Quarterly Review winter 2009/10 Vol 3 No 4) is out
Robert Henderson
email edi...@quarterly-review.org
website: www.quarterly-review.org
Quarterly Review winter 2009/10 Vol 3 No 4)
Contents
Editorial - Derek Turner
Life after Lisbon - what next for Britain? - Robert Henderson
Mercy for Megrahi - brave-heartedly towards Scottish independence? -
Roger Kershaw
The geography of intelligence - Richard Lynn
The sorry state of American conservatism - Mark G Brennan
The end of the affair? - Japan's disenchantment with the West - C B
Liddle
Making a hell out of Hellas - Demetris Demopoulos
Cousins-german - England and Germany before the Great War - Frank Ellis
Oysters - Ann Stevenson
A doomed deal - the Jew who tried to negotiate with the Nzis - Stoddard
Martin
Till unsuitability us do part - Steve Moxon
Minority report on Lincoln, race and slavery - Leslie Jones
Uncollected folk - Roy Kerridge
Second reading: Diary of a Nobody by George and Weedon Grossmith - Derek
Turner
Winter Light - Catherine Savage Brosman
Sample article
Life after Lisbon - what next for Britain? - an edited version appears
in this edition of QR
Robert Henderson
Contents
Decision time
The Lisbon Treaty is simply more of the same
The siren voices of the limited federalists
A variable geometry EU?
Why limited federalism is impossible
Can Britain legally leave the EU?
The practicalities of secession
Would the EU behave vindictively after our withdrawal?
Are EU referenda a poisoned chalice?
Is the only hope “to live in interesting times“?
Decision time
The moment of truth is nearly upon us. The time for listening to
politicians telling ever more absurd lies about how British sovereignty
is still intact is over. We have reached the point where even the
most shameless Europhile cannot plausibly pretend that we have not lost,
in the words of Edward Heath's infamous lie "any necessary
sovereignty" or persuasively deny that Britain would be reduced to
the status of a province in an empire if the Lisbon Treaty is
adopted.
The Treaty includes sweeping changes to qualified majority voting
(QMV) in many major policy areas including asylum, immigration,
security and justice, a president and foreign minister in all but
name and a clause making national law formally subordinate to EU law
(Declaration 27). It also for the first time explicitly prevents a
member state from legally leaving the EU of its own volition (Article
50). Much more on that later.
The question is no longer whether we are moving too far or too fast
towards a federal Europe or whether or not the Lisbon Treaty should be
adopted, but we should Britain be in the EU? If you wish Britain
to become subsumed into a United States of Europe, I will bid you
goodbye at this point. Should you, as I do, wish Britain to remain a
sovereign nation state, we can travel further together to consider the
mechanics and consequences of withdrawal.
The Lisbon Treaty is simply more of the same
Important as it is in changing the relationship between the EU and its
member states, it would be wrong to see the Lisbon Treaty as an ogre
which if slain will deliver us from the onward march of the federalist
monster. Rather it should be recognised as simply a continuation of an
inexorable federalist process which has been in train since the
formation of the Common Market and which has already reached a
dangerous point.
Even if the EU did not advance its remit one jot beyond what it is
before the Lisbon Treaty is in force, it would still be an organisation
any democrat should wish to leave, because it has already leeched such
vast swathes of sovereignty from its constituent members that credible
estimates of the legislation passing through Britain’s Parliament
which ultimately derives from the EU run as high as 85% with many
between 50% and 70% . (EU: is Britain still a sovereign state? Daily
Telegraph Philip Johnston 17 Sep 2009)
Decisions on most of the important political matters - currency,
taxation, interest rates, credit controls, defence, policing,
foreign policy, justice, social security, education, commerce/industry
and immigration - are either already within or are being brought within
the EU remit. It is not fanciful to imagine that in a few years the
EU will be demanding control of national armed forces.
