Postmodernism & Politics
spen...@uci.edu
>spen...@uci.edu:
>| I'm interested in drawing a relation between postmodernism and politics
>| and political science in particular. Does anyone have any suggestions,
>| insights, ideas, etc.?
>
>You haven't paid your dues yet. You have to say what you
>mean by "postmodernism."
Postmodernism means "after modernism" ;) Take it from there.
Scott
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Scott Penrose-Kafka | Visualize Armed Evolution
spen...@uci.edu |
University of California, Irvine |
Dept. of Political Science |
spen...@uci.edu
>spen...@uci.edu wrote:
>> I'm interested in drawing a relation between postmodernism and politics
>> and political science in particular. Does anyone have any suggestions,
>> insights, ideas, etc.?
>
>ideas of the possible connections might be the best way to
>elicit further suggestions. Otherwise, you are inviting to
>paint on a very broad canvas.
Paint away. I don't know where I'm going, and I'm waiting for someone
to start the car. I'll drive later, right now, I just want to watch the
scenery on the road to accomplishing an understanding that I don't
really have.
jle...@utdallas.edu
> In <3f29j6$k...@utdallas.edu>, jle...@utdallas.edu writes:
> >spen...@uci.edu wrote:
> >> I'm interested in drawing a relation between postmodernism and politics
> >> and political science in particular. Does anyone have any suggestions,
> >> insights, ideas, etc.?
> >
> >I'm not sure what you're asking. Giving us some hint of your
> >ideas of the possible connections might be the best way to
> >elicit further suggestions. Otherwise, you are inviting to
> >paint on a very broad canvas.
> Paint away. I don't know where I'm going, and I'm waiting for someone
> to start the car. I'll drive later, right now, I just want to watch the
> scenery on the road to accomplishing an understanding that I don't
> really have.
TANSTAAFF. If you want me to "start your car" and chauffer you around
until you feel like driving, you'll have to hire me as tutor. "Start
the car" or walk or offer me a fee. I really don't care which at this
point. You've made a rather large withdrawl on your "good-will" account.
--
============================================================================
James L Elson: |<o When you stare into the abyss too long o>|
School of Arts & Humanities |<o the abyss stares back into you. o>|
University of Texas-Dallas | --Nietzsche-- |
spen...@uci.edu
>TANSTAAFF. If you want me to "start your car" and chauffer you around
>until you feel like driving, you'll have to hire me as tutor. "Start
>the car" or walk or offer me a fee. I really don't care which at this
>point. You've made a rather large withdrawl on your "good-will" account.
Ok, well, since I'm broke, I might as well go for it.
Power, what is the pomo conception.
Politics, what is the pomo conception.
political science, How does pomo fit in? How does pomo rock the
rat-choice boat? What in-roads has pomo theory made into poli sci?
What are the dominant critiques of pomo theory by rat-choicers, and
others of similarly isolated ilk?
How does Pomo theory think of the relationship between politics and
society?
Are these the questions I should be asking?
jle...@utdallas.edu
> I'm interested in drawing a relation between postmodernism and politics
> and political science in particular. Does anyone have any suggestions,
> insights, ideas, etc.?
I'm not sure what you're asking. Giving us some hint of your
ideas of the possible connections might be the best way to
elicit further suggestions. Otherwise, you are inviting to
paint on a very broad canvas.
--
Sam Vagenas
>Power, what is the pomo conception.
Generally, postmoderns follow the lead of Foucault. There is no way out of
the power matrix. There is no exterior truth outside of power to mold
society. It also tends to reject traditional enlightenment thinking about
inevitable historical progress.
>Politics, what is the pomo conception.
The Greek word politics "Politika" deals with the relationship between the
citizens and the polis. Both historically (emerging out of cults) and
philosophically (Plato and Aristotle), Greek politics soughty unity, something
postmoderns aren't especially fond of. The logoscentrism and state-centrism
of Antiquity emerge together. Thus politics always smacks of Plato's
Republic where the Agathon shines so brightly that it will blind you --
unless, of course, if you're a philosopher king.
>political science, How does pomo fit in? How does pomo rock the
>rat-choice boat? What in-roads has pomo theory made into poli sci?
In terms of political science, it's still a positivist's affair. There are
many in-roads in political theory and philosophy. You should check out
Steven White's book that I posted earlier.
>How does Pomo theory think of the relationship between politics and
>society?
There is no consensus. Some themes are power, multi-perspectivism,
genealogy, emphasis on society's marginal groups and ideological
formations, the deconstruction of traditional ideology and institutions, etc.
ETTINGS
establishes some of the tenets of postmodernism--which seems to be that all
human knowledge is textual knowledge. There is no such thing as history: there
are only historical texts which can be manipulated, transformed, redefined at
will. Orwell calls this "Doublethink"--which is the ability to have two
contradictory thoughts at the same time, that on the one hand history is
mutable because it is textualized and on the other has is permament because it
has to give the illusion of being real and fixed. So Doublethink allows one to
see history as "historical", as objectively real and somehow out there in the
world of facts and events which happened, and on the other as the fabrication
of events. Doublethink, however, cannot admit that it is actually deployed
since it must give the illusion of credence, an illusion of textual reality.
Orwell sees History in the future world--our world--as texts which are in a
sort of permanent flux, oxymorincally, fluctuating and static. It seems that
postmodernism adheres to this notion--that History and therefore Politics
exist ultimately as words, as sentences, as texts. It seems that
postmodernists have uncovered what Orwell has known a few years back and have
made the analysis of how Doublethink works their critical specialty. Foucault
is king in this domain.
Clayton Gillespie
>Power, what is the pomo conception.
>Politics, what is the pomo conception.
>political science, How does pomo fit in? How does pomo rock the
>rat-choice boat? What in-roads has pomo theory made into poli sci?
student presentation:
The construction of "National Security" should be reformulated. There is
a discrepancy between the nation as a people and the nation as a state.
That which is in the interest of the state (the prevailing definition) is
not necessarily in the interest of the people.
Block modeling of political activity along geographic boundaries should
be reconsidered. Recent trans-national coalitions defy the traditional
definition of a political block. (For example, the trans-national
coalition of women against domestic violence - sorry, I don't remember
the official name of this group.)
- Clayton Gillespie
Electra Software & Consulting
cla...@delphi.com
spen...@uci.edu
>Orwell sees History in the future world--our world--as texts which are in a
>sort of permanent flux, oxymorincally, fluctuating and static. It seems that
>postmodernism adheres to this notion--that History and therefore Politics
>exist ultimately as words, as sentences, as texts.
Ok, seem plausible, what do other's think?
Ok, so politics is a text, something that is written, read, interpreted.
It is something then that only exists within the minds of the people who
are thinking about it. For PoMo, does politics disappear if the thought
disappears? Or is it able to objectify the texts, so that they remain
in existence even if they are fluctuating? in other words, does the
conception of an objects-events continuum exist within the continuum?
Is there a continuum of power and politics?
spen...@uci.edu
> The construction of "National Security" should be reformulated. There is
> a discrepancy between the nation as a people and the nation as a state.
> That which is in the interest of the state (the prevailing definition) is
> not necessarily in the interest of the people.
How does the disintegration of the state as nation fit in with pomo
theory? (sorry if this seems like a stupid question, but I don't understand
what you're trying to say.)
> Block modeling of political activity along geographic boundaries should
> be reconsidered. Recent trans-national coalitions defy the traditional
> definition of a political block. (For example, the trans-national
> coalition of women against domestic violence - sorry, I don't remember
> the official name of this group.)
