libertarian socialism and real democracy
Orion
"Anarchism". Anarchy, strictly meaning "without rulers", leads one to
wonder what sort of system would exist in place of one without state or
capitalist masters... the answer being a radically democratic society
while preserving the maximal amount of individual liberty and freedom
possible.
Libertarian Socialism recognizes that the concept of "property"
(specifically, the means of production, factories, land used for
profit, rented space) is theft and that in a truly libertarian society,
the individual would be free of exploitation caused by the
concentration of all means of wealth-making into the hands of an elite
minority of capitalists.
Publius
@v46g2000cwv.googlegroups.com:
> Libertarian Socialism is a term essentially synonymous with the word
> "Anarchism".
"Libertarian socialism" is an oxymoron.
> Libertarian Socialism recognizes that the concept of "property"
> (specifically, the means of production, factories, land used for
> profit, rented space) is theft and that in a truly libertarian society,
> the individual would be free of exploitation caused by the
> concentration of all means of wealth-making into the hands of an elite
> minority of capitalists.
Concentrations of wealth will occur because people differ in their talents,
strengths, motives, and interests. If I write a useful software program and
offer it to others for $10, and 1 million of them buy it, I will have a
concentration of wealth. Since no one was compelled to buy it, no one has
been exploited. You will only be able to prevent that concentration of wealth
by force. And then your "socialism" is no longer libertarian.
"Socialism requires constant interference in economic relations between
consenting adults."
---Nozick
uri
> Concentrations of wealth will occur because people differ in their talents,
> strengths, motives, and interests. If I write a useful software program and
> offer it to others for $10, and 1 million of them buy it, I will have a
> concentration of wealth. Since no one was compelled to buy it, no one has
> been exploited. You will only be able to prevent that concentration of wealth
> by force. And then your "socialism" is no longer libertarian.
>
> "Socialism requires constant interference in economic relations between
> consenting adults."
> ---Nozick
The fact that private ownership over the means of production is
protected by state force is what i see as illigatimate. People differ
but i don't agree that it justifies economic inequality and
concentration of wealth based on arbitrary market forces.
Michael Price
> Publius wrote:
> > Concentrations of wealth will occur because people differ in their talents,
> > strengths, motives, and interests. If I write a useful software program and
> > offer it to others for $10, and 1 million of them buy it, I will have a
> > concentration of wealth. Since no one was compelled to buy it, no one has
> > been exploited. You will only be able to prevent that concentration of wealth
> > by force. And then your "socialism" is no longer libertarian.
> >
> > "Socialism requires constant interference in economic relations between
> > consenting adults."
> > ---Nozick
>
> The fact that private ownership over the means of production is
> protected by state force is what i see as illigatimate.
When has private ownership over anything been protected by State
forces?
The State is specifically the force that can take your property without
your
consent or paying fair value. Property is protected by property
owners. The
State stole some of the property and then claimed that it was using it
to
protect the property of others. While the State has some sucess in
catching
small incompetent thieves they have little sucess in reducing overall
levels of
thievery. If the State were to disappear far more effective means of
protecting
property, in the means of production and in other things.
Publius
news:1140798252....@z34g2000cwc.googlegroups.com:
> The fact that private ownership over the means of production is
> protected by state force is what i see as illigatimate. People differ
> but i don't agree that it justifies economic inequality and
> concentration of wealth based on arbitrary market forces.
If person A has a skill for which 1 million others are willing to pay him $10
each, and person B has no such skill, A and B will end up economically
unequal. That inequality is not justified? If not, why not?
The "arbitrary market forces" of which you complain are nothing more than the
autonomous decisions of everyone who bought A's services. In what sense are
those decisions "arbitrary"?
Dan Clore
> uri wrote:
>>Publius wrote:
>>>Concentrations of wealth will occur because people differ in their talents,
>>>strengths, motives, and interests. If I write a useful software program and
>>>offer it to others for $10, and 1 million of them buy it, I will have a
>>>concentration of wealth. Since no one was compelled to buy it, no one has
>>>been exploited. You will only be able to prevent that concentration of wealth
>>>by force. And then your "socialism" is no longer libertarian.
>>The fact that private ownership over the means of production is
>>protected by state force is what i see as illigatimate.
>
> When has private ownership over anything been protected by State
> forces?
> The State is specifically the force that can take your property without
> your
> consent or paying fair value. Property is protected by property
> owners. The
> State stole some of the property and then claimed that it was using it
> to
> protect the property of others. While the State has some sucess in
> catching
> small incompetent thieves they have little sucess in reducing overall
> levels of
> thievery. If the State were to disappear far more effective means of
> protecting
> property, in the means of production and in other things.
One case of private ownership being protected by State
forces occurs in Publius's post. Without government-enforced
intellectual property, those who owned copies of the useful
software he offers to sell for $10 could freely sell
themselves, or make copies free of charge. To prevent, or at
least greatly reduce, the concentration of wealth, we need
merely remove the use of force, not engage in it.
--
Dan Clore
My collected fiction, _The Unspeakable and Others_:
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/1587154838/thedanclorenecro/
Lord We˙rdgliffe & Necronomicon Page:
http://www.geocities.com/SoHo/9879/
News & Views for Anarchists & Activists:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo
Strange pleasures are known to him who flaunts the
immarcescible purple of poetry before the color-blind.
-- Clark Ashton Smith, "Epigrams and Apothegms"
Publius
news:46a1kcF...@individual.net:
> One case of private ownership being protected by State
> forces occurs in Publius's post. Without government-enforced
> intellectual property, those who owned copies of the useful
> software he offers to sell for $10 could freely sell
> themselves, or make copies free of charge. To prevent, or at
> least greatly reduce, the concentration of wealth, we need
> merely remove the use of force, not engage in it.
Well, that is the classical rationale for the State, and the only one I know
of with any semblance of validity --- namely, the protection of each person's
property against trespasses by others.
Are you suggesting that each person should provide that protection for
himself? I.e., if you make copies of the software I've licensed to you,
despite your agreement not to do so, should I hire a hit man to take care of
the problem, rather than complain to the State?
Tri...@webtv.net
"I Pledge Allegiance to the One Human Family with Individual Rights of
Pre-eminence and Sovereignty."
For a Moral & Ethical, Balanced World
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/uniteddiversity
http://www.globalvisions.org/cl/swn
Tri...@webtv.net
uri
on their own. However without government people will steal, kill and
abuse each other.
Publius
@i39g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:
> Without the state most people could probably not protect their proporty
> on their own. However without government people will steal, kill and
> abuse each other.
Then apparently you agree with me. The State exists to prevent people from
stealing, killing, and otherwise abusing each other. Yet earlier you
suggested the state should not prevent you from stealing my software.
Which is it?
Michael Price
Could they? Presumably all sales were on condition of the purchaser
not
doing that. Now you could argue that private efforts to prevent it
would not be
as effective as State efforts, but I don't see why that would be so.
Very few
violators of intellectual property rights are imprisoned or fined more
than they
gained by the theft.
In fact the State has a habit of violating intellectual property when
it suits it's
purposes, as for example the database program they stole and gave to
other
State's intelligence agencies (with security holes added).
> To prevent, or at least greatly reduce, the concentration of wealth, we need
> merely remove the use of force, not engage in it.
>
> --
> Dan Clore
>
> My collected fiction, _The Unspeakable and Others_:
> http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/1587154838/thedanclorenecro/
> Lord Weÿrdgliffe & Necronomicon Page:
Michael Price
> Without the state most people could probably not protect their proporty
> on their own.
Which is why they form agreements, perhaps commercial, perhaps
mutual,
perhaps familial, for protection. In any case nobody can protect their
property on their own with a State.
> However without government people will steal, kill and
> abuse each other.
They do that with a government. In fact the government pays them to
do it. Have
you not been paying attention to the middle east?
asoko...@gmail.com
one person at a time, that is, if you own your car, I don't also own
it, since we can't use it do do different things at the same time.
Physical items are scarce.
Information, on the other hand, is not scarce - we may not be able to
use the same CD at once, but if we each have our own CD we can use the
"same" program. It's actually two identical copies. If you sell me
your program, my copy is mine, and using force to prevent me from using
it as I wish is an initiation of agression. Forcing people to treat an
unlimited resource as if it is scarce (like intellectual property) is
just as bad as forcing people to treat a scarce resource like it's
unlimited (socialism). Both distort the natural progress of the market
and destroy the incentive to create and trade.
In a free society, information can still be valuable if you use it to
create a valuable product and be first to market. But information
itself is not property, since in its truest form information is just
ideas or thought processes. You have no more right to control the
ideas of others than you do their phyisical property.
People often argue that without patent monopolies, inventors would have
no incentive to create. But they neglect to look at the other side --
yes, you would no longer have exclusive monopoly privileges on your own
ideas (once someone else learns them). But, the government would also
no longer prevent you from using and improving every idea at your
disposal to create something people want! So much innovation is killed
because inventors have to spend extra time and effort designing a
product that doesn't infringe upon existing patents, even if they
thought of the same idea independently. Patents poison innovation.
Publius
@t39g2000cwt.googlegroups.com:
> "Intellectual property" is not property. Property can only be used by
> one person at a time, that is, if you own your car, I don't also own
> it, since we can't use it do do different things at the same time.
> Physical items are scarce.
You make the usual mistake there, namely, equating property with physical
objects. Certain physical goods may well be scarce, but that is not what
qualifies them as "property." Property is a moral concept, not a physical
one, and whether or not it applies to a thing has nothing to do with its
physical composition. Because many of the things treated as property are
physical objects, people become tempted to suppose the physical
characteristics of those things are somehow involved in the definition of
"property." But they aren't.
The term "property" is derived from "proper;" it refers to those things of
which one is in "proper possession," or properly holds. What one properly
holds, and thus may claim as one's property, are those things one has
acquired by first possession, i.e., by discovering or creating them, or
else via a "chain of consent" from the first possessor. It makes no
difference whatsoever whether the thing claimed is a physical object; all
that matters is whether it has some *value*. If it does, then that value
belongs to the creator or discoverer of that valuable thing, but for whom
that value would not exist.
It makes no difference whatsoever how may people can use it at once. 1000
people may be able to view a movie at the same time in a theater; the owner
of the theater may charge each and every one of them for the privilege. If
someone does not wish to buy a ticket the owner may exclude him, even if
there are 500 empty seats in the theater that night. The theater patrons
presumably find value in that movie, and in having a place to view it. That
value belongs to the producer of the movie and the owner of the theater.
They created that value and thus have sole claim to it. None of the patrons
has any claim whatever.
> Information, on the other hand, is not scarce - we may not be able to
> use the same CD at once, but if we each have our own CD we can use the
> "same" program.
Information certainly is scarce --- until someone creates it, it does not
exist. Once created, whatever value it has --- 100% of it --- is the
property of its creator. It is the *value* of the thing which is the
owner's property, regardless of its physical form.
> If you sell me
> your program, my copy is mine, and using force to prevent me from using
> it as I wish is an initiation of agression.
If I *sell* you the program, that is certainly true. However, if I
*license* it you for a limited time or for a limited purpose, then that
*value* is all you have bought. If you attempt to seize more value from it
than what you have paid for, then you commit theft. It is like one of a
group of teenagers buying a movie ticket, then, once inside, sneaking open
the back door to admit his buddies. Then when they are caught, protesting,
"What's the big deal? There are plenty of empty seats!"
> Forcing people to treat an
> unlimited resource as if it is scarce (like intellectual property) is
> just as bad as forcing people to treat a scarce resource like it's
> unlimited (socialism).
You are again confusing the physical properties of the resource with the
moral properties, and it is the latter which define "property." A resource
may not be phyically scarce, *but its value is*. People who produce
software, novels, movies, music, inventions, etc., do so in order to create
value --- to produce something others will find valuable, and thus for
which they will be willing to pay. Being willing to pay means that *they*
must perform some service, must create some value of their own they can
exchange for the software they value. The software thief is a free-luncher
--- he expects to realize the value of software someone else has produced,
without contributing any value himself. He is a moocher.
> In a free society, information can still be valuable if you use it to
> create a valuable product and be first to market. But information
> itself is not property, since in its truest form information is just
> ideas or thought processes.
Information is the most valuable and important property there is. Those who
produce it create more value than all the oil wells in Arabia. And that
value belongs entirely to its creators.
> But, the government would also
> no longer prevent you from using and improving every idea at your
> disposal to create something people want!
You may improve anything you wish, and fully expect to be paid for those
efforts. Most patents are for improvements to existing products.
Dan Clore
> Dan Clore wrote:
>>Michael Price wrote:
>>>uri wrote:
>>>>Publius wrote:
>>>>>Concentrations of wealth will occur because people differ in their talents,
>>>>>strengths, motives, and interests. If I write a useful software program and
>>>>>offer it to others for $10, and 1 million of them buy it, I will have a
>>>>>concentration of wealth. Since no one was compelled to buy it, no one has
>>>>>been exploited. You will only be able to prevent that concentration of wealth
>>>>>by force. And then your "socialism" is no longer libertarian.
>>
>>>>The fact that private ownership over the means of production is
>>>>protected by state force is what i see as illigatimate.
>>>
>>> When has private ownership over anything been protected by State
>>>forces? The State is specifically the force that can take your property without
>>>your consent or paying fair value. Property is protected by property
>>>owners. The State stole some of the property and then claimed that it was using it
>>>to protect the property of others. While the State has some sucess in
>>>catching small incompetent thieves they have little sucess in reducing overall
>>>levels of thievery. If the State were to disappear far more effective means of
>>>protecting property, in the means of production and in other things.
>>
>>One case of private ownership being protected by State
>>forces occurs in Publius's post. Without government-enforced
>>intellectual property, those who owned copies of the useful
>>software he offers to sell for $10 could freely sell [it]
>>themselves, or make copies free of charge.
>
> Could they? Presumably all sales were on condition of the purchaser
> not doing that.
I see no reason for that presumption. Even assuming it true,
though, this would likely not prevent copying by others who
never made any such agreement. Say someone else in the
household of the licensee copies the software. This
individual would never have entered into any agreement not
to distribute it, nor would any subsequent possessors of the
program. I suspect that Publius would still use the State to
enforce his property claim against them.
--
Dan Clore
My collected fiction, _The Unspeakable and Others_:
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/1587154838/thedanclorenecro/
Lord We˙rdgliffe & Necronomicon Page:
Publius
> I see no reason for that presumption. Even assuming it true,
> though, this would likely not prevent copying by others who
> never made any such agreement. Say someone else in the
> household of the licensee copies the software. This
> individual would never have entered into any agreement not
> to distribute it, nor would any subsequent possessors of the
> program. I suspect that Publius would still use the State to
> enforce his property claim against them.
Whenever you are in possession of someone else's property you have a duty of
custodial care of that property. If you rent a car and your teenage son
steals and wrecks it, you will pay the bill.
As for the seeking the help of the State: of course it should assist in
recovering that property, and bringing the thief to justice. That is why it
exists. And the household member is clearly a thief --- he has appropriated
value belonging to someone else without the owner's permission.
jbd...@hotmail.com
Says whom? And all it takes is one of them to give a copy to someone,
and how would you know who distributed the copy?
> Now you could argue that private efforts to prevent it would not be
> as effective as State efforts, but I don't see why that would be so.
Who would you appeal to to stop it?
> Very few violators of intellectual property rights are imprisoned or fined more
> than they gained by the theft.
It is certainly very poorly enforced, and impossible to enforce
thoroughly, as virtually any bogus crime is.
> In fact the State has a habit of violating intellectual property when
> it suits it's purposes, as for example the database program they stole and gave to
> other State's intelligence agencies (with security holes added).
Of course, such rights were invented by the state for its own
utilitarian ends. Obviously it will dispense with them when it suits
its ends.
jbd...@hotmail.com
How would you know I made copies, if I had made them?
jbd...@hotmail.com
> Dan Clore <cl...@columbia-center.org> wrote in
> news:46fj35F...@individual.net:
>
> > I see no reason for that presumption. Even assuming it true,
> > though, this would likely not prevent copying by others who
> > never made any such agreement. Say someone else in the
> > household of the licensee copies the software. This
> > individual would never have entered into any agreement not
> > to distribute it, nor would any subsequent possessors of the
> > program. I suspect that Publius would still use the State to
> > enforce his property claim against them.
>
> Whenever you are in possession of someone else's property you have a duty of
> custodial care of that property.
But I don't recognize your imaginary property. Without the state to
force me to recognize it, what do you do?
> If you rent a car and your teenage son
> steals and wrecks it, you will pay the bill.
But the imaginary property is not a rented item or a tangible item. It
can't be "wrecked".
And you reveal that the only possibly obligated person is somebody who
bought a copy from you, if they agreed to any such conditions in the
first place. If someone else gets a copy somehow they never agreed to
anything. Good luck finding that first user ("custodian") who didn't
uphold his duties and gave one away.
jbd...@hotmail.com
> asoko...@gmail.com wrote in news:1140932346.641428.34590
> @t39g2000cwt.googlegroups.com:
>
> > "Intellectual property" is not property. Property can only be used by
> > one person at a time, that is, if you own your car, I don't also own
> > it, since we can't use it do do different things at the same time.
> > Physical items are scarce.
>
> You make the usual mistake there, namely, equating property with physical
> objects. Certain physical goods may well be scarce, but that is not what
> qualifies them as "property."
I think you're exactly wrong about this. That is where the moral
grounds for property arise, that if I take your property for my needs,
you don't have it to use for your needs. End of story. No B.S. about
vague "value" and other nonsense.
If we can't both use it the same and there must be some mechanism to
say who gets to use it when, and who doesn't and when. Hence,
property.
There is no such need or moral grounds for your imaginary property.
> Property is a moral concept, not a physical
> one, and whether or not it applies to a thing has nothing to do with its
> physical composition. Because many of the things treated as property are
> physical objects, people become tempted to suppose the physical
> characteristics of those things are somehow involved in the definition of
> "property." But they aren't.
>
> The term "property" is derived from "proper;" it refers to those things of
> which one is in "proper possession," or properly holds. What one properly
> holds,
If that's all it means then it's completely subjective. People think
different things are "proper". Claiming exclusive ownership of ideas
or notions, for instance, is improper imo, an Orwellian power grab.
> and thus may claim as one's property, are those things one has
> acquired by first possession, i.e., by discovering or creating them,
"those things" is hopelessly broad. Here:
FIZZA FLUSABOG
I just "discovered or created" that "thing". But I have no legitimate
claim to it. If you find something valueable in that, it's certainly
your moral right to use FIZZA FLUSABOG or change it or give or tell it
to your friends for them to use it. I have no legitimate claim to the
contrary.
The moral reason is that anyone else can use it and it does not
diminish my ability to use it. If others wanted to use it, it would
just be extortion for me to demand that they pay me a fee or else I'm
going to sick the state on them. All I'm trying to do is make their
life difficult, and prevent them from using what they already have, so
they are forced to pay me to do for them what they could already do
themselves, and give them what they already have.
> or else via a "chain of consent" from the first possessor. It makes no
> difference whatsoever whether the thing claimed is a physical object; all
> that matters is whether it has some *value*.
That doesn't matter either. Everything has "value" of some sort or
other, and it's constantly changing. Your claim to a "value" is
actually a claim to a state enforced monopoly on a market.
Your claim is to the monopoly control all transactions of a _category
of product_, and the vague boundaries of this category are defined by
how the state defines the arbitrary boundaries of your "intellectual
property".
> If it does, then that value
> belongs to the creator or discoverer of that valuable thing, but for whom
> that value would not exist.
No other form of property is based on such nonsense. If I own an apple
I don't own any "value". I own an apple. Its "value" or lackthereof
is irrelevant to my ownership. And I own it whether it has value or
not. End of story. If I blow my nose into my kleenex, I own that
kleenex. It doesn't matter that it has no value. If it never has
value I own it. If it becomes a collector's item in ten years, I still
own it. It doesn't make a difference. It's not based on "value",
however that vague notion is defined.
You need to construct bogus and undefined "property" as owning a vague
notion like a "value" because there's no _piece of property_ there.
It's imaginary.
> It makes no difference whatsoever how may people can use it at once. 1000
> people may be able to view a movie at the same time in a theater; the owner
> of the theater may charge each and every one of them for the privilege.
Indeed, because his property is not the abstract notion of the "movie".
It's the space of the auditorium, which is of limited use, and is
alienateable from the owner, from which the notions of property and
exclusion arise. The draw into the auditorium could be anything or
nothing and the right remains.
> If someone does not wish to buy a ticket the owner may exclude him, even if
> there are 500 empty seats in the theater that night.
The theater is a tangible property. The onwer doesn't have to admit
anyone, regardless of seats, empty or full. If he doesn't have this
right, the seats would always be full. Then people are still excluded
again as well, because the limits of the space are exceeded.
> The theater patrons
> presumably find value in that movie, and in having a place to view it. That
> value belongs to the producer of the movie and the owner of the theater.
> They created that value and thus have sole claim to it. None of the patrons
> has any claim whatever.
To make such a claim they'd be violating his right to his tangible
property.
> > Information, on the other hand, is not scarce - we may not be able to
> > use the same CD at once, but if we each have our own CD we can use the
> > "same" program.
>
> Information certainly is scarce --- until someone creates it, it does not
> exist.
That is not scarcity. And information is typically discovered, not
"created".
> Once created, whatever value it has --- 100% of it --- is the
> property of its creator. It is the *value* of the thing which is the
> owner's property, regardless of its physical form.
>
> > If you sell me
> > your program, my copy is mine, and using force to prevent me from using
> > it as I wish is an initiation of agression.
>
> If I *sell* you the program, that is certainly true. However, if I
> *license* it you for a limited time or for a limited purpose, then that
> *value* is all you have bought. If you attempt to seize more value from it
> than what you have paid for, then you commit theft. It is like one of a
> group of teenagers buying a movie ticket, then, once inside, sneaking open
> the back door to admit his buddies.
No it isn't. The movie theater is a tangible property of limited use.
The exclusion right arises for the same reason I described earlier.
It's the same exclusion right you have to keep them out of your house
or car.
> Then when they are caught, protesting,
> "What's the big deal? There are plenty of empty seats!"
That's a fairly reasonable argument to make in such a situation, and
occasionally theater owners will let stuff like that slide if there are
lots of empty seats. I've noticed this at large concerts quite a lot.
This, I think, is an inherent realisation that in such a case their use
will not actually diminish the use of others at that time. But still,
there's no way to do that generally and control the limited space of
the theater at the same time.
> > Forcing people to treat an
> > unlimited resource as if it is scarce (like intellectual property) is
> > just as bad as forcing people to treat a scarce resource like it's
> > unlimited (socialism).
>
> You are again confusing the physical properties of the resource with the
> moral properties, and it is the latter which define "property." A resource
> may not be phyically scarce, *but its value is*. People who produce
> software, novels, movies, music, inventions, etc., do so in order to create
> value
That's an extremely blinkered view of why people produce such things.
I think some have called it the Homo-Economicus view of humanity, very
inadequate.
> --- to produce something others will find valuable, and thus for
> which they will be willing to pay. Being willing to pay means that *they*
> must perform some service, must create some value of their own they can
> exchange for the software they value.
I guess this is the Newspeak way of saying he must give you some money.
> The software thief is a free-luncher
> --- he expects to realize the value of software someone else has produced,
> without contributing any value himself. He is a moocher.
IOW..he doesn't have to pay you because he can make the same thing for
himself because he already has everything necessary to make for himself
what you want to sell him. And since he makes the rational economic
choice to make it himself, you want the state to interfere in his
choices and attack him so you can have a payment extorted for you
without his consent.
But who knows? Maybe you're right. I teach guitar, and I've often had
this feeling that I'm being victimized by my students and their
friends, who I think are "free-lunchers" and "moochers". I show some
of "those things" I've discovered or created to my student, and then he
goes and shows "those things" to all his friends who haven't "created
value" and given it to _me_. These are the "free-luncher moochers" who
are stealing my rightful "value" for all "those things" that I
produced.
Would you mind joining me in a campaign to get my local government to
assist me in attacking these thieves, and those thief-enabling pricks I
used to call my students, to force them to pay reparations to me for
all of my lost "value"?
>
> > In a free society, information can still be valuable if you use it to
> > create a valuable product and be first to market. But information
> > itself is not property, since in its truest form information is just
> > ideas or thought processes.
>
> Information is the most valuable and important property there is. Those who
> produce it create more value than all the oil wells in Arabia. And that
> value belongs entirely to its creators.
Argument by assertion. The value belongs to anyone who has it. See, I
can do it too. If you don't know something and you hear it, that
information is now yours. It belongs to you just as it belongs to
anyone else who's heard it. It is theirs and yours to use, in its
entirety, as you wish.
uri
it was originally, then property itself is theft.
Publius
news:1141037846.6...@u72g2000cwu.googlegroups.com:
>> Whenever you are in possession of someone else's property you have a
>> duty of custodial care of that property.
> But I don't recognize your imaginary property. Without the state to
> force me to recognize it, what do you do?
The same thing I would do if you declared that "you did not recognize" any
other property of mine in the absence of a state. If I was aware of your
predatory impulses at the outset, I'd try to make sure you didn't get your
hands on any property of mine. If you managed to do so by stealth or fraud
(by concealing your intentions), then I'd hunt you down and take
compensation out of your hide, if I couldn't get it any other way. I.e.,
we'd have Hobbes' jungle.
All leftists assert that they "don't recognize" various classes of
property. Georgists declare that land cannot be property, Marxists declare
that factories cannot be property, etc. They are all trying to rationalize
some free lunch or other.
BTW, why would you wish to steal "imaginary property"? You can create all
the imaginary property you wish on your own.
>> If you rent a car and your teenage son
>> steals and wrecks it, you will pay the bill.
>
> But the imaginary property is not a rented item or a tangible item. It
> can't be "wrecked".
Software can be stolen, however (it is not "imaginary," of course, else
you would not be interested in posesessing it).
You may wish to read my response to "asokoloski" (this thread) on the
basis of property. Being tangible has nothing to do with whether something
qualifies as property.
> And you reveal that the only possibly obligated person is somebody who
> bought a copy from you, if they agreed to any such conditions in the
> first place. If someone else gets a copy somehow they never agreed to
> anything. Good luck finding that first user ("custodian") who didn't
> uphold his duties and gave one away.
It may not be possible to find the person guilty of breach of contract. It
may not be possible to find a car thief, either --- it may have been
transferred several times before it is recovered. But whoever possesses it
when recovered is guilty of posession of stolen property. So is the
software thief.
Publius
news:1141037661.2...@i39g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:
>> Well, that is the classical rationale for the State, and the only one I
>> know of with any semblance of validity --- namely, the protection of
>> each person's property against trespasses by others.
>>
>> Are you suggesting that each person should provide that protection for
>> himself? I.e., if you make copies of the software I've licensed to you,
>> despite your agreement not to do so, should I hire a hit man to take
>> care of the problem, rather than complain to the State?
>
> How would you know I made copies, if I had made them?
Someone would eventually spill the beans, and reveal from whom he had
obtained his pirated copy. Or I might have an ID string buried in the code.