The siren voices of the limited federalists
The outright federalists long ago broke cover and are a clear enemy
which may be fought on open ground. More problematical (and
dangerous) are those who argue in the face of all the evidence that the
EU can be reformed to either allow for members of widely differing
status or that powers the EU has acquired could be returned to the
nation states with a line then drawn in the federalist sand
Impractical as these ideas are, this position still has a strong
attraction for the many who through timidity are attracted to any
compromise simply because it is a compromise. (Such people should note
that a compromise is by definition always second best.) The utility
for the federalists of this particular emotional barrier to political
sanity is immense. Consequently, I will spell out why such policies
are impractical.
A variable-geometry EU?
To allow states different status within the EU would undermine both the
idea and the practicality of a union. It would go against the
intensely federalist and statist culture of both the elected
politicians and, even more vitally, the bureaucrats who effectively
control the EU whilst displaying a stupid disdain for the mass of their
peoples which would have done service for nobles of the ancien regime.
As for practicality, take the example of the EU having a foreign
minister in all but name who supposedly spoke for the EU while some
countries, especially a large, powerful state such as Britain, followed
their own foreign policy . This would make the position of the EU
representative feeble at best and absurd at worst.
More generally countries with differing status would inevitably increase
the tendency of those outside the Treaty group to follow their own
national interests. This would inflame the resentment of those within
the Treaty who did have the same freedom of action, something which is
already happening amongst the members of the Euro who look enviously at
those outside of the currency. The other side of the mixed
constitution coin would be the inner group of Treaty states taking
action which would damage those in the non-Treaty group. Such
fragmentation of interests and legal obligations would be a certain
recipe for the eventual dissolution of the EU.
For these reason a variable geometry EU is very unlikely to be allowed
by the Eurofederalists.
Why limited federalism is impossible
The only thing which restrains politicians from seeking every more power
is democratic control. Organisations like the EU dissolve that control
because the politicians of the component national members can no
longer be held responsible for any function which is ceded to the
larger body. Decisions are taken by politicians who, even if they
are elected at the national level, are not in any meaningful sense
responsible to their electors because policy is made at the
supranational level. The upshot is the creation of a supra-national
political class which is effectively beyond the reach of electors and
whose class interest is not that of the people they are supposed to
represent, but that of the supra-national political class. The question
then becomes what are the mentality, the motivations and the ends of
that class?
In the case of the EU, the advanced Eurofederalists have gained the
upper hand to such an extent that argument against further advancement
of EU powers is increasingly dismissed at the EU elite level in
language which suggests that it is akin to treason. In their minds their
ideology has acquired the status of a quasi-religion which is
consequently beyond the touch of reason or refutation. Worse, as
religious believers will do, they have persuaded themselves that
their ends are the ultimate moral and political good and may be
obtained by any means. This includes treating the popular will with
sublime contempt, something which has been shown more emphatically than
ever before in the Euro-Elite’s grotesque behaviour after the
rejection of the proposed Constitution.
Because of the dominance of the advanced federalists, those who wish to
serve as servants of the EU, whether politicians or bureaucrats, have to
at least play the federalist game and pay lip service to its
“virtue”. The consequence of this is that federalist attitudes
become enshrined within the legal and administrative structures of the
EU. This creates a tremendous anchor to hold the federalist status quo
in place.
The existence of a large, long established, well-paid and lavishly
funded bureaucracy is of itself a massive bulwark against change.
Those with experience of the British Civil Service will recognise the
power which public servants can wield through a mixture of
duplicity and the incapacity of politicians. But British civil
servants, with a few exceptions such as political advisers like Alistair
Campbell , are not overtly political appointments. Most
importantly, British civil servants are not politicians in their own
right.
The EU is very different. It routinely employs politicians in its
highest bureaucratic posts and even the European Court of Justice has a
fair sprinkling of politicos (with the advent of the new Eastern EU
entrants, the court also now contains ex-Soviet Bloc judges whose
acquaintance with due process is somewhat distant). The
consequences of such a politicised bureaucracy and underpinning
judiciary are profound. Even if a majority of elected EU politicians
wished to change course towards a less intrusive confederation, they
would experience immense difficulty in overcoming the deliberate
bureaucratic subversion which would follow as surely as night
follows day.