Is trans-national capital also pomo? Migrant labour? Borders have been
shifting based upon new technology/ideas since the begining of
territorial control. Sometimes by conquest, sometimes by a unity of
peoples. How, forgiving my ignorance, does a shift in a political
block, either physically or intellectually, fit into pomo theory, other
than that it's a redefinition.
Gordon Fitch
| >| I'm interested in drawing a relation between postmodernism and politics
| >| and political science in particular. Does anyone have any suggestions,
| >| insights, ideas, etc.?
g...@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) writes:
| >You haven't paid your dues yet. You have to say what you
| >mean by "postmodernism."
| Postmodernism means "after modernism" ;) Take it from there.
"I'm interested in drawing a relation between after
modernism and politics..." doesn't parse. Also, people mean
a lot of things by "modernism." Maybe you'd do better to
pick some specific persons, ideas, objects, events, or
conditions you consider to exemplify "postmodernism", after
which political relations might swim into focus.
--
>< Gordon Fitch >< g...@panix.com ><
Clayton Gillespie
>How does the disintegration of the state as nation fit in with pomo
>theory? (sorry if this seems like a stupid question, but I don't understand
>what you're trying to say.)
To challenge the prevailing construction of the term "nation" can be seen
as deconstruction and therefore postmodern.
>Is trans-national capital also pomo? Migrant labour? Borders have been
>shifting based upon new technology/ideas since the begining of
>territorial control. Sometimes by conquest, sometimes by a unity of
>peoples. How, forgiving my ignorance, does a shift in a political
>block, either physically or intellectually, fit into pomo theory, other
>than that it's a redefinition.
political blocks; they all (except, perhaps, capital) represent situations
where the geographic borders shift. I believe the particular example presented
at the forum was intended to show that no amount of shifting or gerrymandering
(if you will) can encapsulate this constituency geographically. The interest
group permeates a number of states without regard to physical location.
I'm not sure that this group is re-defined by this critique. The interests
are named, but beyond the conceptualization necessary to name the group I
see no need to presume other regularities related to the group. There may
be some, but it could well be a matter of statistical coincidence rather
than any defining feature of the constituency. If so, then this "definition"
of a political block challenges many of the facts presumed by the existing
definition and so may be seen as post-structuralist at the very least. In
order to go further and be more specifically post-modern the argument must
hinge on post-modern arguments. (This particular presentation did in fact
hinge on such arguments but not overtly since the person is still a graduate
student and postmodern approaches are very controversial in that department.)
Mark Weinles
>>> I'm interested in drawing a relation between postmodernism and politics
>>> and political science in particular. Does anyone have any suggestions,
>>> insights, ideas, etc.?
Since no one else seems to be jumping in here, I'll go ahead. Remember
that you said to paint with a broad brush. So: The politics of post-
modernism = May, '68.
Incidentally, there's a ton of stuff you could read, if you wanted to.
You could start with Foucault's _Power/Knowledge_ (an excellent book
that also happens to be very accessible), or his _Discipline and
Punish_. The Frankfurt School is another very good place to look. If
you want a starting point, Adorno's _Minima Moralia_ would be handy.
-- Mark Weinles
--
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Launchpad is an experimental internet BBS. The views of its users do not
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Sam Vagenas
>My problem with the "important question" is that it
>postulated the existence of "postmodernism."
While I understand your sensitivity, that there is a "postmodern" disposition
is the premise of this newsgroup.
"Postmodernism" does sound heavier, like a school of thought or great epoch,
but then the question was originally framed by someone who was just beginning
to explore the area.
Ideas do have consequences. For example, most on this board would agree that
our ideas should not have to comport to some transcendent truth (even
postmodernism). This premise has tremendous implications in areas such as
philosophy and politics in which absolute truth has always been assumed.
Levinas and Foucault are not "postmoderns." They don't agree. However,
they both challenge traditional assumptions of truth and politics, and I can
think of no better newsgroup to discuss such thinkers than alt.postmodern.
To talk of such French philosophers is not meant to delimit. There is no
fixed postmodern horizon, but this does not mean there cannot be
postmodern writing.
Sam Vagenas
>First, post-modernism is not some sort of monolithic ideology. What
>post-modernists have in common is a deep suspicion of the notions,
>premises, assumptions, and language of tradtional Western thought
>and culture.
Yes, this is true. The problem I'm wrestling with is whether the word
"politics" can ever shake its Greek roots. Roots I believe which inevitably
totalize the many into the one -- state-centrism, logoscentrism. By the way,
I see this society-centered metaphor even in liberal thinkers. Karl Popper in
his assault of Plato's totaltarianism fails to realize his very conception of
an "open society" is very similar to Plato's. Pluralism assumes a center.
The buzz words "common good," "common sense," "likeminded," "consensus," etc.
are everywhere.
Is there a society? A center? Can we still use the word politics?
***** A very interesting alternative to Foucault and Nietzsche, which I would
also recommend, is Emmanuel Levinas. His deconstructive metaphor "infinity"
leads away from power to ethics -- a radical ethics. The face of the Other
transcends my totalizing grasp. It demands an ethical response. When the
homeless ask us for assistance, why do we want to turn our face?
>First, post-modernism is not some sort of monolithic ideology. What
>post-modernists have in common is a deep suspicion of the notions,
>premises, assumptions, and language of tradtional Western thought
>and culture. From this it follows that a way to address your
>questions is to investigate the the premises/assumptions of the
>notions you're interested in. Also, you might find it useful
>to look at the historicity of these notions.
>What informs the notion of power? What are the various 'meanings'/
>conotations of the term "power." The same questions for "politics"
>and "political science." Also, what are the implications of the
>linkage between "science" and "politics" in the term "political
>science?" Does this linkage indicate a certain limitation of
>what is can be considered germane in an analysis of political
>systems/histories?
>
>Your least complex question is simplier to gloss. Post-modernism
>"rocks the boat" in the sense that it calls all notions/assumptions
>into question; especially those which have been considered most
>"self-evident."
>> How does Pomo theory think of the relationship between politics and
>> society?
>Which theory? What informs the notion of society? What is at stake
>in a particular conception of "society?"
>> Are these the questions I should be asking?
>Yes, it's a beginning. The questions that I've responded with imply
>that unless you inquire into the "foundations" of traditional notions
>an analysis of "post-modern political theory" will at best be a
>modern wolf in pomo attire.
>Another respondant mentioned Foucault. That is an excellent suggestion
>since he often focuses upon the notion of power. To that I would add,
>read Nietzsche who heavily influenced Foucault. The greatest problem
>with N. is the does not want to be easily understood: often, he is very
>ironic. He only wants to be understood by fellow "free spirits."
>However, you might find _On the Genealogy of Morals_ interesting since
>it also deals with politics.
>I doubt that you will be satisfied with my response. However, the
>questions you are asking would require books, not short "off-the-cuff"
>posts, to fully address all the details and ramifications.
Sam Vagenas
>From: Ralph Dumain <rdu...@igc.apc.org>
>Subject: Re: Postmodernism & Politics
>Date: Sat, 14 Jan 1995 12:45:54 -0800 (PST)
>These stupid responses to an important question are a real
>embarrassment. I for one would like someone to deal seriously
>with the relationship between subcultural "resistance" and real,
>political resistance.
What is "real" political resistance? Is this a new ontology? Are writers
like Foucault, who has been mentioned several times on this thread, false
prophets of "subcultural resistance?" Ralph, please show us the...Way.