Then the hit man would be dispatched.
Publius
news:1141041798.9...@i39g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
>> You make the usual mistake there, namely, equating property with
>> physical objects. Certain physical goods may well be scarce, but that
>> is not what qualifies them as "property."
> I think you're exactly wrong about this. That is where the moral
> grounds for property arise, that if I take your property for my needs,
> you don't have it to use for your needs. End of story. No B.S. about
> vague "value" and other nonsense.
I think you'd find the mistake there if you gave the matter a moment's
thought. *Most* property one acquires is not acquired to meet one's own
personal needs, i.e., for one's own consumption. It is acquired to provide
a value to others. If someone builds a movie theater or hotel, he does not
do so to provide himself a place to watch movies, or a place to sleep. A
doctor does not attend medical school in order to learn how to treat
himself; a mechanic does not learn that skill in order to be sure he can
fix his own car. Those assets and skills are all *capital goods* --- they
are created or developed in order to be able to provide services to
others, for which those others will be expected to pay.
Software and other intellectual property is produced for the same reason
--- to supply a value to others, for which they will be expected to pay.
Thus you misconstrue "needs" in your comment above. The "need" to be
satisfied is not the software developer's own use of that software; the
"need," the purpose for which he writes it, is to create an income stream
for himself by providing a service others will value, just as the doctor
does by attending medical school.
BTW, I'm surprised you find the concept of value "vague." It is quite
well-defined, and indeed all of economic theory depends on it. It is
"needs" which are vague.
> If we can't both use it the same and there must be some mechanism to
> say who gets to use it when, and who doesn't and when. Hence,
> property.
Someone must have the power to say who may use it when regardless of how
many people can use it at once. The latter is entirely irrelevant. And the
person who *properly* has that power is the creator or discoverer of that
asset.
>> Property is a moral concept, not a physical
>> one, and whether or not it applies to a thing has nothing to do with
>> its physical composition. Because many of the things treated as
>> property are physical objects, people become tempted to suppose the
>> physical characteristics of those things are somehow involved in the
>> definition of "property." But they aren't.
>>
>> The term "property" is derived from "proper;" it refers to those things
>> of which one is in "proper possession," or properly holds. What one
>> properly holds,
> If that's all it means then it's completely subjective. People think
> different things are "proper". Claiming exclusive ownership of ideas
> or notions, for instance, is improper imo, an Orwellian power grab.
Actually it is quite objective. There has scarely been a society in
history (I know of none) which did not assign property titles on the basis
of first possession --- which did not regard those things which one has
discovered or created as one's "proper possessions." Such possessions are
"proper" because they were acquired without inflicting losses or injuries
on anyone else.
> "those things" is hopelessly broad. Here:
>
> FIZZA FLUSABOG
>
> I just "discovered or created" that "thing". But I have no legitimate
> claim to it. If you find something valueable in that, it's certainly
> your moral right to use FIZZA FLUSABOG or change it or give or tell it
> to your friends for them to use it. I have no legitimate claim to the
> contrary.
Well, whatever right you may have had you have apparently just
surrendered. No doubt you did so because you doubted that anyone would
find any value in that string of characters, and thus would not likely be
willing to pay you to use them. A lot of music, software, novels, etc.,
meet the same fate.
> The moral reason is that anyone else can use it and it does not
> diminish my ability to use it.
Re-read the first paragraph above on consumer vs. capital goods.
> If others wanted to use it, it would
> just be extortion for me to demand that they pay me a fee or else I'm
> going to sick the state on them.
Is the doctor an "extortionist"? The mechanic? The guy who rents
apartments or tools at Rent-A-Center? All of them could make their
services or assets available to you without depriving themselves of those
services; they probably don't personally use them anyway. They would only
lose their source of income.
Of course, there is a widely-held belief, especially among the Left, that
all of them should do exactly that. That is the "organic fallacy" --- the
belief that societies are organisms, in which each cell (individual
person) has a primary obligation to serve the purposes and meet the needs
of the organism "as a whole." Thus anyone who demands compensation for his
services, beyond what is necessary to meet his own "needs" (which may not
exceed those of anyone else), is an extortionist, an "exploiter."
But of course that is a badly mistaken view of the structure of society.
> All I'm trying to do is make their
> life difficult, and prevent them from using what they already have, so
> they are forced to pay me to do for them what they could already do
> themselves, and give them what they already have.
I'm not following. That certainly looks inconsistent. If they can write
the software themselves, then why bother to steal it? Or are they trying
to avoid investing the time and effort which would be required to write it
themselves? If the latter, then it would seem that buying it from you
would make their lives *easier*, not "more difficult." Or are you simply
saying that *stealing* it is easier than writing it or earning the money
to buy it?
But the latter is true of anything --- stealing a car is much easier than
building one or working to earn enough to buy one. That is why we have
thieves of all kinds.
> That doesn't matter either. Everything has "value" of some sort or
> other, and it's constantly changing. Your claim to a "value" is
> actually a claim to a state enforced monopoly on a market.
Er, no. Not everything has a value. Your character string, for example,
does not. You need to get a grip on the concept of value.
An object *x* has a value V to *p* if *p* (a person) is willing to give up
V to obtain *x* (which may be anything whatsoever, except another person).
V represents the set of all equivalent things (time, money, effort, other
goods), any of which *p* would give up in order to obtain *x*. Goods in
that set are equivalent if *p* would not give up any of them to obtain any
of the others, i.e., he is indifferent between them.
If *p* would not be willing to give up anything to obtain your character
string above, then that string is worthless to *p*. If he would be willing
to give up something to obtain it, then its value V to him is whatever he
would be willing to give up.
What any agent will be willing to give up in order to obtain another thing
can, in general, be determined empirically. That means we can, on
empirical grounds, attach a *value hierarchy* to each agent *p*, which is
the list of his values ranked in order of importance (he is willing to
give up something ranking lower on that list to obtain something ranking
higher).
The values of things are thus always relative to agents. But you can say
that a thing *x* as value V "in itself" as long as there is *at least one
person* willing to give up V to obtain that thing. If more than one person
values *x*, then the "value of *x*" is whatever the current holder of *x*
values most from among the things different valuers are willing to offer.
Hope this clears up the concept of value somewhat.
> Your claim is to the monopoly control all transactions of a _category
> of product_, and the vague boundaries of this category are defined by
> how the state defines the arbitrary boundaries of your "intellectual
> property".
A "category"? Where does that come from? If I write a piece of software, I
have no monopoly control of that *category* of software. I have control
only over the particular code set that I've written. It is indeed a
monopoly control, however. All property creates "monopoly control" over
that property in the hands of its owner.
>> If it does, then that value
>> belongs to the creator or discoverer of that valuable thing, but for
>> whom that value would not exist.
> No other form of property is based on such nonsense.
That is just a simple mistake. All property is based on the very same
premise, namely, that all value derivable from that property belongs to
the owner. I.e., if I own a house, then I may not only decide to live in
the house; I may also decide to rent the house, or conduct tours of the
house (perhaps it is an historic house). I may also dismantle the house
and sell its components. That is, whatever *value* may be realizable from
that house, regardless of its form or source, accrues to me. That is what
is meant by saying the the house is my property.
> If I own an apple
> I don't own any "value". I own an apple. Its "value" or lackthereof
> is irrelevant to my ownership.
I'll give you a chance to re-think that in light of the above. But I'll
suggest that if an apple farmer discovered that no one valued his apples,
and would not buy them, he would think that mattered a great deal to his
ownership of them.
> You need to construct bogus and undefined "property" as owning a vague
> notion like a "value" because there's no _piece of property_ there.
> It's imaginary.
Are you still confusing "property" with physical objects?
>> It makes no difference whatsoever how may people can use it at once.
>> 1000 people may be able to view a movie at the same time in a theater;
>> the owner of the theater may charge each and every one of them for the
>> privilege.
> Indeed, because his property is not the abstract notion of the "movie".
> It's the space of the auditorium, which is of limited use, and is
> alienateable from the owner, from which the notions of property and
> exclusion arise. The draw into the auditorium could be anything or
> nothing and the right remains.
Are you suggesting the movie patrons pay to enter the theater just for a
place to sit for an hour or two?
> To make such a claim they'd be violating his right to his tangible
> property.
Well, earlier you claimed that that right was based on his being denied
its use if others used it. Since that situation does not obtain here, upon
what is his "right" now based?
>> Information certainly is scarce --- until someone creates it, it does
>> not exist.
> That is not scarcity.
It isn't? That which does not exist is not scarce?
> And information is typically discovered, not "created".
Ah. Microsoft Word always existed, perhaps as a Platonic Form, and
Microsoft's programmers just discovered it? Likewise with "Jurassic Park"
(both the movie and the book)?
But it doesn't actually matter. Discovery and creation are both cases of
first-possession, and thus either is sufficient to establish ownership.
>> If I *sell* you the program, that is certainly true. However, if I
>> *license* it you for a limited time or for a limited purpose, then that
>> *value* is all you have bought. If you attempt to seize more value from
>> it than what you have paid for, then you commit theft. It is like one
>> of a group of teenagers buying a movie ticket, then, once inside,
>> sneaking open the back door to admit his buddies.
> No it isn't. The movie theater is a tangible property of limited use.
> The exclusion right arises for the same reason I described earlier.
> It's the same exclusion right you have to keep them out of your house
> or car.
Er, no. I wish to keep others out of my house because if they inhabit it,
I can't. But I don't wish to exclude them from my theater because they
will deny me a seat. I wish to exclude them because they are not paying,
and I built the theater to create an income stream. And the fact that
seats are limited is irrelevant, because those limits are not now being
approached. If 3 or 4 boys sneak in there will still be empty seats. But I
will exclude them anyway, because they may come back tomorrow and buy
tickets. And that is the reason the theater exists --- to provide an
income stream for me, *not* to provide a "public service" or fulfill a
"common good" or meet the needs of a social organism.
>> You are again confusing the physical properties of the resource with
>> the moral properties, and it is the latter which define "property." A
>> resource may not be phyically scarce, *but its value is*. People who
>> produce software, novels, movies, music, inventions, etc., do so in
>> order to create value
> That's an extremely blinkered view of why people produce such things.
> I think some have called it the Homo-Economicus view of humanity, very
> inadequate.
It is not the only reason people produce things --- many people write
software, music, etc., and immediately place it in the public domain. But
it is a major reason people produce things. And of course, that is a
decision each creator of software, music, etc., is free to make. The point
is that, being its creator, it is his property. If he wishes to place it
in the public domain he may certainly do so. If he wishes to license it
for limited use, or dispose of it in some other way, then he may do those
things also. Others may not *assume* that he created it as a charitable
project, for their benefit, especially if he has stated otherwise.
The "Homo-Economicus" analysis is false --- it is a generalization
mistaken for a universal. But at least it is true as a generalization. The
Organic Fallacy, on the other hand, is not even true as a generalization.
>> The software thief is a free-luncher
>> --- he expects to realize the value of software someone else has
>> produced, without contributing any value himself. He is a moocher.
> IOW..he doesn't have to pay you because he can make the same thing for
> himself because he already has everything necessary to make for himself
> what you want to sell him.
Why doesn't he then? Or are you merely saying he has what he needs to make
copies?
Howe many copies could he make without the code?
> But who knows? Maybe you're right. I teach guitar, and I've often had
> this feeling that I'm being victimized by my students and their
> friends, who I think are "free-lunchers" and "moochers". I show some
> of "those things" I've discovered or created to my student, and then he
> goes and shows "those things" to all his friends who haven't "created
> value" and given it to _me_. These are the "free-luncher moochers" who
> are stealing my rightful "value" for all "those things" that I
> produced.
Are they stealing it, or are you giving it away? Sounds like you are
giving it away. Which you're perfectly entitled to do. But you may not
demand that everyone else do likewise.
>> Information is the most valuable and important property there is. Those
>> who produce it create more value than all the oil wells in Arabia. And
>> that value belongs entirely to its creators.
> Argument by assertion.
Er, no. It is economic fact. In the US 97% of the economy is non-tangible
goods --- services, technologies, entertainments, etc. --- value added by
the intellect. Only 3% is attributable to basic resources. Intellectual
property is the bulk of all property.
jbd...@hotmail.com
> jbd...@hotmail.com wrote in
> news:1141037846.6...@u72g2000cwu.googlegroups.com:
>
> >> Whenever you are in possession of someone else's property you have a
> >> duty of custodial care of that property.
>
> > But I don't recognize your imaginary property. Without the state to
> > force me to recognize it, what do you do?
>
> The same thing I would do if you declared that "you did not recognize" any
> other property of mine in the absence of a state. If I was aware of your
> predatory impulses at the outset, I'd try to make sure you didn't get your
> hands on any property of mine. If you managed to do so by stealth or fraud
> (by concealing your intentions), then I'd hunt you down and take
> compensation out of your hide, if I couldn't get it any other way. I.e.,
> we'd have Hobbes' jungle.
Sounds good to me. Good luck with that.
I wouldn't use stealth or fraud though. I'd probably just look for a
more reasonable supplier, and not trouble you about it, so you don't
have to worry.
> All leftists assert that they "don't recognize" various classes of
> property. Georgists declare that land cannot be property, Marxists declare
> that factories cannot be property, etc. They are all trying to rationalize
> some free lunch or other.
>
> BTW, why would you wish to steal "imaginary property"?
I wouldn't. I'd wish to use ideas that i posess and my property to
make things that are useful to me or others. Some raving lunatic might
come try to kill me for "stealing" some imaginary property, but I'd be
fully justified in defending myself from such a lunatic.
> You can create all the imaginary property you wish on your own.
Of course.
> >> If you rent a car and your teenage son
> >> steals and wrecks it, you will pay the bill.
> >
> > But the imaginary property is not a rented item or a tangible item. It
> > can't be "wrecked".
>
> Software can be stolen,
Only via the taking of a tangible item away from someone.
> however (it is not "imaginary," of course, else
> you would not be interested in posesessing it).
>
> You may wish to read my response to "asokoloski" (this thread) on the
> basis of property. Being tangible has nothing to do with whether something
> qualifies as property.
Your arguments consist mainly of arguments by assertion, and thus are
not very convincing.
> > And you reveal that the only possibly obligated person is somebody who
> > bought a copy from you, if they agreed to any such conditions in the
> > first place. If someone else gets a copy somehow they never agreed to
> > anything. Good luck finding that first user ("custodian") who didn't
> > uphold his duties and gave one away.
>
> It may not be possible to find the person guilty of breach of contract. It
> may not be possible to find a car thief, either --- it may have been
> transferred several times before it is recovered. But whoever possesses it
> when recovered is guilty of posession of stolen property. So is the
> software thief.
Bad analogy. What you're describing is not a "software thief" or
"stolen property". You're describing people who've made and possess
copies of something.
The closer car analogy would be to persons who had each made and
posessed a replica of your stolen car. And you would be the
sociopathic lunatic running around claiming that each of them have
your stolen car, and they have to pay you an extortion payment or
you'll kill them.
jbd...@hotmail.com
> <jbd...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:1141041798.9...@i39g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
>
> >> You make the usual mistake there, namely, equating property with
> >> physical objects. Certain physical goods may well be scarce, but that
> >> is not what qualifies them as "property."
> > I think you're exactly wrong about this. That is where the moral
> > grounds for property arise, that if I take your property for my needs,
> > you don't have it to use for your needs. End of story. No B.S. about
> > vague "value" and other nonsense.
>
> I think you'd find the mistake there if you gave the matter a moment's
> thought. *Most* property one acquires is not acquired to meet one's own
> personal needs, i.e., for one's own consumption. It is acquired to provide
> a value to others. If someone builds a movie theater or hotel, he does not
> do so to provide himself a place to watch movies, or a place to sleep. A
> doctor does not attend medical school in order to learn how to treat
> himself; a mechanic does not learn that skill in order to be sure he can
> fix his own car. Those assets and skills are all *capital goods* --- they
> are created or developed in order to be able to provide services to
> others, for which those others will be expected to pay.
None of this matters a whit. All of the above are the owner's use.
The owner's use of an item may be to break it, to stare at it, or to
trade it. It makes no difference to my points.
> Software and other intellectual property is produced for the same reason
> --- to supply a value to others, for which they will be expected to pay.
>
> Thus you misconstrue "needs" in your comment above. The "need" to be
> satisfied is not the software developer's own use of that software; the
> "need," the purpose for which he writes it, is to create an income stream
> for himself by providing a service others will value,
>
> just as the doctor does by attending medical school.
>
> BTW, I'm surprised you find the concept of value "vague."
So tell me the "value" of your program that you claim to own. And be
very specific. You can't because the "value" is no particular thing
and is not defineable.
You're talking about a speculative future value of a notion of
something. Yeah, nothing vague about that.
> It is quite well-defined, and indeed all of economic theory depends on it. It is
> "needs" which are vague.
>
> > If we can't both use it the same and there must be some mechanism to
> > say who gets to use it when, and who doesn't and when. Hence,
> > property.
>
> Someone must have the power to say who may use it when regardless of how
> many people can use it at once.
Argument by assertion again. I see no grounds for such a claim. Why
"must" someone have this power, other than because you want them to
have it? I see just the opposite.
> The latter is entirely irrelevant. And the
> person who *properly* has that power is the creator or discoverer of that
> asset.
More argument by assertion.
> >> Property is a moral concept, not a physical
> >> one, and whether or not it applies to a thing has nothing to do with
> >> its physical composition. Because many of the things treated as
> >> property are physical objects, people become tempted to suppose the
> >> physical characteristics of those things are somehow involved in the
> >> definition of "property." But they aren't.
> >>
> >> The term "property" is derived from "proper;" it refers to those things
> >> of which one is in "proper possession," or properly holds. What one
> >> properly holds,
>
> > If that's all it means then it's completely subjective. People think
> > different things are "proper". Claiming exclusive ownership of ideas
> > or notions, for instance, is improper imo, an Orwellian power grab.
>
> Actually it is quite objective. There has scarely been a society in
> history (I know of none) which did not assign property titles on the basis
> of first possession --- which did not regard those things which one has
> discovered or created as one's "proper possessions."
I don't know about your assertions, but the relevant point is that
you're conflating "property" with "intellectual property" here, while
I'm drawing out distinctions. This is merely a form of assuming your
own conclusion.
There was no society that had "intellectual property" until a couple
hundred years ago. That means such "property" did not exist among the
human race for the overwhelming bulk of its history. And even when
they did arise they were not invented by the State on the grounds of
any moral right of "creators". They were based on utilitarian notions
of providing extra incentives for the creation of what at the time they
viewed as socially useful things for the "common good" of the "social
organism".
> Such possessions are
> "proper" because they were acquired without inflicting losses or injuries
> on anyone else.
IP does inflict loss and injury. It creates, for example, a forcible
limitation on my property and my ability to use ideas that i possess as
I wish to meet my own needs or wants or those of others.
> > "those things" is hopelessly broad. Here:
> >
> > FIZZA FLUSABOG
> >
> > I just "discovered or created" that "thing". But I have no legitimate
> > claim to it. If you find something valueable in that, it's certainly
> > your moral right to use FIZZA FLUSABOG or change it or give or tell it
> > to your friends for them to use it. I have no legitimate claim to the
> > contrary.
>
> Well, whatever right you may have had you have apparently just
> surrendered.
Assuming I didn't, you think I had an inherent moral right to control
the actions of anyone else in the human race who wanted to use "FIZZA
FLUSABOG" without my authorization?
> No doubt you did so because you doubted that anyone would
> find any value in that string of characters, and thus would not likely be
> willing to pay you to use them. A lot of music, software, novels, etc.,
> meet the same fate.
I did so because I was making the point that I have no legitimate moral
claim to exclusive ownership of it, regardless of whether others find
it valuable or not.
> > The moral reason is that anyone else can use it and it does not
> > diminish my ability to use it.
>
> Re-read the first paragraph above on consumer vs. capital goods.
An irrelevant paragraph. You may want to use it for yourself or use it
to give or sell to someone else. It makes no difference to my
argument, or to your ownership. Your reply on that point doesn't
change anything.
> > If others wanted to use it, it would
> > just be extortion for me to demand that they pay me a fee or else I'm
> > going to sick the state on them.
>
> Is the doctor an "extortionist"? The mechanic? The guy who rents
> apartments or tools at Rent-A-Center? All of them could make their
> services or assets available to you without depriving themselves of those
> services;
If I'm using their service at any given time, then they or others can
not use it at that time. Not true of your software.
> they probably don't personally use them anyway. They would only
> lose their source of income.
>
> Of course, there is a widely-held belief, especially among the Left, that
> all of them should do exactly that. That is the "organic fallacy" --- the
> belief that societies are organisms, in which each cell (individual
> person) has a primary obligation to serve the purposes and meet the needs
> of the organism "as a whole."
>
> Thus anyone who demands compensation for his
> services, beyond what is necessary to meet his own "needs" (which may not
> exceed those of anyone else), is an extortionist, an "exploiter."
>
> But of course that is a badly mistaken view of the structure of society.
Whatever, again, no relevance to this discussion. I'm not claiming
that someone selling a service is extortion. I'm claiming that me
forcing you not to provide yourself a service, so that you must
instead pay me an inflated monopoly price to do it, makes me an
extortionist.
> > All I'm trying to do is make their
> > life difficult, and prevent them from using what they already have, so
> > they are forced to pay me to do for them what they could already do
> > themselves, and give them what they already have.
>
> I'm not following. That certainly looks inconsistent. If they can write
> the software themselves, then why bother to steal it?
No one is bothering to steal it. They already know how to make their
own copies themselves, so there's no reason to steal it.
> Or are they trying
> to avoid investing the time and effort which would be required to write it
> themselves?
I should hope so. If the software to do the desired task is already
written, writing it again is just wasted effort and initiative, which
could be put to other tasks which might be worthwhile.
> If the latter, then it would seem that buying it from you
> would make their lives *easier*, not "more difficult." Or are you simply
> saying that *stealing* it is easier than writing it or earning the money
> to buy it?
No, I'm saying that making a copy themselves is easier and more cost
effective than buying a copy that you're making to try to sell to them
at an inflated monopoly price.
> But the latter is true of anything --- stealing a car is much easier than
> building one or working to earn enough to buy one. That is why we have
> thieves of all kinds.
Of course. If I take your car you don't have it anymore. That
wouldn't be right.
...
> > Your claim is to the monopoly control all transactions of a _category
> > of product_, and the vague boundaries of this category are defined by
> > how the state defines the arbitrary boundaries of your "intellectual
> > property".
>
> A "category"? Where does that come from?
>From the creation of "intellectual property". This creates an
exclusive right over a vague notion of something, which then may be
incorporated into any number of items in the marketplace. The totality
of all these items make up the _category of product_ over which
monopoly pricing rights are imposed.
> If I write a piece of software, I
> have no monopoly control of that *category* of software.
I said "category of product". The "software" is not one item. It's
not even any particular number of items. It's merely an idea, a
formula for accomplishing a task. It's a potentially endless number of
goods, and derivatives, the market for which is monopolized and
competition in which is forbidden by state decree.
> I have control only over the particular code set that I've written. It is indeed a
> monopoly control, however. All property creates "monopoly control" over
> that property in the hands of its owner.
But your "property" control creates "monopoly control" over every good
in anyone else's hands that uses the same number as yours.
That's not the same as me having "monopoly control" of the shirt I'm
wearing. It's the same as me having monopoly control over the shirt
I'm wearing and all the shirts in the world that anyone else makes that
look like the one I'm wearing, which is by extension, potentially a
form of monopoly control over the lives of every individual on the
planet.
> >> If it does, then that value
> >> belongs to the creator or discoverer of that valuable thing, but for
> >> whom that value would not exist.
>
> > No other form of property is based on such nonsense.
>
> That is just a simple mistake. All property is based on the very same
> premise, namely, that all value derivable from that property belongs to
> the owner.
This is also false. If you fix up your house, that may increase the
value of your neighbor's house, hence that "value" is "derivable" from
your property, but you dont' own the increased "value" of their house.
You own your house. End of story.
> I.e., if I own a house, then I may not only decide to live in
> the house; I may also decide to rent the house, or conduct tours of the
> house (perhaps it is an historic house). I may also dismantle the house
> and sell its components.
Of course, but you can't attack or extort a payment from me for
building a replica of your house and doing all those same things with
it.
> That is, whatever *value* may be realizable from
> that house, regardless of its form or source, accrues to me. That is what
> is meant by saying the the house is my property.
No, what is meant is that you own the house. Blabbering about "value"
confuses and complicates the meaning by adding a completely pointless
layer of abstraction. Nothing is added by bringing up "value" that
isn't contained in the statement "i own the house".
> > If I own an apple
> > I don't own any "value". I own an apple. Its "value" or lackthereof
> > is irrelevant to my ownership.
>
> I'll give you a chance to re-think that in light of the above.
No need. It's as true now as it was when I first wrote it, and when
you "stole" it to use in your own post without compensating me for my
creation.
> But I'll suggest that if an apple farmer discovered that no one valued his apples,
> and would not buy them, he would think that mattered a great deal to his
> ownership of them.
He might think it "mattered" in some way but it does nothing to change
the fact of his ownership, undermining entirely, your claims. If his
apples had no value or if they were priceless, he owns them the same.
That he might like the second scenario better makes no difference to
ownership.
> > You need to construct bogus and undefined "property" as owning a vague
> > notion like a "value" because there's no _piece of property_ there.
> > It's imaginary.
>
> Are you still confusing "property" with physical objects?
>
> >> It makes no difference whatsoever how may people can use it at once.
> >> 1000 people may be able to view a movie at the same time in a theater;
> >> the owner of the theater may charge each and every one of them for the
> >> privilege.
>
> > Indeed, because his property is not the abstract notion of the "movie".
> > It's the space of the auditorium, which is of limited use, and is
> > alienateable from the owner, from which the notions of property and
> > exclusion arise. The draw into the auditorium could be anything or
> > nothing and the right remains.
>
> Are you suggesting the movie patrons pay to enter the theater just for a
> place to sit for an hour or two?
No. It doesn't matter why they pay. This has no relevance to the
owner's exclusive right on the theater.
> > To make such a claim they'd be violating his right to his tangible
> > property.
>
> Well, earlier you claimed that that right was based on his being denied
> its use if others used it. Since that situation does not obtain here, upon
> what is his "right" now based?
It does obtain there. The owner doesn't have to let anyone in the
theater even if all the seats are empty. That has nothing to do with
it. The fact is that the theater is of limited space, so an
exclusionary right arises. Without that exclusionary right the owner
loses his posession, because then anyone can use it whenever and he
can't use it as he wants.
> >> Information certainly is scarce --- until someone creates it, it does
> >> not exist.
>
> > That is not scarcity.
>
> It isn't? That which does not exist is not scarce?
No. The economic concept of scarcity is about the availability of
existing goods, not about 5,000 pound flying marshmallow men or
anything else that doesn't exist.
> > And information is typically discovered, not "created".
>
> Ah. Microsoft Word always existed, perhaps as a Platonic Form, and
> Microsoft's programmers just discovered it? Likewise with "Jurassic Park"
> (both the movie and the book)?