This politico-bureaucracy now has lavish opportunities to interfere. In
the lives of EU member states. Ironically, the vanguard engine of
federalism was the 'Single Market' created by the Single European Act
beloved of the supposedly arch Eurosceptic Margaret Thatcher. Its
power lies not merely in its role as a facilitator of free trade (of
itself a powerful agent for undermining national power), but as a tool
of social and political change (free movement in search of work,
equalisation of working practices and so on.) On this vanguard machine
of federalism the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties have
massively built, but it is still arguably the Single Market which is
the greatest enabler of interference with national politics.
Without the 'Single Market' the opportunities for EU interference
and, even more importantly, for the employment of bureaucrats would
be much reduced. (The latter is important because no bureaucrats
equals no bureaucratic action). Moreover, the 'Single Market' is
used as a lever towards other forms of integration which have serious
economic consequences, but which cannot be reasonably considered as
part of the necessary measures to ensure a "Single Market". Prime
examples of this practice are Health and Safety measures which can
include, as Britain has discovered to her great cost and immense
Thatcherite dismay, restrictions on one of the primary terms of
employment, namely hours worked.
Can Britain legally leave the EU?
There is a considerable difference between the EU with the Lisbon Treaty
in force and the EU with the Lisbon Treaty unactivated. Article 50 of
the Treaty runs:
1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in
accordance with its own constitutional requirements.
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European
Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the
European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement
with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking
account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union.
That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of
the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded
on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority,
after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the
date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that,
two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the
European
Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously
decides to extend this period.
4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European
Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State
shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council or
Council or in decisions concerning it. A qualified majority shall be
defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of
the European Union.
5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its
request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49.
Article 50 creates untold mischief for a withdrawing country. Apart
from requiring a qualified majority (QM) of the other EU states (QMV
means in practice the support of most of the large EU nations), the
state which wishes to withdraw would be excluded from any discussions on
the conditions for withdrawal.
Then there is the delay before withdrawal can be effected. It is
probable that the minimum period of waiting before secession would be
two years, because it would be extraordinary if the EU did not try to
make withdrawal as difficult as possible, while the provision in para 2
that departure must be by negotiation on an agreement “ setting out
the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for
its future relationship with the Union” means that it will necessarily
be a long winded process.
During the time before Britain left she would be bound by EU laws and
the EU could adopt directives which could do Britain a good deal of
damage, for example, directives which severely interfered with the City.
These would not even have to be directives deliberately designed to harm
Britain, for they could simply be decisions advantageous to the
remaining members of the EU which took no account of the damage they
might do to Britain because Britain was withdrawing. . To put the cherry
on the disadvantage cake, Britain would take no part in discussions or
votes on EU legislation introduced during the period between asking to
withdraw and withdrawing.
The need for agreement by the other EU states and the opportunities
for creating delay and harm to Britain and would place her in a very
weak position negotiating position if she plays by the legal rules. The
upshot would almost certainly be significant conditions for withdrawal
which impinged upon British sovereignty including agreement to
“voluntarily” adopt a good deal of EU legislation, both existing
and future. (The example of Norway and Switzerland are instructive in
this matter. Both being formally outside the EU, they are nonetheless
in practice bound by many of its laws and regulations).
With the Lisbon Treaty unsigned Britain could simply state that it was
withdrawing. Such a declaration would raise the question of whether
Article 56(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties, to which
our political elite have also promiscuously bound Britain, would
sanction withdrawal. The Article runs:
1. A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and
which does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to
denunciation or withdrawal unless:
a) it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility
of denunciation or withdrawal; or
b) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of
the treaty.
