment for the plaintiff; no appeal by defendant.
"K.B.’s testimony is confirmed to some extent by her sister
Lisa’s testimony. Then we have what I call the age fourteen
alcohol incident…the incident when K. arrived home in an
intoxicated state. (oral decision, filed January 11, 1984, p.
2). "Then we have Mr. Mathe’s own testimony that the only
statement he made to Mrs. B was that ‘I wish it hadn’t happe!
ned.’" (Id. at p.4) [Additional evidence of financial payments
by Mr. Mathes as indicating "some scienter or guilty knowledge
on the part of Mr. Mathes" on p. 5] Finally, "based on the
evidence presented in this case…I find that K.B. completely
repressed her recollections of the defendant’s wrongful conduct
from the time of her high school years when she was obviously a
minor until she began seeking counseling for her depression and
anxiety in late 1979. (Id. at p.9) "I further find that it was
not until at least April of 1981 that Ms. B. was able to fully
recall the acts of misconduct by the defendant." (Id. at p.10)
Delaney Nickerson’s memories of child sexual abuse by her
father. The memories first surfaced while Ms. Nickerson was
hospitalized in 1984. Ms. Nickerson filed a criminal complaint
several years later and Mr. Smith was charged. He later pled
guilt, being placed on lifetime parole and ordered by the court
to have no further contact with his daughter. Commonwealth v.
Landon Carter Smith (felony criminal case: Peterburg Virginia,
1990).
Meiers-Post v. Schafer (Michigan Court of Appeals, 1988) A civil
suit by Jan Meiers-Post against her former high-school teacher
for sexual abuse from 1970 to 1974. "We hold that the period of
limitation is tolled where the child victim of an illicit sexual
relationship psychologically represses the memory of the events
and where, after the memory is revived there is corroboration
that the events actually occurred.." "In his deposition,
defendant admitted to having sexual intercourse with plaintiff,
at various times, from 1972 to 1974." 427 N.W. 2d 606, 607.
State v. Wilson (Polk County, Iowa; August, 1990). Criminal
conviction of Thomas Dean Wilson for incest and third-degree
sexual abuse of his daughter. "The trauma was so great that she
was unable to remember for eight years—and then only after
months of therapy." (Marie McCartan, "'Daddy Hurts Me'… The
Horror of Incest," Des Moines Register, February 17, 1991: 1E).
The corroborating evidence uncovered through discovery
included 'inappropriate advances' made by the defendant toward
another minor in his role has a church chaperon, and a former
teen-age babysitter for the family who had repeated sexual
relations with the defendant. There was additional corroboration
from M's childhood medical records. Twelve jurors found Tom
Wilson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Nicolette v. Carey (Federal District Court, Western District of
Michigan, 1990 judicial decision). Civil action by Suzanne
Nicolette against her father, Joseph Carey for child sexual
abuse first remembered in adulthood. In denying the defendant's
motion to dismiss the case, Judge Benjamin F. Gibson noted
that "plaintiff has submitted a letter addressed to plaintiff,
signed by defendant and dated April 19, 1987, in which defendant
discussed three or four incidents of sexual contact he had with
the plaintiff when she was a child." See, Plaintiff's Exhibit
No. 5. Opinion dated November 19, 1990; District Court File No.
1:90-CV-159.
Pfiefle v. Hustwaite (King County Superior Court, Washington;
civil settlement, 1991). Plaintiff, a 31-year-old woman, alleged
that when she was a grade school student at Sky Valley Seventh
Day Adventist School between 1969 and 1976 she was repeatedly
raped and molested by a teacher. She recovered the memory as an
adult. "Discovery revealed several other victims, whose
testimony was helpful in establishing that the Seventh Day
Adventist should have known of the teacher's propensities."
Shepard's/McGraw-Hill, Verdicts, Settlements & Tactics (1991)
D’s recovered memory (in 1991) of sexual abuse by her father,
Stanley Huntingford, 20-34 years earlier. As summarized by
Justice Thackray: "Mr. Huntingford was convicted by a jury on
six counts of what is now generally called sexual assault. The
charges were brought by three of his five children. Of the
three, two had continuous memories of the abuse while the third,
D., recovered her memory 34 years after the first assault." Her
Majesty the Queen v. Stanley Charles Huntingford (Supreme Court
of British Columbia)(Vancouver Registry No. CC940539).
"The first woman [with continuous memory] said that her father
regularly raped her, but stopped when she was 14 because she
screamed when he came into her bedroom. She said she told her
mother about the incidents in 1981….The accused’s wife, who
testified for the defense, told the jury she never confronted
her husband hen the first daughter told her in 1981 about the
abuse." Larry Still, "Father, 73, convicted of incest,"
Vancouver Sun (February 4, 1995: A6).
As Justice Thackray explained at sentencing, on March 28,
1995: "The Crown retained the services of Dr. John Yuille. Dr.
Yuille is a psychologist and a leading expert in retention and
recovery of memory. He also has impressive credentials in the
area of sexual abuse. Dr. Yuille interviewed D. and prepared a
report….. Dr. Yuille therefore gave oral evidence in which he,
in my opinion, fairly set forth the opinions of the two opposing
camps. Dr. Yuille did not in any way demean the opinion of Dr.
Loftus or the opinions of others with whom he parts company on
the subject. Rather, he showed an objectivity that allowed both
the Crown and the defence to rely upon his evidence and
recommend it to the jury." Id.
Commonwealth v. Slutzer (1992 Superior Court of Pennsylvania;
criminal jury verdict). "On November 24, 1990, John Mudd Jr. was
involved in a fight with a friend when, he said, he suddenly
dropped a chair he was holding and started crying. "That's when
I remembered everything that happened that night," he said
during a court hearing [concerning the murder of his father 16
years earlier]." Jon Schmitz, "Court Upholds Murder Conviction
on Son's Old Memory," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (October 8, 1993):
B-1. "The sudden recollections of John Mudd Jr. rekindled the
investigation of his father's murder 16 years ago and thrust the
case into the national limelight. But Steven Slutzker's own
words and the testimony of less sensational witnesses led to his
first-degree murder conviction, jury forewoman Deb Magness said
yesterday after the trial." Jim Cuddy Jr., "Witnesses Convicted
Slutzker of Murder, Juror Says," Pittsburgh Press, (January 29,
1992): B4 In his opinion filed with the appeals court, Judge
Jeffrey Manning said that Mudd's testimony "was markedly
consistent with the testimony of others about the events that
night and with the physical evidence." ["Mudd Jr. testified he
had been watching television with his parents when there was a
power failure, which prompted Mudd Sr. to go to the basement to
check the fuse box. Police later discovered that a fuse that
directed power to the living room had been loosened." Cuddy,
1992] The judgment of sentence was affirmed by a three-judge
panel (809 Pittsburgh 1992 [J-A36043/93]).
Hewczuk v. Sambor ( Civil Action No. 91-6562, Federal District
Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania). "Hewczuk attorney
Nancy Wasser said her client experienced vivid memories of the
alleged torture after she miscarried two years ago….records from
Catholic Charities and hospitals helped corroborate her client's
recollections." (Lisa Brennan, "Abuse Victim Gets $600,000 32
Years Later; Remembered Event Two years Ago," Legal
Intelligencer, November 6, 1992. See also, Lisa Brennan, "Judge
Upholds $600,000 Award in Abuse Case; Memory Suppressed for 32
years," Legal Intelligencer, February 26, 1993: 1)
In response to post-trial motions, the judge affirmed the
verdict, summarizing the evidence and findings as
follows: "Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the
verdict-winner, the trial evidence established that, while in
defendants' foster case for a brief period in early 1960,
plaintiff was horribly mistreated (forced to eat her own vomit
and drink her own urine; smeared with fecal matter and forced to
eat it; bathed in extremely hot water; nearly drowned when her
face was held under water in a toilet bowl; and, on at least one
occasion, sexually assaulted); and that her memory of these
atrocities was totally suppressed for many years. It is also
clear that she regained her memory of these events, more or less
fully, by June of 1991, and that she had begun to
have 'flashbacks' and partial awareness of the earlier trauma in
the summer of 1990." Memorandum and Order, pp. 1-2; Hewczuk v.
Sambor, C.A. 91-6562 (February 18, 1993).
Leonard v. Estate of Cowles. (Hillsborough Circuit Court, 1993).
Frank Leonard's recollection, in therapy, of childhood abuse by
his uncle, Tampa publishing executive Frank Cowles, Jr. "Records
were produced showing that Cowles had been convicted in 1959 of
sexually abusing young boys in Clearwater….According to the
lawsuit, Leonard's uncle admitted the abuse and then killed
himself. Leonard won a settlement from the estate." St.
Petersburg Times, March 6, 1994. See also, "Abuse lawsuit
target's uncle's estate," St. Petersburg Times, April 14, 1993:
1B
Herald v. Hood (Summit County, Ohio, jury verdict, 1992;
affirmed 1995). Julie Herald sued her uncle, Dennis Hood,
alleging sexual abuse from age 3 (in 1962) through 15. The
memory returned while Herald was watching her 4-year old
daughter play with a friend. Herald presented a taped telephone
conversation in which her uncle indicated that she "had been the
only one." Two therapists also testified that at a meeting with
Herald in their offices, he admitted sexually abusing her. She
was awarded $150,000 in compensatory damages and $5 million in
punitive damages. The Ohio Supreme Court recently upheld the
decision. (Reginald Fields, "Witness Says She Felt Confusion and
Guilt; Memory of Sex Abuse Comes Back by Observing Daughter,
Court is Told," Akron Beacon Journal, July 25, 1992: C1.)
Dennis Hood's testimony verifying (a) that knew the subject
matter of Julie Herald's phone call, and (b) that his voice and
Julie Herald's are the ones on the tape.
Complete transcript of the telephone call in which Dennis Hood
acknowledges abusing Julie Herald .
Dr. Devies's testimony on the confrontation between Julie Herald
and Dennis Hood in his office.
Ms.Kepler-Didato's testimony about the same meeting, including
the events immediately thereafter.
R’s recovered memories of being raped as many as 20 times by her
neighbor in childhood, Lorne Francois. "The woman testified that
she was about 13 years old when she went to the accused’s home
one evening to use his living-room telephone because her family
had no phone….She said Francois pulled down her pants and
underwear and had sexual intercourse with her. When it was over,
she said, ‘he told me now to tell anybody, or else." "Prescott
Child Sex-Abuse Probe," Ottawa Citizen (April 1, 1992: p. B2).
Mr. Francois did not take the stand, and the jury reached a
unanimous decision of guilty. The verdict was upheld by the
Ontario Court of Appeal (1993), 14 O.R. 3d 191, with one judge
dissenting due to concerns that the jury drew improper
inferences from the defendant’s failure to take the stand. As
stated by the majority: "The trial judge’s instructions were
unimpeachable." The verdict was also upheld by the Supreme Court
of Canada (R. v. Francois, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 827).
The most powerful corroboration of R’s claim came from Project
Jericho, a massive investigation into child sexual abuse in the
Prescott area. That investigation uncovered a host of other
victims. Francois was found guilty in 1995 "of two sexual
assault charges involving a 13-year-old boy more than 20 years
ago." "Prescott man guilty of sexual abuse," Ottawa Citizen (May
3, 1995: p.D1). "He is already serving six years for sex crimes,
including raping a teenage girl and sexually assaulting two
teenage boys." Id. Charges that Francois sexually assaulted two
patients at the Royal Ottawa Hospital when he was there for a
court-ordered psychiatric assessment in 1991 were dropped when
the Crown failed to move with sufficient speed. Jacquie
Miller, "Child molester’s new charges quashed," Ottawa Citizen
(March 3, 1993: P. A1).
Given Francois’s 30-year history of violent sexual attacks on
children, the Crown moved in 1997 to have him declared a
dangerous-offender. An Ottawa court decided, however, that he
was unfit to take part in the hearing. He was been committed to
a mental hospital, instead. Jeremy Mercer, "Pedophile unfit to
take part in legal action: 69-year-old man faces hospitalization
for dementia instead," Ottawa Citizen (December 5, 1997: p. C3).
Frank Fitzpatrick's memory of prolonged child sexual abuse by
Father James Porter. His personal investigation resulted in tape-
recorded incriminatory statements by Porter, and eventual
identification of dozens of others victims. Porter was
prosecuted criminally in Fall River, Massachusetts, and he pled
guilty. A civil suit against the Catholic church was settled on
terms favorable to the plaintiffs. Robert Correia & Linda
Borg, "'I'm Sorry,' Porter weeps; Victims, judge unmoved; he
gets 18-20 years," Providence Journal-Bulletin, December 9,
1993: 1)
John Robatille's memory of sexual abuse by Father Porter,
triggered by reports about Frank Fitzpatrick. "His specific
memories were confirmed by two classmates… Harvard psychiatrist
Stuart Grassian surveyed 43 [of the Porter victims] in 1993 and
found another 8 - or 19 percent - who reported no thoughts or
memories of the childhood abuse until the case broke in the
media." (Katy Butler, "The Latest on Recovered Memory," Family
Therapy Networker, Nov/Dec 1996: 36).
Keene v. Edie (King County Superior Court, 1993) The jury "found
that Ronald Edie, 57, of Auburn, had molested his former
neighbor between 1973 and 1977…Her claims were bolstered by
testimony of two of Edies daughters and a woman who testified he
molested them when they were children." (Richard
Seven, "Psychiatry of Repressed Memories on Trial," Seattle
Times, July 9, 1993: A1.)
Cynthia Lewis’s memories of child sexual abuse by Rev. Alfred R.
Desrosiers. Her memories were revived in 1993 when her mother,
dying of cancer, expressed the wish to see Father Desrosiers, a
long-time family friend. After a hearing to assess the
reliability of the recovered-memory evidence, Judge Needham
allowed the case to proceed. One reason "was corroborative
evidence" in the form of "conversations Father Desrosiers had
with Louis E. Gelineau, then Bishop of Providence, and the Rev.
Normand Godin after Lewis reported her recalled memories to the
diocese." Tom Mooney, "Why a court accept ‘recovered-memory:
While its legal validity is debate in one sexual-abuse case, a
judge rules that it is reliable and admissible in a trial
involving a Catholic priest," Providence Journal-Bulletin (April
13, 1998: A1).
Hoult v. Hoult (Federal District Court in Massachusetts; jury
verdict, 1993). Successful civil suit against David Hoult for
sustained child sexual abuse. Ms. Hoult's claims were supported
by something her mother witnessed (her father on top of another
sibling in bed) and by a 13-year old babysitter who testified
that David Hoult had sexually molested her. "Other family
members rememberd Jennifer's father grabbing he breasts."
(Minouche Kandel & Eric Kandel, "Flights of Memory," Discover,
May 1994: 32.) Ms. Hoult's family sided with her, and the jury
verdict was unanimous. David Hoult has since sued Ms. Hoult for
libel, over her subsequent statements that he had "raped" her. A
federal district judge recently dismissed that suit after
reviewing the trial record and concluding that "the issue of
rape was decided [in Ms. Hoult's favor] by the jury." Hoult v.
Hoult (Civil Action No. 96-10970-RCL)(Slip opinion, p.6).
People v. Hoffman. (David Hoffman, sentenced in Poughkeepsie,
New York, June 15, 1994 for sexually abusing the young daughter
of his girlfriend 14-16 years earlier. "The woman's first memory
of the abuse came when she was typing a report regard a sexual
abuse case," working in a probation office in Grand Rapids,
Michigan. (ErinMarie Medick, "Woman's Repressed Memories of
Abuse Leads to Conviction, Columbus Dispatch, June 14, 1994:
1A). The woman eventually filed a police report, a detective
interviewed Hoffman, who had been convicted in 1986 of sexually
abusing children at a children's home in Duchess, County, New
York. Hoffman admitted he committed the earlier crimes, while a
graduate student at Ohio State University and pled guilty as
charged.
Gonzalez v. Boullon (Florida jury verdict, 1994). Dr. Nina
Gonzalez successfully brought a civil suit against her
stepfather, Luis Boullon, in Florida. "While a premed at Holy
Cross College in Worcester, Mass, she began to remember what she
recalled as nighttime visits from her stepfather…Testimony of
her little cousin and her stepmother who she told of
the 'massages' years before also weighed with the jurors."
Gonzalez's older brother, Ricardo, testified he had witnessed
two instances of abuse. (John Lantingua, "$1 Million Award Over
Repressed Memory of Abuse," Miami Herald, February 14, 1994: 1A.)
Crook vs. Murphy (Benton County Superior Court, Washington; Case
No. 91-2-01102-5) Verdict for plaintiff by Judge Dennis Yule,
February, 1994. Lynn Crook, the oldest of six childern,
successfully sued her father for recovered memories of child
sexual abuse. One of her sisters testified to an abusive event
she always remembered. This decision is noteworthy for what it
says about Richard Ofshe, a sociologist who testified against
Ms. Crook: "Just as (Ofshe) accuses (therapists) of resolving at
the outset (to find) repressed memories of abuse and then
constructing them, he has resolved at the outset to find a
macabre scheme of memories progressing toward satanic cult
ritual and then creates them." There is a detailed excerpt from
the Los Angeles Times about how Ofshe & Watters misrepresented
the facts of this case in their book, Making Monsters. Ms. Crook
has written a response to Ofshe & Watters, which was published
in the Journal of Child Sexual Abuse.
Alley v. Alley (King County Superior Court, 1994). Plaintiff
successfully sued her father, William Alley, for sexual assault
in her childhood. "No one in the Alley's family testified on the
father's behalf….[The plaintiff's attorneys] used psychiatric
records filed during Williams Alley's 1970s divorce to support
the family's claim of incest and abuse." Richard Seven, "It
Wasn't the Money, It Was Principle; Jury says Father Raped
Daughter," Seattle Times, June 14, 1994: B1). "In addition, an
unexpected witness for the plaintiff came forward during the
last week of the trial, after having read about the case in the
paper, to offer testimony that when she was 12 and Julie Alley
was 6, Ms. Alley told her that, "My daddy touched me," and
pointed to her vagina." ("Dentist Found Liable in Recovered
Memory Case," PR Newswire, June 13, 1994. )
People v. Lynch. California criminal charges against William
Lynch. "Charged with 14 counts of lewd conduct with a child
stemming from alleged attacks on four women when they were
between 7 and 13 years old from March 1967, to July, 1972." One
of the women repressed the memory, the others remembered the
abuse ever since. (Julie Tamaki, "Abuse Case to Challenge New
Law on Limitations," Los Angeles Times, May 15, 1994: B1).
Chris White, whose repressed memories of sexual abuse at Ryerson
Public School 20 years ago, resulted in a guilty plea by Robert
Warren. "Now in his mid-50s and living in British Columbia,
Warren had been with the Toronto Board of Education for 23 years
and had two other convictions for sexual offenses against
children. One dated back to 1965 in Lindsay; the other was in
British Columbia in 1988." (Judy Steed, "Abuse Victim…" The
Toronto Star, May 7, 1995: A1).
Cheit v. San Francisco Boys Chorus and William Farmer (San
Francisco Superior Court: civil settlement with SFBC, default
judgment against Farmer, 1994)(Plumas County Criminal Court:
warrant and criminal arrest, 1994). Corroborated by other
victims and by tape-recorded admission. See, Mike
Stanton, "Bearing Witness" [three-part series] Providence
Journal-Bulletin, May 7-9, 1995; see also, Miriam
Horn, "Unlocking Hidden Memories, " U.S. News & World Report,
November 29, 1993; "Update: Recalling the past, embracing the
future," August 4, 1997.
State v. Quattrocchi (Rhode Island Superior Court jury verdict;
RI Supreme Court No. 95-343-C.A.). The first criminal case in
Rhode Island involving recovered memory. The state presented
evidence from two other girls who reported sexual assaults by
Quattrocchi: one was his own goddaughter, who the defendant
cornered naked in a shower when she was seven-years old (in
1977). She told her parents about it when she was a sophomore in
college. The other incident occurred four years later (in 1981)
and resulted in a contemporaneous report to the police. The
events at issue in this criminal case cover the same years as
those incidents. [In Catch-22 reasoning, the Rhode Island
Supreme court subsequently ruled that such evidence was "too
prejudicial" and the defendant would have to be retried without
such evidence. Without such evidence, many states considered
this kind of testimony too unreliable - in absence of the kind
of corroboration that the Rhode Island court now prohibits.]
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Crawford. (Guilty verdict in
murder case, 1995). "Franklin Crawford, 49, of Dayton was
charged in May 1994 with the murder of Pearl Mae Altman after
another man said that seeing a woman who resembled the victim
brought forth repressed memories of witnessing Crawford throwing
the woman off a bridge. "John Reed cried as he testified
Thursday that he was 16 on Oct. 22, 1971, when he saw Crawford
throw Pearl Mae Altman into the Allegheny River." "Man Guilty in
1971 Slaying After Witness Recalls the Drowning," Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette, February 19, 1995: D15.) A woman's purse and shoes
were found 23 years ago near the spot where he said Altman was
thrown in the river. Crawford also happened to have been the
prime suspect at the time. Crawford's then-wife testified "that
her husband came home that night, removed his clothes, and put
them in the washer. She said it was the only time in their
marriage he put clothes in the washer. She said he got dressed
again and, before leaving, told her to tell anyone looking for
him that she hadn't seen him." Lawrence Walsh, "Murder Memory
Misjudged by Judge," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, August 11, 1996:
B6. [This case was reversed on the ground that the judge did not
allow testimony of a psychiatrist who would have testified about
the "unreliability" of recovered memory, the corroborative ase
notwithstanding. The case is still pending.]
Thomas v. Freeman (Lee County, North Carolina, unanimous jury
verdict, June 22, 1995; Case No. 93 CVS 831; upheld by North
Carolina Court of Appeals, November 19, 1996; No. COA96-226).
Unanimous jury verdict for Shirley Thomas against her father,
Velton Freeman, "for decades' old, once-repressed memories of
horrific physical and sexual abuse…Witnesses corroborated
Thomas' claims with their own memories of Freeman hitting,
bruising and cursing Thomas; of him carrying her out of her
bedroom at night and her returning later in tears; of Thomas
being terrified of his wrath; and of Thomas' mother leaving
marriage and the household in 1962 or '63, long before her
mother and sister claimed it occurred in 1966." (See five-part
series by Jill Warren Lucas, beginning with "Jury Awards
$600,000 in abuse case," Sanford Herald, June 13, 1995.)
D.M.M, a 39-year old Canadian actress. "Remembered repeated
abuse by her family doctor when she joined Alcoholics Anonymous
after years of heavy drinking….[In March, 1996] a provincial
justice ordered Leo Pilo, M.D. to pay her $95,000 -- despite the
testimony of FMSF advisory board member and psychiatrist Harold
Merskey, who suggested that D.M.M. was probably suffering
from ""false memories."" D.M.M.s accusations were supported by
four other women who said Pilo had sexually abused them in
childhood. Pilo's medical license had been previously revoked in
a separate proceeding in which he admitted the women's charges."
(Katy Butler, "The Latest on Recovered Memory," Family Therapy
Networker, Nov/Dec 1996: 36, 37). Criticism by affiliates of the
False Memory Syndrome Foundation. Full-text of the relevant
legal documents in response.
Wilson v. Phillips (California jury verdict, 1996). LaDonna
Wilson and her half-sister (who does not want to be identified)
sued John Phillips for sexual molestations when each daughter
was about 5 years old. A jury awarded $1.15 million in
compensatory damages. "During the trial, Wilson, her sister and
mother testified about a time when Wilson's bed came crashing
down on a box of kittens. When the others came into the bedroom,
Phillips was there naked." (David Reyes, "2 Daughters Win $1.15
Million in Sex Abuse Case," Los Angeles Times, March 30, 1996:
1b).
Franklin v. Stevenson (Utah jury verdict, 1996). Cherise
Franklin's memories of sexual abuse by Kenton Stevenson. As
documented at trial, Franklin was in and out of therapy; her
flashbacks were not recovered during therapy session. "After
recording her [recovered] memories in a dated journal, Franklin
hired a private detective, found Stevenson's former wife and
learned that Stevenson had been found to have abused his own
children as well. At trial [in August 1996] in Salt Lake City,
Stevenson's 16-year-old daughter, Rayne Burtchin, testified that
her father had sexually abused her. A stepdaughter testified
that he had mutilated animals in front of her. The accounts were
supported by a 1986 Family court divorce and custody ruling,
finding that Stevenson had sexually abused his son and two
daughters and had raped one with a coat hanger." (Katy
Butler, "The Latest on Recovered Memory," Family Therapy
Networker, Nov/Dec 1996: 36, 37). The Findings of Fact
established that Stevenson abused all three of his children in
the other marriage. In a highly unusual move, the judge entered
a judgment not withstanding the verdict, in favor of the
defendant. The case is on appeal. Note: Question No. 2 in the
Special Verdict form asked "Did Cherise Franklin produce
corroborating evidence in support of the allegations of abuse
against Kenton Stevenson? The jury responded: Yes.
Shahzade v. Gregory (Massachusetts federal district court,
Docket No. 92-12139-H). Civil suit by Ann Shahzade against an
older cousin for molesting her for a five-year period beginning
when she was 11 years old. "Her cousin, George Gregory, a
California surgeon, acknowledges he fondled her, but says he did
not sexually assault her." Judy Rakowsky, "Memory Expert
Supports Woman," Boston Globe, April 1, 1996: 26. In his
deposition, Gregory admitted a series of fondling incidents that
occurred over a 12 to 16 month period. (Deposition of George
Gregory, May 10, 1995, pages 80-83; he admitted additional
fondling on pages 133-135.) Note: "fondling" is sexual assault
under the criminal laws of virtually every state. (The full text
of the decision to allow recovered memory testimony is available
through Jim Hopper's site on "Recovered Memories of Sexual
Abuse: Scientific Research & Scholarly Resources.") The
defendant settled the case after this decision was rendered;
there is a gag order prohibiting release of the settlement
amount.
Martinelli v. Diocese of Bridgeport (1997 Connecticut civil jury
verdict). Frank Martinelli's adult recollections of sexual abuse
by Father Laurence Brett at St. Cecilia Church in Stamford
between 1962 and 1964. "Martinelli, who is married and has a
young son, testified during the eight-day trial that he
repressed his memory of the abuse until 1991, when it all came
back to him like a "wave" while he was on the telephone with a
friend who told him he had also been abused by Brett as a
child." Daniel Tepfer, "Diocese must pay; Jury awards $750,000
to victim," Connecticut Post (August 27, 1997): A1."Probably the
most damaging evidence of the trial was a memo of a meeting that
took place among diocese officials on Dec. 2, 1964, regarding an
assault by Brett on a 19-year-old male Sacred Heart University
student. The memo states the teen had gone to Brett to discuss a
sexual problem and Brett ended up performing oral sex on him.
The memo goes on to state that Brett was being sent away for
treatment, and, 'A recurrence of hepatitis was to be feigned
should anyone ask,' it read." Id.
Peter VanVeldhuizen’s memories of childhood sexual abuse from
1966 to 1968 by Reverend J. Van Zweden of the Netherlands
Reformed Congregation Church. VanVeldhuizen v. Netherlands
Reformed Church of Rock Valley (Iowa District Court for Sioux
County; 1997). VanVeldhuizen repressed the memory and did not
recall the abuse until February 1991, while undergoing
psychotherapy.
To avoid litigation, Dr. VanVeldthuizen agreed to the request of
the Netherlands Reformed Church to submit the claim and all
related evidence to the Institute for Christian Conciliation. In
a 9 page letter, the Executive Director noted that, "[I]n the
twelve years that I have been working in sexual abuse cases, I
do not recall meeting a more credible witness." Dr.
VanVeldhuizen introduced a variety of corroborating evidence,
including (1) testimony that Rev. Van Zweden sexually abused his
grandson, and (2) eyewitness testimony to one of the incidents
of sexual abuse of Peter VanVeldhuizen by Rev. Van Zweden. The
mediator concluded that, "Peter has more than met the highest
biblical standard of proof, which is actually required only in
capital offenses, namely, that the sin be confirmed by the
testimony of at least two witnesses."
After insisting on Christian Conciliation, the Church refused to
go along with the findings. Dr. VanVeldhuizen sued and proved
his case (again) in court. A Sioux County jury awarded
compensatory and punitive damages, after VanVeldhuizen proved
that Albert Bakker, a church official at the time, witnessed the
acts but did nothing to stop then or to report them to the
appropriate officials.33 Corroborated Cases of Recovered Memory
Cases from Legal Proceedings
Overview: All of the cases in this file involve claims in legal
proceedings. Some cases are criminal, some are civil, and a few
are administrative or involve an estate. The criminal cases all
resulted in either a guilty verdict or a guilty plea. The civil
cases all resulted in either a civil judgment or a civil
settlement. The cases included pre-trial discovery on the facts,
and often full-blown adjudication. In short, the corroboration
in these cases has been scrutinized and in many cases verified
through a legal proceeding.
K.B.’s recovered memories of child sexual abuse by a neighbor
and close family friend. K.B. v. Mathes (U.S. District Court,
Eastern District of Washington). Filed in 1982 (Docket No. C-82-
56), decided January 5, 1984 by Judge Justin L. Quackenbush.
Judgment for the plaintiff; no appeal by defendant.
"K.B.’s testimony is confirmed to some extent by her sister
Lisa’s testimony. Then we have what I call the age fourteen
alcohol incident…the incident when K. arrived home in an
intoxicated state. (oral decision, filed January 11, 1984, p.
2). "Then we have Mr. Mathe’s own testimony that the only
statement he made to Mrs. B was that ‘I wish it hadn’t happe!
ned.’" (Id. at p.4) [Additional evidence of financial payments
by Mr. Mathes as indicating "some scienter or guilty knowledge
on the part of Mr. Mathes" on p. 5] Finally, "based on the
evidence presented in this case…I find that K.B. completely
repressed her recollections of the defendant’s wrongful conduct
from the time of her high school years when she was obviously a
minor until she began seeking counseling for her depression and
anxiety in late 1979. (Id. at p.9) "I further find that it was
not until at least April of 1981 that Ms. B. was able to fully
recall the acts of misconduct by the defendant." (Id. at p.10)
Delaney Nickerson’s memories of child sexual abuse by her
father. The memories first surfaced while Ms. Nickerson was
hospitalized in 1984. Ms. Nickerson filed a criminal complaint
several years later and Mr. Smith was charged. He later pled
guilt, being placed on lifetime parole and ordered by the court
to have no further contact with his daughter. Commonwealth v.
Landon Carter Smith (felony criminal case: Peterburg Virginia,
1990).
Meiers-Post v. Schafer (Michigan Court of Appeals, 1988) A civil
suit by Jan Meiers-Post against her former high-school teacher
for sexual abuse from 1970 to 1974. "We hold that the period of
limitation is tolled where the child victim of an illicit sexual
relationship psychologically represses the memory of the events
and where, after the memory is revived there is corroboration
that the events actually occurred.." "In his deposition,
defendant admitted to having sexual intercourse with plaintiff,
at various times, from 1972 to 1974." 427 N.W. 2d 606, 607.
State v. Wilson (Polk County, Iowa; August, 1990). Criminal
conviction of Thomas Dean Wilson for incest and third-degree
sexual abuse of his daughter. "The trauma was so great that she
was unable to remember for eight years—and then only after
months of therapy." (Marie McCartan, "'Daddy Hurts Me'… The
Horror of Incest," Des Moines Register, February 17, 1991: 1E).
The corroborating evidence uncovered through discovery
included 'inappropriate advances' made by the defendant toward
another minor in his role has a church chaperon, and a former
teen-age babysitter for the family who had repeated sexual
relations with the defendant. There was additional corroboration
from M's childhood medical records. Twelve jurors found Tom
Wilson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Nicolette v. Carey (Federal District Court, Western District of
Michigan, 1990 judicial decision). Civil action by Suzanne
Nicolette against her father, Joseph Carey for child sexual
abuse first remembered in adulthood. In denying the defendant's
motion to dismiss the case, Judge Benjamin F. Gibson noted
that "plaintiff has submitted a letter addressed to plaintiff,
signed by defendant and dated April 19, 1987, in which defendant
discussed three or four incidents of sexual contact he had with
the plaintiff when she was a child." See, Plaintiff's Exhibit
No. 5. Opinion dated November 19, 1990; District Court File No.
1:90-CV-159.
Pfiefle v. Hustwaite (King County Superior Court, Washington;
civil settlement, 1991). Plaintiff, a 31-year-old woman, alleged
that when she was a grade school student at Sky Valley Seventh
Day Adventist School between 1969 and 1976 she was repeatedly
raped and molested by a teacher. She recovered the memory as an
adult. "Discovery revealed several other victims, whose
testimony was helpful in establishing that the Seventh Day
Adventist should have known of the teacher's propensities."
Shepard's/McGraw-Hill, Verdicts, Settlements & Tactics (1991)
D’s recovered memory (in 1991) of sexual abuse by her father,
Stanley Huntingford, 20-34 years earlier. As summarized by
Justice Thackray: "Mr. Huntingford was convicted by a jury on
six counts of what is now generally called sexual assault. The
charges were brought by three of his five children. Of the
three, two had continuous memories of the abuse while the third,
D., recovered her memory 34 years after the first assault." Her
Majesty the Queen v. Stanley Charles Huntingford (Supreme Court
of British Columbia)(Vancouver Registry No. CC940539).
"The first woman [with continuous memory] said that her father
regularly raped her, but stopped when she was 14 because she
screamed when he came into her bedroom. She said she told her
mother about the incidents in 1981….The accused’s wife, who
testified for the defense, told the jury she never confronted
her husband hen the first daughter told her in 1981 about the
abuse." Larry Still, "Father, 73, convicted of incest,"
Vancouver Sun (February 4, 1995: A6).
As Justice Thackray explained at sentencing, on March 28,
1995: "The Crown retained the services of Dr. John Yuille. Dr.
Yuille is a psychologist and a leading expert in retention and
recovery of memory. He also has impressive credentials in the
area of sexual abuse. Dr. Yuille interviewed D. and prepared a
report….. Dr. Yuille therefore gave oral evidence in which he,
in my opinion, fairly set forth the opinions of the two opposing
camps. Dr. Yuille did not in any way demean the opinion of Dr.
Loftus or the opinions of others with whom he parts company on
the subject. Rather, he showed an objectivity that allowed both
the Crown and the defence to rely upon his evidence and
recommend it to the jury." Id.
Commonwealth v. Slutzer (1992 Superior Court of Pennsylvania;
criminal jury verdict). "On November 24, 1990, John Mudd Jr. was
involved in a fight with a friend when, he said, he suddenly
dropped a chair he was holding and started crying. "That's when
I remembered everything that happened that night," he said
during a court hearing [concerning the murder of his father 16
years earlier]." Jon Schmitz, "Court Upholds Murder Conviction
on Son's Old Memory," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (October 8, 1993):
B-1. "The sudden recollections of John Mudd Jr. rekindled the
investigation of his father's murder 16 years ago and thrust the
case into the national limelight. But Steven Slutzker's own
words and the testimony of less sensational witnesses led to his
first-degree murder conviction, jury forewoman Deb Magness said
yesterday after the trial." Jim Cuddy Jr., "Witnesses Convicted
Slutzker of Murder, Juror Says," Pittsburgh Press, (January 29,
1992): B4 In his opinion filed with the appeals court, Judge
Jeffrey Manning said that Mudd's testimony "was markedly
consistent with the testimony of others about the events that
night and with the physical evidence." ["Mudd Jr. testified he
had been watching television with his parents when there was a
power failure, which prompted Mudd Sr. to go to the basement to
check the fuse box. Police later discovered that a fuse that
directed power to the living room had been loosened." Cuddy,
1992] The judgment of sentence was affirmed by a three-judge
panel (809 Pittsburgh 1992 [J-A36043/93]).
Hewczuk v. Sambor ( Civil Action No. 91-6562, Federal District
Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania). "Hewczuk attorney
Nancy Wasser said her client experienced vivid memories of the
alleged torture after she miscarried two years ago….records from
Catholic Charities and hospitals helped corroborate her client's
recollections." (Lisa Brennan, "Abuse Victim Gets $600,000 32
Years Later; Remembered Event Two years Ago," Legal
Intelligencer, November 6, 1992. See also, Lisa Brennan, "Judge
Upholds $600,000 Award in Abuse Case; Memory Suppressed for 32
years," Legal Intelligencer, February 26, 1993: 1)
In response to post-trial motions, the judge affirmed the
verdict, summarizing the evidence and findings as
follows: "Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the
verdict-winner, the trial evidence established that, while in
defendants' foster case for a brief period in early 1960,
plaintiff was horribly mistreated (forced to eat her own vomit
and drink her own urine; smeared with fecal matter and forced to
eat it; bathed in extremely hot water; nearly drowned when her
face was held under water in a toilet bowl; and, on at least one
occasion, sexually assaulted); and that her memory of these
atrocities was totally suppressed for many years. It is also
clear that she regained her memory of these events, more or less
fully, by June of 1991, and that she had begun to
have 'flashbacks' and partial awareness of the earlier trauma in
the summer of 1990." Memorandum and Order, pp. 1-2; Hewczuk v.
Sambor, C.A. 91-6562 (February 18, 1993).
Leonard v. Estate of Cowles. (Hillsborough Circuit Court, 1993).
Frank Leonard's recollection, in therapy, of childhood abuse by
his uncle, Tampa publishing executive Frank Cowles, Jr. "Records
were produced showing that Cowles had been convicted in 1959 of
sexually abusing young boys in Clearwater….According to the
lawsuit, Leonard's uncle admitted the abuse and then killed
himself. Leonard won a settlement from the estate." St.
Petersburg Times, March 6, 1994. See also, "Abuse lawsuit
target's uncle's estate," St. Petersburg Times, April 14, 1993:
1B
Herald v. Hood (Summit County, Ohio, jury verdict, 1992;
affirmed 1995). Julie Herald sued her uncle, Dennis Hood,
alleging sexual abuse from age 3 (in 1962) through 15. The
memory returned while Herald was watching her 4-year old
daughter play with a friend. Herald presented a taped telephone
conversation in which her uncle indicated that she "had been the
only one." Two therapists also testified that at a meeting with
Herald in their offices, he admitted sexually abusing her. She
was awarded $150,000 in compensatory damages and $5 million in
punitive damages. The Ohio Supreme Court recently upheld the
decision. (Reginald Fields, "Witness Says She Felt Confusion and
Guilt; Memory of Sex Abuse Comes Back by Observing Daughter,
Court is Told," Akron Beacon Journal, July 25, 1992: C1.)
Dennis Hood's testimony verifying (a) that knew the subject
matter of Julie Herald's phone call, and (b) that his voice and
Julie Herald's are the ones on the tape.
Complete transcript of the telephone call in which Dennis Hood
acknowledges abusing Julie Herald .
Dr. Devies's testimony on the confrontation between Julie Herald
and Dennis Hood in his office.
Ms.Kepler-Didato's testimony about the same meeting, including
the events immediately thereafter.
R’s recovered memories of being raped as many as 20 times by her
neighbor in childhood, Lorne Francois. "The woman testified that
she was about 13 years old when she went to the accused’s home
one evening to use his living-room telephone because her family
had no phone….She said Francois pulled down her pants and
underwear and had sexual intercourse with her. When it was over,
she said, ‘he told me now to tell anybody, or else." "Prescott
Child Sex-Abuse Probe," Ottawa Citizen (April 1, 1992: p. B2).
Mr. Francois did not take the stand, and the jury reached a
unanimous decision of guilty. The verdict was upheld by the
Ontario Court of Appeal (1993), 14 O.R. 3d 191, with one judge
dissenting due to concerns that the jury drew improper
inferences from the defendant’s failure to take the stand. As
stated by the majority: "The trial judge’s instructions were
unimpeachable." The verdict was also upheld by the Supreme Court
of Canada (R. v. Francois, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 827).
The most powerful corroboration of R’s claim came from Project
Jericho, a massive investigation into child sexual abuse in the
Prescott area. That investigation uncovered a host of other
victims. Francois was found guilty in 1995 "of two sexual
assault charges involving a 13-year-old boy more than 20 years
ago." "Prescott man guilty of sexual abuse," Ottawa Citizen (May
3, 1995: p.D1). "He is already serving six years for sex crimes,
including raping a teenage girl and sexually assaulting two
teenage boys." Id. Charges that Francois sexually assaulted two
patients at the Royal Ottawa Hospital when he was there for a
court-ordered psychiatric assessment in 1991 were dropped when
the Crown failed to move with sufficient speed. Jacquie
Miller, "Child molester’s new charges quashed," Ottawa Citizen
(March 3, 1993: P. A1).
Given Francois’s 30-year history of violent sexual attacks on
children, the Crown moved in 1997 to have him declared a
dangerous-offender. An Ottawa court decided, however, that he
was unfit to take part in the hearing. He was been committed to
a mental hospital, instead. Jeremy Mercer, "Pedophile unfit to
take part in legal action: 69-year-old man faces hospitalization
for dementia instead," Ottawa Citizen (December 5, 1997: p. C3).
Frank Fitzpatrick's memory of prolonged child sexual abuse by
Father James Porter. His personal investigation resulted in tape-
recorded incriminatory statements by Porter, and eventual
identification of dozens of others victims. Porter was
prosecuted criminally in Fall River, Massachusetts, and he pled
guilty. A civil suit against the Catholic church was settled on
terms favorable to the plaintiffs. Robert Correia & Linda
Borg, "'I'm Sorry,' Porter weeps; Victims, judge unmoved; he
gets 18-20 years," Providence Journal-Bulletin, December 9,
1993: 1)
John Robatille's memory of sexual abuse by Father Porter,
triggered by reports about Frank Fitzpatrick. "His specific
memories were confirmed by two classmates… Harvard psychiatrist
Stuart Grassian surveyed 43 [of the Porter victims] in 1993 and
found another 8 - or 19 percent - who reported no thoughts or
memories of the childhood abuse until the case broke in the
media." (Katy Butler, "The Latest on Recovered Memory," Family
Therapy Networker, Nov/Dec 1996: 36).
Keene v. Edie (King County Superior Court, 1993) The jury "found
that Ronald Edie, 57, of Auburn, had molested his former
neighbor between 1973 and 1977…Her claims were bolstered by
testimony of two of Edies daughters and a woman who testified he
molested them when they were children." (Richard
Seven, "Psychiatry of Repressed Memories on Trial," Seattle
Times, July 9, 1993: A1.)
Cynthia Lewis’s memories of child sexual abuse by Rev. Alfred R.
Desrosiers. Her memories were revived in 1993 when her mother,
dying of cancer, expressed the wish to see Father Desrosiers, a
long-time family friend. After a hearing to assess the
reliability of the recovered-memory evidence, Judge Needham
allowed the case to proceed. One reason "was corroborative
evidence" in the form of "conversations Father Desrosiers had
with Louis E. Gelineau, then Bishop of Providence, and the Rev.
Normand Godin after Lewis reported her recalled memories to the
diocese." Tom Mooney, "Why a court accept ‘recovered-memory:
While its legal validity is debate in one sexual-abuse case, a
judge rules that it is reliable and admissible in a trial
involving a Catholic priest," Providence Journal-Bulletin (April
13, 1998: A1).
Hoult v. Hoult (Federal District Court in Massachusetts; jury
verdict, 1993). Successful civil suit against David Hoult for
sustained child sexual abuse. Ms. Hoult's claims were supported
by something her mother witnessed (her father on top of another
sibling in bed) and by a 13-year old babysitter who testified
that David Hoult had sexually molested her. "Other family
members rememberd Jennifer's father grabbing he breasts."
(Minouche Kandel & Eric Kandel, "Flights of Memory," Discover,
May 1994: 32.) Ms. Hoult's family sided with her, and the jury
verdict was unanimous. David Hoult has since sued Ms. Hoult for
libel, over her subsequent statements that he had "raped" her. A
federal district judge recently dismissed that suit after
reviewing the trial record and concluding that "the issue of
rape was decided [in Ms. Hoult's favor] by the jury." Hoult v.
Hoult (Civil Action No. 96-10970-RCL)(Slip opinion, p.6).
People v. Hoffman. (David Hoffman, sentenced in Poughkeepsie,
New York, June 15, 1994 for sexually abusing the young daughter
of his girlfriend 14-16 years earlier. "The woman's first memory
of the abuse came when she was typing a report regard a sexual
abuse case," working in a probation office in Grand Rapids,
Michigan. (ErinMarie Medick, "Woman's Repressed Memories of
Abuse Leads to Conviction, Columbus Dispatch, June 14, 1994:
1A). The woman eventually filed a police report, a detective
interviewed Hoffman, who had been convicted in 1986 of sexually
abusing children at a children's home in Duchess, County, New
York. Hoffman admitted he committed the earlier crimes, while a
graduate student at Ohio State University and pled guilty as
charged.
Gonzalez v. Boullon (Florida jury verdict, 1994). Dr. Nina
Gonzalez successfully brought a civil suit against her
stepfather, Luis Boullon, in Florida. "While a premed at Holy
Cross College in Worcester, Mass, she began to remember what she
recalled as nighttime visits from her stepfather…Testimony of
her little cousin and her stepmother who she told of
the 'massages' years before also weighed with the jurors."
Gonzalez's older brother, Ricardo, testified he had witnessed
two instances of abuse. (John Lantingua, "$1 Million Award Over
Repressed Memory of Abuse," Miami Herald, February 14, 1994: 1A.)
Crook vs. Murphy (Benton County Superior Court, Washington; Case
No. 91-2-01102-5) Verdict for plaintiff by Judge Dennis Yule,
February, 1994. Lynn Crook, the oldest of six childern,
successfully sued her father for recovered memories of child
sexual abuse. One of her sisters testified to an abusive event
she always remembered. This decision is noteworthy for what it
says about Richard Ofshe, a sociologist who testified against
Ms. Crook: "Just as (Ofshe) accuses (therapists) of resolving at
the outset (to find) repressed memories of abuse and then
constructing them, he has resolved at the outset to find a
macabre scheme of memories progressing toward satanic cult
ritual and then creates them." There is a detailed excerpt from
the Los Angeles Times about how Ofshe & Watters misrepresented
the facts of this case in their book, Making Monsters. Ms. Crook
has written a response to Ofshe & Watters, which was published
in the Journal of Child Sexual Abuse.
Alley v. Alley (King County Superior Court, 1994). Plaintiff
successfully sued her father, William Alley, for sexual assault
in her childhood. "No one in the Alley's family testified on the
father's behalf….[The plaintiff's attorneys] used psychiatric
records filed during Williams Alley's 1970s divorce to support
the family's claim of incest and abuse." Richard Seven, "It
Wasn't the Money, It Was Principle; Jury says Father Raped
Daughter," Seattle Times, June 14, 1994: B1). "In addition, an
unexpected witness for the plaintiff came forward during the
last week of the trial, after having read about the case in the
paper, to offer testimony that when she was 12 and Julie Alley
was 6, Ms. Alley told her that, "My daddy touched me," and
pointed to her vagina." ("Dentist Found Liable in Recovered
Memory Case," PR Newswire, June 13, 1994. )
People v. Lynch. California criminal charges against William
Lynch. "Charged with 14 counts of lewd conduct with a child
stemming from alleged attacks on four women when they were
between 7 and 13 years old from March 1967, to July, 1972." One
of the women repressed the memory, the others remembered the
abuse ever since. (Julie Tamaki, "Abuse Case to Challenge New
Law on Limitations," Los Angeles Times, May 15, 1994: B1).
Chris White, whose repressed memories of sexual abuse at Ryerson
Public School 20 years ago, resulted in a guilty plea by Robert
Warren. "Now in his mid-50s and living in British Columbia,
Warren had been with the Toronto Board of Education for 23 years
and had two other convictions for sexual offenses against
children. One dated back to 1965 in Lindsay; the other was in
British Columbia in 1988." (Judy Steed, "Abuse Victim…" The
Toronto Star, May 7, 1995: A1).
Cheit v. San Francisco Boys Chorus and William Farmer (San
Francisco Superior Court: civil settlement with SFBC, default
judgment against Farmer, 1994)(Plumas County Criminal Court:
warrant and criminal arrest, 1994). Corroborated by other
victims and by tape-recorded admission. See, Mike
Stanton, "Bearing Witness" [three-part series] Providence
Journal-Bulletin, May 7-9, 1995; see also, Miriam
Horn, "Unlocking Hidden Memories, " U.S. News & World Report,
November 29, 1993; "Update: Recalling the past, embracing the
future," August 4, 1997.
State v. Quattrocchi (Rhode Island Superior Court jury verdict;
RI Supreme Court No. 95-343-C.A.). The first criminal case in
Rhode Island involving recovered memory. The state presented
evidence from two other girls who reported sexual assaults by
Quattrocchi: one was his own goddaughter, who the defendant
cornered naked in a shower when she was seven-years old (in
1977). She told her parents about it when she was a sophomore in
college. The other incident occurred four years later (in 1981)
and resulted in a contemporaneous report to the police. The
events at issue in this criminal case cover the same years as
those incidents. [In Catch-22 reasoning, the Rhode Island
Supreme court subsequently ruled that such evidence was "too
prejudicial" and the defendant would have to be retried without
such evidence. Without such evidence, many states considered
this kind of testimony too unreliable - in absence of the kind
of corroboration that the Rhode Island court now prohibits.]
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Crawford. (Guilty verdict in
murder case, 1995). "Franklin Crawford, 49, of Dayton was
charged in May 1994 with the murder of Pearl Mae Altman after
another man said that seeing a woman who resembled the victim
brought forth repressed memories of witnessing Crawford throwing
the woman off a bridge. "John Reed cried as he testified
Thursday that he was 16 on Oct. 22, 1971, when he saw Crawford
throw Pearl Mae Altman into the Allegheny River." "Man Guilty in
1971 Slaying After Witness Recalls the Drowning," Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette, February 19, 1995: D15.) A woman's purse and shoes
were found 23 years ago near the spot where he said Altman was
thrown in the river. Crawford also happened to have been the
prime suspect at the time. Crawford's then-wife testified "that
her husband came home that night, removed his clothes, and put
them in the washer. She said it was the only time in their
marriage he put clothes in the washer. She said he got dressed
again and, before leaving, told her to tell anyone looking for
him that she hadn't seen him." Lawrence Walsh, "Murder Memory
Misjudged by Judge," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, August 11, 1996:
B6. [This case was reversed on the ground that the judge did not
allow testimony of a psychiatrist who would have testified about
the "unreliability" of recovered memory, the corroborative ase
notwithstanding. The case is still pending.]