>
> But it doesn't actually matter. Discovery and creation are both cases of
> first-possession, and thus either is sufficient to establish ownership.
Argument by assertion again.
Btw..by your logic, you owe a payment to the first person who uttered
the phrase "first-possession" or their descendants, since that
established that person's moral right to own it.
> >> Y
> >> If I *sell* you the program, that is certainly true. However, if I
> >> *license* it you for a limited time or for a limited purpose, then that
> >> *value* is all you have bought. If you attempt to seize more value from
> >> it than what you have paid for, then you commit theft. It is like one
> >> of a group of teenagers buying a movie ticket, then, once inside,
> >> sneaking open the back door to admit his buddies.
>
> > No it isn't. The movie theater is a tangible property of limited use.
> > The exclusion right arises for the same reason I described earlier.
> > It's the same exclusion right you have to keep them out of your house
> > or car.
>
> Er, no.
Er yes.
> I wish to keep others out of my house because if they inhabit it,
> I can't. But I don't wish to exclude them from my theater because they
> will deny me a seat.
It doesn't matter what your reasons for wanting to exclude.
> I wish to exclude them because they are not paying,
> and I built the theater to create an income stream. And the fact that
> seats are limited is irrelevant,
No, it's very relevant. The same reason it's relevant that the use of
your house is limited. If you can't exclude you can't own the house.
You lose it. Same with the theater.
> because those limits are not now being
> approached. If 3 or 4 boys sneak in there will still be empty seats. But I
> will exclude them anyway, because they may come back tomorrow and buy
> tickets. And that is the reason the theater exists --- to provide an
> income stream for me, *not* to provide a "public service" or fulfill a
> "common good" or meet the needs of a social organism.
Funny you keep bringing up this "social organism" stuff, and providing
for the "common good" thereof, because that is the precise
constitutional and theoretical grounds given for the creation of IP
laws. Do some reading on the topic.
> >> You are again confusing the physical properties of the resource with
> >> the moral properties, and it is the latter which define "property." A
> >> resource may not be phyically scarce, *but its value is*. People who
> >> produce software, novels, movies, music, inventions, etc., do so in
> >> order to create value
>
> > That's an extremely blinkered view of why people produce such things.
> > I think some have called it the Homo-Economicus view of humanity, very
> > inadequate.
>
> It is not the only reason people produce things --- many people write
> software, music, etc., and immediately place it in the public domain. But
> it is a major reason people produce things. And of course, that is a
> decision each creator of software, music, etc., is free to make.
No it isn't. If I want to create a piece of music that someone thinks
looks a lot like yours, for example, my freedoms is taken away and the
art I want to make is suppressed.
> The point
> is that, being its creator, it is his property. If he wishes to place it
> in the public domain he may certainly do so. If he wishes to license it
> for limited use, or dispose of it in some other way, then he may do those
> things also.
Of course.
> Others may not *assume* that he created it as a charitable
> project, for their benefit, especially if he has stated otherwise.
Nobody needs to assume anything about his whims. Your problem though
is that they also have no moral obligation to obey his whims, which is
all his motives and statements are to third parties who want a copy.
> The "Homo-Economicus" analysis is false --- it is a generalization
> mistaken for a universal. But at least it is true as a generalization. The
> Organic Fallacy, on the other hand, is not even true as a generalization.
>
> >> The software thief is a free-luncher
> >> --- he expects to realize the value of software someone else has
> >> produced, without contributing any value himself. He is a moocher.
>
> > IOW..he doesn't have to pay you because he can make the same thing for
> > himself because he already has everything necessary to make for himself
> > what you want to sell him.
>
> Why doesn't he then? Or are you merely saying he has what he needs to make
> copies?
They're the same. He has exactly what you have, the ability to make
copies of X. Him doing it himself is cheaper and quicker, so he
doesn't need or want you to make copies for him at several times the
price. He's found a cheaper and more convenient supplier of those
copies. Therefore, you want the state to come in to squash him,
because he is introducing competition into what you want to be your
personal monopoly market.
> Howe many copies could he make without the code?
You said that he had the code.
> > But who knows? Maybe you're right. I teach guitar, and I've often had
> > this feeling that I'm being victimized by my students and their
> > friends, who I think are "free-lunchers" and "moochers". I show some
> > of "those things" I've discovered or created to my student, and then he
> > goes and shows "those things" to all his friends who haven't "created
> > value" and given it to _me_. These are the "free-luncher moochers" who
> > are stealing my rightful "value" for all "those things" that I
> > produced.
>
> Are they stealing it, or are you giving it away? Sounds like you are
> giving it away.
No. I never gave consent for this, they just do it and I don't know
what to do about it. They're just *stealing* my "value" when I'm not
around. If there was a law available to enforce my property rights, as
is the proper role for the state, as you said, then maybe I'd have
proper recourse. But if I went to try to get my rightful "value" back
from the thieves that stole it, the state would attack me.
Publius
news:1141103243.3...@u72g2000cwu.googlegroups.com...
>> > I think you're exactly wrong about this. That is where the moral
>> > grounds for property arise, that if I take your property for my
>> > needs, you don't have it to use for your needs. End of story. No B.S.
>> > about vague "value" and other nonsense.
>> I think you'd find the mistake there if you gave the matter a moment's
>> thought. *Most* property one acquires is not acquired to meet one's own
>> personal needs, i.e., for one's own consumption. It is acquired to
>> provide a value to others. If someone builds a movie theater or hotel,
>> he does not do so to provide himself a place to watch movies, or a
>> place to sleep. A doctor does not attend medical school in order to
>> learn how to treat himself; a mechanic does not learn that skill in
>> order to be sure he can fix his own car. Those assets and skills are
>> all *capital goods* --- they are created or developed in order to be
>> able to provide services to others, for which those others will be
>> expected to pay.
> None of this matters a whit. All of the above are the owner's use.
> The owner's use of an item may be to break it, to stare at it, or to
> trade it. It makes no difference to my points.
Ok --- you are apparently not limiting "use" to personal consumption.
Hence one use to which the owner might put his property is to create
income for himself. Correct?
In that case, a programmer who writes software in order to licence it to
others to produce income for himself is within his rights to use it in
that way. Correct?
> So tell me the "value" of your program that you claim to own. And be
> very specific. You can't because the "value" is no particular thing
> and is not defineable.
I think this was covered in the previous post. The specific value of my
software to a person *p* is whatever *p* would be willing to pay me to use
it under whatever restrictions and conditions I specify. I may try to set
a mimimum price. If no one proves willing to pay that price, then either
I'll reduce it or go hungry. It's price then exceeds its value. It is, in
other words, the same mechanism by which the market value of any other
product is determined.
I'm mystified by your claim that "'value' is no particular thing." The
values of almost anything can be determined, with considerable precision,
just by walking through Wal-Mart and looking at price tags.
Prices are not values, of course, but they have a definite relationship
which I'm sure you understand.
> You're talking about a speculative future value of a notion of
> something. Yeah, nothing vague about that.
Values of anything are indeed speculative until they are proven in a
market. At that point they become quite definite.
>> Someone must have the power to say who may use it when regardless of
>> how many people can use it at once.
> Argument by assertion again. I see no grounds for such a claim. Why
> "must" someone have this power, other than because you want them to
> have it? I see just the opposite.
That is quite obvious. If I create a piece of useful software, then the
power to say who may use it (and under what conditions) at that point
rests exclusively with me, *de facto*. No one else even knows it exists. I
may thereafter use it myself and tell no one else about it. Or I may
decide to allow others to use it, provided they are willing to pay for the
privilege and accept my conditions. And that power of mine does not depend
in the least on how many people can use it at once. The latter fact is
altogether immaterial. Whether they use it at the same time or
consecutively makes no difference, either to the *de facto* control over
it that I have at that point, or to value each of them places on it.
> I don't know about your assertions, but the relevant point is that
> you're conflating "property" with "intellectual property" here, while
> I'm drawing out distinctions. This is merely a form of assuming your
> own conclusion.
Well, you haven't drawn any distinction. At least none that is relevant.
The purpose of the concept of property is, and has always been, to secure
the *value* of goods to the creators of that value. The only thing
necessary to qualify a thing as property is that it have some value, and
that the creator of that value be known. I assume that by now you know how
the values of things are determined.
The physical characteristics of a good are important only to the extent
that they are valued --- that they yield some benefit or advantage to
persons for which those persons would be willing to give up something else
--- time, money, effort, etc. Unless it had some value so defined, its
physical properties would be irrelevant, and no one would claim it as
property.
> There was no society that had "intellectual property" until a couple
> hundred years ago.
That's partly true and partly false. Intellectual property first began to
be recognized in law about 500 years ago. It coincided roughly with the
invention of the printing press and the Enlightenment, when the *value* of
products of the mind began to become apparent. During the Dark Ages, very
few products of the intellect were produced, and legal systems were
rudimentary, where they existed at all. You were lucky if anyone would
help you recover a stolen cow, much less a stolen poem. And before the
invention of the printing press no one could realize any economic value
from their creative works anyway. Many of them *had* no economic value.
However, the value of information was still recognized, even if not
protected by law. Almost every craftsman or artisan worth his salt had
trade secrets --- methods or techniques or ingredients in his products
which enhanced their value, and which he took pains to keep secret. Roman
Law protected trade secrets, and punished under its criminal code anyone
who revealed them after obtaining them in confidence from their owner.
> That means such "property" did not exist among the
> human race for the overwhelming bulk of its history. And even when
> they did arise they were not invented by the State on the grounds of
> any moral right of "creators". They were based on utilitarian notions
> of providing extra incentives for the creation of what at the time they
> viewed as socially useful things for the "common good" of the "social
> organism".
That is always part of the rationalization for any law --- it is "for the
good of society." But why is it a good?
"Every useful discovery is, in to Kant's words 'the presentation of a
service rendered to Society'. It is, therefore, just that he who has
rendered this service should be compensated by Society that received it.
This is an equitable result, a veritable contract or exchange that
operates between the authors of a new discovery and Society. The former
supply the noble products of their intelligence and Society grants to them
in return the advantages of an exclusive exploitation of their discovery
for a limited period".
---French Patent Law of 1844.
> IP does inflict loss and injury. It creates, for example, a forcible
> limitation on my property and my ability to use ideas that i possess as
> I wish to meet my own needs or wants or those of others.
Ideas you "possess"? You may use anything you happen to possess as you
please? You may rent a car from Hertz, then sell it and keep the money?
Give it to your girlfriend as a birthday present? The question is, How did
you come to possess it? If there is no chain of consent linking you to its
creator, then your current possession is illegitimate, whether it is a car
or a piece of software. If there is a chain of consent then your uses of
that property are limited by the terms of the conveyance by which you came
into possession of it.
Perhaps you will say, "Well, I cannot sell Hertz's car, because then they
could not rent it to anyone else." And of course the same is true of
software. If you sell it or give it away, the owner will not be able to
license it to anyone else --- which is the reason the programmer created
it in the first place, the same reason Hertz bought the car.
> Assuming I didn't, you think I had an inherent moral right to control
> the actions of anyone else in the human race who wanted to use "FIZZA
> FLUSABOG" without my authorization?
Without getting into the meaning of "inherent moral right" (I have no idea
what that would be), if your string had some economic value, and others
sought to expropriate that value without paying for it, then you would
certainly have a right to prevent that expropriation. You are required to
exercise due diligence, of course --- to make clear whatever conditions
you wish to impose on use of your string, and restrict distribution to
those who have agreed to those conditions.
> I did so because I was making the point that I have no legitimate moral
> claim to exclusive ownership of it, regardless of whether others find
> it valuable or not.
Ah. Then you will have to explain what you take to be the basis of
"legitimate moral claims." Securing values to their first possessors is
the only basis I know of, whether it is the value of their lives,
liberties, property of any kind. The point of all moral rules is prevent
some persons from seizing valuable things from others which those others
did not seize from anyone else, but instead created or discovered (or
perhaps brought with them into the world). That is, to secure to each
person his or her *rightful* possessions.
But perhaps you have some other basis for "moral legitimacy" in mind.
>> Is the doctor an "extortionist"? The mechanic? The guy who rents
>> apartments or tools at Rent-A-Center? All of them could make their
>> services or assets available to you without depriving themselves of
>> those services;
> If I'm using their service at any given time, then they or others can
> not use it at that time. Not true of your software.
You have yet to explain what difference this "concurrent use" criterion
makes. Some goods can be utilized by a number of persons concurrently,
others only sequentially. It is the *value* realizable from the good that
property rights aim to protect, and secure to the owner of that good.
Whether that value is realized concurrently, such as by the attendees at a
concert, or sequentially, over pay-per-view teevee, is quite irrelevant.
Unless you can explain how it is relevant.
> Whatever, again, no relevance to this discussion. I'm not claiming
> that someone selling a service is extortion. I'm claiming that me
> forcing you not to provide yourself a service, so that you must
> instead pay me an inflated monopoly price to do it, makes me an
> extortionist.
What precisely is the "service" here? Creating a CD with 740 MB of random
data on it? Or is it the ordering of that data that is the real "service,"
that has value? Did I create that order, and thus that value, or did you?
> I should hope so. If the software to do the desired task is already
> written, writing it again is just wasted effort and initiative, which
> could be put to other tasks which might be worthwhile.
I certainly agree. That is why most people will pay $100 or so for
Microsoft Word, rather than writing a comparable app themselves. It
certainly would have been wasted time and effort for Microsoft, if the
company cannot capture its value. Are you suggesting you may avoid wasting
your own time and effort by wasting someone else's retroactively?
> No, I'm saying that making a copy themselves is easier and more cost
> effective than buying a copy that you're making to try to sell to them
> at an inflated monopoly price.
I don't understand the "inflated." In what sense is the price "inflated"
(assuming it is a market price)? In what way do the prices of software
differ from the prices of anything else? Or are all market prices
"inflated"?
BTW, I am not *selling* the software. I'm licensing it.
> Of course. If I take your car you don't have it anymore. That
> wouldn't be right.
Now you seem to be back to the consumption sense of "use." Hertz doesn't
buy cars for use of their stockholders or employees. They buy them to
generate revenue. If you steal one of their cars you steal the revenue
they could have earned from it.
>> A "category"? Where does that come from?
> From the creation of "intellectual property". This creates an
> exclusive right over a vague notion of something, which then may be
> incorporated into any number of items in the marketplace.
Before you thought "value" was vague. Now intellectual property is vague?
Hardly anything can be more precisely defined than an item of intellectual
property. A software program is a very specific string of bits. What is
"vague" about it?
> I said "category of product". The "software" is not one item. It's
> not even any particular number of items. It's merely an idea, a
> formula for accomplishing a task.
No. It is a very specific string of bits which can accomplish some task.
> But your "property" control creates "monopoly control" over every good
> in anyone else's hands that uses the same number as yours.
It creates a monopoly power over my code, regardless of who's hands it is
in. Just as with Hertz's cars. Not sure what you mean by "same number,"
however.
> That's not the same as me having "monopoly control" of the shirt I'm
> wearing. It's the same as me having monopoly control over the shirt
> I'm wearing and all the shirts in the world that anyone else makes that
> look like the one I'm wearing, which is by extension, potentially a
> form of monopoly control over the lives of every individual on the
> planet.
"Looks like" is not enough. The design of the shirt has to be described
specifically enough to be recognizable "beyond reasonable doubt." With
software, that is no problem at all. A checksum will verify that.
>> That is just a simple mistake. All property is based on the very same
>> premise, namely, that all value derivable from that property belongs to
>> the owner.
> This is also false. If you fix up your house, that may increase the
> value of your neighbor's house, hence that "value" is "derivable" from
> your property, but you dont' own the increased "value" of their house.
> You own your house. End of story.
That's right. That is a "neighborhood effect." I can't claim those because
they attach to others' property, to which they have prior claims. Software
also creates neighborhood effects. For example, dozens of people have
written add-ons to AutoCad. Without AutoCad, those programs --- those
income opportunities --- wouldn't exist. But AutoDesk doesn't get a cent
from them. Neighborhood effects are "freebies" to everyone in the
neighborhood.
> Of course, but you can't attack or extort a payment from me for
> building a replica of your house and doing all those same things with
> it.
I sure can, if I (or my architect) has copyrighted that design.
> No, what is meant is that you own the house. Blabbering about "value"
> confuses and complicates the meaning by adding a completely pointless
> layer of abstraction. Nothing is added by bringing up "value" that
> isn't contained in the statement "i own the house".
If the house had no value, you wouldn't bother claiming ownership of it.
In fact, you'd be more likely to pretend it wasn't yours. It is the
*value* you hope to secure by claiming ownership. I suspect you understand
that, despite your protests.
>> But I'll suggest that if an apple farmer discovered that no one valued
>> his apples, and would not buy them, he would think that mattered a
>> great deal to his ownership of them.
> He might think it "mattered" in some way but it does nothing to change
> the fact of his ownership, undermining entirely, your claims. If his
> apples had no value or if they were priceless, he owns them the same.
> That he might like the second scenario better makes no difference to
> ownership.
What determines his ownership is the first possession principle. That
establishes the *fact* of ownership. The value of the asset supplies the
*reason* for asserting ownership to something. No one claims ownership of
things with no value, even if they are the first possessors. If one comes
into possession of such things, they are quickly abandoned.
> It does obtain there. The owner doesn't have to let anyone in the
> theater even if all the seats are empty. That has nothing to do with
> it. The fact is that the theater is of limited space, so an
> exclusionary right arises. Without that exclusionary right the owner
> loses his posession, because then anyone can use it whenever and he
> can't use it as he wants.
You have to get clear on whether you're referring ("use it as he wants")
to consumption use or use as a capital asset. If there are empty seats,
the sneak-ins do not deny him a consumption use; they only deny him
certain benefits from his capital asset. The same is true of software. The
right to exclude arises from the right to maximize the return on one's
assets; it has nothing to do with the number of seats in the theater, or
with how many are filled, or how many people can use the asset
concurrently. Those facts are all beside the point. The theater owner did
not build the theater to augment and allocate a "scarce resource;" he
built it to make money. The programmer wrote the software for the same
reason. Hence if you deny them the money those assets would yield (if used
as the owners stipulate), you deny those owners the uses for which those
assets were created.
You're constantly confusing those two uses. Using pirated software does
not deny the owner (or anyone else) a *consumption* use. It denies them
its use as a capital asset. And that use is the one for which it was
created.
> No. The economic concept of scarcity is about the availability of
> existing goods, not about 5,000 pound flying marshmallow men or
> anything else that doesn't exist.
Then why do so many people spend so much time and money trying to find new
drugs, new technologies, write new novels, new music, etc.? A nonexistent
good is the scarcest of all. Until it is created, there is no distribution
problem to worry about.
> No, it's very relevant. The same reason it's relevant that the use of
> your house is limited. If you can't exclude you can't own the house.
> You lose it. Same with the theater.
Same with the software (remember the difference between consumption use
and use as a capital asset).
>> It is not the only reason people produce things --- many people write
>> software, music, etc., and immediately place it in the public domain.
>> But it is a major reason people produce things. And of course, that is
>> a decision each creator of software, music, etc., is free to make.
> No it isn't. If I want to create a piece of music that someone thinks
> looks a lot like yours, for example, my freedoms is taken away and the
> art I want to make is suppressed.
"Looks a lot like" is not good enough.
> Nobody needs to assume anything about his whims. Your problem though
> is that they also have no moral obligation to obey his whims, which is
> all his motives and statements are to third parties who want a copy.
Well, then so must be Hertz's rental contract to anyone who wants to keep
one of their cars.
>> Howe many copies could he make without the code?
> You said that he had the code.
And under what conditions has he acquired that code?
Michael Price
Well if sales were not made on that condition then the producer has
no right
to ask the State or anyone else to enforce a right he waived.
> Even assuming it true, though, this would likely not prevent copying by
> others who never made any such agreement.
Such people would be violating the property rights of the purchaser,
which he
agree to exercise to forbid copying.
> Say someone else in the household of the licensee copies the software. This
> individual would never have entered into any agreement not
> to distribute it, nor would any subsequent possessors of the
> program.
He did not have the permission of the purchaser to do that, or if he
did the
purchaser violated the sales agreement to grant it.
> I suspect that Publius would still use the State to
> enforce his property claim against them.
>
> --
> Dan Clore
>
> My collected fiction, _The Unspeakable and Others_:
> http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/1587154838/thedanclorenecro/
> Lord Weÿrdgliffe & Necronomicon Page:
Michael Price
> Publius wrote:
> > jbd...@hotmail.com wrote in
> > news:1141037846.6...@u72g2000cwu.googlegroups.com:
> >
> > >> Whenever you are in possession of someone else's property you have a
> > >> duty of custodial care of that property.
> >
> > > But I don't recognize your imaginary property. Without the state to
> > > force me to recognize it, what do you do?
> >
> > The same thing I would do if you declared that "you did not recognize" any
> > other property of mine in the absence of a state. If I was aware of your
> > predatory impulses at the outset, I'd try to make sure you didn't get your
> > hands on any property of mine. If you managed to do so by stealth or fraud
> > (by concealing your intentions), then I'd hunt you down and take
> > compensation out of your hide, if I couldn't get it any other way. I.e.,
> > we'd have Hobbes' jungle.
>
> Sounds good to me. Good luck with that.
>
> I wouldn't use stealth or fraud though. I'd probably just look for a
> more reasonable supplier, and not trouble you about it, so you don't
> have to worry.
>
better terms
than Publius is offering then he's either offering stuff Publius
doesn't own or he's
offering stuff that he stole from Publius. In the first place Publius
has nothing
to do with it and in the second place you are recieving stolen goods.
> > All leftists assert that they "don't recognize" various classes of
> > property. Georgists declare that land cannot be property, Marxists declare
> > that factories cannot be property, etc. They are all trying to rationalize
> > some free lunch or other.
> >
> > BTW, why would you wish to steal "imaginary property"?
>
> I wouldn't. I'd wish to use ideas that i posess and my property to
> make things that are useful to me or others. Some raving lunatic might
> come try to kill me for "stealing" some imaginary property, but I'd be
> fully justified in defending myself from such a lunatic.
>
> > You can create all the imaginary property you wish on your own.
>
> Of course.
>
> > >> If you rent a car and your teenage son
> > >> steals and wrecks it, you will pay the bill.
> > >
> > > But the imaginary property is not a rented item or a tangible item. It
> > > can't be "wrecked".
> >
> > Software can be stolen,
>
> Only via the taking of a tangible item away from someone.
No, ideas have consequences and are thus "real", they can be stolen.
>
> > however (it is not "imaginary," of course, else
> > you would not be interested in posesessing it).
> >
> > You may wish to read my response to "asokoloski" (this thread) on the
> > basis of property. Being tangible has nothing to do with whether something
> > qualifies as property.
>
> Your arguments consist mainly of arguments by assertion, and thus are
> not very convincing.
So a futures contract is tangible?
>
> > > And you reveal that the only possibly obligated person is somebody who
> > > bought a copy from you, if they agreed to any such conditions in the
> > > first place. If someone else gets a copy somehow they never agreed to
> > > anything. Good luck finding that first user ("custodian") who didn't
> > > uphold his duties and gave one away.
> >
> > It may not be possible to find the person guilty of breach of contract. It
> > may not be possible to find a car thief, either --- it may have been
> > transferred several times before it is recovered. But whoever possesses it
> > when recovered is guilty of posession of stolen property. So is the
> > software thief.
>
> Bad analogy. What you're describing is not a "software thief" or
> "stolen property". You're describing people who've made and possess
> copies of something.
And that copy contains information they did not create and have no
right to.
>
> The closer car analogy would be to persons who had each made and
> posessed a replica of your stolen car. And you would be the
> sociopathic lunatic running around claiming that each of them have
> your stolen car, and they have to pay you an extortion payment or
> you'll kill them.
A copy of a car is a lot harder to create than a copy of a program
and thus
the design is not most of the value.
jbd...@hotmail.com
> jbd...@hotmail.com wrote:
> > Publius wrote:
> > > jbd...@hotmail.com wrote in
> > > news:1141037846.6...@u72g2000cwu.googlegroups.com:
> > >
> > > >> Whenever you are in possession of someone else's property you have a
> > > >> duty of custodial care of that property.
> > >
> > > > But I don't recognize your imaginary property. Without the state to
> > > > force me to recognize it, what do you do?
> > >
> > > The same thing I would do if you declared that "you did not recognize" any
> > > other property of mine in the absence of a state. If I was aware of your
> > > predatory impulses at the outset, I'd try to make sure you didn't get your
> > > hands on any property of mine. If you managed to do so by stealth or fraud
> > > (by concealing your intentions), then I'd hunt you down and take
> > > compensation out of your hide, if I couldn't get it any other way. I.e.,
> > > we'd have Hobbes' jungle.
> >
> > Sounds good to me. Good luck with that.
> >
> > I wouldn't use stealth or fraud though. I'd probably just look for a
> > more reasonable supplier, and not trouble you about it, so you don't
> > have to worry.
> >
> Well if the supplier is granting you use of intellectual property on
> better terms than Publius is offering then he's either offering stuff Publius
> doesn't own or he's
> offering stuff that he stole from Publius.
No he isn't. He's making and offering a version of a good which
Publius claims the right to monopolize the market for, because Publius
would like to have more money.
> In the first place Publius has nothing
> to do with it and in the second place you are recieving stolen goods.
No I'm not. I'm buying a copy of something. There has been no stolen
good in the first place.
It's just a contract.
> > > > And you reveal that the only possibly obligated person is somebody who
> > > > bought a copy from you, if they agreed to any such conditions in the
> > > > first place. If someone else gets a copy somehow they never agreed to
> > > > anything. Good luck finding that first user ("custodian") who didn't
> > > > uphold his duties and gave one away.
> > >
> > > It may not be possible to find the person guilty of breach of contract. It
> > > may not be possible to find a car thief, either --- it may have been
> > > transferred several times before it is recovered. But whoever possesses it
> > > when recovered is guilty of posession of stolen property. So is the
> > > software thief.
> >
> > Bad analogy. What you're describing is not a "software thief" or
> > "stolen property". You're describing people who've made and possess
> > copies of something.
>
> And that copy contains information they did not create and have no
> right to.
No it doesn't. Almost all information that people encounter and use
was not created by them. That has no bearing on whether they have a
right to it.
> > The closer car analogy would be to persons who had each made and
> > posessed a replica of your stolen car. And you would be the
> > sociopathic lunatic running around claiming that each of them have
> > your stolen car, and they have to pay you an extortion payment or
> > you'll kill them.
>
> A copy of a car is a lot harder to create than a copy of a program
> and thus
> the design is not most of the value.
So you don't care about that "theft". It's exactly the same principle.
James A. Donald
On 23 Feb 2006 20:39:02 -0800, "Orion" <dan...@bezeqint.net> wrote:
> Libertarian Socialism is a term essentially synonymous with the word
> "Anarchism".