Whether the various treaties which encumber the EU before the Lisbon
Treaty is in force could be said to imply a right of withdrawal is a
matter of legal debate, although the fact that the Lisbon Treaty itself
makes provision for withdrawal is a tacit admission that withdrawal was
always implied. But legal or not, a situation where the right of
withdrawal was claimed where no treaty sanctioned, forbade or laid down
conditions for withdrawal would be a vastly more fluid and,
consequently, Britain would be in a much stronger bargaining situation
than that which would exist after the Lisbon Treaty becomes law. After
implementation of the Treaty Article 54 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law on Treaties would apply to the EU. The Article runs:
The termination of a treaty or the withdrawal of a party may
take place:
(a) in conformity with the provisions of the treaty; or
(b) at any time by consent of all the parties after consultation with
the other contracting States.
That is in conformity with the withdrawal Article in the Lisbon Treaty
and the legal position of the EU would be massively strengthened by the
Treaty‘s implementation. . That is one of the reasons why the EU
members are so desperate to get the Treaty ratified before the next
British General Election and a plausible if unspoken reason why
Cameron is unwilling to commit to a referendum on the Treaty if it is
already in force. However, Cameron’s position is confused because it
is conceivable that the Treaty could be brought into force after the
General Election and before a Cameron government had time to hold a
referendum. The Tory Party would then be in exactly the same position as
they would be if they had promised a referendum regardless of when the
Treaty was implemented. I will leave readers to judge whether such
confusion shows Cameron’s position to be disingenuous and that his
secretly favoured outcome is for the Lisbon Treaty to be implemented to
before he comes to power. .
As I write in late October 2009 it appears almost certain that the
Treaty will be in force before the General Election, the only
possibility of sufficient delay being the demand by the Czechs and
Slovaks for legally enforceable assurances that the Germans
dispossessed and driven out of those countries during WW2 and its
immediate aftermath and their descendents will not be able to claim
property lost in the 1940s. If either the Czechs or Slovaks were
successful in getting such assurances added to the Treaty that would
require re-ratification, including the possibility of a third Irish
referendum. However, even in this circumstance, it is possible that
the re-ratification could be completed before the General Election is
held or before a Cameron government could arrange a referendum,
something which would move from possible to probable if the Irish
Supreme Court decided that the addition of the assurances to the Czechs
and Slovaks did not constitute an Irish constitutional matter.
But legality in international matters is not the same as legality within
a nation state. This is so both because there is no democratic
legitimacy for international law as it is not made solely at the
national level and for the entirely practical reason that there is no
means of enforcing such law short of extreme actions such as blockade
and war if the nation state in question refuses to abide by the law.
Hence, much of international law is a dead letter, it all too often
being observed in its breach by powerful nations and enforced by the
powerful on the weak. Its frequently unreality is shown in Article
42 of the Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties, viz:
Validity and continuance in force of treaties
1. The validity of a treaty or of the consent of a State or an
international organization to be bound by a treaty may be impeached only
through the
application of the present Convention.
2. The termination of a treaty, its denunciation or the withdrawal of a
party, may take place only as a result of the application of the
provisions of the treaty or of the present Convention. The same rule
applies to
suspension of the operation of a treaty.
This means that for Britain to legally withdraw from the Vienna
Convention all Britain’s co-signatories would have to agree to the
withdrawal. 24 carat fantasy.
If the Lisbon Treaty is ratified by all EU members and there is no
legal way out because the other members would not agree to it, what
could Britain do if she wished to withdraw? The answer is beautifully
simple: cut the Gordian knot by withdrawing from the EU unilaterally
and then trade with the EU as we do with the rest of the world.
The practicalities of secession
Aside from the question of legality, a country could leave at
present because the administrative control of all aspects of
government are still within the grasp of the individual nation states -
there is no EU army, no EU police force, no EU control of ports and such
forth.
In terms of standing on her own two national feet, Britain has
considerable advantages over most EU states. Her economy is large,
economically diversified and with a wide variety of trading
partners. Britain also have as a legacy of being on the winning
side in two world wars and her imperial past, a past which still has
economic and diplomatic resonance, unusual international influence
through our membership of the controlling councils of such bodies as
the UN, the World Bank and the IMF. To these advantages may be
added the general protection given by WTO rules from the imposition of
unfair trading practices.
