Hobb, Sade and Post-Modernism
cullen
: While most attribute the beginning of the postmodernist movement to
: Nietzsche, I read some de Sade lately and found that his rejection of
: morality, God, and the good as a powerful precedent to postmodernism.
I found the same thing, actually. I brought it up in class("Postmodernity
and Politics," no less), and it didn't merit more than a vague
acknowledgement and a comment about how boring DeSade is to read.
: Specificially, in -Justine-, Sade harshly mocks virtue as the fantasy of
: the weak, much as Nietzsche's later condemnation of the "slave moralty."
It was reading _Juliette_ that got it for me. The lectures of the
headmistress on the nature of morality, law, etc. resounded with much of
Nietzsche's _Beyond Good and Evil_.
: In addition, Sade affirms the right of the strong to take advantage of
: the weak, again similar to the concept of "master morality."
I would question whether this is an aspect of Nietzsche; at the very
least i would question whether it is a part of N. that the postmodernists
have inherited. Even a diehard Nietzschean like Foucault worked very much
towards equality and justice, particularly in the form of advocating
prisoners' rights.
--
--
Left Deviation
http://hamp.hampshire.edu/~cmnF93/noise.html
Free Mumia Abu-Jamal!
Gordon Fitch
| : While most attribute the beginning of the postmodernist movement to
| : Nietzsche, I read some de Sade lately and found that his rejection of
| : morality, God, and the good as a powerful precedent to postmodernism.
cmn...@hamp.hampshire.edu (cullen):
| I found the same thing, actually. I brought it up in class("Postmodernity
| and Politics," no less), and it didn't merit more than a vague
| acknowledgement and a comment about how boring DeSade is to read.
Victor Shih (shiz...@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu) wrote:
| : Specificially, in -Justine-, Sade harshly mocks virtue as the fantasy of
| : the weak, much as Nietzsche's later condemnation of the "slave moralty."
cmn...@hamp.hampshire.edu (cullen):
| It was reading _Juliette_ that got it for me. The lectures of the
| headmistress on the nature of morality, law, etc. resounded with much of
| Nietzsche's _Beyond Good and Evil_.
| ...
It seems to me that a "rejection of morality, God, and the
good" is a powerful precedent to Modernism. It is, after
all, a religious and ethical position, and certainly seems
to have ambition to be a regnant discourse, one which
disowns the past in favor of an austere classicism and winds
up bedding down with fascism and imperialism.
Postmodernism, on the other hand -- I will make an effort
here and pretend there is such a thing -- would on the
contrary refuse to reject morality, God, and the good, but
allow them to coexist with their opposites, absences,
masks, simulations, and subverters.
I suggest reading Nietzsche for his poetry, or, if he must
be read as a law-giver, upside-down and backward. Sade is
not even poetic.
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
Gordon Fitch
| : I suggest reading Nietzsche for his poetry, or, if he must
| : be read as a law-giver, upside-down and backward. Sade is
| : not even poetic.
wein...@mail2.sas.upenn.edu (Silke-Maria Weineck):
| Hm. I don't think his poetry is very good (with the exception of _some_
| of the Dionysos-Dithyrambs), but there is room for disagreement, naturally.
| I'd suggest reading him as a philosopher, and a rather rigorous
| one to boot.
I found _The_Genealogy_of_Morals_ stupid. However, if you
read it upside-down, it suggests ways that the "weak" can
overcome and destroy the "strong", which I try to put into
practice every day. Perhaps Nietzsche cleverly wrote it
upside-down so I would do this?
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
Gordon Fitch
| : | : I suggest reading Nietzsche for his poetry, or, if he must
| : | : be read as a law-giver, upside-down and backward. Sade is
| : | : not even poetic.
wein...@mail2.sas.upenn.edu (Silke-Maria Weineck):
|: | Hm. I don't think his poetry is very good (with the exception of _some_
|: | of the Dionysos-Dithyrambs), but there is room for disagreement, naturally.
|: | I'd suggest reading him as a philosopher, and a rather rigorous
|: | one to boot.
gcf:
| : I found _The_Genealogy_of_Morals_ stupid. However, if you
| : read it upside-down, it suggests ways that the "weak" can
| : overcome and destroy the "strong", which I try to put into
| : practice every day. Perhaps Nietzsche cleverly wrote it
| : upside-down so I would do this?
wein...@mail1.sas.upenn.edu (Silke-Maria Weineck):
| I don't think that you have to do tricks with the book to get that reading
| -- it's obvious; and you should take into account what 'weak' means in
| this context, and what it is about Christian Morality that Nietzsche
| heartily dislikes. If you approve of that kind of weakness triumphing, I'd
| be surprised.
I certainly approve of its corruption and destruction of
the Roman Empire. If only it could have done a more
thorough job! But then it became strong, and had to be
destroyed in its turn.
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
and...@phoenix.princeton.edu
> Gordon Fitch (g...@panix.com) wrote:
> | : I suggest reading Nietzsche for his poetry, or, if he must
> | : be read as a law-giver, upside-down and backward. Sade is
> | : not even poetic.