In Catalonia, the Libertarian socialists attempted to implement both
liberty and socialism. They soon found that socialism required terror
and mass murder. Initially they attempted to make socialism work with
genuinely anarchistic, highly decentralized, terror and mass murder,
but they soon found that terror and mass murder are public goods
(public goods in the economic sense, in that only a state can
efficiently provide terror and mass murder, not public goods in the
sense of actually being good) and pretty soon they proceeded with a
highly centralized dictatorship that the Stalinists rightly ridiculed
as even more centralized and dictatorial than their own.
For a short outline of these events, see "What really happened in
Catalonia" http://www.jim.com/cat/ For a longer outline, see "The
anarcho statists of spain"
http://www.gmu.edu/departments/economics/bcaplan/spain.htm
For an explanation of what anarchy is, and what the those
totalitarians *thought* they were going to implement before they
actually discovered the contradiction between liberty and socialism,
see the "anarchist theory faq"
http://www.gmu.edu/departments/economics/bcaplan/anarfaq.htm
--digsig
James A. Donald
6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG
oT07aid97xq66cGEHSy7Llxd054JFeAdsY19y9Tf
4XkV3/2N/F+Ylgc8fS2dvbx+g1Xgq4COhN5bOo/bX
uri
movenment. There are many kinds of terrorism and state terrorism is by
far the worst. Violence has always existed.
Most left-wing groups condemn terrorism.
James A. Donald
> "Terror" and violence is not associated with any specific political
> movenment. There are many kinds of terrorism and state terrorism is by
> far the worst. Violence has always existed.
yet the body count of socialism during the twentieth century
substantially exceeds all the rest put together.
While some may need to destroy their enemies, and define their enemies
alarmingly broadly, socialists need to use terror to get light bulbs
in their sockets and toilet paper in the toilets - see my web page
"Why socialism needs killing fields:"
http://www.jim.com/killingfields.html
James A. Donald
On 28 Feb 2006 15:56:24 -0800, "uri" <dan...@bezeqint.net> wrote:
> "Terror" and violence is not associated with any specific political
> movenment. There are many kinds of terrorism and state terrorism is
> by far the worst. Violence has always existed.
yet the body count of socialism during the twentieth century
substantially exceeds all the rest put together.
While some political tendencies may need to destroy their enemies, and
define their enemies alarmingly broadly, socialists need to use terror
to get light bulbs in their sockets and toilet paper in the toilets -
see my web page "Why socialism needs killing fields:"
http://www.jim.com/killingfields.html
The problem with radical Islam is that they want to dominate us. The
problem with socialists was that they wanted to enslave us for our own
good.
--digsig
James A. Donald
6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG
AommC1zO1AgE9tXT9xZE7zEccqCE7gOv9hYxEjSL
45sQUHk+lw8/U04fuswhmHbge5HECPGGB0DNscUzo
jbd...@hotmail.com
Sure. That's just trade, which is another use.
> > So tell me the "value" of your program that you claim to own. And be
> > very specific. You can't because the "value" is no particular thing
> > and is not defineable.
>
> I think this was covered in the previous post. The specific value of my
> software to a person *p* is whatever *p* would be willing to pay me to use
> it under whatever restrictions and conditions I specify.
That is no specific value. It's un unknown value that may or may not
materialize at some unknown point in the future, if someone happens to
agree to it at some point in the future. That is far from a specific
"value".
> I may try to set a mimimum price. If no one proves willing to pay that price, then either
> I'll reduce it or go hungry. It's price then exceeds its value. It is, in
> other words, the same mechanism by which the market value of any other
> product is determined.
Then you still have exactly the "value" you claim to own. All you're
claiming above is that you have a right to get whatever *p* will agree
to pay you. If everyone copies it as they wish you still have that
same "value". You'll still get whatever *p* agrees to pay you.
> > You're talking about a speculative future value of a notion of
> > something. Yeah, nothing vague about that.
>
> Values of anything are indeed speculative until they are proven in a
> market. At that point they become quite definite.
And you do not own that "value" until that point is reached. Until
then, you just own the item, nothing more and nothing less.
>
> >> Someone must have the power to say who may use it when regardless of
> >> how many people can use it at once.
>
> > Argument by assertion again. I see no grounds for such a claim. Why
> > "must" someone have this power, other than because you want them to
> > have it? I see just the opposite.
>
> That is quite obvious. If I create a piece of useful software, then the
> power to say who may use it (and under what conditions) at that point
> rests exclusively with me, *de facto*. No one else even knows it exists. I
> may thereafter use it myself and tell no one else about it.
Sure.
> Or I may decide to allow others to use it, provided they are willing to pay for the
> privilege and accept my conditions.
Sure.
> And that power of mine does not depend
> in the least on how many people can use it at once. The latter fact is
> altogether immaterial. Whether they use it at the same time or
> consecutively makes no difference, either to the *de facto* control over
> it that I have at that point, or to value each of them places on it.
I agree. There's nothing special there. You haven't asserted anything
different from a real property owner yet, namely, you haven't yet
asserted the right to impose your will on the entire human race to
prevent them from using their property to make their own versions and
likenesses of the thing you own and compete with you in the
marketplace.
> > I don't know about your assertions, but the relevant point is that
> > you're conflating "property" with "intellectual property" here, while
> > I'm drawing out distinctions. This is merely a form of assuming your
> > own conclusion.
>
> Well, you haven't drawn any distinction. At least none that is relevant.
> The purpose of the concept of property is, and has always been, to secure
> the *value* of goods to the creators of that value.
No, it's to secure control of the goods, regardless of their value. I
already established this. But if you think that, then you'll surely
you won't mind if I come take all your stuff, but leave in its place
other stuff of equal "value".
> The only thing
> necessary to qualify a thing as property is that it have some value,
No, it's property regardless of its value.
> and that the creator of that value be known. I assume that by now you know how
> the values of things are determined.
>
> The physical characteristics of a good are important only to the extent
> that they are valued --- that they yield some benefit or advantage to
> persons for which those persons would be willing to give up something else
> --- time, money, effort, etc. Unless it had some value so defined, its
> physical properties would be irrelevant, and no one would claim it as
> property.
>
> > There was no society that had "intellectual property" until a couple
> > hundred years ago.
>
> That's partly true and partly false. Intellectual property first began to
> be recognized in law about 500 years ago. It coincided roughly with the
> invention of the printing press and the Enlightenment, when the *value* of
> products of the mind began to become apparent. During the Dark Ages, very
> few products of the intellect were produced, and legal systems were
> rudimentary, where they existed at all. You were lucky if anyone would
> help you recover a stolen cow, much less a stolen poem. And before the
> invention of the printing press no one could realize any economic value
> from their creative works anyway. Many of them *had* no economic value.
Yeah, Bach's compositions had no value, and he never realized any
economic value from them. See, you don't have to extort people and
become a murderous sociopath to realize economic value from creative
works.
> However, the value of information was still recognized, even if not
> protected by law. Almost every craftsman or artisan worth his salt had
> trade secrets --- methods or techniques or ingredients in his products
> which enhanced their value, and which he took pains to keep secret.
Good for them. That's all they have a right to do. If they release
their "secrets" then they belong to anyone that learns of them.
> Roman Law protected trade secrets, and punished under its criminal code anyone
> who revealed them after obtaining them in confidence from their owner.
Well, that's violating contract and no surprise that legal systems
might punish it. Did they also punish everyone else in the world who
heard and used the already revealed secret, which is what you'd like to
do?
> > That means such "property" did not exist among the
> > human race for the overwhelming bulk of its history. And even when
> > they did arise they were not invented by the State on the grounds of
> > any moral right of "creators". They were based on utilitarian notions
> > of providing extra incentives for the creation of what at the time they
> > viewed as socially useful things for the "common good" of the "social
> > organism".
>
> That is always part of the rationalization for any law --- it is "for the
> good of society."
Not always.
> But why is it a good?
It's not. But that was the rationale at the time. It may have been so
in some cases, and under the much narrower limits that were set at the
onset.
> "Every useful discovery is, in to Kant's words 'the presentation of a
> service rendered to Society'. It is, therefore, just that he who has
> rendered this service should be compensated by Society that received it.
> This is an equitable result, a veritable contract or exchange that
> operates between the authors of a new discovery and Society. The former
> supply the noble products of their intelligence and Society grants to them
> in return the advantages of an exclusive exploitation of their discovery
> for a limited period".
> ---French Patent Law of 1844.
So, you think the right arises because of the _Social Contract_. Ok.
I much prefer Jefferson's views on the issue to the above gibberish and
rationalizations though.
> > IP does inflict loss and injury. It creates, for example, a forcible
> > limitation on my property and my ability to use ideas that i possess as
> > I wish to meet my own needs or wants or those of others.
>
> Ideas you "possess"? You may use anything you happen to possess as you
> please? You may rent a car from Hertz, then sell it and keep the money?
> Give it to your girlfriend as a birthday present?
No, when Hertz gave me the car I contracted to only use that car for a
limited time and then give it back. I'd be violating a contract.
> The question is, How did you come to possess it? If there is no chain of consent
> linking you to its creator, then your current possession is illegitimate, whether it is a
> car or a piece of software.
No chain of consent is required for me because I'm not taking anything
that belongs to the creator. He still has his creation. The creator
of a car does not own copies of a car that anyone might make, even if
they indirectly decrease the "value" of his car. He only owns the car,
nothing more, nothing less. Likewise your software.
> If there is a chain of consent then your uses of
> that property
"It" isn't property. "It" is an arbitrary abstraction that you're
reifying and pretending is like a car in order to justify what you'd
like to do to people in order to get more money for yourself.
> are limited by the terms of the conveyance by which you came
> into possession of it.
>
> Perhaps you will say, "Well, I cannot sell Hertz's car, because then they
> could not rent it to anyone else."
No. I wouldn't, but might, because that's the means of Hertz getting
the "value" they want, and which is supposedly what they own.
...
> > I did so because I was making the point that I have no legitimate moral
> > claim to exclusive ownership of it, regardless of whether others find
> > it valuable or not.
>
> Ah. Then you will have to explain what you take to be the basis of
> "legitimate moral claims." Securing values to their first possessors is
> the only basis I know of, whether it is the value of their lives,
> liberties, property of any kind. The point of all moral rules is prevent
> some persons from seizing valuable things
Yes, prevent seizure of the _things_, not their "value".
...
> from others which those others
> did not seize from anyone else, but instead created or discovered (or
> perhaps brought with them into the world). That is, to secure to each
> person his or her *rightful* possessions.
>
> But perhaps you have some other basis for "moral legitimacy" in mind.
>
> >> Is the doctor an "extortionist"? The mechanic? The guy who rents
> >> apartments or tools at Rent-A-Center? All of them could make their
> >> services or assets available to you without depriving themselves of
> >> those services;
>
> > If I'm using their service at any given time, then they or others can
> > not use it at that time. Not true of your software.
>
> You have yet to explain what difference this "concurrent use" criterion
> makes. Some goods can be utilized by a number of persons concurrently,
> others only sequentially. It is the *value* realizable from the good that
> property rights aim to protect, and secure to the owner of that good.
No it isn't. It is the good.
> Whether that value is realized concurrently, such as by the attendees at a
> concert, or sequentially, over pay-per-view teevee, is quite irrelevant.
> Unless you can explain how it is relevant.
There is no relevance in what you're saying. They're both commodities
of limited use.
> > Whatever, again, no relevance to this discussion. I'm not claiming
> > that someone selling a service is extortion. I'm claiming that me
> > forcing you not to provide yourself a service, so that you must
> > instead pay me an inflated monopoly price to do it, makes me an
> > extortionist.
>
> What precisely is the "service" here? Creating a CD with 740 MB of random
> data on it? Or is it the ordering of that data that is the real "service,"
> that has value?
You aren't selling me the latter service. You already performed that
service. You're only providing me the former service, and if I can do
that service myself there's no need to pay your an inflated monopoly
price.
> Did I create that order, and thus that value, or did you?
You discovered a formula, that when a string of numbers are ordered in
such a way they can accomplish a certain task.
> > I should hope so. If the software to do the desired task is already
> > written, writing it again is just wasted effort and initiative, which
> > could be put to other tasks which might be worthwhile.
>
> I certainly agree. That is why most people will pay $100 or so for
> Microsoft Word, rather than writing a comparable app themselves. It
> certainly would have been wasted time and effort for Microsoft, if the
> company cannot capture its value.
They can capture its value exactly as you've defined it, even when
everyone copies it. The value might be a lower amount when everyone
copies it, but that's irrelevant to your definition of value, because
*p* is just deciding to pay less.
> Are you suggesting you may avoid wasting
> your own time and effort by wasting someone else's retroactively?
I didn't tell them how to use their time. If they don't like how they
spent their time that would be their problem.
> > No, I'm saying that making a copy themselves is easier and more cost
> > effective than buying a copy that you're making to try to sell to them
> > at an inflated monopoly price.
>
> I don't understand the "inflated." In what sense is the price "inflated"
> (assuming it is a market price)? In what way do the prices of software differ from the
> prices of anything else? Or are all market prices "inflated"?
You're not talking about a market price. You're talking about a
monopoly price. One producer/seller of a product setting one price for
all incarnations of that product under state imposed monopoly. In a
market others could make that same product themselves and competing
producers and sellers could make and offer the same product.
Thus, my use of "inflated".
> BTW, I am not *selling* the software. I'm licensing it.
>
> > Of course. If I take your car you don't have it anymore. That
> > wouldn't be right.
>
> Now you seem to be back to the consumption sense of "use." Hertz doesn't
> buy cars for use of their stockholders or employees. They buy them to
> generate revenue. If you steal one of their cars you steal the revenue
> they could have earned from it.
No, I steal the car. It doesn't matter if they use it for trade or
personal consumption.
> >> A "category"? Where does that come from?
>
> > From the creation of "intellectual property". This creates an
> > exclusive right over a vague notion of something, which then may be
> > incorporated into any number of items in the marketplace.
>
> Before you thought "value" was vague.
It is, but now it's more clear, in that under your definition if
everyone copies your software whenever they wish, you still have the
exact same "value" you defined: whatever *p* feels like giving you.
> Now intellectual property is vague?
> Hardly anything can be more precisely defined than an item of intellectual
> property. A software program is a very specific string of bits. What is
> "vague" about it?
You said the property was a "value". Now it's a string of bits?
Well, if the property is the string of bits you have no worries. I can
copy your string of bits all I want and you'll still have your
intellectual property.
> > > I have control only over the particular code set that I've written. It is indeed a
> > > monopoly control, however. All property creates "monopoly control" over
> > > that property in the hands of its owner.
> >
> > But your "property" control creates "monopoly control" over every good
> > in anyone else's hands that uses the same number as yours.
>
> It creates a monopoly power over my code, regardless of who's hands it is
> in. Just as with Hertz's cars.
It is nothing like with Hertz's cars. I can use my assets to make
copies of of the cars and use as I want.
> Not sure what you mean by "same number," however.
>
> > That's not the same as me having "monopoly control" of the shirt I'm
> > wearing. It's the same as me having monopoly control over the shirt
> > I'm wearing and all the shirts in the world that anyone else makes that
> > look like the one I'm wearing, which is by extension, potentially a
> > form of monopoly control over the lives of every individual on the
> > planet.
>
> "Looks like" is not enough. The design of the shirt has to be described
> specifically enough to be recognizable "beyond reasonable doubt." With
> software, that is no problem at all. A checksum will verify that.
Ok, so it's the same as me having monopoly control over the shirt I'm
wearing and all the shirts in the world that anyone else makes that,
beyond a reasonable doubt, look like the one I'm wearing, just like
with "all property".
> >> That is just a simple mistake. All property is based on the very same
> >> premise, namely, that all value derivable from that property belongs to
> >> the owner.
>
> > This is also false. If you fix up your house, that may increase the
> > value of your neighbor's house, hence that "value" is "derivable" from
> > your property, but you dont' own the increased "value" of their house.
> > You own your house. End of story.
>
> That's right. That is a "neighborhood effect." I can't claim those because
> they attach to others' property, to which they have prior claims. Software
> also creates neighborhood effects. For example, dozens of people have
> written add-ons to AutoCad. Without AutoCad, those programs --- those
> income opportunities --- wouldn't exist. But AutoDesk doesn't get a cent
> from them. Neighborhood effects are "freebies" to everyone in the
> neighborhood.
Fine. So we agree that your claim that "All property is based on the
very same premise, namely, that all value derivable from that property
belongs to the owner." is clearly false. At least we have that
settled.
So why isn't my new copy of your software a "neighborhood effect"? It
also attaches to my property, to which I have prior claims.
> > Of course, but you can't attack or extort a payment from me for
> > building a replica of your house and doing all those same things with
> > it.
>
> I sure can, if I (or my architect) has copyrighted that design.
So when I point out that something is not true of non-IP property, you
reply that it would be if it was made IP. Ok.
> > No, what is meant is that you own the house. Blabbering about "value"
> > confuses and complicates the meaning by adding a completely pointless
> > layer of abstraction. Nothing is added by bringing up "value" that
> > isn't contained in the statement "i own the house".
>
> If the house had no value, you wouldn't bother claiming ownership of it.
> In fact, you'd be more likely to pretend it wasn't yours. It is the
> *value* you hope to secure by claiming ownership. I suspect you understand
> that, despite your protests.
It doesn't matter what I *hope to secure*. My whims do not change my
rights. All I secure is the house, regardless of its value.
> >> But I'll suggest that if an apple farmer discovered that no one valued
> >> his apples, and would not buy them, he would think that mattered a
> >> great deal to his ownership of them.
>
> > He might think it "mattered" in some way but it does nothing to change
> > the fact of his ownership, undermining entirely, your claims. If his
> > apples had no value or if they were priceless, he owns them the same.
> > That he might like the second scenario better makes no difference to
> > ownership.
>
> What determines his ownership is the first possession principle. That
> establishes the *fact* of ownership. The value of the asset supplies the
> *reason* for asserting ownership to something. No one claims ownership of
> things with no value, even if they are the first possessors. If one comes
> into possession of such things, they are quickly abandoned.
Fine, so I'll just take everyone's possessions and return others of the
same "value". I'm sure nobody will mind, since that, and not the item,
is what their property is. I'll call my project the Publiemminent
Domain Project.
> > It does obtain there. The owner doesn't have to let anyone in the
> > theater even if all the seats are empty. That has nothing to do with
> > it. The fact is that the theater is of limited space, so an
> > exclusionary right arises. Without that exclusionary right the owner
> > loses his posession, because then anyone can use it whenever and he
> > can't use it as he wants.
>
> You have to get clear on whether you're referring ("use it as he wants")
> to consumption use or use as a capital asset.
Why do I have to make this clear? It doesn't make any difference.
They're both "using it as he wants".
> If there are empty seats,
> the sneak-ins do not deny him a consumption use; they only deny him
> certain benefits from his capital asset.
They deny him his exclusive right over the property. That may deny him
neither consumption use nor capital benefits in a given case.
> The same is true of software. The
> right to exclude arises from the right to maximize the return on one's
> assets;
My copy is not your asset. You never had it. You didn't make it. And
you still have every asset you had before, and may still attempt to
maximize any return you'd like on them.
> it has nothing to do with the number of seats in the theater, or
> with how many are filled, or how many people can use the asset
> concurrently.
I agree. I never mentioned any of the three. They are all irrelevant.
Something that is relevant in terms of exclusion though is whether
there is a limit on use or not. If there is none, the exclusive right
loses any moral grounds it might have had.
> Those facts are all beside the point. The theater owner did
> not build the theater to augment and allocate a "scarce resource;" he
> built it to make money. The programmer wrote the software for the same
> reason. Hence if you deny them the money those assets would yield (if used
> as the owners stipulate), you deny those owners the uses for which those
> assets were created.
I agree. But this is irrelevant because I'm not using their assets.
They still have all their assets and may use them as they please. I'm
using my assets to make something that looks like their assets.
> You're constantly confusing those two uses.
No I'm not. I'm just not distinguishing them, because there's no
relevant distinction regarding my points.
> Using pirated software does
> not deny the owner (or anyone else) a *consumption* use. It denies them
> its use as a capital asset.
No it doesn't. That's just it. They may still use the software as a
capitalist asset to their hearts content, and they may still acquire
their "value" exactly as you defined it above.
Michael Price
offering something
he stole from Publius.
> > In the first place Publius has nothing
> > to do with it and in the second place you are recieving stolen goods.
>
> No I'm not. I'm buying a copy of something. There has been no stolen
> good in the first place.
What you bought contained information that was Publius's property.
That's
stealing.
>
> > > > All leftists assert that they "don't recognize" various classes of
> > > > property. Georgists declare that land cannot be property, Marxists declare
> > > > that factories cannot be property, etc. They are all trying to rationalize
> > > > some free lunch or other.
> > > >
> > > > BTW, why would you wish to steal "imaginary property"?
> > >
> > > I wouldn't. I'd wish to use ideas that i posess and my property to
> > > make things that are useful to me or others. Some raving lunatic might
> > > come try to kill me for "stealing" some imaginary property, but I'd be
> > > fully justified in defending myself from such a lunatic.
> > >
> > > > You can create all the imaginary property you wish on your own.
> > >
> > > Of course.
> > >
> > > > >> If you rent a car and your teenage son
> > > > >> steals and wrecks it, you will pay the bill.
> > > > >
> > > > > But the imaginary property is not a rented item or a tangible item. It
> > > > > can't be "wrecked".
> > > >
> > > > Software can be stolen,
> > >
> > > Only via the taking of a tangible item away from someone.
> >
> > No, ideas have consequences and are thus "real", they can be stolen.
>
> Only via the taking of a tangible item away from someone.
>
No you can certainly steal information.
> > > > however (it is not "imaginary," of course, else
> > > > you would not be interested in posesessing it).
> > > >
> > > > You may wish to read my response to "asokoloski" (this thread) on the
> > > > basis of property. Being tangible has nothing to do with whether something
> > > > qualifies as property.
> > >
> > > Your arguments consist mainly of arguments by assertion, and thus are
> > > not very convincing.
> >
> > So a futures contract is tangible?
>
> It's just a contract.
So is it tangible or not?
>
> > > > > And you reveal that the only possibly obligated person is somebody who
> > > > > bought a copy from you, if they agreed to any such conditions in the
> > > > > first place. If someone else gets a copy somehow they never agreed to
> > > > > anything. Good luck finding that first user ("custodian") who didn't
> > > > > uphold his duties and gave one away.
> > > >
> > > > It may not be possible to find the person guilty of breach of contract. It
> > > > may not be possible to find a car thief, either --- it may have been
> > > > transferred several times before it is recovered. But whoever possesses it
> > > > when recovered is guilty of posession of stolen property. So is the
> > > > software thief.
> > >
> > > Bad analogy. What you're describing is not a "software thief" or
> > > "stolen property". You're describing people who've made and possess
> > > copies of something.
> >
> > And that copy contains information they did not create and have no
> > right to.
>
> No it doesn't. Almost all information that people encounter and use
> was not created by them. That has no bearing on whether they have a
> right to it.
What does have a bearing is if the creator of the information imposes
conditions
on it's use. They have just as much right to do this as creators of
bicycles have
to impose conditions on the use of those bikes.
>
> > > The closer car analogy would be to persons who had each made and
> > > posessed a replica of your stolen car. And you would be the
> > > sociopathic lunatic running around claiming that each of them have
> > > your stolen car, and they have to pay you an extortion payment or
> > > you'll kill them.
> >
> > A copy of a car is a lot harder to create than a copy of a program
> > and thus the design is not most of the value.
>
> So you don't care about that "theft". It's exactly the same principle.
Well OK, then if you copy a car design then yes, you're stealing.
It's just that
most care designers don't care about intellectual theft.
James A. Donald
On 27 Feb 2006 05:59:59 -0800, "uri" <dan...@bezeqint.net> wrote:
> If property on land is created through coercion, violence and war,
> as it was originally, then property itself is theft.
The proposition that property is theft is self contradictory.
Property often changes hands through successful theft, but the passage
of time buries the thief, and legitimizes the current possessors -
statute of limitations and all that.
--digsig
James A. Donald
6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG
eVCkn9Sp6+Qy7MaJcbjx6px+vAx8ZZ/VYAHb1Yk+
4vp7+Fh0KIjY/afEISbb3YOeavo3zTNqipJ0uTUrF
jbd...@hotmail.com
No I didn't because it didn't.
> That's stealing.
Look. Copyright infringments aren't stealing, either in law or by
logic. The law treats it separately from theft, and if it were
stealing you already have theft law. No need for copyright law.
it's also illogical on the simple and obvious grounds that you still
have the thing I supposedly "stole".
Sorry, the "stealing" line just doesn't wash. It may reflect your
emotions on the issue well, but it's illogical hyperbole at best, and
not convincing of anything.
What a contract? It may be tangible or not. If it's not tangible I
certainly can't steal it.
> > > > > > And you reveal that the only possibly obligated person is somebody who
> > > > > > bought a copy from you, if they agreed to any such conditions in the
> > > > > > first place. If someone else gets a copy somehow they never agreed to
> > > > > > anything. Good luck finding that first user ("custodian") who didn't
> > > > > > uphold his duties and gave one away.
> > > > >
> > > > > It may not be possible to find the person guilty of breach of contract. It
> > > > > may not be possible to find a car thief, either --- it may have been
> > > > > transferred several times before it is recovered. But whoever possesses it
> > > > > when recovered is guilty of posession of stolen property. So is the
> > > > > software thief.
> > > >
> > > > Bad analogy. What you're describing is not a "software thief" or
> > > > "stolen property". You're describing people who've made and possess
> > > > copies of something.
> > >
> > > And that copy contains information they did not create and have no
> > > right to.
> >
> > No it doesn't. Almost all information that people encounter and use
> > was not created by them. That has no bearing on whether they have a
> > right to it.
>
> What does have a bearing is if the creator of the information imposes
> conditions
> on it's use. They have just as much right to do this as creators of
> bicycles have
> to impose conditions on the use of those bikes.
No, they claim a right to impose conditions on likenesses of their
bicycle that other people make.
uri
> The proposition that property is theft is self contradictory.
>
> Property often changes hands through successful theft, but the passage
> of time buries the thief, and legitimizes the current possessors -
> statute of limitations and all that.
>
Property is just a title given by government and hence property is
force. So the right-"libertarian" concept of freedom is not freedom at
all.
Publius
news:1141188706.3...@e56g2000cwe.googlegroups.com...
>> In that case, a programmer who writes software in order to licence it
>> to others to produce income for himself is within his rights to use it
>> in that way. Correct?
> Sure. That's just trade, which is another use.
And if others, without his permission, copy that software (either in
violation of their licensing agreements, or after obtaining the software
from someone who has), they then deny him that use of the software, in
direct proportion to the extent of those unauthorized uses. He can no
longer use it to generate an income stream. Correct?
>> > So tell me the "value" of your program that you claim to own. And be
>> > very specific. You can't because the "value" is no particular thing
>> > and is not defineable.
>> I think this was covered in the previous post. The specific value of my
>> software to a person *p* is whatever *p* would be willing to pay me to
>> use it under whatever restrictions and conditions I specify.