Most importantly, Britain has retained its currency. If she was
enmeshed in the Euro the practical difficulties of leaving the EU would
be immense. Not only would there be the trauma of trying to re-establish
an independent currency, but membership of the Euro would give the EU a
considerable lever to exact penal terms for leaving the EU.
It is conceivable that Britain outside the EU could be faced with a
protectionist EU which formally repudiated all or part of the WTO
rules or which simply refused to abide by either the WTO rules or WTO
judgements. But equally a Britain within the EU could find itself
disadvantaged by being part of a protectionist trading block. In other
words, whatever course we choose has economic dangers. It is also worth
noting that outside the EU Britain could again negotiate its own trade
deals, which would potentially give much greater economic flexibility.
There would also be other bolsters to Britain’s economy after
departure. She would receive the direct financial advantage of the
cessation of the £14 billion or so Danegeld Britain currently pays
Brussels each year. Of this approximately £4 billion goes to subsidise
other member states which are of course Britain’s trading
competitors. Much of the balance of £10 billion which is graciously
returned to Britain is expenditure which would probably not be made if
Britain was outside the EU for much of it goes on EU designed spending
such as the structural fund disbursements.
If Britain remains within the EU her contributions, large as they
already are, will rise rapidly. Global Vision has calculated that
they will rise to an average of £6.5 billion net at 2004 prices for
the period 2011-13http://www.global-vision.net/perspectives11.asp). More
immediately, the European Parliament has just voted to increase
Britain’s contributions for 2010 by £5 million a day or £1.83
billion pa (Daily Telegraph 26 October 2009 Martin Banks).
Beyond these advantages Britain would also be freed of the mountain of
extra costs piled onto business and public bodies by EU directives, or
would be if she has the sense to withdraw from the EU by a simple Act
of Parliament repudiating all EU related treaties and then trade with
the EU as we would any other part of the world.
Would the EU behave vindictively after our withdrawal?
Other things being equal the EU would be strongly tempted to make
Britain’s position as difficult as possible. But other things are not
equal and the EU has pressing reasons not to be unduly difficult. Their
immediate Achilles heel would be the Republic of Ireland (RoI) whose
economy would simply collapse if (a) Britain removed all the privileges
the RoI t currently enjoys including absolutely free movement and
residency within the UK or (b) was affected by trade sanctions against
Britain by the EU or reciprocal trade sanctions taken out by Britain in
response to EU ones. The EU would be left with a choice between
abandoning the RoI , financing it very heavily indefinitely or behaving
reasonably towards Britain.
Less immediately pressing but important in the longer term are (1) the
fact that the EU trade balance with Britain is heavily in their favour,
(2) there are parts of the EU, especially parts of France, and
particular industries, for example, fishing, which rely very heavily on
trade with Britain or use of its resources, (3) Britain is heavily
involved in joint EU projects such as Eurofighter and Airbus, (4) there
are more EU citizens from other EU states in Britain than there are
Britons in other EU states, and (5) most Britons working in the EU will
be in significant jobs while most EU foreigners in Britain will be
working in menial jobs (thus making any exchange of populations much to
Britain's benefit) .
Politically the EU would have a considerable amount to lose if it
alienated Britain, because Britain still has, if she chooses to use
it, considerable diplomatic clout as a consequence of the post-1945
international settlement which left Britain with potent strategic
instruments such as permanent membership of the UN Security Council
and power with the IMF. In addition, because of Britain's involvement
with the likes of the UN, the wider global power players such as the US
have a vested interest in Britain remaining a viable country, Britain
could be very obstructive of EU foreign policy if it chose and very
helpful to it if relations remained cordial between Britain and the EU.
Are EU referenda a poisoned chalice?
I am not opposed to referenda on principle, indeed I believe them to
be a necessary mechanism of democracy provided the structures are in
place to ensure they are fairly conducted. But democracy also requires
that no decision made by an electorate be irreversible, either
in principle or practice. Make legally irreversible decisions and all
that the disenfranchised populations are left with is violence if they
wish to change that which has been put legally beyond their power to
change.