Michael Calvin McGee
>An excellent place to start would be George Orwell's 1984 which prophetically
>establishes some of the tenets of postmodernism--which seems to be that all
>human knowledge is textual knowledge. There is no such thing as history: there
>are only historical texts which can be manipulated, transformed, redefined at
>will.
I don't think you quite get it. Doublespeak is involved only if a
thing both is and is not. From what I take to be your objectivist
perspective, one would say that in postmodernism history-as-text
+is+, and that history +is not+. History as object is past, gone,
dead--its only linear connection to the present is the same as
that of a corpse: Fertilizer. History has meanings only when the
past and the present are linked +textually+, in history books and
arguments such as this. But be clear that the question inspiring
most pm types to think about history is not the same question that
inspired virtually all modernists to think about history. Hegel,
e.g., sees meaning in the corpse. I see meaning in the texts that
construct the past-in-the-present.
Hope this helps!
Michael
>
Michael Calvin McGee
In article <3f563k$1...@news.service.uci.edu>, spen...@uci.edu (spen...@uci.edu) writes:
>In <xO36J8r...@delphi.com>, ETTINGS <ron...@delphi.com> writes:
>>Orwell sees History in the future world--our world--as texts which are in a
>>sort of permanent flux, oxymorincally, fluctuating and static. It seems that
>>postmodernism adheres to this notion--that History and therefore Politics
>>exist ultimately as words, as sentences, as texts.
>
>It is something then that only exists within the minds of the people who
>are thinking about it. For PoMo, does politics disappear if the
thought
>disappears? Or is it able to objectify the texts, so that they remain
>in existence even if they are fluctuating?
(1) Orwell was commenting upon the Stalinist habit of willy-nilly
inventing a history that glorified their politics. In mid-century
Soviet history, eg, virtually all technology (postage stamp, light
bulb) was invented by a good comrade in Gorky. Stalin's toadies
in the Kremlin +knew+ they were lying, engaging in propaganda. PM
focusses on people +who think they're telling the truth+. In fact
such folk produce discourse from a particular perspective: Do you
think of any American history written from the viewpoint of women,
native Americans, prisoners, or drug dealers?
The American history presented to me in my youth was a history of
what MEN were alleged to have done in the past. The very idea that
a proper history should discuss what WOMEN did in the past would
have been shocking. Writers from the MEN perspective commonly
suggested that what WOMEN did was unimportant, irrelevant. What
would the allegedly "same" history look like if we made the
opposite claim, that what MEN did (war, business, politics,
whatever) is unimportant and irrelevant?
(2) I don't think you're getting it, Scott, when you write:
>Ok, so politics is a text, something that is written, read, interpreted.
>It is something then that only exists within the minds of the people who
>are thinking about it.
Texts a material, "out there" phenomena. Once you publish them,
you lose control over even your own texts. Political events,
forces, exist so powerfully outside the minds of people who are
thinking about it that they can terrorize, tyrannize, oppress.
But it is +texts+ that are having these consequences. Whoever said
"sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt
me" was damnably wrongheaded.
Michael
Sam Vagenas
>[Sam wrote:]
>: Yes, this is true. The problem I'm wrestling with is whether the word
>: "politics" can ever shake its Greek roots. Roots I believe which inevitably
>: totalize the many into the one -- state-centrism, logoscentrism. By the way,
>: I see this society-centered metaphor even in liberal thinkers. Karl Popper in
>: his assault of Plato's totaltarianism fails to realize his very conception of
>: an "open society" is very similar to Plato's. Pluralism assumes a center.
>: The buzz words "common good," "common sense," "likeminded," "consensus," etc.
>: are everywhere.
Cris responded:
>If you're asking whether we as a species can ever reject our
>communal tendencies, I think the answer is "no." We don't
>appear to be well cut-out for solitary existence (with some
>obvious exceptions). Most of us seem to like to hang around
>in groups. (E.g.: we *could* all read Foucault, Derrida and
>whomever else, write our reactions in personal journals, and
>never share our ideas with anyone ... instead, we're here on
>this newsgroup kibbitzing about it.)
>Alas, once you introduct the concept of the group -- be it a
>family, tribe, clan, newsgroup or nation -- you begin to get
>explicit or implied rules of behavior to facilitate that group.
*******************************************************************************
This wasn't meant to be a query on the "social" nature of man. Assuming we
are social, the question is how to articulate our relationship
with others. The predominate political model is the center/circle model.
In this political order the center dictates policy to the periphery. Even
Democratic variations of this state-centered model puts a great emphasis on
the center -- whether it be a common good, an open society, or a great
society. I would like to get out of this metaphorical structure, but I
think the word "politics" may be too wed to logoscentrism and state-centrism
because of its Classical roots.
Sam Vagenas
>At a most basic level, a hypothetical:
>Jane has some widgets. Jane says Ellen blotzed those widgets.
>Most people in this society use widgets in some manner, and
>once widgets have been blotzed, their value is diminished.
>Ellen denies blotzing the widgets.
>The society has a choice. It can ignore the issue, which
>impliedly grants everyone the right to blotz other people's
>widgets and ultimately undermines a significant aspect of
>that society. Or it can devise some way of determining:
>(a) whether the widgets were blotzed; (b) if so, by whom;
>and, (c) what to do about it to discourage future widget-
>blotzing.
What's a widget?
>If the society chooses the first option (ignore the problem),
>and if widgets really are significant to that society, the
>society will fail. If the society chooses the second option
>(deal with the problem), it necessarily puts the good of the
>society over some liberties of its members.
>A society which repeatedly chose the first option, in every
>instance, would fail miserably. In a sense, it wouldn't *be*
>a "society," but rather a collection of free agents, each
>taking whatever he/she wanted from whomever he/she perceived
>as weak enough to pick on. Ultimately, in the pursuit of total
>liberty, all liberty is lost.
>A society which repeatedly chose the second option, in every
>instance, would also fail. Individuals would be controlled
>as to every aspect of their lives, decisionmaking would be
>centralized at the top, inefficiency would be the order of
>the day, and dissatisfied citizens would eventually revolt.
>Ultimately, in the pursuit of total order, all order is lost.
>Successful societies steer a middle course, trying to balance
>the mutually incompatible goals of individual liberty and
>societal order.
It is this fictional dichotomy between the "individual" and "society" that I'm
trying to avoid. I appreciate your "common" sense (you know, this middle
course business is the oldest trick in the book) approach to the issue, but it
betrays the dichotomies I'm seeking to transcend. Maybe your saying there is
no other way. OK. But I think we can do better than this...
Gordon Fitch
| ...
| My criticism of your evolutionary vs. social restraints double-think
| bit is that you are naturalizing pomo. Which I happen to agree with
| even though it doesn't make sense.
Social restraints are part of evolution, but now on a social
rather than an entirely biological level. One can hope
that some of them are arbitrary.
| Unless of course you happen to present a new proof... then I'll change
| my mind. Pomo double-think is also unconditional positive regard.
Not necessarily "positive."
| The happy dreams of the commodity which will "adapt" to any consumer
| who happens to purchase it.
The consumer/consumed can submit to the commodity or
overcome it -- reappropriate it. But this is not often
done, except by artists -- cars turned into pure sculpture,
signed soup cans. Usually we have submitted to commodities
in advance. Multiplethink can only be to the
consumer/consumed's advantage in this struggle.
--
>< Gordon Fitch >< g...@panix.com ><
Gordon Fitch
I might answer, "Everything that happened to everybody, the
sum of experience."