> That is no specific value. It's un unknown value that may or may not
> materialize at some unknown point in the future, if someone happens to
> agree to it at some point in the future. That is far from a specific
> "value".
I assumed that by "specific value" you were asking for a methodology, a
means of determining the specific value of a good. Which I gave. Are you
asking for a specific value in the sense of an actual dollar amount? If
the latter, then you will have to specify the actual software you are
asking the value of. You can't give actual values of hypothetical goods. I
could give a specific *hypothetical* value of a hypothetical good, if that
would be helpful --- e.g., the hypothetical value of the hypothetical
software in question is $100 per copy, that being the median price at
which it sells in the market.
>> I may try to set a mimimum price. If no one proves willing to pay that
>> price, then either I'll reduce it or go hungry. It's price then exceeds
>> its value. It is, in other words, the same mechanism by which the
>> market value of any other product is determined.
> Then you still have exactly the "value" you claim to own. All you're
> claiming above is that you have a right to get whatever *p* will agree
> to pay you. If everyone copies it as they wish you still have that
> same "value". You'll still get whatever *p* agrees to pay you.
Well, you left out an important condition: I have a right to get whatever
*p* would pay me *rather than do without*. Leaving that condition out
means that I am entitled only to whatever a thief would pay me, which is
of course nothing. The value of any property to any person is his
indifference point --- the point where he would rather do without the good
than give up any more to get it. That is the economic definition of value.
Economic value cannot be defined for any good if thievery is permitted
(the consumer can obtain the good without the producer's permission and
give up nothing). No goods then have value, and there is no economy.
>> Values of anything are indeed speculative until they are proven in a
>> market. At that point they become quite definite.
> And you do not own that "value" until that point is reached. Until
> then, you just own the item, nothing more and nothing less.
I agree. Not sure what the point is, though. If I paint a brooding, stormy
seascape, when I put down the brush all I have is a canvas with some
paint on it. Its value at that point is indeterminate. To determine it, I
have to place it on the market. Perhaps I auction it. Assume the auction
is well-attended by art lovers --- 1000 persons or so. Over a hundred of
them bid, with the highest bid being $5000. That is then the value of the
painting at that time.
>> And that power of mine does not depend
>> in the least on how many people can use it at once. The latter fact is
>> altogether immaterial. Whether they use it at the same time or
>> consecutively makes no difference, either to the *de facto* control
>> over it that I have at that point, or to value each of them places on
>> it.
> I agree. There's nothing special there. You haven't asserted anything
> different from a real property owner yet, namely, you haven't yet
> asserted the right to impose your will on the entire human race to
> prevent them from using their property to make their own versions and
> likenesses of the thing you own and compete with you in the
> marketplace.
There are two basic errors running through your arguments. The major one
is the moral basis of property (I'll get to that next). The second is the
one above --- that copyrights prevent others from making "their own
versions and likenesses" of the copyrighted work.
A software pirate is not making his "own version or likeness" of the
stolen work. He is making an identical copy. Nothing prevents anyone from
writing "clones" of, say, Microsoft Word (in fact there are several).
Nothing prevents anyone from writing and selling software that resembles
(that is a "likeness" of) Microsoft Word (provided it is not so much like
it that the customer will be misled). Nothing prevents anyone from writing
software that serves the same purposes as Word, and will compete with it.
Of course, part of the problem is that you suppose "property" is defined
in physical terms, which is next on the agenda here. But I assume you will
agree that software is not a physical thing; it is information, which,
unlike physical things, is not located in any particular place in time and
space; it has no spatio-temporal coordinates. Information can be
*represented* in many different spatio-temporal locations at once, but a
particular representation of information is not the information. The
information is what is *identical* in all of those representations. And it
is that which the writer of the software created --- that which is
identical in all representations.
That identical element can be precisely defined --- perhaps we call it
"software Z." Indeed, we can define "software Z" with more precision that
we can define any physical property (the boundaries of a tract of land,
for example). Because it can be defined so precisely, we can easily
determine whether software Z is unique. If it is, then there is only one
software Z in the Universe, regardless of how many many representations of
it may exist, since two alleged things which cannot be distinguished in
any way are the same thing (Leibniz's Identity of Indiscernibles). If that
identical element (software Z) is original and unique --- if it didn't
exist until the programmer created it --- that is what he may copyright.
Let's suppose that Alfie wrote software Z and thus is its owner (per the
first possession principle). If software Z is unique and original, then
there is only one software Z in the universe --- nothing else exists which
is identical to software Z. It follows that anyone in possession of
software Z --- however it may be represented --- is in possession of that
which Alfie created --- of the very same, identical thing. However many
representations of it there may be, if they are all identical to the
software Z Alfie created and copyrighted, then they are all his property,
since they cannot be distinguished from it. Of course, only that which
they have in common, the software Z, is his property; the medium of
representation may belong to others.
Now, of course, I realize you do not wish to regard software Z as Alfie's
*property*, because you deny that information can be property. But it
should be clear that any possessor of software Z is in possession of
Alfie's *creation* --- the very thing he created --- whether you wish to
call it his "property" or not.
The next task is then to show that software Z does indeed qualify as
"property;" that it satisfies all morally relevant conditions for having
that status.
>> Well, you haven't drawn any distinction. At least none that is
>> relevant. The purpose of the concept of property is, and has always
>> been, to secure the *value* of goods to the creators of that value.
> No, it's to secure control of the goods, regardless of their value. I
> already established this. But if you think that, then you'll surely
> you won't mind if I come take all your stuff, but leave in its place
> other stuff of equal "value".
That is as good a launching point as any.
"Goods" are defined in terms of value. Describing something as a "good"
makes no sense except in terms of value. Without an assumption of value,
there is no distinguishing "goods" from "bads," or from items to which one
is indifferent.
You seem to think "property" is defined in physical terms, despite the
(admittedly sketchy) arguments I've made so far. But you do seem to agree
that "property" is a moral concept, that the term serves to mark off those
those things to which people lay claims, and which it would be immoral to
deprive them of. So let's begin there.
A *good* is anything someone desires to acquire or retain. An *evil* is
anything someone desires to avoid, or be rid of. Anything someone desires
to acquire or retain has *value* to that person. Different people desire
to acquire or retain different things, for different reasons. They attach
different values to the things they seek to acquire or retain, which means
that on each person's list of goods, some of them rank higher than others.
We know that because they will exchange certain goods for others ---
though they consider both A and B to be goods, and will acquire them both
if the opportunity arises, they will exchange B for A if that choice
presents itself.
I assume you will agree that morality consists in rules governing
interactions among persons, the aim of which is to prevent persons, when
they are pursuing their own good, from inflicting harms upon others. One
person harms another when he deprives him of something he has acquired as
a good, or imposes upon him something he regards as an evil. So a
primitive moral principle seems to be, "Do no harm." The complement of
that rule is, "Do whatever you wish when pursuing your good, provided you
do not harm others."
Of course, whenever there are several persons in a common social setting,
the possibility arises that two or more of them will value the same thing,
and will desire to acquire (or retain) it. How to decide who shall have
it? Enter the first possession rule --- whoever first possessed it shall
have it. Why is that? Because the first possessor does not harm anyone by
acquiring it, since it was not already in anyone else's possession.
Indeed, first possession usually occurs when the first possessor either
created or discovered the good claimed, which means it did not exist or
was not known to exist prior to that creation or discovery. Thus no one
could possibly be harmed by that original acquisition. In any subsequent
acquisition, however, the possibility of harms is always present. If Alfie
is the first possessor of some good G, then no one is harmed (no one's
good is reduced) by Alfie's mere acquisition of G. But if Bruno later
acquires G by seizing it from Alfie, then Alfie *is* harmed; his good is
reduced.
That is, of course, the basis for the notion of *property* --- a person's
property consists in those goods he has acquired without inflicting harms.
You should be able to see that if the concept of property is to have any
moral significance, it cannot be understood in physical terms. One cannot
derive "ought" from "is." Declaring that some item-in-the-world has
physical properties A, B, and C has no moral import or implications
whatsoever. Those characteristics serve only to identify that item;
whether there is any moral significance to who is in possession of it
depends entirely upon whether it is *valued* by some person or other,
whether someone counts it as a *good*. If no one counts it a good, then
who possesses it is a matter of indifference, morally speaking. Possessing
it
benefits no one; taking it harms no one. No one will care who possesses, or
probably even notice.
Property is a moral concept. It signifies the things people value, that
they regard as goods, and which they have acquired without inflicting
harms. The physical characteristics of those things are morally
irrrelevant, and in fact they need not be physical at all. All that
matters morally is whether someone will be harmed if deprived of that
thing. Persons are harmed if the things they value, whether physical or
non-physical, which they have acquired without harming anyone, are taken
from them.
People write software because they value the benefits they expect to
realize from it, which consists of the payments they expect to receive
from others for the privilege of using it. If no one wants to use it, then
no one need pay for it. But they may not morally use it without paying for
it, any more than they may use any other property of another's without
paying for it. It qualifies as property because it has value to its owner,
and because he is its first possessor, and that is all that matters. All
copies of it are the owner's property, because they cannot be
distinguished from the software he created, and are therefore strictly
identical with it.
> No, it's property regardless of its value.
If you wish to maintain that claim you'll need to explain how you define
property, and what is the moral significance of the concept as you define
it.
>> Roman Law protected trade secrets, and punished under its criminal code
>> anyone who revealed them after obtaining them in confidence from their
>> owner.
> Well, that's violating contract and no surprise that legal systems
> might punish it. Did they also punish everyone else in the world who
> heard and used the already revealed secret, which is what you'd like to
> do?
You agree then that anyone who copies and distributes licensed software in
punishable?
I doubt the Romans tried to track down all illicit users of stolen
secrets. As with any laws, there are practical limits to enforcement. The
moral issues are distinct from the legal practicalities, however. Anyone
who uses software he knows to be licensed, and has not paid for it, is
behaving immorally. He is deriving benefit from a product of others' time
and effort without compensating the person who invested that time and
effort. He is a moocher, a parasite.
>> "Every useful discovery is, in to Kant's words 'the presentation of a
>> service rendered to Society'. It is, therefore, just that he who has
>> rendered this service should be compensated by Society that received
>> it. This is an equitable result, a veritable contract or exchange that
>> operates between the authors of a new discovery and Society. The former
>> supply the noble products of their intelligence and Society grants to
>> them in return the advantages of an exclusive exploitation of their
>> discovery for a limited period".
>> ---French Patent Law of 1844.
>
> So, you think the right arises because of the _Social Contract_. Ok.
That is not a social contract argument; it is a moral argument
(compensation should be rendered because it is just).
> I much prefer Jefferson's views on the issue to the above gibberish and
> rationalizations though.
I'm a great admirer of Jefferson. But he was wrong about patents.
>> Ideas you "possess"? You may use anything you happen to possess as you
>> please? You may rent a car from Hertz, then sell it and keep the money?
>> Give it to your girlfriend as a birthday present?
> No, when Hertz gave me the car I contracted to only use that car for a
> limited time and then give it back. I'd be violating a contract.
What if someone else rented the car and sold it to you? May you keep it,
since you had no contract with Hertz?
> No chain of consent is required for me because I'm not taking anything
> that belongs to the creator. He still has his creation. The creator
> of a car does not own copies of a car that anyone might make, even if
> they indirectly decrease the "value" of his car. He only owns the car,
> nothing more, nothing less. Likewise your software.
The above comments should have covered that. There is only one software Z.
All copies are the same software Z. If you are using software Z without
the permission of its creator, and that use deprives that creator of part
of its value, you are stealing.
There is no temptation to make copies of a car. If you wished to make a
copy of Hummer, it would cost you as much or more than it would to buy
one.
> "It" isn't property. "It" is an arbitrary abstraction that you're
> reifying and pretending is like a car in order to justify what you'd
> like to do to people in order to get more money for yourself.
I think we've covered whether it is property. But I'm curious as to why
you would call a piece of software an "arbitrary abstraction." Scarcely
anything can be more precisely defined.
>> Ah. Then you will have to explain what you take to be the basis of
>> "legitimate moral claims." Securing values to their first possessors is
>> the only basis I know of, whether it is the value of their lives,
>> liberties, property of any kind. The point of all moral rules is
>> prevent some persons from seizing valuable things
> Yes, prevent seizure of the _things_, not their "value".
Now you have to explain why seizure of a "thing" would have any moral
significance, unless it had value to someone.
> There is no relevance in what you're saying. They're both commodities
> of limited use.
Limited *concurrent* use. And what is the moral significance of that fact?
>> What precisely is the "service" here? Creating a CD with 740 MB of
>> random data on it? Or is it the ordering of that data that is the real
>> "service," that has value?
> You aren't selling me the latter service. You already performed that
> service.
And have you paid for that service? Or do you propose to benefit from it
without paying for it?
>> Did I create that order, and thus that value, or did you?
> You discovered a formula, that when a string of numbers are ordered in
> such a way they can accomplish a certain task.
And if that is a task from which you may benefit, there is no need to
compensate the maker of the tool you intend to use?
> They can capture its value exactly as you've defined it, even when
> everyone copies it. The value might be a lower amount when everyone
> copies it, but that's irrelevant to your definition of value, because
> *p* is just deciding to pay less.
Yes. He is deciding to pay nothing. That is the decision all thieves make.
> You're not talking about a market price. You're talking about a
> monopoly price.
I don't think you know what a monopoly price is. You have a monopoly when
there are no competing products. Virtually all software has competing
products. Everyone in an economy has a monopoly on his own products and
property, i.e., the exclusive right to sell, lease, rent, etc., that
particular property. All property confers a monopoly over *that property*.
> One producer/seller of a product setting one price for
> all incarnations of that product under state imposed monopoly. In a
> market others could make that same product themselves and competing
> producers and sellers could make and offer the same product.
Ford and GM do not make the *same* product. They make competing products.
Ford has no power to make and sell Chevrolets. That fact does not confer a
monopoly, as normally understood, on GM.
> It is, but now it's more clear, in that under your definition if
> everyone copies your software whenever they wish, you still have the
> exact same "value" you defined: whatever *p* feels like giving you.
Yes, when the alternative is doing without. Using the product and paying
nothing is not an alternative. If that is permitted there is no economy.
>> Hardly anything can be more precisely defined than an item of
>> intellectual property. A software program is a very specific string of
>> bits. What is "vague" about it?
> You said the property was a "value". Now it's a string of bits?
The property consists in its value. The string of bits serves to identify
it as the property of a particular person. The property value of an acre
of land is given by the value of the crops it yields. The legal
description identifes that acre and associates it ---and its value ---
with a particular owner.
>> > This is also false. If you fix up your house, that may increase the
>> > value of your neighbor's house, hence that "value" is "derivable"
>> > from your property, but you dont' own the increased "value" of their
>> > house. You own your house. End of story.
>> That's right. That is a "neighborhood effect." I can't claim those
>> because they attach to others' property, to which they have prior
>> claims. Software also creates neighborhood effects. For example, dozens
>> of people have written add-ons to AutoCad. Without AutoCad, those
>> programs --- those income opportunities --- wouldn't exist. But
>> AutoDesk doesn't get a cent from them. Neighborhood effects are
>> "freebies" to everyone in the neighborhood.
> Fine. So we agree that your claim that "All property is based on the
> very same premise, namely, that all value derivable from that property
> belongs to the owner." is clearly false. At least we have that
> settled.
All value *derivable* from the asset; not all value *traceable* to the
asset.
> So why isn't my new copy of your software a "neighborhood effect"? It
> also attaches to my property, to which I have prior claims.
Because that value is not *derivable* from the efforts you invested. Those
efforts, without the code to copy, have essentially no value.
>> If the house had no value, you wouldn't bother claiming ownership of
>> it. In fact, you'd be more likely to pretend it wasn't yours. It is the
>> *value* you hope to secure by claiming ownership. I suspect you
>> understand that, despite your protests.
> It doesn't matter what I *hope to secure*. My whims do not change my
> rights. All I secure is the house, regardless of its value.
Covered, I think.
>> What determines his ownership is the first possession principle. That
>> establishes the *fact* of ownership. The value of the asset supplies
>> the *reason* for asserting ownership to something. No one claims
>> ownership of things with no value, even if they are the first
>> possessors. If one comes into possession of such things, they are
>> quickly abandoned.
> Fine, so I'll just take everyone's possessions and return others of the
> same "value".
You can't do that because you don't know what those values are until the
owners tell you. Only Aunt Alice, the owner of Grandma's armoir, can tell
you its value to her. And is it her, Aunt Alice, you must avoid harming.
Which means you must meet her price or forego the armoir.
>> The same is true of software. The
>> right to exclude arises from the right to maximize the return on one's
>> assets;
> My copy is not your asset. You never had it. You didn't make it.
Covered above.
> Something that is relevant in terms of exclusion though is whether
> there is a limit on use or not. If there is none, the exclusive right
> loses any moral grounds it might have had.
Copying software limits the use for which the owner wrote it, namely, to
make money. He who creates the asset defines the use (for him).
[few points snipped because they repeated points addressed elsewhere]
Publius
@p10g2000cwp.googlegroups.com:
> Property is just a title given by government and hence property is
> force. So the right-"libertarian" concept of freedom is not freedom at
> all.
You may benefit from "What the HECK are Rights?", here:
Constantinople
A mere title is not force. It is enforcement which uses force. But
enforcement of anything uses force. For example enforcement of a law
against murder, or enforcement of a law against rape. Enforcement of
these laws is necessary to preserve freedom, and therefore freedom
requires the use of force.
The difference between freedom and slavery is not whether force is
used, but what the force is used for.
Constantinople
Publius wrote:
> <jbd...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:1141188706.3...@e56g2000cwe.googlegroups.com...
>
> >> In that case, a programmer who writes software in order to licence it
> >> to others to produce income for himself is within his rights to use it
> >> in that way. Correct?
>
> > Sure. That's just trade, which is another use.
>
> And if others, without his permission, copy that software (either in
> violation of their licensing agreements, or after obtaining the software
> from someone who has), they then deny him that use of the software, in
> direct proportion to the extent of those unauthorized uses. He can no
> longer use it to generate an income stream. Correct?
True, but similarly, if you have a restaurant, and then someone opens
up a better restaurant and people stop coming to your restaurant
because of that, then the restaurant owner can no longer use his
restaurant to generate an income stream.
The restaurant owner is within his rights to use his restaurant (to the
extent that he can get customers) to produce income for himself. That
right is not violated by a competing restaurant, because the competing
restaurant reduces the extent to which he can get customers, but not
his ability to get income from those customers he can get. His right
only extends to a right to do business with willing customers. It does
not extend to a right to have willing customers in the first place.
Similarly with software. As written above:
:: In that case, a programmer who writes software in order to licence
it
:: to others to produce income for himself is within his rights to use
it
:: in that way. Correct?
His right is the right to produce income to the extent that he can get
customers who are willing to pay him. If no one is willing to do
business with him, he does not have a right to do business with them
contrary to their will. This is the same as a restaurant owner: neither
one has the right to have customers, only a right to do business with
those customers he has.
So if something deprives the restaurant owner, or the programmer, of
those customers, this does not infringe on his right to do business
with those customers he has. A competing restaurant deprives a
restaurant owner of some of his customers, and pirated software
deprives a programmer of some of his customers.
If you want to argue against software piracy, you need to go some other
route. There are other routes, for example contract: contracts, like
nondisclosure agreements, help to keep secrets from leaking out, and if
the secrets do leak out then there is probably a culprit, someone who
signed an agreement and broke it.
Alternatively, you can argue against software piracy on utilitarian
grounds, or economic grounds: protecting intellectual property
maximizes the incentive to produce innovative software, and piracy
causes net harm by reducing that incentive. However, there are economic
arguments that go different ways - for example, there's been a lot of
negative buzz about patents, about a possible chilling effect they have
on innovation because would-be inventors are afraid of unknowingly
stepping on someone else's patent, and of doing a lot of work only to
have the fruits of their labor taken from them by a lurking patent
holder.
There is also a real question about exactly when copyright should
expire to maximize the net benefit. Should copyright last 100 years or
ten years? Or less? What would happen without any copyright? These are
questions to which there are no simple answers.
jbd...@hotmail.com
> Publius wrote:
> > <jbd...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> > news:1141188706.3...@e56g2000cwe.googlegroups.com...
> >
> > >> In that case, a programmer who writes software in order to licence it
> > >> to others to produce income for himself is within his rights to use it
> > >> in that way. Correct?
> >
> > > Sure. That's just trade, which is another use.
> >
> > And if others, without his permission, copy that software (either in
> > violation of their licensing agreements, or after obtaining the software
> > from someone who has), they then deny him that use of the software, in
> > direct proportion to the extent of those unauthorized uses. He can no
> > longer use it to generate an income stream. Correct?
>
> True,
Actually it's false. He can still use it to generate an income stream
(trade it) all he likes. It's true that it might be a smaller income
stream, but that's not being denied a use. It's claiming to be denied
a particular amount of return for that use, namely the amount that
would arise under perfect monopoly conditions.
> but similarly, if you have a restaurant, and then someone opens
> up a better restaurant and people stop coming to your restaurant
> because of that, then the restaurant owner can no longer use his
> restaurant to generate an income stream.
No, he still has that use as before. It just means that the choice to
put it to that use may not meet his hopes as much as before.
But he's already said that's not enough. He wants the right to go
after every third party that learns of the already revealed secret, who
had never entered any agreement.
> Alternatively, you can argue against software piracy on utilitarian
> grounds, or economic grounds: protecting intellectual property
> maximizes the incentive to produce innovative software, and piracy
> causes net harm by reducing that incentive. However, there are economic
> arguments that go different ways - for example, there's been a lot of
> negative buzz about patents, about a possible chilling effect they have
> on innovation because would-be inventors are afraid of unknowingly
> stepping on someone else's patent, and of doing a lot of work only to
> have the fruits of their labor taken from them by a lurking patent
> holder.
But he can't go that route, because that would be appealing to the good
of the "social organism" and he's said that's bad.
It's nice to agree on something for a change anyway, be it in whole or
in part.
uri
> A mere title is not force. It is enforcement which uses force. But
> enforcement of anything uses force. For example enforcement of a law
> against murder, or enforcement of a law against rape. Enforcement of
> these laws is necessary to preserve freedom, and therefore freedom
> requires the use of force.
>
> The difference between freedom and slavery is not whether force is
> used, but what the force is used for.
The big distinction here is between negative and positive rights.
Right-libertarians put property rights above all other rights.
Freedom without equality is privilege, hence imo is not really freedom.
Marc Welch
> force.
Property predates title. And often exists in opposition to the State.
Ask a dead Indian.
Publius
@v46g2000cwv.googlegroups.com:
> The big distinction here is between negative and positive rights.
> Right-libertarians put property rights above all other rights.
All rights are property rights. Every right is *to* something; they all have
the form,
pRx,
where p is a person and x is that to which p has the right. x is p's
*property*, whatever it may be.
> Freedom without equality is privilege, hence imo is not really freedom.
Freedom and (material) equality are contradictories. They cannot exist
together. Freedom entails inequalities, and equality entails denial of
freedom. You cannot have both. You have to choose one or the other, or
neither.
Marc Welch
> freedom.
Since people are not the same, equality without freedom yields
neither freedom nor equality. The "libertarian-socialists" of
Spain wound up with at police state that was neither equal nor
free.
Publius
news:1141236714....@u72g2000cwu.googlegroups.com:
>> And if others, without his permission, copy that software (either in
>> violation of their licensing agreements, or after obtaining the software
>> from someone who has), they then deny him that use of the software, in
>> direct proportion to the extent of those unauthorized uses. He can no
>> longer use it to generate an income stream. Correct?
> True, but similarly, if you have a restaurant, and then someone opens
> up a better restaurant and people stop coming to your restaurant
> because of that, then the restaurant owner can no longer use his
> restaurant to generate an income stream.
> The restaurant owner is within his rights to use his restaurant (to the
> extent that he can get customers) to produce income for himself. That
> right is not violated by a competing restaurant, because the competing
> restaurant reduces the extent to which he can get customers, but not
> his ability to get income from those customers he can get. His right
> only extends to a right to do business with willing customers. It does
> not extend to a right to have willing customers in the first place.
All correct so far. But you're not paying sufficent attention to the
"unauthorized uses," which leads you to:
> Similarly with software. As written above:
>
>> In that case, a programmer who writes software in order to licence
>> it to others to produce income for himself is within his rights to use
>> it in that way. Correct?
>
> His right is the right to produce income to the extent that he can get
> customers who are willing to pay him. If no one is willing to do
> business with him, he does not have a right to do business with them
> contrary to their will. This is the same as a restaurant owner: neither
> one has the right to have customers, only a right to do business with
> those customers he has.
>
> So if something deprives the restaurant owner, or the programmer, of
> those customers, this does not infringe on his right to do business
> with those customers he has. A competing restaurant deprives a
> restaurant owner of some of his customers, and pirated software
> deprives a programmer of some of his customers.
Ah. You overlook that there is a big difference in the "something" that
deprives the restauranteur and the programmer of customers. The competing
restauranteur employs his own property to offer a competing product, which
reduces the first restauranteur's income. The software pirate uses the
*programmer's* property to deprive the programmer of income. He is not
offering a competing product; he is offering the same product, which is the
property of the programmer. It is as if the pirate were to set up his own
cashier station on the first restaurant's premises, hang a sign announcing
"20% off at this register," proceed to pocket the money, and then attempt
to defend his conduct by saying, "Well it is my register, and the customers
paid me willingly."
Of course, for this to be clear you have to understand that software is
property. Anyone in possession of the programmer's software without his
permission is trespassing upon his property. Look again at my previous post
for those arguments.
> If you want to argue against software piracy, you need to go some other
> route. There are other routes, for example contract: contracts, like
> nondisclosure agreements, help to keep secrets from leaking out, and if
> the secrets do leak out then there is probably a culprit, someone who
> signed an agreement and broke it.
That's true. There is always some breach of contract issue in software
piracy. That can reach only the parties to the contract. The trespass issue
is separate, and reaches anyone in unauthorized possession of the software.
> There is also a real question about exactly when copyright should
> expire to maximize the net benefit. Should copyright last 100 years or
> ten years? Or less? What would happen without any copyright? These are
> questions to which there are no simple answers.
I agree that legal protection of patents, copyrights, etc., should continue
only for limited times, both for reasons of practical enforcement and
increasing transaction costs (the more patents there are, the more
difficult and costly it becomes to research them). Where those limits
should be drawn is an important question, and not easy to answer. But it is
distinct from the moral question.
James A. Donald
On 1 Mar 2006 01:17:44 -0800, "uri" <dan...@bezeqint.net> wrote:
> Property is just a title given by government
Do you have a government issued title for the computer on which you
typed that.?
Furthermore, in California, and in most reasonably capitalist places,
property in land is *not* a government issued title, for actual
possession over several years trumps mere paper. It is only in the
more socialist leaning places that the government claims that it is
the source of all property rights.