If irreversible decisions are illegitimate, where does this leave
supporters of referenda on either the Lisbon Treaty or on withdrawal
legitimate? The honest answer is in a difficult logical position. A
vote to either accept the Lisbon Treaty or to remain with the EU would
in practice be irreversible by legal means, that is, within the terms
of the Lisbon Treaty. It would comprehensively undermine the
opportunity for democratic action and consequently would be an
illegitimate use of referenda. Contrariwise, a vote to refuse the
Lisbon Treaty or to withdraw from the EU would be results which were
democratically legitimate because they would improve democratic
opportunity, in the former instance, by lessening the power of the
EU and, in the latter case, by providing the basis for removing Britain
from EU control. Nonetheless such votes would still give credence to
the idea that sovereignty can be put at hazard.
There is also the problem of fairness in the conduct of referenda. It
might be possible to hold a meaningful referendum on the Lisbon Treaty.
Such a referendum would only be held if the Tories were in power, they
would (presumably) campaign against it, the referendum question would
almost certainly be simple (something like Should Britain accept the
Lisbon Treaty, Yes or No?) and a significant proportion of the
mainstream media would be happy to parade their Eurosceptic credentials
on anything short of British withdrawal.
A referendum on our continued membership would present a very different
picture. All the major British parties would support our continued
membership. Add to that the overwhelming general EU bias within the
mainstream media - no national newspaper has as yet taken our
withdrawal from the EU as its editorial stance and the broadcast
media is overwhelmingly for Britain’s continued membership - the
finance available through big business to the pro-EU lobby, and the
pro-membership political control of the question which would go on
the ballot paper and it is difficult to see how a referendum could be
fairly conducted. It should never be forgotten that in the 1975
referendum campaign , the polls were initially heavily for rejection of
the new terms the Wilson Government had negotiated and consequently for
withdrawal ( the referendum question was '"Do you think the UK should
stay in the European Community (Common Market)?"), yet come referendum
day there was an overwhelming vote to stay in what was then the EEC (Yes
17,378,581 67.2% No 8,470,073 32.8%).
But even if there were referendum decisions for either the
rejection of the Treaty or for withdrawal, profound political damage
would be done because it would give a spurious legitimacy to the
idea that referenda can decide whether a country can permanently
alienate sovereignty. The use of a referendum would not, of course, make
the concept of permanently alienated sovereignty constitutionally
right, but it would provide a strong if intellectually specious
justification for any party wishing in the future to either defend a
loss of sovereignty already sustained or to propose a further loss of
sovereignty.
The British constitutional position on perpetual alienation of
sovereignty is clear. No parliament has the power to alienate
in perpetuity Britain's sovereignty, for if the British
Constitution has one overriding principle it is that no parliament can
bind another. That is but a commonplace.
More fundamentally, such an alienation cannot logically or
practically be made whilst free national elections exist because in
such circumstances nothing can prevent a party standing on a platform
calling for the amendment or complete repudiation of the Treaty of
Rome and its subsequent amendments and additions. In fact, no
statute, treaty or institution can be sacrosanct under an elective
system of government, not even where there is a written constitution
and an interpretative constitutional court. This is so because a
political party may still stand on a platform which states that a
change will be made regardless of what the constitution, laws ad
treaties decree, and make of electoral success a legitimate
mandate. By extension, the same argument obtains for decisions made by
referenda.
There is also a good logical reason why no referendum should be held on
the question of withdrawal: none was held before Heath signed us up to
the Treaty of Rome in 1972. Not only that, but Heath took Britain into
the then EEC without a vote after promising during the 1970 general
election that if Britain joined further European integration would not
happen “except with the full-hearted consent of the Parliaments and
peoples of the new member countries.” ("Ultimate Vindication: The
Spectator and Europe 1966-79", Thomas Teodorczuk ) and only gained a
Commons majority for the Bill authorising membership after normal party
discipline in the Commons had broken down and then barely for the
second reading of the European Communities Bill was only passed by 309
to 301 votes.