Thomas v. Freeman (Lee County, North Carolina, unanimous jury
verdict, June 22, 1995; Case No. 93 CVS 831; upheld by North
Carolina Court of Appeals, November 19, 1996; No. COA96-226).
Unanimous jury verdict for Shirley Thomas against her father,
Velton Freeman, "for decades' old, once-repressed memories of
horrific physical and sexual abuse…Witnesses corroborated
Thomas' claims with their own memories of Freeman hitting,
bruising and cursing Thomas; of him carrying her out of her
bedroom at night and her returning later in tears; of Thomas
being terrified of his wrath; and of Thomas' mother leaving
marriage and the household in 1962 or '63, long before her
mother and sister claimed it occurred in 1966." (See five-part
series by Jill Warren Lucas, beginning with "Jury Awards
$600,000 in abuse case," Sanford Herald, June 13, 1995.)
D.M.M, a 39-year old Canadian actress. "Remembered repeated
abuse by her family doctor when she joined Alcoholics Anonymous
after years of heavy drinking….[In March, 1996] a provincial
justice ordered Leo Pilo, M.D. to pay her $95,000 -- despite the
testimony of FMSF advisory board member and psychiatrist Harold
Merskey, who suggested that D.M.M. was probably suffering
from ""false memories."" D.M.M.s accusations were supported by
four other women who said Pilo had sexually abused them in
childhood. Pilo's medical license had been previously revoked in
a separate proceeding in which he admitted the women's charges."
(Katy Butler, "The Latest on Recovered Memory," Family Therapy
Networker, Nov/Dec 1996: 36, 37). Criticism by affiliates of the
False Memory Syndrome Foundation. Full-text of the relevant
legal documents in response.
Wilson v. Phillips (California jury verdict, 1996). LaDonna
Wilson and her half-sister (who does not want to be identified)
sued John Phillips for sexual molestations when each daughter
was about 5 years old. A jury awarded $1.15 million in
compensatory damages. "During the trial, Wilson, her sister and
mother testified about a time when Wilson's bed came crashing
down on a box of kittens. When the others came into the bedroom,
Phillips was there naked." (David Reyes, "2 Daughters Win $1.15
Million in Sex Abuse Case," Los Angeles Times, March 30, 1996:
1b).
Franklin v. Stevenson (Utah jury verdict, 1996). Cherise
Franklin's memories of sexual abuse by Kenton Stevenson. As
documented at trial, Franklin was in and out of therapy; her
flashbacks were not recovered during therapy session. "After
recording her [recovered] memories in a dated journal, Franklin
hired a private detective, found Stevenson's former wife and
learned that Stevenson had been found to have abused his own
children as well. At trial [in August 1996] in Salt Lake City,
Stevenson's 16-year-old daughter, Rayne Burtchin, testified that
her father had sexually abused her. A stepdaughter testified
that he had mutilated animals in front of her. The accounts were
supported by a 1986 Family court divorce and custody ruling,
finding that Stevenson had sexually abused his son and two
daughters and had raped one with a coat hanger." (Katy
Butler, "The Latest on Recovered Memory," Family Therapy
Networker, Nov/Dec 1996: 36, 37). The Findings of Fact
established that Stevenson abused all three of his children in
the other marriage. In a highly unusual move, the judge entered
a judgment not withstanding the verdict, in favor of the
defendant. The case is on appeal. Note: Question No. 2 in the
Special Verdict form asked "Did Cherise Franklin produce
corroborating evidence in support of the allegations of abuse
against Kenton Stevenson? The jury responded: Yes.
Shahzade v. Gregory (Massachusetts federal district court,
Docket No. 92-12139-H). Civil suit by Ann Shahzade against an
older cousin for molesting her for a five-year period beginning
when she was 11 years old. "Her cousin, George Gregory, a
California surgeon, acknowledges he fondled her, but says he did
not sexually assault her." Judy Rakowsky, "Memory Expert
Supports Woman," Boston Globe, April 1, 1996: 26. In his
deposition, Gregory admitted a series of fondling incidents that
occurred over a 12 to 16 month period. (Deposition of George
Gregory, May 10, 1995, pages 80-83; he admitted additional
fondling on pages 133-135.) Note: "fondling" is sexual assault
under the criminal laws of virtually every state. (The full text
of the decision to allow recovered memory testimony is available
through Jim Hopper's site on "Recovered Memories of Sexual
Abuse: Scientific Research & Scholarly Resources.") The
defendant settled the case after this decision was rendered;
there is a gag order prohibiting release of the settlement
amount.
Martinelli v. Diocese of Bridgeport (1997 Connecticut civil jury
verdict). Frank Martinelli's adult recollections of sexual abuse
by Father Laurence Brett at St. Cecilia Church in Stamford
between 1962 and 1964. "Martinelli, who is married and has a
young son, testified during the eight-day trial that he
repressed his memory of the abuse until 1991, when it all came
back to him like a "wave" while he was on the telephone with a
friend who told him he had also been abused by Brett as a
child." Daniel Tepfer, "Diocese must pay; Jury awards $750,000
to victim," Connecticut Post (August 27, 1997): A1."Probably the
most damaging evidence of the trial was a memo of a meeting that
took place among diocese officials on Dec. 2, 1964, regarding an
assault by Brett on a 19-year-old male Sacred Heart University
student. The memo states the teen had gone to Brett to discuss a
sexual problem and Brett ended up performing oral sex on him.
The memo goes on to state that Brett was being sent away for
treatment, and, 'A recurrence of hepatitis was to be feigned
should anyone ask,' it read." Id.
Peter VanVeldhuizen’s memories of childhood sexual abuse from
1966 to 1968 by Reverend J. Van Zweden of the Netherlands
Reformed Congregation Church. VanVeldhuizen v. Netherlands
Reformed Church of Rock Valley (Iowa District Court for Sioux
County; 1997). VanVeldhuizen repressed the memory and did not
recall the abuse until February 1991, while undergoing
psychotherapy.
To avoid litigation, Dr. VanVeldthuizen agreed to the request of
the Netherlands Reformed Church to submit the claim and all
related evidence to the Institute for Christian Conciliation. In
a 9 page letter, the Executive Director noted that, "[I]n the
twelve years that I have been working in sexual abuse cases, I
do not recall meeting a more credible witness." Dr.
VanVeldhuizen introduced a variety of corroborating evidence,
including (1) testimony that Rev. Van Zweden sexually abused his
grandson, and (2) eyewitness testimony to one of the incidents
of sexual abuse of Peter VanVeldhuizen by Rev. Van Zweden. The
mediator concluded that, "Peter has more than met the highest
biblical standard of proof, which is actually required only in
capital offenses, , namely, that the sin be confirmed by the
testimony of at least two witnesses."
After insisting on Christian Conciliation, the Church refused to
go along with the findings. Dr. VanVeldhuizen sued and proved
his case (again) in court. A Sioux County jury awarded
compensatory and punitive damages, after VanVeldhuizen proved
that Albert Bakker, a church official at the time, witnessed the
acts but did nothing to stop then or to report them to the
appropriate officials.
Son_of_Chive_Mynde
Scientific and Academic Publications
The case of "Claudia." Recovered memories of child sexual abuse
by her older brother and corroborated by documentary evidence.
Her case is notable for three reasons: first, it was written up
in Science News, second, the memories cam back in the course of
group therapy, and third, they were corroborated through
powerful documentary physical evidence. As detailed by Bruce
Bower:
"After losing more than 100 pounds in a hospital weight-
reduction program she had entered to battle severe obesity,
Claudia experienced flashbacks of sexual abuse committed by her
older brother. She joined a therapy group for incest survivors,
and memories of abuse flooded back. Claudia told group members
that from the time she was 4 years old to her brother's
enlistment in the Army three years later, he had regularly
handcuffed her, burned her with cigarettes, and forced her to
submit to a variety of sexual acts. "
"Claudia's brother had died in combat in Vietnam more than 15
years before her horrifying memories surfaced. Yet Claudia's
parents had left his room and his belongings untouched since
then. Returning home from the hospital, Claudia searched the
room. Inside a closet she found a large pornography collection,
handcuffs, and a diary in which her brother had extensively
planned and recorded what he called sexual ‘experiments’ with
his sister." Bruce Bower, "Sudden recall: adult memories of
child abuse spark a heated debate." Science News (September 18,
1993), Vol. 144 , No. 12: pp. 184-86.
Six men who grew up in Fall River, Massachusetts (in additional
to Frank Fitzpatrick and John Robitaille, whose cases are
included in the legal section of this archive) who were sexually
assaulted by Father Porter as children and "who reported no
thoughts or memories of childhood abuse until the case broke."
These findings were reported by Harvard psychiatrist Stuart
Grassian, who surveyed 43 of the victims in 1993. [Katy
Butler, "The Latest on Recovered Memory," Family Therapy
Networker, Nov/Dec 1996: 36. ]
The case of "D." Boy in treatment for obsessive-compulsive
symptoms, who eventually recovered memories of an attempted
strangling by his mother years earlier. The events were
subsequently confirmed by the mother. Nathan M. Szajnberg,
Recovering a repressed memory, and representational shift in an
adolescent," Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association
(1994), vol. 41 (3): 711-727.
Four adult women reported by Linda M. Williams. See case studies
in "Recovered Memories of Abuse in Women with Documented
Histories of Child Sexual Victimization," Journal of Traumatic
Stress, Vol. 8, No. 4,(1995): 649-73.
Two cases from Puerto Rico. See, Taboas A. Martinez, "Repressed
Memories: Some Clinical Data Contributing Toward its
Elucidation," American Journal Psychotherapy (Spring 1996), 50
(2): 217-30.
The case of "Laura." Using both prospective and restrospective
data, this case "circumvents many limitations of previous
studies by including multiple corroborative sources of evidence
of sexual trauma n early childhood, prospective evidence of
memory loss in oral and written measures in consecutive
assessments, and evidence of spontaneous recovery of memory
outside of therapy in the context of late adolescence." Sunita
Duggal & L. Alan Sroufe, "Recovered Memory of Childhood Sexual
Trauma: A Documented Case from a Longitudinal Study," Journal of
Traumatic Stress, Vol. 11, No. 2, (1998): 301-21.
Son_of_Chive_Mynde
CORROBORATED CASES OF RECOVERED MEMORY
Some self-proclaimed skeptics of recovered memory claim that
traumatic childhood events simply cannot be forgotten at the
time only to be remembered later in life. In an article
promoting the recently formed False Memory Syndrome Foundation
(FMSF), for example, Martin Gardner asserted:
"Studies show that among children who witnessed the murder of a
parent, not a single one repressed the terrible memory. Not only
do victims of child incest not repress such painful memories (to
repress means to completely forget the experience without any
conscious effort to do so); they try unsuccessfully to forget
them." (Gardner, 1993, p. 372)
Gardner failed to cite any specific studies in support of the
claim about incest, and it turns out there is only one study of
children who witnessed the murder of a parent. That study
(Malmquist, 1986) is based on sixteen children, all of whom had
extensive contacts with police, social workers, and family
members about the tragic events they later reported as invasive.
FMSF Advisory Board members repeatedly cite the Malmquist study
(see e.g., Underwager & Wakefield, 1996; Ofshe & Watters, 1994;
Loftus, 1993). The Malmquist study is also cited in legal briefs
filed by the organization. Indeed, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court, the only court to side with the FMSF’s stated desire to
ban recovered memory testimony from court, cited the Malmquist
study with approval (State v. Hungerford, 1997).
Paul McHugh, a psychiatrist and FMSF Advisory Board member,
echoes this untempered position, claiming that "severe traumas
are not blocked out by children, but are remembered all too
well" (Washington Post, 1993). Fellow psychiatrist and FMSF
Advisory Board member John Hochman similarly claims
that "memories of emotionally charged events are among the least
forgettable memories we have" (Hochman, 1994b, p. B3). "For
those who were in Nazi concentration camps or underwent torture
as POWs in Vietnam, this can become a serious lifelong problem"
(Hochman, 1994a, p. 17).
Of course, nobody contests the existence of invasive memories
for some, even most, victims of severe trauma. The question is
whether that phenomenon eliminates the possibility of the
opposite reaction: no conscious memory of the trauma until later
in life. Some false memory partisans avoid the question with a
rhetorical sleight of hand. Retired English professor and FMSF
Advisory Board member Frederick Crews, for example, has
constructed a "logic" whereby corroborated cases of recovered
memory cannot exist in reality because that contradicts his
theories about Freud. Cognitive psychology professor Jennifer
Freyd has demonstrated the circularity of this position (Freyd,
1996). Less extreme "skeptics," who allow that cases of
recovered memory might exist, often report finding few, if any,
actual cases. For example, Loftus (1993, p. 524) notes
that "claims of corroborated repressed memories occasionally
appear in the published literature." She proceeds to cite one
case from 1955 that she finds less than convincing. In a similar
vein, psychology professor John Kihlstrom, a former FMSF
Advisory Board member, rejects cases cited in support of the
trauma-memory argument because of "the general lack of
independent verification of the ostensibly forgotten memories"
(Kihlstrom, 1995, p. 63). PBS producer Ofra Bikel reached a more
extreme conclusion, reporting that after almost a year of
research she could find "only one case where a claim of
recovered memory could be backed up by anything more substantial
than a woman and her therapist believing it so" (Johnson, 1995).
This Web site brings together the extensive and growing evidence
of cases ignored or overlooked by those "skeptics" cited above.
The project began as a letter to PBS. That letter described how
an undergraduate Research Assistant at Brown University found
half a dozen corroborated cases of recovered memory in just a
few hours of electronic database searching, clearly disproving
Ms. Bikel’s claim to the contrary (Cheit, 1995). That modest
research effort has evolved into this Web site. For a more a
detailed discussion of the criteria for including cases in the
archive, along with some reflections on the science and politics
of recovered memory, see Ross E. Cheit, "Consider This, Skeptics
of Recovered Memory," Ethics and Behavior (forthcoming, 1998).
REFERENCES
Cheit, R. (1995). Letter to Ervin Duggan. Reprinted in Moving
Forward, 3(3), 8-11.
Freyd, J. (1996). Betrayal Trauma: The logic of forgetting
childhood abuse. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.
Gardner, M. (1993, summer). "The False Memory Syndrome,"
Skeptical Inquirer, pp. 370-375.
Hochman, J. (1994a, January 10). "Buried Memories Challenge the
Law." National Law Journal, pp. 17-18.
Hochman, J. (1994b, January 1). "Recovering Memories:
Emotionally charged events are among the least forgettable,"
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, p. B3.
Johnson, S. (1995, April 3). "Past Imperfect: ‘Divided Memories’
casts skeptical eye on repressed-memory movement," Chicago
Tribune, p. C3.
Kihlstrom, J. F. (1995, March). "The trauma-memory argument,"
Consciousness and Cognition, 4(1), 63-7.
Loftus, E. (1993. May). "The Reality of Repressed Memories,"
American Psychologist 48, 518-537.
Malmquist, C. P. (1986). "Children Who Witness Parental Murder:
Posttraumatic Aspects," Journal of American Academy of Child
Psychiatry 25, 320-326.
Ofshe, R. & Watters, E. (1994). Making Monsters: False memory,
satanic cult abuse and sexual hysteria. New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons.
State v. Hungerford, 697 A.2d 916 (1997).
Underwager, R. & Wakefield, H. (1996). "Therapeutic Influence in
DID and Recovered Memories of Sexual Abuse," Issues in Child
Abuse Accusations 8(3/4), 169-169.
Washington Post. (1993). "Skeptics question sex abuse memories,"
Reprinted in Providence Journal-Bulletin (November 26), p. A7.
Son_of_Chive_Mynde
Overview: The cases in this file don't fit comfortably into
either of the other categories. Many of the cases are "legal" in
the sense that they involve legal claims - but the ones in this
file were not allowed to go forward, most often on ground
involving the statute of limitations. This archive preserves the
corroborative facts that the plaintiff tried to introduce in
those cases. A few others are pending, but clearly have
corroboration. Most of the remaining cases are cases reported
solely in magazines or newspapers, often by journalists who
spent a considerable amount of time investigating. For example,
the case uncovered by Tad Shannon in the Eugene Register-Guard
in 1998 is unquestionably a powerful case of recovered memory;
so is the one self-reported by Jill Christman (and consciously
avoided by Ofra Bikel in her one-sided PBS "documentary" on
recovered memory).
Jill Stimson’s memories of child sexual abuse by her father. "In
times of intimacy with her husband [beginning in the late
1960s], Stimson began having disturbing flashbacks" – both vague
and horrifying. For years, she struggled with low self-esteem
and other problems, but she never identified the source of the
flashbacks. "It wasn’t until 1982 that Stimson learned what
happened." Her mother, moved by the knowledge that her ex-
husband was occasionally babysitting Stimson’s daughter, told
her, in hopes of protecting the granddaughter, that "when you
were a little girl your father molested you." The mother had
seen physical evidence at the time, had confronted the father,
and had even consulted a lawyer. Tad Shannon, "Memory and the
mind: recovered memories lead Eugene woman to a painful truth,"
Eugene Register-Guard (July 11, 1998: A1).
Jill Chrisman’s recovered memories of child sexual abuse. Ms.
Chrisman’s case is noteworthy for at least two reasons: first,
she obtained verification from a childhood friend who witnessed
the abuse; second, she told the entire story to Ofra Bikel of
PBS, who later claimed (erroneously) that she could "could not
find" any corroborated cases of recovered memory. See Chrisman,
J. (1998) "Quieting Doubt: The gift of corroboration," Moving
Forward Online, 4 (1)
Marilyn Van Derbur's recovered memories of child sexual abuse
(revealed publicly in Denver, Colorado, May 1991). Her memories
were corroborated by her sister, Gwen Mitchell, who had
continuous memory of similar abuse and who long thought she "was
the only one" sexually abused in the family. Fawn Germer, "Ex-
Beauty Queen's Sister Acknowledges Father Molested Her, Too,"
Rocky Mountain News, May 11, 1991: 6.
Cynthia Yerrick’s recovered memories (in 1991) of verbal,
physical, and sexual abuse by the Rev. Robert E. Kelley (in the
mid-1960s). Ms. Yerrick recovered the memories in
therapy. "Asked by her therapist to draw a picture of what made
her so angry, the troubled young mother of two felt a sudden
rush of emotion. She sketched the Catholic Church she attended
as a 4-year old in a small Massachusetts town." Jason
Wolfe, "Woman Relies on Repressed Memory in Alleging Priest
Abuse," Maine Sunday Telegram (October 26, 1997: 1B). Soon
thereafter she began recalling horrifying memories of
abuse. "With the memories bubbling to the surface, Yerick and
her husband, who salvaged their marriage, decided to find out
about Kelley. They leaned that three years earlier, in 1990, he
had pleaded guilty to molesting a 10-year-old girl and had been
sentenced to five to seven years in state prison." Id. Mr.
Yerrick was awarded $527,734 by Judge Daniel Toomey in a lawsuit
against Kelley. Richard Nangle & Gary Murray, "Ruling against
priest," Telegram & Gazette (Worcester, Ma.) (October 18, 1997:
A1). In Yerrick’s suit against the church, which is still
pending, Judge Fremont-Smith recently found the diocese
in "serious and culpable non-compliance" with the rule of civil
procedure for, among other things, trying to conceal
corroborating evidence. "The judge found that the diocese
withheld a 1963 pastor’s report on Kelley in which his pastor
answered ‘yes’ to the question, ‘Has he conducted himself with
persons of the other sex in such a way as to cause scandal,
criticism or suspicion." Dianne Williamson, "Court raps
diocese’s knuckles," Telegram & Gazette (Worcester, Ma.) (July
21, 1998: B1).
Linda Lee's recollections of child sexual abuse (Florida,
1992). "Linda Lee can see flashes of her childhood. Horrendous
images: a relative forcing oral sex on her when she was 3 and 4,
the same man raping her when she was a teen, his big hands
gripping her throat to hold her still….[Lee] says she didn't
remember one single detail of a childhood filled with sexual
abuse until she was an adult. Her mother finally confirmed it
this year and her abuser, when confronted, didn't deny it." "In
the case of Linda Lee, her mom recently admitted that she knew
what was going on, but was too emotionally battered herself to
protect her daughter. A childhood friend told Lee last year that
she once saw Lee being attacked, but was afraid to tell." Tracie
Cone, "Memories of Sex Abuse," Miami Herald, June 7, 1992: 1J.
The initial complaint against Norman Ackison for rape and child
sexual abuse. (Separate complaints were ultimately the basis for
criminal charges, but those complaints certainly corroborate the
recovered memory). "A number of adults in the Shasta Drive
neighborhood recalled being victimized by Ackison when they were
young, Patten said. However, no charges could be brought in
those cases because of the statute of limitations had expired."
Ackison was eventually charged for offenses involving 'three
girls between 5 and 6 [that] occurred between September 1989 and
February 1991. Ackison surrendered after being featured on
America's most Wanted. "The investigation was triggered when one
of the victims became upset after watching an episode of In The
heat of the Night featuring a child abuse case." (Jim Woods, "TV
Show May Have Scared Accused Child Abuser Into Giving Up,"
Columbus Dispatch, April 16, 1992: 3D.)
John BBB Doe and John MMM Doe’s recovered memories of child
sexual abuse by Rev. William J. Effinger. These plaintiffs were
joined in a civil suit by five others who always remembered
abuse by Rev. Effinger, but who did not understand its
significance until adulthood. The repressed memory claim for BBB
and MMM "was included in their briefs in opposition to the
motions to dismiss." Doe. V. Archdiocese of Milwaukee (1997),
211 Wis 2d. 312; 565 N.W. 2d 94; footnote 1. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court prohibited all seven suits from proceeding,
arguing that only the legislature can extend the statute of
limitations in such cases.
The corroboration for the two men with recovered memory extends
far beyond the others in this lawsuit. Seven other men and two
women who were abused by Rev. Effinger in Wisconsin reached out-
of-court settlements with the Archdioscese of Milwaukee. "Church
Settles with 9 for Abuse by Priest," Chicago Tribune (December
1, 1993: p.3). Those claims spanned 20 years – "from the
priest’s first parish assignment to his last." Id. In 1993,
Father Effinger entered a no-contest plea in Sheboygan County to
second-degree sexual assault against a 14-year-old boy. He was
sentenced to 10 years and died in prison.
Chris White, whose repressed memories of sexual abuse at Ryerson
Public School 20 years ago, resulted in a guilty plea by Robert
Warren. "Now in his mid-50s and living in British Columbia,
Warren had been with the Toronto Board of Education for 23 years
and had two other convictions for sexual offenses against
children. One dated back to 1965 in Lindsay; the other was in
British Columbia in 1988." (Judy Steed, "Abuse Victim…" The
Toronto Star, May 7, 1995: A1).
Janet Ostrowski’s memories of child sexual abuse by Rev. John
Mott, pastor of St. Catherine of Sienna Roman Catholic Church in
Franklin Square. Ms. Ostrowski was prohibited from pursuing the
claim because of the statute of limitations, but "four more
women subsequently contacted the Roman Catholic Diocese of
Rockville Center to say that they had been sexually abused by
Mott when they were teenagers." Stuart Vincent, "Dismissal of
Abuse Suit Appealed," Newsday (May 11, 1995: A31).
Angela Mitchell's flashbacks of being sexually abused 27 years
earlier by Monsignor Arthur Sego at the St. Patrick Catholic
School. "Mitchell repressed her memories of the incidents until
April 1994, when she began helping an abused boy while working
as a teacher's aide at the Kokomo YMCA." "Kokomo Woman Says
Monsignor Molested Her," Gary Post-Tribune (March 5, 1995: B12).
Mitchell told her older sister at the time of the abuse. Her
sister told her mother, who contacted the diocese in
Lafayette, "but a bishop there allegedly told her not to tell
anyone, saying that church officials would handle the
situation." Id. (The Monsignor was sent to the St. Joseph Mother
House for two and one-half weeks to reflect on what had
occurred. He also received psychiatric therapy for two and one-
half months. He was then assigned to a different parish.)
The Bishop confirmed the basic facts in a 1967 letter that
ended: "I would suggest that you might destroy this letter after
you read it. In this way, we will protect both [A.M.] and
Monsignor." A.M. v. Roman Catholic Church, 669 N.E.2d 1034
(Indiana Court of Appeals, 1996). The mother "followed the
Bishop's instructions and never again spoke to A.M. about the
molestations. The older sister also kept the secret." Id.
Remarkably, the Indiana Court of Appeals did not allow Mitchell
to proceed with her highly-corroborated claim because the
perpetrator was not a family member, and she did not bring the
suit before turning 18--something that would have been
impossible, since her first recollections were at age 34.
Stephen McCaffrey's adult recollections of sexual abuse by Rev.
Robert J. Vonnahmen at the Belleville diocese camp. "Neither
[another abuse survivor] nor McCaffrey used hypnosis, or was in
therapy at the time of the flashbacks." The suit was still
pending at the time of this article, which also states
that "Rev. Vonnahmen is one of eight priests who have been
removed from their duties in the Belleville diocese." Virginia
Baldwin Hick, "False 'Memories' a Growing Issue in Abuse Cases,"
St. Louis Post Dispatch, March 3, 1994: 5B.)
Former altar-boy in Baltimore, who requested anonymity, but
whose adult recollection of abuse resulted in the removal of
four priests. The victim told the Washington Post that
the "molestations began when he was 11 or 12 and continued until
he was about 17. He began having marital problems several years
ago and sought therapy. On January 19 [1995], he met for nearly
two hours with Monsignor William Lori. The next day, Lori
separately interviewed the four priests and each admitted to the
victim's allegations." (Clari.news.crime.sex; article 865,
February 6, 1995; see also, "4 Priests Removed After Admitting
They Molested an Altar Boy," New York Times, February 7, 1995:
A14.).
Kevin MacKenzie, former alter boy in Pennsylvania, who "did not
remember the abuse until certain events triggered his 'repressed
memory' in 1993." A New Jersey appeals court dismissed his case
under the statute of limitations. "N.J. Court Dismisses Lawsuit
Against Priest," Philadelphia Inquirer, July 25, 1995: N1. While
this case was pending, Kohler was apprehended for his
involvement "in taking 'suggestive photographs'" of young boys
with ex-priest William O'Connell. "Priest Will Face Obscenity
Charge," Bergen County Record, July 13, 1994: A6. "Thousands of
photographs of young boys, some of them naked" were found in the
home."
Michael Helferty's recollections of abduction and sexual torture
37 years earlier (Ottawa, 1996). "It was, in fact, a horrifying
personal flashback that brought [Owen] Dulmage to police
attention….That account, combined with recent evidence from a
Quebec man who says he was abducted in the late 1940's, led to
Dulmage's arrest." "[P]olice cordoned off the Dulmage home last
week and carted away boxes filled with what police said were
photographs of naked and bound boys, allegedly abducted during a
period that spans more than four decades….Examples from some of
the evidence collected last week are chilling: a book titled
They Asked for Death, photographs that show boys wearing paper-
bag hoods and bound hand and foot; others show boys strung by a
rope and pulley from rafters or tree limbs; and in one black-and-
white shot, a youngster crouched naked and bound on a tarpoline….
[Dulmage's job as a scout master] ended in 1951, with his
conviction for the kidnapping and torture of a 13-year-old
Kingston, Ont., boy, Teddy Wainright. In a sensational trial,
Dulmage admitted that he knocked the boy out and then took him
to his Ottawa home, where he suspended the trussed youngster
from the rafters, poured hot wax onto his eyelids to seal his
eyes closed, and carved the initials TW into his thigh….Dulmage
received a one-year sentence….The faces of only 10 boys in the
hundreds of grainy photographs seized from Dulmage's Ottawa home
are visible." E. Kaye Fulton, "Unsavory Secrets: Ottawa Police
Find a Cache of Horrifying Pictures," Maclean's, April 7, 1997:
18."In 1951, nobody really believed me," explained a man who was
abducted as a 13-year-old and whose case resulted in prosecution
at the time. An article in the Toronto Sun described how he and
his mother were ostracized after the trial, and how the
perpetrator smiled at receiving a one-year sentence.
Susan Lees’ recovered memories of horrendous physical and sexual
abuse as a child (Birmingham, England; 1997). Ms. Lees was
adopted at the age of five by a family who treated her as one of
her own, and did not even know about all the abuse that she had
suffered before they adopted her. Her memories of abuse did not
begin until she was 35. Lees was listening to a news report from
Bosnia on her car radio and heard the screams of a young girl in
Bosnia having shrapnel removed from her back without an
anaesthetic.
"The next thing I knew I had pulled over and was crying
uncontrollably. When I got home I dashed into the attic to get
my old doll out of the loft. I started to bathe and wash because
I felt dirty. For weeks afterward I bathed and scrubbed my legs
because they itched. It got to the stage where they were raw."
Lucy Johnston, "Memories of Child Abuse Spark Lawsuit", The
Observer (March 2, 1997): 3.
Fearing that she was going insane, Lees contacted a GP, who
referred her to a therapist. During the next six months more
flashbacks came back. Then she set out to find her social
service records. "Documentary evidence from more than 30 yeas
ago confirms that Ms. Lees’ mother left her alone with an
alcoholic father when was nine months old, and that social
workers sent her to live with a friend of her father who the
NSPCC knew to have been involved in child abuse." Id. The
itching turned out to be an actual memory of being defleaed when
she was admitted to the hospital at age four; according to
medical records, she was anemic and had screaming fits. Ms. Lees
also "has evidence that she was buggered and had her toes
smashed with a hammer" before she was adopted. Id.
Terry Throneberry’s recovered memories (in 1990) of sexual abuse
by Rodney Grantham at the Shults-Lewis Children’s Home between
1960 and 1969. Throneberry’s claims that Grantham impregnated
her when she was 14 years old and gave her "pills containing
quinine which caused vomiting, diarrhea and bleeding, and
resulted in abortions." These memories, recovered in therapy,
were corroborated by Margie Cole, who had continuous memories of
similar abuse by Grantham in 1962. Matthew Tully & Frank
Wiget, "Court: Woman’s Case Can Proceed," Post-Tribune (Gary,
Ind.) (March 19, 1997: A1). The memories were also corroborated
by Grantham, who "admitted to the allegations in court papers,"
but challenged the suits on statute of limitations grounds.
Michael Puente, "Lawsuit Pivots in Ruling on Repressed Memory,"
Post-Tribune (Gary, Ind.) (September 11, 1995: A1). The Indiana
Court of Appeals allowed Throneberry’s action to proceed,
agreeing that she "had no independent memory [before 1990] of
Grantham sexually molesting her." Cole v. Shults-Lewis Child and
Family Services, 677 N.E.2d 1069, 1074; 1997 Ind. App. LEXIS 177
(March 18, 1997).
Lisa Shogren’s 1992 criminal complaint against Lee Roy Donnell
for child sexual abuse. Ms. Shogren "testified at pretrial
hearings that her memories of that [assault] and other incidents
had been repressed until she entered therapy ! in recent years."
Donnell was convicted of sexual battery. "Father Guilty in
Assault," Washington Port (September 10, 1992): B3.
Adam Farthing’s successful claim for childhood sexual abuse
before the Crimes Compensation Tribunal in Melbourne, Australia.
Claim corroborated by two siblings. Formal hearing on February
2, 1998.
Son_of_Chive_Mynde
History and Their Evaluation of Training and Competence in These
Areas
Kenneth S. Pope and Shirley Feldman-Summers
"National Survey of Psychologists' Sexual and Physical Abuse
History and Their Evaluation of Training and Competence in These
Areas" was published in Professional Psychology: Research &
Practice, October, 1992, vol.23, #5, pages 353-361. Request a
free reprint of this article.
ABSTRACT: A national survey of clinical and counseling
psychologists (return rate was 58%) showed that over two thirds
(69.93%) of the women and one third (32.85%) of the men had
experienced some form of physical or sexual abuse. Participants
gave low ratings to their graduate training programs and
internships with regard to addressing abuse issues, although
more recent graduates gave higher ratings. Participants rated
themselves as being moderately competent to provide services
related to victims of abuse, although women perceived themselves
to be more competent than men. Practical and theoretical
implications are discussed
Son_of_Chive_Mynde
A National Survey of Psychologists
Shirley Feldman-Summers and Kenneth S. Pope
This national study ("The Experience of 'Forgetting' Childhood
Abuse: A National Survey of Psychologists") was published in
Journal of Consulting & Clinical Psychology, June, 1994, vol.
62, #3, pages 636-639. Request a free reprint of this article.
ABSTRACT: A national sample of psychologists were asked whether
they had been abused as children and, if so, whether they had
ever forgotten some or all of the abuse. Almost a quarter of the
sample (23.9%) reported childhood abuse, and of those,
approximately 40% reported a period of forgetting some or all of
the abuse. The major findings were that (1) both sexual and
nonsexual abuse were subject to periods of forgetting; (2) the
most frequently reported factor related to recall was being in
therapy; (3) approximately one half of those who reported
forgetting also reported corroboration of the abuse; and (4)
reported forgetting was not related to gender or age of the
respondent but was related to severity of the abuse.
Son_of_Chive_Mynde
Memory Syndrome Epidemic is the award address for the American
Psychological Association's Award for Distinguished
Contributions to Public Service delivered at the 103rd Annual
Convention of the American Psychological Association, New York,
NY. August 1995. An audiotape of this talk (audiotape No. APA9S-
245) may be ordered from from Sound Images, Aurora, CO;
telephone: 303-649-1811).
An adapted version of the address that appears below was
published in American Psychologist, September, 1996, vol. 51,
no. 9, pages 957-974. Those wishing to read the American
Psychologist article may request a free reprint by clicking
here.
Another adapted version of this award address appears in K. S.
Pope and L. S. Brown (1996), Recovered Memories of Abuse:
Assessment, Therapy, Forensics by Kenneth S. Pope and Laura S.
Brown, published by the American Psychological Association
(Washington, DC). For more information about this book, call APA
Press at (800) 374-2721 or (202) 336-5500. To purchase this book
online via Amazon.com, click here. [Click here to return to the
site index.]
Memory, Abuse, and Science:
Questioning Claims about the False Memory Syndrome Epidemic
Kenneth S. Pope
I would like to thank APA for this award and for this
opportunity to share with you some questions that I've been
struggling with. I would also like to thank my friend Gerry
Koocher for that generous introduction.
In the time we have together this afternoon, I would like would
like to consider the highly publicized and strikingly
influential claims about memory that have emerged in the 1990s.
I'd like to look at each claim in the light of available
scientific evidence, and to examine their implications for
clinical standards and malpractice law.
How should we, as psychologists, respond to these recent claims?
How do we test their validity? To reject them reflexively--that
is to say, without examining their logic and evidence--is
dogmatic, pseudoscientific, and downright wrong. But to accept
them reflectively--without examining their logic and evidence--
is also an anti-scientific stance and a terrible blunder. My
approach is not to provide a simplified set of supposed answers
or support a sense of certitude but rather to suggest that our
essential task as psychologists is careful, informed, and
comprehensive questioning. We must question our own assumptions,
biases, and perspectives, not just once during initial training,
but throughout our careers. We must also question claims about
scientific discoveries, evidence, and conclusions, no matter how
prestigious or popular the source.
One of the major sets of claims that I'll be examining this
afternoon holds that many therapists-for reasons as diverse as
well-meaning naiveté, greed, incompetence, and zealotry-suggest
a history of childhood sexual abuse to clients who have no
actual abuse history. According to the claims, clients who
uncritically accept these suggestions and come to believe
illusory memories of abuse with great conviction, suffer from an
iatrogenic disorder termed false memory syndrome . This
psychopathology, which according to Kihlstrom (1996) resembles a
personality disorder, has allegedly manifested sufficient
numbers of cases to reach epidemic proportions. In the short
span of time since the 1992 founding of the False Memory
Syndrome Foundation (FMSF), claims about false memory syndrome --
a condition that the Foundation identified and named-and
related phenomena have had a profound impact on issues germane
to ethical and competent psychological science and practice.
FMSF noted its own "success" as reflected in
the "institutionalization of this information in psychology text
books, in reference works, in novels, in television dramas, and
in hundreds of scholarly papers" (P. Freyd, 1996). The American
Psychological Association (APA) approved FMSF as a provider of
continuing education programs for psychologists ("American
Psychological Association Approves, " 1995). The false memory
syndrome concept is addressed in appellate decisions (e.g.,
State v. Warnberg , 1994). Herman (1994) and Landsberg (1996a,
1996b) are among those who have noted the popular media's
frequently uncritical acceptance of these claims.
Although it is unusual that a lay advocacy group could produce
adequate scientific evidence to support its discoveries and
claims, FMSF highlights the contributions of its Scientific and
Professional Advisory Board. FMSF emphasizes not only
that "board members make substantial donations to the Foundation
both in time and money" but also that "it is the presence of the
Advisory Board that has given our efforts credibility" ("FMSF
Advisory Board Meeting, " 1993, p. 3). The FMSF Scientific and
Professional Advisory Board includes distinguished and prominent
members in the fields of psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and
cognitive science (FMSF, 1996a). Their contributions of time,
money, reputations, and credibility to the goals and work of
FMSF may represent a significant if not crucial factor in the
Foundation's success. The Scientific and Professional Advisory
Board's implicit endorsement of the false memory syndrome
diagnosis may help explain why such FMSF claims are so vividly
reflected in the professional literature, expert testimony, and
the popular media. If widely accepted, claims about a false
memory syndrome epidemic traced to therapeutic malpractice may
influence diagnosis and treatment for many people; the access or
lack of access that individuals have to various services; and
the clinical, forensic, and public response to those who report
memories of childhood abuse.
This afternoon I would like to suggest some specific scientific
questions for assessing the evidence that supposedly supports
the widespread claims about a false memory syndrome. I would
also like to examine the methods used to promote these claims--
such a diagnosing those who disagree and making unsupported
statements about their character--that might influence the
degree to which these claims are critically examined. Are the
methods used creating a context in which such claims are
unlikely to be examined critically, freely, and comprehensively?
But to place some of these claims in context, its useful to look
at a bit of history.
Review of the Literature: Memory Theory Prior to the False
Memory Syndrome Foundation and False Memory Syndrome
The recent literature setting forth claims of a false memory
syndrome epidemic may have fostered the notion that until
recently--perhaps until the 1990s--psychologists believed that
memory was like a videotape. But even a cursory look at the
psychological literature from the 19th century up to the present
shows this notion to have no historical support. Rather than
viewing memory as a perfect or near-perfect recording device,
psychologists have at least a century-long tradition of
exploring how-rather than whether-memory could be fallible,
malleable, and suggestible. Psychology's fascination with
memory's imperfections dates back at least to the founding of
the APA, which provides a vivid example. Writing a history of
the Association's first 38 years, Fernberger (1932) described
the memorable meeting on July 8, 1892, among APA organizers
Stanley Hall, George Fullerton, Joseph Jastrow, William James,
George Ladd, James Cattell, and Mark Baldwin. A decade later, he
described his attempts to verify accounts of that meeting,
including his contacting of two of the alleged participants
(Cattell and Jastrow), both of whom denied having attended. He
concluded, "There is really no evidence that the meeting was
ever actually and physically held" (Fernberger, 1943, p. 35).
Two years before this supposed meeting, William James (1890)
wrote the following:
False memories are by no means rare occurrences in most of us.
Most people, probably, are in doubt about certain matters
ascribed to their past. They may have seen them, may have said
them, done them, or they may only have dreamed or imagined they
did so. The most frequent source of false memory is the accounts
we give to others of our experiences. Such accounts we almost
always make both more simple and more interesting than the
truth. We quote what we should have said or done rather than
what we really said or did; and in the first telling we may be
fully aware of the distinction. But ere long the fiction expels
the reality from memory and reigns in its stead alone. This is
one great source of the fallibility of testimony meant to be
quite honest. It is next to impossible to get a story of this
sort accurate in all its details, although it is the inessential
details that suffer most change. (pp. 373-374)
(Müensterberg's (1908) studies of how people imperfectly
remember experimentally staged events, Bird's (1927)
demonstration of how postevent information can influence
recollection, and Barlett's (1932) analysis of how telling a
story from memory (as in the game of "gossip" or "telephone")
reveal distortions are but a few examples of the rich and
diverse history of research in this area.
The fallibility of memory and even perception itself, which
furnishes so much of memory's content, resulted in part from
their creative action. Long before (Hubel and Wiesel (1962a,
1962b, (1979) investigated the neurophysiological construction
of perceptions, Koffka (1935) reviewed extensive studies of how
stimulus properties, contextual forces, and observer variables
could bring forth misperceptions such as Wertheimer's (see
Boring, 1929) "phenomenal movement" (or "phi-phenomen"), the
classic optical illusions, and the phantom limb phenomenon. The
mind did not passively receive and store perfect perceptual
representations; it actively constructed representations of
varying correspondence with external events and continued to
work on the constructions. In rejecting the static, passive,
storehouse model of perception, memory, and mind, Koffka (1935)
emphasized what a strange store-house we find it to be! Things
do not simply fall into those places into which they are being
thrown, they arrange themselves in coming and during their time
of storage according to the many ways in which they belong
together. And they do more; they influence each other, form
groups of various sizes and kinds, always trying to meet the
exigencies of the moment. (p. 518)
He concluded that "we are in full agreement with Barlett, who
says: 'In fact, if we consider evidence rather than
presupposition, remembering appears to be far more decisively an
affair of construction rather than one of mere reproduction'"
(p. 656). The mind, memory, and perception have each emerged
this century not as "static, not a large storage bin nor a
passive blank slate [but rather as] an organ of activity,
process, and ongoing work" (K. S. Pope & Singer, 1978a, p. 106;
see also K. S. Pope & Singer, 1978b, 1980).
False Memory Syndrome: Claims of a Scientifically Validated
Syndrome and Epidemic
Memory's imperfection provides a context for the FMSF's claims
about the supposed syndrome it appeared to discover and helped
to institutionalize. According to proponents of this reputed new
syndrome, sufficient cases have been diagnosed to constitute an
epidemic. These claims of a mental health epidemic provide an
opportunity to consider questions that can be useful in
evaluating purported scientific discoveries, evidence, and
conclusions.
The definition of false memory syndrome found in the literature
published by the FMSF was written by John Kihlstrom, who has
served as an FMSF Scientific and Professional Advisory Board
member. The current FMSF brochure repeats this description of
the False Memory Syndrome -- a condition in which a person's
identity and interpersonal relationships are centered around a
memory of traumatic experience which is objectively false but in
which the person strongly believes. Note that the syndrome is
not characterized by false memories as such. We all have
memories that are inaccurate. Rather, the syndrome may be
diagnosed when the memory is so deeply engrained that it orients
the individual's entire personality and lifestyle, in turn
disrupting all sorts of other adaptive behaviors. The analogy to
personality disorder is intentional. False Memory Syndrome is
especially destructive because the person assiduously avoids
confrontation with any evidence that might challenge the memory.
Thus it takes on a life of its own, encapsulated, and resistant
to correction. The person may become so focused on the memory
that he or she may be effectively distracted from coping with
the real problems in his or her life. (Kihlstrom, 1996; also
cited in FMSF, 1995)
Ceci, Bronfrenbrenner, Eckman, and Shepard were among 17
researchers who coauthored a statement objecting to the term
false memory syndrome as "a non-psychological term originated by
a private foundation whose stated purpose is to support accused
parents." They urged, "For the sake of intellectual honesty,
let's leave the term 'false memory syndrome' to the popular
press" (Carstensen et al., 1993, p. 23).
Methodology for Determining That Memories Are Objectively False
Several questions may be useful in assessing the scientific
validity of these diagnostic features. First, how did the
researchers, clinicians, or others who validated this syndrome
determine in each case that the memory was "objectively false?"
Those claiming that scientific research has validated false
memory syndrome and identified an epidemic have a responsibility
to disclose the methods for determining that each case involved
a memory that was objectively false. The peer-reviewed
scientific literature still lacks adequate information about
this methodology.
It remains unclear whether the protocol of any research
purporting to validate the false memory syndrome diagnosis in
large numbers of persons used any criterion other than the
decision rule that all recovered memories of abuse are
inherently false. Statements by some FMSF proponents have seemed
to characterize recovered memories of trauma as objectively
false per se. FMSF Scientific and Professional Advisory Board
member Harrison Pope and his colleague James Hudson (1995a; see
also (1995b) emphasized that "traumatic experiences are
memorable" (p. 715), asserted that there has never been a
confirmed case of "noncontrived amnesia among neurologically
intact individuals over the age of 6 who experienced events
sufficiently traumatic that no one would be expected to simply
forget them" (p. 716), and asserted that trauma survivors in
scientifically valid studies "unanimously remembered the events"
(p. 715). Founding FMSF Scientific and Professional Advisory
Board members Hollida Wakefield and Ralph Underwager (no longer
listed as a member of the FMSF Scientific and Professional
Advisory Board) wrote, "People who undergo severe trauma
remember it" (1994, p. 182). Scientific and Professional
Advisory Board member Martin Gardner (1993) asserted that
better-trained, older psychiatrists do not believe that
childhood memories of trauma can be repressed for any length of
time, except in rare cases of actual brain damage. And there is
abundant evidence that totally false memories are easily aroused
in the mind of a suggestible patient. (p. 374)
FMSF (1992b) itself published the claim: "Psychiatrists advising
the Foundation members seem to be unanimous in the belief that
memories of such atrocities cannot be repressed. Horrible
incidents of childhood are remembered" (p. 2).
In light of the evidence put forward to establish their
validity, it is important to examine the claims that human
memory systems process significantly traumatic experiences
differently from other stimuli-for example, that sufficiently
traumatic experiences are always available to awareness; are
never subject to such varying constructs as forgetting (see
Feldman-Summers & Pope 1994), amnesia, dissociation, or
repression; and thus can never be subject to recovered memory.
Other questions emerge when examining claims about the diagnosis
of false memory syndrome and the supposed epidemic. If there are
validation studies for false memory syndrome and the epidemic
that do not reflexively judge all reports of recovered memories
of abuse to be objectively false, what was the research
methodology for determining whether the reports were objectively
true or false? Does the methodology yield an acceptable rate of
false positives and false negatives? Assuming more than one
person made each judgment, what was the interrater reliability?
How was the methodology itself validated?
Until the methodology and raw data used in identifying and
validating the syndrome and verifying sufficient cases to
constitute an epidemic are adequately disclosed, it may be
helpful to consider the methods and evidence that proponents
have set forth to determine whether memories of abuse are
objectively false. One proposed set of criteria for
distinguishing between objectively true and false memories of
abuse focuses on the reactions of the person who experienced the
memories. FMSF (1994) published a newsletter article
entitled "How Does a Person Know That Memories of Abuse Were
False?" based on a study of an unspecified number of people who
experienced such memories, later decided the memories were
false, and subsequently retracted their claims of having
experienced abuse. Indicants of false memories included failure
to find corroborating evidence, memories described by
retractors "as not 'feeling' like other memories" (FMSF, 1994,
p. 3), and "the change in their life since they came to this
realization" (i.e., "Many describe a sense of peace and comfort
with their decision that their memories were false and a sense
of well-being that they missed while entrenched in the memory
recovery process"; p. 4).
A second set of criteria for distinguishing true and false
memories of abuse emerged from a study of what was described
as "a representative sample of families who had contacted the
FMS Foundation" (The sample consisted of nine families. The
methodology for selecting the sample was as follows: "In order
to select a representative sample of families who had contacted
the FMS Foundation, the investigator chose a telephone area code
and contacted all families within that code who met [certain]
criteria" (de Rivera, 1994, p. 149).). Seven criteria were set
forth as appearing to identify false memories. Among these
indicants were: "There are no such memories prior to
therapy, " "The accused has no history of any pedophiliac
tendencies and there is no evidence of any sexual interest in
children, " and "The accused and the family are willing to
openly discuss the allegations and explore them for logical
coherence" (de Rivera, 1994, p. 154).
A third set of indicants was set forth by Pamela Freyd, who is
currently FMSF executive director, in an article entitled "How
Do We Know We Are Not Representing Pedophiles?" (1992b). Two
methods were presented as ways to show that the memories forming
the basis of accusations against members are false:
There are two ways that we will address this concern. The first
has to do with who we are. If I had taken a camera to any of the
three meetings held here in Philadelphia, I would have been hard
put to know whom to photograph. We are a good looking bunch of
people: graying hair, well-dressed, healthy, smiling. The
similarity of the stories is astounding, so script-like and
formulaic that doubts dissolve after chats with a few families.
Just about every person who has attended is someone you would
likely find interesting and want to count as a friend.
The second way that we will address this concern involves lie
detector tests. If all members of the FMS Foundation either have
had or express a willingness to be polygraphed, we will have a
powerful statement that we are not in the business of
representing pedophiles. (p. 1)
Such assertions in support of claims about reliably separating
true and false reports of child abuse may or may not be
persuasive to the media, clinicians assessing child abuse
accusations, the courts, or others, depending on a variety of
circumstances. However persuasive they may seem, such claims are
best examined in light of such questions as, is there adequate
scientific research to support the claims? Similar claims, such
as clinicians' assertion that they can, on the basis of certain
profiles or criteria, reliably and validly determine whether an
individual is capable of engaging in sex with a child, benefit
from a careful examination of the scientific evidence
demonstrating such clinical abilities. In Legal Aspects of False
Memory Syndrome, FMSF (1992b) informed its members that
some "psychiatrists will opine that, in their opinion, a
particular individual is not a pedophile and perhaps would not
or could not have performed the acts complained of" (p. 2).