--digsig
James A. Donald
6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG
vbT3x7j4fV5ZJtIVuY0++EnP2b+PT7KGNHr4sCKx
4oxwZwncBhWG2YA8jZ4svhyEVsB5F3QdUZ+EvBHMq
jbd...@hotmail.com
No he's using his property to make something that looks like the
programmer's property.
> He is not offering a competing product; he is offering the same product, which is the
> property of the programmer.
You're all bungled up in a semantic ambiguity here. They are only "the
same product" in the sense that a pear that I'm eating and a pear that
you're eating are sometimes semantically referred to as "the same
product" in some contexts. IOW, only in a particular abstract
classification sense, which highlights those features that are shared
between two _different items_ and discards the differences between the
two items for the purpose of constructing a general classification.
Thus my previous point that you are claiming a monopoly over a
_category_, a _class_, of product, covering all products that _other
people_ might produce that feature certain characteristics that you've
chosen to group into your semantic classification.
Despite the semantic ambiguity of the particular usage that you're
using, they are, without doubt, two distinct and different products. I
can eat my pear and you still have your pear. Likewise, I can destroy
or change my software and you still have your software just as it was.
This is because we do not actually have the same product, but two
different products, but two different products which could be described
as being in the same _class of product_ in certain contexts.
> It is as if the pirate were to set up his own
> cashier station on the first restaurant's premises, hang a sign announcing
> "20% off at this register," proceed to pocket the money, and then attempt
> to defend his conduct by saying, "Well it is my register, and the customers
> paid me willingly."
The analogies just keep getting more absurd. It would be like me
building my own restaurant and using my own cash register to sell the
same dishes that you're selling with the same ingredients and the same
taste, but charging 20% less.
> Of course, for this to be clear you have to understand that software is
> property.
IOW, we first assume your conclusion to the issue under debate, then
we'll agree with your conclusions.
> Anyone in possession of the programmer's software without his
> permission is trespassing upon his property. Look again at my previous post
> for those arguments.
>
> > If you want to argue against software piracy, you need to go some other
> > route. There are other routes, for example contract: contracts, like
> > nondisclosure agreements, help to keep secrets from leaking out, and if
> > the secrets do leak out then there is probably a culprit, someone who
> > signed an agreement and broke it.
>
> That's true. There is always some breach of contract issue in software
> piracy. That can reach only the parties to the contract. The trespass issue
> is separate, and reaches anyone in unauthorized possession of the software.
>
> > There is also a real question about exactly when copyright should
> > expire to maximize the net benefit. Should copyright last 100 years or
> > ten years? Or less? What would happen without any copyright? These are
> > questions to which there are no simple answers.
>
> I agree that legal protection of patents, copyrights, etc., should continue
> only for limited times, both for reasons of practical enforcement and
> increasing transaction costs (the more patents there are, the more
> difficult and costly it becomes to research them).
This is another issue exposing the fallacy of the moral argument for
the imaginary property, and yet another distinction between it and real
property. If I actually built a car or a shirt, on what grounds could
it be taken away from me just because some period of time has past?
And aren't you appealing to the "good of the social organism" there?
Constantinople
Publius wrote:
> "Constantinople" <constan...@gmail.com> wrote in
> news:1141236714....@u72g2000cwu.googlegroups.com:
[...]
> Of course, for this to be clear you have to understand that software is
> property. Anyone in possession of the programmer's software without his
> permission is trespassing upon his property. Look again at my previous post
> for those arguments.
While I have not read all your words on this I have read widely over
the years and not found compelling arguments. I addressed a
*particular* argument in your post which I took to be an argument for
intellectual property rights. As I see you agree, that particular
argument assumes the conclusion, assumes that software is property. You
seem to be agreeing that the argument from curtailment of income does
not constitute an argument for intellectual property rights but rather
takes it as a given, taking as a given that software is property. If
you think there's a compelling argument for intellectual property
rights, feel free to repeat it or emphasize it.
James A. Donald
On 1 Mar 2006 12:39:17 -0800, "uri" <dan...@bezeqint.net> wrote:
> The big distinction here is between negative and positive rights.
> Right-libertarians put property rights above all other rights.
All other rights *are* property rights. If a printing press is not
private property, no freedom of speech, if soil under a church is not
private property, no freedom of religion.
And we are not "right" libertarians. Libertarian socialism was tried,
and it became apparent that liberty and socialism were incompatible.
--digsig
James A. Donald
6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG
/ShSgukQLCGPcixzTiAKymaiLdTLXfxvrXFXdcT6
4wNIVdIZ6fx6HcsLwQdWsMqnG7+uhkRcr/A006otc
Publius
news:1141269500....@j33g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:
>> Ah. You overlook that there is a big difference in the "something" that
>> deprives the restauranteur and the programmer of customers. The
>> competing restauranteur employs his own property to offer a competing
>> product, which reduces the first restauranteur's income. The software
>> pirate uses the *programmer's* property to deprive the programmer of
>> income.
> No he's using his property to make something that looks like the
> programmer's property.
>> He is not offering a competing product; he is offering the same
>> product, which is the property of the programmer.
> You're all bungled up in a semantic ambiguity here. They are only "the
> same product" in the sense that a pear that I'm eating and a pear that
> you're eating are sometimes semantically referred to as "the same
> product" in some contexts. IOW, only in a particular abstract
> classification sense, which highlights those features that are shared
> between two _different items_ and discards the differences between the
> two items for the purpose of constructing a general classification.
You need to address the arguments on that point in the previous post. My
pear and your pear are fruit from trees of the same species, but they are
not the same pear. The original software and the copy are the same software
--- they are *strictly identical*. Strict identity exists when two alleged
things cannot be distinguished by any possible means. My individual pear
and your individual pair can be distinguished in dozens of ways --- they
will have different sizes, shapes, colors, weights, sugar content, etc.
etc., not to mention having different spatio-temporal coordinates.
A piece of software, (say, software Z) is defined as a string of bits of
length *n* in a given order, {b_0 . . . b_n}. Those two parameters
*completely* define software Z. There are no further defining
characteristics of software Z. In particular, software Z has no physical
properties --- it has no mass, no charge, no spatio-temporal location. It
is a mathematical entity. Only its *representations* have any of those
properties, and such properties of its representations are irrelevant to
software Z itself; they have nothing to do with the role of software Z in
an information structure, or with the purposes it can serve or the tasks it
can perform. All representations of software Z will serve those purposes
equally well and perform those tasks the same way. For any task to which
you want to apply software Z it will not matter which representation you
use, or what may be the physical characterstics of the representation.
There is no "semantical ambiguity" here. You are simply failing to
distinguish between qualitative identity and strict identity.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity/
There might be a deeper problem here, namely, that you are assuming some
sort of naive-realist metaphysics, i.e., that physical objects are the only
things that "really exist." Hence you can make no distinction between a
mathematical entity and its physical representations, and consider only the
representations to be "real." That position would cause you big problems in
many other areas, including mathematics, most sciences, information theory,
and even ethics. All of those realms presume non-physical (but definitely
real) entities.
> Despite the semantic ambiguity of the particular usage that you're
> using, they are, without doubt, two distinct and different products.
Software Z, or its various representations?
>> Of course, for this to be clear you have to understand that software is
>> property.
> IOW, we first assume your conclusion to the issue under debate, then
> we'll agree with your conclusions.
I can see why you might suppose software cannot be property if you don't
think it exists in the first place, that only its physical representations
do. That is incoherent, of course. If software Z does not exist, then
neither can any representation of it.
>> I agree that legal protection of patents, copyrights, etc., should
>> continue only for limited times, both for reasons of practical
>> enforcement and increasing transaction costs (the more patents there
>> are, the more difficult and costly it becomes to research them).
> This is another issue exposing the fallacy of the moral argument for
> the imaginary property, and yet another distinction between it and real
> property. If I actually built a car or a shirt, on what grounds could
> it be taken away from me just because some period of time has past?
There is that "imaginary property" again. Only physical things are "real."
Your phrase "real property" is interesting, though. That particular term
today refers primarily to property in land, "real estate," which at one
time was the only thing considered to qualify as property. Various other
classes of property were added over time, first to tangible things
("moveable property"), then to various intangible things, such as
contracts, notes, receivables, stocks, "goodwill," etc. Beginning 500 years
ago or so, various kinds of "intellectual property" began to included as
property. The reason for adding them, of course, is that they all had
value, and the law sought to secure that value to its rightful possessors,
that being the purpose of all property law.
I think you are still in the 12th century or thereabouts. :-)
BTW, there are comparable statutory enforcement limits on theft of shirts
or cars also. They are called "statutes of limitations." They are, like
patent or copyright periods, declarations by the government of how long it
will consider itself bound to enforce your rights. Even trespasses upon
land become unenforceable after a period of time, under the doctrine of
adverse possession (10 years in most states).
Publius
news:1141273380....@v46g2000cwv.googlegroups.com:
> While I have not read all your words on this I have read widely over
> the years and not found compelling arguments. I addressed a
> *particular* argument in your post which I took to be an argument for
> intellectual property rights.
No, it wasn't. It was only an argument that the analogy you had drawn between
the competing restauranteur and the software pirate was invalid, there being
an obvious difference between the cases. Neither the analogy or my argument
against it, by themselves, would serve as arguments for or against the
proposition that software qualifies as property. I'd just given that argument
in the post to jbd4020.
> As I see you agree, that particular
> argument assumes the conclusion, assumes that software is property. You
> seem to be agreeing that the argument from curtailment of income does
> not constitute an argument for intellectual property rights but rather
> takes it as a given, taking as a given that software is property. If
> you think there's a compelling argument for intellectual property
> rights, feel free to repeat it or emphasize it.
That was just posted in the response mentioned above. It is only a few posts
back in this thread. If it has already been zapped from your server, let me
know and I will repost it.
constan...@gmail.com
Publius wrote:
> "Constantinople" <constan...@gmail.com> wrote in
> news:1141273380....@v46g2000cwv.googlegroups.com:
>
> > While I have not read all your words on this I have read widely over
> > the years and not found compelling arguments. I addressed a
> > *particular* argument in your post which I took to be an argument for
> > intellectual property rights.
>
> No, it wasn't. It was only an argument that the analogy you had drawn between
> the competing restauranteur and the software pirate was invalid,
No, things are getting confused here. "It" (i.e., what I had addressed)
refers to something that you wrote *before* I endered this exchange
(since the post in which I addressed it was my first post to this
exchange between you and Josh), so "it" definitely is not an argument
about an analogy I had not drawn yet.
> there being
> an obvious difference between the cases. Neither the analogy or my argument
> against it, by themselves, would serve as arguments for or against the
> proposition that software qualifies as property. I'd just given that argument
> in the post to jbd4020.
>
> > As I see you agree, that particular
> > argument assumes the conclusion, assumes that software is property. You
> > seem to be agreeing that the argument from curtailment of income does
> > not constitute an argument for intellectual property rights but rather
> > takes it as a given, taking as a given that software is property. If
> > you think there's a compelling argument for intellectual property
> > rights, feel free to repeat it or emphasize it.
>
> That was just posted in the response mentioned above. It is only a few posts
> back in this thread. If it has already been zapped from your server, let me
> know and I will repost it.
Your post is long and contains different arguments. I already picked
something and you said that's not it. If I pick something else maybe
you'll say that's not it either. I'm not going to spend an hour
commenting on something just to have you say no that's not it.
Publius
news:gfuc02lc46a2ijre9...@4ax.com:
> All other rights *are* property rights. If a printing press is not
> private property, no freedom of speech, if soil under a church is not
> private property, no freedom of religion.
James --- I sent an e yesterday via the address link on your web site.
Wondering if you received it.
Publius
news:1141282287.5...@u72g2000cwu.googlegroups.com:
> No, things are getting confused here. "It" (i.e., what I had addressed)
> refers to something that you wrote *before* I endered this exchange
> (since the post in which I addressed it was my first post to this
> exchange between you and Josh), so "it" definitely is not an argument
> about an analogy I had not drawn yet.
Heh. OK. That would have been a response to some comment of jbd's. It would
not have been an argument for the thesis that information qualifies as
property *per se*.
> Your post is long and contains different arguments. I already picked
> something and you said that's not it. If I pick something else maybe
> you'll say that's not it either. I'm not going to spend an hour
> commenting on something just to have you say no that's not it.
Here is the argument for the thesis that information qualifies as property,
as excerpted from the cited post, along with the precipitating exchange:
------------------------
>> Well, you haven't drawn any distinction. At least none that is
>> relevant. The purpose of the concept of property is, and has always
>> been, to secure the *value* of goods to the creators of that value.
> No, it's to secure control of the goods, regardless of their value. I
> already established this. But if you think that, then you'll surely
> you won't mind if I come take all your stuff, but leave in its place
> other stuff of equal "value".
That is as good a launching point as any.
"Goods" are defined in terms of value. Describing something as a "good"
makes no sense except in terms of value. Without an assumption of value,
there is no distinguishing "goods" from "bads," or from items to which one
is indifferent. By calling something a "good" you presume a value.
it confers benefits on no one; taking it harms no one. No one
will care who possesses it, or probably will even notice.
Property is a moral concept. It signifies the things people value, that
they regard as goods, and which they have acquired without inflicting
harms. The physical characteristics of those things are morally
irrrelevant, and in fact they need not be physical at all. All that
matters morally is whether someone will be harmed if deprived of that
thing. Persons are harmed if the things they value, whether physical or
non-physical, and which they have acquired without harming anyone, are
taken from them.
People write software because they value the benefits they expect to
realize from it, which consists of the payments they expect to receive
from others for the privilege of using it. If no one wants to use it, then
no one need pay for it. But they may not morally use it without paying for
it, any more than they may use any other property of another's without
paying for it. It qualifies as property because it has value to its owner,
and because he is its first possessor, and that is all that matters. All
copies of it are the owner's property, because they cannot be
distinguished from the software he created, and are therefore strictly
identical with it.
---------------------
There is another argument for the strict identity of all copies of any
particular piece of software, which is not included here.
Hope this helps.
Constantinople
This assumes that both cannot acquire it at the same time. Some things
can be acquired by two people at the same time. For example, a single
book can exist in two copies. Each of two people can have one of the
copies. By having just one copy, a person also has the book itself. For
example by reading that one copy, he reads the book itself. Since he
can read the book, he must possess the book, since how can he read
something he does not possess.
Copyright is the right to control copying. If someone possesses
copyright and copyright is enforced, then the valued good he possesses
is the ability to control copying - he has control over copying. Of
course the ability to control copying cannot be acquired by two people
at the same time. But maybe it cannot be acquired by anyone at all. If
something cannot be acquired at all, then the fact that two different
people desire it becomes a non-issue. What cannot be acquired in the
first place, cannot subsequently be stolen.
In fact I would argue that, absent the state, the ability to control
copying cannot be acquired. Since it cannot be acquired, it cannot be
possessed. Since it cannot be possessed, it cannot be stolen.
And anyway software pirates do not actually take the ability to control
copying. I.e., they do not take that ability for themselves. Rather,
they destroy it altogether. What they acquire is merely a copy, not the
ability to control copying. If you insist on the idea of intellectual
property, then pirates are more properly considered vandals than
thieves because they destroy something, the ability to control copying,
they do not steal the ability since they do not acquire the ability.
Do they steal the copy? No. The particular copy that the thieves
acquire is not taken but rather made, and the copy that they used is
left in place. So the particular copy they copied is not stolen either.
If a pirate copies someone's program, he does not deprive him of the
program itself, because he still has the program, though someone else
now also has the program. Nor does he deprive him of his particular
copy of the program, because he still has that as well. What he
deprives him of is the ability to control the copying of the program,
but if he never had that then he is not deprived of it by the pirate.
Of course, someone who writes a program and keeps it a secret and
shares it with no one will retain not only the program but also the
ability to control copying of the program. But the moment he shares the
program with others he begins to lose the ability to control the
copying of the program. But that happens as a result of his sharing the
program. All a pirate does is make use of the fact that the program's
originator no longer has control over the copying of the program.
Moreover the notion that someone who has something he values has a
right to keep it is questionable. Someone who has nice neighbors does
not for that reason get to keep on having nice neighbors, even if he
can sell the nice neighbors (he can sell his nice neighbors by selling
his house - the buyer of the house acquires the nice neighbors since
they come with the house). So someone can have a salable good and still
does not for this reason have a right to retain the good.
Someone may have the status of being the fastest human on the planet.
This may be something they value. They may be deprived of this status,
and as a result they may lose happiness and lose sponsorship and lose
money. But the even faster human who deprives them of this status has
not violated their rights.
James A. Donald
On Thu, 02 Mar 2006 00:54:42 -0600, Publius
> James --- I sent an e yesterday via the address link on your web
> site. Wondering if you received it.
I do not seem to have received anything from "Publius" - maybe it fell
into my spam filter - which is filtering poorly at the moment.
The address on my web page should be the same address as on this
usenet post, so if you simply reply to the poster, instead of the
post,should work. It is a valid address, unlike most.
--digsig
James A. Donald
6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG
jBlBSht1kHan1s984cYQOkP11+H8+Y4UaGfkGuqk
4Coq4LN1JRwEDmEo+X+YsygBNvamq8AsNkhd78ySx
Publius
news:1141288675....@u72g2000cwu.googlegroups.com:
>> I assume you will agree that morality consists in rules governing
>> interactions among persons, the aim of which is to prevent persons,
>> when they are pursuing their own good, from inflicting harms upon
>> others. One person harms another when he deprives him of something he
>> has acquired as a good, or imposes upon him something he regards as an
>> evil. So a primitive moral principle seems to be, "Do no harm." The
>> complement of that rule is, "Do whatever you wish when pursuing your
>> good, provided you do not harm others."
>> Of course, whenever there are several persons in a common social
>> setting, the possibility arises that two or more of them will value the
>> same thing, and will desire to acquire (or retain) it.
> This assumes that both cannot acquire it at the same time. Some things
> can be acquired by two people at the same time. For example, a single
> book can exist in two copies. Each of two people can have one of the
> copies. By having just one copy, a person also has the book itself. For
> example by reading that one copy, he reads the book itself. Since he
> can read the book, he must possess the book, since how can he read
> something he does not possess.
Those points are important, and I'll answer them, but they are not really
relevant to the thrust of the argument presented. Maybe I can clarify by
outlining jbd's argument. His basic thesis is that information cannot be
property, that it is "imaginary property." His arguments for that turn on
the fact that information is not physical, that it does not have such
physical properties as a unique location in time and space, and hence can
exist in multiple locations at once. If it has no definite location in
spacetime, and can exist in may places at once (and therefore may be used
by many people at once), it cannot be property.
The argument in my last post was that property is a moral, not a physical
concept. Whether or not a thing qualifies as property has nothing to do
with its physical characteristics, or even whether it is a physical thing
at all. The moral burden of the concept of property is to prevent persons
from injuring others by demarcating the goods each may rightfully claim,
and to assure that any benefits or value derivable from those rightfully
held goods accrue to their owners, and not to others, to the detriment of
the owners.
That is, *property* may embrace anything which a person deems valuable,
whether physical or non-physical; all that is necessary to qualify a thing
as property is that it be of value to someone, and that its claimant
acquired it in a moral way, i.e., without injuring anyone else. Those are
the only characteristics of property which have any moral relevance. Any
physical properties it may have, such as its location in time and space
and how many can use it concurrently, are morally inconsequential. What
matters is that someone deems it valuable and thus would be injured if
deprived of it. Much information clearly qualifies as property on that
ground, and that is the morally relevant ground.
To answer your points: People may indeed acquire a given good at the same
time. If they are the first possessors of that good then they are joint
owners of it. If they are not first possessors, but subsequent possessors,
then the rights they have in the good depend upon whether there is a chain
of consent linking them to the first possessors. If there is not, then
their current possession is a theft or a trespass.
Keep in mind that possession and property are not the same thing. Property
originates with *first* possession. Others may possess it later, but it
does not become their property merely because they now possess it. I may
be currently in possession of one of Hertz's rental cars, but it is not my
property. Many people may be in possession of a book or a computer program
at once, but unless they are the first possessors, it is not their
property.
> Copyright is the right to control copying.
No. Copyright is the right to the property copyrighted. It is no different
than any other property right --- it entails the power to decide who may
use the property, and under what conditions. Controlling copying is merely
one of the conditions which may be imposed, just as "No loud music after
midnight" may be a condition imposed on a rental flat. A property right
includes the power to control *all* uses of the property, whatever the
owner deems necessary to preserve the value of the asset.
> Of
> course the ability to control copying cannot be acquired by two people
> at the same time. But maybe it cannot be acquired by anyone at all. If
> something cannot be acquired at all, then the fact that two different
> people desire it becomes a non-issue. What cannot be acquired in the
> first place, cannot subsequently be stolen.
Keep in mind that property is a purely moral notion. The first possessor
of a good gains the *right* to the good; he will not always have the means
to eenforce that right. No property owner does. In fact, however (as you
note below) a writer of software has considerably more physical power over
his asset, at the outset, than does, say, the builder of a house or a
landowner. He can opt to inform no one about it, and run very low risk of
trespass. Anyone who later possesses it without his permission has
acquired it via a breach of faith, breach of contract, or as a result of
one of those.
> In fact I would argue that, absent the state, the ability to control
> copying cannot be acquired. Since it cannot be acquired, it cannot be
> possessed. Since it cannot be possessed, it cannot be stolen.
In the absence of the State no one would have control over any property.
At least, that was the argument of Hobbes and Locke, among others. But he
would still have the right to the property, whether or not he had
effective control over it.
> And anyway software pirates do not actually take the ability to control
> copying. I.e., they do not take that ability for themselves.
The right to the property does not consist in the right to control
copying. That is only an incident to the right. The right consists in
realizing any value or benefit derivable from the property.
> So the particular copy they copied is not stolen either.
What is stolen is part of the value of the asset.
> If a pirate copies someone's program, he does not deprive him of the
> program itself, because he still has the program, though someone else
> now also has the program. Nor does he deprive him of his particular
> copy of the program, because he still has that as well. What he
> deprives him of is the ability to control the copying of the program,
> but if he never had that then he is not deprived of it by the pirate.
What he deprives him of is the value, the benefits, realizable from the
program.
> Moreover the notion that someone who has something he values has a
> right to keep it is questionable. Someone who has nice neighbors does
> not for that reason get to keep on having nice neighbors,
Correct. People cannot have property rights in other people.
> Someone may have the status of being the fastest human on the planet.
> This may be something they value. They may be deprived of this status,
> and as a result they may lose happiness and lose sponsorship and lose
> money. But the even faster human who deprives them of this status has
> not violated their rights.
Correct also. That is similar to jbd's "competitor" argument. No property
right guarantees anyone any particular value from or return on one's
asset. Lightning may strike my house; the stock market may crash, wiping
out my investments; Home Depot may build a superstore across the street
and put my small hardware store out of business; a plague of locusts may
eat all my corn. All those outcomes are bad, but they are not immoral,
because they did not involve violation of moral rules by moral agents.
Software piracy clearly does.
jbd...@hotmail.com
> jbd...@hotmail.com wrote in
> news:1141269500....@j33g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:
>
> >> Ah. You overlook that there is a big difference in the "something" that
> >> deprives the restauranteur and the programmer of customers. The
> >> competing restauranteur employs his own property to offer a competing
> >> product, which reduces the first restauranteur's income. The software
> >> pirate uses the *programmer's* property to deprive the programmer of
> >> income.
>
> > No he's using his property to make something that looks like the
> > programmer's property.
>
> >> He is not offering a competing product; he is offering the same
> >> product, which is the property of the programmer.
>
> > You're all bungled up in a semantic ambiguity here. They are only "the
> > same product" in the sense that a pear that I'm eating and a pear that
> > you're eating are sometimes semantically referred to as "the same
> > product" in some contexts. IOW, only in a particular abstract
> > classification sense, which highlights those features that are shared
> > between two _different items_ and discards the differences between the
> > two items for the purpose of constructing a general classification.
>
> You need to address the arguments on that point in the previous post. My
> pear and your pear are fruit from trees of the same species, but they are
> not the same pear.
Of course. For the same kind of reasons that my copy of your imaginary
property isn't the same as your original.
> The original software and the copy are the same software
> --- they are *strictly identical*.
They are two different things that have certain identical features and
other different features, just like pears. Twins are identical in many
respects but they are not the same thing.
Furthermore, imaginary property rights do not claim to restrict
themselves to the purportedly "strictly identical". See, for example,
George Harrison's copyright suit over his song My Sweet Lord.
Or take simple photo-copies of books. Obviously the photo-copy is not
"strictly identical" to the original copy.
If that's what you have to resort to to keep your case afloat, you've
pretty well undermined copyright and intellectual property altogether.
So please proceed.
> Strict identity exists when two alleged
> things cannot be distinguished by any possible means.
But they can be distinguished, very easily and unambiguously, as I've
already said. I can destroy or change my copy of the software and
yours remains unharmed. As such they are easily distinguishable as two
separate entities. No matter how many aspects of them we might think
are "strictly identical" from a certain strictly conceptual point of
view, they simply are not.
> My individual pear
> and your individual pair can be distinguished in dozens of ways --- they
> will have different sizes, shapes, colors, weights, sugar content, etc.
> etc., not to mention having different spatio-temporal coordinates.
Well, you should be saying that it's only the *representations* of the
pear that have any of those things. ;-)
> A piece of software, (say, software Z) is defined as a string of bits of
> length *n* in a given order, {b_0 . . . b_n}. Those two parameters
> *completely* define software Z. There are no further defining
> characteristics of software Z.
Yes I'm aware that the abstract conceptual generalization that you're
calling "software Z" is defining an entire category or class of goods
that might feature certain observeable characteristics, like, for
instance, the generalization "pear".
> In particular, software Z has no physical
> properties --- it has no mass, no charge, no spatio-temporal location. It
> is a mathematical entity. Only its *representations* have any of those
> properties, and such properties of its representations are irrelevant to
> software Z itself; they have nothing to do with the role of software Z in
> an information structure, or with the purposes it can serve or the tasks it
> can perform. All representations of software Z will serve those purposes
> equally well and perform those tasks the same way. For any task to which
> you want to apply software Z it will not matter which representation you
> use, or what may be the physical characterstics of the representation.
That's great. Then I obviously haven't stolen software Z, since I've
only made a representation of it, which is of course completely
distinct from "software Z" itself, which has no mass...etc.
Look all you're doing here is selectively employing theoretical
categories and reifying them. It's like saying: Person Z is a mammal
of the human species born on a Tuesday.
Then when such people protest at being treated as one person, you
reply: No, your differences are not relevant. Different
*representations* of Person Z can have any number of differences, so
you're just different *representations* of Person Z, as can be
discovered by looking at my definition of Person Z, which does not
include those differences, which are physical differences, while Person
Z has no distinguishing physical characteristics.
Then when they say that Person Z is just an abstraction and an invented
categorization and conceptual collectivization of actually autonomous
things into a theoretical "organism", and only exists in your mind, you
can reply that obviously Person Z is real and exists because you, the
representations of Person Z, could not exist if Person Z did not exist.
See, it's all very logical, very circularly logical.
> There is no "semantical ambiguity" here.