Clearly, there is too much to think about; even in
attempting to think about it, we generate more history,
faster than we can think it. How many people have lived
since the beginning? So many faces, so many eyes.
At some point, then, one must stop and say that some
experiences are more important than other experiences, or
look for patterns and formulas that sum up large volumes of
experiences. Both of these strategies enable us to destroy
huge amounts of information, as much as we want to. We can
defend ourselves from the onslaught after all.
Finally simple, clean tales of kings and princes appear in
a book. "On the day of judgment, you shall be joined to
that which you love."
--
>< Gordon Fitch >< g...@panix.com ><
Sam Vagenas
>If you somehow manage to "transcend" the frictional
>dichotomy between individual liberty and social order,
>we'll invent some other equally vexatious "game" and
>leave societal construction behind. That's the nature
>of consciousness.
Let's try and invent a new game -- call it vexatious. Your it. Cris, you
still didn't answer my question: what's a widget?
NS Brown
[Sam wrote:]
: Yes, this is true. The problem I'm wrestling with is whether the word
: "politics" can ever shake its Greek roots. Roots I believe which inevitably
: totalize the many into the one -- state-centrism, logoscentrism. By the way,
: I see this society-centered metaphor even in liberal thinkers. Karl Popper in
: his assault of Plato's totaltarianism fails to realize his very conception of
: an "open society" is very similar to Plato's. Pluralism assumes a center.
: The buzz words "common good," "common sense," "likeminded," "consensus," etc.
: are everywhere.
If you're asking whether we as a species can ever reject our
communal tendencies, I think the answer is "no." We don't
appear to be well cut-out for solitary existence (with some
obvious exceptions). Most of us seem to like to hang around
in groups. (E.g.: we *could* all read Foucault, Derrida and
whomever else, write our reactions in personal journals, and
never share our ideas with anyone ... instead, we're here on
this newsgroup kibbitzing about it.)
Alas, once you introduct the concept of the group -- be it a
family, tribe, clan, newsgroup or nation -- you begin to get
explicit or implied rules of behavior to facilitate that group.
Just an opinion, worth what you paid for it. :)
Cris
Gordon Fitch
| : One might ask, what is history if it is _not_ text?
nsb...@news.IntNet.net (NS Brown):
| Actually, the notion of the past as "fixed" is merely
| another construct ... another choice. The past is far
| from static; it is and always has been malleable.
Not according to Aquinas, who said that even God could not
change the past. Do you think that God could change the
past? Or perhaps worldlines from the past converge into
this moment just as they fan out from this moment into all
possible futures, all equally coexistent in eternity.
Relax, take a breath. "There is nothing that you have not
done, there is nowhere that you have not been." Better not
squash the bug on the windowsill: it is you. Even that tiny
spark.
Of course, this is different from the social construction of
the past, but we all know about the social construction of
the past. At least in postmodernity we're supposed to.
--
>< Gordon Fitch >< g...@panix.com ><
NS Brown
[In response to Sam's question as to whether we could ever
abandon the group-centered notions of politics, I wrote:]
: >If you're asking whether we as a species can ever reject our
: >communal tendencies, I think the answer is "no." We don't
: >appear to be well cut-out for solitary existence (with some
: >obvious exceptions). Most of us seem to like to hang around
: >in groups. (E.g.: we *could* all read Foucault, Derrida and
: >whomever else, write our reactions in personal journals, and
: >never share our ideas with anyone ... instead, we're here on
: >this newsgroup kibbitzing about it.)
: >Alas, once you introduct the concept of the group -- be it a
: >family, tribe, clan, newsgroup or nation -- you begin to get
: >explicit or implied rules of behavior to facilitate that group.
[Sam replies:]
: This wasn't meant to be a query on the "social" nature of man.
: Assuming we are social, the question is how to articulate our
: relationship with others. The predominate political model is
: the center/circle model. In this political order the center
: dictates policy to the periphery. Even Democratic variations
: of this state-centered model puts a great emphasis on the center
: -- whether it be a common good, an open society, or a great
: society. I would like to get out of this metaphorical structure,
: but I think the word "politics" may be too wed to logoscentrism
: and state-centrism because of its Classical roots.
At a most basic level, a hypothetical:
Jane has some widgets. Jane says Ellen blotzed those widgets.
Most people in this society use widgets in some manner, and
once widgets have been blotzed, their value is diminished.
Ellen denies blotzing the widgets.
The society has a choice. It can ignore the issue, which
impliedly grants everyone the right to blotz other people's
widgets and ultimately undermines a significant aspect of
that society. Or it can devise some way of determining:
(a) whether the widgets were blotzed; (b) if so, by whom;
and, (c) what to do about it to discourage future widget-
blotzing.
If the society chooses the first option (ignore the problem),
and if widgets really are significant to that society, the
society will fail. If the society chooses the second option
(deal with the problem), it necessarily puts the good of the
society over some liberties of its members.
A society which repeatedly chose the first option, in every
instance, would fail miserably. In a sense, it wouldn't *be*
a "society," but rather a collection of free agents, each
taking whatever he/she wanted from whomever he/she perceived
as weak enough to pick on. Ultimately, in the pursuit of total
liberty, all liberty is lost.
A society which repeatedly chose the second option, in every
instance, would also fail. Individuals would be controlled
as to every aspect of their lives, decisionmaking would be
centralized at the top, inefficiency would be the order of
the day, and dissatisfied citizens would eventually revolt.
Ultimately, in the pursuit of total order, all order is lost.
Successful societies steer a middle course, trying to balance
the mutually incompatible goals of individual liberty and
societal order.
You suggest that any imposition of order is "center-oriented."
I suggest that at least *some* order is necessary to safeguard
those on the periphery ... it benefits all.
NS Brown
[I wrote:]
: | Actually, the notion of the past as "fixed" is merely
: | another construct ... another choice. The past is far
: | from static; it is and always has been malleable.
[Gordon Fitch replies:]
: Not according to Aquinas, who said that even God could not
: change the past. Do you think that God could change the
: past?
If *we* can (and I assert we can), why couldn't She? :)
: Or perhaps worldlines from the past converge into
: this moment just as they fan out from this moment into all
: possible futures, all equally coexistent in eternity.
Or perhaps the past is merely another set of possibilities?
: Of course, this is different from the social construction of
: the past, but we all know about the social construction of
: the past. At least in postmodernity we're supposed to.
The social construction of the past is merely the "I *really
was* at work on Friday!" example, writ large. :)
Gordon Fitch
| Gordon, I sent your double-think post to a scientist friend of mine.
| I told him that monist thought could also be scientific. He disagreed.
| The following is how he responded:
|
| I think the author is confusing doublethink, a term coined
| by Orwell to describe the practice of simultaneously believing
| two contradictory "truths" with multiple hypotheses. Scientists
| strongly advise against uncritically adopting the first explanation that
| fits the facts. Instead, scientists believe in keeping mulitiple
| hypotheses in mind and designing future experiments to eliminate
| contenders. Until those experiment are performed preference is given
| to the simplest hypothesis or the hypothesis that is most consistent
| with current theory. The difference between multiple hypotheses and
| doublethink is the all the candidate hypothesis must explain the known
| facts, although they do not have to be consistent with each other.
| Doublethink, at least in the Orwellian case, has little to do with
| fact, and indeed was designed as a tool for thought control.
There's a line being drawn between "hypothesis" and "belief
in truth" here which is artificial. The animal brain
constantly constructs hypotheses about the world around it
in which it believes, more or less. The more complex
animals appear to be able to construct multiple hypotheses;
at least, that's how I interpret their behavior. Humans,
obviously, can construct many such hypotheses
simultaneously. They can apparently believe in more than
one at once. This is especially true if the universe of
belief is a small one, e.g. about certain abstractions.