Regardless of whether courts may admit such statements as
evidence that a recovered memory of childhood sexual abuse
is "objectively false, " psychologists have an obligation to
examine the scientific bases supporting such assessments.
Claims about valid, reliable identification of false memories of
child abuse or of false accusations based on these false
memories deserve and require careful evaluation in light of
evidence and logic. For example, if self-reports of abuse
memories are to be doubted in the absence of external "proof, "
why are self-reports about retracted memories presented as
presumed valid in the absence of external verification? What
scientific evidence supports claims that such factors as good
looks, dress, health, and smiling serve as valid and reliable
indicants of whether or not an individual has engaged in child
abuse?
Methodology for Assessing an "Entire Personality and Lifestyle"
Having determined that the memory was objectively false, how did
those who validated false memory syndrome assess whether that
false memory actually "orients the individual's entire
personality and lifestyle?" Assessing whether there are aspects
of the individuals' personality or lifestyle that remain
consistent and unchanged (i.e., not oriented to the objectively
false "memory") would present a considerable challenge even to
the most skilled and experienced clinicians. Disclosing the
methodology for making this determination would allow careful
examination of the assumptions, evidence, and reasoning that
support the research and encourage replication and additional
research into false memory syndrome.
Claims of False Memory Syndrome's Similarity to Personality
Disorders
It is not clear how similar this new disorder is to the
recognized personality disorders to which it is explicitly
analogized, or whether this analogy simply makes explicit the
notion that the same sort of severe pathology presumed present
in the classic personality disorders is present in the alleged
false memory syndrome. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (4th ed.; DSM-IV ; American Psychiatric
Association, 1994), for example, states that
a Personality Disorder is an enduring pattern of inner
experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the
expectations of the individual's culture, is pervasive and
inflexible, has an onset in adolescence or early adulthood, is
stable over time, and leads to distress or impairment. (American
Psychiatric Association, 1994, p. 629)
Does defining false memory syndrome to resemble recognized
personality disorders imply that onset does not occur beyond
early adulthood? Does it suggest that, whereas the syndrome
becomes manifest in adulthood, its foundation-like the
foundation of recognized personality disorders-rests on earlier
weaknesses or dysfunction in the individual? Wakefield and
Underwager (1994), for example, noted that "Gardner sees the
women who make false allegations based on recovered memories as
very angry, hostile, and sometimes paranoid. He believes that
all will have demonstrated some type of psychopathology in
earlier parts of their lives" (p. 333). The Philadelphia
Inquirer quoted Wakefield's description of those who recover
memories: "The adult children who 'remember' sexual abuse
decades after they say it happened are 'not just anybody. They
are women who already have problems, such as personality
disorder, and they're likely to be unusually suggestible' "
(Sifford, 1991, p. 12).
Thousands of Empirically Documented Cases
Within about a year of the founding of FMSF, which identified
and named a new syndrome, proponents began to claim that the
syndrome was widespread. FMSF Scientific and Professional
Advisory Board member Martin Gardner (1993) wrote that among the
purposes of the FMSF was "to seek reasons for the FMS epidemic"
(p. 375). In the process of researching the problem, FMSF made
the following statement:
FMSF is first a research organization that is documenting the
extent of this phenomenon. There is a standard procedure that is
followed for phone interviews. We currently have in our files
hundreds and hundreds of "Maybe's." Maybe's are names that are
given to us as families that are affected by false memory
syndrome but for whom we do not have the standard documentation
information. Unless we have complete and standard documentation,
we do not add these people to the count of affected families.
(FMSF, 1993, p. 7)
Two of the founding Scientific and Professional Advisory Board
members cited as validating evidence for false memory
syndrome "the empirical data the FMS Foundation has from 12, 000
families" (Wakefield & Underwager, 1994, p. 98 ).
The FMSF's (see Wakefield & Underwager, 1994) research evidence
allegedly
points with high certainty towards a false memory syndrome that
meets the requirements for a syndrome contained in the DSM-III-R
and the DSM-IV. The thousands of instances that contain those
common elements are likely to be more support for this syndrome
than for any other that has been accepted as a legitimate
classification category. (p. 99)
Expert witnesses, therapists, policy makers, reporters, the
courts, graduate courses, and continuing education programs
could thus cite a growing literature accepting and helping
institutionalize the notion that false memory syndrome was not
only a scientifically validated disorder caused by
psychotherapy, but that the number of documented cases was
exceptionally large. For instance, Goldstein and Farmer (1993)
asserted, "Now we know that False Memory Syndrome is an
iatrogenic disease created by therapy gone haywire. We know that
false memory syndrome has reached epidemic proportions" (p. 9).
By 1996, FMSF distributed an information sheet and order form
(for its video False Memory Syndrome) in which it claimed
that "False Memory Syndrome [is] a devastating phenomenon that
has affected tens of thousands of individuals and families
worldwide" (1996b ).
It would be helpful for FMSF and its Scientific and Professional
Advisory Board to describe the research protocols or other
formal procedures by which false memory syndrome has been
adequately validated as a syndrome and by which it was
determined that it has affected tens of thousands of individuals
and families. Clearly stating such operationalized procedures as
how reported memories of abuse are found to be "objectively
false" in any study that documents the widespread nature of
false memory syndrome allows the independent analysis,
verification, and replication that is the hallmark of
psychological scientific empiricism. It is possible that the
impressive names, prestige, offices, and affiliations of the
Scientific and Professional Advisory Board may have, however
unintentionally, led fellow scientists, the courts, the popular
media, and others to accept without customary skepticism, care,
and examination of alternative hypotheses the methodology and
arrays of primary data relevant to the notion of false memory
syndrome and other FMSF assertions as scientifically validated.
It is worth emphasizing that some therapists engage in
incompetent, unethical, or well-meaning but misguided behaviors,
sometimes with disastrous consequences for patients (see, e.g.,
K. S. Pope, 1990, (1994; K. S. Pope, Simpson, & Weiner, 1978 ).
In some instances, these behaviors include using unvalidated,
misleading, or bizarre methods for assessing whether a patient
was sexually abused as a child (K. S. Pope & Vasquez, 1991).
However, such facts alone are insufficient basis for claims that
there "is an iatrogenic disease created by therapy" and that
this "false memory syndrome has reached epidemic proportions"
(Goldstein & Farmer, 1993, p. 9). The scientific evidence that
supposedly validates claims about this so-called syndrome, its
causes, and its epidemic proportions needs to be made available
and carefully examined.
Informed-Consent Issues in Research Validating False Memory
Syndrome
Research involving human participants usually involves the
informed consent of the participants. For those independently
evaluating or attempting to replicate studies seeming to
validate the existence and widespread occurrence of false memory
syndrome, it would be useful if the procedures for obtaining
informed consent-if consent was obtained-from people who were
diagnosed as suffering from false memory syndrome were
disclosed. It appears possible, on the basis of a reading of
materials generated by the FMSF, that some might not consider
interviewing or clinically assessing the people supposedly
afflicted by false memory syndrome to be an essential component
of a study of the validity and occurrence of the syndrome. If,
for this reason, the informed consent of or even direct contact
with people diagnosed with false memory syndrome has been
considered unnecessary in documenting specific cases or the
extent of the phenomenon, it would be useful for FMSF and its
Scientific and Professional Advisory Board to report any
available scientific data about the ability to diagnose false
memory syndrome without meeting the person alleged to have the
disorder. If the person reporting the so-called memory does not
participate in the research, how do researchers conclude that
the memory is objectively false (rather than simply subjectively
judged to be false by those who have been accused)? How do
researchers determine that the center of a person's identity and
interpersonal relationships is a particular false memory without
even meeting the person? How do they examine all aspects of
personality without interviewing, evaluating, or even knowing
the person?
Independent Examination of the Primary Data and Methodology
Independent examination of the primary data and methodology used
to establish the validity and reliability of a new psychological
diagnosis, prior to its application to large numbers of people,
is an essential scientific responsibility. Diagnoses lacking
validity may attract proponents if distorting influences like
confirmation bias, illusory correlation, and false consensus
have not been eliminated from the validation studies and
subsequent use. However, once set forth as a scientifically
valid, established, and institutionalized category, a readily
diagnosed formal psychological syndrome gains immense power to
influence others. As Rosenhan wrote,
Such labels, conferred by mental health professionals, are as
influential on the patient as they are on his [sic] relatives
and friends, and it should not surprise anyone that the
diagnosis acts on all of them as a self-fulfilling prophesy.
Eventually, the patient himself [sic] accepts the diagnosis,
with all of its surplus meanings and expectations, and behaves
accordingly. (1973, p. 254; see also L. S. Brown, 1995b; Langer
& Abelson, 1974; Mednick, 1989; Murphy, 1976; K. S. Pope,
Butcher, & Seelen, 1993; Reiser & Levenson, 1984)
The Cause of False Memory Syndrome: Trauma Memories Implanted in
Therapy
To exaplain why people who had never been abused would accuse
parents or others of sexually abusing them, false memory
syndrome proponents have tended to assert that therapists
implanted the memories. For example, FMSF (1995) claimed "that
certain psychotherapeutic techniques, theories and practices
have led many people to falsely believe they were sexually
abused as children" (p. 1). Seeking research evidence that
specific therapist behaviors cause harm poses a dilemma:
Investigators cannot randomly assign patients to conditions
hypothesized to cause injury. Typically, studies attempt to
correct for the absence of random assignment by selecting
appropriate comparison groups, by matching patients on relevant
variables, and by using measures that are likely to create
maximum sensitivity and specificity to the phenomenon at issue.
For example, research assessing whether therapists' sexual
behaviors were associated with specific patient symptoms might
compare a group of patients who had engaged in sex with a
therapist with matched (in regard to demographics, etc.) groups
of patients who had not engaged in sex with a therapist and of
patients who had engaged in sex with a physician who was not a
therapist (for reviews of such research, see K. S. Pope, 1994 ;
K. S. Pope, Sonne, & Holroyd, 1993). In this instance,
researchers have tended instead to attempt demonstration that
false memories of events described as traumatic can be implanted
in other contexts, with generalizations from these findings to
what must occur in psychotherapy.
Loftus's widely cited experiment in which older family members
apparently implanted memories in 14-year-old Chris, 8-year-old
Brittany, and three other participants has been claimed as
the "proof" (Loftus & Ketcham, 1994, p. 99) that implanting
traumatic memories is possible. When challenged with the
assertion, "But it's just not possible to implant in someone's
mind a complete memory with details and relevant emotions for a
traumatic event that didn't happen, " Loftus responded: "But
that's exactly what we did in the shopping mall experiment"
(Loftus & Ketcham, 1994, p. 212). Proponents described this
experiment as demonstrating the creation of an extensive false
memory. (Lynn and Nash (1994) reported that "Loftus and Coan
were able to implant an extensive autobiographical memory" (p.
198). (Lindsay and Read (1994) claimed that "Loftus and Coan
demonstrated that people can be led to create detailed and
extended 'recollections' of childhood that never occurred" (p.
289). The popular press echoed a similar theme arguing, for
example, that the most practical significance about the lost-in-
the-shopping-mall study is that "it buttresses an alternative
explanation for the source of recovered memories that True
Believers purport to have repressed. Namely that the memories
have been implanted by some type of suggestion; they are false"
(Boss&comma 1994, p. 12).
Among the kinds of questions that might be useful in evaluating
claims about implanting "a complete memory with details and
relevant emotions for a traumatic event that didn't happen"
based on this research are the following:
Does the trauma specified in the lost-in-the-mall experiment
seem comparable to the trauma forming the basis of false memory
syndrome? Loftus (1993) described the implanted traumatic event
in the shopping-mall experiment as follows: "Chris was convinced
by his older brother Jim, that he had been lost in a shopping
mall when he was five years old" (p. 532). Does this seem, for
example, a reasonable analogy for a five-year-old girl being
repeatedly raped by her father? Pezdek (1995; see also (Pezdek,
Finger, & Hodge, 1996) has suggested that this may not be the
case. In attempting to arrive at a more analogous situation-that
of a suggested false memory of a rectal enema-her experimental
attempts at implantation of a suggestion had a 0% success rate.
What is the impact of the potentially confounding variables in
claiming the shopping-mall experiment to be a convincing
analogue of therapy (Loftus, 1993; Loftus & Ketcham, 1994)? Is
it possible that the findings are an artifact of this particular
design, for example, that the older family member claims to have
been present when the event occurred and to have witnessed it, a
claim the therapist can never make? To date, replications and
extensions of this study have tended to use a similar
methodology; that is, either the older family member makes the
suggestions in his or her role as the experimenter's
confederate, or the experimenter presents the suggestion as
being the report of an older family member, thus creating a
surrogate confederate.
Has this line of research assumed that verbal reports provided
to researchers are the equivalent of actual memories? Spanos
(1994) suggested that changes in report in suggestibility
research may represent compliance with social demand conditions
of the research design rather than actual changes in what is
recalled. In what ways were the measures to demonstrate actual
changes or creations of memory representations validated and
confounding variables (e.g., demand characteristics) excluded?
Given that being lost while out shopping is apparently a common
childhood experience, how is the determination made that the
lost-in-the-mall memory is not substantially correct? What
supports the claim that "Chris had remembered a traumatic
episode that never occurred" (Garry & Loftus, 1994, p. 83). That
is, is there any possibility that Chris's family had forgotten
an actual event of this type?
If the experiment is assumed for heuristic reasons to
demonstrate that an older family member can extensively rewrite
a younger relative's memory in regard to a trauma at which the
older relative was present, why have false memory syndrome
proponents presented this research as applying to the dynamics
of therapy (e.g., Loftus, 1993; Loftus & Ketcham, 1994) but not
to the dynamics of families, particularly those in which parents
or other relatives may be exerting pressure on an adult to
retract reports of delayed recall? Is it possible that older
family members can rewrite younger relatives' memories in regard
to traumatic events at which they were present? Might this occur
in the context of sexual abuse when the repeated suggestion is
made by a perpetrator that "nothing happened" and that any
subsequent awareness of the abuse constitutes a false memory?
This line of research has been extended by others, and similar
research has been carried out in varied designs (e.g., "false
memories" of words that did not appear in a list of words,
suggestions of earaches and trips to the hospital at night,
suggestions of rectal enemas). One crucial question is, does
this research adequately justify the claims that are being made
in legal cases and elsewhere? An FMSF (1995) amicus curiae brief
(which includes a list of the 47 prominent members of the FMSF
Scientific and Professional Advisory Board as an appendix)
presented a typical claim: "Memories of truly traumatic events
are easily altered and false recollections, though felt to be
actual memories of real events, can easily be induced by
suggestion" (p. 20).
Loftus (1992) published claims that are even more sweeping:
If handled skillfully, the power of misinformation is so
enormous and sufficiently controllable that a colleague and I
recently postulated a not-too-distant "brave new world" in which
misinformation researchers would be able to proclaim: "Give us a
dozen healthy memories and our own specified world to handle
them in. And we'll guarantee to take any one at random and train
it to become any type of memory that we might select regardless
of its origin or the brain that holds it." The implications for
the legal field, for advertising, and for clinical settings are
far reaching. (p. 123)
These expansive a claims echo those made by Watson (1939) over a
half century ago, when a line of behavioral research led to
claims that the power of learning theory was so enormous and
sufficiently controllable that psychologists with sufficient
resources could take individuals at random and produce any kind
of people and behavior they might select. If there was a lesson
to be learned from the Watsonian claim, it was modesty. Not only
did human beings fail to fall helplessly under the power of
conditioning, docile animals often refused to act in accordance
with the proclaimed principles of the new science (e.g., Breland
& Breland, 1961). It was the rush to uncritically embrace claims
that went far beyond the data-the failure to question carefully-
that caused the Watsonian fall.
Therapists as Perpetrators of False Memory Syndrome
An additional assertion with regard to false memory syndrome has
been the claim that significant numbers of therapists engage in
behaviors likely to iatrogenically inflict the false memory
syndrome. Lindsay and Poole (1995), for example, stated, "In our
view there are solid grounds to fear that tens of thousands of
people have developed illusory memories or false beliefs about
CSA [child sexual abuse] through suggestive memory recovery
techniques and ancillary practices in psychotherapy, self-help,
or group therapy" (p. 464). In a study to examine clinical
practices, Poole, Lindsay, Memon, and Bull (1995) reported data
from a study of both U.S. and British clinicians and suggested
that their findings indicated that
25% of the members of those organizations who conduct
psychotherapy with adult female clients believe that recovering
memories is an important part of therapy, think they can
identify clients with hidden memories during the initial session
and use two or more techniques to help such clients recover
suspected memories of CSA. (p. 434; initial findings from Poole
et al.'s study were previously presented and discussed in an
article by (Lindsay & Read, 1994)
(Lindsay and Read (1994) "refer to such approaches collectively
as 'memory recovery therapies'" (p. 282), "are sharply critical
of the memory recovery techniques" (p. 298), and fear "that
these powerful techniques are being used in ways that are
damaging the lives of many clients and their families" (p. 282).
They compare memory recovery therapy "to a powerful medicine
that may be helpful to victims of a disease but that can cause
great harm when given to people who do not have the disease" (p.
282). They claimed that the self-report of a constellation of
beliefs (i.e., recovering memories is an important part of
psychotherapy and therapists thinking they can identify clients
with hidden memories) and practices (i.e., use any two of a list
of techniques in the last two years) constitutes a "grave risk"
(p. 327).
Others besides the study's authors have cited the results as
providing evidence that so-called memory recovery therapies are
commonly practiced by psychotherapists and that many therapists
are at risk of harming clients by engaging in such behaviors.
For example, an FMSF (1995) amicus curiae brief claimed
that "recent surveys of therapists' understanding and practices
have shown a number of widely held misconceptions, which if
communicated to patients, may increase a client's responsiveness
to suggestion-and in turn, [lead] to the development of false
memories" (p. 5).
FMSF Scientific and Professional Advisory Board member Dawes
(1995) characterized the techniques included in the study
as "coercive techniques" (p. 12). Loftus (1995) claimed "that
these activities can and do sometimes lead to false memories
seems now to be beyond dispute" (p. 24). In addition, Loftus,
Milo, and Paddock (1995) used Poole et al.'s (1995) data to
estimate that as many as 25% of clinicians "may be using
techniques that are risky if not dangerous" (p. 304). Because
they use some techniques included in Poole et al.'s list,
specific therapists have been publicly labeled as "dangerous."
For example, the Jerusalem Post reported opposition to Utrecht
University psychology professor Onno van der Hart's plan to
lecture in Israel on his treatment of adults who suffered
childhood abuse:
Members of the US False Memory Syndrome Foundation and
psychologists in various parts of the world charged that van der
Hart and his colleagues were "very dangerous." His critics
charged that van der Hart's techniques represented a "harmful
and unscientific method of pseudotherapy that must be seen as a
threat to psychology in Israel. This 'therapy' makes the patient
dependent on the therapist by inventing multiple personalities,
false memories and accusations, which have already destroyed
tens of thousands of families in the US." (Siegel-Itzkovich,
1996, p. 7)
Poole et al.'s (1995) study has also been used as the basis for
various estimates of the frequency with which illusory memories
of abuse may occur. Pendergrast (1995) estimated that "25% of
doctoral level therapists constitute True Believers" (I'll be
discussing the use of the term True Believers later on near the
end of my talk) and that "over one million cases of 'recovered
memories' each year" (p. 491)-allegedly illusory ones-occur in
psychotherapy in the United States. Using similar calculations,
FMSF Scientific and Professional Advisory Board member (Crews
(1995) claimed that "it is hard to form even a rough idea of the
number of persuaded clients a conservative guess would be a
million persons since 1988 alone" (p. 160). Dawes (1995)
estimated a lower bound of 1,475,833 women who, in the last two
years, had seen therapists who reported using two or more
techniques specified in Poole et al.'s survey to help
individuals recover memories. Thus, Dawes concluded
that "Wakefield and Underwager are absolutely correct in their
assessment that recovered memory therapy is widespread" (p.12).
Olio (1995a, 1995b, in press) suggested, however, that such
conclusions might not be valid. She formulated questions about
the research design, statistical tests, and inferences that
might be useful in evaluating this study, among which are the
following four:
Did the survey construction lead to confounded results?
Olio (1996) noted that the critics of recovered memories have
repeatedly emphasized the thesis that memory may be particularly
susceptible to distorting or confabulating influences when
responding to questions (especially related to the past) or
giving self-reports. Ironically, this study relies on similar
data-gathering procedures in which people are asked numerous
questions based on their memory of past complex events. (Poole
(1996) herself acknowledged that the data "do not necessarily
index what clinicians do in their offices because they are
retrospective self-report measures" (p. 1).
The study failed to use free-recall questions. For example,
rather than asking, "Do you use any memory-recovery techniques,
and if so, what are they?" Poole et al. (1995) used a
potentially suggestive technique of the type they criticized
therapists for using. Participants were first told that
other "therapists use special techniques to help clients
remember childhood sexual abuse" (Poole et al., 1995, p. 430)
and then were provided a list of techniques to check. Olio
(1996) suggested that in light of current theory on memory,
recall, and the impact that questioning may exert on responses,
the use of these techniques may have unintentionally shaped the
findings to confirm the beliefs of false memory syndrome
proponents.
Do the measures have face validity?
According to Olio (1996), the conclusions of (Poole et al.'s
(1995) study are based on the unproven assumption that
clinicians with certain (self-reported) beliefs practice
differently from clinicians with other beliefs and that these
differences in practice create greater risk for the production
of illusory memories. She questioned this assumption that
beliefs are reliable predictors of behaviors. The complex chain
of assumptions (i.e., reported belief to actual belief to
behavior to consequences for patients) may be questionable at
best. For example, Polusny and Follette (1996) found that
despite therapists' beliefs about the prevalence of repressed
memories, the majority of therapists holding these beliefs
reported that they had not seen any cases of adult clients who
entered therapy with no memory of childhood sexual abuse and
subsequently recalled abuse during therapy.
Poole et al. (1995), according to Olio (1996), apparently drew
inferences about implanting or creating illusory memories of
childhood abuse in clients who reported no memories of childhood
abuse at the beginning of psychotherapy and who did not in fact
have an actual history of childhood abuse. Unfortunately, key
questions in the survey did not inquire specifically about the
use of various therapy techniques with this particular
population. The questions used were
Survey 1: "Some therapists use special techniques to help
clients remember childhood sexual abuse. Check any technique
that you have used with abuse victims in the past 2 years."
Survey 2: "Check on the left ["tick" for the British survey] any
technique that you have used in the past 2 years to help clients
remember childhood sexual abuse." (p. 430)
The question on Survey 1 specifically asked about techniques
used with "abuse victims" and did not inquire how many (if any)
of these were clients who denied abuse, but whom the clinician
suspected might have had abuse histories. Similarly, the inquiry
regarding techniques used to "help clients remember childhood
sexual abuse" in Survey 2 did not differentiate between
techniques used with clients who reported a history of abuse
(both those with continuous or accessible memory and those who
recovered memories of abuse prior to psychotherapy) and
techniques used with clients who denied such a history.
Olio (1996) suggested that other inconsistencies between the
actual survey questions used and the reported conclusions may be
important. For example, Poole et al. (1995) claimed that "25%
believe that recovering memories is an important part of
therapy" (p. 434), whereas the actual survey question asked
respondents to rate "how important is it 'that a client who was
sexually abused acknowledges or remembers [italics added] the
abuse in order for the therapy to be effective'" (p. 430). Poole
et al. (1995) suggested that their survey "indicates that some
clinicians believe they can identify clients who were sexually
abused as children even when those clients deny abuse histories"
(p. 434). However, the survey question (in Survey 2) asked about
instances in which the client did not explicitly report any
abuse, not about instances in which the client denied abuse
histories. Finally, Poole et al.'s (1995) claim that 25% "think
they can identify clients with hidden memories during the
initial session" (p. 434) is based on questions that asked
(retrospectively), "Of adult female clients whom you suspected
[italics added] were sexually abused as children what percentage
initially denied any memory of childhood abuse" (p. 430; Survey
1) and asked if participants "had ever suspected [italics added]
that a client had been abused although the client did not
explicitly report any abuse" (p. 430; Survey 2). It seems that a
clinician's acknowledgment that he or she sometimes had
suspected an abuse history significantly differs from a belief
that he or she could identify those with hidden abuse memories
(see subsequent section Not Suspecting Child Abuse ).
Are the techniques risky?
Poole et al.'s (1995) characterization of potentially risky
behaviors practiced by 25% of clinicians relied on
a "constellation" of three self-report items (discussed
previously): two items relating to beliefs and one to practice.
Olio (1996) observed, however, that there are no validation
studies for this constellation of reported beliefs and practice
and therefore no way to determine what is actually being
measured by these items, no way to determine what outcome(s)
result from this constellation, and no way to know how the
results might differ from other psychotherapy practices.
According to Olio, the study apparently assumed that some
techniques are risky per se, rather than recognizing that
virtually all psychotherapy techniques have the potential for
damage depending on the manner, context, and timing in which
they are used.
Olio (1996) noted that Poole et al. (1995) did not offer any
criteria or research to define what might constitute a risky
frequency of use for the listed techniques. Despite expressing
concerns regarding approaches to therapy "that combine several
techniques in a prolonged search for suspected hidden memories"
( Lindsay, 1995a, pp. 281-282), in Poole et al.'s data, the
criteria for questionable practice is satisfied with the single
use of any two techniques (even on a single occasion) during the
last two years. Therefore, a therapist who allows one client to
keep a journal and bring in family photos as a way of decreasing
the anxiety and pain of the remembering process would be counted
among those engaging in coercive, risky practices that can
create false memories and would be classified as a potentially
dangerous recovered-memory therapist.
Olio (1996) argued that in essence (Poole et al. (1995) created
an unvalidated checklist (for risky practices), not dissimilar
to the unvalidated checklists of symptoms that (Lindsay and Read
(1994), among others, correctly criticized some clinicians for
using to identify histories of childhood abuse. Responding to
Olio's critique, Lindsay (1995b) conceded that he did "agree
that there are far too little data to make firm statements about
the prevalence of 'risky' memory work" (p. 1).
Did Poole et al. (1995) incorrectly infer causality?
Olio (1996) noted that Poole et al. (1995) claimed "our survey
indicates these interventions can have serious implications for
clients (e.g., lead some clients to terminate relations with
their fathers)" (p. 434). This conclusion is based on responses
to the following question: "Of the adult female clients who
initially denied any memory of sexual abuse, what percentage
came to remember childhood sexual abuse during the course of
therapy?" (p. 431). Poole et al. reported that in "Survey I, we
asked respondents to report the percentage of clients, among
those who through therapy remembered abuse, who confronted their
abuser and who cut off relations with the abuser" (p. 432).
Thus, all abuse reported by therapists as having been recalled
during the course of therapy (Poole et al., 1995, p. 431) was
claimed by the authors to represent cases of abuse
remembered "through" therapy (p. 432). Olio (1996) observed that
this is a form of the logical fallacy post hoc, ergo propter hoc
("after this, therefore on account of this"). Poole et al.
committed this fallacy, according to Olio, with their claim that
because therapists reported having used certain techniques and
reported that some clients recovered memories during this time
span, the techniques must have caused the memories. Furthermore,
Poole et al. used this logic to claim that the use of those
particular techniques had serious implications; that is, it was
the use of those techniques that lead clients to terminate
relations with their fathers. In both instances, presumed
correlation is confused with causation.
Olio (1996) noted that such assumed correlations may be
misleading. She used the example of a hypothetical survey in
which respondents were asked if their patients got older during
the course of therapy. Even if 100% of the therapists reported
that their clients became older during therapy, it does not
provide evidence that the aging process was attributable to or
even differentially associated with therapy. Olio emphasized the
importance of placing such data within a 2 x 2 (whether patients
recovered memories by whether therapist used specified
interventions) or similar model and of assessing whether
randomization and other procedures were adequately considered.
Such a statistical model would assess the relationships among
(a) patients recovering memories during therapy as reported by
therapists using specified interventions, (b) patients not
recovering memories during therapy as reported by therapists
using specified interventions, (c) patients recovering memories
during therapy as reported by therapists not using specified
interventions, and (d) patients not recovering memories during
therapy as reported by therapists not using specified
interventions.
Redefining Malpractice and the Standard of Care
The FMSF and its proponents have published claims not only about
scientific findings but also about the nature of malpractice and
the standard of care. Pending systematic surveys and other
research addressing the issue, it is impossible to know the
degree to which such published statements by a prominent
organization or professionals may have a chilling effect on the
professional services provided by therapists who disagree with
these claims. What impact will clinicians' knowledge that
prominent expert witnesses may testify that certain services
constitute malpractice have on the availability of those kinds
of services? As with claims of scientific findings, it is
important to respond with neither reflexive acceptance nor
rejection but rather careful questioning.
Should Therapists Be Required To Seek External Validation?
One set of claims asserts that without seeking external
validation through family members or others, the therapist
violates the legal standard of care by providing treatment when
recovered memories of abuse are at issue. FMSF has highlighted
in its publications such statements about the standard of care
by its Scientific and Professional Advisory Board members
as, "To treat for repressed memories without any effort at
external validation is malpractice pure and simple" (McHugh,
1993b, p. 1; for an alternate view, see American Psychological
Association Task Force on Violence and the Family, 1996, p. 74.
FMSF (1992a) also published a statement, adapted from two
Scientific and Professional Advisory Board members, of the 13
steps a therapist needs to take in regard to gathering external
validating information when adult patients allege childhood sex
abuse. The therapist of a person who has sought treatment for
recovered memories of incest must not only contact the parents
and seek other sources of validation but must also provide
comprehensive information about the patient to clinicians
working on behalf of the parents; to refuse to provide such
information raises the question of an absence of "good faith"
(McHugh, 1993a, p. 3).
Questions that might be useful in evaluating this claim include
the following: Do FMSF proponents imply that therapists can
accept without external validation reports based on memories
that have been continuously accessible rather than recovered;
that is, is there no legal mandate to seek external validation
when an adult's memories of child sex abuse have been
continuous? If so, what research findings support this
distinction? Do FMSF proponents imply that therapists are
legally required to seek external validation only when a patient
reports child sex abuse; that is, is there no legal mandate to
seek external validation for all patient reports of violence,
abuse, crimes, or other such interactions? If so, what research
findings support this distinction?
Behavioral and Pharmacological Therapies and Directing Feelings
Recent claims in this area address the kinds and content of
therapy. (Loftus (1995) in the Skeptical Inquirer , for example,
supported the development, evaluation, and use of "behavioral
and pharmacological therapies that minimize the possibility of
false memories and false diagnoses" and urged therapists to
avoid "dwelling on the misery of childhood" (p. 28). Maintaining
that patients are best served when therapists adhere to the
following principles, Loftus wrote,
Borrowing from John Gottman's (1994) excellent advice on how to
make your marriage succeed, patients might be reminded that
negative events in their lives do not completely cancel out all
the positives (p. 182). Encourage the patient to think about the
positive aspects of life-even to look through picture albums
from vacations and birthdays. Think of patients as the
architects of their thoughts, and guide them to build a few
happy rooms. The glass that's half empty is also half full.
Campbell (1994) offers similar advice. Therapists, he believes,
should encourage their clients to recall some positive things
about their families. A competent therapist will help others
support and assist the client, and help the client direct
feelings of gratitude toward those significant others. ( Loftus,
1995, p. 28)
Among the questions useful in carefully evaluating these claims
are the following:
Is there research demonstrating that behavioral and
pharmacological therapies produce fewer false memories and false
diagnoses than other forms of therapy?
What evidence supports the claim that to be competent a
therapist must render help to third parties in their efforts to
support and assist a therapy client?
What evidence supports the claim that to be competent a
therapist must help clients to direct feelings of gratitude to
third parties?
Not Suspecting Child Abuse
Claims that such factors as clothing, attractive appearance,
smiling behavior, and chatting provide a reliable basis for
concluding that a person has never engaged in child abuse stand
in contrast to claims that presenting symptoms must never lead
anyone to suspect that a person may have been sexually abused.
For example, Kihlstrom (1995b; see also (Olio, 1995c) wrote
that "it is not permissible to infer, or frankly even to
suspect, a history of abuse in people who present symptoms of
abuse." He similarly asserted that "you can never, never, never,
never, never, infer a history of sexual abuse from the patient's
presenting symptoms.
Nevernevernevernevernevernevernevernevernevernever" (1995a).
These claims taken together seem to suggest that although
presenting "symptoms of abuse" never justify suspicion that a
person was involved in child abuse, presenting factors such as
clothing and appearance can reliably demonstrate that a person
was not involved in child abuse.
In evaluating the effects of prohibiting suspicion of child
abuse based on presenting symptoms, it may be useful to as, k,
how
will it affect mandated reporting of suspected child abuse?
Reviews of state laws suggest that almost 50% use a form of the
verb "suspect" (e.g., "suspect that a child has been abused") in
legislation requiring therapists to report suspected child abuse
(Kalichman, 1993). Other states use similar concepts but
different wording.
Another question for evaluating this prohibition is, to what
degree if at all might therapists refrain from pursuing
diagnostic leads based on presenting symptoms because of the
threat of malpractice suits? Decisions to report suspected child
abuse may be covered by at least a qualified immunity, but
assessment and treatment actions generally are not. Without
research data concerning the potential influence of this
prohibition, it is impossible to know if or how it will affect
clinicians' responses to presenting symptoms.
A third question useful for assessing this claim is, to what
degree do various arrays of presenting symptoms lead at least
some therapists to suspect child abuse as one possible event
that may be associated with the symptoms and warrant
consideration in the assessment process? Approaches to gathering
relevant information might take a variety of forms such as
presenting symptom arrays to clinicians and asking if they might
lead to a suspicion of abuse. For example, a cluster of
presenting symptoms for a young girl might include panic and
avoidant behavior in the presence of her father; nightmares
occurring every few hours that, according to the patient,
involve a shadowy figure grabbing at her genitals; and refusal
to allow a physical examination although she had previously
allowed them during medical office visits. Clinicians might also
be asked if the notion that chart notes or other evidence
revealing that such presenting symptoms led them to suspect
child abuse as a diagnostic possibility might subject them to a
malpractice suit affected their responses to these symptoms.
Unacceptable Books and Ideas
In some instances published works condemned by FMSF proponents
become targets of legal action. Lawsuits in two California
cities blamed a book for leading people to believe false
memories of childhood sex abuse ("Author Target of False-
Memories Lawsuit, " 1994; Butler, 1994; K. S. Pope, 1995). A
licensing complaint was filed against a therapist
asserting "that an article she had written for a journal titled
Medical Aspects of Human Sexuality could suggest false incest
diagnoses" (Butler, 1995, p. 28).
Therapists may themselves face formal complaints for using books
containing unacceptable ideas. The Philadelphia Inquirer , for
example, quoted Paul Fink, a past president of the American
Psychiatric Association, saying on the topic of therapists who
give The Courage To Heal: A Guide for Women Survivors of Child
Sexual Abuse (Davis & Bass, 1994) and similar books to their
patients: "There's a name for this-bibliotherapy. To give a book
that espouses a narrow thesis of mental functioning is
malpractice" (Sifford, 1992, p. D6).
Careful evaluation of such restrictions on the flow of ideas may
include consideration of such questions as
At what point does a thesis of mental functioning become defined
as sufficiently narrow that any book espousing it must be banned
from therapy? For example, B. F. Skinner relegated so-called
mental functioning to an unobservable epiphenomenon, irrelevant
as a variable in the scientific study of human behavior. Would
this thesis of mental functioning be considered sufficiently
narrow that a behavior therapist giving one of Skinner's books
to a client would be considered malpractice?
Is it essential to the malpractice claim that the harmful ideas
appear in the form of a published book? For example, if instead
of giving the book to a patient so that the patient can study
and form an opinion about the thesis himself or herself, the
therapist were to say to a patient, "There is a book by Bass and
Davis that espouses this view of mental functioning, " or
otherwise discuss the ideas within the book, is that too
malpractice?
If it is malpractice for therapists to give such books to their
patients, would it also constitute malpractice for supervisors
to give such books to their therapy trainees, hospitals and
clinics to make such books available in their libraries,
professionals leading workshops to use them as texts, or
professors to assign them to their students?
How, if at all, does the prospect of encountering expert
testimony that giving a particular sort of book to a patient is
per se malpractice influence the behavior of therapists and the
range of services, ideas, and choices available to those in
need?
Checklists for Assessing Incompetence and Other Forms of
Malpractice
Some FMSF proponents have created and endorsed checklists by
which patients can supposedly determine whether a therapist is
incompetent, is causing harm, or is engaging in other forms of
malpractice. For example, an FMSF Scientific and Professional
Advisory Board member noted that "whether or not a therapist has
a doctoral degree, is irrelevant to his psychotherapeutic
competence" ( Campbell, 1994, p. 49) and published a 40-item
checklist by which patients can supposedly assess a therapist's
competence (p. 251). With minor revision, this instrument has
been published by others (e.g., (Wakefield & Underwager, 1994).
The number of "yes" responses supposedly indicates the
likelihood that the therapist is "incompetent" and that the
therapist is causing "much more harm than good." The book,
however, provides no references to published research
establishing the validity, reliability, sensitivity, or
specificity of this instrument. If there is a scientific basis
for this instrument, it would be useful for the FMSF Scientific
and Professional Advisory Board members endorsing it to provide
those research data so that these claims can be carefully
evaluated.
Careful Examination: The Scientific Process
Questioning scientific claims may be difficult if a prestigious
group portrays them as the only legitimate scientific view,
sufficiently established so as to preclude serious consideration
of any alternative views. For example, a prominent regional
psychological association invited an array of scientists to
discuss the debate about memory and abuse from a scientific
perspective. Suggestions that a more balanced program might be
achieved by supplementing the members of the FMSF Scientific and
Professional Advisory Board who had been invited as speakers
with scientists who might present alternatives to the FMSF view
were rejected by FMSF as unscientific. The False Memory Syndrome
Newletter set forth the rationale for the rejection:
A memory researcher told us that research academics "don't even
know what this memory debate is about. They see the evidence and
to them the science of memory is obvious." He is right.
The "science" of the "memory" is established. How could a
scientific program about memory be "balanced?" The notion makes
no more sense than trying to balance a program in astronomy by
including astrologers. ("Social Political Movement, " 1996)
As previously noted, the factors that can discourage careful
questioning of scientific claims or consideration of alternate
views are many. Scientists must be aware of these factors and
must carefully and responsibly question claims and consider
other explanatory models regardless of the prestige of those who
might assert that a particular thesis about memory and abuse is
beyond question.
Responsible scientific questioning of specific claims bears at
least one similarity to conducting well-designed experimental
research. Experimental research must attend not only to
variables of primary interest but also to potentially
confounding factors. Similarly, careful examination of reported
scientific findings and principles must attend not only to
central claims but also to potentially confounding factors that
may influence the degree to which people are inclined, willing,
or free to question or reject certain claims. This section
examines such potentially confounding factors and their
implications.
Picketing
Picketing therapists is a highly visible tactic. If therapists
who disagree with certain claims, voice their disagreement, and
behave in ways that are inconsistent with those claims fear that
their patients may be forced to cross a picket line in order to
obtain their services, it may affect the degree to which they
feel free to carefully question and rationally consider these
claims.
As early as 1992 in an FMSF newsletter article titled "What Can
Families Do?" the tactic of picketing was discussed (FMSF,
1992c ). FMSF members picketing therapists has emerged as a
topic at professional conferences and in the literature of this
area, sometimes including discussion of the experience of a
therapist targeted for picketing (e.g., (Brown, 1995a; Calof,
1996; see also (Butler, 1995). Among questions that might be
useful in evaluating the potential consequences and implications
of this tactic are the following:
What is the impact on patients who are forced to cross a picket
line to obtain treatment from a provider of a particular form of
legal health care service? Will patients choose to cross picket
lines, forego treatment altogether, or pursue treatment from
someone acceptable to false memory syndrome proponents who
establish picket lines?
Some patients or potential patients may perceive and value a
right of privacy and believe it important that no one else know
that they seek mental health services. Those wishing to seek
treatment for concerns such as sexual abuse from family members,
domestic violence, or torture may fear that, should the fact
that they are seeking professional help become known, their own
lives or the lives of their families might be endangered or that
other negative consequences might occur (see, e.g., Calof, 1996;
J. J. Freyd, 1996; Herman, 1992; Koss et al., 1994; (K. S. Pope
& Garcia-Peltoniemi, 1991; (Salter, 1995). How does forcing
patients to cross picket lines affect such privacy concerns?
How do patients (or therapists) evaluate or anticipate what may
happen to them should they cross through the picket line (do
they believe it possible or likely that they will be followed,
their license plate number taken down, their picture taken, and
so on)? How do clients form opinions about what the pickets,
FMSF, or others may view as justifiable steps to take when
targeted services continue despite picketing? Butler (1995)
quoted the FMSF executive director:
"If somebody came into your house and shot your child, it would
probably be justifiable homicide if you did something, and
that's how these parents feel, " says Freyd. "When you get
between parents and children, you can expect things to happen."
(p. 75)
Describing and Diagnosing Individuals Who Disagree
Diagnosing and otherwise categorizing those who disagree may
influence the degree to which people are inclined, willing, and
free to question scientific claims. When such diagnoses and
categorizations are set forth, it is important to examine the
scientific evidence on which they rest, their social or policy
consequences, and their potential effects on scientific
deliberations. Two founding members of the FMSF Scientific and
Professional Advisory Board published an article examining why
University of California, Los Angeles, professor Roland Summit
and others persist in believing in child abuse phenomena that
according to some claims are unscientific and absurd. They
concluded that the cause of such beliefs among professionals lay
not in the evidence for the hypotheses, nor in social or
contextual variables, nor in differing perspectives, but rather
in the relational dysfunctions or psychopathology of those who
believe these ideas. Underwager and Wakefield (1991) wrote,
The answer to the question why do some professionals believe and
not others is in the internal variables of the personalities of
the believers. It ranges from factors that may make a person
difficult to relate to but remaining functional to serious
psychopathology. (p. 190)
Paranoid.
Those disagreeing may be characterized more specifically as
manifesting paranoid beliefs or responses. FMSF Scientific and
Professional Advisory Board member Richard Ofshe wrote, "These
responses signal the collective paranoia of a social movement
turning inward" (Ofshe & Watters, 1993, p. 16). Another FMSF
Scientific and Professional Advisory Board member explained, in
an APA divisional presidential address, that the belief
of "abuse-believers" frequently "takes on a paranoid cast"
(Spence, 1993; see also Wakefield & Underwager, 1994, pp. 41-
43).
Cult and sect.
The Washington Post quoted the FMSF executive director as
characterizing those who work to open up the topic of sex abuse
to public awareness as cult-like. " 'I can understand, ' says
Freyd, 'people who are trying to open up the area of sexual
abuse being infuriated by us. They feel we aren't helping their
work. But they are a little like a cult' " (Sherrill, 1995, p.
F1). Pendergrast (1995) recommended different terminology. "Some
have called the Survivor Movement not only a religion, but a
cult. It is all too easy to label any fervent group a 'cult, '
with all its negative connotations. I prefer the word 'sect' "
(p. 478). This characterization addresses the motivation of
certain therapists who disagree:
Most of the therapists appear to be True Believers on a mission.
That fits Hassan's general observations: "They believe that what
they are doing is truly beneficial to you. However, they want
something more valuable than your money. They want your mind! Of
course, they'll take your money, too, eventually." Similarly,
trauma therapy guarantees a protracted period of recovery and,
hence, a steady income. (Pendergrast, 1995, p. 479)
True Believers.
One of the most commonly used labels to describe individuals who
disagree with the FMSF is True Believer . Loftus used the
concept of True Believer to support her claim that resistance to
her work is based not on evidence, reason, and good faith but
rather prejudice and fear (e.g., "I know the prejudices and
fears that lie behind the resistance to my life's work"; (Loftus
& Ketcham, 1994, p. 4). She split the profession into two
groups. Identifying herself as a skeptic, she and her colleague
wrote,
On one side are the "True Believers, " who insist that the mind
is capable of repressing memories and who accept without
reservation or question the authenticity of recovered memories.
On the other side are the "Skeptics, " who argue that the notion
of repression is purely hypothetical and essentially untestable,
based as it is on unsubstantiated speculation and anecdotes that
are impossible to confirm or deny. (Loftus & Ketcham, 1994, p.
31)
Loftus makes clear her source by quoting from Hoffer's
(1951/1989) well-known text, The True Believer .
If the skeptic demands proof, how does the True Believer decide
what to believe in? Hoffer (1951/1989) observed that True
Believers shut themselves off from facts, ignoring a doctrine's
validity while valuing its ability to insulate them from reality
(p. 80). Hoffer (1951/1989) described the True Believer's
passionate hatred and fanaticism, noting "the acrid secretion of
the frustrated mind, though composed chiefly of fear and ill
will, acts yet as a marvelous slime to cement the embittered and
disaffected into one compact whole" (p. 124). Among the most
prominent professionals who are True Believers, according to the
false memory literature, are psychologists Judith Alpert, Laura
Brown, and Christine Courtois, three members of the APA working
group on recovered memories. (Pendergrast (1995) wrote, "The
American Psychological Association has created a six-person
committee to study the repressed-memory issue. Three of the
members are experimental researchers who are skeptical of
massive repression, including Elizabeth Loftus. The other three
are True Believer therapists." (pp. 503-504; see also Wakefield
& Underwager, 1994, p. 349). The term True Believers
characterizing those who disagree now appears in the peer-
reviewed scientific literature, for example, in an article by a
member of the FMSF Scientific and Professional Advisory Board
(Crews, 1996, p. 66 ).
Use of Holocaust imagery.
Those who disagree with FMSF have also been compared to
Fascists. In her book Diagnosis for Disaster: The Devastating
Truth About False Memory Syndrome and Its Impact on Accusers and
Families , Wassil-Grimm (1995) , for example, used the imagery
of the Holocaust, explicitly referring to Hitler and the
Jews: "Hitler had the Jews; McCarthy had the communists; radical
feminists have perpetrators" (p. 91). The Oregonian quoted the
FMSF Executive Director Pamela Freyd as describing the behavior
of professor Jennifer Freyd as "Gestapolike" (Mitchell, 1993, p.
L6 ), a term she had previously used in a journal article, later
reprinted as a book chapter (Doe, 1994, p. 29). (In late
February 1992, when she wrote that she was "going to serve as
Executive Director of the FMS foundation, " Pamela Freyd
confirmed in the False Memory Syndrome Newsletter that "You
already know me as Jane Doe".) Another use of imagery related to
the Holocaust, used on this occasion to compare an FMSF
Scientific and Professional Advisory Board member to those who
risked their lives to save Jews from the Nazis, appeared in the
Boston Globe: " 'I feel like Oskar Schindler, ' Loftus muses,
referring to the German financier who rescued doomed Jews from
the Nazis. 'There is this desperate drive to work as fast as I
can'" (Kahn, 1994, p. 80).
It is important to examine the use of imagery related to the
Holocaust to compare explicitly or implicitly one who disagrees
to Hitler, the Gestapo, and Nazis or to portray an FMSF
proponent as engaged in a desperate rescue. Among questions to
be addressed in careful examination of this use are the
following: Do such statements reflect on the motivation,
character, and decency of those who disagree with FMSF claims?
Do such statements promote a climate of hate and hostility
toward those who fail to accept FMSF claims? Do such statements
have a chilling effect on some who otherwise might voice
questions about FMSF claims? How might such statements affect
the scientific and popular (e.g., media) evaluation of FMSF
claims about the difficult and complex issues of remembering
child sex abuse?
Obtaining and Revealing Disclosures to Therapists
According to the Portland Oregonian , FMSF director Pamela Freyd
recommended tactics to learn about someone else's
therapy: "Follow your child to the office, hire a private
detective, pry the information from other relatives your child
may talk to, pose as a patient yourself" (Mitchell, 1993, p. L1;
see also FMSF, 1992c, p. 4; Loftus, 1993, pp. 529-530). Finding
out and revealing what people have said to their therapists has
placed communications to therapists about alleged child abuse in
a new context. In The Myth of Repressed Memory: False Memories
and Allegations of Sexual Abuse , (Loftus and Ketcham (1994)
reprinted quotes from a Playboy article (Nathan, 1992) that were
apparently verbatim statements by women who were meeting with
therapists as part of a four-day "retreat for survivors of
sexual abuse, physical abuse, emotional abuse and neglect" (p.
202). The Playboy article's author was an investigative
journalist who had attended the retreat for survivors and
therapists:
Does knowing about such published accounts affect the decisions
of those who view themselves as having experienced sexual abuse,
physical abuse, emotional abuse, and neglect about whether to
seek services in group settings?
It is worth asking whether the accounts of people's disclosures
to therapists accord them basic respect and dignity. For
example, The Myth of Repressed Memory: False Memories and
Allegations of Sexual Abuse used such characterizations as the
following to describe women talking with therapists about
abuse: "Soon it was time to plunge into the gory details. A
veritable competition began as one woman after another related
her grisly stories, progressively upping the ante of horror"
(Loftus & Ketcham, 1994, p. 203). FMSF has helped popularize
what appears to be ridicule of those who claim to be abuse
survivors through publication of such articles as "Whining About
Abuse Is an Epidemic" (Nethaway, 1993, p. 6). Research could be
useful in exploring whether the manner in which disclosures to
therapists about alleged abuse are characterized in books,
newsletters, and other works by FMSF proponents has any
influence on the willingness of those who view themselves
(accurately or inaccurately) as survivors of various forms of
abuse to seek professional help.
It is worth asking whether those who make such disclosures to
therapists have concerns about the uses to which their
statements may be put? Would they fear that their statements
might be used in legal actions to deprive them of their civil
rights, that is, that their statements would be construed as
evidence of false memory syndrome, rendering them unable to make
their own decisions? In "Legal Aspects of False Memory
Syndrome, " for example, FMSF (1992b) informed parents that
they "may take the legal position that the accusing child is
incompetent and seek guardianship proceedings" (p. 3).