There is a _HUGE_ semantical ambiguity here, exactly as I described,
and you sound progressively ridiculous as you try to keep your claims
afloat.
> You are simply failing to distinguish between qualitative identity and strict identity.
My only "failure" is not going along with your reification of an
abstraction you've chosen to construct in order to seize power over
other people.
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity/
>
> There might be a deeper problem here, namely, that you are assuming some
> sort of naive-realist metaphysics, i.e., that physical objects are the only
> things that "really exist." Hence you can make no distinction between a
> mathematical entity and its physical representations, and consider only the
> representations to be "real."
What I consider "real" has nothing to do with whether I can make
distinctions or not. I could make any conceptual distinctions and
classifications and categories I like, regardless of whether I think
they "really exist" or not. My "deep problem" seems to consist
entirely of, not an inability to distinguish, but a reluctance to reify
whatever conceptual categories I happen to concoct, or more aptly,
whatever ones you concoct.
...
> I can see why you might suppose software cannot be property if you don't
> think it exists in the first place, that only its physical representations
> do. That is incoherent, of course. If software Z does not exist, then
> neither can any representation of it.
"Software Z" as you've described it is an abstract notion, a particular
and selective way of conceptualizing and categorizing the physical
world in the mind. The only thing that exists outside the mind are its
"representations".
Thus your "property" is imaginary property. It exists in the realm of
the mind: the imagination, and nowhere else. The only things that
exist elsewhere are the "representations".
> >> I agree that legal protection of patents, copyrights, etc., should
> >> continue only for limited times, both for reasons of practical
> >> enforcement and increasing transaction costs (the more patents there
> >> are, the more difficult and costly it becomes to research them).
>
> > This is another issue exposing the fallacy of the moral argument for
> > the imaginary property, and yet another distinction between it and real
> > property. If I actually built a car or a shirt, on what grounds could
> > it be taken away from me just because some period of time has past?
>
> There is that "imaginary property" again. Only physical things are "real."
Well, things that do not exist in the physical world, as you insist of
your imaginary property, only exist in the mind, as concept. Thus,
imaginary seems quite an appropriate term for things that only exist as
concept. Or it may be termed religious property, from another
perspective, or perhaps both.
jbd...@hotmail.com
It would be much better to use quotations or something rather than
giving your "version" of my "basic thesis". For example, I said
nothing about whether something can be used by "many people at once", a
distortion you abused at great length. I discussed something having no
limit on use. "Many" still implies a limit on use. And in fact, I've
covered considerably more ground.
> The argument in my last post was that property is a moral, not a physical
> concept. Whether or not a thing qualifies as property has nothing to do
> with its physical characteristics, or even whether it is a physical thing
> at all. The moral burden of the concept of property is to prevent persons
> from injuring others by demarcating the goods each may rightfully claim,
> and to assure that any benefits or value derivable from those rightfully
> held goods accrue to their owners, and not to others, to the detriment of
> the owners.
Here again with "deriveable". I already refuted this completely with
my example of others deriving value from my home improvements. You
said this is called the "neighborhood effect" and you drew an
unexplained distinction between "value derivable" for your goods and
"value traceable" to the goods. I think it would help to give an
explanation of the semantic straw you're grasping for there. What
exactly is the difference between value "traceable" to and "deriveable"
from my goods?
The rest is just you asserting your axioms again. so...
Constantinople
Publius wrote:
> Keep in mind that possession and property are not the same thing. Property
> originates with *first* possession. Others may possess it later, but it
> does not become their property merely because they now possess it. I may
> be currently in possession of one of Hertz's rental cars, but it is not my
> property. Many people may be in possession of a book or a computer program
> at once, but unless they are the first possessors, it is not their
> property.
Let me try to state as succinctly as I can what I think is the
fundamental disagreement between us (because, in the end, I think there
is a fundamental disagreement, a line I'm not going to cross, a failure
to be persuaded). I think that, roughly, when someone possesses
something, they have the right to keep possessing it but only to the
extent that they have possessed it so far. For example if someone works
the earth under his feet he only has a right to the earth that he's
worked, and taken possession of by working, and he doesn't have a right
to the entire planet.
And similarly, if someone walks along a path and he's the first one (I
don't mean a beaten path but just whatever strip of land he walks
across), he's taken possession of the path in the limited sense of
using it for walking, and people cannot later stop him from continuing
to walk on that path. But neither can he stop them from walking on it,
because he's only taken possession of it to the limited extent that he
has. It's not like he's built a house on it.
Similarly with intellectual property. When someone comes into
possession of a book, in fact they only possess it to the extent of
possessing the copies they possess, they do not possess it to the
extent of possessing all the other copies that might now or might in
the future exist. So being the first to possess a book does not give a
person a right to control all uses of that book, in the sense of
controlling all uses of all copies of the book.
There, I've tried to say it as succinctly as I can. I read all your
post and I started replying to it point by point but in the end I
thought I should highlight what I thought was the fundamental
disagreement.
Publius
> The address on my web page should be the same address as on this
> usenet post, so if you simply reply to the poster, instead of the
> post,should work. It is a valid address, unlike most.
Resent (forwarded) using the "Publius" moniker.
uri
the expense of negative liberty. Planet earth belongs to everyone so
everyone has a right to take a piece of it. Therefore i think
"property" should be held mutually.
In the past, land was taken either by conquest, war or enslavement.
James A. Donald
On 2 Mar 2006 15:36:11 -0800, "uri" <dan...@bezeqint.net> wrote:
> I agree with left-libertarians who try to promote positive liberty
> at the expense of negative liberty. Planet earth belongs to everyone
> so everyone has a right to take a piece of it. Therefore i think
> "property" should be held mutually.
But if "everyone" owns something, not "everyone" can make decisions
about its use. Some political apparatus supposedly representing
everyone has to make the decisions - thus "mutual" ownership is
necessarily in practice state ownership, and when the state owns too
much, and individuals too little, the result is terror and tyranny.
--digsig
James A. Donald
6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG
iOSeU0tXWjN7mXNZk1ZdYCcUP+OgA5TTRgwY71t2
4W6vfqU/eYi0iNFKefyKeaZwXQFEEzpzyovOWpLQz
uri
> But if "everyone" owns something, not "everyone" can make decisions
> about its use. Some political apparatus supposedly representing
> everyone has to make the decisions - thus "mutual" ownership is
> necessarily in practice state ownership, and when the state owns too
> much, and individuals too little, the result is terror and tyranny.
>
This is why i think direct democracy and community censuses are better.
Publius
news:1141336382.6...@z34g2000cwc.googlegroups.com:
> Let me try to state as succinctly as I can what I think is the
> fundamental disagreement between us (because, in the end, I think there
> is a fundamental disagreement, a line I'm not going to cross, a failure
> to be persuaded). I think that, roughly, when someone possesses
> something, they have the right to keep possessing it but only to the
> extent that they have possessed it so far. For example if someone works
> the earth under his feet he only has a right to the earth that he's
> worked, and taken possession of by working, and he doesn't have a right
> to the entire planet.
Well, if he claimed the entire Earth he'd have conflicts with other, prior
claimants to portions of it.
But essentially I agree. That is the question about the limits, or
boundaries, of a property claim. If a pioneer family drives its wagon into
an unexplored, unsettled valley, and decides to homestead there, how much
of the valley may they claim? Where laws exist, they usually set those
limits by statute, or precedent. The US Homestead Act, for example, set
claim sizes at 160 acres. The underlying principle, however, is that the
claim may extend only as far as the claimant may reasonably expect to
derive benefits. 160 acres was about as much land as a pioneer family would
be able to work. Similarly, grandiose claims by explorers who climbed the
highest hill around and declared possession of "all the land from the sea
to the horizon, in the name of His Majesty King Ferdinand," were routinely
ignored.
The adverse possession principle is based on similar reasoning. That
ancient principle allows land claimed by another to be taken, if the
original claimant is not attending to it or putting it to beneficial use.
Again, we have the connection between property and benefits, or value. The
aim of property law is to secure the *benefits* derivable from some asset
to the property owner, and the limits of the property are thus determined
by the extent to which he can actually realize benefits. Of course, there
can be no valid prior claim to any portion of the property he now claims.
The claimant must also specify the boundaries of the claim, so that others
may know exactly what property he is claiming. The claimed property must be
identifiable.
> And similarly, if someone walks along a path and he's the first one (I
> don't mean a beaten path but just whatever strip of land he walks
> across), he's taken possession of the path in the limited sense of
> using it for walking, and people cannot later stop him from continuing
> to walk on that path. But neither can he stop them from walking on it,
> because he's only taken possession of it to the limited extent that he
> has. It's not like he's built a house on it.
The first possessor must announce, in some public way, his claim, and its
extent. If your trailblazer has discovered, say, some new route through a
mountain range, which is shorter and less arduous than other known routes,
he may decide to announce that route, perhaps make some improvements to the
trail, and set up a toll station. He has just created a toll road, and is
perfectly entitled to do so. One famous road along the Oregon Trail, the
Barlow Road, was built in just that way. Previously, anyone travelling the
trail had to divert to a ferry to get around Mt. Hood in the Columbia
Gorge. Barlow built his road to compete with the ferrymen. Barlow marked
his road, removed some of the bigger rocks and softened some of the steeper
grades, and claimed the entire length (150 miles) as his right-of way. He
charged $5 per wagon, and did a good business.
http://www.isu.edu/~trinmich/00.n.barlowroad.html
> Similarly with intellectual property. When someone comes into
> possession of a book, in fact they only possess it to the extent of
> possessing the copies they possess, they do not possess it to the
> extent of possessing all the other copies that might now or might in
> the future exist. So being the first to possess a book does not give a
> person a right to control all uses of that book, in the sense of
> controlling all uses of all copies of the book.
All property confers two basic rights on its owner:
1. The right to all benefits and advantages derivable from the property,
and
2. The right to control all uses of the property.
The purpose of the second right is to assure the first. Those two rights
apply to *all* property. As Blackstone put it,
"There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages
the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe."
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/blackstone/bk2ch1.htm
If the first possessor of your book --- who would be the author --- does
not have those rights over his property, you shall have to explain why he
doesn't. Provided every customer is free to buy the book or refuse it, why
may the author not impose any conditions on its use that he pleases?
If there are limits to the conditions he may impose, do they apply to all
property, or only to books?
Please explain.
Publius
@p10g2000cwp.googlegroups.com:
> Planet earth belongs to everyone so everyone has a right to take a piece of
> it.
What is the basis of that claim?
> Therefore i think "property" should be held mutually.
If it has not been created mutually --- a piece of software, for example, or
a hotel --- why should it be held mutually? What is the basis for claims by
non-creators?
uri
> If it has not been created mutually --- a piece of software, for example, or
> a hotel --- why should it be held mutually? What is the basis for claims by
> non-creators?
No one created land (or the resources it provides) so land should by
shared mutually. E-property is different because e-property is almost
unlimited.
Publius
news:1141348665....@v46g2000cwv.googlegroups.com:
> No one created land (or the resources it provides) so land should by
> shared mutually.
Land and the resources on it are not created, but they are discovered. Until
discovered, they benefit no one. Why should any non-discoverers share in
those benefits?
> E-property is different because e-property is almost unlimited.
Hardly. Until it is created it does not exist. Its limit is 0 copies.
uri
> Land and the resources on it are not created, but they are discovered. Until
> discovered, they benefit no one. Why should any non-discoverers share in
> those benefits?
It's an oxymoron. What about the children of the discoverers who did
not discover it by themselves?
Also according to this logic, why not claim property on air (since air
was discovered by chemists)?
> Hardly. Until it is created it does not exist. Its limit is 0 copies.
It exists but it can be transformed by labor in another product. The
silicon is natural but the computer chip is not. It is scarcity, not
only labor which determines valid property.
The problem is that modern economists do not consider land a separate
factor of production, but rather classify it as capital.
Marc Welch
> liberty at the expense of negative liberty.
Marx believed this, hence his scorn term "bourgeois liberty".
Positive liberty is power. Negative liberty is immunity.
It is no accident that proponents of positive liberty in
practice wind up erecting an all powerful state where no
person is free from being "liberated". In East Germany, we
saw positive liberty. In West Germany, we saw negative.
> Planet earth belongs to everyone so everyone has a right
> to take a piece of it.
Why just the earth? Why not the stars? Would aliens be
co-holders? If not, why not? If so, then when did you get
authorization to use the land you occupy?
> Therefore i think "property" should be held mutually.
Does not follow. Land that "belongs to everyone" can be
vested exclusively in someone. Many israeli kibbutz now
work this way. Even monistaries can extend a monk a
(negative) right to his cell and garden plot.
> In the past, land was taken either by conquest, war or
> enslavement.
If the "earth belongs to everybody" then it can not be
"taken either by conquest, war or enslavement". Some
co-holders simply had strong disagreements with other
co-holders.
uri
behind left-libertarianism and geolibertarianism.
Paul Bramscher
> Publius wrote:
>
>>Concentrations of wealth will occur because people differ in their talents,
>>strengths, motives, and interests. If I write a useful software program and
>>offer it to others for $10, and 1 million of them buy it, I will have a
>>concentration of wealth. Since no one was compelled to buy it, no one has
>>been exploited. You will only be able to prevent that concentration of wealth
>>by force. And then your "socialism" is no longer libertarian.
>>
>>"Socialism requires constant interference in economic relations between
>>consenting adults."
>>---Nozick
>
>
> The fact that private ownership over the means of production is
> protected by state force is what i see as illigatimate. People differ
> but i don't agree that it justifies economic inequality and
> concentration of wealth based on arbitrary market forces.
Even if real market forces, the concentration passes along caste-like
vehicles between the generations. So one great enterprising person
(capitalist exploiter or not) passes his wealth onto his incompetent
son. There's no market force at play there, that dynamic bears much
more in common with the systems of royalty than of supposed "free market."
Publius
news:1141301505....@p10g2000cwp.googlegroups.com...
>> You need to address the arguments on that point in the previous post.
>> My pear and your pear are fruit from trees of the same species, but
>> they are not the same pear.
> Of course. For the same kind of reasons that my copy of your imaginary
> property isn't the same as your original.
>> The original software and the copy are the same software
>> --- they are *strictly identical*.
> They are two different things that have certain identical features and
> other different features, just like pears. Twins are identical in many
> respects but they are not the same thing.
Hm. Apparently you did not read the link I gave you on identity. Or you
are just opting to ignore the difference between strict and qualitative
identity, or pretend it doesn't matter.
> Furthermore, imaginary property rights do not claim to restrict
> themselves to the purportedly "strictly identical". See, for example,
> George Harrison's copyright suit over his song My Sweet Lord.
Copyrights extend to the entire work and to all original and identifiable
portions of a work. Each identifiable portion is a product in its own
right. For example, a software program will normally consist of a large
set of routines and subroutines. Some of those will be in the public
domain, some will be original. Those that are original are themselves
copyrighted. They are original products in and of themselves, and are thus
the property of their creator.
> Or take simple photo-copies of books. Obviously the photo-copy is not
> "strictly identical" to the original copy.
No copies, or representations, of a program are identical, as copies. What
is identical is the code they contain. And that is what is copyrighted.
But of course, you cannot see that distinction, since only the copies are
"real."
But I don't think you can maintain that position consistently. Let's
consider two copies of software Z, copy ZA and copy ZB. ZA and ZB differ
in that ZA is written on a floppy disk made by 3M, and ZB is written on a
hard disk made by Seagate. Obviously, ZA and ZB differ in may ways -- the
hard disk is larger and heavier, made of different materials from the
floppy, they are located in different places, etc. Your position seems to
be that ZA and ZB are therefore two different pieces of property, and that
the code they contain, software Z, cannot in itself be property.
Now of course, I've been arguing that the purpose of the concept of
property is to secure whatever value some identifiable item may have to
the owner of that item, whatever its nature, physical or non-physical. You
haven't yet responded to that, so (as far as I know) you may either agree
or disagree with it.
1. Suppose you agree, i.e., that anything of value qualifies as property.
If the software Z written on ZA and ZB in itself cannot be property, then
it must have no value. In that case, if the data of the disks were
scrambled, or erased, then their value would be unchanged. Correct? If you
are the owner of ZA, then you would have no objection if someone erased
your disk, since nothing of value would be lost. You still have all the
paper, ink, plastic, oxide particles, etc., you had before.
2. Suppose you disagree --- only physical things can be property; value is
irrelevant. Hence if someone were to erase or scramble the data on your
disk ZA, they would violate no property right of yours, since you still
have everything you count as property. Of course, if someone handled your
disk without your permission, they would have infringed your right. But it
would be a very minor infringement, not different than, say, a visitor
moving the disk to the other side of the table to make room for his coffee
cup. You cannot complain of losing the *data* on the disk, however
valuable it may be, because you had no property right to that data in the
first place, since data cannot be property. Correct?
So either the data on the disk has no value (case 1), or even if it does
have value, it cannot be property, and therefore no one could violate your
property rights by merely erasing that data (case 2).
Trying to argue either that data has no value, or that it cannot be
property, puts you in a contradictory and hypocritical position. If it has
no value or cannot be property then you have no grounds for complaint if
someone were to erase that data, or if, say, the government ordered that
it all be erased. You would lose nothing to which you were entitled; your
physical property remains unchanged.
You can't maintain that that data has no value, or cannot be property,
while it is the hands of Microsoft, but somehow acquires value and the
status of property when it falls into your hands.
> But they can be distinguished, very easily and unambiguously, as I've
> already said. I can destroy or change my copy of the software and
> yours remains unharmed.
ZA and ZB are not software Z. You can distinguish ZA from ZB, by physical
means, but you cannot distinguish the software they contain, software Z,
from that copyrighted by Microsoft. But you're right that changing your
*copy* does not effect anyone else's *copy*. It probably won't effect the
owner of software Z either. What may effect the owner is making
unauthorized copies of software Z.
>> A piece of software, (say, software Z) is defined as a string of bits
>> of length *n* in a given order, {b_0 . . . b_n}. Those two parameters
>> *completely* define software Z. There are no further defining
>> characteristics of software Z.
> Yes I'm aware that the abstract conceptual generalization that you're
> calling "software Z" is defining an entire category or class of goods
> that might feature certain observeable characteristics, like, for
> instance, the generalization "pear".
Sorry, you need to acquaint yourself with concept of identity. Software Z
is not a category or a class. It is singular; it is distinguished from all
other things in the universe by its definition. There is only one software
Z, regardless of how or where or how often it is represented. Nor is it an
"abstract generalization;" it is as specific and concrete as anything can
be. Of course, if you suppose that only physical objects can be specific
and concrete, you probably will not think so. But then you will have a
hard time doing mathematics, physics, economics, ethics, etc.
> That's great. Then I obviously haven't stolen software Z, since I've
> only made a representation of it, which is of course completely
> distinct from "software Z" itself, which has no mass...etc.
If you can make a representation that does not contain software Z, have at
it. Your representation will be distingushable from other representations,
but not by any criteria derived from the definition of software Z. Any
differences have nothing to do with software Z.
> Look all you're doing here is selectively employing theoretical
> categories and reifying them.
There is nothing theoretical about software Z.
> It's like saying: Person Z is a mammal
> of the human species born on a Tuesday.
I'm sure you're aware that software Z is not defined that way. That is
what Aristotle called a definition by "genus and difference." Software Z
is defined down to the last bit. For your analogy to hold, you will to
specify "person Z" down to the last atom, and their exact arrangments.
Once you do that, no one will be lumped with anyone else.
> Then when such people protest at being treated as one person, you
> reply: No, your differences are not relevant.
And they certainly should object!
> There is a _HUGE_ semantical ambiguity here, exactly as I described,
> and you sound progressively ridiculous as you try to keep your claims
> afloat.
Can you describe the "ambiguity" to which you refer?
> "Software Z" as you've described it is an abstract notion, a particular
> and selective way of conceptualizing and categorizing the physical
> world in the mind. The only thing that exists outside the mind are its
> "representations".
> Thus your "property" is imaginary property. It exists in the realm of
> the mind: the imagination, and nowhere else. The only things that
> exist elsewhere are the "representations".
You are quite correct that software is a product of the imagination; you
are incorrect that it therefore exists anywhere but in the imagination. It
exists wherever it is represented. The number 2, circles, the Pythagorean
Theorem, the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics, and Quantum Theory are also
products of the imagination, and exist wherever they are represented.
Likewise with such notions as value, legal and illegal, good and evil,
right and wrong, all art and music, and even such trivial things as
checkmates and baseball --- they are all products of the imagination, and
exist wherever represented.
What you are overlooking is the fact that products of the imagination are
the most valuable things we humans have, without which most of the "bare
physical stuff" of the universe would be useless to us, and most
uninteresting.
But then, you have suggested that the *value* of things is irrelevant to
the concept of property, that the term denotes only physical stuff. You
have yet to explain how such a concept of property might have any moral
significance.
But perhaps you see no need to do so. After all, morality is also
"imaginary."
Publius
news:1141350409.0...@j33g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:
>> Land and the resources on it are not created, but they are discovered.
>> Until discovered, they benefit no one. Why should any non-discoverers
>> share in those benefits?
> It's an oxymoron. What about the children of the discoverers who did
> not discover it by themselves?
Any oxymoron? Where is the contradiction?
If the property is not given to the children by the discovers then they have
no more claim to it than anyone else. The discovers, of course, can do
whatever they wish with it. They own it.
> Also according to this logic, why not claim property on air (since air
> was discovered by chemists)?
Er, no. Air was not discovered by chemists. Only its chemical makeup was
discovered by chemists. Its existence has been known as long as there have
been humans.
>> Hardly. Until it is created it does not exist. Its limit is 0 copies.
> It exists but it can be transformed by labor in another product. The
> silicon is natural but the computer chip is not. It is scarcity, not
> only labor which determines valid property.
Software is not silicon. It is information which can make a silicon chip
useful. Until it is written it does not exist, and the silicon chip is just a
paperweight.
> The problem is that modern economists do not consider land a separate
> factor of production, but rather classify it as capital.
Well, in fact most of them do count it a factor of production. But until it
is discovered it is not available for producing anything.
Publius
news:du8g7j$jcd$1...@lenny.tc.umn.edu:
> Even if real market forces, the concentration passes along caste-like
> vehicles between the generations. So one great enterprising person
> (capitalist exploiter or not) passes his wealth onto his incompetent
> son. There's no market force at play there, that dynamic bears much
> more in common with the systems of royalty than of supposed "free
> market."
There most certainly is. As long as the incompetent son acquired his wealth
with the consent of his enterprising father, it was a free exchange, and that
is the only "market force" there is.
Moreover, as a general characterization of market behavior, it is a bum rap.
There are very few "castes." Of the 25 wealthiest Americans, 15 are self-
made, they inherited nothing substantial. The other 10 inherited from their
fathers, who were all self-made. In other words, the wealth of none of them
is more than 2 generations old.
Marc Welch
Equality and freedom are orthogonal. Mistaking one for the other
endangers both. Nestor Makhno's despotic communes were
neither free nor equal.
jbd...@hotmail.com
> <jbd...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:1141301505....@p10g2000cwp.googlegroups.com...
>
> >> You need to address the arguments on that point in the previous post.
> >> My pear and your pear are fruit from trees of the same species, but
> >> they are not the same pear.
>
> > Of course. For the same kind of reasons that my copy of your imaginary
> > property isn't the same as your original.
>
> >> The original software and the copy are the same software
> >> --- they are *strictly identical*.
>
> > They are two different things that have certain identical features and
> > other different features, just like pears. Twins are identical in many
> > respects but they are not the same thing.
>
> Hm. Apparently you did not read the link I gave you on identity. Or you
> are just opting to ignore the difference between strict and qualitative
> identity, or pretend it doesn't matter.
I found nothing of importance there to my points. If you think there
are some, go ahead and bring them up.
> > Furthermore, imaginary property rights do not claim to restrict
> > themselves to the purportedly "strictly identical". See, for example,
> > George Harrison's copyright suit over his song My Sweet Lord.
>
> Copyrights extend to the entire work and to all original and identifiable
> portions of a work. Each identifiable portion is a product in its own
> right. For example, a software program will normally consist of a large
> set of routines and subroutines. Some of those will be in the public
> domain, some will be original. Those that are original are themselves
> copyrighted. They are original products in and of themselves, and are thus
> the property of their creator.
Copyrights do whatever a government declares they are to do by fiat. I
understand what copyrights do, and it's irrelevant to my argument.
> > Or take simple photo-copies of books. Obviously the photo-copy is not
> > "strictly identical" to the original copy.
>
> No copies, or representations, of a program are identical, as copies. What
> is identical is the code they contain. And that is what is copyrighted.
> But of course, you cannot see that distinction, since only the copies are
> "real."
I can see that distinction just fine. I can see all kinds of
distinctions that aren't "real", such as the distinction between Person
Z, and persons who do not have the characteristics of Person Z.
My seeing it as "real" would just change whether, say, I impose my
views about Person Z on others, or just use it as a thought exercise,
or for the purpose of argument, and such.
> But I don't think you can maintain that position consistently. Let's
> consider two copies of software Z, copy ZA and copy ZB. ZA and ZB differ
> in that ZA is written on a floppy disk made by 3M, and ZB is written on a
> hard disk made by Seagate. Obviously, ZA and ZB differ in may ways -- the
> hard disk is larger and heavier, made of different materials from the
> floppy, they are located in different places, etc. Your position seems to
> be that ZA and ZB are therefore two different pieces of property, and that
> the code they contain, software Z, cannot in itself be property.
>
> Now of course, I've been arguing that the purpose of the concept of
> property is to secure whatever value some identifiable item may have to
> the owner of that item, whatever its nature, physical or non-physical. You
> haven't yet responded to that, so (as far as I know) you may either agree
> or disagree with it.
Of course I've responded to it, at lenght and several times. That sort
of clues me in on how productive this conversation is going to be, or
has been.
> 1. Suppose you agree, i.e., that anything of value qualifies as property.
> If the software Z written on ZA and ZB in itself cannot be property, then
> it must have no value. In that case, if the data of the disks were
> scrambled, or erased, then their value would be unchanged. Correct? If you
> are the owner of ZA, then you would have no objection if someone erased
> your disk, since nothing of value would be lost. You still have all the
> paper, ink, plastic, oxide particles, etc., you had before.
>
> 2. Suppose you disagree --- only physical things can be property; value is
> irrelevant. Hence if someone were to erase or scramble the data on your
> disk ZA, they would violate no property right of yours, since you still
> have everything you count as property. Of course, if someone handled your
> disk without your permission, they would have infringed your right. But it
> would be a very minor infringement, not different than, say, a visitor
> moving the disk to the other side of the table to make room for his coffee
> cup. You cannot complain of losing the *data* on the disk, however
> valuable it may be, because you had no property right to that data in the
> first place, since data cannot be property. Correct?
No. The data on the disk was part of my ZA. And he took that part of
my ZA away from me. I now have a different ZA that isn't what it was
before.
> So either the data on the disk has no value (case 1), or even if it does
> have value, it cannot be property, and therefore no one could violate your
> property rights by merely erasing that data (case 2).
case 2 is false. case 1 has nothing to do with me.