>
> wein...@mail2.sas.upenn.edu (Silke-Maria Weineck):
> | Hm. I don't think his poetry is very good (with the exception of _some_
> | of the Dionysos-Dithyrambs), but there is room for disagreement, naturally.
> | I'd suggest reading him as a philosopher, and a rather rigorous
> | one to boot.
>
> read it upside-down, it suggests ways that the "weak" can
> overcome and destroy the "strong", which I try to put into
> practice every day. Perhaps Nietzsche cleverly wrote it
> upside-down so I would do this?
the desires of the "weak" and the "strong" for "power", the only difference is
how they pursue it. There is also of course the problem of who you define as
"strong" and "weak".
> --
> }"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
and...@phoenix.princeton.edu
> gcf:
> | : I found _The_Genealogy_of_Morals_ stupid. However, if you
> | : read it upside-down, it suggests ways that the "weak" can
> | : overcome and destroy the "strong", which I try to put into
> | : practice every day. Perhaps Nietzsche cleverly wrote it
> | : upside-down so I would do this?
>
> | I don't think that you have to do tricks with the book to get that reading
> | -- it's obvious; and you should take into account what 'weak' means in
> | this context, and what it is about Christian Morality that Nietzsche
> | heartily dislikes. If you approve of that kind of weakness triumphing, I'd
> | be surprised.
>
> I certainly approve of its corruption and destruction of
> the Roman Empire. If only it could have done a more
> thorough job! But then it became strong, and had to be
> destroyed in its turn.
empire except for the fact that it was corrupt? Why approve of such a
civilizations collapse?
rafael cardenas
> gcf:
> | > I certainly approve of its corruption and destruction of
> | > the Roman Empire. If only it could have done a more
> | > thorough job! But then it became strong, and had to be
> | > destroyed in its turn.
>
> | You approve of something which corrupts? What was wrong with the
> | empire except for the fact that it was corrupt? Why approve of such a
> | civilizations collapse?
>
> corrupted.
>
> I once read that, except for racism, the values of Rome were
> hardly distinct from those of Nazi Germany. I don't know if
> I agree; the Nazis didn't practice public crucifixion or
> gladiatorial combat by slaves and prisoners, as far as I
> know.
It's rather doubtful that the prohibition by christians of public
crucifixion and gladiatorial combat brought down the Roman Empire.
And the view that Xtianity brought it down is highly questionable.
The states that superseded it remained 'organizations of slavery'
for several centuries after its fall in the West, so that issue is irrelevant to
the desirability or otherwise of the empire's fall.
And the Visigothic state that succeeded it in Spain added racism to its
other vices (see their laws against the Jews).
The view that the collapse of the Empire in the West was a _good_ is
a relict of Christian propaganda: the Augustinian view that it didn't
matter because the City of God was elsewhere being echoed in the
19th-century view that it didn't matter because the Church,
or the Papacy, carried on everything that was worth while (to Hobbes, 'the ghost' of the empire
'sitting crowned upon the grave thereof'), so that's all right then; a biased view of what was
in fact worth while. To most people living at the time, the collapse of
the government, which also brought about a massive _economic_ collapse
(not vice versa), was probably an unmitigated evil (and no, the fall didn't abolish
taxation, landlordism, or exploitation either). But most of those
people left no descendants and no voice. In part, the 'renewal' thesis
about Rome's fall is a typical example of historians' worship of brute
strength.
Keynes said that practical businessmen, who imagined they were free
from ideas, were in fact 'slaves to some defunct economist'. In the
same way, most people who post about the fall of Rome on Usenet
are slaves to some defunct historian, whether it's Orosius, Gibbon,
Bury, Rostovtzeff, or Jones.
rafael cardenas huitlodayo
Swarfmire College, Goscote, UK
Gordon Fitch
| > I certainly approve of its corruption and destruction of
| > the Roman Empire. If only it could have done a more
| > thorough job! But then it became strong, and had to be
| > destroyed in its turn.
and...@phoenix.princeton.edu:
| You approve of something which corrupts? What was wrong with the
| empire except for the fact that it was corrupt? Why approve of such a
| civilizations collapse?
It was a organization of slavery, far worse uncorrupted than
corrupted.
I once read that, except for racism, the values of Rome were
hardly distinct from those of Nazi Germany. I don't know if
I agree; the Nazis didn't practice public crucifixion or
gladiatorial combat by slaves and prisoners, as far as I
know.
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
Gordon Fitch
| : I take _strong_ and _weak_ as political terms, the only ones
| : that seem meaningful in the context. The strong are those
| : who dominate, enslave, and kill; the weak are those they
| : dominate, enslave, and kill.
wein...@mail2.sas.upenn.edu (Silke-Maria Weineck):
| I sympathize with the political aspect; however, Nietzsche is after
| something else, as far as I can see; to his mind, it is Christian
| morality that strives to dominate and enslave ideologically, if not to
| kill (they did, of course, but that's a different matter); the point is
| that weakness, even political weakness, can be used _as_ a strength
| within a setting that privileges weakness, or at least pretends to. In
| other words, the strong/weak thing is utterly unstable ---- like the
| active/passive distinction in any scene of seduction.