It is worth asking whether these data-gathering activities and
publications impose specific informed-consent duties on
therapists? Do patients have a right to know that other
patients, clerical or support staff, shelter volunteers, or
others present may actually be detectives, reporters, and so
forth, and that what they say in the presence of these other
people may be published or put to use in other ways? Are
patients who believe that they are talking to therapists or
other helpers aware that in certain circumstances they may find
their words quoted, even with a pseudonym. Pseudonyms may not
prevent recognition of a specific individual (see, e.g., K. S.
Pope, 1995). Is it possible that the information gathered may be
used in a way patients would not have chosen or given consent
for? If informed consent and informed refusal are fundamental
rights of those seeking health care services, and if the consent
process involves telling potential patients about factors that
might reasonably affect their decision to consent to or refuse
treatment (Caudill & Pope, 1995; (K. S. Pope & Vasquez, 1991),
it is difficult to imagine any legitimate justification for
withholding information about such possibilities from those who
will be most affected. This is an important question of
professional responsibility and public policy and deserves
careful and comprehensive discussion.
Conclusion
In closing today, I'd like to return to the primary theme: that
the claims that have been set forth--about a new diagnostic
category (false memory syndrome) reaching epidemic proportions,
the ease with which extensive autobiographical memories about
trauma can be implanted, and the large number of therapists
engaging in behaviors likely to cause false memories of trauma
in their patients--must be given careful, open, unbiased
consideration in light of the rigorous standards of scientific
theory and research.
On one hand, it is crucial that we review all available evidence
and consider the implications that the claims may be valid.
Crews (1995), Dawes (1994), Goldstein and Farmer (1993, 1994),
Loftus and Ketcham (1994), Ofshe and Watters (1994), (Underwager
and Wakefield (1994), and (Wassil-Grimm (1995) are among those
whose books have set forth vividly the significant implications
for individuals lives, public policy, legal standards of care,
therapy, and education and training.
On the other hard it is equally crucial that we allow for the
possibility that the evidence and logic do not convincingly
establish the validity of some or perhaps any such claims. We
must be prepared to examine the profound implications for
individual lives, public policy, the standard of care, clinical
work, and education and training if these widely accepted and
institutionalized claims are invalid. Is it possible that tens
of thousands of individuals have been wrongly diagnosed with a
label lacking adequate scientific validation. Have well-meaning
scholars issued an invalid alert of an epidemic?
Psychologists--particularly social and cognitive psychologists--
have traditionally studied the way such claims are evaluated and
institutionalized, including tactics used to promote them. We
must be as attentive to factors that, however unintentionally,
may confound the process of consideration and discussion as they
are to factors that may confound an individual experiment. If
disagreement with certain claims is determined to reflect
impaired functioning or serious psychopathology, the scientific
process may be subverted. If those who question, doubt, or
disagree are authoritatively characterized by professionals as
hate-filled True Believers, paranoid cultists, or Hitler-like
zealots, the process of free and independent analysis of FMSF
claims may be affected. If patients currently seeking legal
health care services from those who question or disagree with
FMSF are forced to cross picket lines to obtain those services
or if they are subjected to other interventions, it may unduly,
unfairly, and detrimentally influence their rights to choice and
their rights to treatment.
Refusing to consider divergent evidence, disallowing doubt or
skepticism, and discrediting anyone who disagrees, especially
through unsupported claims about character are the hallmarks of
pseudoscience. As scientists, we must determine whether claims
take the shape of hypotheses that are falsifiable, and then
scrutinize with openness but reasonable skepticism whether the
primary data, research methodology, assumptions, and inferences
adequately establish those hypotheses. This process of careful
questioning is essential to the scientific venture.
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"SCIENCE AS CAREFUL QUESTIONING: ARE CLAIMS OF A FALSE MEMORY
SYNDROME EPIDEMIC BASED ON EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE?" by Ken Pope
appeared in American Psychologist, September, 1997, vol. 52, #9,
pp. 997-1006
Son_of_Chive_Mynde
Practices?
A Review of the Logic and Methodology of the Poole, Lindsay et
al. Study
Karen A. Olio
"Are 25% of Clinicians Using Potentially Risky Therapeutic
Practices? A Review of the Logic and Methodology of the Poole,
Lindsay et al. Study" was published in JOURNAL OF PSYCHIATRY &
LAW, Summer, 1996, pages 277-298.
ABSTRACT: Conclusions from the Poole, Lindsay et al. study are
often cited to document claims regarding the frequency and
potential risks of using so-called suggestive memory recovery
techniques or memory recovery therapies. This study has also
been used to document the alleged number of persuaded clients
who have developed false memories of childhood abuse. The basis
for these claims seems questionable when the Poole, Lindsay et
al. study is examined carefully. Lack of operational
definitions, flawed survey construction, lack of face validity,
misclassification of techniques, and fallacious inferences about
causality, such as mistaking correlation for causation, make it
impossible to use these data to draw scientific conclusions
about the nature and outcomes of clinicians' practices.
Son_of_Chive_Mynde
SURVIVORS
DeWind, E. (1968). The confrontation with death. International
Journal of Psychoanalysis, 49, 302-305.
Most former inmates of Nazi concentration camps could not
remember anything of the first days of imprisonment because
perception of reality was so overwhelming that it would lead to
a mental chaos which implies a certain death.
Durlacher, GL (1991). De zoektocht [The search]. Amsterdam:
Meulenhoff.
Dutch sociologist , a survivor of Birkenau, describes his search
for and meetings with another 20 child survivors from this
camp. "Misha...looks helplessly at me and admits hesitantly that
the period in the camps is wiped out from his brain....With each
question regarding the period between December 12, 1942 till May
7, 1945, he admits while feeling embarrassed that he cannot
remember anything." Jindra...had to admit that he remembers
almost nothing from his years in the camps...."From the winter
months of 1944 until just before the liberation in April 1945,
only two words stayed with him: Dora and Nordhausen....In a
flash I understand his amnesia, and shocked, I hold my tongue.
Dora was the hell which almost nobody surivived, was it not?
Underground, without fresh air or daylight, Hitler's secret
weapon of destruction, the V-2 rocket, was made by prisoners.
Only the dying or the dead came above the ground, and Kapos, and
guards." (P.129).
Jaffe, R. (1968). Dissociative phenomena in former concentration
camp inmates. International Journal of Psycho-analysis, 49, 310-
312.
Case descriptions include amnesia for traumatic events and
subsequent twilight states in which events would be relived
without conscious awareness. "I should like to add that the
dissociative phenomena described here turn out not to be rare,
once one is on the look out for them." (p. 312.)
Keilson, H. (1979/1992). Sequential traumatization in children.
Jerusalem: The Magnes Press/Hebrew University.
Amnesia in Jewish Dutch child survivors for the traumatic
separation from their parents.
Krell, R. (1993). Child survivors of the Holocaust: Strategies
of adaptation. Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 38, 384-389.
"The most pervasive preoccupation of child survivors is the
continuing struggle with memory, whether there is too much or
too little....For a child survivor today, an even more vexing
problem is the intrusion of fragments of memory - most are
emotionally powerful and painful but make no sense. They seem to
become more frequent with time and are triggered by thousands of
subtle or not so subtle events....As children they were
encouraged not to tell, but to lead normal lives and forget the
past....Some are able to protect themselves by splitting time
into past, present , and future....The interviewer can assist in
sequencing fragments of memory, sometimes even filling in gaps
with historical information and other data. Fragments of memory
which made no sense had often been experienced as 'crazy' and
never shared with anyone...To achieve relief for symptomatic
child survivors, the knowledgeable therapist elicits memories,
assists in their integration, makes sense of the sequence and
encourages the child survivor to write their story, publish it,
tape, or teach it."
Krystal, H. (1994). Holocaust survivor studies in the context of
PTSD. PTSD Research Quarterly, 5 (4).
"Some authors also point to disturbances of memory: amnesia,
hyperamnesias and disturbances of consciousness, which in
retrospect we later recognized as trances."
Krystal, H., & Neiderland, WG (1968). Clinical observations on
the survivors syndrome. In H. Krystal (Ed). Massive Psychic
Trauma, 327-384. New York: International Universities Press.
Discusses problems of hypermnesia and amnesia.
Kuch, K., & Cox, B.J. (1992). Symptoms of PTSD in 124 survivors
of the Holocaust. American Journal of Psychiatry, 149, 337-340.
Potential subjects with confirmed or suspected organicity,
bipolar or obsessive complusive disorder were excluded. One
group (N=78) had been detained in various concentration camps
for greater than 1 month. A second group (N=20) had been
detained in Auschwitz and had been tatooed. A third group (N=45)
had not been in labor camps, ghettos, or had hidden in the
illegal underground. Psychogenic amnesia was found in 3.2% of
the totals sample, in 3.8 of the general concentration camp
survivors, and in 10% of tattoed survivors of Auschwitz. 17.7%
(N=22) of the total sample had received psychotherapy. The
tattoed survivors had a higher number of PTSD symptoms overall.
Lagnado, LM, & Dekel, SC (1991). Children of the flames: Dr.
Josef Mengele and the untold story of the twins of Auschwitz.
New York: William and Morrow & Co.
"A few of the twins insisted that they had no memories of
Auschwitz whatsoever. Instead, they dwelt on the sadness of
their postwar adult lives - their emotional upheavals, physical
breakdowns, and longings for the dead parents they had hardly
known." (p. 8).
Laub, D., & Auerhahn, N. (1989). Failed empathy - A central
theme in the survivor's Holocaust experience. Psychoanalytic
Psychology, 6(4), 377-400.
Holocaust survivors remember their experiences through a prism
of fragmentation and usually recount them only in fragments....A
curious blend often exists between almost polar experiences:
Remembering minute details in their fullest color and subtlest
tones, while being unable to place those details in their
narrative context or specific situational reference.
Laub, D. & Auerhahn, N (1993). Knowing and not knowing massive
psychic trauma: Forms of traumatic memory. American Journal of
Psychoanalysis, 74, 287-302.
"The knowledge of trauma is fiercely defended against, for it
can be a momentous, threatening, cognitive and affective task,
involving an unjaundiced appraisal of events and our own
injuries, failures, conflicts, and losses....To protect
ourselves from affect we must, at times, avoid
knowledge....Situations of horror destroy the detached
sensibility necessary for articulation, analysis,
elaboration....Knowing...requires a capacity for metaphor which
cannot withstand atrocity...Notwithstanding the difficulties
around and the struggle against knowing, the reality of
traumatic events is so compelling that knowledge prevails,
despite its absence to consciousness and its
incompleteness....The different forms of remembering trauma
range from not knowing, fugue states, fragments, transference
phenomena, overpowering narratives, life themes, witnessed
narratives, metaphors....These vary in degree of encapsulation
versus integration of the experience and in degree of ownership
of the memory, i.e., the degree to which an experiencing 'I' is
present as subject....Erecting barriers against knowing is often
the first response to such trauma. Women in Nazi concentration
camps dealt with difficult interrogation by the Gestapo by
derealization, by asserting 'I did not go through it. Somebody
else went through the experience.' A case study example is
included of a man in therapy who wanted to capture an elusive
memory. The only remaining trace was a sense of dread on hearing
the phone click. Over time, he recollected a traumatic war time
experience as a child involving the death of a doctor whom he
had loved, and for which he felt partly responsible. Having
recovered the memory he had lost, its intrusive fragments no
longer blocked him from pursuing his life. Many of his somatic
symptoms receded at the time....Unintegrable memories endure as
a split-off part, a cleavage in the ego....When the balance is
such that the ego cannot deal with the experience, fragmentation
occurs....Simply put, therapy with those impacted by trauma
involves, in part, the reinstatement of the relationship between
event, memory and personality.
Marks, J. (1995). The hidden children: The secret survivors of
the Holocaust. Toronto: Bantam Books.
Ava Landy describes her amnesia: "So much of my childhood
between the ages of four and nine is blank....It's almost as if
my life was smashed into little pieces...The trouble is, when I
try to remember, I come up with so little. This ability to
forget was probably my way of surviving emotionally as a child.
Even now, whenever anything unpleasant happens to me, I have a
mental garbage can in which I can put all the bad stuff and
forget it....I'm still afraid of being hungry....I never leave
my house without some food....Again, I don't remember being
hungry. I asked my sister and she said that we were hungry. So I
must have been! I just don't remember." (P. 188).
Mazor, A., Ganpel, Y., Enright, RD, & Ornstein, R. (Jan., 1990).
Holocaust survivors: Coping with posttraumatic memories in
childhood and 40 years later. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 3
(1), 11-14.
Modai, I. (1994). Forgetting childhood: A defense mechanism
against psychosis in a Holocaust survivor. In T. L. Brink,
(Ed.). Holocaust survivors' mental health. New York: Haworth
Press. Also published in: (1994) Clinical Gerontologist, 14(3),
67-71.
In a debate about uncovering painful memories of the Holocaust,
Modai's case is of a 58 year old woman who is unable to remember
her childhood.
Moskovitz, S., & Krell, R. (1990). Child survivors of the
Holocaust: Psychological adaptations to survival. Israel Journal
of Psychiatry and Related Services, 27 (2), 81-91.
"Whatever the memories, much is repressed as too fearful for
recall, or suppressed by well-meaning caretakers wishing the
child to forget. Without confronting the fear and recapturing
the fragments of memory, the survivor cannot make the necessary
connections which allow reintegration of their whole life;
neither can they obtain the peace of mind that comes with
closure." (p. 89).
Musaph, H. (1993). Het post-concentratiekampsyndroom [The post-
concentration camp syndrome]. Maandblad Geestelijke
volksgezondheid [ Dutch Journal of Mental Health], 28 (5), 207-
217.
Amnesia exists for certain Holocaust experiences, while other
experiences are extremely well remembered.
Niederland, WG. (1968). Clinical observations on the "survivor
syndrome." International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 49, 313-315.
Discusses memory disturbances such as amnesia and hypermnesia.
Somer, E. (1994). Hypnotherapy and regulated uncovering in the
treatment of older survivors of Nazi persecution. Clinical
Gerontologist, 14(3), 47-65.
Discusses hypnotherapeutic titration techniques to assist
Holocaust survivors to uncover previously repressed memory of
concentration camp experiences.
Stein, A. (1994). Hidden children: Forgotten survivors of the
Holocaust. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books.
Collection of interviews with child survivors who were hidden
during the war. Ervin Staub: "Over the years I have been trying
to re-experience those feelings, but they kept eluding me. I was
cut off from most of my memories, and from relieving the anxiety
of that time." (P. 106). I remember nothing about the time I
spent with those people....Not a face, not a voice, not a piece
of furniture. As if the time I spent there had been a time out
of my life. (P. 107)....What is missing? Why can't I conjure up
those memories? I am staring into the darkness with occasional
flashes of light allowing me to unearth bits and pieces of life."
van Ravesteijn, L. (1976). Gelaagdheid van herinneringen
[Layering of memories]. Tijdschrift boor Psychotherapie, 5 (1).
"A smell, a sound, an image evoke fragments of images or
emotions, more compelling than current reality, fragments to
which all experience pain, anger, fear, shame, and powerlessness
have attached themselves. Must a coherent account be given, then
it is often painfully apparent that this is impossible. Most
often, the person is unable to present an overview of this
period." (p. 195).
Wagenaar, WA, & Groenweg, J. (1990). The memory of concentration
camp survivors. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 4, 77-87.
The study is concerned with whether extremely emotional
experiences leave traces in memory that cannot be extinguished.
Testimonies of 78 survivors are taken from 1943-1947 and for a
second time during a Nazi war criminal trial (Defendant - Marins
de Rijke, Camp Erika, Netherlands) from 1984-1987. The witnesses
agreed about the basic facts. Three of 38 survivors tortured by
De Rijke had forgotten his name on the second interview; one had
known his name quite well in the original interview. The fact
that the memories of the more brutal events were not more
resistant against forgetting remains highly informative, even if
the forgetting is aggravated by age effects. The forgotten
elements are not only the unique details of events, but also
some aspects to which the witnesses were exposed repeatedly. The
effects of forgetting reported above cannot easily be situated
in the stage of encoding. The forgotten elements were in many
cases reported in the early testimonies. Results show camp
experiences were generally well-remembered although specific but
essential details were forgotten, including being maltreated,
names and appearances of torturers, and being a witness to
murder. Intensity of experience is NOT a sufficient safeguard
against forgetting.
Wilson, J., Harel, Z, & Kahana, B. (1988). Human adaptation to
extreme stress: From the Holocaust to Vietnam. New York: Plenum
Press.
Yehuda, R., Elkin, et al. (July, 1996). Dissociation in aging
Holocaust survivors. American Journal of Psychiatry, 153, (7),
935-940.
Yehuda, R., Schniedler, J, Siever, LJ, Binder-Brynes, K, &
Elkin, A. (1997). Individual differences in posttraumatic stress
disorder symptom profiles in Holocaust survivors in
concentration camps or in hiding. Journal of Traumatic Stress,
10, 453-465.
46% of 100 survivors report amnesia on PTSD measures.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
This list was compiled by:
Kathy Steele, RN, MN, CS
2801 Buford Highway
Suite 400
Atlanta, GA 30329
Tel. 404 321-4954, ext. 5
Fax 404 321-1928
Email: KStee...@aol.com
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
Last Updated September 18, 1997.
24 PUBLICATIONS CONCERNING TRAUMATIC AMNESIA IN HOLOCAUST
SURVIVORS
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
DeWind, E. (1968). The confrontation with death. International
Journal of Psychoanalysis, 49, 302-305.
Most former inmates of Nazi concentration camps could not
remember anything of the first days of imprisonment because
perception of reality was so overwhelming that it would lead to
a mental chaos which implies a certain death.
Durlacher, GL (1991). De zoektocht [The search]. Amsterdam:
Meulenhoff.
Dutch sociologist , a survivor of Birkenau, describes his search
for and meetings with another 20 child survivors from this
camp. "Misha...looks helplessly at me and admits hesitantly that
the period in the camps is wiped out from his brain....With each
question regarding the period between December 12, 1942 till May
7, 1945, he admits while feeling embarrassed that he cannot
remember anything." Jindra...had to admit that he remembers
almost nothing from his years in the camps...."From the winter
months of 1944 until just before the liberation in April 1945,
only two words stayed with him: Dora and Nordhausen....In a
flash I understand his amnesia, and shocked, I hold my tongue.
Dora was the hell which almost nobody surivived, was it not?
Underground, without fresh air or daylight, Hitler's secret
weapon of destruction, the V-2 rocket, was made by prisoners.
Only the dying or the dead came above the ground, and Kapos, and
guards." (P.129).
Jaffe, R. (1968). Dissociative phenomena in former concentration
camp inmates. International Journal of Psycho-analysis, 49, 310-
312.
Case descriptions include amnesia for traumatic events and
subsequent twilight states in which events would be relived
without conscious awareness. "I should like to add that the
dissociative phenomena described here turn out not to be rare,
once one is on the look out for them." (p. 312.)
Keilson, H. (1979/1992). Sequential traumatization in children.
Jerusalem: The Magnes Press/Hebrew University.
Amnesia in Jewish Dutch child survivors for the traumatic
separation from their parents.
Krell, R. (1993). Child survivors of the Holocaust: Strategies
of adaptation. Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 38, 384-389.
"The most pervasive preoccupation of child survivors is the
continuing struggle with memory, whether there is too much or
too little....For a child survivor today, an even more vexing
problem is the intrusion of fragments of memory - most are
emotionally powerful and painful but make no sense. They seem to
become more frequent with time and are triggered by thousands of
subtle or not so subtle events....As children they were
encouraged not to tell, but to lead normal lives and forget the
past....Some are able to protect themselves by splitting time
into past, present , and future....The interviewer can assist in
sequencing fragments of memory, sometimes even filling in gaps
with historical information and other data. Fragments of memory
which made no sense had often been experienced as 'crazy' and
never shared with anyone...To achieve relief for symptomatic
child survivors, the knowledgeable therapist elicits memories,
assists in their integration, makes sense of the sequence and
encourages the child survivor to write their story, publish it,
tape, or teach it."
Krystal, H. (1994). Holocaust survivor studies in the context of
PTSD. PTSD Research Quarterly, 5 (4).
"Some authors also point to disturbances of memory: amnesia,
hyperamnesias and disturbances of consciousness, which in
retrospect we later recognized as trances."
Krystal, H., & Neiderland, WG (1968). Clinical observations on
the survivors syndrome. In H. Krystal (Ed). Massive Psychic
Trauma, 327-384. New York: International Universities Press.
Discusses problems of hypermnesia and amnesia.
Kuch, K., & Cox, B.J. (1992). Symptoms of PTSD in 124 survivors
of the Holocaust. American Journal of Psychiatry, 149, 337-340.
Potential subjects with confirmed or suspected organicity,
bipolar or obsessive complusive disorder were excluded. One
group (N=78) had been detained in various concentration camps
for greater than 1 month. A second group (N=20) had been
detained in Auschwitz and had been tatooed. A third group (N=45)
had not been in labor camps, ghettos, or had hidden in the
illegal underground. Psychogenic amnesia was found in 3.2% of
the totals sample, in 3.8 of the general concentration camp
survivors, and in 10% of tattoed survivors of Auschwitz. 17.7%
(N=22) of the total sample had received psychotherapy. The
tattoed survivors had a higher number of PTSD symptoms overall.
Lagnado, LM, & Dekel, SC (1991). Children of the flames: Dr.
Josef Mengele and the untold story of the twins of Auschwitz.
New York: William and Morrow & Co.
"A few of the twins insisted that they had no memories of
Auschwitz whatsoever. Instead, they dwelt on the sadness of
their postwar adult lives - their emotional upheavals, physical
breakdowns, and longings for the dead parents they had hardly
known." (p. 8).
Laub, D., & Auerhahn, N. (1989). Failed empathy - A central
theme in the survivor's Holocaust experience. Psychoanalytic
Psychology, 6(4), 377-400.
Holocaust survivors remember their experiences through a prism
of fragmentation and usually recount them only in fragments....A
curious blend often exists between almost polar experiences:
Remembering minute details in their fullest color and subtlest
tones, while being unable to place those details in their
narrative context or specific situational reference.
Laub, D. & Auerhahn, N (1993). Knowing and not knowing massive
psychic trauma: Forms of traumatic memory. American Journal of
Psychoanalysis, 74, 287-302.
"The knowledge of trauma is fiercely defended against, for it
can be a momentous, threatening, cognitive and affective task,
involving an unjaundiced appraisal of events and our own
injuries, failures, conflicts, and losses....To protect
ourselves from affect we must, at times, avoid
knowledge....Situations of horror destroy the detached
sensibility necessary for articulation, analysis,
elaboration....Knowing...requires a capacity for metaphor which
cannot withstand atrocity...Notwithstanding the difficulties
around and the struggle against knowing, the reality of
traumatic events is so compelling that knowledge prevails,
despite its absence to consciousness and its
incompleteness....The different forms of remembering trauma
range from not knowing, fugue states, fragments, transference
phenomena, overpowering narratives, life themes, witnessed
narratives, metaphors....These vary in degree of encapsulation
versus integration of the experience and in degree of ownership
of the memory, i.e., the degree to which an experiencing 'I' is
present as subject....Erecting barriers against knowing is often
the first response to such trauma. Women in Nazi concentration
camps dealt with difficult interrogation by the Gestapo by
derealization, by asserting 'I did not go through it. Somebody
else went through the experience.' A case study example is
included of a man in therapy who wanted to capture an elusive
memory. The only remaining trace was a sense of dread on hearing
the phone click. Over time, he recollected a traumatic war time
experience as a child involving the death of a doctor whom he
had loved, and for which he felt partly responsible. Having
recovered the memory he had lost, its intrusive fragments no
longer blocked him from pursuing his life. Many of his somatic
symptoms receded at the time....Unintegrable memories endure as
a split-off part, a cleavage in the ego....When the balance is
such that the ego cannot deal with the experience, fragmentation
occurs....Simply put, therapy with those impacted by trauma
involves, in part, the reinstatement of the relationship between
event, memory and personality.
Marks, J. (1995). The hidden children: The secret survivors of
the Holocaust. Toronto: Bantam Books.
Ava Landy describes her amnesia: "So much of my childhood
between the ages of four and nine is blank....It's almost as if
my life was smashed into little pieces...The trouble is, when I
try to remember, I come up with so little. This ability to
forget was probably my way of surviving emotionally as a child.
Even now, whenever anything unpleasant happens to me, I have a
mental garbage can in which I can put all the bad stuff and
forget it....I'm still afraid of being hungry....I never leave
my house without some food....Again, I don't remember being
hungry. I asked my sister and she said that we were hungry. So I
must have been! I just don't remember." (P. 188).
Mazor, A., Ganpel, Y., Enright, RD, & Ornstein, R. (Jan., 1990).
Holocaust survivors: Coping with posttraumatic memories in
childhood and 40 years later. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 3
(1), 11-14.
Modai, I. (1994). Forgetting childhood: A defense mechanism
against psychosis in a Holocaust survivor. In T. L. Brink,
(Ed.). Holocaust survivors' mental health. New York: Haworth
Press. Also published in: (1994) Clinical Gerontologist, 14(3),
67-71.
In a debate about uncovering painful memories of the Holocaust,
Modai's case is of a 58 year old woman who is unable to remember
her childhood.
Moskovitz, S., & Krell, R. (1990). Child survivors of the
Holocaust: Psychological adaptations to survival. Israel Journal
of Psychiatry and Related Services, 27 (2), 81-91.
"Whatever the memories, much is repressed as too fearful for
recall, or suppressed by well-meaning caretakers wishing the
child to forget. Without confronting the fear and recapturing
the fragments of memory, the survivor cannot make the necessary
connections which allow reintegration of their whole life;
neither can they obtain the peace of mind that comes with
closure." (p. 89).
Musaph, H. (1993). Het post-concentratiekampsyndroom [The post-
concentration camp syndrome]. Maandblad Geestelijke
volksgezondheid [ Dutch Journal of Mental Health], 28 (5), 207-
217.
Amnesia exists for certain Holocaust experiences, while other
experiences are extremely well remembered.
Niederland, WG. (1968). Clinical observations on the "survivor
syndrome." International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 49, 313-315.
Discusses memory disturbances such as amnesia and hypermnesia.
Somer, E. (1994). Hypnotherapy and regulated uncovering in the
treatment of older survivors of Nazi persecution. Clinical
Gerontologist, 14(3), 47-65.
Discusses hypnotherapeutic titration techniques to assist
Holocaust survivors to uncover previously repressed memory of
concentration camp experiences.
Stein, A. (1994). Hidden children: Forgotten survivors of the
Holocaust. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books.
Collection of interviews with child survivors who were hidden
during the war. Ervin Staub: "Over the years I have been trying
to re-experience those feelings, but they kept eluding me. I was
cut off from most of my memories, and from relieving the anxiety
of that time." (P. 106). I remember nothing about the time I
spent with those people....Not a face, not a voice, not a piece
of furniture. As if the time I spent there had been a time out
of my life. (P. 107)....What is missing? Why can't I conjure up
those memories? I am staring into the darkness with occasional
flashes of light allowing me to unearth bits and pieces of life."
van Ravesteijn, L. (1976). Gelaagdheid van herinneringen
[Layering of memories]. Tijdschrift boor Psychotherapie, 5 (1).
"A smell, a sound, an image evoke fragments of images or
emotions, more compelling than current reality, fragments to
which all experience pain, anger, fear, shame, and powerlessness
have attached themselves. Must a coherent account be given, then
it is often painfully apparent that this is impossible. Most
often, the person is unable to present an overview of this
period." (p. 195).
Wagenaar, WA, & Groenweg, J. (1990). The memory of concentration
camp survivors. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 4, 77-87.
The study is concerned with whether extremely emotional
experiences leave traces in memory that cannot be extinguished.
Testimonies of 78 survivors are taken from 1943-1947 and for a
second time during a Nazi war criminal trial (Defendant - Marins
de Rijke, Camp Erika, Netherlands) from 1984-1987. The witnesses
agreed about the basic facts. Three of 38 survivors tortured by
De Rijke had forgotten his name on the second interview; one had
known his name quite well in the original interview. The fact
that the memories of the more brutal events were not more
resistant against forgetting remains highly informative, even if
the forgetting is aggravated by age effects. The forgotten
elements are not only the unique details of events, but also
some aspects to which the witnesses were exposed repeatedly. The
effects of forgetting reported above cannot easily be situated
in the stage of encoding. The forgotten elements were in many
cases reported in the early testimonies. Results show camp
experiences were generally well-remembered although specific but
essential details were forgotten, including being maltreated,
names and appearances of torturers, and being a witness to
murder. Intensity of experience is NOT a sufficient safeguard
against forgetting.
Wilson, J., Harel, Z, & Kahana, B. (1988). Human adaptation to
extreme stress: From the Holocaust to Vietnam. New York: Plenum
Press.
Yehuda, R., Elkin, et al. (July, 1996). Dissociation in aging
Holocaust survivors. American Journal of Psychiatry, 153, (7),
935-940.
Yehuda, R., Schniedler, J, Siever, LJ, Binder-Brynes, K, &
Elkin, A. (1997). Individual differences in posttraumatic stress
disorder symptom profiles in Holocaust survivors in
concentration camps or in hiding. Journal of Traumatic Stress,
10, 453-465.
46% of 100 survivors report amnesia on PTSD measures.
24 PUBLICATIONS CONCERNING TRAUMATIC AMNESIA IN HOLOCAUST
SURVIVORS
DeWind, E. (1968). The confrontation with death. International
Journal of Psychoanalysis, 49, 302-305.
Most former inmates of Nazi concentration camps could not
remember anything of the first days of imprisonment because
perception of reality was so overwhelming that it would lead to
a mental chaos which implies a certain death.
Durlacher, GL (1991). De zoektocht [The search]. Amsterdam:
Meulenhoff.
Dutch sociologist , a survivor of Birkenau, describes his search
for and meetings with another 20 child survivors from this
camp. "Misha...looks helplessly at me and admits hesitantly that
the period in the camps is wiped out from his brain....With each
question regarding the period between December 12, 1942 till May
7, 1945, he admits while feeling embarrassed that he cannot
remember anything." Jindra...had to admit that he remembers
almost nothing from his years in the camps...."From the winter
months of 1944 until just before the liberation in April 1945,
only two words stayed with him: Dora and Nordhausen....In a
flash I understand his amnesia, and shocked, I hold my tongue.
Dora was the hell which almost nobody surivived, was it not?
Underground, without fresh air or daylight, Hitler's secret
weapon of destruction, the V-2 rocket, was made by prisoners.
Only the dying or the dead came above the ground, and Kapos, and
guards." (P.129).
Jaffe, R. (1968). Dissociative phenomena in former concentration
camp inmates. International Journal of Psycho-analysis, 49, 310-
312.
Case descriptions include amnesia for traumatic events and
subsequent twilight states in which events would be relived
without conscious awareness. "I should like to add that the
dissociative phenomena described here turn out not to be rare,
once one is on the look out for them." (p. 312.)
Keilson, H. (1979/1992). Sequential traumatization in children.
Jerusalem: The Magnes Press/Hebrew University.
Amnesia in Jewish Dutch child survivors for the traumatic
separation from their parents.
Krell, R. (1993). Child survivors of the Holocaust: Strategies
of adaptation. Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 38, 384-389.
"The most pervasive preoccupation of child survivors is the
continuing struggle with memory, whether there is too much or
too little....For a child survivor today, an even more vexing
problem is the intrusion of fragments of memory - most are
emotionally powerful and painful but make no sense. They seem to
become more frequent with time and are triggered by thousands of
subtle or not so subtle events....As children they were
encouraged not to tell, but to lead normal lives and forget the
past....Some are able to protect themselves by splitting time
into past, present , and future....The interviewer can assist in
sequencing fragments of memory, sometimes even filling in gaps
with historical information and other data. Fragments of memory
which made no sense had often been experienced as 'crazy' and
never shared with anyone...To achieve relief for symptomatic
child survivors, the knowledgeable therapist elicits memories,
assists in their integration, makes sense of the sequence and
encourages the child survivor to write their story, publish it,
tape, or teach it."
Krystal, H. (1994). Holocaust survivor studies in the context of
PTSD. PTSD Research Quarterly, 5 (4).
"Some authors also point to disturbances of memory: amnesia,
hyperamnesias and disturbances of consciousness, which in
retrospect we later recognized as trances."
Krystal, H., & Neiderland, WG (1968). Clinical observations on
the survivors syndrome. In H. Krystal (Ed). Massive Psychic
Trauma, 327-384. New York: International Universities Press.
Discusses problems of hypermnesia and amnesia.
Kuch, K., & Cox, B.J. (1992). Symptoms of PTSD in 124 survivors
of the Holocaust. American Journal of Psychiatry, 149, 337-340.
Potential subjects with confirmed or suspected organicity,
bipolar or obsessive complusive disorder were excluded. One
group (N=78) had been detained in various concentration camps
for greater than 1 month. A second group (N=20) had been
detained in Auschwitz and had been tatooed. A third group (N=45)
had not been in labor camps, ghettos, or had hidden in the
illegal underground. Psychogenic amnesia was found in 3.2% of
the totals sample, in 3.8 of the general concentration camp
survivors, and in 10% of tattoed survivors of Auschwitz. 17.7%
(N=22) of the total sample had received psychotherapy. The
tattoed survivors had a higher number of PTSD symptoms overall.
Lagnado, LM, & Dekel, SC (1991). Children of the flames: Dr.
Josef Mengele and the untold story of the twins of Auschwitz.
New York: William and Morrow & Co.
"A few of the twins insisted that they had no memories of
Auschwitz whatsoever. Instead, they dwelt on the sadness of
their postwar adult lives - their emotional upheavals, physical
breakdowns, and longings for the dead parents they had hardly
known." (p. 8).
Laub, D., & Auerhahn, N. (1989). Failed empathy - A central
theme in the survivor's Holocaust experience. Psychoanalytic
Psychology, 6(4), 377-400.
Holocaust survivors remember their experiences through a prism
of fragmentation and usually recount them only in fragments....A
curious blend often exists between almost polar experiences:
Remembering minute details in their fullest color and subtlest
tones, while being unable to place those details in their
narrative context or specific situational reference.
Laub, D. & Auerhahn, N (1993). Knowing and not knowing massive
psychic trauma: Forms of traumatic memory. American Journal of
Psychoanalysis, 74, 287-302.
"The knowledge of trauma is fiercely defended against, for it
can be a momentous, threatening, cognitive and affective task,
involving an unjaundiced appraisal of events and our own
injuries, failures, conflicts, and losses....To protect
ourselves from affect we must, at times, avoid
knowledge....Situations of horror destroy the detached
sensibility necessary for articulation, analysis,
elaboration....Knowing...requires a capacity for metaphor which
cannot withstand atrocity...Notwithstanding the difficulties
around and the struggle against knowing, the reality of
traumatic events is so compelling that knowledge prevails,
despite its absence to consciousness and its
incompleteness....The different forms of remembering trauma
range from not knowing, fugue states, fragments, transference
phenomena, overpowering narratives, life themes, witnessed
narratives, metaphors....These vary in degree of encapsulation
versus integration of the experience and in degree of ownership
of the memory, i.e., the degree to which an experiencing 'I' is
present as subject....Erecting barriers against knowing is often
the first response to such trauma. Women in Nazi concentration
camps dealt with difficult interrogation by the Gestapo by
derealization, by asserting 'I did not go through it. Somebody
else went through the experience.' A case study example is
included of a man in therapy who wanted to capture an elusive
memory. The only remaining trace was a sense of dread on hearing
the phone click. Over time, he recollected a traumatic war time
experience as a child involving the death of a doctor whom he
had loved, and for which he felt partly responsible. Having
recovered the memory he had lost, its intrusive fragments no
longer blocked him from pursuing his life. Many of his somatic
symptoms receded at the time....Unintegrable memories endure as
a split-off part, a cleavage in the ego....When the balance is
such that the ego cannot deal with the experience, fragmentation
occurs....Simply put, therapy with those impacted by trauma
involves, in part, the reinstatement of the relationship between
event, memory and personality.
Marks, J. (1995). The hidden children: The secret survivors of
the Holocaust. Toronto: Bantam Books.
Ava Landy describes her amnesia: "So much of my childhood
between the ages of four and nine is blank....It's almost as if
my life was smashed into little pieces...The trouble is, when I
try to remember, I come up with so little. This ability to
forget was probably my way of surviving emotionally as a child.
Even now, whenever anything unpleasant happens to me, I have a
mental garbage can in which I can put all the bad stuff and
forget it....I'm still afraid of being hungry....I never leave
my house without some food....Again, I don't remember being
hungry. I asked my sister and she said that we were hungry. So I
must have been! I just don't remember." (P. 188).
Mazor, A., Ganpel, Y., Enright, RD, & Ornstein, R. (Jan., 1990).
Holocaust survivors: Coping with posttraumatic memories in
childhood and 40 years later. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 3
(1), 11-14.
Modai, I. (1994). Forgetting childhood: A defense mechanism
against psychosis in a Holocaust survivor. In T. L. Brink,
(Ed.). Holocaust survivors' mental health. New York: Haworth
Press. Also published in: (1994) Clinical Gerontologist, 14(3),
67-71.
In a debate about uncovering painful memories of the Holocaust,
Modai's case is of a 58 year old woman who is unable to remember
her childhood.
Moskovitz, S., & Krell, R. (1990). Child survivors of the
Holocaust: Psychological adaptations to survival. Israel Journal
of Psychiatry and Related Services, 27 (2), 81-91.
"Whatever the memories, much is repressed as too fearful for
recall, or suppressed by well-meaning caretakers wishing the
child to forget. Without confronting the fear and recapturing
the fragments of memory, the survivor cannot make the necessary
connections which allow reintegration of their whole life;
neither can they obtain the peace of mind that comes with
closure." (p. 89).
Musaph, H. (1993). Het post-concentratiekampsyndroom [The post-
concentration camp syndrome]. Maandblad Geestelijke
volksgezondheid [ Dutch Journal of Mental Health], 28 (5), 207-
217.
Amnesia exists for certain Holocaust experiences, while other
experiences are extremely well remembered.
Niederland, WG. (1968). Clinical observations on the "survivor
syndrome." International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 49, 313-315.
Discusses memory disturbances such as amnesia and hypermnesia.
Somer, E. (1994). Hypnotherapy and regulated uncovering in the
treatment of older survivors of Nazi persecution. Clinical
Gerontologist, 14(3), 47-65.
Discusses hypnotherapeutic titration techniques to assist
Holocaust survivors to uncover previously repressed memory of
concentration camp experiences.
Stein, A. (1994). Hidden children: Forgotten survivors of the
Holocaust. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books.
Collection of interviews with child survivors who were hidden
during the war. Ervin Staub: "Over the years I have been trying
to re-experience those feelings, but they kept eluding me. I was
cut off from most of my memories, and from relieving the anxiety
of that time." (P. 106). I remember nothing about the time I
spent with those people....Not a face, not a voice, not a piece
of furniture. As if the time I spent there had been a time out
of my life. (P. 107)....What is missing? Why can't I conjure up
those memories? I am staring into the darkness with occasional
flashes of light allowing me to unearth bits and pieces of life."
van Ravesteijn, L. (1976). Gelaagdheid van herinneringen
[Layering of memories]. Tijdschrift boor Psychotherapie, 5 (1).
"A smell, a sound, an image evoke fragments of images or
emotions, more compelling than current reality, fragments to
which all experience pain, anger, fear, shame, and powerlessness
have attached themselves. Must a coherent account be given, then
it is often painfully apparent that this is impossible. Most
often, the person is unable to present an overview of this
period." (p. 195).
Wagenaar, WA, & Groenweg, J. (1990). The memory of concentration
camp survivors. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 4, 77-87.
The study is concerned with whether extremely emotional
experiences leave traces in memory that cannot be extinguished.
Testimonies of 78 survivors are taken from 1943-1947 and for a
second time during a Nazi war criminal trial (Defendant - Marins
de Rijke, Camp Erika, Netherlands) from 1984-1987. The witnesses
agreed about the basic facts. Three of 38 survivors tortured by
De Rijke had forgotten his name on the second interview; one had
known his name quite well in the original interview. The fact
that the memories of the more brutal events were not more
resistant against forgetting remains highly informative, even if
the forgetting is aggravated by age effects. The forgotten
elements are not only the unique details of events, but also
some aspects to which the witnesses were exposed repeatedly. The
effects of forgetting reported above cannot easily be situated
in the stage of encoding. The forgotten elements were in many
cases reported in the early testimonies. Results show camp
experiences were generally well-remembered although specific but
essential details were forgotten, including being maltreated,
names and appearances of torturers, and being a witness to
murder. Intensity of experience is NOT a sufficient safeguard
against forgetting.
Wilson, J., Harel, Z, & Kahana, B. (1988). Human adaptation to
extreme stress: From the Holocaust to Vietnam. New York: Plenum
Press.
Yehuda, R., Elkin, et al. (July, 1996). Dissociation in aging
Holocaust survivors. American Journal of Psychiatry, 153, (7),
935-940.
Yehuda, R., Schniedler, J, Siever, LJ, Binder-Brynes, K, &
Elkin, A. (1997). Individual differences in posttraumatic stress
disorder symptom profiles in Holocaust survivors in
concentration camps or in hiding. Journal of Traumatic Stress,
10, 453-465.
46% of 100 survivors report amnesia on PTSD measures.
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This list was compiled by:
Kathy Steele, RN, MN, CS
2801 Buford Highway
Suite 400
Atlanta, GA 30329
Tel. 404 321-4954, ext. 5
Fax 404 321-1928
Email: KStee...@aol.com
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Last Updated September 18, 1997.
24 PUBLICATIONS CONCERNING TRAUMATIC AMNESIA IN HOLOCAUST
SURVIVORS
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DeWind, E. (1968). The confrontation with death. International
Journal of Psychoanalysis, 49, 302-305.
Most former inmates of Nazi concentration camps could not
remember anything of the first days of imprisonment because
perception of reality was so overwhelming that it would lead to
a mental chaos which implies a certain death.
Durlacher, GL (1991). De zoektocht [The search]. Amsterdam:
Meulenhoff.
Dutch sociologist , a survivor of Birkenau, describes his search
for and meetings with another 20 child survivors from this
camp. "Misha...looks helplessly at me and admits hesitantly that
the period in the camps is wiped out from his brain....With each
question regarding the period between December 12, 1942 till May
7, 1945, he admits while feeling embarrassed that he cannot
remember anything." Jindra...had to admit that he remembers
almost nothing from his years in the camps...."From the winter
months of 1944 until just before the liberation in April 1945,
only two words stayed with him: Dora and Nordhausen....In a
flash I understand his amnesia, and shocked, I hold my tongue.
Dora was the hell which almost nobody surivived, was it not?
Underground, without fresh air or daylight, Hitler's secret
weapon of destruction, the V-2 rocket, was made by prisoners.
Only the dying or the dead came above the ground, and Kapos, and
guards." (P.129).
Jaffe, R. (1968). Dissociative phenomena in former concentration
camp inmates. International Journal of Psycho-analysis, 49, 310-
312.
Case descriptions include amnesia for traumatic events and
subsequent twilight states in which events would be relived
without conscious awareness. "I should like to add that the
dissociative phenomena described here turn out not to be rare,
once one is on the look out for them." (p. 312.)
Keilson, H. (1979/1992). Sequential traumatization in children.
Jerusalem: The Magnes Press/Hebrew University.
Amnesia in Jewish Dutch child survivors for the traumatic
separation from their parents.
Krell, R. (1993). Child survivors of the Holocaust: Strategies
of adaptation. Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 38, 384-389.
"The most pervasive preoccupation of child survivors is the
continuing struggle with memory, whether there is too much or
too little....For a child survivor today, an even more vexing
problem is the intrusion of fragments of memory - most are
emotionally powerful and painful but make no sense. They seem to
become more frequent with time and are triggered by thousands of
subtle or not so subtle events....As children they were
encouraged not to tell, but to lead normal lives and forget the
past....Some are able to protect themselves by splitting time
into past, present , and future....The interviewer can assist in
sequencing fragments of memory, sometimes even filling in gaps
with historical information and other data. Fragments of memory
which made no sense had often been experienced as 'crazy' and
never shared with anyone...To achieve relief for symptomatic
child survivors, the knowledgeable therapist elicits memories,
assists in their integration, makes sense of the sequence and
encourages the child survivor to write their story, publish it,
tape, or teach it."
Krystal, H. (1994). Holocaust survivor studies in the context of
PTSD. PTSD Research Quarterly, 5 (4).
"Some authors also point to disturbances of memory: amnesia,
hyperamnesias and disturbances of consciousness, which in
retrospect we later recognized as trances."
Krystal, H., & Neiderland, WG (1968). Clinical observations on
the survivors syndrome. In H. Krystal (Ed). Massive Psychic
Trauma, 327-384. New York: International Universities Press.
Discusses problems of hypermnesia and amnesia.
Kuch, K., & Cox, B.J. (1992). Symptoms of PTSD in 124 survivors
of the Holocaust. American Journal of Psychiatry, 149, 337-340.
Potential subjects with confirmed or suspected organicity,
bipolar or obsessive complusive disorder were excluded. One
group (N=78) had been detained in various concentration camps
for greater than 1 month. A second group (N=20) had been
detained in Auschwitz and had been tatooed. A third group (N=45)
had not been in labor camps, ghettos, or had hidden in the
illegal underground. Psychogenic amnesia was found in 3.2% of
the totals sample, in 3.8 of the general concentration camp
survivors, and in 10% of tattoed survivors of Auschwitz. 17.7%
(N=22) of the total sample had received psychotherapy. The
tattoed survivors had a higher number of PTSD symptoms overall.
Lagnado, LM, & Dekel, SC (1991). Children of the flames: Dr.
Josef Mengele and the untold story of the twins of Auschwitz.
New York: William and Morrow & Co.
"A few of the twins insisted that they had no memories of
Auschwitz whatsoever. Instead, they dwelt on the sadness of
their postwar adult lives - their emotional upheavals, physical
breakdowns, and longings for the dead parents they had hardly
known." (p. 8).
Laub, D., & Auerhahn, N. (1989). Failed empathy - A central
theme in the survivor's Holocaust experience. Psychoanalytic
Psychology, 6(4), 377-400.
Holocaust survivors remember their experiences through a prism
of fragmentation and usually recount them only in fragments....A
curious blend often exists between almost polar experiences:
Remembering minute details in their fullest color and subtlest
tones, while being unable to place those details in their
narrative context or specific situational reference.
Laub, D. & Auerhahn, N (1993). Knowing and not knowing massive
psychic trauma: Forms of traumatic memory. American Journal of
Psychoanalysis, 74, 287-302.
"The knowledge of trauma is fiercely defended against, for it
can be a momentous, threatening, cognitive and affective task,
involving an unjaundiced appraisal of events and our own
injuries, failures, conflicts, and losses....To protect
ourselves from affect we must, at times, avoid
knowledge....Situations of horror destroy the detached
sensibility necessary for articulation, analysis,
elaboration....Knowing...requires a capacity for metaphor which
cannot withstand atrocity...Notwithstanding the difficulties
around and the struggle against knowing, the reality of
traumatic events is so compelling that knowledge prevails,
despite its absence to consciousness and its
incompleteness....The different forms of remembering trauma
range from not knowing, fugue states, fragments, transference
phenomena, overpowering narratives, life themes, witnessed
narratives, metaphors....These vary in degree of encapsulation
versus integration of the experience and in degree of ownership
of the memory, i.e., the degree to which an experiencing 'I' is
present as subject....Erecting barriers against knowing is often
the first response to such trauma. Women in Nazi concentration
camps dealt with difficult interrogation by the Gestapo by
derealization, by asserting 'I did not go through it. Somebody
else went through the experience.' A case study example is
included of a man in therapy who wanted to capture an elusive
memory. The only remaining trace was a sense of dread on hearing
the phone click. Over time, he recollected a traumatic war time
experience as a child involving the death of a doctor whom he
had loved, and for which he felt partly responsible. Having
recovered the memory he had lost, its intrusive fragments no
longer blocked him from pursuing his life. Many of his somatic
symptoms receded at the time....Unintegrable memories endure as
a split-off part, a cleavage in the ego....When the balance is
such that the ego cannot deal with the experience, fragmentation
occurs....Simply put, therapy with those impacted by trauma
involves, in part, the reinstatement of the relationship between
event, memory and personality.
Marks, J. (1995). The hidden children: The secret survivors of
the Holocaust. Toronto: Bantam Books.
Ava Landy describes her amnesia: "So much of my childhood
between the ages of four and nine is blank....It's almost as if
my life was smashed into little pieces...The trouble is, when I
try to remember, I come up with so little. This ability to
forget was probably my way of surviving emotionally as a child.
Even now, whenever anything unpleasant happens to me, I have a
mental garbage can in which I can put all the bad stuff and
forget it....I'm still afraid of being hungry....I never leave
my house without some food....Again, I don't remember being
hungry. I asked my sister and she said that we were hungry. So I
must have been! I just don't remember." (P. 188).
Mazor, A., Ganpel, Y., Enright, RD, & Ornstein, R. (Jan., 1990).
Holocaust survivors: Coping with posttraumatic memories in
childhood and 40 years later. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 3
(1), 11-14.
Modai, I. (1994). Forgetting childhood: A defense mechanism
against psychosis in a Holocaust survivor. In T. L. Brink,
(Ed.). Holocaust survivors' mental health. New York: Haworth
Press. Also published in: (1994) Clinical Gerontologist, 14(3),
67-71.
In a debate about uncovering painful memories of the Holocaust,
Modai's case is of a 58 year old woman who is unable to remember
her childhood.