> Trying to argue either that data has no value, or that it cannot be
> property, puts you in a contradictory and hypocritical position. If it has
> no value or cannot be property then you have no grounds for complaint if
> someone were to erase that data, or if, say, the government ordered that
> it all be erased.
Of course i would. They'd be changing my ZA.
> You would lose nothing to which you were entitled; your
> physical property remains unchanged.
>
> You can't maintain that that data has no value, or cannot be property,
> while it is the hands of Microsoft, but somehow acquires value and the
> status of property when it falls into your hands.
I agree. That's why I don't maintain either.
> > But they can be distinguished, very easily and unambiguously, as I've
> > already said. I can destroy or change my copy of the software and
> > yours remains unharmed.
>
> ZA and ZB are not software Z. You can distinguish ZA from ZB, by physical
> means, but you cannot distinguish the software they contain,
Because you've simply invented an abstract classification to define a
feature or features they both contain, like my definition of Person Z.
> software Z,from that copyrighted by Microsoft. But you're right that changing your
> *copy* does not effect anyone else's *copy*. It probably won't effect the
> owner of software Z either. What may effect the owner is making
> unauthorized copies of software Z.
>
> >> A piece of software, (say, software Z) is defined as a string of bits
> >> of length *n* in a given order, {b_0 . . . b_n}. Those two parameters
> >> *completely* define software Z. There are no further defining
> >> characteristics of software Z.
>
> > Yes I'm aware that the abstract conceptual generalization that you're
> > calling "software Z" is defining an entire category or class of goods
> > that might feature certain observeable characteristics, like, for
> > instance, the generalization "pear".
>
> Sorry, you need to acquaint yourself with concept of identity. Software Z
> is not a category or a class.
Yes it is.
> It is singular;
All abstractions of this sort are a singular.
> it is distinguished from all
> other things in the universe by its definition.
A definition, which is something a persons simply invents, just as I
invented the definition of Person Z.
> There is only one software
> Z, regardless of how or where or how often it is represented. Nor is it an
> "abstract generalization;" it is as specific and concrete as anything can
> be. Of course, if you suppose that only physical objects can be specific
> and concrete, you probably will not think so. But then you will have a
> hard time doing mathematics, physics, economics, ethics, etc.
No, I'll just have a hard time reifying my abstractions to justify
seizing power over others. I'll have no trouble with math or anything
else.
> > That's great. Then I obviously haven't stolen software Z, since I've
> > only made a representation of it, which is of course completely
> > distinct from "software Z" itself, which has no mass...etc.
>
> If you can make a representation that does not contain software Z, have at
> it. Your representation will be distingushable from other representations,
> but not by any criteria derived from the definition of software Z. Any
> differences have nothing to do with software Z.
>
> > Look all you're doing here is selectively employing theoretical
> > categories and reifying them.
>
> There is nothing theoretical about software Z.
>
> > It's like saying: Person Z is a mammal
> > of the human species born on a Tuesday.
>
> I'm sure you're aware that software Z is not defined that way.
It's defined exactly that way.
> That is what Aristotle called a definition by "genus and difference." Software Z
> is defined down to the last bit.
So is Person Z. Look at the definition. Human species and born on
Tuesday are its only bits. Any other bits you might notice when seeing
Person Z are only bits of the particular physical representations, as
you can see by observing the definition. Thus all such people are
representations of Person Z. Therefore obviously Person Z exists
because there couldn't be representations of Person Z otherwise.
Likewise, anytime you see Software Z actually "represented" in the
physical world, the "representation" always has more "bits" than those
in the definition, but those are just the "bits" of the particular
representation.
> For your analogy to hold, you will to
> specify "person Z" down to the last atom,
Person Z doesn't have "atoms". He is not a part of the physical world.
Only His representations have atoms.
> and their exact arrangments.
> Once you do that, no one will be lumped with anyone else.
>
> > Then when such people protest at being treated as one person, you
> > reply: No, your differences are not relevant.
>
> And they certainly should object!
>
> > There is a _HUGE_ semantical ambiguity here, exactly as I described,
> > and you sound progressively ridiculous as you try to keep your claims
> > afloat.
>
> Can you describe the "ambiguity" to which you refer?
I already have.
> > "Software Z" as you've described it is an abstract notion, a particular
> > and selective way of conceptualizing and categorizing the physical
> > world in the mind. The only thing that exists outside the mind are its
> > "representations".
>
> > Thus your "property" is imaginary property. It exists in the realm of
> > the mind: the imagination, and nowhere else. The only things that
> > exist elsewhere are the "representations".
>
> You are quite correct that software is a product of the imagination; you
> are incorrect that it therefore exists anywhere but in the imagination. It
> exists wherever it is represented.
So then it exists in the physical world. How does a non-physical thing
exist in the physical world? This should be fun.
James A. Donald
James A. Donald wrote:
> > But if "everyone" owns something, not "everyone" can make
> > decisions about its use. Some political apparatus supposedly
> > representing everyone has to make the decisions - thus "mutual"
> > ownership is necessarily in practice state ownership, and when the
> > state owns too much, and individuals too little, the result is
> > terror and tyranny.
uri wrote:
> This is why i think direct democracy and community censuses are
> better.
We tried direct democracy in the sixties and early seventies. It did
not work - you got rule by at best those with the strongest bladders,
more often rule by a small conspiratorial minority. The attempt at
direct democracy was a major reason that the "new" left got taken over
by the old left.
Direct democracy means having lots and lots of long boring meetings,
and pretty soon normal people stop turning up.
We would caucus in advance to decide what the mass meeting was going
to decide, and the people who had been the leader or in the leadership
group in the caucuse meeting would in the mass meeting be crouching
down at the back trying to look unobtrusive. By framing the issues
sufficiently obscurely, and keeping the meeting going on and on and
on, we would usually end up with the caucus group having the swing
vote, and if too damn many people turned up, (which happened only
twice in my recollection) we would just stuff the ballot, since we had
already played the same trick with the vote counting apparatus. And
if someone made difficulties with the vote counting, something bad
might happen to him later.
The Soviet Union operated on the slogan of direct democracy "All power
to the Soviets" - but the Soviets were manifestly incapable of
exercising power, so necessarily delegated everything to the supreme
soviet, which by necessity delegated everything to general committee,
which delegated everything to the secretariat of the general
committee, which delegated everything to one man. A soviet could only
decide on what color to paint the factory wall, for all its inputs
came from somewhere else, and all its outputs went somewhere else.
--digsig
James A. Donald
6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG
PRXWSe9d5YWHxJoVJ8kSL3wjbNrDV7H+epa1B2rU
40ncVTnkAJJaTea7eh3awPOaek+Ce93tWQykfTcjO
brique
James A. Donald <jam...@echeque.com> wrote in message
news:gfuc02lc46a2ijre9...@4ax.com...
> --
> On 1 Mar 2006 12:39:17 -0800, "uri" <dan...@bezeqint.net> wrote:
> > The big distinction here is between negative and positive rights.
> > Right-libertarians put property rights above all other rights.
>
> All other rights *are* property rights. If a printing press is not
> private property, no freedom of speech, if soil under a church is not
> private property, no freedom of religion.
>
> And we are not "right" libertarians. Libertarian socialism was tried,
> and it became apparent that liberty and socialism were incompatible.
Thus James and his ilk favor a re-run of Fuedalism to see if they can get it
right this time. (As long as they get to be the lords, rather than the
peasants)
Constantinople
Thanks brique, I needed my nightly dose of mindless crap.
James A. Donald
On 2 Mar 2006 19:16:27 -0800, "uri" <dan...@bezeqint.net> wrote:
> My point is that equality is also freedom.
People are different, thus equality can only be imposed from above,
and those imposing the equality are inherently above those upon whom
equality is imposed, unequal and superior.
--digsig
James A. Donald
6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG
iO/BikszAZywxziaBqzlqsv89YZyW8Mf68LJ1yBj
41fYGighD0HM0FkBFAA6OePnhebJO1KXOqOKeav2F
uri
exploitation and oppression. Right-wingers put property rights above
anything else.
Freedom cannot be given, it can only be taken.
uri
> --
> People are different, thus equality can only be imposed from above,
> and those imposing the equality are inherently above those upon whom
> equality is imposed, unequal and superior.
>
If equality cannot be enforced by a state oligarchy than neither do
property rights.
Publius
@z34g2000cwc.googlegroups.com:
> Without social equality any economic system will be based on power,
> exploitation and oppression. Right-wingers put property rights above
> anything else.
I'm not entirely sure what "social equality" involves, but it is probably not
in question. What is in question is *material* equality, i.e., equality of
wealth, income, etc., and the various differences in want satisfaction which
those entail. It is material equality which is incompatible with liberty.
Publius
@v46g2000cwv.googlegroups.com:
> If equality cannot be enforced by a state oligarchy than neither do
> property rights.
The State can (in principle) enforce property rights without destroying
liberty. It cannot enforce (material) equality without destroying liberty.
Hence the choice: liberty or material equality.
Publius
news:1141363027.2...@t39g2000cwt.googlegroups.com:
>> > They are two different things that have certain identical features
>> > and other different features, just like pears. Twins are identical in
>> > many respects but they are not the same thing.
>> Hm. Apparently you did not read the link I gave you on identity. Or you
>> are just opting to ignore the difference between strict and qualitative
>> identity, or pretend it doesn't matter.
> I found nothing of importance there to my points. If you think there
> are some, go ahead and bring them up.
I already did. There is a 1-to-1 correspondence between every identifiable
element of the data on disk ZA and the data on disk ZB. There is no such
correspondence between every identifiable element of the data defining
Pear 1 and Pear 2. The data on the two disks is therefore *strictly
identical*, and that of the pears is not. The data set on the disks
consititutes software Z. If that data set is uniquely identifiable and has
value, it may be property.
Perhaps you're thinking that there may be some *subset* of the data sets
for the two pears which is also identical between them. And there may well
be. If so, and if that common element --- call it Factor C --- was created
by someone, then (provided it had some value in its own right) it could be
copyrighted or patented also. Any value added to the two pears by the
presence of Factor C would be the property of the holder of that patent.
That is the premise underlying patents on genetic modifications. Of
course, anyone selling pears without Factor C would owe that patent holder
nothing.
The same is of course true with disks ZA and ZB. If those disks have any
value, whatever part of that value is due to the presence of software Z on
the disks is the property of the inventor of software Z. Any other value
the disks may have is the property of others.
>> No copies, or representations, of a program are identical, as copies.
>> What is identical is the code they contain. And that is what is
>> copyrighted. But of course, you cannot see that distinction, since only
>> the copies are "real."
> I can see that distinction just fine. I can see all kinds of
> distinctions that aren't "real", such as the distinction between Person
> Z, and persons who do not have the characteristics of Person Z.
If I recall, "Person Z" is defined by two properties, being human and
being born on Tuesday. Some humans are thus instances of Person Z and some
are not. Correct? Now, it is rather misleading to name that common data
set "Person Z," since the word "person" is already in use to designate
things having more properties than that. But it is allowable, and it does
serve to draw a distinction between Z's and non-Z's. You seem to be saying
that distinction is not "real." What is unreal about it?
> My seeing it as "real" would just change whether, say, I impose my
> views about Person Z on others, or just use it as a thought exercise,
> or for the purpose of argument, and such.
Not following there. What views regarding "Person Z" are those, and how
would you impose them on anyone?
>> Now of course, I've been arguing that the purpose of the concept of
>> property is to secure whatever value some identifiable item may have to
>> the owner of that item, whatever its nature, physical or non-physical.
>> You haven't yet responded to that, so (as far as I know) you may either
>> agree or disagree with it.
> Of course I've responded to it, at lenght and several times. That sort
> of clues me in on how productive this conversation is going to be, or
> has been.
Well, apparently I missed a post. You *asserted* a number of times that
value is irrelevant to property (and I asserted several times that it was
the essence of property, and the sole reason for denoting anything as
property). So a couple of posts back I gave an extended argument for that
view (which I later excerpted and reposted for constantinople). If you
have responded to that argument, I missed it.
I recall asking in that post that you outline your definition of property
and explain, if it does not involve value, how it is morally relevant. Did
you do that in the post I apparently missed?
>> 2. Suppose you disagree --- only physical things can be property; value
>> is irrelevant. Hence if someone were to erase or scramble the data on
>> your disk ZA, they would violate no property right of yours, since you
>> still have everything you count as property. Of course, if someone
>> handled your disk without your permission, they would have infringed
>> your right. But it would be a very minor infringement, not different
>> than, say, a visitor moving the disk to the other side of the table to
>> make room for his coffee cup. You cannot complain of losing the *data*
>> on the disk, however valuable it may be, because you had no property
>> right to that data in the first place, since data cannot be property.
>> Correct?
> No. The data on the disk was part of my ZA. And he took that part of
> my ZA away from me. I now have a different ZA that isn't what it was
> before.
What (physical) part was taken? If only the *data* was taken, and you are
complaining, then you must be counting data, despite not being physical,
not only as property, but as valuable property. For all your physical
property remains as it was --- all the oxide particles remain in place,
none of them have moved, the disk has the same net charge, etc.
You're in kind of a quandry here, jbd. You can't construe data as "part of
property" without it making property also. Whatever is "part of" property
is itself property. Anything that is "part of" property is severable, and
can become a separate property in its own right. If I have oil on my land,
I may sever the mineral rights and sell them; they then become someone
else's property.
You're trying to have your cake and eat it too --- data is not property
when it belongs to someone else, so you may steal it with impunity. But
once you have it, it suddenly becomes property for you.
>> Trying to argue either that data has no value, or that it cannot be
>> property, puts you in a contradictory and hypocritical position. If it
>> has no value or cannot be property then you have no grounds for
>> complaint if someone were to erase that data, or if, say, the
>> government ordered that it all be erased.
> Of course i would. They'd be changing my ZA.
Only by changing the data on it. But if data cannot be property then no
property right of yours is violated. Even if the data is not itself
property, yet somehow has value, you still can't complain, since you can
have no right to that value (since that would make that value property).
>> There is only one software
>> Z, regardless of how or where or how often it is represented. Nor is it
>> an "abstract generalization;" it is as specific and concrete as
>> anything can be. Of course, if you suppose that only physical objects
>> can be specific and concrete, you probably will not think so. But then
>> you will have a hard time doing mathematics, physics, economics,
>> ethics, etc.
> No, I'll just have a hard time reifying my abstractions to justify
> seizing power over others. I'll have no trouble with math or anything
> else.
All property entails a power over others --- it vests in its owner the
power to dictate whether and how others use that property. Intellectual
property confers no more and no different power over others than any other
property.
Perhaps you are complaining that intellectual property, when combined with
others' physical property, dictates how the owners of the physical
property may use it. But intellectual property is no different from any
other property in that respect either. If you borrow my tire chains, I may
say, "Don't drive over 30 mph." Thus you are restricted in how you may use
your car, as long as my chains are on it. If you rent me a house and tell
me, "No waterbeds, except in the basement," then you have dictated how I
may use my waterbed. Whenever one person's property is combined with that
of another, the owner of the second is restricted by the demands of the
first.
Of course, if data is not property, then all those demands are arbitrary
and irrelevant. But if it isn't, then you have no grounds for complaint if
your disk is erased.
> Likewise, anytime you see Software Z actually "represented" in the
> physical world, the "representation" always has more "bits" than those
> in the definition, but those are just the "bits" of the particular
> representation.
That's right. And you may do anything you like with the extra bits.
>> Can you describe the "ambiguity" to which you refer?
> I already have.
Sorry, but I must have missed that also. The only ambiguity I recall was
that concerning identity, whose two meanings you confused and I resolved.
Was there another term with different meanings which I confused?
> So then it exists in the physical world. How does a non-physical thing
> exist in the physical world? This should be fun.
The physical world is filled with non-physical things, including all those
I mentioned --- values, laws, mathematical theorems, scientific theories,
symphonies, games, etc. etc. They exist in the physical world because when
we think them up we populate the physical world with them. They then
become *real*.
jbd...@hotmail.com
> jbd...@hotmail.com wrote in
> news:1141363027.2...@t39g2000cwt.googlegroups.com:
>
> >> > They are two different things that have certain identical features
> >> > and other different features, just like pears. Twins are identical in
> >> > many respects but they are not the same thing.
>
> >> Hm. Apparently you did not read the link I gave you on identity. Or you
> >> are just opting to ignore the difference between strict and qualitative
> >> identity, or pretend it doesn't matter.
>
> > I found nothing of importance there to my points. If you think there
> > are some, go ahead and bring them up.
>
> I already did. There is a 1-to-1 correspondence between every identifiable
> element of the data on disk ZA and the data on disk ZB. There is no such
> correspondence between every identifiable element of the data defining
> Pear 1 and Pear 2. The data on the two disks is therefore *strictly
> identical*, and that of the pears is not.
So, if I record and release my version of "your song", what is
"strictly identical"?
> The data set on the disks
> consititutes software Z. If that data set is uniquely identifiable and has
> value, it may be property.
>
> Perhaps you're thinking that there may be some *subset* of the data sets
> for the two pears which is also identical between them. And there may well
> be. If so, and if that common element --- call it Factor C --- was created
> by someone,
Well, it just has to be "discovered", not "created", by someone, as you
discovered that a particular string of code will do task X, just as
anyone else could have discoved the same thing independently from you.
Just as someone discovered that if you shape a flat surface into a
circle you can roll it. Thus, someone "created" the wheel, just as
anyone else could have. And this is just as I've "created" Person Z.
...
> >> No copies, or representations, of a program are identical, as copies.
> >> What is identical is the code they contain. And that is what is
> >> copyrighted. But of course, you cannot see that distinction, since only
> >> the copies are "real."
>
> > I can see that distinction just fine. I can see all kinds of
> > distinctions that aren't "real", such as the distinction between Person
> > Z, and persons who do not have the characteristics of Person Z.
>
> If I recall, "Person Z" is defined by two properties, being human and
> being born on Tuesday. Some humans are thus instances of Person Z and some
> are not. Correct?
Some are representations of Person Z and some are not.
> Now, it is rather misleading to name that common data
> set "Person Z," since the word "person" is already in use to designate
> things having more properties than that.
Words often have several meanings. Take "free" for example, or
"value", or "property".
> But it is allowable, and it does
> serve to draw a distinction between Z's and non-Z's. You seem to be saying
> that distinction is not "real." What is unreal about it?
You can call it a "real" distinction if you like, but a distinction is
not an object. It's just a conceptual categorization of some features
of the world, just like your "software Z". The "distinction" only has
any "existence" in the mind.
By your standard, nothing is unreal and everything is real. So for
instance, if I imagine a big green dinosaur sitting next to me, he's
"real". For some reason, I feel it important to draw a distinction
between the "reality" of him and the reality of an acual person sitting
next to me.
For you, since you are trying to maintain an illegitimate position, you
must add layer after layer of abstraction and turn the conversation
into unresolveable philosophical quandries like "what does existence
mean" in order to make it impossible to distinguish between the
"reality" of the person sitting next to me, and the "reality" of the
big green dinosaur sitting next to me.
...
> I recall asking in that post that you outline your definition of property
> and explain, if it does not involve value, how it is morally relevant. Did
> you do that in the post I apparently missed?
>
> >> 2. Suppose you disagree --- only physical things can be property; value
> >> is irrelevant. Hence if someone were to erase or scramble the data on
> >> your disk ZA, they would violate no property right of yours, since you
> >> still have everything you count as property. Of course, if someone
> >> handled your disk without your permission, they would have infringed
> >> your right. But it would be a very minor infringement, not different
> >> than, say, a visitor moving the disk to the other side of the table to
> >> make room for his coffee cup. You cannot complain of losing the *data*
> >> on the disk, however valuable it may be, because you had no property
> >> right to that data in the first place, since data cannot be property.
> >> Correct?
>
> > No. The data on the disk was part of my ZA. And he took that part of
> > my ZA away from me. I now have a different ZA that isn't what it was
> > before.
>
> What (physical) part was taken?
My "representation" of Z.
> If only the *data* was taken,
My "representation" of the data was taken.
> and you are complaining, then you must be counting data, despite not being physical,
> not only as property, but as valuable property.
No, that's what you'd do because you objectify and categorize the
abstract and subjective notion of "value" as property. I do not.
If you have a bike, and I have the same type of bike, and someone each
steals our bike, they may have different "value". You may LOVE your
bike and use it all the time, and consider it part of your personal
identity. It thus is very valuable to you. I may not use my bike much
and not really like it. You will feel a bigger loss in "value" than I
will if it disappears, but the same property was taken in each
respective case. By your logic, you have more property than me.
> For all your physical
> property remains as it was --- all the oxide particles remain in place,
> none of them have moved, the disk has the same net charge, etc.
When I've put "data" onto a disk or taken it off the disk is not as it
was. You can see the difference even.
> You're in kind of a quandry here, jbd. You can't construe data as "part of
> property" without it making property also.
I'm talking about a representation of data. Furthermore I'm not
actually arguing about whether it's "property" in a given
representation under some definition or other. The apt example would
be somebody copying, not destroying the Z in my ZA, because that's what
we're talking about. You're changing the issue, granted, as you must
to keep your argument afloat.
If you want to claim to own the one manifestation of the data that you
have on ZA as property, go ahead. I probably won't complain because
whether it is or isn't is kind of like whether 9 or 10 angels can dance
on the head of a pin. That isn't what we've been talking about. We've
been talking about your claim to own all other present and future
representations of the data that anyone else in the world might make.
> Whatever is "part of" property
> is itself property. Anything that is "part of" property is severable, and
> can become a separate property in its own right. If I have oil on my land,
> I may sever the mineral rights and sell them; they then become someone
> else's property.
>
> You're trying to have your cake and eat it too --- data is not property
> when it belongs to someone else, so you may steal it with impunity.
I've only claimed a right to make my own 'representation' of the data,
not to "steal" or destroy someone else's represetation that they made.
Your scenario of erasing data from someone's ZA is of course closer to
"stealing" it because it actually takes, at least, a specific
manifestation of something away from the person.
....
> >> There is only one software
> >> Z, regardless of how or where or how often it is represented. Nor is it
> >> an "abstract generalization;" it is as specific and concrete as
> >> anything can be. Of course, if you suppose that only physical objects
> >> can be specific and concrete, you probably will not think so. But then
> >> you will have a hard time doing mathematics, physics, economics,
> >> ethics, etc.
>
> > No, I'll just have a hard time reifying my abstractions to justify
> > seizing power over others. I'll have no trouble with math or anything
> > else.
>
> All property entails a power over others --- it vests in its owner the
> power to dictate whether and how others use that property. Intellectual
> property confers no more and no different power over others than any other
> property.
It conveys the power to forbid others from making their own
"representations" of the imaginary property. The property in my bike
conveys nothing like this power.
> Perhaps you are complaining that intellectual property, when combined with
> others' physical property, dictates how the owners of the physical
> property may use it. But intellectual property is no different from any
> other property in that respect either. If you borrow my tire chains, I may
> say, "Don't drive over 30 mph."
>
> Thus you are restricted in how you may use
> your car, as long as my chains are on it. If you rent me a house and tell
> me, "No waterbeds, except in the basement," then you have dictated how I
> may use my waterbed. Whenever one person's property is combined with that
> of another, the owner of the second is restricted by the demands of the
> first.
>
> Of course, if data is not property, then all those demands are arbitrary
> and irrelevant. But if it isn't, then you have no grounds for complaint if
> your disk is erased.
Of course there is. My ZA was used without permission and my
autonomous singular representation of Z was destroyed.
...
> > So then it exists in the physical world. How does a non-physical thing
> > exist in the physical world? This should be fun.
>
> The physical world is filled with non-physical things, including all those
> I mentioned --- values, laws, mathematical theorems, scientific theories,
> symphonies, games, etc. etc.
No, the physical world is not filled with these things. These are
conceptual distinctions and categories of things in the physical world.
Those things are just concepts, existing in the sphere of the mind.
The mind is filled with them, and they're used to categorize, in the
mind, things in the real world. The physical world is only filled with
their "representations".
uri
> > I'm not entirely sure what "social equality" involves, but it is probably not
> > in question. What is in question is *material* equality, i.e., equality of
> > wealth, income, etc., and the various differences in want satisfaction which
> > those entail. It is material equality which is incompatible with liberty.
>
Without equality there is no liberty, just privilege for a few
oligarchs. Everyone has a right to an adequate standard of living and
material satification.
Libertarian socialism denies the legitimacy of most forms of
economically significant private property, since, according to
socialists, when private property becomes capital, it leads to the
exploitation of others with less economic means and thus infringes on
the exploited class's individual freedoms.
Publius
news:1141419402.9...@i39g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:
>> > I'm not entirely sure what "social equality" involves, but it is
>> > probably not in question. What is in question is *material* equality,
>> > i.e., equality of wealth, income, etc., and the various differences
>> > in want satisfaction which those entail. It is material equality
>> > which is incompatible with liberty.
> Without equality there is no liberty, just privilege for a few
> oligarchs. Everyone has a right to an adequate standard of living and
> material satification.
Well, you'll have to offer some arguments or evidence for your claim. As far
as I can see, there is no connection between liberty and (material) equality.
100 prisoners in a prison may all be materially equal, but none of them are
free. Someone outside the prison may be no better off materially than the
prisoners (he has no more living space, no more food, etc.) but he is free,
and the prisoners are not.
How does (material) equality affect anyone's freedom?
BTW, a *privilege* is a permission to use someone else's property. If your
"oligarchs" are using their own property, not someone else's, then they are
not "privileged." They are exercising their rights.
> Libertarian socialism denies the legitimacy of most forms of
> economically significant private property, since, according to
> socialists, when private property becomes capital, it leads to the
> exploitation of others with less economic means and thus infringes on
> the exploited class's individual freedoms.
That is Marx's "exploitation argument." It has been refuted so often I'm
surprised you're still citing it.
Marc Welch
> for a few oligarchs.
Liberty can and does exist without equality. It was
Makhno's brutal authoritarianism that constrained his
Ukrainian militias from perpetrating any more antisemitic
pogroms than they actually did.
Marc Welch
> based on power, exploitation and oppression.
People differ, inequality is a given. "Social equality"
must be imposed, which yields neither equality nor
freedom. Pol Pot imposed near equal destitution from on
high. KR Cambodia had one of the lowest Gini scores of
its time.
James A. Donald
On Thu, 02 Mar 2006 22:21:13 -0600, Paul Bramscher
> Even if real market forces, the concentration passes along
> caste-like vehicles between the generations.
No it does not. There is very high social mobility in America. We
only see inequality running from generation to generation in less
capitalist countries such as France.
At one time, Korean children for adoption were randomly assigned to
families. Bruce Sacerdote did a study of these children, and found no
correlation between socioeconomic class of these grown children, and
the socioeconomic class of their parents, indicating that in America
the social class of the individual is the result of chance, merit and
ambition, and is entirely uninfluenced by social class of parents.
See Bruce Sacerdote "What Happens When We Randomly Assign Children to
Families?" http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/10894.html
--digsig
James A. Donald
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