The scientific method exteriorizes some of the procedures
of hypothesis-construction; scientists can decide that one
explanation is better than two, for their purposes.
However, if my understanding of the present state of
physics is correct, there are several different hypotheses
about the best explanation of quantum phenomena now
coexisting, and there has not yet been a resolution of the
relativity / quantum-mechanics difference. If the
scientists believe what Niels Bohr said ("Science asks not
what things _are_, but what can be said about them", or
something like that) then there would not seem to be an
absolute reason not to have two or more sayings.
Actually, I don't have a problem with two or more "beings"
for the universe, either, or even messier arrangements, but
many people do. Monism is our daddy, we don't want to grow
up.
"Doublethink" is a response to thought control, but it is
not a tool of thought control. It would be easier to
control thought if it were singlethink (less to control).
However, organisms constantly try to perceive their
environment and make up hypotheses about it. When Winston
observes O'Brien holding up two fingers and is told that
he's holding up three, he's confronted with a conflict
between a need to survive in a social environment where
O'Brien is holding up three fingers and a physical
environment where he's holding up two. Doublethink enables
Winston to survive (sort of). This sort of thing happens
all the time; civilization is based on it.
| > With the invention of slavery, it became ideologically
| > desirable to deprive the slaves of the capacity to imagine
| > freedom. Hence the desirability of constructing mono-
| > theistic ideologies where there is one and only one True
| > Truth, unique, absolute, and eternal. The slave can be
| > informed that he is really, really a slave and that even
| > God says so.
| >
|
| This is a good example of thought control, but I'm not sure what
| it has to do with doublethink. I think the author is a bit confused
| on the whole issue.
I'm pointing out what I said above: singlethink is easier to
control than doublethink. I am contradicting Orwell, who
thought otherwise.
--
>< Gordon Fitch >< g...@panix.com ><
Gordon Fitch
| : | Actually, the notion of the past as "fixed" is merely
| : | another construct ... another choice. The past is far
| : | from static; it is and always has been malleable.
gcf:
| : Not according to Aquinas, who said that even God could not
| : change the past. Do you think that God could change the
| : past?
nsb...@news.IntNet.net (NS Brown):
| If *we* can (and I assert we can), why couldn't She? :)
She could change the past into a past that couldn't change.
| ...
nsb...@news.IntNet.net (NS Brown):
| The social construction of the past is merely the "I *really
| was* at work on Friday!" example, writ large. :)
I think there's more to it than that. If there's a
"really", the history-constructor thinks there's a single
past out of which he's selecting what's convenient. If, on
the other hand, history-constructors "really" construct the
past, then each one can have their own -- or, in fact,
many, as many as they wanted. You could say "I was at work
on Friday" and the boss could say "No, you weren't" and no
one could say "really" without talking nonsense.
"Merely" is not a word I would use to describe the
situation.
--
>< Gordon Fitch >< g...@panix.com ><
NS Brown
[At the conclusion of a hypothetical, I wrote:]
: >Successful societies steer a middle course, trying to balance
: >the mutually incompatible goals of individual liberty and
: >societal order.
[Sam replies:]
: It is this fictional dichotomy between the "individual" and "society" that I'm
: trying to avoid. I appreciate your "common" sense (you know, this middle
: course business is the oldest trick in the book) approach to the issue, but it
: betrays the dichotomies I'm seeking to transcend. Maybe your saying there is
: no other way. OK. But I think we can do better than this...
You assert that the dichotomy is "fictional." What do you
mean by that word in that context?
I would assert that the dichotomy is "frictional," that it
exists because the resulting friction is what makes the
construct of society interesting. If we "transcend" that
dichotomy -- if we remove the friction -- we'll cease to
construct societal experiences.
Consider by way of analogy the game of golf. We could
easily have devised the game such that the object was to
drop a softball-sized ball into a series of eighteen
bushel baskets, each time standing directly over the
basket in question and dropping the ball from a height
of a few inches. With even adequate gross motor skills,
anyone could reach the "perfect score" of 18, every time.
Somehow, I doubt that game would have survived very long.
Instead, we take a tiny ball, hit it with a long stick,
and try to get it in a three-inch hole which lays 400 yards
away. Moreover, because that wouldn't be difficult enough
on its own, we only mow a 25- to 60-yard wide fairway, and
let the rest grow into ankle-deep (or worse) rough. Then
we line that fairway with trees. Then we tuck the hole in
behind a stream or pond, and surround it with sand traps.
Then we outlaw equipment which makes the game "too easy"
(e.g.: the USGA's ban on "square grooves"). And then,
having made the game nigh unto impossible, we go one step
further and create the magic score of "par," a score which
less than 1% of the game's participants will ever make for
a round. And finally ... Joe and Bob decide to place a
$5 bet on each hole, "just to keep it interesting."
If you somehow manage to "transcend" the frictional
dichotomy between individual liberty and social order,
we'll invent some other equally vexatious "game" and
leave societal construction behind. That's the nature
of consciousness.
We make these "problems" because they're fun.
NS Brown
[I wrote:]
: | The social construction of the past is merely the "I *really
: | was* at work on Friday!" example, writ large. :)
[Gordon replies:]
: I think there's more to it than that. If there's a
: "really", the history-constructor thinks there's a single
: past out of which he's selecting what's convenient. If, on
: the other hand, history-constructors "really" construct the
: past, then each one can have their own -- or, in fact,
: many, as many as they wanted. You could say "I was at work
: on Friday" and the boss could say "No, you weren't" and no
: one could say "really" without talking nonsense.
That's why I avoid the terms "real," "really," "reality,"
and the like. We don't have access to "what *really*
happened," but only to our own experience of what happened.
That experience is a construct, only loosely tied to events
outside ourselves (if indeed such events exist).
Ultimately, all we can say is that [this] construct appears
to be more *reliable* than [that] construct ... so we'll
act as if [this] "really happened." But that reliability
is context-dependent ... we can say [this] is more reliable
for [some] purpose, but [that] is more reliable for some
[other] purpose.
(By the way, when I put words in [brackets], that indicates
that they're merely markers ... sort of like algebraic
variables. You can substitute in examples as appropriate
if it helps.)
For example, let's take the U.S. Constitution and its treatment
of the assertion: "There exists a God, which God can usefully
direct the actions of human beings."
If that assertion is directed to the purpose that our
legislators must collectively look to God for guidance in
evaluating a particular bill, the assertion would be "false."
Specifically, "Congress shall make no law ... respecting an
establishment of religion...." _U.S. Const._, Amend. I.
On the other hand, if that assertion is directed to the
purpose that individuals may choose to look to God for
guidance in deciding whom to vote for, the assertio would
be "true." Specifically, "Congress shall make no law ...
respecting an establishment of religion, NOR PROHIBITING
the free exercise thereof." _Id._ (emphasis added).
So which is it "really?" Does the Constitution admit that
there is a God, or does the Constitution deny the existence
of God? Both, depending on the context.
That's the problem with words like "real," "really" and
"reality." They imply universal answers applicable in any
and all contexts. We have endowed them with more power than
any construct can reasonably be expected to generate.
NS Brown
[Sam wrote:]
: Let's try and invent a new game -- call it vexatious. Your it. Cris, you
: still didn't answer my question: what's a widget?
It's what people normally blotz with.