Moskovitz, S., & Krell, R. (1990). Child survivors of the
Holocaust: Psychological adaptations to survival. Israel Journal
of Psychiatry and Related Services, 27 (2), 81-91.
"Whatever the memories, much is repressed as too fearful for
recall, or suppressed by well-meaning caretakers wishing the
child to forget. Without confronting the fear and recapturing
the fragments of memory, the survivor cannot make the necessary
connections which allow reintegration of their whole life;
neither can they obtain the peace of mind that comes with
closure." (p. 89).
Musaph, H. (1993). Het post-concentratiekampsyndroom [The post-
concentration camp syndrome]. Maandblad Geestelijke
volksgezondheid [ Dutch Journal of Mental Health], 28 (5), 207-
217.
Amnesia exists for certain Holocaust experiences, while other
experiences are extremely well remembered.
Niederland, WG. (1968). Clinical observations on the "survivor
syndrome." International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 49, 313-315.
Discusses memory disturbances such as amnesia and hypermnesia.
Somer, E. (1994). Hypnotherapy and regulated uncovering in the
treatment of older survivors of Nazi persecution. Clinical
Gerontologist, 14(3), 47-65.
Discusses hypnotherapeutic titration techniques to assist
Holocaust survivors to uncover previously repressed memory of
concentration camp experiences.
Stein, A. (1994). Hidden children: Forgotten survivors of the
Holocaust. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books.
Collection of interviews with child survivors who were hidden
during the war. Ervin Staub: "Over the years I have been trying
to re-experience those feelings, but they kept eluding me. I was
cut off from most of my memories, and from relieving the anxiety
of that time." (P. 106). I remember nothing about the time I
spent with those people....Not a face, not a voice, not a piece
of furniture. As if the time I spent there had been a time out
of my life. (P. 107)....What is missing? Why can't I conjure up
those memories? I am staring into the darkness with occasional
flashes of light allowing me to unearth bits and pieces of life."
van Ravesteijn, L. (1976). Gelaagdheid van herinneringen
[Layering of memories]. Tijdschrift boor Psychotherapie, 5 (1).
"A smell, a sound, an image evoke fragments of images or
emotions, more compelling than current reality, fragments to
which all experience pain, anger, fear, shame, and powerlessness
have attached themselves. Must a coherent account be given, then
it is often painfully apparent that this is impossible. Most
often, the person is unable to present an overview of this
period." (p. 195).
Wagenaar, WA, & Groenweg, J. (1990). The memory of concentration
camp survivors. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 4, 77-87.
The study is concerned with whether extremely emotional
experiences leave traces in memory that cannot be extinguished.
Testimonies of 78 survivors are taken from 1943-1947 and for a
second time during a Nazi war criminal trial (Defendant - Marins
de Rijke, Camp Erika, Netherlands) from 1984-1987. The witnesses
agreed about the basic facts. Three of 38 survivors tortured by
De Rijke had forgotten his name on the second interview; one had
known his name quite well in the original interview. The fact
that the memories of the more brutal events were not more
resistant against forgetting remains highly informative, even if
the forgetting is aggravated by age effects. The forgotten
elements are not only the unique details of events, but also
some aspects to which the witnesses were exposed repeatedly. The
effects of forgetting reported above cannot easily be situated
in the stage of encoding. The forgotten elements were in many
cases reported in the early testimonies. Results show camp
experiences were generally well-remembered although specific but
essential details were forgotten, including being maltreated,
names and appearances of torturers, and being a witness to
murder. Intensity of experience is NOT a sufficient safeguard
against forgetting.
Wilson, J., Harel, Z, & Kahana, B. (1988). Human adaptation to
extreme stress: From the Holocaust to Vietnam. New York: Plenum
Press.
Yehuda, R., Elkin, et al. (July, 1996). Dissociation in aging
Holocaust survivors. American Journal of Psychiatry, 153, (7),
935-940.
Yehuda, R., Schniedler, J, Siever, LJ, Binder-Brynes, K, &
Elkin, A. (1997). Individual differences in posttraumatic stress
disorder symptom profiles in Holocaust survivors in
concentration camps or in hiding. Journal of Traumatic Stress,
10, 453-465.
46% of 100 survivors report amnesia on PTSD measures.
Son_of_Chive_Mynde
1. The recovery of memories in clinical practice: Experiences
and beliefs of British Psychological Society practitioners
Andrews, Bernice; Morton, John; Bekerian, Debra A.; Brewin,
Chris R.; Davis, Graham M.; Mollon, Phil
The Psychologist
1995 May, Vol. 8, pp. 209-214
This article does not have a traditional abstract, so I have
selected a few quotes from the article, including the author
note. "The authors were members of the Society's Working Party
on Recovered Memories. In February the Society published the
Working Party's report. Here the results of the survey, which
formed a part of the report, are published in full." "The
findings suggest that. . .recovery from total amnesia of past
traumatic material involving both CSA and non-CSA experiences is
by no means an uncommon feature of clinical practice among our
highly trained professional members." ". . .our large-scale
survey confirms and extends previous research. . . . Memory
recovery appears to be a robust and frequent phenomenon."
2. Recovered Memories of Trauma: Phenomenology and Cognitive
Mechanisms
Berwin, Chris B. and Bernice Andrews.
Clinical Psychology Review
Vol. 18, 949-970 (1998).
3. Self-reported amnesia for abuse in adults molested as
children.
Briere, John; Conte, Jon R.
U Southern California School of Medicine, Los Angeles, US
Journal of Traumatic Stress
1993 Jan Vol 6(1) 21-31
Studied 450 adult clinical Ss reporting sexual abuse histories
regarding their repression of sexual abuse incidents. 267 Ss
identified some period in their lives, before 18 yrs of age,
when they had no memory of their abuse. Variables most
predictive of abuse-related amnesia (ARA) were greater current
psychological symptoms, molestation at an early age, extended
abuse, and variables reflecting especially violent abuse (e.g.,
victimization by multiple perpetrators, having been physically
injured as a result of the abuse, victim fears of death if she
or he disclosed the abuse to others). In contrast, abuse
characteristics more likely to produce physiological conflict
were not associated with ARA. Results are interpreted as
supporting Freud's (1954, 1966) initial "seduction hypothesis."
4. Memory presentations of childhood sexual abuse.
Burgess AW; Hartman CR; Baker T
University of Pennsylvania, School of Nursing, Philadelphia
19104, USA.
J Psychosoc Nurs Ment Health Serv (UNITED STATES) Sep 1995, Vol
33 (9) 9-16.
Questions are continually raised about the accuracy and validity
of very young children's memories of traumatic events. Out of 19
children, where the median age was 2 1/2 at time of disclosure,
11 had full verbal memory, five had fragmented verbal memory
traces, and three had no memory 5 to 10 years following day care
sexual abuse. Data from this clinical study suggest the nature
of children's memory is four-dimensional: somatic, behavioral,
verbal, and visual. Efforts need to continue to document the
nonverbal components for assessment and treatment purposes.
5. Women survivors confronting their abusers: Issues,
decisions, and outcomes.
Cameron, Catherine
U La Verne, Behavioral Science Dept, CA, US
Journal of Child Sexual Abuse
1994 Vol 3(1) 7-35
Surveyed 72 women who entered therapy in the mid-1980s to deal
with the long-term consequences of childhood sexual abuse. 51 Ss
were surveyed again in 1988 and 1992. In general, responses to
the 1st survey were characterized by a desire to confront
without the readiness to do so, responses to Survey 2 by
completed confrontations, and responses to Survey 3 by
reconfrontations. Findings support recommendations regarding
helping clients to plan, practice, and carry out confrontations
safely. More recognition should be given to the aftermath of
confrontation, debriefing, and reconfrontation, and to survivors
with specialized needs, such as women formerly amnesic to their
abuse.
6. Accuracy, timing and circumstances of disclosure in therapy
of recovered and continuous memories of abuse.
Dalenberg, Constance J.
CSPP, Trauma Research Inst, San Diego, CA, US
Journal of Psychiatry & Law
1996 Sum Vol 24(2) 229-275
Investigated the accuracy of recovered and continuous memories
in 17 women (average age 29.5 yrs) who had recovered memories of
physical or sexual abuse by their fathers while in therapy. Ss
and their 43-72 yr old fathers cooperated in gathering physical
evidence confirming or refuting these memories. This evidence
was analyzed and rated by 6 independent judges recruited for the
purpose. Memories of abuse were found to be equally accurate
whether recovered or continuously remembered. Predictors of
number of memory units for which evidence was uncovered included
several measures of memory and perceptual accuracy. Recovered
memories that were later supported arose in psychotherapy more
typically during periods of positive rather than negative
feeling toward the therapist, and they were more likely to be
held with confidence by the abuse victim.
7. Posttraumatic stress associated with delayed recall of
sexual abuse: A general population study. Special Issue:
Research on traumatic memory.
Elliott, Diana M.; Briere, John
U California-Los Angeles Medical Ctr, Child Abuse Crisis Ctr,
Harbor
Campus, Torrance, US
Journal of Traumatic Stress
1995 Oct Vol 8(4) 629-647
Examined delayed recall of childhood sexual abuse with 505 Ss.
Ss completed the Traumatic Events Survey, Trauma Symptom
Inventory, Impact of Event Scale, and the Symptom Checklist. Of
Ss who reported a history of sexual abuse, 42% described some
period of time when they had less memory of the abuse than they
did at the time of data collection. No demographic differences
were found between Ss with continuous recall and those who
reported delayed recall. However, delayed recall was associated
with the use of threats at the time of the abuse. Ss who had
recently recalled aspects of their abuse reported particularly
high levels of posttraumatic symptomatology and self
difficulties at the time of data collection compared to other
Ss.
8. Traumatic events: Prevalence and delayed recall in the
general population
Elliott, Diana M.
U California-Los Angeles Medical Ctr, Child Abuse Crisis Ctr,
Harbor
Campus, Torrance, US
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology
1997 Vol 65, 811-820
A random sample of 724 individuals from across the United States
were mailed a questionnaire containing demographic information,
an abridged version of the Traumatic Events Survey (DM Elliott,
1992), and questions regarding memory for traumatic events. Of
these, 505 (70%) completed the survey. Among respondents who
reported some form of trauma (72%), delayed recall of the event
was reported by 32%. This phenomenon was most common among
individuals who observed the murder or suicide of a family
member, sexual abuse survivors, and combat veterans. The
severity of the trauma was predictive of memory status, but
demographic variables were not. The most commonly reported
trigger to recall of the trauma was some form of media
presentation (i.e., television show, movie), whereas
psychotherapy was the least commonly reported trigger.
9. The experience of "forgetting" childhood abuse: A national
survey of psychologists.
Feldman-Summers, Shirley; Pope, Kenneth S.
Independent practice, Edmonds, WA, US
Journal of Consulting & Clinical Psychology
1994 Jun Vol 62(3) 636-639
A national sample of psychologists were asked whether they had
been abused as children and, if so, whether they had ever
forgotten some or all of the abuse. Almost a quarter of the
sample (23.9%) reported childhood abuse, and of those,
approximately 40% reported a period of forgetting some or all of
the abuse. The major findings were that (1) both sexual and
nonsexual abuse were subject to periods of forgetting; (2) the
most frequently reported factor related to recall was being in
therapy; (3) approximately one half of those who reported
forgetting also reported corroboration of the abuse [see
comparable percentage in the Pope & Tabachnick (1995) study
below]; and (4) reported forgetting was not related to gender or
age of the respondent but was related to severity of the abuse.
10. Do you believe in repressed memories?
Golding, Jonathan M.; Sanchez, Rebecca Polley; Sego, Sandra A
U Kentucky, Dept of Psychology, Lexington, KY, US
Professional Psychology: Research & Practice
1996 Oct Vol 27(5) 429-437
A survey of 613 undergraduates investigated beliefs about and
experience with repressed memories. The results indicated that
participants (a) had some degree of belief in repressed
memories; (b) felt that therapy sometimes leads to false
memories being implanted; (c) felt, to some degree, that
repressed memory evidence should be allowed in court; and (d)
had experience with repressed memories, either personally or
through media coverage. Also, the gender of the participants
affected many of the ratings (e.g., women had greater belief in
and more personal experience with such memories than men). The
implications of these results for professionals and laypeople
are discussed.
11. Recovery and verification of memories of childhood sexual
trauma.
Herman, Judith L.; Schatzow, Emily
Women's Mental Health Collective, Somerville, MA
Psychoanalytic Psychology
1987 Win Vol 4(1) 1-14
53 women outpatients (aged 15-53 yrs) participated in short-term
therapy groups for incest survivors. This treatment modality
proved to be a powerful stimulus for recovery of previously
repressed traumatic memories. A relationship was observed
between the age of onset, duration, and degree of violence of
the abuse and the extent to which memory of the abuse had been
repressed. 74% of Ss were able to validate their memories by
obtaining corroborating evidence from other sources. The
therapeutic function of recovering and validating traumatic
memories is explored in relation to case material.
12. A field study of "false memory syndrome": Construct
validity and incidence.
Hovdestad, Wendy E.; Kristiansen, Connie M.
Carleton U, Dept of Psychology, Ottawa, ON, Canada
Journal of Psychiatry & Law
1996 Sum Vol 24(2) 299-338
Reviewed the literature on false memory syndrome (FMS) and
examined the validity of 4 clusters of symptoms associated with
FMS using data from a community survey of 100 women (aged 18-57
yrs) who identified themselves as survivors of childhood sexual
abuse (CSA). Ss' responses to a questionnaire were divided into
2 groups, those whose memory of CSA was continuous and those who
reported recovered memories for at least 1 perpetrator.
Examining the discriminant validity of the 4 FMS criteria
revealed that the 51 Ss who had recovered memories of their
abuse, and who could therefore potentially have FMS, did not
differ from the 49 Ss with continuous memories on indicators of
these criteria. Despite frequent claims that FMS is occurring in
epidemic proportions, only 3.9%-13.6% of the Ss with a recovered
memory satisfied the diagnostic criteria, and Ss with continuous
memories were equally unlikely to meet these criteria.
13. False attribution of suggestibility to explain recovered
memory of childhood sexual abuse following extended amnesia.
Leavitt, Frank
Department of Psychology & Social Sciences, Rush Medical
College, Chicago, IL
Child Abuse & Neglect
1997, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 265-272
Suggestibility is central to arguments proffered by critics of
recovered memory of childhood sexual abuse who believe that
memories involving amnesia are false creations by treatment. The
present study represents the first direct investigation of
suggestibility among patients who report recovered memory.
Suggestibility was measured in 44 patients who recovered
memories and in 31 patient comparison group without a history of
sexual trauma using the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale. Results
indicate that patients who recover memories were remarkably less
suggestible than the clinical field has been led to believe by
advocates of false memory. As a group, they scored low on
suggestibility. Recovered Memory patients yielded to suggested
prompts an average of 6.7 times per case. This compares to an
average of 10.6 in the Psychiatric comparison group.
Paradoxically, patients without a history of sex abuse were more
at risk for altering memory to suggestive prompts. These
findings appreciably challenge advocated theories of suggested
memory.
14. Memories of childhood sexual abuse: Remembering and
repressing.
Loftus, Elizabeth F.; Polonsky, Sara; Fullilove, Mindy Thompson
U Washington, Psychology Dept, Seattle, US
Psychology of Women Quarterly
1994 Mar Vol 18(1) 67-84
Women involved in outpatient treatment for substance abuse were
interviewed to examine their recollections of childhood sexual
abuse. Overall, 54% of the 105 women reported a history of
childhood sexual abuse. Of these, the majority (81%) remembered
all or part of the abuse their whole lives; 19% reported they
forgot the abuse for a period of time, and later the memory
returned. Women who remembered the abuse their whole lives
reported a clearer memory, with a more detailed picture. They
also reported greater intensity of feelings at the time the
abuse happened. Women who remembered the abuse their whole lives
did not differ from others in terms of the violence of the abuse
or whether the violence was incestuous.
15. Childhood memory and a history of different forms of
abuse.
Melchert, Timothy P.
Texas Tech U, Dept of Psychology, Lubbock, TX, US
Professional Psychology: Research & Practice
1996 Oct Vol 27(5) 438-446
A widespread professional and public controversy has recently
emerged regarding recovered memories of child sexual abuse, but
the prevalence and nature of these memories have received
limited empirical examination. This study (N = 553 nonclinical
participants) found that very similar proportions of those with
histories of physical, emotional, or sexual abuse reported that
they had periods without memory of their abuse (21%, 18%, and
18%, respectively). The responses of approximately one half of
these participants suggested that they lacked conscious access
to their abuse memories, whereas the responses from the others
suggested that they had conscious access to their memories. A
great deal of variance was found in the reported quality of
general childhood memory and the offset of infantile amnesia,
and the findings also suggest that it is normative to recover
memories of childhood. Each of these variables was also
unrelated to the experience of child abuse.
16. Remembering childhood sexual abuse: A national survey of
psychologists' clinical practices, beliefs, and personal
experiences.
Polusny, Melissa A.; Follette, Victoria M.
U Nevada, Clinical Psychology Doctoral Program, Reno, NV, US
Professional Psychology: Research & Practice
1996 Feb Vol 27(1) 41-52
A national survey of 1,000 psychologists, to which 223
responded, assessed professionals' clinical practices and
beliefs about the treatment of adult survivors of childhood
sexual abuse (CSA), personal CSA history, and the phenomenon of
clients remembering CSA in therapy. Results indicated that over
25% of therapists reported using guided imagery, dream
interpretation, bibliotherapy regarding sexual abuse, referral
to sexual abuse survivors' group, and free association of
childhood memories as memory retrieval techniques with clients
who had no specific memory of CSA. However, the majority of
therapists reported that they had not seen any cases of adult
clients entering therapy with no memory of CSA and subsequently
recalling abuse in the course of therapy. A personal history of
CSA was not associated with most clinical practices related to
treating sexual abuse survivors. The implications for training
and establishing scientific standards of psychological practice
are discussed.
17. Recovered memories of abuse among therapy patients: A
national survey.
Pope, Kenneth S.; Tabachnick, Barbara G.
Independent practice, Norwalk, CT, US
Ethics & Behavior
1995 Vol 5(3) 237-248
A survey of 205 female and 173 male psychologists found that 73%
of them had had at least 1 patient who claimed to recover
previously forgotten memories of childhood sex abuse. There were
gender differences regarding patients who claim to have
recovered memories of abuse. Patients who are alleged to have
sexually abused a child who recovered memories of the abuse
after a period of being unable to remember it do not show such
differences except that 3 times as many men were reported to
have been the object of a civil or criminal complaint on the
basis of the recovered memory. Data suggest that when recovered
memories seem to implicate male and female patients as
perpetrators or victims of childhood sex abuse, therapist's
gender is a significant variable only for women patients who
recover memories of having been abused. Therapists' theoretical
orientation was not relevant.
[Note: In this study, the therapists reported 2,452 patients
(out of a total of 273,785 whom they had treated over the course
of their career) who reported recovering memories of childhood
abuse. This represents about 8 or 9 patients out of every 1,000.
According to the therapists, about 50% of the the patients who
claimed to have recovered the memories had found external
validation, a percentage that coincides with that obtained in
the Feldman-Summers & Pope, 1994 study.]
18. Characteristics of previously forgotten memories of sexual
abuse: A descriptive study.
Roe, Catherine M.; Schwartz, Mark F.
Journal of Psychiatry & Law
1996 Sum Vol 24(2) 189-206
Investigated the childhood sexual abuse memories of 52 women 21-
55 yrs old who had been hospitalized for treatment of sexual
trauma, been sexually abused prior to age 18, and reported a
period of amnesia before recalling abuse memories. Ss completed
a questionnaire about their first suspicions of having been
sexually abused, their first memories of sexual abuse, other
memories of abuse, and details of their abuse history. Ss were
more likely to recall part of an abuse episode, as opposed to an
entire abuse episode, following a period of no memory of the
abuse. Additionally, first memories tended to be described as
vivid rather that vague. Descriptive statistics are used to
present and summarize additional findings.
19. Telling the secret: Adult women describe their disclosures
of incest.
Roesler, Thomas A.; Wind, Tiffany Weissmann
National Jewish Ctr for Immunology & Respiratory Medicine,
Denver, CO, US
Journal of Interpersonal Violence
1994 Sep Vol 9(3) 327-338
A questionnaire survey of 755 adults sexually abused as
children, asking about the circumstances of their disclosure to
the 1st person they told, resulted in 286 responses (228 from
female victims of incest). Ss were asked basic demographic
information, details about their abuse, who they told first, the
reaction of the 1st person told, and reasons why they delayed
telling or finally did tell. The women telling their parents
first were likely to tell in childhood. Those telling friends,
other family members, or partners were more likely to tell in
early adulthood. Survivors telling therapists revealed the abuse
at a later age. Those revealing the incest to parents in
childhood received a worse reaction than did those waiting until
adulthood. When women disclosed to parents prior to age 18, the
incest continued for more than 1 yr after the disclosure in 52%
of the cases. Women who disclosed as children were more often
met with disbelief or blame.
20. Dissociation and the fragmentary nature of traumatic
memories: Overview and exploratory study. Special Issue:
Research on traumatic memory.
van der Kolk, Bessel A.; Fisler, Rita
HRI Trauma Ctr, Brookline, MA, US
Journal of Traumatic Stress
1995 Oct Vol 8(4) 505-525
Investigated the retrieval of traumatic memories compared to
nontraumatic memories with 46 subjects with posttraumatic stress
disorder (PTSD). Ss completed the Traumatic Antecedents
Questionnaire, Dissociative Experiences Scale, Inventory of
Traumatic Experiences, and the Traumatic Memory Inventory.
Traumatic memories were retrieved, at least initially, as
dissociated mental imprints of sensory and affective elements of
the traumatic experience: as visual, olfactory, affective,
auditory, and kinesthetic experiences. Over time, Ss reported
the gradual emergence of a personal narrative that can be
properly referred to as explicit memory. The implications of
these findings for understanding the nature of traumatic
memories are discussed.
21. Accuracy of adult recollections of childhood victimization:
Part 1.
Childhood physical abuse.
Widom, Cathy Spatz; Shepard, Robin L
State U New York, School of Criminal Justice, Albany, NY, US
Psychological Assessment
1996 Dec Vol 8(4) 412-421
Using data from a study with prospective-cohorts design in which
children who were physically abused, sexually abused, or
neglected about 20 years ago were followed up along with a
matched control group, accuracy of adult recollections of
childhood physical abuse was assessed. Two hour in-person
interviews were conducted in young adulthood with 1,196 of the
original 1,575 participants. Two measures (including the
Conflict Tactics Scale) were used to assess histories of
childhood physical abuse. Results indicate good discriminant
validity and predictive efficiency of the self-report measures,
despite substantial underreporting by physically abused
respondents. Tests of construct validity reveal shared method
variance, with self-report measures predicting self-reported
violence and official reports of physical abuse predicting
arrests for violence. Findings are discussed in the context of
other research on the accuracy of adult recollections of
childhood experiences.
22. Recall of childhood trauma: A prospective study of women's
memories of child sexual abuse.
Williams, Linda Meyer
U New Hampshire, Family Research Lab, Durham, US
Journal of Consulting & Clinical Psychology
1994 Dec Vol 62(6) 1167-1176
One hundred twenty-nine women with previously documented
histories of sexual victimization in childhood were interviewed
and asked detailed questions about their abuse histories to
answer the question "Do people actually forget traumatic events
such as child sexual abuse, and if so, how common is such
forgetting?" A large proportion of the women (38%) did not
recall the abuse that had been reported 17 years earlier. Women
who were younger at the time of the abuse and those who were
molested by someone they knew were more likely to have no recall
of the abuse. The implications for research and practice are
discussed. Long periods with no memory of abuse should not be
regarded as evidence that the abuse did not occur.
Peer-Reviewed Studies About Amnesia and Child Abuse
Son_of_Chive_Mynde
Decision of a US District Court
Judge Edward F. Harrington
Presentation by Jim Hopper, Ph.D.
An ASCII copy of the text may be downloaded (link below)
The legal documentation citation is: 923 Federal Supplement 286
(D. Mass. 1996)
Some notable quotes from the decision:
"The factors to be considered when deciding if proffered
testimony is valid 'scientific knowledge,' and therefore
reliable, are. . ." (p.3)
"After considering these factors, this Court finds that the
reliability of the phenomenon of repressed memory has been
established, and therefore, will permit the plaintiff to
introduce evidence which relates to the plaintiff's recovered
memories" (p.3).
"In brief, Dr. van der Kolk testified that repressed memories is
not a scientific controversy, but merely a political and
forensic one" (p.5).
"Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV,
1994), which is a widely used manual by psychiatrists to define
mental diagnostic categories and is published by the American
Psychiatric Association, also recognizes the concept of
repressed memories" (p.7).
Final paragraph: "It is important to stress that, in considering
the admissibility of repressed memory evidence, it is not the
role of the Court to rule on the credibility of this individual
plaintiff's memories, but rather on the validity of the theory
itself. For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby denies the
Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Repressed Memory
Evidence. For the law to reject a diagnostic category generally
accepted by those who practice the art and science of psychiatry
would be folly. Rules of law are not petrified in the past but
flow with the current of expanding knowledge" (p.9).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
______________________________
)
ANN SHAHZADE, )
Plaintiff )
) CIVIL ACTION NO.:
v. ) 92-12139-EFH
)
GEORGE GREGORY, )
Defendant. )
______________________________)
_MEMORANDUM AND ORDER_
May 8, 1996
HARRINGTON, D.J.
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion
in Limine to Exclude
Repressed Memory Evidence. The defendant in this case is Dr.
George Gregory, the
plaintiff is Ann Shahzade, the defendant's cousin. For the
reasons set forth below, the
Court hereby denies the defendant's motion.
The plaintiff in this case alleges repeated episodes of non-
consensual sexual
touching of her by the defendant from 1940 to 1945, more than
forty-seven years prior
to her filing a complaint. The plaintiff was between the ages
of approximately twelve
and seventeen at this time; the defendant is approximately five
years her senior. The
plaintiff claims that these episodes had been completely blocked
out and that she had
no memory of them until she recovered so-called "repressed
memories" of these
touchings during psychotherapy in November of 1990. The
defendant admits to some
degree of sexual activity between himself and the plaintiff, but
there is a dispute with
regard to the nature and extent of such activity. The plaintiff
now wants to introduce
evidence relating to these alleged repressed memories.
[- 1 -]
When a proffered scientific theory is beyond the general
understanding of a
jury, in order to introduce evidence relating to this theory, an
individual must rely on
expert testimony as to the validity of the theory. _See United
States v. Montas_, 41 F.3d
775, 783 (1st Cir. 1994). The proposed expert must qualify as
an expert and must
offer testimony relating to reliable scientific knowledge.
_Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc._, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2796 (1993). The Court
acknowledges the
appropriateness of an expert in this type of case and concludes
that the plaintiff's
expert, Dr. Bessel van der Kolk, is not only qualified as an
expert in the field of
memory, but that he is one of the country's most renowned
psychiatrists in this
specialty. 1 For the following reasons, the Court finds the
subject matter, repressed
memory syndrome, to be reliable and therefore admissible.
Under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, in order
for evidence to be
admissible, the trial court must conclude that "any and all
scientific testimony...is
not only relevant, but reliable." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795.
The reliability standard is
grounded in Rule 702's requirement that an expert's testimony
relate to "scientific
knowledge." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2790. To qualify
as "scientific," the theory must
be grounded in the methods and procedures of science.
_Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795.
To qualify as "knowledge," the testimony must be more than
subjective belief or
________________________
1 Dr. van der Kolk is currently an Associate Professor of
Psychiatry at Harvard
Medical School and the Chief of the Trauma Clinic at
Massachusetts General Hospital.
He has gained international recognition in the field of trauma
and memory and is on
the Board of Directors for the International Society for
Traumatic Stress Studies. Dr.
van der Kolk has published many articles on the topic and he is
currently writing his
fourth book, _Memory, Trauma and the Integration of Experience_.
- 2 -
unsupported speculation. _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. In
addition, "in order to qualify
as 'scientific knowledge,' an inference or assertion must be
derived by the scientific
method." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. In cases dealing with
scientific evidence,
reliability is based upon scientific validity. _Daubert_, 113
S.Ct. at 2795, n.9. The
Supreme Court in _Daubert_ set forth several criteria which
should be considered when
determining "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is
scientifically valid...." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2796. The
factors to be considered
when deciding if proffered testimony is valid "scientific
knowledge," and therefore
reliable, are (1) whether the theory has been tested; (2)
whether the theory has been
subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the theory's known
or potential rate of
error; and (4) whether the theory has attained general
acceptance within the relevant
scientific community. _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2796-97. After
considering these factors,
this Court finds that the reliability of the phenomenon of
repressed memory has been
established, and therefore, will permit the plaintiff to
introduce evidence which relates
to the plaintiff's recovered memories.
In a case raising the same issue, _Isely v. Capuchin
Province_, 877 F.Supp. 1055
(E.D. Mich. 1995), the court stated that in order to introduce
repressed memory
evidence, a witness must "testify as to whether that theory can
be, or has been, tested
or corroborated and, if so, by whom and under what
circumstances; whether the
theory has been proven out or not proven out under clinical
tests or some other
accepted procedure for bearing it out; and whether the theory
has been subjected to
other types of peer review.... Obviously this part of this
foundational element will
- 3 -
include testimony as to whether or not the theory of repressed
memory is widely
accepted in the field of psychology." _Isely_, 877 F.Supp. at
1064.
Dr. van der Kolk's testimony sufficiently satisfies these
foundational factors. Dr.
van der Kolk discussed in detail several studies which focused
on the concept of
repressed memories and ultimately, through their findings, serve
to validate the
theory.2 One such study, which Dr. van der Kolk referred to as
the Herman and
Schatzow study, looked at victims of sexual abuse and found that
only approximately
one-third of the victims remembered all the details of the
abuse. Another one-third
of the victims had a partial memory of the abuse, while the
final one-third
remembered nothing relating to the abuse. Dr. van der Kolk
stated that these figures
represent "the sort of figures that every study comes in,
regardless of what the
methodology is..." (Tr.45-46; April 9, 1996).
A study conducted by Linda Meyer Williams, which Dr. van
der Kolk referred to
as "the best study on all of this," (Tr. 52; April 9, 1996)
further validates the theory of
repressed memories. As a graduate student in psychology at the
University of
Pennsylvania from 1973 to 1975, Ms. Williams did her doctoral
dissertation on
sexually abused children who had been treated at the
Philadelphia Children's Hospital.
She conducted extensive interviews with young women who had been
sexually abused,
and her dissertation detailed the experiences which they had
undergone. Seventeen
years later, as a research psychologist, Ms. Williams
reinterviewed patients who had
_________________
2 See Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, Trauma and Memory, for a detailed
analysis of several
experimental studies done on memory performance in traumatized
and non-
traumatized populations.
- 4 -
been the subject of her dissertation to see what impact the
earlier sexual abuse had on
their later life. She was able to locate about half of her
original subjects, and after
reinterviewing them, she found that thirty-eight percent of her
patients no longer
remembered the abuse.
Dr. van der Kolk further testified that the majority of
_clinical_ psychiatrists
recognize the theory of repressed memories and do not find the
_theory_ itself
controversial. He further stated that this is not "a new craze
among American
_psychiatrists_... this is a very old issue in psychiatry." (Tr.
32; April 9, 1996). The
issue only became controversial when studies on the issue of
repressed memories of
_sexual abuse_, as opposed to repressed memories of natural
traumatic events or
wartime incidents, began to surface. People began to
say, "You're full of
nonsense. This doesn't happen." (Tr. 42, April 9, 1996). In
brief, Dr. van der Kolk
testified that repressed memories is not a scientific
controversy, but merely a political
and forensic one.
Dr. van der Kolk stated that currently the major detractors
of the theory are so-
called outsiders, "psychologists who do not treat traumatized
patients." (Tr. 24, April
9, 1996). Although the defendant's expert, Dr. Bodkin, was a
clinical psychiatrist, he
does not specialize in the field of memory. Nor do his
credentials and expertise in the
area of memory compare with those of Dr. van der Kolk.
Furthermore, Dr. Bodkin did
not claim that the theory of repressed memory was invalid, he
merely stated that, in
his opinion, the 52 studies relating to repressed memories which
he critiqued
- 5 -
contained methodological deficiencies and therefore could not
serve to validate the
theory.
According to the expert who testified in _Isely_, the only
controversy among the
majority of _clinical_ psychiatrists with respect to the issue
of repressed memory "is
specifically in the area of elicitation of repressed memories,
not with the concept
itself." _Isely_, 877 F.Supp. at 1065-66. Dr. van der Kolk
expanded on this point in
recognizing that some memories may not be accurate. "I think
there has always been
controversies about whether people can trust a patient still.
And, particularly, people
have always been concerned whether when people tell them
something that happened
maybe a long time ago that suddenly comes up, whether you can
really believe what
people, what people tell you." (Tr. 16, April 10,
1996). "Translating [a] sensation into
a story is still subject to ordinary human distortions that we
all are capable of... So
at the end, just like every other story you hear, you take your
subjective self and
eventually you decide what you believe - whether you believe
what people tell you is
true or not, it's how we all make up our minds. So at the end,
there is really no
scientific proof whether something is true or not unless there
is independent
corroboration, unless there was somebody there taking a
movie."3 (Tr. 69-70; April 9,
1996). The testimony of the defendant's second expert, Dr.
Ofshe, supported this
point. The elicitation and accuracy of the recovered memory
itself, however, is not
the issue currently before the Court. The Court must decide if
the _theory_ itself is
__________________
3 The defendant admits to some degree of sexual activity
between himself and the
plaintiff.
- 6 -
valid. Dr. Ofshe's testimony did not directly address this
issue. It must be also noted
that Dr. Ofshe is not a clinical psychiatrist, but rather a
doctor of Social Psychology.
The American Psychiatric Association, which is the major
professional
association for psychiatrists in America, recognizes the theory
of repressed memories
and believes it to be very common among people who have
experienced severe
trauma. In an official statement by the American Psychiatric
Association relating to
memories of sexual abuse, the Association stated that "Children
and adolescents who
have been abused cope with trauma by using a variety of coping
mechanisms. In some
instances these coping mechanisms result in a lack of conscious
awareness of the abuse
for varying periods of time. Conscious thoughts and feelings
stemming from the abuse
may emerge at a later date." (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 2,
Statement on Memories of
Sexual Abuse).
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
IV, 1994), which is
a widely used manual by psychiatrists to define mental
diagnostic categories and is
published by the American Psychiatric Association, also
recognizes the concept of
repressed memories. The term "Dissociative Amnesia," however,
is the true technical
psychiatric or medical term for the theory and is the term used
when defining the
condition in the manual. Repressed memories is the popular term.
The two terms
were used interchangeably in the hearing. The manual states
that "Dissociative
Amnesia is characterized by an inability to recall important
personal information,
usually of a traumatic or stressful nature, that is too
extensive to be explained by
ordinary forgetfulness." (DSM-IV at 477). "Dissociative
Amnesia can be distinguished
- 7 -
from normal gaps in memory by the intermittent and involuntary
nature of the inability
to recall and by the presence of significant distress or
impairment." (DSM-IV at 481).
The manual goes on to state that "Dissociative Amnesia most
commonly presents as a
retrospectively reported gap or series of gaps in recall for
aspects of the individual's
life history. These gaps are usually related to traumatic or
extremely stressful events."
(DSM-IV at 478). Particularly relevant to the issue presently
before the Court, the
manual recognizes that "In recent years in the United States,
there has been an
increase in reported cases of Dissociative Amnesia that involves
previously forgotten
early childhood traumas." (DSM-IV at 479). The manual lists
criteria used in
diagnosing Dissociative Amnesia: (1) one or more episodes of
memory loss relating to
a traumatic personal experience which is too extensive to be
ordinary forgetfulness;
(2) The disturbance does not happen exclusively while the person
is suffering from a
psychiatric disorder or other general medical condition; (3) The
symptoms cause
significant distress in important areas of functioning. (DSM-IV
at 481). The fact that
Dissociative Amnesia is included and discussed in such depth
within the DSM-IV is
significant, and, speaking as a member of the Psychiatric
Association, Dr.
van der Kolk said that listing Dissociative Amnesia in DSM-
IV "means that at this point
in time we recognize that [Dissociative Amnesia] exists." (Tr.
37; April 9, 1996).
Based on the evidence and testimony of Dr. van der Kolk,
the Court finds that
the plaintiff has satisfied the four foundational factors which
are to be considered,
although not independently determinative, in order to introduce
evidence relating to
repressed memories. The plaintiff has presented sufficient
evidence through both Dr.
- 8 -
van der Kolk's testimony and various submissions to the Court
that (1) the theory has
been the subject of various tests; (2) the _theory_ has been
subjected to peer-review and
publication; (3) that repressed memory, as is true with ordinary
memories, "cannot be
tested empirically," and may not always be accurate, however,
the theory itself has
been established to be valid through various studies. _Isely_,
877 F.-Supp. at 1065; and
(4) the theory has attained general acceptance within the
relevant scientific
community, namely, that of clinical psychiatrists.
It is important to stress that, in considering the
admissibility of repressed
memory evidence, it is not the role of the Court to rule on the
credibility of this
individual plaintiff's memories, but rather on the validity of
the theory itself. For the
foregoing reasons, the Court hereby denies the Defendant's
Motion in Limine to
Exclude Repressed Memory Evidence. For the law to reject a
diagnostic category
generally accepted by those who practice the art and science of
psychiatry would be
folly. Rules of law are not petrified in the past but flow with
the current of expanding
knowledge.
SO ORDERED.
_______________________
EDWARD F.
HARRINGTON
United States
District Judge
- 9 -
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
For more evidence and understanding, please see my page
Recovered Memories of Sexual Abuse: Scientific Research &
Scholarly Resources
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
______________________________
)
ANN SHAHZADE, )
Plaintiff )
) CIVIL ACTION NO.:
v. ) 92-12139-EFH
)
GEORGE GREGORY, )
Defendant. )
______________________________)
_MEMORANDUM AND ORDER_
May 8, 1996
HARRINGTON, D.J.
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion
in Limine to Exclude
Repressed Memory Evidence. The defendant in this case is Dr.
George Gregory, the
plaintiff is Ann Shahzade, the defendant's cousin. For the
reasons set forth below, the
Court hereby denies the defendant's motion.
The plaintiff in this case alleges repeated episodes of non-
consensual sexual
touching of her by the defendant from 1940 to 1945, more than
forty-seven years prior
to her filing a complaint. The plaintiff was between the ages
of approximately twelve
and seventeen at this time; the defendant is approximately five
years her senior. The
plaintiff claims that these episodes had been completely blocked
out and that she had
no memory of them until she recovered so-called "repressed
memories" of these
touchings during psychotherapy in November of 1990. The
defendant admits to some
degree of sexual activity between himself and the plaintiff, but
there is a dispute with
regard to the nature and extent of such activity. The plaintiff
now wants to introduce
evidence relating to these alleged repressed memories.
[- 1 -]
When a proffered scientific theory is beyond the general
understanding of a
jury, in order to introduce evidence relating to this theory, an
individual must rely on
expert testimony as to the validity of the theory. _See United
States v. Montas_, 41 F.3d
775, 783 (1st Cir. 1994). The proposed expert must qualify as
an expert and must
offer testimony relating to reliable scientific knowledge.
_Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc._, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2796 (1993). The Court
acknowledges the
appropriateness of an expert in this type of case and concludes
that the plaintiff's
expert, Dr. Bessel van der Kolk, is not only qualified as an
expert in the field of
memory, but that he is one of the country's most renowned
psychiatrists in this
specialty. 1 For the following reasons, the Court finds the
subject matter, repressed
memory syndrome, to be reliable and therefore admissible.
Under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, in order
for evidence to be
admissible, the trial court must conclude that "any and all
scientific testimony...is
not only relevant, but reliable." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795.
The reliability standard is
grounded in Rule 702's requirement that an expert's testimony
relate to "scientific
knowledge." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2790. To qualify
as "scientific," the theory must
be grounded in the methods and procedures of science.
_Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795.
To qualify as "knowledge," the testimony must be more than
subjective belief or
________________________
1 Dr. van der Kolk is currently an Associate Professor of
Psychiatry at Harvard
Medical School and the Chief of the Trauma Clinic at
Massachusetts General Hospital.
He has gained international recognition in the field of trauma
and memory and is on
the Board of Directors for the International Society for
Traumatic Stress Studies. Dr.
van der Kolk has published many articles on the topic and he is
currently writing his
fourth book, _Memory, Trauma and the Integration of Experience_.
- 2 -
unsupported speculation. _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. In
addition, "in order to qualify
as 'scientific knowledge,' an inference or assertion must be
derived by the scientific
method." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. In cases dealing with
scientific evidence,
reliability is based upon scientific validity. _Daubert_, 113
S.Ct. at 2795, n.9. The
Supreme Court in _Daubert_ set forth several criteria which
should be considered when
determining "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is
scientifically valid...." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2796. The
factors to be considered
when deciding if proffered testimony is valid "scientific
knowledge," and therefore
reliable, are (1) whether the theory has been tested; (2)
whether the theory has been
subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the theory's known
or potential rate of
error; and (4) whether the theory has attained general
acceptance within the relevant
scientific community. _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2796-97. After
considering these factors,
this Court finds that the reliability of the phenomenon of
repressed memory has been
established, and therefore, will permit the plaintiff to
introduce evidence which relates
to the plaintiff's recovered memories.
In a case raising the same issue, _Isely v. Capuchin
Province_, 877 F.Supp. 1055
(E.D. Mich. 1995), the court stated that in order to introduce
repressed memory
evidence, a witness must "testify as to whether that theory can
be, or has been, tested
or corroborated and, if so, by whom and under what
circumstances; whether the
theory has been proven out or not proven out under clinical
tests or some other
accepted procedure for bearing it out; and whether the theory
has been subjected to
other types of peer review.... Obviously this part of this
foundational element will
- 3 -
include testimony as to whether or not the theory of repressed
memory is widely
accepted in the field of psychology." _Isely_, 877 F.Supp. at
1064.
Dr. van der Kolk's testimony sufficiently satisfies these
foundational factors. Dr.
van der Kolk discussed in detail several studies which focused
on the concept of
repressed memories and ultimately, through their findings, serve
to validate the
theory.2 One such study, which Dr. van der Kolk referred to as
the Herman and
Schatzow study, looked at victims of sexual abuse and found that
only approximately
one-third of the victims remembered all the details of the
abuse. Another one-third
of the victims had a partial memory of the abuse, while the
final one-third
remembered nothing relating to the abuse. Dr. van der Kolk
stated that these figures
represent "the sort of figures that every study comes in,
regardless of what the
methodology is..." (Tr.45-46; April 9, 1996).
A study conducted by Linda Meyer Williams, which Dr. van
der Kolk referred to
as "the best study on all of this," (Tr. 52; April 9, 1996)
further validates the theory of
repressed memories. As a graduate student in psychology at the
University of
Pennsylvania from 1973 to 1975, Ms. Williams did her doctoral
dissertation on
sexually abused children who had been treated at the
Philadelphia Children's Hospital.
She conducted extensive interviews with young women who had been
sexually abused,
and her dissertation detailed the experiences which they had
undergone. Seventeen
years later, as a research psychologist, Ms. Williams
reinterviewed patients who had
_________________
2 See Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, Trauma and Memory, for a detailed
analysis of several
experimental studies done on memory performance in traumatized
and non-
traumatized populations.
- 4 -
been the subject of her dissertation to see what impact the
earlier sexual abuse had on
their later life. She was able to locate about half of her
original subjects, and after
reinterviewing them, she found that thirty-eight percent of her
patients no longer
remembered the abuse.
Dr. van der Kolk further testified that the majority of
_clinical_ psychiatrists
recognize the theory of repressed memories and do not find the
_theory_ itself
controversial. He further stated that this is not "a new craze
among American
_psychiatrists_... this is a very old issue in psychiatry." (Tr.
32; April 9, 1996). The
issue only became controversial when studies on the issue of
repressed memories of
_sexual abuse_, as opposed to repressed memories of natural
traumatic events or
wartime incidents, began to surface. People began to
say, "You're full of
nonsense. This doesn't happen." (Tr. 42, April 9, 1996). In
brief, Dr. van der Kolk
testified that repressed memories is not a scientific
controversy, but merely a political
and forensic one.
Dr. van der Kolk stated that currently the major detractors
of the theory are so-
called outsiders, "psychologists who do not treat traumatized
patients." (Tr. 24, April
9, 1996). Although the defendant's expert, Dr. Bodkin, was a
clinical psychiatrist, he
does not specialize in the field of memory. Nor do his
credentials and expertise in the
area of memory compare with those of Dr. van der Kolk.
Furthermore, Dr. Bodkin did
not claim that the theory of repressed memory was invalid, he
merely stated that, in
his opinion, the 52 studies relating to repressed memories which
he critiqued
- 5 -
contained methodological deficiencies and therefore could not
serve to validate the
theory.
According to the expert who testified in _Isely_, the only
controversy among the
majority of _clinical_ psychiatrists with respect to the issue
of repressed memory "is
specifically in the area of elicitation of repressed memories,
not with the concept
itself." _Isely_, 877 F.Supp. at 1065-66. Dr. van der Kolk
expanded on this point in
recognizing that some memories may not be accurate. "I think
there has always been
controversies about whether people can trust a patient still.
And, particularly, people
have always been concerned whether when people tell them
something that happened
maybe a long time ago that suddenly comes up, whether you can
really believe what
people, what people tell you." (Tr. 16, April 10,
1996). "Translating [a] sensation into
a story is still subject to ordinary human distortions that we
all are capable of... So
at the end, just like every other story you hear, you take your
subjective self and
eventually you decide what you believe - whether you believe
what people tell you is
true or not, it's how we all make up our minds. So at the end,
there is really no
scientific proof whether something is true or not unless there
is independent
corroboration, unless there was somebody there taking a
movie."3 (Tr. 69-70; April 9,
1996). The testimony of the defendant's second expert, Dr.
Ofshe, supported this
point. The elicitation and accuracy of the recovered memory
itself, however, is not
the issue currently before the Court. The Court must decide if
the _theory_ itself is
__________________
3 The defendant admits to some degree of sexual activity
between himself and the
plaintiff.
- 6 -
valid. Dr. Ofshe's testimony did not directly address this
issue. It must be also noted
that Dr. Ofshe is not a clinical psychiatrist, but rather a
doctor of Social Psychology.
The American Psychiatric Association, which is the major
professional
association for psychiatrists in America, recognizes the theory
of repressed memories
and believes it to be very common among people who have
experienced severe
trauma. In an official statement by the American Psychiatric
Association relating to
memories of sexual abuse, the Association stated that "Children
and adolescents who
have been abused cope with trauma by using a variety of coping
mechanisms. In some
instances these coping mechanisms result in a lack of conscious
awareness of the abuse
for varying periods of time. Conscious thoughts and feelings
stemming from the abuse
may emerge at a later date." (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 2,
Statement on Memories of
Sexual Abuse).
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
IV, 1994), which is
a widely used manual by psychiatrists to define mental
diagnostic categories and is
published by the American Psychiatric Association, also
recognizes the concept of
repressed memories. The term "Dissociative Amnesia," however,
is the true technical
psychiatric or medical term for the theory and is the term used
when defining the
condition in the manual. Repressed memories is the popular term.
The two terms
were used interchangeably in the hearing. The manual states
that "Dissociative
Amnesia is characterized by an inability to recall important
personal information,
usually of a traumatic or stressful nature, that is too
extensive to be explained by
ordinary forgetfulness." (DSM-IV at 477). "Dissociative
Amnesia can be distinguished
- 7 -
from normal gaps in memory by the intermittent and involuntary
nature of the inability
to recall and by the presence of significant distress or
impairment." (DSM-IV at 481).
The manual goes on to state that "Dissociative Amnesia most
commonly presents as a
retrospectively reported gap or series of gaps in recall for
aspects of the individual's
life history. These gaps are usually related to traumatic or
extremely stressful events."
(DSM-IV at 478). Particularly relevant to the issue presently
before the Court, the
manual recognizes that "In recent years in the United States,
there has been an
increase in reported cases of Dissociative Amnesia that involves
previously forgotten
early childhood traumas." (DSM-IV at 479). The manual lists
criteria used in
diagnosing Dissociative Amnesia: (1) one or more episodes of
memory loss relating to
a traumatic personal experience which is too extensive to be
ordinary forgetfulness;
(2) The disturbance does not happen exclusively while the person
is suffering from a
psychiatric disorder or other general medical condition; (3) The
symptoms cause
significant distress in important areas of functioning. (DSM-IV
at 481). The fact that
Dissociative Amnesia is included and discussed in such depth
within the DSM-IV is
significant, and, speaking as a member of the Psychiatric
Association, Dr.
van der Kolk said that listing Dissociative Amnesia in DSM-
IV "means that at this point
in time we recognize that [Dissociative Amnesia] exists." (Tr.
37; April 9, 1996).
Based on the evidence and testimony of Dr. van der Kolk,
the Court finds that
the plaintiff has satisfied the four foundational factors which
are to be considered,
although not independently determinative, in order to introduce
evidence relating to
repressed memories. The plaintiff has presented sufficient
evidence through both Dr.
- 8 -
van der Kolk's testimony and various submissions to the Court
that (1) the theory has
been the subject of various tests; (2) the _theory_ has been
subjected to peer-review and
publication; (3) that repressed memory, as is true with ordinary
memories, "cannot be
tested empirically," and may not always be accurate, however,
the theory itself has
been established to be valid through various studies. _Isely_,
877 F.-Supp. at 1065; and
(4) the theory has attained general acceptance within the
relevant scientific
community, namely, that of clinical psychiatrists.