I think only the weak thing is unstable, that is, live.
Once strength is established (by whatever strategem) it has
to maintain itself. Slavery and the revolt against slavery
have gone on for thousands of years; increasingly, slavery
finds it must become more subtle and corrupt to preserve
itself, it must absorb more weakness. Hence classical
slavery had to give way to feudalism and Christianity, and
these to liberalism and capitalism. But in the end it
always has to reveal itself as power -- in particular, the
power of one person to override the will of another. And
there follows the sacred emotion of _resentment_, under
which one _may_ begin to think of liberation, or at least
of vengeance.
It's true I got some of this by going through Nietzsche's
pockets.
Here is another commentary:
Rintrah roars & shakes his fires in the burdend air;
Hungry clouds swag on the deep
Once meek, and in a perilous path
The just man kept his course along
The vale of death.
Roses are planted where thorns grow.
And on the barren heath
Sing the honey bees.
Then the perilous path was planted:
And a river, and a spring
On every cliff and tomb;
And on the bleached bones
Red clay brought forth.
Till the villain left the paths of ease,
To walk in perilous paths, and drive
The just man into barren climes.
Now the sneaking serpent walks
In mild humility.
And the just man rages in the wilds
Where lions roam.
Rintrah roars & shakes his fires in the burdend air;
Hungry clouds swag on the deep
(William Blake, from _The_Marriage_of_Heaven_and_Hell)
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
Victor Shih
: In article: <4cmgk8$f...@panix2.panix.com> g...@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) writes:
: > gcf:
: It's rather doubtful that the prohibition by christians of public
Isn't that the way all the time?? People are always more interested and
receptive to ideas that fit their worldview, desire, and needs. Going
back to economic ideas, the current U.S. business community almost
unanimously adopts the MOnetarist ideas of Friedman because it advocates
less taxes but a governmental safty net of the economy using interest
rate adjustments.
Cheers,
Victor
: rafael cardenas huitlodayo
: Swarfmire College, Goscote, UK
--
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Victor Shih (Shi Zonghan) shiz...@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu.
East Asian Affairs Major (China focus)
Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington University, D.C.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
moggin
>>...the difference for Nietzsche is not so much quest for power or no
>>quest for power, since there is no outside the quest for power; with
>>Nietzsche, it's the much trickier question of what is "furthering
>>life," and the problem what life is, what furthering is, and, as
>>moggin would point out, whether it's a good thing to further life to
>>begin with.
Andy:
>You lost me at the end there. Does Nietzsche ever really question
>"life" as the ultimate value? We might want him to (it would make him
>a bit more consistent), but I can't think of any passage in which he
>does.
He doesn't question it explicitly (unless Silke's thinking of
something I can't think of). You can point out that his affirmations
of life are problematic in various ways, and that they tend to under-
mine themselves, but at least on the surface, Nietzsche firmly insists
on the value of life; or rather, as you put it, on life as the highest
value.
Whether that's inconsistent is another question. It's plainly
not consistent with his critical thinking, but it _is_ of a piece with
his thinking on the whole, since his affirmation of life goes hand-in-
hand with his rejection of truth as the supreme value. Of course, you
could look at it the other way around, and say that rejecting truth is
perfectly consistent with Nietzsche's critical outlook, since it's the
will to truth itself that asks "_What_ is us really wants 'truth'?" as
well as "_Why not rather_ untruth?"
However, whether Nietzsche _does_ reject the value of truth is
another question, yet. The ambiguities of his position are multiplied
in his practice.
-- moggin
DAMMIT ALL
: [ . . . ] What really matters, it seems to me, isn't that art is
: deceptive (Nietzsche would have to be _more_ of a Platonist for that
: to bother him), but rather that the deception is _necessary_.
Of course it is: it's what distinguishes a tree from a painting of
a tree that does it. He wrote of walks in the mountains so often
that I'm sure he knew, and celebrated, this distinction--and that
he prefered real trees to fake ones, even (had he seen them) Van
Gogh's cypresses. It's not the deception per the but the _character
and quality_ of the deception: too much damn "bad art" everywhere.
(See for example his comments on Christianity in his later works.)
: That's strong evidence for your original argument that Nietzsche has
: doubts about the value of life.
No it isn't. You'll have to go elsewhere for that, tho it IS there.
: The deceptions of art are required to redeem
: life from the "horror and terror" that characterize it.
In our era we've substituted the sedation of ennui.
: [...] he seems to think that
: life is more easily painted over than transformed.
An obvious truism, don't you think?
: So his reversal of "the wisdom of Silenus" might be the
: same type of illusion
Or it might be one of those silly word games he liked to play.
[...]
: And that impulse is to "veil" the horrors of
: life in order to avoid "overwhelming dismay."
Like I said, it sounds like he knew my girlfriend.
TheDavid(TM)
--
i practice philosophy only in self-defense
I PRACTICE PHILOSOPHY ONLY IN SELF-DEFENSE
(--Gordon Fitch, 11 Jan. 1996)