The truth about appeasement
cromwell
Finkel, Monthly Review Press, 1998.
No historical metaphor has been as abused and hackneyed, because it is so
poorly understood as appeasement, which is variously defined in terms of
compromise,
naivety, pacifism right through to cowardice. Leibovitz & Finkel succeed in
correcting these mistaken interpretations, painting a picture which is both
darker and conspiratorial.
The authors provide much substantation for their case, mainly out of the
mouths of the partipants themselves. This is the strong side of the book.
But it also has its weak side, namely its treatment of the role of the
Soviet Union and USA. I will return to this later.
In Our Time focuses on the Govt. of Nevile Chamberlain(May 1937 - May 1940)
which was most closely associated with appeasement.
Hitler made no secret of his desire to enlarge German territory in the East,
a fact not lost on the British govt. The 1933 Annual report of the British
Chiefs of Staff concluded that the purpose of German rearmament was solely
"to make it possible for her to secure a revision of frontiers in the
East."(p 22). Hitler admitted as much to Sir Eric Phipps, the British
ambassador to Germany, that his goal was "expansion in eastern europe."(p.
23). This element of Hitlers foreign policy became pivotal to the policy of
appeasement.
From the ascention of Hitler to power, appeasement dominated British and
French thinking, but it became a formal policy with the Chamberlain
admin(132). Lord Lothian, a close associate of Chamberlain, visited Hitler
during May 1937, and talked about Germany's desire to restore its former
empire, suggesting "there was no reason why Germany should not extend her
influence economically in Central and Eastern Europe"(106). Figures in the
Chamberlain administration, justified this orientation in the most racist
forms. Nevile Henderson, British ambassador to Germany, reported in the same
month, that the borders of eastern Europe were neither settled nor a vital
British interest "and the German is certainly more civilized than the
Slav...One might even go so far as to assert that it is not even just to
endeavor to prevent Germany from completing her unity or from being prepared
for war against the Slav..."(p. 103). Henderson therefore advocated a German
free hand in Eastern and Central Europe, the long term aim a Russo-German
conflict(103-104)
Hitler reiterated this Nazi goal during his meeting with Chamberlain at
Godsberg,
"Between us there should be no conflict...we will not stand in the way of
your pursuit of your non-European interests and you may without harm let us
have a free hand on the European continent in Central and South-East Europe.
Sometime we will have to solve the colonial question; but this has time, and
war is not to be considered in this case."(141)
Chamberlain made no attempt to object to Hitler's war policy in the east,
because he was in agreement with it. He also made it clear to the French,
that this free hand in the East, extended to the Soviet Union, "There had
been indications that there might be in the mind of the German Government an
idea that they could begin the disruption of Russia by the encouragement of
agitation for an independent Ukraine."(174) Chamberlain wanted to know how
the French would react in the light of the Franco-Russian treaty.
Lord Halifax, who replaced Anthony Eden as foreign secretary in Feb 1938,
was a major proponent of appeasement(though not always consistent) and
German encroachment on Russia,
"To secure mastery over Central Europe by reducing Czechoslovakia and Hungry
to a state of vassalage and then to create a Greater Ukraine under German
control - this is what essentially appears to be the leading idea now
accepted by the Nazi leaders and doubtless by Herr Hitler himself..."(175)
It was toward this end that Halifax noted that "Ruthenia would be the focus
of the movement."(176). During January 1939, the authors observe,
Chamberlain and his followers believed a German move against the Ukraine was
imminent.(183). It was precisely the failure of this end, which placed
appeasement under enormous strain.
When German troops marched and occupied the rump of Czechoslovakia,
Chamberlain failed to condemn this before the House of Commons on the 15th
March 1939. Yet this all changed within two days, when Chamberlain issued a
condemnation during a speech in Birmingham. Why the change? Most narratives
of the period explain Chamberlains change of tune arising from back bench
pressure, or the opposition of the dominians, or the backlash of public
opinion against appeasement. Leibovitz & Finkel reject this explanation. On
March 17th, the British govt learned that Hitler had accepted Hungarian
occupation of Ruthenia, making any move against the Ukraine by the Nazi's
remote. Leibinotz and Finkel make their case, by reproducing a memo dated
July 27th 1939 by Schnurre of the German Foreign Office which was the record
of a conversation with the Soviet Charge d' affairs Astrakhov,
"the solution of the Carpatho-Ukrainian(German exceptance of Hungarian
occupation of Ruthenia - GS) question had shown that here we did not aim at
anything there that would endanger Soviet interests."(196).
The aims of the appeasers had crashed to the ground, Hitler had failed to
detach the Ukraine and trigger a Russio-Germany war, all Chamberlains
efforts to convince Hitler otherwise' did not 'bear fruit.'(201). We now
know why this was so and it brings us to a big flaw in the book - the
treatment of Stalin's Russia, for which the authors have nothing but praise.