It is important to stress that, in considering the
admissibility of repressed
memory evidence, it is not the role of the Court to rule on the
credibility of this
individual plaintiff's memories, but rather on the validity of
the theory itself. For the
foregoing reasons, the Court hereby denies the Defendant's
Motion in Limine to
Exclude Repressed Memory Evidence. For the law to reject a
diagnostic category
generally accepted by those who practice the art and science of
psychiatry would be
folly. Rules of law are not petrified in the past but flow with
the current of expanding
knowledge.
SO ORDERED.
_______________________
EDWARD F.
HARRINGTON
United States
District Judge
- 9 -
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
This page is maintained by Jim Hopper, Ph.D., as are these
related pages:
Recovered Memories of Sexual Abuse: Scientific Research &
Scholarly Resources
Child Abuse: Statistics, Research, and Resources
Sexual Abuse of Males: Prevalence, Lasting Effects, and Resources
Factors in the Cycle of Violence - Abused Boys, Gender
Socialization, and Violent Men
Jim Hopper
j...@jimhopper.com
www.jimhopper.com
last revised 8/22/96 The Validity of Recovered Memory:
Decision of a US District Court
Judge Edward F. Harrington
Presentation by Jim Hopper, Ph.D.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
For more evidence and understanding, please see my page
Recovered Memories of Sexual Abuse: Scientific Research &
Scholarly Resources
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
Some notes on the presented text of Judge Harrington's decision:
The text is just over eight double-spaced pages--a fairly quick
read
Underlines in the original are represented in the text like
this: _underlined words_
There are two versions of the text on this page: one in normal
type, the other small
An ASCII copy of the text may be downloaded (link below)
The legal documentation citation is: 923 Federal Supplement 286
(D. Mass. 1996)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
Some notable quotes from the decision:
"The factors to be considered when deciding if proffered
testimony is valid 'scientific knowledge,' and therefore
reliable, are. . ." (p.3)
"After considering these factors, this Court finds that the
reliability of the phenomenon of repressed memory has been
established, and therefore, will permit the plaintiff to
introduce evidence which relates to the plaintiff's recovered
memories" (p.3).
"In brief, Dr. van der Kolk testified that repressed memories is
not a scientific controversy, but merely a political and
forensic one" (p.5).
"Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV,
1994), which is a widely used manual by psychiatrists to define
mental diagnostic categories and is published by the American
Psychiatric Association, also recognizes the concept of
repressed memories" (p.7).
Final paragraph: "It is important to stress that, in considering
the admissibility of repressed memory evidence, it is not the
role of the Court to rule on the credibility of this individual
plaintiff's memories, but rather on the validity of the theory
itself. For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby denies the
Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Repressed Memory
Evidence. For the law to reject a diagnostic category generally
accepted by those who practice the art and science of psychiatry
would be folly. Rules of law are not petrified in the past but
flow with the current of expanding knowledge" (p.9).
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
small text, this page downloadable ASCII text
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
______________________________
)
ANN SHAHZADE, )
Plaintiff )
) CIVIL ACTION NO.:
v. ) 92-12139-EFH
)
GEORGE GREGORY, )
Defendant. )
______________________________)
_MEMORANDUM AND ORDER_
May 8, 1996
HARRINGTON, D.J.
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion
in Limine to Exclude
Repressed Memory Evidence. The defendant in this case is Dr.
George Gregory, the
plaintiff is Ann Shahzade, the defendant's cousin. For the
reasons set forth below, the
Court hereby denies the defendant's motion.
The plaintiff in this case alleges repeated episodes of non-
consensual sexual
touching of her by the defendant from 1940 to 1945, more than
forty-seven years prior
to her filing a complaint. The plaintiff was between the ages
of approximately twelve
and seventeen at this time; the defendant is approximately five
years her senior. The
plaintiff claims that these episodes had been completely blocked
out and that she had
no memory of them until she recovered so-called "repressed
memories" of these
touchings during psychotherapy in November of 1990. The
defendant admits to some
degree of sexual activity between himself and the plaintiff, but
there is a dispute with
regard to the nature and extent of such activity. The plaintiff
now wants to introduce
evidence relating to these alleged repressed memories.
[- 1 -]
When a proffered scientific theory is beyond the general
understanding of a
jury, in order to introduce evidence relating to this theory, an
individual must rely on
expert testimony as to the validity of the theory. _See United
States v. Montas_, 41 F.3d
775, 783 (1st Cir. 1994). The proposed expert must qualify as
an expert and must
offer testimony relating to reliable scientific knowledge.
_Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc._, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2796 (1993). The Court
acknowledges the
appropriateness of an expert in this type of case and concludes
that the plaintiff's
expert, Dr. Bessel van der Kolk, is not only qualified as an
expert in the field of
memory, but that he is one of the country's most renowned
psychiatrists in this
specialty. 1 For the following reasons, the Court finds the
subject matter, repressed
memory syndrome, to be reliable and therefore admissible.
Under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, in order
for evidence to be
admissible, the trial court must conclude that "any and all
scientific testimony...is
not only relevant, but reliable." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795.
The reliability standard is
grounded in Rule 702's requirement that an expert's testimony
relate to "scientific
knowledge." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2790. To qualify
as "scientific," the theory must
be grounded in the methods and procedures of science.
_Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795.
To qualify as "knowledge," the testimony must be more than
subjective belief or
________________________
1 Dr. van der Kolk is currently an Associate Professor of
Psychiatry at Harvard
Medical School and the Chief of the Trauma Clinic at
Massachusetts General Hospital.
He has gained international recognition in the field of trauma
and memory and is on
the Board of Directors for the International Society for
Traumatic Stress Studies. Dr.
van der Kolk has published many articles on the topic and he is
currently writing his
fourth book, _Memory, Trauma and the Integration of Experience_.
- 2 -
unsupported speculation. _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. In
addition, "in order to qualify
as 'scientific knowledge,' an inference or assertion must be
derived by the scientific
method." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. In cases dealing with
scientific evidence,
reliability is based upon scientific validity. _Daubert_, 113
S.Ct. at 2795, n.9. The
Supreme Court in _Daubert_ set forth several criteria which
should be considered when
determining "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is
scientifically valid...." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2796. The
factors to be considered
when deciding if proffered testimony is valid "scientific
knowledge," and therefore
reliable, are (1) whether the theory has been tested; (2)
whether the theory has been
subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the theory's known
or potential rate of
error; and (4) whether the theory has attained general
acceptance within the relevant
scientific community. _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2796-97. After
considering these factors,
this Court finds that the reliability of the phenomenon of
repressed memory has been
established, and therefore, will permit the plaintiff to
introduce evidence which relates
to the plaintiff's recovered memories.
In a case raising the same issue, _Isely v. Capuchin
Province_, 877 F.Supp. 1055
(E.D. Mich. 1995), the court stated that in order to introduce
repressed memory
evidence, a witness must "testify as to whether that theory can
be, or has been, tested
or corroborated and, if so, by whom and under what
circumstances; whether the
theory has been proven out or not proven out under clinical
tests or some other
accepted procedure for bearing it out; and whether the theory
has been subjected to
other types of peer review.... Obviously this part of this
foundational element will
- 3 -
include testimony as to whether or not the theory of repressed
memory is widely
accepted in the field of psychology." _Isely_, 877 F.Supp. at
1064.
Dr. van der Kolk's testimony sufficiently satisfies these
foundational factors. Dr.
van der Kolk discussed in detail several studies which focused
on the concept of
repressed memories and ultimately, through their findings, serve
to validate the
theory.2 One such study, which Dr. van der Kolk referred to as
the Herman and
Schatzow study, looked at victims of sexual abuse and found that
only approximately
one-third of the victims remembered all the details of the
abuse. Another one-third
of the victims had a partial memory of the abuse, while the
final one-third
remembered nothing relating to the abuse. Dr. van der Kolk
stated that these figures
represent "the sort of figures that every study comes in,
regardless of what the
methodology is..." (Tr.45-46; April 9, 1996).
A study conducted by Linda Meyer Williams, which Dr. van
der Kolk referred to
as "the best study on all of this," (Tr. 52; April 9, 1996)
further validates the theory of
repressed memories. As a graduate student in psychology at the
University of
Pennsylvania from 1973 to 1975, Ms. Williams did her doctoral
dissertation on
sexually abused children who had been treated at the
Philadelphia Children's Hospital.
She conducted extensive interviews with young women who had been
sexually abused,
and her dissertation detailed the experiences which they had
undergone. Seventeen
years later, as a research psychologist, Ms. Williams
reinterviewed patients who had
_________________
2 See Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, Trauma and Memory, for a detailed
analysis of several
experimental studies done on memory performance in traumatized
and non-
traumatized populations.
- 4 -
been the subject of her dissertation to see what impact the
earlier sexual abuse had on
their later life. She was able to locate about half of her
original subjects, and after
reinterviewing them, she found that thirty-eight percent of her
patients no longer
remembered the abuse.
Dr. van der Kolk further testified that the majority of
_clinical_ psychiatrists
recognize the theory of repressed memories and do not find the
_theory_ itself
controversial. He further stated that this is not "a new craze
among American
_psychiatrists_... this is a very old issue in psychiatry." (Tr.
32; April 9, 1996). The
issue only became controversial when studies on the issue of
repressed memories of
_sexual abuse_, as opposed to repressed memories of natural
traumatic events or
wartime incidents, began to surface. People began to
say, "You're full of
nonsense. This doesn't happen." (Tr. 42, April 9, 1996). In
brief, Dr. van der Kolk
testified that repressed memories is not a scientific
controversy, but merely a political
and forensic one.
Dr. van der Kolk stated that currently the major detractors
of the theory are so-
called outsiders, "psychologists who do not treat traumatized
patients." (Tr. 24, April
9, 1996). Although the defendant's expert, Dr. Bodkin, was a
clinical psychiatrist, he
does not specialize in the field of memory. Nor do his
credentials and expertise in the
area of memory compare with those of Dr. van der Kolk.
Furthermore, Dr. Bodkin did
not claim that the theory of repressed memory was invalid, he
merely stated that, in
his opinion, the 52 studies relating to repressed memories which
he critiqued
- 5 -
contained methodological deficiencies and therefore could not
serve to validate the
theory.
According to the expert who testified in _Isely_, the only
controversy among the
majority of _clinical_ psychiatrists with respect to the issue
of repressed memory "is
specifically in the area of elicitation of repressed memories,
not with the concept
itself." _Isely_, 877 F.Supp. at 1065-66. Dr. van der Kolk
expanded on this point in
recognizing that some memories may not be accurate. "I think
there has always been
controversies about whether people can trust a patient still.
And, particularly, people
have always been concerned whether when people tell them
something that happened
maybe a long time ago that suddenly comes up, whether you can
really believe what
people, what people tell you." (Tr. 16, April 10,
1996). "Translating [a] sensation into
a story is still subject to ordinary human distortions that we
all are capable of... So
at the end, just like every other story you hear, you take your
subjective self and
eventually you decide what you believe - whether you believe
what people tell you is
true or not, it's how we all make up our minds. So at the end,
there is really no
scientific proof whether something is true or not unless there
is independent
corroboration, unless there was somebody there taking a
movie."3 (Tr. 69-70; April 9,
1996). The testimony of the defendant's second expert, Dr.
Ofshe, supported this
point. The elicitation and accuracy of the recovered memory
itself, however, is not
the issue currently before the Court. The Court must decide if
the _theory_ itself is
__________________
3 The defendant admits to some degree of sexual activity
between himself and the
plaintiff.
- 6 -
valid. Dr. Ofshe's testimony did not directly address this
issue. It must be also noted
that Dr. Ofshe is not a clinical psychiatrist, but rather a
doctor of Social Psychology.
The American Psychiatric Association, which is the major
professional
association for psychiatrists in America, recognizes the theory
of repressed memories
and believes it to be very common among people who have
experienced severe
trauma. In an official statement by the American Psychiatric
Association relating to
memories of sexual abuse, the Association stated that "Children
and adolescents who
have been abused cope with trauma by using a variety of coping
mechanisms. In some
instances these coping mechanisms result in a lack of conscious
awareness of the abuse
for varying periods of time. Conscious thoughts and feelings
stemming from the abuse
may emerge at a later date." (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 2,
Statement on Memories of
Sexual Abuse).
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
IV, 1994), which is
a widely used manual by psychiatrists to define mental
diagnostic categories and is
published by the American Psychiatric Association, also
recognizes the concept of
repressed memories. The term "Dissociative Amnesia," however,
is the true technical
psychiatric or medical term for the theory and is the term used
when defining the
condition in the manual. Repressed memories is the popular term.
The two terms
were used interchangeably in the hearing. The manual states
that "Dissociative
Amnesia is characterized by an inability to recall important
personal information,
usually of a traumatic or stressful nature, that is too
extensive to be explained by
ordinary forgetfulness." (DSM-IV at 477). "Dissociative
Amnesia can be distinguished
- 7 -
from normal gaps in memory by the intermittent and involuntary
nature of the inability
to recall and by the presence of significant distress or
impairment." (DSM-IV at 481).
The manual goes on to state that "Dissociative Amnesia most
commonly presents as a
retrospectively reported gap or series of gaps in recall for
aspects of the individual's
life history. These gaps are usually related to traumatic or
extremely stressful events."
(DSM-IV at 478). Particularly relevant to the issue presently
before the Court, the
manual recognizes that "In recent years in the United States,
there has been an
increase in reported cases of Dissociative Amnesia that involves
previously forgotten
early childhood traumas." (DSM-IV at 479). The manual lists
criteria used in
diagnosing Dissociative Amnesia: (1) one or more episodes of
memory loss relating to
a traumatic personal experience which is too extensive to be
ordinary forgetfulness;
(2) The disturbance does not happen exclusively while the person
is suffering from a
psychiatric disorder or other general medical condition; (3) The
symptoms cause
significant distress in important areas of functioning. (DSM-IV
at 481). The fact that
Dissociative Amnesia is included and discussed in such depth
within the DSM-IV is
significant, and, speaking as a member of the Psychiatric
Association, Dr.
van der Kolk said that listing Dissociative Amnesia in DSM-
IV "means that at this point
in time we recognize that [Dissociative Amnesia] exists." (Tr.
37; April 9, 1996).
Based on the evidence and testimony of Dr. van der Kolk,
the Court finds that
the plaintiff has satisfied the four foundational factors which
are to be considered,
although not independently determinative, in order to introduce
evidence relating to
repressed memories. The plaintiff has presented sufficient
evidence through both Dr.
- 8 -
van der Kolk's testimony and various submissions to the Court
that (1) the theory has
been the subject of various tests; (2) the _theory_ has been
subjected to peer-review and
publication; (3) that repressed memory, as is true with ordinary
memories, "cannot be
tested empirically," and may not always be accurate, however,
the theory itself has
been established to be valid through various studies. _Isely_,
877 F.-Supp. at 1065; and
(4) the theory has attained general acceptance within the
relevant scientific
community, namely, that of clinical psychiatrists.
It is important to stress that, in considering the
admissibility of repressed
memory evidence, it is not the role of the Court to rule on the
credibility of this
individual plaintiff's memories, but rather on the validity of
the theory itself. For the
foregoing reasons, the Court hereby denies the Defendant's
Motion in Limine to
Exclude Repressed Memory Evidence. For the law to reject a
diagnostic category
generally accepted by those who practice the art and science of
psychiatry would be
folly. Rules of law are not petrified in the past but flow with
the current of expanding
knowledge.
SO ORDERED.
_______________________
EDWARD F.
HARRINGTON
United States
District Judge
- 9 -
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
For more evidence and understanding, please see my page
Recovered Memories of Sexual Abuse: Scientific Research &
Scholarly Resources
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
______________________________
)
ANN SHAHZADE, )
Plaintiff )
) CIVIL ACTION NO.:
v. ) 92-12139-EFH
)
GEORGE GREGORY, )
Defendant. )
______________________________)
_MEMORANDUM AND ORDER_
May 8, 1996
HARRINGTON, D.J.
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion
in Limine to Exclude
Repressed Memory Evidence. The defendant in this case is Dr.
George Gregory, the
plaintiff is Ann Shahzade, the defendant's cousin. For the
reasons set forth below, the
Court hereby denies the defendant's motion.
The plaintiff in this case alleges repeated episodes of non-
consensual sexual
touching of her by the defendant from 1940 to 1945, more than
forty-seven years prior
to her filing a complaint. The plaintiff was between the ages
of approximately twelve
and seventeen at this time; the defendant is approximately five
years her senior. The
plaintiff claims that these episodes had been completely blocked
out and that she had
no memory of them until she recovered so-called "repressed
memories" of these
touchings during psychotherapy in November of 1990. The
defendant admits to some
degree of sexual activity between himself and the plaintiff, but
there is a dispute with
regard to the nature and extent of such activity. The plaintiff
now wants to introduce
evidence relating to these alleged repressed memories.
[- 1 -]
When a proffered scientific theory is beyond the general
understanding of a
jury, in order to introduce evidence relating to this theory, an
individual must rely on
expert testimony as to the validity of the theory. _See United
States v. Montas_, 41 F.3d
775, 783 (1st Cir. 1994). The proposed expert must qualify as
an expert and must
offer testimony relating to reliable scientific knowledge.
_Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc._, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2796 (1993). The Court
acknowledges the
appropriateness of an expert in this type of case and concludes
that the plaintiff's
expert, Dr. Bessel van der Kolk, is not only qualified as an
expert in the field of
memory, but that he is one of the country's most renowned
psychiatrists in this
specialty. 1 For the following reasons, the Court finds the
subject matter, repressed
memory syndrome, to be reliable and therefore admissible.
Under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, in order
for evidence to be
admissible, the trial court must conclude that "any and all
scientific testimony...is
not only relevant, but reliable." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795.
The reliability standard is
grounded in Rule 702's requirement that an expert's testimony
relate to "scientific
knowledge." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2790. To qualify
as "scientific," the theory must
be grounded in the methods and procedures of science.
_Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795.
To qualify as "knowledge," the testimony must be more than
subjective belief or
________________________
1 Dr. van der Kolk is currently an Associate Professor of
Psychiatry at Harvard
Medical School and the Chief of the Trauma Clinic at
Massachusetts General Hospital.
He has gained international recognition in the field of trauma
and memory and is on
the Board of Directors for the International Society for
Traumatic Stress Studies. Dr.
van der Kolk has published many articles on the topic and he is
currently writing his
fourth book, _Memory, Trauma and the Integration of Experience_.
- 2 -
unsupported speculation. _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. In
addition, "in order to qualify
as 'scientific knowledge,' an inference or assertion must be
derived by the scientific
method." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. In cases dealing with
scientific evidence,
reliability is based upon scientific validity. _Daubert_, 113
S.Ct. at 2795, n.9. The
Supreme Court in _Daubert_ set forth several criteria which
should be considered when
determining "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is
scientifically valid...." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2796. The
factors to be considered
when deciding if proffered testimony is valid "scientific
knowledge," and therefore
reliable, are (1) whether the theory has been tested; (2)
whether the theory has been
subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the theory's known
or potential rate of
error; and (4) whether the theory has attained general
acceptance within the relevant
scientific community. _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2796-97. After
considering these factors,
this Court finds that the reliability of the phenomenon of
repressed memory has been
established, and therefore, will permit the plaintiff to
introduce evidence which relates
to the plaintiff's recovered memories.
In a case raising the same issue, _Isely v. Capuchin
Province_, 877 F.Supp. 1055
(E.D. Mich. 1995), the court stated that in order to introduce
repressed memory
evidence, a witness must "testify as to whether that theory can
be, or has been, tested
or corroborated and, if so, by whom and under what
circumstances; whether the
theory has been proven out or not proven out under clinical
tests or some other
accepted procedure for bearing it out; and whether the theory
has been subjected to
other types of peer review.... Obviously this part of this
foundational element will
- 3 -
include testimony as to whether or not the theory of repressed
memory is widely
accepted in the field of psychology." _Isely_, 877 F.Supp. at
1064.
Dr. van der Kolk's testimony sufficiently satisfies these
foundational factors. Dr.
van der Kolk discussed in detail several studies which focused
on the concept of
repressed memories and ultimately, through their findings, serve
to validate the
theory.2 One such study, which Dr. van der Kolk , referred to as
the Herman and
Schatzow study, looked at victims of sexual abuse and found that
only approximately
one-third of the victims remembered all the details of the
abuse. Another one-third
of the victims had a partial memory of the abuse, while the
final one-third
remembered nothing relating to the abuse. Dr. van der Kolk
stated that these figures
represent "the sort of figures that every study comes in,
regardless of what the
methodology is..." (Tr.45-46; April 9, 1996).
A study conducted by Linda Meyer Williams, which Dr. van
der Kolk referred to
as "the best study on all of this," (Tr. 52; April 9, 1996)
further validates the theory of
repressed memories. As a graduate student in psychology at the
University of
Pennsylvania from 1973 to 1975, Ms. Williams did her doctoral
dissertation on
sexually abused children who had been treated at the
Philadelphia Children's Hospital.
She conducted extensive interviews with young women who had been
sexually abused,
and her dissertation detailed the experiences which they had
undergone. Seventeen
years later, as a research psychologist, Ms. Williams
reinterviewed patients who had
_________________
2 See Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, Trauma and Memory, for a detailed
analysis of several
experimental studies done on memory performance in traumatized
and non-
traumatized populations.
- 4 -
been the subject of her dissertation to see what impact the
earlier sexual abuse had on
their later life. She was able to locate about half of her
original subjects, and after
reinterviewing them, she found that thirty-eight percent of her
patients no longer
remembered the abuse.
Dr. van der Kolk further testified that the majority of
_clinical_ psychiatrists
recognize the theory of repressed memories and do not find the
_theory_ itself
controversial. He further stated that this is not "a new craze
among American
_psychiatrists_... this is a very old issue in psychiatry." (Tr.
32; April 9, 1996). The
issue only became controversial when studies on the issue of
repressed memories of
_sexual abuse_, as opposed to repressed memories of natural
traumatic events or
wartime incidents, began to surface. People began to
say, "You're full of
nonsense. This doesn't happen." (Tr. 42, April 9, 1996). In
brief, Dr. van der Kolk
testified that repressed memories is not a scientific
controversy, but merely a political
and forensic one.
Dr. van der Kolk stated that currently the major detractors
of the theory are so-
called outsiders, "psychologists who do not treat traumatized
patients." (Tr. 24, April
9, 1996). Although the defendant's expert, Dr. Bodkin, was a
clinical psychiatrist, he
does not specialize in the field of memory. Nor do his
credentials and expertise in the
area of memory compare with those of Dr. van der Kolk.
Furthermore, Dr. Bodkin did
not claim that the theory of repressed memory was invalid, he
merely stated that, in
his opinion, the 52 studies relating to repressed memories which
he critiqued
- 5 -
contained methodological deficiencies and therefore could not
serve to validate the
theory.
According to the expert who testified in _Isely_, the only
controversy among the
majority of _clinical_ psychiatrists with respect to the issue
of repressed memory "is
specifically in the area of elicitation of repressed memories,
not with the concept
itself." _Isely_, 877 F.Supp. at 1065-66. Dr. van der Kolk
expanded on this point in
recognizing that some memories may not be accurate. "I think
there has always been
controversies about whether people can trust a patient still.
And, particularly, people
have always been concerned whether when people tell them
something that happened
maybe a long time ago that suddenly comes up, whether you can
really believe what
people, what people tell you." (Tr. 16, April 10,
1996). "Translating [a] sensation into
a story is still subject to ordinary human distortions that we
all are capable of... So
at the end, just like every other story you hear, you take your
subjective self and
eventually you decide what you believe - whether you believe
what people tell you is
true or not, it's how we all make up our minds. So at the end,
there is really no
scientific proof whether something is true or not unless there
is independent
corroboration, unless there was somebody there taking a
movie."3 (Tr. 69-70; April 9,
1996). The testimony of the defendant's second expert, Dr.
Ofshe, supported this
point. The elicitation and accuracy of the recovered memory
itself, however, is not
the issue currently before the Court. The Court must decide if
the _theory_ itself is
__________________
3 The defendant admits to some degree of sexual activity
between himself and the
plaintiff.
- 6 -
valid. Dr. Ofshe's testimony did not directly address this
issue. It must be also noted
that Dr. Ofshe is not a clinical psychiatrist, but rather a
doctor of Social Psychology.
The American Psychiatric Association, which is the major
professional
association for psychiatrists in America, recognizes the theory
of repressed memories
and believes it to be very common among people who have
experienced severe
trauma. In an official statement by the American Psychiatric
Association relating to
memories of sexual abuse, the Association stated that "Children
and adolescents who
have been abused cope with trauma by using a variety of coping
mechanisms. In some
instances these coping mechanisms result in a lack of conscious
awareness of the abuse
for varying periods of time. Conscious thoughts and feelings
stemming from the abuse
may emerge at a later date." (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 2,
Statement on Memories of
Sexual Abuse).
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
IV, 1994), which is
a widely used manual by psychiatrists to define mental
diagnostic categories and is
published by the American Psychiatric Association, also
recognizes the concept of
repressed memories. The term "Dissociative Amnesia," however,
is the true technical
psychiatric or medical term for the theory and is the term used
when defining the
condition in the manual. Repressed memories is the popular term.
The two terms
were used interchangeably in the hearing. The manual states
that "Dissociative
Amnesia is characterized by an inability to recall important
personal information,
usually of a traumatic or stressful nature, that is too
extensive to be explained by
ordinary forgetfulness." (DSM-IV at 477). "Dissociative
Amnesia can be distinguished
- 7 -
from normal gaps in memory by the intermittent and involuntary
nature of the inability
to recall and by the presence of significant distress or
impairment." (DSM-IV at 481).
The manual goes on to state that "Dissociative Amnesia most
commonly presents as a
retrospectively reported gap or series of gaps in recall for
aspects of the individual's
life history. These gaps are usually related to traumatic or
extremely stressful events."
(DSM-IV at 478). Particularly relevant to the issue presently
before the Court, the
manual recognizes that "In recent years in the United States,
there has been an
increase in reported cases of Dissociative Amnesia that involves
previously forgotten
early childhood traumas." (DSM-IV at 479). The manual lists
criteria used in
diagnosing Dissociative Amnesia: (1) one or more episodes of
memory loss relating to
a traumatic personal experience which is too extensive to be
ordinary forgetfulness;
(2) The disturbance does not happen exclusively while the person
is suffering from a
psychiatric disorder or other general medical condition; (3) The
symptoms cause
significant distress in important areas of functioning. (DSM-IV
at 481). The fact that
Dissociative Amnesia is included and discussed in such depth
within the DSM-IV is
significant, and, speaking as a member of the Psychiatric
Association, Dr.
van der Kolk said that listing Dissociative Amnesia in DSM-
IV "means that at this point
in time we recognize that [Dissociative Amnesia] exists." (Tr.
37; April 9, 1996).
Based on the evidence and testimony of Dr. van der Kolk,
the Court finds that
the plaintiff has satisfied the four foundational factors which
are to be considered,
although not independently determinative, in order to introduce
evidence relating to
repressed memories. The plaintiff has presented sufficient
evidence through both Dr.
- 8 -
van der Kolk's testimony and various submissions to the Court
that (1) the theory has
been the subject of various tests; (2) the _theory_ has been
subjected to peer-review and
publication; (3) that repressed memory, as is true with ordinary
memories, "cannot be
tested empirically," and may not always be accurate, however,
the theory itself has
been established to be valid through various studies. _Isely_,
877 F.-Supp. at 1065; and
(4) the theory has attained general acceptance within the
relevant scientific
community, namely, that of clinical psychiatrists.
It is important to stress that, in considering the
admissibility of repressed
memory evidence, it is not the role of the Court to rule on the
credibility of this
individual plaintiff's memories, but rather on the validity of
the theory itself. For the
foregoing reasons, the Court hereby denies the Defendant's
Motion in Limine to
Exclude Repressed Memory Evidence. For the law to reject a
diagnostic category
generally accepted by those who practice the art and science of
psychiatry would be
folly. Rules of law are not petrified in the past but flow with
the current of expanding
knowledge.
SO ORDERED.
_______________________
EDWARD F.
HARRINGTON
United States
District Judge
- 9 -The Validity of
Recovered Memory:
Decision of a US District Court
Judge Edward F. Harrington
Presentation by Jim Hopper, Ph.D.
An ASCII copy of the text may be downloaded (link below)
The legal documentation citation is: 923 Federal Supplement 286
(D. Mass. 1996)
Some notable quotes from the decision:
"The factors to be considered when deciding if proffered
testimony is valid 'scientific knowledge,' and therefore
reliable, are. . ." (p.3)
"After considering these factors, this Court finds that the
reliability of the phenomenon of repressed memory has been
established, and therefore, will permit the plaintiff to
introduce evidence which relates to the plaintiff's recovered
memories" (p.3).
"In brief, Dr. van der Kolk testified that repressed memories is
not a scientific controversy, but merely a political and
forensic one" (p.5).
"Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV,
1994), which is a widely used manual by psychiatrists to define
mental diagnostic categories and is published by the American
Psychiatric Association, also recognizes the concept of
repressed memories" (p.7).
Final paragraph: "It is important to stress that, in considering
the admissibility of repressed memory evidence, it is not the
role of the Court to rule on the credibility of this individual
plaintiff's memories, but rather on the validity of the theory
itself. For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby denies the
Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Repressed Memory
Evidence. For the law to reject a diagnostic category generally
accepted by those who practice the art and science of psychiatry
would be folly. Rules of law are not petrified in the past but
flow with the current of expanding knowledge" (p.9).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
______________________________
)
ANN SHAHZADE, )
Plaintiff )
) CIVIL ACTION NO.:
v. ) 92-12139-EFH
)
GEORGE GREGORY, )
Defendant. )
______________________________)
_MEMORANDUM AND ORDER_
May 8, 1996
HARRINGTON, D.J.
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion
in Limine to Exclude
Repressed Memory Evidence. The defendant in this case is Dr.
George Gregory, the
plaintiff is Ann Shahzade, the defendant's cousin. For the
reasons set forth below, the
Court hereby denies the defendant's motion.
The plaintiff in this case alleges repeated episodes of non-
consensual sexual
touching of her by the defendant from 1940 to 1945, more than
forty-seven years prior
to her filing a complaint. The plaintiff was between the ages
of approximately twelve
and seventeen at this time; the defendant is approximately five
years her senior. The
plaintiff claims that these episodes had been completely blocked
out and that she had
no memory of them until she recovered so-called "repressed
memories" of these
touchings during psychotherapy in November of 1990. The
defendant admits to some
degree of sexual activity between himself and the plaintiff, but
there is a dispute with
regard to the nature and extent of such activity. The plaintiff
now wants to introduce
evidence relating to these alleged repressed memories.
[- 1 -]
When a proffered scientific theory is beyond the general
understanding of a
jury, in order to introduce evidence relating to this theory, an
individual must rely on
expert testimony as to the validity of the theory. _See United
States v. Montas_, 41 F.3d
775, 783 (1st Cir. 1994). The proposed expert must qualify as
an expert and must
offer testimony relating to reliable scientific knowledge.
_Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc._, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2796 (1993). The Court
acknowledges the
appropriateness of an expert in this type of case and concludes
that the plaintiff's
expert, Dr. Bessel van der Kolk, is not only qualified as an
expert in the field of
memory, but that he is one of the country's most renowned
psychiatrists in this
specialty. 1 For the following reasons, the Court finds the
subject matter, repressed
memory syndrome, to be reliable and therefore admissible.
Under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, in order
for evidence to be
admissible, the trial court must conclude that "any and all
scientific testimony...is
not only relevant, but reliable." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795.
The reliability standard is
grounded in Rule 702's requirement that an expert's testimony
relate to "scientific
knowledge." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2790. To qualify
as "scientific," the theory must
be grounded in the methods and procedures of science.
_Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795.
To qualify as "knowledge," the testimony must be more than
subjective belief or
________________________
1 Dr. van der Kolk is currently an Associate Professor of
Psychiatry at Harvard
Medical School and the Chief of the Trauma Clinic at
Massachusetts General Hospital.
He has gained international recognition in the field of trauma
and memory and is on
the Board of Directors for the International Society for
Traumatic Stress Studies. Dr.
van der Kolk has published many articles on the topic and he is
currently writing his
fourth book, _Memory, Trauma and the Integration of Experience_.
- 2 -
unsupported speculation. _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. In
addition, "in order to qualify
as 'scientific knowledge,' an inference or assertion must be
derived by the scientific
method." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. In cases dealing with
scientific evidence,
reliability is based upon scientific validity. _Daubert_, 113
S.Ct. at 2795, n.9. The
Supreme Court in _Daubert_ set forth several criteria which
should be considered when
determining "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is
scientifically valid...." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2796. The
factors to be considered
when deciding if proffered testimony is valid "scientific
knowledge," and therefore
reliable, are (1) whether the theory has been tested; (2)
whether the theory has been
subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the theory's known
or potential rate of
error; and (4) whether the theory has attained general
acceptance within the relevant
scientific community. _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2796-97. After
considering these factors,
this Court finds that the reliability of the phenomenon of
repressed memory has been
established, and therefore, will permit the plaintiff to
introduce evidence which relates
to the plaintiff's recovered memories.
In a case raising the same issue, _Isely v. Capuchin
Province_, 877 F.Supp. 1055
(E.D. Mich. 1995), the court stated that in order to introduce
repressed memory
evidence, a witness must "testify as to whether that theory can
be, or has been, tested
or corroborated and, if so, by whom and under what
circumstances; whether the
theory has been proven out or not proven out under clinical
tests or some other
accepted procedure for bearing it out; and whether the theory
has been subjected to
other types of peer review.... Obviously this part of this
foundational element will
- 3 -
include testimony as to whether or not the theory of repressed
memory is widely
accepted in the field of psychology." _Isely_, 877 F.Supp. at
1064.
Dr. van der Kolk's testimony sufficiently satisfies these
foundational factors. Dr.
van der Kolk discussed in detail several studies which focused
on the concept of
repressed memories and ultimately, through their findings, serve
to validate the
theory.2 One such study, which Dr. van der Kolk referred to as
the Herman and
Schatzow study, looked at victims of sexual abuse and found that
only approximately
one-third of the victims remembered all the details of the
abuse. Another one-third
of the victims had a partial memory of the abuse, while the
final one-third
remembered nothing relating to the abuse. Dr. van der Kolk
stated that these figures
represent "the sort of figures that every study comes in,
regardless of what the
methodology is..." (Tr.45-46; April 9, 1996).
A study conducted by Linda Meyer Williams, which Dr. van
der Kolk referred to
as "the best study on all of this," (Tr. 52; April 9, 1996)
further validates the theory of
repressed memories. As a graduate student in psychology at the
University of
Pennsylvania from 1973 to 1975, Ms. Williams did her doctoral
dissertation on
sexually abused children who had been treated at the
Philadelphia Children's Hospital.
She conducted extensive interviews with young women who had been
sexually abused,
and her dissertation detailed the experiences which they had
undergone. Seventeen
years later, as a research psychologist, Ms. Williams
reinterviewed patients who had
_________________
2 See Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, Trauma and Memory, for a detailed
analysis of several
experimental studies done on memory performance in traumatized
and non-
traumatized populations.
- 4 -
been the subject of her dissertation to see what impact the
earlier sexual abuse had on
their later life. She was able to locate about half of her
original subjects, and after
reinterviewing them, she found that thirty-eight percent of her
patients no longer
remembered the abuse.
Dr. van der Kolk further testified that the majority of
_clinical_ psychiatrists
recognize the theory of repressed memories and do not find the
_theory_ itself
controversial. He further stated that this is not "a new craze
among American
_psychiatrists_... this is a very old issue in psychiatry." (Tr.
32; April 9, 1996). The
issue only became controversial when studies on the issue of
repressed memories of
_sexual abuse_, as opposed to repressed memories of natural
traumatic events or
wartime incidents, began to surface. People began to
say, "You're full of
nonsense. This doesn't happen." (Tr. 42, April 9, 1996). In
brief, Dr. van der Kolk
testified that repressed memories is not a scientific
controversy, but merely a political
and forensic one.
Dr. van der Kolk stated that currently the major detractors
of the theory are so-
called outsiders, "psychologists who do not treat traumatized
patients." (Tr. 24, April
9, 1996). Although the defendant's expert, Dr. Bodkin, was a
clinical psychiatrist, he
does not specialize in the field of memory. Nor do his
credentials and expertise in the
area of memory compare with those of Dr. van der Kolk.
Furthermore, Dr. Bodkin did
not claim that the theory of repressed memory was invalid, he
merely stated that, in
his opinion, the 52 studies relating to repressed memories which
he critiqued
- 5 -
contained methodological deficiencies and therefore could not
serve to validate the
theory.
According to the expert who testified in _Isely_, the only
controversy among the
majority of _clinical_ psychiatrists with respect to the issue
of repressed memory "is
specifically in the area of elicitation of repressed memories,
not with the concept
itself." _Isely_, 877 F.Supp. at 1065-66. Dr. van der Kolk
expanded on this point in
recognizing that some memories may not be accurate. "I think
there has always been
controversies about whether people can trust a patient still.
And, particularly, people
have always been concerned whether when people tell them
something that happened
maybe a long time ago that suddenly comes up, whether you can
really believe what
people, what people tell you." (Tr. 16, April 10,
1996). "Translating [a] sensation into
a story is still subject to ordinary human distortions that we
all are capable of... So
at the end, just like every other story you hear, you take your
subjective self and
eventually you decide what you believe - whether you believe
what people tell you is
true or not, it's how we all make up our minds. So at the end,
there is really no
scientific proof whether something is true or not unless there
is independent
corroboration, unless there was somebody there taking a
movie."3 (Tr. 69-70; April 9,
1996). The testimony of the defendant's second expert, Dr.
Ofshe, supported this
point. The elicitation and accuracy of the recovered memory
itself, however, is not
the issue currently before the Court. The Court must decide if
the _theory_ itself is
__________________
3 The defendant admits to some degree of sexual activity
between himself and the
plaintiff.
- 6 -
valid. Dr. Ofshe's testimony did not directly address this
issue. It must be also noted
that Dr. Ofshe is not a clinical psychiatrist, but rather a
doctor of Social Psychology.
The American Psychiatric Association, which is the major
professional
association for psychiatrists in America, recognizes the theory
of repressed memories
and believes it to be very common among people who have
experienced severe
trauma. In an official statement by the American Psychiatric
Association relating to
memories of sexual abuse, the Association stated that "Children
and adolescents who
have been abused cope with trauma by using a variety of coping
mechanisms. In some
instances these coping mechanisms result in a lack of conscious
awareness of the abuse
for varying periods of time. Conscious thoughts and feelings
stemming from the abuse
may emerge at a later date." (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 2,
Statement on Memories of
Sexual Abuse).
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
IV, 1994), which is
a widely used manual by psychiatrists to define mental
diagnostic categories and is
published by the American Psychiatric Association, also
recognizes the concept of
repressed memories. The term "Dissociative Amnesia," however,
is the true technical
psychiatric or medical term for the theory and is the term used
when defining the
condition in the manual. Repressed memories is the popular term.
The two terms
were used interchangeably in the hearing. The manual states
that "Dissociative
Amnesia is characterized by an inability to recall important
personal information,
usually of a traumatic or stressful nature, that is too
extensive to be explained by
ordinary forgetfulness." (DSM-IV at 477). "Dissociative
Amnesia can be distinguished
- 7 -
from normal gaps in memory by the intermittent and involuntary
nature of the inability
to recall and by the presence of significant distress or
impairment." (DSM-IV at 481).
The manual goes on to state that "Dissociative Amnesia most
commonly presents as a
retrospectively reported gap or series of gaps in recall for
aspects of the individual's
life history. These gaps are usually related to traumatic or
extremely stressful events."
(DSM-IV at 478). Particularly relevant to the issue presently
before the Court, the
manual recognizes that "In recent years in the United States,
there has been an
increase in reported cases of Dissociative Amnesia that involves
previously forgotten
early childhood traumas." (DSM-IV at 479). The manual lists
criteria used in
diagnosing Dissociative Amnesia: (1) one or more episodes of
memory loss relating to
a traumatic personal experience which is too extensive to be
ordinary forgetfulness;
(2) The disturbance does not happen exclusively while the person
is suffering from a
psychiatric disorder or other general medical condition; (3) The
symptoms cause
significant distress in important areas of functioning. (DSM-IV
at 481). The fact that
Dissociative Amnesia is included and discussed in such depth
within the DSM-IV is
significant, and, speaking as a member of the Psychiatric
Association, Dr.
van der Kolk said that listing Dissociative Amnesia in DSM-
IV "means that at this point
in time we recognize that [Dissociative Amnesia] exists." (Tr.
37; April 9, 1996).
Based on the evidence and testimony of Dr. van der Kolk,
the Court finds that
the plaintiff has satisfied the four foundational factors which
are to be considered,
although not independently determinative, in order to introduce
evidence relating to
repressed memories. The plaintiff has presented sufficient
evidence through both Dr.
- 8 -
van der Kolk's testimony and various submissions to the Court
that (1) the theory has
been the subject of various tests; (2) the _theory_ has been
subjected to peer-review and
publication; (3) that repressed memory, as is true with ordinary
memories, "cannot be
tested empirically," and may not always be accurate, however,
the theory itself has
been established to be valid through various studies. _Isely_,
877 F.-Supp. at 1065; and
(4) the theory has attained general acceptance within the
relevant scientific
community, namely, that of clinical psychiatrists.
It is important to stress that, in considering the
admissibility of repressed
memory evidence, it is not the role of the Court to rule on the
credibility of this
individual plaintiff's memories, but rather on the validity of
the theory itself. For the
foregoing reasons, the Court hereby denies the Defendant's
Motion in Limine to
Exclude Repressed Memory Evidence. For the law to reject a
diagnostic category
generally accepted by those who practice the art and science of
psychiatry would be
folly. Rules of law are not petrified in the past but flow with
the current of expanding
knowledge.
SO ORDERED.
_______________________
EDWARD F.
HARRINGTON
United States
District Judge
- 9 -
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
For more evidence and understanding, please see my page
Recovered Memories of Sexual Abuse: Scientific Research &
Scholarly Resources
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
______________________________
)
ANN SHAHZADE, )
Plaintiff )
) CIVIL ACTION NO.:
v. ) 92-12139-EFH
)
GEORGE GREGORY, )
Defendant. )
______________________________)
_MEMORANDUM AND ORDER_
May 8, 1996
HARRINGTON, D.J.
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion
in Limine to Exclude
Repressed Memory Evidence. The defendant in this case is Dr.
George Gregory, the
plaintiff is Ann Shahzade, the defendant's cousin. For the
reasons set forth below, the
Court hereby denies the defendant's motion.
The plaintiff in this case alleges repeated episodes of non-
consensual sexual
touching of her by the defendant from 1940 to 1945, more than
forty-seven years prior
to her filing a complaint. The plaintiff was between the ages
of approximately twelve
and seventeen at this time; the defendant is approximately five
years her senior. The
plaintiff claims that these episodes had been completely blocked
out and that she had
no memory of them until she recovered so-called "repressed
memories" of these
touchings during psychotherapy in November of 1990. The
defendant admits to some
degree of sexual activity between himself and the plaintiff, but
there is a dispute with
regard to the nature and extent of such activity. The plaintiff
now wants to introduce
evidence relating to these alleged repressed memories.
[- 1 -]
When a proffered scientific theory is beyond the general
understanding of a
jury, in order to introduce evidence relating to this theory, an
individual must rely on
expert testimony as to the validity of the theory. _See United
States v. Montas_, 41 F.3d
775, 783 (1st Cir. 1994). The proposed expert must qualify as
an expert and must
offer testimony relating to reliable scientific knowledge.
_Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc._, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2796 (1993). The Court
acknowledges the
appropriateness of an expert in this type of case and concludes
that the plaintiff's
expert, Dr. Bessel van der Kolk, is not only qualified as an
expert in the field of
memory, but that he is one of the country's most renowned
psychiatrists in this
specialty. 1 For the following reasons, the Court finds the
subject matter, repressed
memory syndrome, to be reliable and therefore admissible.
Under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, in order
for evidence to be
admissible, the trial court must conclude that "any and all
scientific testimony...is
not only relevant, but reliable." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795.
The reliability standard is
grounded in Rule 702's requirement that an expert's testimony
relate to "scientific
knowledge." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2790. To qualify
as "scientific," the theory must
be grounded in the methods and procedures of science.
_Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795.
To qualify as "knowledge," the testimony must be more than
subjective belief or
________________________
1 Dr. van der Kolk is currently an Associate Professor of
Psychiatry at Harvard
Medical School and the Chief of the Trauma Clinic at
Massachusetts General Hospital.
He has gained international recognition in the field of trauma
and memory and is on
the Board of Directors for the International Society for
Traumatic Stress Studies. Dr.
van der Kolk has published many articles on the topic and he is
currently writing his
fourth book, _Memory, Trauma and the Integration of Experience_.
- 2 -
unsupported speculation. _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. In
addition, "in order to qualify
as 'scientific knowledge,' an inference or assertion must be
derived by the scientific
method." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. In cases dealing with
scientific evidence,
reliability is based upon scientific validity. _Daubert_, 113
S.Ct. at 2795, n.9. The
Supreme Court in _Daubert_ set forth several criteria which
should be considered when
determining "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is
scientifically valid...." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2796. The
factors to be considered
when deciding if proffered testimony is valid "scientific
knowledge," and therefore
reliable, are (1) whether the theory has been tested; (2)
whether the theory has been
subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the theory's known
or potential rate of
error; and (4) whether the theory has attained general
acceptance within the relevant
scientific community. _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2796-97. After
considering these factors,
this Court finds that the reliability of the phenomenon of
repressed memory has been
established, and therefore, will permit the plaintiff to
introduce evidence which relates
to the plaintiff's recovered memories.
In a case raising the same issue, _Isely v. Capuchin
Province_, 877 F.Supp. 1055
(E.D. Mich. 1995), the court stated that in order to introduce
repressed memory
evidence, a witness must "testify as to whether that theory can
be, or has been, tested
or corroborated and, if so, by whom and under what
circumstances; whether the
theory has been proven out or not proven out under clinical
tests or some other
accepted procedure for bearing it out; and whether the theory
has been subjected to
other types of peer review.... Obviously this part of this
foundational element will
- 3 -
include testimony as to whether or not the theory of repressed
memory is widely
accepted in the field of psychology." _Isely_, 877 F.Supp. at
1064.
Dr. van der Kolk's testimony sufficiently satisfies these
foundational factors. Dr.
van der Kolk discussed in detail several studies which focused
on the concept of
repressed memories and ultimately, through their findings, serve
to validate the
theory.2 One such study, which Dr. van der Kolk referred to as
the Herman and
Schatzow study, looked at victims of sexual abuse and found that
only approximately
one-third of the victims remembered all the details of the
abuse. Another one-third
of the victims had a partial memory of the abuse, while the
final one-third
remembered nothing relating to the abuse. Dr. van der Kolk
stated that these figures
represent "the sort of figures that every study comes in,
regardless of what the
methodology is..." (Tr.45-46; April 9, 1996).
A study conducted by Linda Meyer Williams, which Dr. van
der Kolk referred to
as "the best study on all of this," (Tr. 52; April 9, 1996)
further validates the theory of
repressed memories. As a graduate student in psychology at the
University of
Pennsylvania from 1973 to 1975, Ms. Williams did her doctoral
dissertation on
sexually abused children who had been treated at the
Philadelphia Children's Hospital.
She conducted extensive interviews with young women who had been
sexually abused,
and her dissertation detailed the experiences which they had
undergone. Seventeen
years later, as a research psychologist, Ms. Williams
reinterviewed patients who had
_________________
2 See Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, Trauma and Memory, for a detailed
analysis of several
experimental studies done on memory performance in traumatized
and non-
traumatized populations.
- 4 -
been the subject of her dissertation to see what impact the
earlier sexual abuse had on
their later life. She was able to locate about half of her
original subjects, and after
reinterviewing them, she found that thirty-eight percent of her
patients no longer
remembered the abuse.
Dr. van der Kolk further testified that the majority of
_clinical_ psychiatrists
recognize the theory of repressed memories and do not find the
_theory_ itself
controversial. He further stated that this is not "a new craze
among American
_psychiatrists_... this is a very old issue in psychiatry." (Tr.
32; April 9, 1996). The
issue only became controversial when studies on the issue of
repressed memories of
_sexual abuse_, as opposed to repressed memories of natural
traumatic events or
wartime incidents, began to surface. People began to
say, "You're full of
nonsense. This doesn't happen." (Tr. 42, April 9, 1996). In
brief, Dr. van der Kolk
testified that repressed memories is not a scientific
controversy, but merely a political
and forensic one.
Dr. van der Kolk stated that currently the major detractors
of the theory are so-
called outsiders, "psychologists who do not treat traumatized
patients." (Tr. 24, April
9, 1996). Although the defendant's expert, Dr. Bodkin, was a
clinical psychiatrist, he
does not specialize in the field of memory. Nor do his
credentials and expertise in the
area of memory compare with those of Dr. van der Kolk.
Furthermore, Dr. Bodkin did
not claim that the theory of repressed memory was invalid, he
merely stated that, in
his opinion, the 52 studies relating to repressed memories which
he critiqued
- 5 -
contained methodological deficiencies and therefore could not
serve to validate the
theory.
According to the expert who testified in _Isely_, the only
controversy among the
majority of _clinical_ psychiatrists with respect to the issue
of repressed memory "is
specifically in the area of elicitation of repressed memories,
not with the concept
itself." _Isely_, 877 F.Supp. at 1065-66. Dr. van der Kolk
expanded on this point in
recognizing that some memories may not be accurate. "I think
there has always been
controversies about whether people can trust a patient still.
And, particularly, people
have always been concerned whether when people tell them
something that happened
maybe a long time ago that suddenly comes up, whether you can
really believe what
people, what people tell you." (Tr. 16, April 10,
1996). "Translating [a] sensation into
a story is still subject to ordinary human distortions that we
all are capable of... So
at the end, just like every other story you hear, you take your
subjective self and
eventually you decide what you believe - whether you believe
what people tell you is
true or not, it's how we all make up our minds. So at the end,
there is really no
scientific proof whether something is true or not unless there
is independent
corroboration, unless there was somebody there taking a
movie."3 (Tr. 69-70; April 9,
1996). The testimony of the defendant's second expert, Dr.