Both "blotz" and "widget" were made-up words, analagous
to algebraic variables. Insert your own verb and noun,
respectively, as appropriate. (Actually, I didn't make
up "widget" out of whole cloth; it's used often in law
to refer to some vague, hypothetical object or product,
such as: "Buyer contracts with Seller for the purchase
and sale of widgets.")
Sorry for the confusion. :)
Hartmut Schmider
> "Doublethink" is a response to thought control, but it is
> not a tool of thought control. It would be easier to
> control thought if it were singlethink (less to control).
> However, organisms constantly try to perceive their
> environment and make up hypotheses about it. When Winston
> observes O'Brien holding up two fingers and is told that
> he's holding up three, he's confronted with a conflict
> between a need to survive in a social environment where
> O'Brien is holding up three fingers and a physical
> environment where he's holding up two. Doublethink enables
> Winston to survive (sort of). This sort of thing happens
(all the time) ...
Winston is no good to O'Brien dead. He has to pay his due first,
and that is double-think. It means exercising the reflex for survival,
the human flexibility, his ability to adopt to the situation.
Nature has finally been overcome and replaced by power, and the
organism has to deal with that. In surviving, Winston confirms
Big Brother. His ratio still suggests single-think, and Winston
still believes that he can rebel against power through thought.
He forgets that thought is the instrument that brought the powers
that be to where they are: O'Brien is the rationalist, not Winston.
The society Orwell talked about is based on the flexibility of
it's members: so is ours, as you said. In that sense, the
double-think of science is not far from Orwell's idea.
Both instrumentalize thought, both make it powerless. In science,
thought leads only to facts, in society only to survival. Both do
not touch "Big Brother".
> I'm pointing out what I said above: singlethink is easier to
> control than doublethink. I am contradicting Orwell, who
> thought otherwise.
Singlethink is stuborn and unflexible. It is reactionary and
easily mislead. But it has a center and a goal. It brought us
into the mess, but it may get us out. Doublethink is the mess.
Were the crusaders under better control than the yuppies are?
Was it the singlethink bent on power and greatness that brought
the fascists to power, or was it the flexible reaction of individuals
that are rather on the side of the winner, even if he wears an ugly
moustache?
It may be easier to control singlethink. Doublethink is certainly
more effective as a means of control.
Best regards,
--
Hartmut Schmider, Kemisk Lab. B | Nein, der Seele bleibt keine Narbe
DTU - 301, 2800 Lyngby, Denmark | zurueck. Der Menschheit wird die Kugel
| beim einen Ohr hinein und beim andern
e-mail ha...@tkemi.klb.dth.dk | herausgegangen sein. K. Kraus
PR...@cunyvm.cuny.edu
In article <3fdpl8$9...@panix.com>, g...@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) says:
>
><PR...@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU>:
>| ...
>| My criticism of your evolutionary vs. social restraints double-think
>| bit is that you are naturalizing pomo. Which I happen to agree with
>| even though it doesn't make sense.
>
>Social restraints are part of evolution, but now on a social
>rather than an entirely biological level. One can hope
>that some of them are arbitrary.
>
Dogs have been domesticated.
Biologically, we are much closer to being a wild animal than a weiner dog.
I guess what I'm wondering is if it is possible to really be postmodern
until we do become something like a weiner dog. There really would be
"no way out," for if we were to leave the lap of our masters, we would not even
have the biological resources to survive in the wild.
In the meantime, being biologically intact, is it all still social darwinism?
With pomo, we double and triple think... we multi-task... so we must be
more highly evolved. Right?
It seems this could be one implication of what you are saying.
Ralph France
> For example, let's take the U.S. Constitution and its treatment
> of the assertion: "There exists a God, which God can usefully
> direct the actions of human beings."
>
It largely ignores it. A most it treats it as something not within the
realm of goverment to decide.
> If that assertion is directed to the purpose that our
> legislators must collectively look to God for guidance in
> evaluating a particular bill, the assertion would be "false."
> Specifically, "Congress shall make no law ... respecting an
> establishment of religion...." _U.S. Const._, Amend. I.
>
Not at all. The fact that congress is forbidden from respecting an
establishment of religion has no bearing on the existence of a god of any
kind whatsoever. The first amendment is in no way contradictory with the
assertion listed above.
> On the other hand, if that assertion is directed to the
> purpose that individuals may choose to look to God for
> guidance in deciding whom to vote for, the assertio would
> be "true." Specifically, "Congress shall make no law ...
> respecting an establishment of religion, NOR PROHIBITING
> the free exercise thereof." _Id._ (emphasis added).
>
This is just as silly as your previous paragraph. Assume for a second that
the assertion is false. All the 1st amendment now states is that the
congress can't prohibit you from believing something which is false.
There is no contradiction here at all. As in your previous post you seem
to be ignoring the possibility "we don't know." The point within the
constitution is that it is not the government's role to decide this
reality. Ie reality is not decided by majority rule or by governmental
decree.
> So which is it "really?" Does the Constitution admit that
> there is a God, or does the Constitution deny the existence
> of God? Both, depending on the context.
Neither, regardless of the context. It provides no information of any kind
on whether or not God exists.
>
> That's the problem with words like "real," "really" and
> "reality." They imply universal answers applicable in any
> and all contexts. We have endowed them with more power than
> any construct can reasonably be expected to generate.
>
We know much more about reality than you seem willing to admit. Scientists
are also quite aware that we will never know everything about reality. In
fact we know much less than we don't know. Most scientists will also
freely admit that much of what we do know isn't perfect. At best
scientific models and theories provide close approximations to descriptions
of reality.
> Just an opinion, worth what you paid for it. :)
>
> Cris
Ralph France
Wright Nuclear Structure Lab
Yale University
These opinions are mine alone.
t
NS Brown
[I wrote:]
: > In think it's useful to note at this point that the scientist's
: > "facts" are usually pre-distilled for convenience. That is, in
[Ralph France replies:]
: They do not come "Pre-distilled." In fact the majority of the effort in
: experinmental science is the distillation process, it is certainly not done
: for "convenience". How you eliminate the vast majority of unimportant or
: uninteresting events without eliminating the interesting ones is the
: hardest question in experimental physics.
"Uninteresting events" ... "interesting events" ... sounds like
"convenience" to me. Doesn't mean there's anything *wrong* with
that ... but admit that you're ignoring some of the data (those
"uninteresting events").
: The scientist must be able to justify ingnoring this data. You appear to
: be conflating the concepts of background reduction with "controlled
: laboratory conditions" The two are related, but different. The criticisms
: you make work fairly well for psychology, sociology, and economics, but
: fail miserably for physics. The physics of what happens in your car engine
: or computer screen is fairly well understood, or do you consider those to
: be "controlled laboratory conditions" as well.
Justify to *whom*? Other scientists, of course! Other people
who are used to marginalizing data for convenience.
Let me emphasize that this is *not* a criticism of the Scientific
Method. The Method is a wonderful tool for gaining an understanding
of our physical domain(s), for helping us to make sense of our
experiences in those domains. It is useful. It "works." In those
domains. But it doesn't work in *all* domains. It has its limits,
and I think Scientism makes a grave mistake when it implies that
any experience which lies outside the domain of scientific inquiry
is somehow less significant.
[I asserted that the "facts" of science, because they are
distilled, are sometimes less than useful in our everyday
experience. It may be clear on the blackboard, but it gets
very fuzzy in our daily lives. Ralph replies:]
: Depends which facts. Aspirin can relieve pain in a significant proportion
: of the population. This does indeed seem to aply to most experience. The
: facts of combustion seem to apply pretty well; I can see some cars driving
: along the road outside my window right now.