Contacts between Germany and Russia had occurred over trade negotiations in
late 1938, but five days before the German occupation of Prague, on the 10th
March 1939, at 18th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
Stalin gave a much noticed speech in which he said "We stand for peace and
the strengthening of business relations with all countries." and warned also
that Soviet policy would "not allow our country to be drawn into conflicts
of warmongers who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of
the fire for them."(Michael Jabara Carely 97). Then on April 28th, Hitler
delivered a speech, in which he ommitted his customary attack on the Soviet
Union. Then there was the replacement of Litvinov by Molotov,
the scene being set for the infamous Nazi-Soviet Pact, which completely
stunned world opinion and led to Soviet support of German occupation of West
Poland, France, Holland and Norway and the Nazi puppet regimes of Slovakia
and Vichy. And then of course, there were the occupation of East Poland and
the Baltic
states by Stalin. None of these treacheries receive so much as a mention.
And if the authors whitewash the record of the Stalinists, they create a
ficticious opposition to appeasement, by the Roosevelt administration. They
state "Even the US government was beginning to express its doubts about
appeasement of the dictators...' Roosevelt in a speech in October 1937,
called for a 'quarantine' against international law breakers". Now Leibnitz
and Finkel admit this was vague in terms of action and directed entirely at
Japan.(123) But they continue saying that FDR "sent a naval officer to
London to hold talks with his British counterparts, and Under Secretary of
State Sumner Welles called for a conference on international law WHERE
ROOSEVELT COULD PRESSURE THE BRITISH LEADERS TO ABANDON THEIR APPEASEMENT
POLICIES(my emphasis - GS)."(124)
It has been noted that FDR could use different language, with different
emphasis, at different times in different places(see Schmitz and Challener),
that he could take one position in private and quiet another in public.
There is certainly no evidence that I can find, of any public statement, by
either FDR or his functionaries against appeasement, prior to 1940. The
opposite is the case. If what Leibovitz & Finkel say's is true, then how do
they explain FDR's appointment of Joseph Kennedy as ambassador to the
UK(December 1937)or Hugh Wilson to Germany(Jan 1938), both arch appeasers.
It is also clear, from evidence that Leibovitz & Finkel themselves provide,
that the US was aware of the real meaning of appeasment as opposed to the
mythical one. For example, US Interior Secretary Harold Ickes wrote in his
diary on December 10th 1938 that Bullitt, "thinks that it is now the policy
of England and France to permit other nations to have their will of
Russia...by leaving Russia to her fate, England and France will be diverting
the threat of Germany from their own lands."(172)
And again, Bullitt spoke to Minister of Foreign Affairs in French Govt Yvon
Delbos(February 1938). He was told that English policy was for "turning over
central and eastern Europe to Germany in spite of her obligations under the
League of Nations."(111)
In a conservation between Joseph Kennedy and Lord Halifax(Oct 1938), the
latter admitted that Hitler could "go ahead and do what he likes in Central
Europe...."(168). Appeasement as a policy for war in the East does not seem
to have gotten by the Americans.
So FDR's representatives in Europe to the major protagonists Britain and
France, were aware that Chamberlain and Halifax were pursuiting a 'free
hand' for Germany which would end in a war between Germany and Russia. Yet
there was not a word from FDR in objection. On the contrary, Welles, Kennedy
and Bullitt all gave support to Munich, the high point of appeasement
policy.
As for the international conference of Sumner Welles, the authors were
clearly cherry picking their evidence. Offner provides a completely
contrasting view. Offner summaries Sumners plan,
" America would call, to set principles in international relations, laws and
customs of land and naval warfare, and rights and obligations of neutrals,
and to guarantee freedom of access for all peoples to raw materials. This
latter category was clearly of major importance to Welles--as his later
memoranda would show--and he believed German and Italian, though probably
not Japanese, cooperation could be secured at such a conference."(190)
German cooperation could be secured! Hardly a comdenation of appeasement!
And Offner quotes Sumner Welles,
"that the recommendations would "lend support and impetus" to British and
French efforts "to reach the bases for a practical understanding with
Germany on colonies and security."(218) 'Lending support and impetus' to the
Anglo-French policy of war in the East, seems a far cry from pressure to
abandon the policy of appeasement!
Leibovitz and
Finkel make a well argued, evidence based case: appeasement was no weak,
naive pursuit of pacifism, but a deliberate policy of funneling Nazi
aggression toward the east, and specifically toward the Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, the authors approach to the role of the Soviet Union and the
US, in the years leading to WWII, amounts to nothing more than a whitewash.
This book is recommended but must be read with some discretion.
Geoff.
Michael Jabara Carely, 1939: The Alliance That Never Was And the Coming of
World War II, 1999, House of Stratus.
Appeasement in Europe A Reassessment of U.S. Policies, Edited by David F.
Schmitz and Richard D. Challener, 1990, Greenwood Press, chapter 1.
ARNOLD A. OFFNER, American Appeasement UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND
GERMANY, 1933-1938, 1969, Belknap Press.
For an excellent critque of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, see Stalinism in Britain
by Robert Black, 1970, New Park, chapters X-XII.