Ofshe, supported this
point. The elicitation and accuracy of the recovered memory
itself, however, is not
the issue currently before the Court. The Court must decide if
the _theory_ itself is
__________________
3 The defendant admits to some degree of sexual activity
between himself and the
plaintiff.
- 6 -
valid. Dr. Ofshe's testimony did not directly address this
issue. It must be also noted
that Dr. Ofshe is not a clinical psychiatrist, but rather a
doctor of Social Psychology.
The American Psychiatric Association, which is the major
professional
association for psychiatrists in America, recognizes the theory
of repressed memories
and believes it to be very common among people who have
experienced severe
trauma. In an official statement by the American Psychiatric
Association relating to
memories of sexual abuse, the Association stated that "Children
and adolescents who
have been abused cope with trauma by using a variety of coping
mechanisms. In some
instances these coping mechanisms result in a lack of conscious
awareness of the abuse
for varying periods of time. Conscious thoughts and feelings
stemming from the abuse
may emerge at a later date." (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 2,
Statement on Memories of
Sexual Abuse).
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
IV, 1994), which is
a widely used manual by psychiatrists to define mental
diagnostic categories and is
published by the American Psychiatric Association, also
recognizes the concept of
repressed memories. The term "Dissociative Amnesia," however,
is the true technical
psychiatric or medical term for the theory and is the term used
when defining the
condition in the manual. Repressed memories is the popular term.
The two terms
were used interchangeably in the hearing. The manual states
that "Dissociative
Amnesia is characterized by an inability to recall important
personal information,
usually of a traumatic or stressful nature, that is too
extensive to be explained by
ordinary forgetfulness." (DSM-IV at 477). "Dissociative
Amnesia can be distinguished
- 7 -
from normal gaps in memory by the intermittent and involuntary
nature of the inability
to recall and by the presence of significant distress or
impairment." (DSM-IV at 481).
The manual goes on to state that "Dissociative Amnesia most
commonly presents as a
retrospectively reported gap or series of gaps in recall for
aspects of the individual's
life history. These gaps are usually related to traumatic or
extremely stressful events."
(DSM-IV at 478). Particularly relevant to the issue presently
before the Court, the
manual recognizes that "In recent years in the United States,
there has been an
increase in reported cases of Dissociative Amnesia that involves
previously forgotten
early childhood traumas." (DSM-IV at 479). The manual lists
criteria used in
diagnosing Dissociative Amnesia: (1) one or more episodes of
memory loss relating to
a traumatic personal experience which is too extensive to be
ordinary forgetfulness;
(2) The disturbance does not happen exclusively while the person
is suffering from a
psychiatric disorder or other general medical condition; (3) The
symptoms cause
significant distress in important areas of functioning. (DSM-IV
at 481). The fact that
Dissociative Amnesia is included and discussed in such depth
within the DSM-IV is
significant, and, speaking as a member of the Psychiatric
Association, Dr.
van der Kolk said that listing Dissociative Amnesia in DSM-
IV "means that at this point
in time we recognize that [Dissociative Amnesia] exists." (Tr.
37; April 9, 1996).
Based on the evidence and testimony of Dr. van der Kolk,
the Court finds that
the plaintiff has satisfied the four foundational factors which
are to be considered,
although not independently determinative, in order to introduce
evidence relating to
repressed memories. The plaintiff has presented sufficient
evidence through both Dr.
- 8 -
van der Kolk's testimony and various submissions to the Court
that (1) the theory has
been the subject of various tests; (2) the _theory_ has been
subjected to peer-review and
publication; (3) that repressed memory, as is true with ordinary
memories, "cannot be
tested empirically," and may not always be accurate, however,
the theory itself has
been established to be valid through various studies. _Isely_,
877 F.-Supp. at 1065; and
(4) the theory has attained general acceptance within the
relevant scientific
community, namely, that of clinical psychiatrists.
It is important to stress that, in considering the
admissibility of repressed
memory evidence, it is not the role of the Court to rule on the
credibility of this
individual plaintiff's memories, but rather on the validity of
the theory itself. For the
foregoing reasons, the Court hereby denies the Defendant's
Motion in Limine to
Exclude Repressed Memory Evidence. For the law to reject a
diagnostic category
generally accepted by those who practice the art and science of
psychiatry would be
folly. Rules of law are not petrified in the past but flow with
the current of expanding
knowledge.
SO ORDERED.
_______________________
EDWARD F.
HARRINGTON
United States
District Judge
- 9 -
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
This page is maintained by Jim Hopper, Ph.D., as are these
related pages:
Recovered Memories of Sexual Abuse: Scientific Research &
Scholarly Resources
Child Abuse: Statistics, Research, and Resources
Sexual Abuse of Males: Prevalence, Lasting Effects, and Resources
Factors in the Cycle of Violence - Abused Boys, Gender
Socialization, and Violent Men
Jim Hopper
j...@jimhopper.com
www.jimhopper.com
last revised 8/22/96 The Validity of Recovered Memory:
Decision of a US District Court
Judge Edward F. Harrington
Presentation by Jim Hopper, Ph.D.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
For more evidence and understanding, please see my page
Recovered Memories of Sexual Abuse: Scientific Research &
Scholarly Resources
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
Some notes on the presented text of Judge Harrington's decision:
The text is just over eight double-spaced pages--a fairly quick
read
Underlines in the original are represented in the text like
this: _underlined words_
There are two versions of the text on this page: one in normal
type, the other small
An ASCII copy of the text may be downloaded (link below)
The legal documentation citation is: 923 Federal Supplement 286
(D. Mass. 1996)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
Some notable quotes from the decision:
"The factors to be considered when deciding if proffered
testimony is valid 'scientific knowledge,' and therefore
reliable, are. . ." (p.3)
"After considering these factors, this Court finds that the
reliability of the phenomenon of repressed memory has been
established, and therefore, will permit the plaintiff to
introduce evidence which relates to the plaintiff's recovered
memories" (p.3).
"In brief, Dr. van der Kolk testified that repressed memories is
not a scientific controversy, but merely a political and
forensic one" (p.5).
"Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV,
1994), which is a widely used manual by psychiatrists to define
mental diagnostic categories and is published by the American
Psychiatric Association, also recognizes the concept of
repressed memories" (p.7).
Final paragraph: "It is important to stress that, in considering
the admissibility of repressed memory evidence, it is not the
role of the Court to rule on the credibility of this individual
plaintiff's memories, but rather on the validity of the theory
itself. For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby denies the
Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Repressed Memory
Evidence. For the law to reject a diagnostic category generally
accepted by those who practice the art and science of psychiatry
would be folly. Rules of law are not petrified in the past but
flow with the current of expanding knowledge" (p.9).
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
small text, this page downloadable ASCII text
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
______________________________
)
ANN SHAHZADE, )
Plaintiff )
) CIVIL ACTION NO.:
v. ) 92-12139-EFH
)
GEORGE GREGORY, )
Defendant. )
______________________________)
_MEMORANDUM AND ORDER_
May 8, 1996
HARRINGTON, D.J.
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion
in Limine to Exclude
Repressed Memory Evidence. The defendant in this case is Dr.
George Gregory, the
plaintiff is Ann Shahzade, the defendant's cousin. For the
reasons set forth below, the
Court hereby denies the defendant's motion.
The plaintiff in this case alleges repeated episodes of non-
consensual sexual
touching of her by the defendant from 1940 to 1945, more than
forty-seven years prior
to her filing a complaint. The plaintiff was between the ages
of approximately twelve
and seventeen at this time; the defendant is approximately five
years her senior. The
plaintiff claims that these episodes had been completely blocked
out and that she had
no memory of them until she recovered so-called "repressed
memories" of these
touchings during psychotherapy in November of 1990. The
defendant admits to some
degree of sexual activity between himself and the plaintiff, but
there is a dispute with
regard to the nature and extent of such activity. The plaintiff
now wants to introduce
evidence relating to these alleged repressed memories.
[- 1 -]
When a proffered scientific theory is beyond the general
understanding of a
jury, in order to introduce evidence relating to this theory, an
individual must rely on
expert testimony as to the validity of the theory. _See United
States v. Montas_, 41 F.3d
775, 783 (1st Cir. 1994). The proposed expert must qualify as
an expert and must
offer testimony relating to reliable scientific knowledge.
_Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc._, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2796 (1993). The Court
acknowledges the
appropriateness of an expert in this type of case and concludes
that the plaintiff's
expert, Dr. Bessel van der Kolk, is not only qualified as an
expert in the field of
memory, but that he is one of the country's most renowned
psychiatrists in this
specialty. 1 For the following reasons, the Court finds the
subject matter, repressed
memory syndrome, to be reliable and therefore admissible.
Under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, in order
for evidence to be
admissible, the trial court must conclude that "any and all
scientific testimony...is
not only relevant, but reliable." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795.
The reliability standard is
grounded in Rule 702's requirement that an expert's testimony
relate to "scientific
knowledge." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2790. To qualify
as "scientific," the theory must
be grounded in the methods and procedures of science.
_Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795.
To qualify as "knowledge," the testimony must be more than
subjective belief or
________________________
1 Dr. van der Kolk is currently an Associate Professor of
Psychiatry at Harvard
Medical School and the Chief of the Trauma Clinic at
Massachusetts General Hospital.
He has gained international recognition in the field of trauma
and memory and is on
the Board of Directors for the International Society for
Traumatic Stress Studies. Dr.
van der Kolk has published many articles on the topic and he is
currently writing his
fourth book, _Memory, Trauma and the Integration of Experience_.
- 2 -
unsupported speculation. _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. In
addition, "in order to qualify
as 'scientific knowledge,' an inference or assertion must be
derived by the scientific
method." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. In cases dealing with
scientific evidence,
reliability is based upon scientific validity. _Daubert_, 113
S.Ct. at 2795, n.9. The
Supreme Court in _Daubert_ set forth several criteria which
should be considered when
determining "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is
scientifically valid...." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2796. The
factors to be considered
when deciding if proffered testimony is valid "scientific
knowledge," and therefore
reliable, are (1) whether the theory has been tested; (2)
whether the theory has been
subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the theory's known
or potential rate of
error; and (4) whether the theory has attained general
acceptance within the relevant
scientific community. _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2796-97. After
considering these factors,
this Court finds that the reliability of the phenomenon of
repressed memory has been
established, and therefore, will permit the plaintiff to
introduce evidence which relates
to the plaintiff's recovered memories.
In a case raising the same issue, _Isely v. Capuchin
Province_, 877 F.Supp. 1055
(E.D. Mich. 1995), the court stated that in order to introduce
repressed memory
evidence, a witness must "testify as to whether that theory can
be, or has been, tested
or corroborated and, if so, by whom and under what
circumstances; whether the
theory has been proven out or not proven out under clinical
tests or some other
accepted procedure for bearing it out; and whether the theory
has been subjected to
other types of peer review.... Obviously this part of this
foundational element will
- 3 -
include testimony as to whether or not the theory of repressed
memory is widely
accepted in the field of psychology." _Isely_, 877 F.Supp. at
1064.
Dr. van der Kolk's testimony sufficiently satisfies these
foundational factors. Dr.
van der Kolk discussed in detail several studies which focused
on the concept of
repressed memories and ultimately, through their findings, serve
to validate the
theory.2 One such study, which Dr. van der Kolk referred to as
the Herman and
Schatzow study, looked at victims of sexual abuse and found that
only approximately
one-third of the victims remembered all the details of the
abuse. Another one-third
of the victims had a partial memory of the abuse, while the
final one-third
remembered nothing relating to the abuse. Dr. van der Kolk
stated that these figures
represent "the sort of figures that every study comes in,
regardless of what the
methodology is..." (Tr.45-46; April 9, 1996).
A study conducted by Linda Meyer Williams, which Dr. van
der Kolk referred to
as "the best study on all of this," (Tr. 52; April 9, 1996)
further validates the theory of
repressed memories. As a graduate student in psychology at the
University of
Pennsylvania from 1973 to 1975, Ms. Williams did her doctoral
dissertation on
sexually abused children who had been treated at the
Philadelphia Children's Hospital.
She conducted extensive interviews with young women who had been
sexually abused,
and her dissertation detailed the experiences which they had
undergone. Seventeen
years later, as a research psychologist, Ms. Williams
reinterviewed patients who had
_________________
2 See Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, Trauma and Memory, for a detailed
analysis of several
experimental studies done on memory performance in traumatized
and non-
traumatized populations.
- 4 -
been the subject of her dissertation to see what impact the
earlier sexual abuse had on
their later life. She was able to locate about half of her
original subjects, and after
reinterviewing them, she found that thirty-eight percent of her
patients no longer
remembered the abuse.
Dr. van der Kolk further testified that the majority of
_clinical_ psychiatrists
recognize the theory of repressed memories and do not find the
_theory_ itself
controversial. He further stated that this is not "a new craze
among American
_psychiatrists_... this is a very old issue in psychiatry." (Tr.
32; April 9, 1996). The
issue only became controversial when studies on the issue of
repressed memories of
_sexual abuse_, as opposed to repressed memories of natural
traumatic events or
wartime incidents, began to surface. People began to
say, "You're full of
nonsense. This doesn't happen." (Tr. 42, April 9, 1996). In
brief, Dr. van der Kolk
testified that repressed memories is not a scientific
controversy, but merely a political
and forensic one.
Dr. van der Kolk stated that currently the major detractors
of the theory are so-
called outsiders, "psychologists who do not treat traumatized
patients." (Tr. 24, April
9, 1996). Although the defendant's expert, Dr. Bodkin, was a
clinical psychiatrist, he
does not specialize in the field of memory. Nor do his
credentials and expertise in the
area of memory compare with those of Dr. van der Kolk.
Furthermore, Dr. Bodkin did
not claim that the theory of repressed memory was invalid, he
merely stated that, in
his opinion, the 52 studies relating to repressed memories which
he critiqued
- 5 -
contained methodological deficiencies and therefore could not
serve to validate the
theory.
According to the expert who testified in _Isely_, the only
controversy among the
majority of _clinical_ psychiatrists with respect to the issue
of repressed memory "is
specifically in the area of elicitation of repressed memories,
not with the concept
itself." _Isely_, 877 F.Supp. at 1065-66. Dr. van der Kolk
expanded on this point in
recognizing that some memories may not be accurate. "I think
there has always been
controversies about whether people can trust a patient still.
And, particularly, people
have always been concerned whether when people tell them
something that happened
maybe a long time ago that suddenly comes up, whether you can
really believe what
people, what people tell you." (Tr. 16, April 10,
1996). "Translating [a] sensation into
a story is still subject to ordinary human distortions that we
all are capable of... So
at the end, just like every other story you hear, you take your
subjective self and
eventually you decide what you believe - whether you believe
what people tell you is
true or not, it's how we all make up our minds. So at the end,
there is really no
scientific proof whether something is true or not unless there
is independent
corroboration, unless there was somebody there taking a
movie."3 (Tr. 69-70; April 9,
1996). The testimony of the defendant's second expert, Dr.
Ofshe, supported this
point. The elicitation and accuracy of the recovered memory
itself, however, is not
the issue currently before the Court. The Court must decide if
the _theory_ itself is
__________________
3 The defendant admits to some degree of sexual activity
between himself and the
plaintiff.
- 6 -
valid. Dr. Ofshe's testimony did not directly address this
issue. It must be also noted
that Dr. Ofshe is not a clinical psychiatrist, but rather a
doctor of Social Psychology.
The American Psychiatric Association, which is the major
professional
association for psychiatrists in America, recognizes the theory
of repressed memories
and believes it to be very common among people who have
experienced severe
trauma. In an official statement by the American Psychiatric
Association relating to
memories of sexual abuse, the Association stated that "Children
and adolescents who
have been abused cope with trauma by using a variety of coping
mechanisms. In some
instances these coping mechanisms result in a lack of conscious
awareness of the abuse
for varying periods of time. Conscious thoughts and feelings
stemming from the abuse
may emerge at a later date." (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 2,
Statement on Memories of
Sexual Abuse).
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
IV, 1994), which is
a widely used manual by psychiatrists to define mental
diagnostic categories and is
published by the American Psychiatric Association, also
recognizes the concept of
repressed memories. The term "Dissociative Amnesia," however,
is the true technical
psychiatric or medical term for the theory and is the term used
when defining the
condition in the manual. Repressed memories is the popular term.
The two terms
were used interchangeably in the hearing. The manual states
that "Dissociative
Amnes, ia is characterized by an inability to recall important
personal information,
usually of a traumatic or stressful nature, that is too
extensive to be explained by
ordinary forgetfulness." (DSM-IV at 477). "Dissociative
Amnesia can be distinguished
- 7 -
from normal gaps in memory by the intermittent and involuntary
nature of the inability
to recall and by the presence of significant distress or
impairment." (DSM-IV at 481).
The manual goes on to state that "Dissociative Amnesia most
commonly presents as a
retrospectively reported gap or series of gaps in recall for
aspects of the individual's
life history. These gaps are usually related to traumatic or
extremely stressful events."
(DSM-IV at 478). Particularly relevant to the issue presently
before the Court, the
manual recognizes that "In recent years in the United States,
there has been an
increase in reported cases of Dissociative Amnesia that involves
previously forgotten
early childhood traumas." (DSM-IV at 479). The manual lists
criteria used in
diagnosing Dissociative Amnesia: (1) one or more episodes of
memory loss relating to
a traumatic personal experience which is too extensive to be
ordinary forgetfulness;
(2) The disturbance does not happen exclusively while the person
is suffering from a
psychiatric disorder or other general medical condition; (3) The
symptoms cause
significant distress in important areas of functioning. (DSM-IV
at 481). The fact that
Dissociative Amnesia is included and discussed in such depth
within the DSM-IV is
significant, and, speaking as a member of the Psychiatric
Association, Dr.
van der Kolk said that listing Dissociative Amnesia in DSM-
IV "means that at this point
in time we recognize that [Dissociative Amnesia] exists." (Tr.
37; April 9, 1996).
Based on the evidence and testimony of Dr. van der Kolk,
the Court finds that
the plaintiff has satisfied the four foundational factors which
are to be considered,
although not independently determinative, in order to introduce
evidence relating to
repressed memories. The plaintiff has presented sufficient
evidence through both Dr.
- 8 -
van der Kolk's testimony and various submissions to the Court
that (1) the theory has
been the subject of various tests; (2) the _theory_ has been
subjected to peer-review and
publication; (3) that repressed memory, as is true with ordinary
memories, "cannot be
tested empirically," and may not always be accurate, however,
the theory itself has
been established to be valid through various studies. _Isely_,
877 F.-Supp. at 1065; and
(4) the theory has attained general acceptance within the
relevant scientific
community, namely, that of clinical psychiatrists.
It is important to stress that, in considering the
admissibility of repressed
memory evidence, it is not the role of the Court to rule on the
credibility of this
individual plaintiff's memories, but rather on the validity of
the theory itself. For the
foregoing reasons, the Court hereby denies the Defendant's
Motion in Limine to
Exclude Repressed Memory Evidence. For the law to reject a
diagnostic category
generally accepted by those who practice the art and science of
psychiatry would be
folly. Rules of law are not petrified in the past but flow with
the current of expanding
knowledge.
SO ORDERED.
_______________________
EDWARD F.
HARRINGTON
United States
District Judge
- 9 -
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For more evidence and understanding, please see my page
Recovered Memories of Sexual Abuse: Scientific Research &
Scholarly Resources
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
______________________________
)
ANN SHAHZADE, )
Plaintiff )
) CIVIL ACTION NO.:
v. ) 92-12139-EFH
)
GEORGE GREGORY, )
Defendant. )
______________________________)
_MEMORANDUM AND ORDER_
May 8, 1996
HARRINGTON, D.J.
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion
in Limine to Exclude
Repressed Memory Evidence. The defendant in this case is Dr.
George Gregory, the
plaintiff is Ann Shahzade, the defendant's cousin. For the
reasons set forth below, the
Court hereby denies the defendant's motion.
The plaintiff in this case alleges repeated episodes of non-
consensual sexual
touching of her by the defendant from 1940 to 1945, more than
forty-seven years prior
to her filing a complaint. The plaintiff was between the ages
of approximately twelve
and seventeen at this time; the defendant is approximately five
years her senior. The
plaintiff claims that these episodes had been completely blocked
out and that she had
no memory of them until she recovered so-called "repressed
memories" of these
touchings during psychotherapy in November of 1990. The
defendant admits to some
degree of sexual activity between himself and the plaintiff, but
there is a dispute with
regard to the nature and extent of such activity. The plaintiff
now wants to introduce
evidence relating to these alleged repressed memories.
[- 1 -]
When a proffered scientific theory is beyond the general
understanding of a
jury, in order to introduce evidence relating to this theory, an
individual must rely on
expert testimony as to the validity of the theory. _See United
States v. Montas_, 41 F.3d
775, 783 (1st Cir. 1994). The proposed expert must qualify as
an expert and must
offer testimony relating to reliable scientific knowledge.
_Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc._, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2796 (1993). The Court
acknowledges the
appropriateness of an expert in this type of case and concludes
that the plaintiff's
expert, Dr. Bessel van der Kolk, is not only qualified as an
expert in the field of
memory, but that he is one of the country's most renowned
psychiatrists in this
specialty. 1 For the following reasons, the Court finds the
subject matter, repressed
memory syndrome, to be reliable and therefore admissible.
Under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, in order
for evidence to be
admissible, the trial court must conclude that "any and all
scientific testimony...is
not only relevant, but reliable." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795.
The reliability standard is
grounded in Rule 702's requirement that an expert's testimony
relate to "scientific
knowledge." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2790. To qualify
as "scientific," the theory must
be grounded in the methods and procedures of science.
_Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795.
To qualify as "knowledge," the testimony must be more than
subjective belief or
________________________
1 Dr. van der Kolk is currently an Associate Professor of
Psychiatry at Harvard
Medical School and the Chief of the Trauma Clinic at
Massachusetts General Hospital.
He has gained international recognition in the field of trauma
and memory and is on
the Board of Directors for the International Society for
Traumatic Stress Studies. Dr.
van der Kolk has published many articles on the topic and he is
currently writing his
fourth book, _Memory, Trauma and the Integration of Experience_.
- 2 -
unsupported speculation. _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. In
addition, "in order to qualify
as 'scientific knowledge,' an inference or assertion must be
derived by the scientific
method." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. In cases dealing with
scientific evidence,
reliability is based upon scientific validity. _Daubert_, 113
S.Ct. at 2795, n.9. The
Supreme Court in _Daubert_ set forth several criteria which
should be considered when
determining "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is
scientifically valid...." _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2796. The
factors to be considered
when deciding if proffered testimony is valid "scientific
knowledge," and therefore
reliable, are (1) whether the theory has been tested; (2)
whether the theory has been
subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the theory's known
or potential rate of
error; and (4) whether the theory has attained general
acceptance within the relevant
scientific community. _Daubert_, 113 S.Ct. at 2796-97. After
considering these factors,
this Court finds that the reliability of the phenomenon of
repressed memory has been
established, and therefore, will permit the plaintiff to
introduce evidence which relates
to the plaintiff's recovered memories.
In a case raising the same issue, _Isely v. Capuchin
Province_, 877 F.Supp. 1055
(E.D. Mich. 1995), the court stated that in order to introduce
repressed memory
evidence, a witness must "testify as to whether that theory can
be, or has been, tested
or corroborated and, if so, by whom and under what
circumstances; whether the
theory has been proven out or not proven out under clinical
tests or some other
accepted procedure for bearing it out; and whether the theory
has been subjected to
other types of peer review.... Obviously this part of this
foundational element will
- 3 -
include testimony as to whether or not the theory of repressed
memory is widely
accepted in the field of psychology." _Isely_, 877 F.Supp. at
1064.
Dr. van der Kolk's testimony sufficiently satisfies these
foundational factors. Dr.
van der Kolk discussed in detail several studies which focused
on the concept of
repressed memories and ultimately, through their findings, serve
to validate the
theory.2 One such study, which Dr. van der Kolk referred to as
the Herman and
Schatzow study, looked at victims of sexual abuse and found that
only approximately
one-third of the victims remembered all the details of the
abuse. Another one-third
of the victims had a partial memory of the abuse, while the
final one-third
remembered nothing relating to the abuse. Dr. van der Kolk
stated that these figures
represent "the sort of figures that every study comes in,
regardless of what the
methodology is..." (Tr.45-46; April 9, 1996).
A study conducted by Linda Meyer Williams, which Dr. van
der Kolk referred to
as "the best study on all of this," (Tr. 52; April 9, 1996)
further validates the theory of
repressed memories. As a graduate student in psychology at the
University of
Pennsylvania from 1973 to 1975, Ms. Williams did her doctoral
dissertation on
sexually abused children who had been treated at the
Philadelphia Children's Hospital.
She conducted extensive interviews with young women who had been
sexually abused,
and her dissertation detailed the experiences which they had
undergone. Seventeen
years later, as a research psychologist, Ms. Williams
reinterviewed patients who had
_________________
2 See Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, Trauma and Memory, for a detailed
analysis of several
experimental studies done on memory performance in traumatized
and non-
traumatized populations.
- 4 -
been the subject of her dissertation to see what impact the
earlier sexual abuse had on
their later life. She was able to locate about half of her
original subjects, and after
reinterviewing them, she found that thirty-eight percent of her
patients no longer
remembered the abuse.
Dr. van der Kolk further testified that the majority of
_clinical_ psychiatrists
recognize the theory of repressed memories and do not find the
_theory_ itself
controversial. He further stated that this is not "a new craze
among American
_psychiatrists_... this is a very old issue in psychiatry." (Tr.
32; April 9, 1996). The
issue only became controversial when studies on the issue of
repressed memories of
_sexual abuse_, as opposed to repressed memories of natural
traumatic events or
wartime incidents, began to surface. People began to
say, "You're full of
nonsense. This doesn't happen." (Tr. 42, April 9, 1996). In
brief, Dr. van der Kolk
testified that repressed memories is not a scientific
controversy, but merely a political
and forensic one.
Dr. van der Kolk stated that currently the major detractors
of the theory are so-
called outsiders, "psychologists who do not treat traumatized
patients." (Tr. 24, April
9, 1996). Although the defendant's expert, Dr. Bodkin, was a
clinical psychiatrist, he
does not specialize in the field of memory. Nor do his
credentials and expertise in the
area of memory compare with those of Dr. van der Kolk.
Furthermore, Dr. Bodkin did
not claim that the theory of repressed memory was invalid, he
merely stated that, in
his opinion, the 52 studies relating to repressed memories which
he critiqued
- 5 -
contained methodological deficiencies and therefore could not
serve to validate the
theory.
According to the expert who testified in _Isely_, the only
controversy among the
majority of _clinical_ psychiatrists with respect to the issue
of repressed memory "is
specifically in the area of elicitation of repressed memories,
not with the concept
itself." _Isely_, 877 F.Supp. at 1065-66. Dr. van der Kolk
expanded on this point in
recognizing that some memories may not be accurate. "I think
there has always been
controversies about whether people can trust a patient still.
And, particularly, people
have always been concerned whether when people tell them
something that happened
maybe a long time ago that suddenly comes up, whether you can
really believe what
people, what people tell you." (Tr. 16, April 10,
1996). "Translating [a] sensation into
a story is still subject to ordinary human distortions that we
all are capable of... So
at the end, just like every other story you hear, you take your
subjective self and
eventually you decide what you believe - whether you believe
what people tell you is
true or not, it's how we all make up our minds. So at the end,
there is really no
scientific proof whether something is true or not unless there
is independent
corroboration, unless there was somebody there taking a
movie."3 (Tr. 69-70; April 9,
1996). The testimony of the defendant's second expert, Dr.
Ofshe, supported this
point. The elicitation and accuracy of the recovered memory
itself, however, is not
the issue currently before the Court. The Court must decide if
the _theory_ itself is
__________________
3 The defendant admits to some degree of sexual activity
between himself and the
plaintiff.
- 6 -
valid. Dr. Ofshe's testimony did not directly address this
issue. It must be also noted
that Dr. Ofshe is not a clinical psychiatrist, but rather a
doctor of Social Psychology.
The American Psychiatric Association, which is the major
professional
association for psychiatrists in America, recognizes the theory
of repressed memories
and believes it to be very common among people who have
experienced severe
trauma. In an official statement by the American Psychiatric
Association relating to
memories of sexual abuse, the Association stated that "Children
and adolescents who
have been abused cope with trauma by using a variety of coping
mechanisms. In some
instances these coping mechanisms result in a lack of conscious
awareness of the abuse
for varying periods of time. Conscious thoughts and feelings
stemming from the abuse
may emerge at a later date." (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 2,
Statement on Memories of
Sexual Abuse).
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
IV, 1994), which is
a widely used manual by psychiatrists to define mental
diagnostic categories and is
published by the American Psychiatric Association, also
recognizes the concept of
repressed memories. The term "Dissociative Amnesia," however,
is the true technical
psychiatric or medical term for the theory and is the term used
when defining the
condition in the manual. Repressed memories is the popular term.
The two terms
were used interchangeably in the hearing. The manual states
that "Dissociative
Amnesia is characterized by an inability to recall important
personal information,
usually of a traumatic or stressful nature, that is too
extensive to be explained by
ordinary forgetfulness." (DSM-IV at 477). "Dissociative
Amnesia can be distinguished
- 7 -
from normal gaps in memory by the intermittent and involuntary
nature of the inability
to recall and by the presence of significant distress or
impairment." (DSM-IV at 481).
The manual goes on to state that "Dissociative Amnesia most
commonly presents as a
retrospectively reported gap or series of gaps in recall for
aspects of the individual's
life history. These gaps are usually related to traumatic or
extremely stressful events."
(DSM-IV at 478). Particularly relevant to the issue presently
before the Court, the
manual recognizes that "In recent years in the United States,
there has been an
increase in reported cases of Dissociative Amnesia that involves
previously forgotten
early childhood traumas." (DSM-IV at 479). The manual lists
criteria used in
diagnosing Dissociative Amnesia: (1) one or more episodes of
memory loss relating to
a traumatic personal experience which is too extensive to be
ordinary forgetfulness;
(2) The disturbance does not happen exclusively while the person
is suffering from a
psychiatric disorder or other general medical condition; (3) The
symptoms cause
significant distress in important areas of functioning. (DSM-IV
at 481). The fact that
Dissociative Amnesia is included and discussed in such depth
within the DSM-IV is
significant, and, speaking as a member of the Psychiatric
Association, Dr.
van der Kolk said that listing Dissociative Amnesia in DSM-
IV "means that at this point
in time we recognize that [Dissociative Amnesia] exists." (Tr.
37; April 9, 1996).
Based on the evidence and testimony of Dr. van der Kolk,
the Court finds that
the plaintiff has satisfied the four foundational factors which
are to be considered,
although not independently determinative, in order to introduce
evidence relating to
repressed memories. The plaintiff has presented sufficient
evidence through both Dr.
- 8 -
van der Kolk's testimony and various submissions to the Court
that (1) the theory has
been the subject of various tests; (2) the _theory_ has been
subjected to peer-review and
publication; (3) that repressed memory, as is true with ordinary
memories, "cannot be
tested empirically," and may not always be accurate, however,
the theory itself has
been established to be valid through various studies. _Isely_,
877 F.-Supp. at 1065; and
(4) the theory has attained general acceptance within the
relevant scientific
community, namely, that of clinical psychiatrists.
It is important to stress that, in considering the
admissibility of repressed
memory evidence, it is not the role of the Court to rule on the
credibility of this
individual plaintiff's memories, but rather on the validity of
the theory itself. For the
foregoing reasons, the Court hereby denies the Defendant's
Motion in Limine to
Exclude Repressed Memory Evidence. For the law to reject a
diagnostic category
generally accepted by those who practice the art and science of
psychiatry would be
folly. Rules of law are not petrified in the past but flow with
the current of expanding
knowledge.
SO ORDERED.
_______________________
EDWARD F.
HARRINGTON
United States
District Judge
- 9 -v
Son_of_Chive_Mynde
The Summer 1996 volume of The Journal of Psychiatry and Law,
published in February of 1997, is an indispensable resource. Its
six articles include Scheflin and Brown's recent and
comprehensive review of scientific studies of recovered memories
of sexual abuse, and Dalenberg's study of the accuracy of sexual
abuse memories recovered in psychotherapy (she actually
conducted interviews with both victims and perpetrators, some of
whom confessed). Directions for ordering this special issue, as
well as the Fall 1995 special issue that focused on claims of
false memories, are at the end of this section.
Brown, D., & Scheflin, A. W. Editors' Page.
Excerpt: "The Fall 1995 issue of The Journal of Psychiatry and
Law was a special issue on the false-memory controversy. It
contained a number of papers originally given at a 1994
conference at Johns Hopkins University sponsored by the False
Memory Syndrome Foundation. These papers represented only one
side of the complex issues involved in the false-memory
controversy. We appreciate the gracious invitation of Howard
Nashel, editor-in-chief of this journal, to serve as guest
editors to prepare a second issue that is representative of the
work in the trauma field in response to false-memory claims. Our
hope is that the readers of this journal will consider the Fall
1995 issue along with this Summer 1996 issue as a unit in order
to get a more balanced overview of the controversy (p.139).
". . . . Taken as a whole, these six articles demonstrate
that false-memory claims need to be made much more cautiously,
especially in courts and in the media, as recent databased
studies have either failed to support important false-memory
claims or have shown that these claims have been overstated.
Most importantly, the science of memory must be permitted to
continue untainted by ideological considerations. The false-
memory controversy must be converted from a political debate to
a scientific inquiry. It is our hope that this issue of The
Journal of Psychiatry and Law will help accomplish that goal."
Scheflin, A. W., & Brown, D. Repressed memory or dissociative
amnesia: What the science says.
Abstract: "Legal actions of alleged abuse victims based on
recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse (CSA) have been
challenged arguing that the concept of repressed memories does
not meet a generally accepted standard of science. A recent
review of the scientific literature on amnesia for CSA concluded
that the evidence was insufficient. The issues revolve around:
(1) the existence of amnesia for CSA, and (2) the accuracy of
recovered memories. A total of 25 studies on amnesia for CSA now
exist, all of which demonstrate amnesia in a subpopulation; no
study failed to find it, including recent studies with design
improvements such as random sampling and prospective designs
that address weaknesses in earlier studies. A reasonable
conclusion is that amnesia for CSA is a robust finding across
studies using very different samples and methods of assessment.
Studies addressing the accuracy of memories show that recovered
memories are no more or no less accurate than continuous
memories for abuse.
Excerpts: "Even more significantly, no study has surfaced that
refutes the dissociative amnesia hypothesis by failing to get
reports of inability to voluntarily recall repeated childhood
abuse (pp.145-146).
"Most scientific studies can be criticized for
methodological weaknesses, but such design limitations should
not obscure the fact that the data reported across every one of
the 25 studies demonstrate that either partial or full abuse-
specific amnesia, either for single incidents of childhood
sexual abuse or across multiple incidents of childhood sexual
abuse, is a robust finding. Partial or full amnesia was found
across studies regardless of whether the sample was clinical,
nonclinical, random or non-random, or whether the study was
retrospective or prospective. Every known study has found
amnesia for childhood sexual abuse in at least a portion of the
sampled individuals (pp.178-179, italics in original).
"These studies, when placed together, meet the test of
science – namely, that the finding holds up across quite a
number of independent experiments, each with different samples,
each assessing the target variables in a variety of different
ways, and each arriving at a similar conclusion. When multiple
samples and multiple sampling methods are used, the error rate
across studies is reduced. Even where a small portion of these
cases of reported amnesia may be associated with abuse that may
not have occurred or at least could not be substantiated, the
great preponderance of the evidence strongly suggests that at
least some subpopulation of sexually abused survivors
experiences a period of full or partial amnesia for the abuse.
Moreover, a significant portion of these amnestic subjects, at
least in some of the studies, later acquired some form of
corroboration of the abuse (p.179).
"Furthermore these 25 studies. . . illustrate how
scientific inquiry evolves, in the best sense. The earliest
clinical surveys were appropriately criticized on the grounds of
possible sample and experimenter bias. Perhaps those reporting
amnesia represented a highly select group of patients, or
perhaps their report of recovered memories was influenced, or
even 'implanted,' by the therapist-experimenters. Nonclinical
samples began to appear as a way to address the sample bias
problem. A number of subsequent studies clearly demonstrated
that psychotherapy was not frequently endorsed as the reason
for recovery of memories, nor responsible for them. When the
nonclinical-sample experiments were criticized on the grounds of
possible selection bias, a number of random-sample studies
appeared that addressed this objection. All of the self-report
studies were then criticized because they allegedly lacked
objective verification of the reported childhood sexual abuse.
In response to these criticisms, well-designed prospective
studies were conducted. These studies also document an inability
to recall a critical childhood abuse incident up to one or two
decades after the event in a subpopulation of sexually abused
individuals. Not surprisingly, the prospective studies were
criticized for failure to include a follow-up interview to
distinguish between memory failure and memory denial. However,
these criticisms failed to take into consideration that such an
interview could not easily be conducted without introducing
response bias and other possible expectation and suggestive
effects. The prospective studies specifically attempted to
reduce interviewing bias and to approximate the conditions of
free recall in the research design because the memory error rate
is minimized under the conditions of free recall" (pp. 179 &
182, italics in original).
"These studies should have a direct impact on two
significant and currently volatile legal issues. First, courts
holding a Frye or Daubert evidentiary hearing involving expert
or lay testimony on the issue of whether 'repressed memory' is
reliable must, consistent with the science, hold either that
such memories are reliable or that all memory, repressed or
otherwise, is unreliable. The first solution is the wiser and
better choice. Second, judges and legislators deciding whether
the delayed-discovery doctrine should be applied to toll the
statute of limitations in 'repressed' memory must acknowledge
that a class of sexual abuse victims with repressed memories
truly exists. The extent to which they are entitled to legal
protection is a legal question, not a scientific one. Some
jurisdictions have favored victims with 'repressed' memories;
others have not. . . As a result of these studies, no person
should in the future be denied proper legal consideration on the
grounds that 'repressed' memory, as one judge unscientifically
stated, 'transcends human experience.'
"It appears that the repressed memory controversy will
follow Arthur Schopenhauer's wise observation: 'All truth passes
through three stages. First, it is ridiculed. Second, it is
violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident'"
(p.183, some references omitted).
Dalenberg, C. J. Accuracy, timing and circumstances of
disclosure in therapy of recovered and continuous memories of
abuse.
Abstract: "Seventeen patients who had recovered memories of
abuse in therapy participated in a search for evidence
confirming or refuting these memories. Memories of abuse were
found to be equally accurate whether recovered or continuously
remembered. Predictors of number of memory units for which
evidence was uncovered included several measures of memory and
perceptual accuracy. Recovered memories that were later
supported arose in psychotherapy more typically during periods
of positive rather than negative feelings toward the therapist,
and they were more likely to be held with confidence by the
abuse victim."
Excerpts: "[I]n the present research the author was able to
substantiate the existence of the evidence offered by the
clients and to have this evidence rated for evidentiary value.
Further, both alleged victims and perpetrators participated in
the evidence collection, providing a better balance for the
search for confirming and refuting evidence (p.234).
"Both father and daughter participating in
locating 'evidence.' The evidence was of two types, primary and
contextual (p.242)
"Subjects were not significantly younger at the time of
the event relating to their first recovered memory (M = 5.53)
than at the time of their first reported continuous memory (M =
5.29; t(16) = .48, ns). . . . Average confidence in the truth of
the memory before evidence was gathered was significantly lower
for recovered than for continuous memories (t(16) = 2.79, p
< .02).
"Of those memories for which some evidence was submitted
(70% of all memories), 74.6% of continuous and 74.7% of
recovered memories were judged by the full set of raters as
having at least one piece of Category 1 [primary] or Category 2
[contextual] support. Support for the identity of the
perpetrator was found for at least one recovered memory for 10
subjects and for at least one of the continuous memories for 12
subjects. . . At least one memory was supported by confession in
seven recovered memory cases and 10 continuous memory cases
(underline added).
"Overall there was no consistent pattern of subjects
showing superior recovered or continuous memory for abuse.
However, four subjects had significantly more evidence for
accuracy of their recovered memory (using the general abuse
memory data), two showed significantly more evidence for
accuracy (and two for marginally more evidence) for continuous
memory, and nine were equal in amount of confirming evidence.
These individual differences might be worth further exploration
(pp.245-247).
"The likelihood of finding evidence of accuracy for a
recovered memory did relate to both timing and affective tone of
therapy. . . Seven subjects found significantly more evidence
for accuracy of memories reported during the last six months of
therapy than during the first three months, a pattern that
crossed recovered and continuous memories. . . Supported
recoveries were also more likely in the 'de-repression' sessions
(identified either by the presence of an alliance repair or the
presence of higher than average [top 12%] ratings of positive
affect toward the therapist). These sessions comprised 15% of
the total (p.250).
"An alternative method for expressing these data is in
likelihood ratios. As implied earlier, the ratio of supported to
nonsupported memories in this data set was approximately 3:1.
The ratio drops to 2:1 in the negative-emotion or state-
dependency sessions, but rises to 14:1 in the alliance repair
sessions (pp.250-251).
"Recovered and continuous memories also differed in the
degree to which they were associated with specific affective
descriptions. . . When affective terms were counted in the
accounting of each abuse episode, explicit statements regarding
fear/terror and shame were more likely to appear in recovered
accounts, and sadness/loss/depression was more likely to appear
in continuous accounts. Considering the episodes as independent
units, the probability of fear/terror mentioned (explicitly) in
a recovered memory was .72 (compared with .52 for continuous
memories). Shame was mentioned explicitly in 54% of the 57
recovered memory episodes and in 32% of the continuous memory
descriptions. Anger appeared equally in all memory types, and
sadness appeared more frequently for continuous memories (.67
compared with .28). The difference in patterns (testing the most
frequently named emotion in each memory description) was
significant (Chi Square = 37.00, p < .001) (pp.251-252).
"Finally, on an exploratory note, 13 of the 17 subjects
showed an increase in the level of symptoms and 12 showed an
increase in the variance of symptoms. . . on their
contemporaneous self-report comparing the six weeks prior to the
first recovery with the 12 weeks following their first recovery.
Resolution of symptoms typically occurred by four to six months
following recovery (p.252).
Olio, K. A. Are 25% of clinicians using potentially risky
therapeutic practices? A review of the logic and methodology of
the Poole, Lindsay, et al. study.
Abstract: "Conclusions from the Poole, Lindsay et al. study are
often cited to document claims regarding the frequency and
potential risks of using so-called suggestive memory recovery
techniques or memory recovery therapies. This study has also
been used to document the alleged number of persuaded clients
who have developed false memories of childhood abuse. The basis
for these claims seems questionable when the Poole, Lindsay et
al. study is examined carefully. Lack of operational
definitions, flawed survey construction, lack of face validity,
misclassification of techniques, and fallacious inferences about
causality, such as mistaking correlation for causation, make it
impossible to use these data to draw scientific conclusions
about the nature and outcomes of clinicians' practices."
Roe, C. M., & Schwartz, M. F. Characteristics of previously
forgotten memories of sexual abuse: A descriptive study.
Abstract: "The present study is a first attempt to describe what
people remember when they initially recall childhood sexual
abuse after a period of self-reported amnesia for that abuse.
Subjects were 52 white women who had previously been
hospitalized for treatment of sexual trauma. Participants
completed a questionnaire that inquired about their first
suspicions of having been sexually abused, their first memories
of sexual abuse, other memories of abuse, and details of their
abuse history. Participants were more likely to recall part of
an abuse episode, as opposed to an entire abuse episode,
following a period of no memory of the abuse. Additionally,
first memories tended to be described as vivid rather than
vague. Descriptive statistics are used to present and summarize
additional findings."
Williams, M. R. Suits by adults for childhood sexual abuse:
Legal origins of the "repressed memory" controversy.
Abstract: "In the last decade there has been a proliferation of
civil lawsuits by adults claiming to be survivors of childhood
sexual abuse (CSA). Many states have permitted such suits to go
forward by applying some form of 'delayed discovery of injury'
exception to the statute of limitations. Advocates for those
claiming to have been falsely accused have generated a new
concept – 'false memory syndrome' – as an alternative
explanation for delayed memories of CSA. Its proponents claim
that there is an epidemic of therapy-induced 'false memories' of
CSA. Psychotherapists and the profession as a whole have become
involved in a heated controversy, whose substance as well as
intensity is to a large extent litigation driven. To understand
the controversy and get a handle on its future, it is important
to examine its legal origins, history and context."
Hovdestad, W. E., & Kristiansen, C. M. A field study of "false
memory syndrome": Construct validity and incidence.
Abstract: "False memory syndrome (FMS) is described as a serious
form of psychopathology characterized by strongly believed
pseudomemories of childhood sexual abuse. A literature review
revealed four clusters of symptoms underlying the syndrome
regarding victims' belief in their memories of abuse and their
identity as survivors, their current interpersonal
relationships, their trauma symptoms across the lifespan, and
the characteristics of their therapy experiences. The validity
of these clusters was examined using data from a community
sample of 113 women who identified themselves as survivors of
girlhood sexual abuse. Examining the discriminant validity of
these criteria revealed that participants who had recovered
memories of their abuse (n = 51), and who could therefore
potentially have FMS, generally did not differ from participants
with continuous memories (n = 49) on indicators of these
criteria. Correlational analyses also indicated that these
criteria typically failed to converge. Further, despite frequent
claims that FMS is occurring in epidemic proportions, only 3.9%-
13.6% of the women with a recovered memory satisfied the
diagnostic criteria, and women with continuous memories were
equally unlikely to meet these criteria. The implications of
these findings for FMS theory and the delayed-memory debate more
generally are discussed."
To purchase a copy of this Summer 1996 issue and/or the Fall
1995 issue, send a letter or fax, on letterhead, including your
name and address, and the complete name and volume (e.g., "The
Journal of Psychiatry and Law, Summer 1996") to:
Federal Legal Publications
157 Chamber Street
New York, New York 10007
Attn: Back Issues
Do not send money. You will be billed $14 for each volume,
shipped at the "book rate," which will take a week to 10 days;
first class shipping adds approximately $4 per volume (depending
on where you live). If you have questions, call (212) 608-3141.
Son_of_Chive_Mynde
University of Washington psychologist Elizabeth Loftus is an
accomplished researcher with expertise in eyewitness testimony,
particularly how the memories of crime witnesses can be
distorted by post-event questioning. Loftus is a prominent
spokesperson for the False Memory Syndrome Foundation, and her
views have by and large been very well received by the mass
media in the United States. Loftus also testifies as an expert
witness on the behalf of people accused of child abuse on the
basis of recovered memories. She has co-authored a book entitled
The Myth of Repressed Memory.
You've probably heard of Dr. Loftus, and seen her quoted
approvingly and uncritically in the popular media. No doubt, as
reported in the media, she has prevented some wrongly accused
people from being unjustly convicted. She has also played a
valuable role by bringing attention and accountability to bear
on some irresponsible practices by some incompetent therapists.
Yet Dr. Loftus has also claimed that recovered memory is
a "myth," and that the majority of such memories are false and
implanted by therapists.
Unfortunately, thus far reporters and journalists have
almost completely failed to critically evaluate her claims. Nor
have they addressed two crucial facts about her work:
1. Loftus herself conducted and published a study in which
nearly one in five women who reported childhood sexual abuse
also reported completely forgetting the abuse for some period of
time and recovering the memory of it later.
2. Loftus is well aware that those who study traumatic memory
have for several years, based on a great deal of research and
clinical experience, used the construct of dissociation to
account for the majority of recovered memories. Despite this
knowledge, she continues to focus on and attack "repression"
and "repressed memories," and in this way confuses and misleads
many people.
Here is the study almost never mentioned by Dr. Loftus or the
media:
Loftus, E.F., Polonsky, S., & Fullilove, M. T. (1994). Memories
of childhood sexual abuse: Remembering and repressing.
Psychology of Women Quarterly, 18, 67-845.
Abstract: "Women involved in out-patient treatment for substance
abuse were interviewed to examine their recollections of
childhood sexual abuse. Overall, 54% of the women reported a
history of childhood sexual abuse. The majority (81.1%)
remembered all or part of the abuse their whole lives; 19%
reported they forgot the abuse for a period of time, and later
the memory returned. Women who remembered the abuse their whole
lives reported a clearer memory, with a more detailed picture.
They also reported greater intensity of feelings at the time the
abuse happened. Women who remembered the abuse their whole lives
did not differ from others in terms of the violence of the abuse
or whether the abuse was incestuous. These data bear on current
discussions concerning the extent to which repression is a
common way of coping with child sexual abuse trauma, and also
bear on some widely held beliefs about the correlates of
repression."
If you read this paper (and I strongly encourage you to do so,
especially if you are presenting this issue to others), you will
find that Loftus devotes most of it to attacking the construct
of repression. If you read this paper, you will probably find it
interesting and ironic that Loftus, after her sustained attack
on the construct of repression, uses it to explain the recovered
memories of her own study's subjects. If you read this paper and
some of the other works cited on this page, you will understand
that experts in psychological trauma would not explain the
recovered memories of her research subjects in that way, but in
terms of dissociation.
Here are the findings at issue:
"Forgetting was associated with a different quality of memory,
compared to those who did not forget. Forgetting was associated
with a current memory that was deteriorated in some respects.
The deteriorated memory was less clear; it contained less of
a 'picture,' and the remembered intensity of feelings at the
time of the abuse was less" (p.79).