I also have a car which won't start, and the mechanic's official
diagnosis is "It must have a ghost in it." He tried to start it,
and it wouldn't start. He went and got his test equipment, hooked
the equipment up, and it started. It's been starting ever since ...
but it's still at the garage because they *know* there's something
broken somewhere. Until they can get it to be broken when they
have the test equipment attached, they can't figure out where.
So it sits there, obstinately starting every time they give it
a shot ... but as soon as I bring it home .... (This is the
third time they've had to tow it in in two weeks; that's why
they're keeping it while they look for that "ghost.") So much
for precision.
[I countered the assertion that science is tied to "facts," by
the previous assertion that those "facts" are created by the
process of ignoring data which don't fit or, as Ralph said, are
"uninteresting events." Ralph replies:]
: This largely depends upon what is a "fact." If one uses the deffinition as
: given by Gould, which most scientists I know agree with, then scientific
: hypotheses are most deffinitely tied to facts.
Posit a definition for "fact." I'll guarantee you that I can
show it to be expressing a notion implying ambiguity and
imprecision.
[I wrote:]
: > Exactly. The existence of mutually incompatible constructs
: > in our experience is commonplace. The term "conflicting
: > emotions" encompasses a wide variety of examples. Consider
: > the parent who loves his/her children and loves spending time
: > with them, yet at the same time would love a weekend away from
: > them. So the parent takes that weekend away ... and calls to
: > see how the kids are doing. So which *one* does the parent
: > really want? Both, of course!
[Ralph replies:]
: The fact that one can desire two mutually incompatible conditions seems to
: weaken your argument, not strengthen it. How are emotions "constructs."
: The present evidence is that they are caused by biochemical states in the
: brain. Evidence for this would include the existece of emotion changing
: chemicals.
Science has been trying to put emotions in a bottle for years.
Still doesn't work. Prozac makes a significant proportion of
its users less depressed; it also makes a significant proportion
*more* depressed, even suicidally so. And we've known for many
years that you can give people a sugar pill, tell them it's an
"anti-depressant," and a significant number will feel less
depressed. (The "placebo effect.") Finally, a larger-than-
any-of-the-above proportion of people can overcome depression
with no medication at all, often by merely rearranging the
ways we construct our experiences.
So much for emotion == chemistry.
[I gave an example of conflicting motives from criminal law,
where we don't want to punish behavior before it occurs, yet
we'd rather not have to wait until the harm is done either,
concluding:]
: > So ... to the scientist, I ask ... which "facts" am I ignoring?
: > Where is The One True Solution to this problem, and countless
: > other similar examples I could cite?
[Ralph replies:]
: You are ignoring the fact that scientists never claim to have all the
: answers. The science of predicting human behavior is particularly
: unsuccessful. Science does not claim to make value judgements, which is
: just what your decision between two incompatible goals is.
: It appears evident that you are atacking a caricature of science, rather
: than the real thing. (Unfortunately this caricature does seem to exist and
: seems to be taught within some "social science" departments)
I submit the following quotes by emminent scientists for your
consideration:
"[After a discussion of the possibility that an infinitely
long fence could exist within a finite area.] This is one
of the great lessons of science. It is often necessary to
resort to the abstract -- to formal mathematical manipu-
lations -- to make sense of the world. Ordinary experience
alone can be an unreliable guide." Paul Davies, _God and
the New Physics_, (1983) at 16. (Dr. Davies is Professor
of Theoretical Physics at Newcastle-upon-Tyne, England.)
"There exists ... a science pyramid. The base of the pyramid
is mathematics, not because math is more abstract or more
groovy, but because mathematics does not rest upon or need
any of the other disciplines, whereas physics, the next
layer of the pyramid, relies upon mathematics. Above physics
lies chemistry, which relies on the discipline of physics....
[Explanation that each higher level relies on the disciplines
of those below it elided.] Then comes biology, which rests
on an understanding of both chemistry and physics. The upper
tiers of the pyramid become increasingly blurred and less
definable: as we reacy physiology, medicine, psychology, the
pristine hierarchy becomes confused.... The pyramid may be
disrespectfully summed up by an old saying: the physicists
defer only to the mathematicians, and the mathemeticians defer
only to God (though you may be hard pressed to find a mathe-
matician that modest)." Leon Lederman, _The God Particle_,
(1993) at 12-13. (Dr. Lederman is a Nobel Laureate in Physics.)
One assumes that sociology and ultimately philosophy would
be found in the upper reaches of Lederman's pyramid ... and
would thus ultimately rely on physics and mathematics. It
seems to be the nature of contemporary science to believe that
it holds the ultimate answers to all questions.
Then again, what does a mere Nobel Laureate know about "the
real thing" of science?
Just an opinion, worth what you paid for it. :)
Cris
: t
-Mammel,L.H.
NS Brown <nsb...@news.IntNet.net> wrote:
>
>I also have a car which won't start, and the mechanic's official
>diagnosis is "It must have a ghost in it." He tried to start it,
>and it wouldn't start. He went and got his test equipment, hooked
>the equipment up, and it started. It's been starting ever since ...
>but it's still at the garage because they *know* there's something
>broken somewhere. Until they can get it to be broken when they
>have the test equipment attached, they can't figure out where.
>
>So it sits there, obstinately starting every time they give it
>a shot ... but as soon as I bring it home .... (This is the
>third time they've had to tow it in in two weeks; that's why
>they're keeping it while they look for that "ghost.") So much
>for precision.
Probably moisture in the ignition wiring.
Lew Mammel, Jr.
MedRev
..of post-modernism. In a way it analogous to saying that if I
..throughly deconstruct/destructure the notion of self my own
.."sense of self" will vanish, and, thus, I will cease to exist...
...Does that seem plausible?
Of course, if one were to deconstruct themself, they might dissolve into
some Buddhist, Neo-Platonic, or other spiritual Monism where they neither
exist or not exist -- such dualism becomes meaningless. It might be more
interesting to deconstruct the notion of deconstructing. For instance, is
it even possible to deconstruct anything?
spen...@uci.edu
>>I guess I still am not getting it. <snip> Can a political
>>policy terrorize, tyrannize, oppress... me if I don't know about it, and
>>never come into contact with anyone who wants to enforce it on me?
>
>Of course it can! That phenomenon is usually indexed by the terms
><ideology> and <hegemony>. The state does not reproduce itself by
>coercive means alone (your "enforcement"), but also by defining
>for each member of its polity a range of acceptable beliefe and
>actions. Of course human beings are variable in every direction,
>and so can refuse to operate within those fences. Most, however,
>stay within the fences +because it never occurs to them to leave+!
>(eg., I do not stop at a stop-sign in the country at 3:00 am for
>fear of getting a ticket. I stop because it does not occur to me
>not to stop.) Liberalism is a sneaky ideology: It defines a
>certain kind of rebelliousness as accepted activity, thus giving
>you the illusion that you're free of ideological influences and
>subtle state rhetorical controls.
Let us take for example a collection of individuals arranged into a
society, which has particularistic beliefs and activities, which either
due to spatial isolation or ritualistic adherence to silence outside of
their self-constructed borders, has no conception of the outside
hegemony which claims them as members. Said group participates in the
non-ritualistic slaughter and consumption of animal flesh. Never before
has a member of the group strayed outside of the "fences" and there is
no reason to fear that anyone would contemplate a future compromise of
the groups beliefs. Meanwhile, the hegemon which considers this group
as part of its subjected population, if it were to know that it existed,
explicitly prohibited this slaughter and consumption. So while the
hegemon includes all groups, known or unknown to it, and the unknown
group either because of its isolation or silence refuses to acknowledge
(or know about) the hegemon, how can we suggest that the hegemon, with
its texts encoding laws of behavior, controls or effects the group?