Notice the use of the word "deteriorated" to describe memory
characteristics that most trauma specialists would describe
as "dissociative." The principle that initially whole memories
deteriorate over time is derived from research on nontraumatic
memory. In contrast, just as dissociation involves a
fragmentation of experience during abuse, subsequent memories
tend to appear as fragments too – from the beginning. Thus, if a
subject had dissociated during the abuse experience, such
fragmentation would likely cause her memory to be "less clear,"
and to involve less of a "picture." Further, dissociative
fragmentation during abuse typically involves a defensive
attempt to split (dis-associate) physical and emotional pain
from one's conscious experience. This could explain the finding
that the women who had forgotten for some time, compared to
those who had not, remembered the intensity of their feelings
being less during the abuse. But Loftus and her colleagues,
understandably wedded to their traditional model of memory and
either unable or unwilling to apply the construct of
dissociation, can only characterize such memories
as "deteriorated."
This leads Loftus to misuse repression as an explanation for
these lost memories – though no trauma expert would do so:
"Suppose instead we define repression more conservatively. . . .
Just under one fifth of the women reported that they forgot the
abuse for a period of time and later regained the memory. One
could argue that this means that robust repression was not
especially prevalent in our sample" (p.80).
In summary:
Loftus has conducted and published research which calls into
question her public statements on recovered memories; her own
study demonstrated that the conditions of amnesia and delayed
recall for sexual abuse do exist.
She has relentlessly attacked the construct of repression in her
scholarly work, in her expert testimony to judges and juries,
and in her statements to the media; this behavior causes many
uninformed people to believe she is arguing that the conditions
of amnesia and delayed recall for sexual abuse do not exist.
She knows that experts on traumatic and recovered memories, when
they do employ explanatory constructs, use dissociation much
more than repression to understand these phenomena.
She has used repression to explain recovered memories reported
by subjects in her own research, though experts in traumatic
memory would argue that they are more likely dissociative in
nature.
For most of you, this is the first time you are learning these
facts, because most members of the popular media addressing this
issue have yet to do their homework or to make these facts
known. (For more on the unreliability and poor track record of
the popular media on this issue, see Mike Stanton's piece in the
Columbia Journalism Review, U-Turn on Memory Lane).
PangK
>Newsgroups: alt.psychology
>ETHICS COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST PROMINENT FMSF BOARD MEMBER
>APA DECLINES TO INVESTIGATE
>
>In December 1995, two women filed ethics complaints with the
>American Psychological Association (APA) against Elizabeth
hey shithead!!!!! This is the year 2000.
The APA finally DID investigate yourt PSYCHOTIC rants and found them "WIOTHOUT
MERIT!" Nice try No cigar lyingboy!
PangK
>Newsgroups: alt.psychology
17 posts in ONE morning and 3.7 gb of raving LUNACY. Man you have a SERIOUS
medical problem. Look in the yellow pages under PSYCHIATRISTS!
You need HELP badly!
Son_of_Chive_Mynde
These four papers by Harvard psychiatrist Judith Herman and her
colleagues Mary Harvey and Emily Schatzow address fundamental
issues in the memory controversy. Judith Herman is the author of
Trauma and Recovery, which is widely viewed as the best book yet
written on psychological trauma and recovery; it includes an
excellent chapter entitled "Remembrance and Mourning."
The first paper below was published in 1987, before the
False Memory Syndrome Foundation had come into existence. Herman
and Schatzow present evidence that patients may recover
verifiable memories of childhood sexual abuse in the course of
group treatment. In the second paper, Harvey and Herman show how
the knowledge of clinicians should inform scientific research on
traumatic memory. In the third paper, Herman articulates
the "dialectic of psychological trauma" which characterizes both
abuse survivors' struggles with their memories and social
controversies like that over recovered memories. She illuminates
the ways that victims, perpetrators and bystanders respond to
crimes ranging from organized political violence to the private
crimes of sexual and domestic violence – and the moral
obligations of mental health professionals who find themselves
embroiled in such situations. I have provided an extended
excerpt in which Herman addresses the utility of the construct
of dissociation for understanding paradoxical qualities of
traumatic memories. In the fourth paper and most recent paper,
Herman and Harvey review 77 intake evaluations conducted in
their own outpatient program, and report that trauma-specific
reminders and recent life crises, not previous psychotherapy,
are the typical precipitants of delayed recall.
Herman, J. L., & Schatzow, E. (1987). Recovery and verification
of memories of childhood sexual trauma. Psychoanalytic
Psychology, 4, 1-14.
Abstract: "Fifty-three women outpatients participated in short-
term therapy groups for incest survivors. This treatment
modality proved to be a powerful stimulus for recovery of
previously repressed traumatic memories. A relationship was
observed between the age of onset, duration, and degree of
violence of the abuse and the extent to which the memory of the
abuse had been repressed. Three out of four patients were able
to validate their memories by obtaining corroborating evidence
from other sources. The therapeutic function of recovering and
validating traumatic memories is explored."
Excerpts: "The majority of the patients (64%) did not have full
recall of the sexual abuse but reported at least some degree of
amnesia. . . Just over one quarter of the women (28%) reported
severe memory deficits [i.e., recalled very little from
childhood, reported recent eruption of previously inaccessible
memories, or had such recall during the course of group
treatment]" (p.4).
"The majority of patients (74%) were able to obtain
confirmation of the abuse from another source. Twenty-one women
(40%) obtained corroborating evidence from the perpetrator
himself, from other family members, or from physical evidence
such as diaries or photographs. Another 18 women (34%)
discovered that another child, usually a sibling, had been
abused by the same perpetrator. An additional 5 women (9%)
reported statements from other family members indicating a
strong likelihood that they had also been abused, but did not
confirm their suspicions by direct questioning. The three
following case examples illustrate corroboration of the incest
histories by, respectively, admission of the perpetrator,
testimony of other family members, and physical evidence.
"Andrea (Case Example 1) wrote a letter to her stepfather
confronting him about the sexual abuse and demanding an apology.
Her stepfather responded by phone. He acknowledged 'fooling
around' with her but refused to apologize, stating that she knew
she 'wanted it as much as he did.' He did not believe the abuse
had been harmful because vaginal intercourse had not occurred,
and added resentfully that he had respected her virginity, only
to have her 'throw it away on a bum.' He concluded the
conversation by exhorting her to stop blaming the family for the
troubles she had brought upon herself.
"Bernadette (Case Example 2) disclosed the sexual abuse to her
mother, who burst into tears and cried, 'Oh no! Not you too!'
She then told Bernadette that after she left home, her younger
sisters had complained that their father tried to molest them.
"After a heroic military career, Claudia's brother (Case Example
3) was killed in combat in Vietnam. Her parents continued to
make pilgrimages to his grave, and had transformed their home
into a shrine dedicated to his memory. His room with all of his
belongings, had been left untouched. During a visit to her
parents home, Claudia conducted a search of her brother's room.
In a closet she found an extensive pornography collection,
handcuffs, and a diary in which he planned and recorded his
sexual 'experiments' with his sister in minute detail" (p.10).
Harvey, M. R., & Herman, J. L. (1994). Amnesia, partial amnesia,
and delayed recall among adult survivors of childhood trauma.
Consciousness and Cognition, 4, 295-306.
Abstract: "Clinical experience suggests that adult survivors of
childhood trauma arrive at their memories in a number of ways,
with varying degrees of associated distress and uncertainty and,
in some cases, after memory lapses of varying duration and
extent. Among those patients who enter psychotherapy as a result
of early abuse, three general patterns of traumatic recall are
identified: (1) relatively continuous recall of childhood abuse
experiences coupled with changing interpretations (delayed
understandings) of these experiences, (2) partial amnesia for
abuse events, accompanied by a mixture of delayed recall and
delayed understanding, and (3) delayed recall following a period
of profound and pervasive amnesia. These patterns are
represented by three composite clinical vignettes. Variations
among them suggest that the phenomena underlying traumatic
recall are continuous and not dichotomous. Future research into
the nature of traumatic memory should be informed by clinical
observation."
Excerpt: "One aim of this paper is simply to describe the
variations in traumatic recall that are frequently witnessed in
clinical settings by ethical, observant, and reliable
psychotherapists. Another is to counter an increasingly
adversarial relationship between memory researchers who are
relatively less familiar with clinical realities than they might
be and clinicians who feel placed on the defensive by sweeping
accusations of professional malfeasance" (p.297).
Herman, J. L. (1995). Crime and memory. Bulletin of the American
Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 23, 5-17.
Abstract: "The conflict between knowing and not knowing, speech
and silence, remembering and forgetting, is the central
dialectic of psychological trauma. This conflict is manifest in
the individual disturbances of memory, the amnesias and
hypermnesias [inabilities to forget], of traumatized people. It
is manifest also on a social level, in persisting debates over
the historical reality of atrocities that have been documented
beyond any reasonable doubt. Social controversy becomes
particularly acute at moments in history when perpetrators face
the prospect of being publicly exposed or held legally
accountable for crimes long hidden or condoned. This situation
obtains in many countries emerging from dictatorship, with
respect to political crimes such as murder and torture. It
obtains in this country with respect to the private crimes of
sexual and domestic violence. This article examines a current
public controversy, regarding the credibility of adult recall of
childhood abuse, as a classic example of the dialectic of
trauma."
Excerpt: "On the one hand, traumatized people remember too much;
on the other hand, they remember too little . . . . The memories
intrude when they are not wanted, in the form of nightmares,
flashbacks, and behavioral reenactments. Yet the memories may
not be accessible when they are wanted. Major parts of the story
may be missing, and sometimes an entire event or series of
events may be lost. We have by now a very large body of data
indicating that trauma simultaneously enhances and impairs
memory. How can we account for this? If traumatic events are (in
the words of Robert J. Lifton) 'indelibly imprinted,' then how
can they also be inaccessible to ordinary memory?"
When scientific observations present a paradox, one way of
resolving the contradiction is to ignore selectively some of the
data. Hence we find some authorities even today asserting that
traumatic amnesia cannot possibly exist because, after all,
traumatic events are strongly remembered. Fortunately for the
enterprise of science, empirical observations do not go away
simply because simplistic theories fail to explain them. On the
contrary, I believe that some of the most important discoveries
arise from attempts to understand apparent paradoxes of this
kind. I would like to offer two theoretical constructs that may
help us clarify and organize our thinking in this area. The
first is the concept of state-dependent learning; the second is
the distinction between storage and retrieval of memory. . . .
When people are in a state of terror, attention is narrowed
and perceptions are altered. Peripheral detail, context, and
time sense fall away, while attention is strongly focused on
central detail in the immediate present. When the focus of
attention is extremely narrow, people may experience profound
perceptual distortions, including insensitivity to pain,
depersonalization, time slowing and amnesia. This is that state
we call dissociation. . . .
Traumatic events have great power to elicit dissociative
reactions. Some people dissociate spontaneously in response to
terror. Others may learn to induce this state voluntarily,
especially if they are exposed to traumatic events over and
over. Political prisoners instruct one another in simple self-
hypnosis techniques in order to withstand torture. In my
clinical work with incest survivors, again and again I have
heard how as children they taught themselves to enter a trance
state.
These profound alterations of consciousness at the time of
the trauma may explain some of the abnormal features of the
memories that are laid down. It may well be that because of the
narrow focusing of attention, highly specific somatic and
sensory information may be deeply engraved in memory, whereas
contextual information, time-sequencing, and verbal narrative
may be poorly registered. In other words, people may fail to
establish the associative linkages that are part of ordinary
memory.
If this were so, we would expect to find abnormalities not
only in storage of traumatic memories, but also in retrieval. On
the one hand, we would expect that the normal process of
strategic search, that is, scanning autobiographical memory to
create a coherent sequential narrative, might be relatively
ineffective as a means of gaining access to traumatic memory. On
the other hand, we would expect that certain trauma-specific
sensory cues, or biologic alterations that produce a state of
hyperarousal, might be effective. We would also expect that
traumatic memories might be unusually accessible in a trance
state.
This is, of course, just what clinicians have observed for
the past century. The role of altered states of consciousness in
the pathogenesis of traumatic memory was discovered
independently by Janet and Freud and Breuer 100 years ago" (pp.7-
9).
Herman, J. L., & Harvey, M. R. (1997). Adult memories of
childhood trauma: A naturalistic clinical study. Journal of
Traumatic Stress, 10, 557-571.
Abstract: "The clinical evaluations of 77 adult outpatients
reporting memories of childhood trauma were reviewed. A majority
of patients reported some degree of continuous recall. Roughly
half (53%) said they had never forgotten the traumatic events.
Two smaller groups described a mixture of continuous and delayed
recall (17%) or a period of complete amnesia followed by delayed
recall (16%). Patients with and without delayed recall did not
differ significantly in the proportions reporting corroboration
of their memories from other sources. Idiosyncratic, trauma-
specific reminders and recent life crises were most commonly
cited as precipitants to delayed recall. A previous
psychotherapy was cited as a factor in a minority (28%) of
cases. By contrast, intrusion of memories after a period of
amnesia was frequently cited as a factor leading to the decision
to seek psychotherapy. The implications of these findings are
discussed with respect to the role of psychotherapy in the
process of recovering traumatic memories."
Excerpts: "The types of childhood trauma reported were as
follows: 59% patient (77%) reported sexual abuse, 53 (69%)
reported physical abuse, and 24 (31%) reported witnessing
intrafamilial violence. Of the group who reported witnessing
violence, all but two patients reported having been directly
victimized as well. Forty five patients (58%) reported exposure
to two or more types of childhood trauma, and 12 (16%) reported
exposure to all three types.
"Table 1 [see below] summarizes the manner in which
patients described the continuity of their memories. A majority
of patients reported that they had always remembered their
childhood experiences. Thirteen patients reported a mixture of
continuous and delayed recall. In this category, some patients
who had experienced more than one type of abuse made a
distinction between their continuous memories for one type of
abuse and delayed recall of another. Others reported that they
had always known that they were abused, but had initially
remembered other, often earlier instances of abuse. Twelve
patients described a period of complete amnesia followed by
delayed recall" (p.563).
". . . The type of precipitant most frequently identified
was an idiosyncratic, trauma-specific reminder whose meaning
could only be understood in the context of the patient's
history. Examples included a chance meeting with a childhood
friend, returning to a former neighborhood, or learning of the
violent death of a relative (pp.563-564).
"Although patients were not asked whether they had any
information which might confirm their memories of childhood
abuse, 33 patients (43%) spontaneously described some type of
corroboration. Only seven patients described having undertaken
an active search for evidence that might confirm their memories;
the majority of the patient who had such evidence had not
actively sought it. Among the 25 patients who reported some
degree of amnesia and delayed recall, nine (36%) reported having
obtained confirming evidence for their memories, while among the
patients who did not report any memory deficits, a slightly
larger proportion (24 of 52, or 46%) reported obtaining
corroboration. The difference between the two groups was not
statistically significant" (p.565).
"The most common types of confirmation came from family
members who told the patient that they had either directly
witnessed or indirectly known of the abuse. Eleven patients
described confirming information that was meaningful only in
context and hence difficult to categorize. For example, one
patient had recently learned from a former classmate that her
abuser, a revered junior high school teacher, suddenly left the
school 'under a cloud,' and soon afterwards married an
adolescent girl who had been his pupil. This type of information
is listed as an idiosyncratic source [see Table 4 below]. Of the
patients who reported this type of evidence, seven also had
confirmatory information from other sources. Ten patients
reported obtaining more than one type of confirmation. It should
be noted that interviewers did not attempt to verify
independently the information given by the patients (pp.565-566).
"The Victims of Violence Program. . . is a setting known
for offering feminist-informed treatment to crime victims, both
men and women. As such, it might be expected to attract patients
who identify themselves as survivors of childhood abuse. The
selective nature of our patient population may account for some
differences between our findings and those of previous
investigators, and may limit the generalizability of our data.
However, the main findings of this study are congruent with
previous studies documenting memory disturbances in a
considerable proportion of patients with histories of childhood
trauma" (pp.566-567).
"Our data also suggest that delayed recall of childhood
trauma is often a process that unfolds over time rather than a
single event, and that it occurs most commonly in the context of
a life crisis or developmental milestone, with a trauma-specific
reminder serving as a proximal cue to new recall. Psychotherapy
was not implicated in the early stages of delayed recall in most
cases. However, the retrieval of memories, once begun, proved to
be a powerful incentive for entering psychotherapy. Patients
rarely sought treatment with the goal of recovering more
memories; rather, they wished to gain more control over
intrusive, involuntary reliving experiences and to make sense of
the fragmented, often confusing and disturbing recollections
they already had" (p.567).
"Though psychotherapy may turn out to play a minor role in
initiating recall of traumatic events, it often does play a role
in enlarging and changing patients' understanding of their past.
We believe that the proper role of psychotherapy is to provide
an environment of confidentiality and empathic, nonjudgemental
attention, where uncertainty, complexity and ambivalence are
tolerated. A stance of open-minded, reflective curiosity should
prevail. Such an environment stands in marked contrast to the
adversarial, polarized environment of the courtroom. We believe,
however, that for most patients it is a far more appropriate
setting for gaining understanding of the impact of traumatic
events. Within such an environment, and with careful timing and
pacing, exploration of abusive childhood experiences may be
carried out safely. The purpose of such exploration is not the
forensic documentation of facts, but the construction of an
integrated, personally meaningful narrative that helps free the
patient from the persistent noxious effects of traumatic events
in the distant past. . . Future clinical research is needed in
order systematically to document treatment outcome and establish
preferred modalities of psychotherapy for patients with
histories of childhood trauma" (pp.568-569).
Three tables from the paper:
Table 1
Continuity of Memory
Continuity of Memory Number of patients % of Total
Continuous recall 41 53
Continuous memory and delayed recall 13 17
Complete amnesia and delayed recall 12 16
Uninformative charts 11 14
Total 77 100
Table 2
Precipitants to Delayed Recall of Childhood Trauma
Type of Precipitant Patients with Delayed
Recall (n = 25) %
Trauma-specific reminder 12 48
Recent life crises/milestone 10 40
Psychotherapy 7 28
New information from another person 5 20
Change in close relationship 5 20
Abstinence from drugs or alcohol 5 20
Altered state experience 5 20
Unspecified precipitant 4 16
Illness or injury 2 8
Book, article, or TV program 2 8
Table 4
Sources of Memory Confirmation
Confirmation Source Number of Patients % of Total
Indirect witness (e.g., family member knew of abuse) 12 16
Idiosyncratic sources 11 14
Direct witness (e.g., family member witnessed abuse) 10 13
Disclosure by another victim of same perpetrator 10 13
Multiple sources 10 13
Perpetrator charged with similar crime 6 8
Indirect evidence (e.g., medical record of injuries) 4 5
Physical evidence 1 1
Admisssion by perpetrator 1 1
Son_of_Chive_Mynde
University of New Hampshire psychologist Linda Meyer Williams
has conducted the best research to date on amnesia and delayed
recall for experiences of childhood sexual abuse. The two papers
below are essential reading for anyone who seeks knowledge of
the best available scientific evidence that people experience
amnesia and delayed recall for memories of abuse.
Both studies are part of a research project involving detailed
interviews with 129 women who, 17 years before, had been
evaluated in a hospital emergency room after being sexually
abused.
Study 1
Williams found that for the documented incidents of sexual abuse
that had occurred 17 years earlier, one in three women did not
report those abuse experiences. In these interviews the women
shared intimate details of their sexual lives, and 68% of those
who did not report the documented incident of sexual abuse
reported other sexual assaults experienced in childhood.
Williams concluded that most if not all of these women actually
did not remember their previously documented abuse experiences.
Williams also found that the closer the relationship to the
perpetrator and the younger the child at the time, the greater
the likelihood an incident was (apparently) not remembered.
The group of three articles listed below provide you with a
unique opportunity to witness leading scholars and researchers
debate over amnesia for child abuse experiences – and to
evaluate the research and arguments for yourself. The first is
Williams' report of the study. The second is a critique of this
study by Elizabeth Loftus (who has declared and argued that
repressed memory is a "myth") and two of her colleagues. The
third is Williams' response.
I strongly encourage you to call local college and
university libraries to find one with this journal (a very
reputable and popular one), to make the trip and make copies.
Williams, L. M. (1994). Recall of childhood trauma: A
prospective study of women's memories of child sexual abuse.
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 62, 1167-1176.
Loftus, Elizabeth E. F., Garry, M., & Feldman, J. (1994).
Forgetting sexual trauma: What does it mean when 38% forget.
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 62, 1177-1181.
Williams, L. M. (1994). What does it mean to forget child sexual
abuse: A Reply to Loftus, Garry, and Feldman. Journal of
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 62, 1182-1186.
Study 2
This study is the second from Williams' research interviews with
129 women, 17 years after they were sexually abused and
evaluated in a hospital emergency room. This paper reports the
most important research to date on recovered memories of child
sexual abuse, and is essential reading for anyone who wishes to
evaluate the highest quality evidence currently available. The
relatively young Journal of Traumatic Stress may not be easy to
find, but it is highly respected in the field of psychological
trauma studies. (This article is from a special issue of the
journal, which is presented elsewhere on this page, as is
ordering information.)
Williams, L. M. (1995). Recovered memories of abuse in women
with documented child sexual victimization histories. Journal of
Traumatic Stress, 8, 649-673.
Abstract: "This study provides evidence that some adults who
claim to have recovered memories of sexual abuse recall actual
events that occurred in childhood. One hundred twenty-nine women
with documented histories of sexual victimization in childhood
were interviewed and asked about abuse history. Seventeen years
following the initial report of the abuse, 80 of the women
recalled the victimization. One in 10 women (16% of those who
recalled the abuse) reported that at some time in the past they
had forgotten about the abuse. Those with a prior period of
forgetting – the women with 'recovered memories' – were younger
at the time of abuse and were less likely to have received
support from their mothers than the women who reported that they
had always remembered their victimization. The women who had
recovered memories and those who had always remembered had the
same number of discrepancies when their accounts of the abuse
were compared to the reports from the early 1970's."
Excerpt: "[T]hese findings are important because they are based
on a prospective study of all reported cases of child sexual
abuse in a community sample. Because the abuse was documented in
hospital records this is the first study to provide evidence
that some adults who claim to have recovered memories of child
sexual abuse recall actual events which occurred in childhood.
These findings are also not limited to a clinical sample of
women in treatment for child sexual abuse. The findings document
the occurrence of recovered memories. There is no evidence from
this study of child sexual abuse experienced by this community
sample of women that recovery of memories was fostered by
therapy or therapists. For this sample of women memories
resurfaced in conjunction with registering events or reminders
and an internal process of rumination and clarification. For
women with greater economic means than those of the women who
comprised this sample, therapy may play a greater role in
recovering memories of child sexual abuse.
Regarding the accuracy of the accounts, this study suggests
that while the women's reports of some details have changed
(N.B., this may be a problem in the original account, not the
adult memory) the women's stories were in large part true to the
basic elements of the original incident. Interestingly, despite
limited discrepancies, the women themselves were very often
unsure about their memories and said things such as 'What I
remember is mostly a dream.' Or, 'I'm really not too sure about
this.' These are statements which may arouse skepticism in
individuals who hear the accounts of women who claim to have
recovered memories of child sexual abuse (e.g., therapists,
judges, family members, researchers, the media). The findings
from this study suggest that such skepticism should be tempered.
Indeed, the woman's level of uncertainty about recovered
memories was not associated with more discrepancies in her
account. While these findings cannot be used to assert the
validity of all recovered memories of child abuse, this study
does suggest that recovered memories of child sexual abuse
reported by adults can be quite consistent with contemporaneous
documentation of the abuse and should not be summarily dismissed
by therapists, lawyers, family members, judges, or the women
themselves" (pp.669-670).
Son_of_Chive_Mynde
Boston University psychiatrist Bessel van der Kolk is one of the
foremost authorities on traumatic memory, particularly the
possible roles of biological and dissociative phenomena in the
processes of encoding and retrieval. (Disclosure: I conduct
research with Dr. van der Kolk and I am a co-investigator on two
studies that include investigation of traumatic memories.) The
first paper below, "Dissociation and the Fragmentary Nature of
Traumatic Memories," is essential reading for anyone who wants
to understand why and how the psychological construct of
dissociation sheds much more light on the nature of many
traumatic memories than that of repression.
Versions of two of the three papers cited below are on the Web.
van der Kolk, B., & Fisler, R. (1995). Dissociation and the
fragmentary nature of traumatic memories: Overview and
exploratory study. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 8, 505-525.
Abstract: "Since trauma arises from an inescapable stressful
event that overwhelms people's coping mechanisms, it is
uncertain to what degree the results of laboratory studies of
ordinary events are relevant to the understanding of traumatic
memories. This paper reviews the literature on differences
between recollections of stressful and of traumatic events. It
then reviews the evidence implicating dissociation as the
central pathogenic mechanism that gives rise to posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD). A systematic exploratory study of 46
subjects with PTSD indicated that traumatic memories were
retrieved, at least initially, in the form of dissociated mental
imprints of sensory and affective elements of the traumatic
experience: as visual, olfactory, affective, auditory, and
kinesthetic experiences. Over time, subjects reported the
gradual emergence of a personal narrative that can be properly
referred to as 'explicit memory.' The implications of these
findings for understanding the nature of traumatic memories are
discussed."
Excerpt: "Trauma and dissociation. Dissociation refers to the
compartmentalization of experience: elements of the experience
are not integrated into a unitary whole, but are stored in
memory as isolated fragments consisting of sensory perceptions
or affect states. . . However, the word dissociation is
currently used to describe four distinct, but interrelated
phenomena: (1) the sensory and emotional fragmentation of
experience. . . (2) depersonalization [feeling that you are not
real] and derealization [feeling the world is unreal] at the
moment of the trauma. . . (3) ongoing depersonalization
or 'spacing out' in everyday life. . . (4) containing traumatic
memories within distinct ego-states (Dissociative
Disorder). . . . The precise interrelationships among these
various phenomena remain to be spelled out: not all people who
have vivid sensory intrusions of traumatic events also
experience depersonalization, while only a small proportion of
people who have both of these experiences will go on to
chronically dissociate, or to develop a full-blown dissociative
disorder" (pp.510-511).
Christianson (1982) has described how, when people feel
threatened, they experience a significant narrowing of
consciousness, and remain merely focussed on the central
perceptual details. As people are being traumatized, this
narrowing of consciousness sometimes evolves into amnesia for
parts of the event, or for the entire experience. Students of
traumatized individuals have repeatedly noted that during
conditions of high arousal 'explicit memory' may fail. The
individual is left in a state of 'speechless terror' in which he
or she lacks words to describe what has happened. . . However,
while traumatized individuals may be unable to give a coherent
narrative of the incident, there may be no interference with
implicit memory: they may 'know' the emotional valence of a
stimulus and be aware of associated perceptions, without being
able to articulate the reasons for feeling or behaving in a
particular way" (p.511).
Excerpts from the study's results:
"Of the 36 subjects with childhood trauma, 15 (42%) had suffered
significant or total amnesia for their trauma at some time in
their lives" (p.516).
"Twenty-seven of the 36 subjects with childhood trauma reported
confirmation of their childhood trauma from a mother, sibling,
or other source who knew about the abuse, from court or hospital
records, or from confessions or convictions of the perpetrator
(s)" (pp.516-517).
"Subjects considered most questions about the [comparison]
nontraumatic memory nonsensical: none had olfactory, visual,
auditory, kinesthetic reliving experience related to such events
as high school graduations, birthdays, weddings, or births of
their children. They also denied having vivid dreams or
flashbacks about these events. Subjects claimed not to have
periods in their lives when they had amnesias for any of these
events, and none of the subjects felt the need to make special
efforts to suppress memories of these events" (p.517).
"No subject reported having a narrative for the traumatic event
as their initial mode of awareness (they claimed not having been
able to tell a story about what had happened), regardless of
whether they had continuous awareness of what had happened, or
whether there had been a period of amnesia. . . [A]ll subjects,
regardless of age at which the first trauma occurred, reported
that they initially 'remembered' the trauma in the form of
somatosensory or emotional flashback experiences. At the peak of
their intrusive recollections all sensory modalities were
enhanced, and a narrative memory started to emerge" (p.517).
"[The score of subjects on the Dissociative Experiences Scale]
was significantly correlated with the event-related variables of
duration of the trauma. . . , presence of physical abuse. . .,
and presence of neglect. . . Also, level of dissociation was
correlated with affective reliving. . ., kinesthetic
reliving. . . lack of current narrative memory. . . and with
self-destructive self-soothing behaviors. . . Dissociation was
not correlated with the self-soothing behaviors of talking
things over, working, cleaning, sleeping or turning to religion"
(p.517-518).
van der Kolk, B. A., & van der Hart, O. (1989). Pierre Janet and
the breakdown of adaption in psychological trauma. American
Journal of Psychiatry, 146, 1530-1540.
Abstract: "In the reappraisal of the work of Pierre Janet at the
centenary of the publication of L'automatisme psychologique, the
authors review his investigations into the mental processes that
transform traumatic experience into psychopathology. Janet was
the first to systematically study dissociation as the crucial
psychological process with which the organism reacts to
overwhelming experiences and show that traumatic memories may be
expressed as sensory perceptions, affect states, and behavioral
reenactments. Janet provided a broad framework that unifies into
a larger perspective the various approaches to psychological
functioning which have developed along independent lines in this
century. Today his integrated approach may help clarify the
interrelationships among such diverse topics as memory
processes, state-dependent learning, dissociative reactions, and
posttraumatic psychopathology."
Excerpt: "[Janet wrote that when] people become too upset to
tell their story, these [traumatic] memories cannot be
transformed into a neutral narrative: 'the person is unable to
make the recital which we call narrative memory, and yet he
remains in the difficult situation'. . . This results in
a 'phobia of memory' . . . that prevents the integration
('synthesis') of traumatic events and splits off the traumatic
memories from ordinary consciousness. . . The memory traces of
the trauma linger as subconscious fixed ideas that cannot
be 'liquidated' as long as they have not been transformed into a
personal narrative and instead continue to intrude as terrifying
perceptions, obsessional preoccupations, and somatic
experiences, such as anxiety reactions" (p.1533).
van der Kolk, B. A. (1994). The body keeps the score: Memory and
the evolving psychobiology of posttraumatic stress. Harvard
Review of Psychiatry, 1, 253-265.
Excerpt: "[Posttraumatic Stress Disorder], by definition, is
accompanied by memory disturbances, consisting of both
hypermnesias [inabilities to forget] and amnesias. . . Research
into the nature of traumatic memories. . . indicates that trauma
interferes with declarative memory, i.e. conscious recall of
experience, but does not inhibit implicit, or non-declarative
memory, the memory system that controls conditioned emotional
responses, skills and habits, and sensorimotor sensations
related to experience. There now is enough information available
about the biology of memory storage and retrieval to start
building coherent hypotheses regarding the underlying
psychobiological processes involved in these memory
disturbances. . ."
Son_of_Chive_Mynde
Diana Elliott is a psychologist at the University of California
at Los Angeles (UCLA) School of Medicine. She has published two
important studies of delayed recall of abuse and other traumatic
experiences, based on data from a stratified random sample of
the general US population. The most recent of these publications
is an investigation of rates of partial and complete delayed
recall for a variety of traumatic experiences, not just sexual
abuse. It was published in the October 1997 Journal of
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, the methodologically
rigorous and most prestigious journal of the American
Psychological Association. In that paper, extensively excerpted
below, Elliott uses her findings to address the validity of the
construct of psychogenic or dissociative amnesia and the claim
that recovered memories are the product of questionable therapy
practices.
Elliott, D. M. (1997). Traumatic events: Prevalence and delayed
recall in the general population. Journal of Consulting and
Clinical Psychology, 65, 811-820.
Abstract: A random sample of 724 individuals from across the
United States were mailed a questionnaire containing demographic
information, an abridged version of the Traumatic Events Survey
(DM Elliott, 1992), and questions regarding memory for traumatic
events. Of these, 505 (70%) completed the survey. Among
respondents who reported some form of trauma (72%), delayed
recall of the event was reported by 32%. This phenomenon was
most common among individuals who observed the murder or suicide
of a family member, sexual abuse survivors, and combat veterans.
The severity of the trauma was predictive of memory status, but
demographic variables were not. The most commonly reported
trigger to recall of the trauma was some form of media
presentation (i.e., television show, movie), whereas
psychotherapy was the least commonly reported trigger.
Excerpts from the literature review:
"In contrast to normal forgetting, theoretical writers in
the area of trauma have suggested that some memory loss in
trauma survivors may reflect dissociative avoidance strategies
developed by the victim to reduce trauma-related distress. . .
From this perspective, traumatic memory loss may be understood
as a form of avoidance conditioning, whereby access to memory is
punished by the negative affect that accompanies the recall,
thereby motivating the development of memory-inhibiting
mechanisms. Such avoidance strategies might interfere with
memory at any point during rehearsal, storage, or retrieval of
material. . . There are other reasons for memory loss, such as
organic impairment, lack of significance of the event, and
infantile amnesia. However, if access to events is lost because
of avoidance conditioning, the more severe and chronic the
trauma, the more painful the resultant affect should be, and
thus, the more likely the victim's avoidance behavior would be
reinforced. . .
". . . [S]ome memory disruption seems to occur at the
retrieval level, rather than solely at rehearsal and storage
levels. According to Tulving (1983), cues that assist in the
recall of events are typically those that match the original
encoded material. This suggests that dissociative avoidance
strategies may be effective if they reduce the individual's
responsiveness to relevant cues in the environment that
otherwise may activate the original memory traces. However, when
recognition cues are sufficient in number, intensity, or
meaningfulness, they may overwhelm existing avoidance defenses,
resulting in the emergence of previously unavailable memories.
Extreme dissociative avoidance (i.e., in response to a highly
aversive experience), however, might be relatively resistant to
external cuing and, thus, less likely to remit in response to
environmental triggers.
"Understood from this perspective, dissociative amnesia for
previous traumatic events would be best predicted by the
severity of the trauma and most apt to be triggered by
intrapersonal, interpersonal, or environmental cues that closely
match the original trauma. Although certain forms of memory loss
(e.g., infantile amnesia, normal forgetting, organic impairment)
may best be predicted by demographic variables (e.g., age at
time of trauma, length of time since the event, current age),
avoidance-related traumatic memory loss should be less a
function of demographic variables and more related to
characteristics of the trauma" (p.812).
Excerpts from the results section:
"Participants were most likely to report continuous
memories of adult sexual assault that did not include
penetration (94%), major motor vehicle accidents (92%), and
natural disasters (89%). A history of partial memory loss was
most common when an individual had witnessed murder or suicide
of a loved one (38%), had been victim of child sexual abuse
(22%), and had been a victim of child physical abuse (22%). A
history of complete memory loss was most common among victims of
child sexual abuse (20%), witnesses of combat injury (16%),
victims of adult rape (13%), and witnesses of domestic violence
as a child (13%)" (p.814).
". . . . [T]hose who reported delayed recall (partial or
complete memory loss) of any trauma also reported significantly
(a) more types of trauma, (b) more distress about the trauma
(both at the time of the event and at the time of data
collection), and (c) a younger age at the time of the earliest
trauma.
"The relationship between age and a history of memory loss
could be due to the normal lack of recall for events occurring
in the first 3 to 4 years of life (i.e., infantile amnesia) for
those victimized in early childhood (Loftus, 1993). To examine
this hypothesis, I completed a second analysis, deleting the 24
participants who reported trauma before the age of 5. This
produced no change in the results, with memory loss more
frequently reported when the trauma occurred at a younger
age. . ." (p.814)
". . . Across traumas, participants reported that recall
was most commonly triggered by some sort of media presentation
(54%), an experience similar to the original trauma (37%), and a
conversation with a family member. Recall of the trauma was
least likely to have been triggered by a sexual experience
(17%), or psychotherapy (14%)" (p.815).
Excerpts from the discussion section:
"The findings of the present study suggest that a history
of trauma is common in the United States. For example, 40% of
respondents experienced a major motor vehicle accident or
natural disaster, 43% had witnessed violence, and 50% had been
victims of interpersonal violence. . . .
"These data also suggest that delayed recall of traumatic
experiences may not be uncommon, with some proportion of
individuals reporting impaired recollection for virtually every
type of trauma. This phenomenon appears to be more common among
events considered particularly upsetting or distressing (e.g.,
among childhood sexual abuse survivors, those who witnessed the
murder or suicide of a loved one, and veterans who witnessed
combat injury) and less common for events that contained no
interpersonal violence (e.g., major motor vehicle accidents,
disasters, and having a child die under the age of 18)" (p.816).
"Race was the only demographic variable that was even
marginally associated with delayed recall of a trauma, and the
race-memory relationship was mediated by the severity of the
trauma experienced. However, several characteristics of trauma
severity predicted memory status. Such data support an avoidance
defense mechanism hypothesis as a partial explanation for the
findings, because more traumatic events would appear more likely
to be remembered, not forgotten, if no defensive response was
involved" (p.817).
"The extent to which the questions used in the present
study may have been misunderstood by participants is unclear.
However, a pretest of the questions used in this study indicated
that 96% of the individuals understood the questions to refer to
a period of time in which the individual was unable to access
part or all of the memory of the traumatic event, as opposed to
simply not thinking about the trauma. Additionally, participants
in the present study went on to record their age at recall of
each specific trauma and indicated what it was that cued their
recall. Given these data, misinterpreting the questions to be
about normal forgetting is not likely to be a sufficient
explanation for the memory findings reported here" (p.818).
"This study does not support the notion that delayed recall
is limited to sexual abuse. It suggests that the phenomena
occurs across a variety of traumas and is especially high for
traumatic events involving interpersonal victimization" (p.818).
"With regard to the claim [that therapy creates recovered
memories], only 14% of the participants in this study who
reported delayed recall of a trauma reported having their memory
triggered during the course of therapy. Even if all the
individuals who had ever been in treatment reported delayed
recall of trauma (a conservative assumption), 86% of the sample,
nevertheless, reported recovering memory through other means.
This finding suggests that the process of psychotherapy, per se,
does not intrinsically explain the recovered memory phenomenon.
Rather, these data suggest that, like other posttraumatic stress
responses, intrusion of previously avoided memory can be cued by
environmental stimuli, perhaps in the same way as has been
documented with posttraumatic flashbacks. . ." (p.818)
The final paragraph:
"As previously noted, the best predictor of memory status
was the severity of the trauma, rather than demographic
variables. These findings suggest that the traumatic impact of
the event – rather than childhood amnesia, normal forgetting,
secondary gain, or iatrogenic treatment effects – provides a
good conceptual fit to the data. Many authors (Herman, 1992;
Terr, 1994; van der Kolk, et al., 1996) have noted that
traumatic amnesia is a complex phenomenon that involves
biological, cognitive, and psychological aspects that may vary
from traditional notions of 'normal' memory. In this regard,
future research might focus on such processes as they relate to
normal versus traumatic encoding, forgetting, and recalling"
(p.818).
Elliott, D. M., & Briere, J. (1995). Posttraumatic stress
associated with delayed recall of sexual abuse: A general
population study. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 8, 629-647.
Abstract: "This study examined delayed recall of childhood
sexual abuse in a stratified random sample of the general
population (N = 505). Of participants who reported a history of
sexual abuse, 42% described some period of time when they had
less memory of the abuse than they did at the time of data
collection. No demographic differences were found between
subjects with continuous recall and those who reported delayed
recall. However, delayed recall was associated with the use of
threats at the time of the abuse. Subjects who had recently
recalled aspects of their abuse reported particularly high
levels of posttraumatic symptomatology and self difficulties (as
measured by the IES, SCL, and TSI) at the time of data
collection compared to other subjects."
Son_of_Chive_Mynde
Psychologist John Briere, of the University of Southern
California (USC) Medical School, is a highly respected
researcher and clinician in the field of traumatic stress
studies. He has written numerous articles and several books on
the lasting effects of child sexual abuse and the treatment of
adults sexually abused in childhood. These include the papers
below, which report research studies on amnesia for and delayed
recall of memories of child sexual abuse.
Briere, J., & Conte, J. (1993). Self-reported amnesia for abuse
in adults molested as children. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 6,
21-31.
Abstract: "A sample of 450 adult clinical subjects reporting
sexual abuse histories were studied regarding their repression
of sexual abuse incidents. A total of 267 subjects (59.3%)
identified some period in their lives, before age 18, when they
had no memory of their abuse. Variables most predictive of abuse-
related amnesia were greater current psychological symptoms,
molestation at an early age, extended abuse, and variables
reflecting especially violent abuse (e.g., victimization by
multiple perpetrators, having been physically injured as a
result of the abuse, victim fears of death if she or he
disclosed the abuse to others). In contrast, abuse
characteristics more likely to produce psychological conflict
(e.g., enjoyment of the abuse, acceptance of bribes, feelings of
guilt or shame) were not associated with abuse-related amnesia.
The results of this study are interpreted as supporting Freud's
initial 'seduction hypothesis,' as well as more recent theories
of post-traumatic stress disorder."
Elliott, D. M., & Briere, J. (1995). Posttraumatic stress
associated with delayed recall of sexual abuse: A general
population study. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 8, 629-647.
Abstract: "This study examined delayed recall of childhood
sexual abuse in a stratified random sample of the general
population (N = 505). Of participants who reported a history of
sexual abuse, 42% described some period of time when they had
less memory of the abuse than they did at the time of data
collection. No demographic differences were found between
subjects with continuous recall and those who reported delayed
recall. However, delayed recall was associated with the use of
threats at the time of the abuse. Subjects who had recently
recalled aspects of their abuse reported particularly high
levels of posttraumatic symptomatology and self difficulties (as
measured by the IES, SCL, and TSI) at the time of data
collection compared to other subjects."
Son_of_Chive_Mynde
Special Issue: Traumatic Memory Research
This October 1995 special issue is an important and rich
resource. I have provided an excerpt of Editor Bonnie Green's
introduction, and abstracts of relevant papers. A version of
the entire paper by van der Kolk and Fisler is accessible via
hyperlink to David Baldwin's Trauma Information Pages. Finally,
if you want a copy of this journal, ordering information appears
at the end of this section.
Special Issue: Traumatic Memory Research. Journal of Traumatic
Stress, Volume 8, Number 4, October, 1995.
Contents and Abstracts
Green, B. L. Introduction to special issue on traumatic memory
research.
Excerpt: "The present issue of JTS is dedicated to the topic of
research on traumatic memory. While a few of the articles fall
slightly outside of this overall designation, all articles were
seen to be pertinent to clinicians and scholars who study and
treat individuals with a history of traumatic exposure. The
issue is sparked, to some extent, by the controversy raging
within and between mental health professionals and academics
about whether individuals can 'forget' traumatic events in their
pasts, and whether they can 'remember' events that never took
place. While the issue is not focused on this controversy per
se, it was undertaken to inform clinicians and researchers about
a variety of topics related to traumatic memory, 'recovered' or
otherwise" (p.501).
van der Kolk, B., & Fisler, R. Dissociation and the fragmentary
nature of traumatic memories: Overview and exploratory study.
Abstract: "Since trauma arises from an inescapable stressful
event that overwhelms people's coping mechanisms, it is
uncertain to what degree the results of laboratory studies of
ordinary events are relevant to the understanding of traumatic
memories. This paper reviews the literature on differences
between recollections of stressful and of traumatic events. It
then reviews the evidence implicating dissociation as the
central pathogenic mechanism that gives rise to posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD). A systematic exploratory study of 46
subjects with PTSD indicated that traumatic memories were
retrieved, at least initially, in the form of dissociated mental
imprints of sensory and affective elements of the traumatic
experience: as visual, olfactory, affective, auditory, and
kinesthetic experiences. Over time, subjects reported the
gradual emergence of a personal narrative that can be properly
referred to as 'explicit memory.' The implications of these
findings for understanding the nature of traumatic memories are
discussed."
Read excerpts from this paper.
Bremner, J. D., Krystal, J. H., & Charney, D. S. Functional
neuroanatomical correlates of the effects of stress on memory.
Abstract: "Recently there has been an increase in interest in
the relationship between stress and memory. Brain regions which
are involved in memory function also effect the stress response.
Traumatic stress results in changes in these brain regions;
alterations in these brain regions in turn may mediate symptoms
of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Neural mechanisms which
are relevant to the effects of stress on memory, such as fear
conditioning, stress sensitization, and extinction, are reviewed
in relation to their implications for PTSD. Special topics
including neural mechanisms in dissociation, neurobiological
approaches to the validity of childhood memories as they apply
to controversies over the "False Memory Syndrome," and
implications of the effects of stress on memory for
psychotherapy, are also reviewed. The findings discussed in this
paper are consistent with the formulation that stress-induced
alterations in brain regions and systems involved in memory may
underlie many of the symptoms of PTSD, as well as dissociative
amnesia, seen in survivors of traumatic stress."
Fivush, R., & Schwarzmueller, A. Say it once again: Effects of
repeated questions on children's event recall.
Abstract: "In this paper, we review research examining the
influences of repeated questioning on children's event recall.
Issues addressed include how children's free recall changes
across multiple recounts of the same event, whether responding
to specific questions about an event affects subsequent
responses to those same questions, and whether there are
developmental differences in how children respond to repeated
questioning. Both naturalistic studies of conversational
remembering and more controlled studies using standardized
interviews are discussed. Effects of repeated questioning both
within and across interviews are assessed. In integrating the
research findings, we present a developmental framework for
understanding the effects of repeated questioning that relies on
children's developing memory and narrative skills as well as
their social understanding of the recall context."
Excerpt: "Certainly, when children are abused, they are often
sworn to secrecy, or even threatened with aversive consequences
if they tell. In these kinds of situations, what happens to
memory? Given the theoretical framework laid out here, we would
predict that these memories may become especially difficult to
retrieve and recall. If young children are dependent to some
extent on talking about events with others who help them
organize their verbal recount, which in turn leads to long-term
retention of these events, then it seems quite likely that if
children are not given the opportunity to engage in this kind of
verbal work, their memories of the event would not be as good as
memories of events that are discussed. Indeed, Goodman [et al.]
(1994) recently reported results that support this prediction
[Consciousness & Cognition, 3, 369-394]. They examined
children's memories for a painful medical procedure involving
catheterization and voiding. Those children whose mothers
subsequently talked with them about their experience had more
accurate memories of the event than children whose mothers did
not discuss the event. More research focusing on the
consequences of discussing or not discussing experiences on the
fate of these event memories is clearly necessary. This is a
critical question, both for a theoretical understanding of the
role of rehearsal on memory, as well as applied issues
concerning children's memories for abusive experiences, and
adults' ability to recall abusive experiences from their
childhood" (pp.576-577).
Ornstein, P. A. Children's long-term retention of salient
personal experiences.
Tromp, S., Koss, M. P., & Tharan, M. Are rape memories
different? A comparison of rape, other unpleasant, and pleasant
memories among employed women.
Abstract: "The study examined empirically-measured memory
characteristics, compared pleasant and unpleasant intense
memories as well as rape and other unpleasant memories, and
determined whether rape memories exhibited significantly
more "flashbulb' characteristics. Data consisted of responses to
a mailed survey of women employees of a medical center (N =
1,037) and a university (N = 2,142). Pleasant and unpleasant
memories were differentiated by feelings, consequences, and
level of unexpectedness. The most powerful discriminator of rape
from other unpleasant memories was the degree to which they were
less clear and vivid, contained a less meaningful order, were
less well-remembered, and were less thought and talked about.
Few 'flashbulb' characteristics discriminated among memory
types. Implications for clinical work with rape survivors were
discussed."
Elliott, D. M., & Briere, J. Posttraumatic stress associated
with delayed recall of sexual abuse: A general population study.
Abstract: "This study examined delayed recall of childhood
sexual abuse in a stratified random sample of the general
population (N = 505). Of participants who reported a history of
sexual abuse, 42% described some period of time when they had
less memory of the abuse than they did at the time of data
collection. No demographic differences were found between
subjects with continuous recall and those who reported delayed
recall. However, delayed recall was associated with the use of
threats at the time of the abuse. Subjects who had recently
recalled aspects of their abuse reported particularly high
levels of posttraumatic symptomatology and self difficulties (as
measured by the IES, SCL, and TSI) at the time of data
collection compared to other subjects."
Williams, L. M. Recovered memories of abuse in women with
documented child sexual victimization histories.
Abstract: "This study provides evidence that some adults who
claim to have recovered memories of sexual abuse recall actual
events that occurred in childhood. One hundred twenty-nine women
with documented histories of sexual victimization in childhood
were interviewed and asked about abuse history. Seventeen years
following the initial report of the abuse, 80 of the women
recalled the victimization. One in 10 women (16% of those who
recalled the abuse) reported that at some time in the past they
had forgotten about the abuse. Those with a prior period of
forgetting – the women with 'recovered memories' – were younger
at the time of abuse and were less likely to have received
support from their mothers than the women who reported that they
had always remembered their victimization. The women who had
recovered memories and those who had always remembered had the
same number of discrepancies when their accounts of the abuse
were compared to the reports from the early 1970's."
Read an excerpt from this paper.
Foa, E. B., Molnar, C., & Cashman, L. Change in rape narratives
during exposure therapy for posttraumatic stress disorder.
Rogers, M. L. Factors influencing recall of childhood sexual
abuse.
Wolfe, J. Trauma, traumatic memory, and research: Where do we go
from here?
To purchase a copy of this issue, send a personal check to:
Plenum Publishing
233 Spring Street
New York, New York 10013
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>>From: Son_of_Chive_Mynde ooochiveooomy...@my-deja.com.invalid
>>Newsgroups: alt.psychology
>
>>ETHICS COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST PROMINENT FMSF BOARD MEMBER
>>APA DECLINES TO INVESTIGATE
>>
>>In December 1995, two women filed ethics complaints with the
>>American Psychological Association (APA) against Elizabeth
>
> hey shithead!!!!! This is the year 2000.
>The APA finally DID investigate yourt PSYCHOTIC rants and found them "WIOTHOUT
>MERIT!" Nice try No cigar lyingboy!
For the scoop on PangK, plus a photo, visit:
http://www.anet.com/~freedom/pangk.html
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