Things would be much more complicated if the group knows about the
hegemon, for then they would be constructing a counter force, by default
in opposition, yet within, the hegemon. But if neither group or hegemon
is congnizant of the existance of the other, then the hegemon can
construct all the texts it wants and it will make no difference. Only
when and if there is a recognition on the part of the hegemon that the
group exists does the situation change and that the group recognizes
the existence of the hegemon; does the group begin to operate
within the constructed texts of the hegemon. (Am I making sense?)
Thus, my point that texts are meaningless without the expressed
application of recognition that they exist. (not the same as opposing
texts)
>>So, still I am stuck with the concept that the text is meaningless, and
>>is nothing but an empty formless sack into which the reader places what
>>s/he wants to place.
>
>Most ideological and hegemonic controls exist +only+ in and as
>texts, and are rendered invisible because their truth is thought
>of as "natural and necessary, self-evident." So, for instance,
>French feminists argue (and I think rightly) that gender
>differences are virtually always scripted--they have to substance
>apart from the texts which describe/exploit them. The same can be
>said, I think, for every cluster of ideological beliefs:
>Religion, Liberty, and Property (the trinity of liberalism) exist,
>for me, only in and as the discourse which represents them and the
>people who agree to embody and enact that discourse.
Perhaps, according to a snipet of a point you mentioned here, I might
better illucidate my cognizations on this topic. (e.g., for example),
what if I am from a small community in the jungles of south america, and
I believe in a particular animistic religious construction. I have
never met a single individual who maintains the hegemonic (particularly
in S.A.) religious construction known as christianity. I have never
heard of a heaven and a hell, a god and a devil, an edifice for prayer,
and a jesus for salvation. (thank "heavens") Certainly, the
construction of christianity includes me as either "saved", or capable
of being saved. Yet, I am unaffected. Until the missionary stumbles
into my village, I am a member, but I do not know it, and it has no
affect or effect upon me. Things change when the missionary does
stumble in, and if I choose to not accept the belief construction, then
I am in opposition to it. But until that time, the text of christianity
means nothing to me.
But what if I have had some contact, I have heard of christianity, yet
it does not know of my existence. At this point, I do not believe that
the particular religious belief of this jungle dweller is in opposition
to christianity. Only when there is mutual recognition of existence
would that take place.
Thus, the text of the human body, within society, is constructed
according to the scripts which you mention, but only when the society is
acknowledged and the society acknowledges the human body being
constructed. So, I understand your point. The question that I then
have is whether it is possible, given mutual recognition of hegemon and
subject, to construct new texts outside of, yet not in opposition to, the
hegemon's constructions? Or, once mutual recognition takes place, does
any construction automatically fall within the boundaries of the
hegemon?.
Scott
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Scott Penrose-Kafka | Visualize Armed Evolution
spen...@uci.edu |
University of California, Irvine |
Dept. of Political Science |
michael calvin mcgee
In article <3ghot6$n...@news.service.uci.edu>, spen...@uci.edu (spen...@uci.edu) writes:
>In <1...@isocrates.win.net>, mcm...@isocrates.win.net (Michael Calvin McGee) writes:
>
>>>I guess I still am not getting it. <snip> Can a political
>>>policy terrorize, tyrannize, oppress... me if I don't know about it, and
>>>never come into contact with anyone who wants to enforce it on me?
>>
>>Of course it can! That phenomenon is usually indexed by the terms
>><ideology> and <hegemony>. The state does not reproduce itself by
>>coercive means alone (your "enforcement"), but also by defining
>>for each member of its polity a range of acceptable beliefe and
>>actions. Of course human beings are variable in every direction,
>>and so can refuse to operate within those fences. Most, however,
>>stay within the fences +because it never occurs to them to leave+!
>>(eg., I do not stop at a stop-sign in the country at 3:00 am for
>>fear of getting a ticket. I stop because it does not occur to me
>>not to stop.) Liberalism is a sneaky ideology: It defines a
>>certain kind of rebelliousness as accepted activity, thus giving
>>you the illusion that you're free of ideological influences and
>>subtle state rhetorical controls.
>Thus, the text of the human body, within society, is constructed
>according to the scripts which you mention, but only when the society is
>acknowledged and the society acknowledges the human body being
>constructed. So, I understand your point. The question that I then
>have is whether it is possible, given mutual recognition of hegemon and
>subject, to construct new texts outside of, yet not in opposition to, the
>hegemon's constructions? Or, once mutual recognition takes place, does
>any construction automatically fall within the boundaries of the
>hegemon?.
A physician friend of mine, a specialist, is a hard-nosed
scientist who orders every test for every known disease before
risking a diagnosis. He won't let himself guess. He calls it
"hunting for zebras." The theory is that both he and his
patient will worry themselves sick that a pain in the chest is
heart disease, cancer, lupus--a zebra--so that neither will be
confident when it is treated as simple bronchitis, just a plain
old American squirrel. By hunting for zebras, the process of
elimination leaves no credible doubt.
I think you're hunting for zebras. I applaud that, because when
you discover the simplicity of liberalism's subtle controls, you
will find them credible. There is no hegemon. As Stuart Hall
once remarked, "there will be no meeting of the ruling class
this week in Houston." The hegemony ("fences") is established as
an unargued anticipation of voluntary compliance. Customs, laws,
turn-taking rules of conversation, all are instances of hegemony.
Just as there are provisions for amending constitutions and
changing the law, so the hegemony is always prepared for change,
and thus for rebelliousness. It does not seek to stop the young
from being young, or the wolf from being a wolf. It rather seeks
to make sure that the violent energy of rebellious youth flows in
"positive" directions, and that the wolf's hunger be sated on
wild game and not on some poor rancher's sheep. The system will
reward you for promoting armed evolution; it will punish you for
revolution, armed or not.
michael
-Mammel,L.H.
michael calvin mcgee <mcm...@isocrates.win.net> wrote:
>
>I think you're hunting for zebras. I applaud that, because when
>you discover the simplicity of liberalism's subtle controls, you
>will find them credible. There is no hegemon. As Stuart Hall
>once remarked, "there will be no meeting of the ruling class
>this week in Houston." The hegemony ("fences") is established as
>an unargued anticipation of voluntary compliance. Customs, laws,
>turn-taking rules of conversation, all are instances of hegemony.
>Just as there are provisions for amending constitutions and
>changing the law, so the hegemony is always prepared for change,
>and thus for rebelliousness. It does not seek to stop the young
>from being young, or the wolf from being a wolf. It rather seeks
>to make sure that the violent energy of rebellious youth flows in
>"positive" directions, and that the wolf's hunger be sated on
>wild game and not on some poor rancher's sheep. The system will
>reward you for promoting armed evolution; it will punish you for
>revolution, armed or not.
On the subject of taxonomy, there was an article just today in the
NYT about increased racial tensions in the LA county jail system.
Some official was quoted as saying of the inmates, "Some of these
guys are like scorpions, they'll strike at anyone, anytime, inside
or outside of jail." ( quote from memory ) The article went on
to talk about how social life inside the jail was a reflection
or extension of social life outside. Better start putting
"punish" in quotes.
Lew Mammel, Jr.