The cleanest political course for withdrawal is to forget about a
referendum and simply pass an Act of Parliament repudiating our
membership and repealing any Acts passed since 1972 which put that
membership into British law and then ride the situation as it develops.
Once out of the EU, Britain should adopt a written constitution which
specifically forbade any alienation of sovereignty. That would remove
the possibility of future governments trying legally lure Britain back
into the EU by hook or by crook.
Is the only hope of escape from the EU “to live in interesting times“?
I would not choose to live, in the words of the Chinese proverb, “in
interesting times“, but sadly that may be the only realistic
opportunity we have of freeing ourselves from Brussels because our
entire political class is saturated with the idea that we must remain in
Europe at all costs.
On the face of it the chances of Britain ever escaping the cancerous
embrace of the EU seem slim going on non-existent. Labour and the
LibDems are firmly committed to not only our continued membership but
the willing embrace of the Lisbon Treaty. As for the Tories, the
heaviest odds are on them not having to honour their promise of a
referendum if they gained power before the Treaty is finally activated.
As for the vague promises given by Cameron that he will renegotiate our
relationship with the EU to return powers to Britain, these are as
likely to bear substantial fruit as the embarrassingly ineffective
“re-negotiation” of the second Wilson Government before the 1975
referendum. At the same time the seeming inevitability of the Lisbon
Treaty being in force makes the EU from the outside look ever more of an
unmoveable political edifice.
A pretty daunting picture for those who want to see Britain a free,
sovereign country once more. But political appearances can be
wonderfully out of kilter with reality. To almost all professional
political analysts the Soviet Union in the late 1980s seemed as certain
a feature of the future global landscape as it had done twenty years
before. So strong was this belief that CIA Soviet specialists refused
right up to the fall of the Berlin Wall to believe that the Red empire
was on the point of collapse.
Could the EU empire be so rotten that it will implode as suddenly as
the Soviet one? There are reasons to believe that it might. The most
likely cause of disintegration would be the collapse of the Euro,
which is suffering immense strains as it desperately props up economic
basket cases such as the Republic of Ireland and Spain to preserve the
illusion of a viable super-power currency. Add in the impossibility
of running a currency to suit the vastly differing economies of its
various member states, a difficulty greatly magnified by the current
recession, and there is a realistic if still small chance of the
currency folding in the next few years. If that happened it would
produce a fluid situation where individual states would seek their own
economic salvation and that could result in a general breakdown of EU
discipline.
There are two other serious tensions within the EU which plausibly could
result in the collapse of the EU. The first is economic. The world is
rapidly turning to protectionist measures as a response to the present
recession and there is already widespread resentment within the EU of
the effects of imports and outsourcing (both between EU members and
between EU states and countries outside the EU) and the free
movement of labour within the EU. As economic hardship grows
politicians at the national level will become more receptive to
breaching EU rules on trade and free movement of labour as they try to
favour their own countries. A coach and horses had already been driven
through the EU’s supposed strict rules on state aid to industry since
the recession began. In addition, those countries which bankroll the EU
- primarily Britain and Germany - may say enough is enough and refuse
to continue to do so.
The second tension is the growing racial and ethnic unrest across
the EU. This could easily develop into such serious conflict that there
was a general breakdown of the free movement within the EU and the
repudiation or ignoring by some states of the European Convention on
Human Rights, which although not an EU treaty is woven into the fabric
of EU law and thinking. Such developments would be potentially
explosive for the EU. Imagine for example a member state deliberately
causing a mass movement of an unwanted minority across the border to
other EU states or what amounted to civil war having the same effect.
Alternatively, a post-Yugoslavia type situation could plausibly arise
in the eastern EU states. The EU even after the Lisbon Treaty is in
force would have little power to act decisively because it does not as
yet have control of any armed forces. Nor is national feeling so
submerged that obedience to any non-military action such as sanctions
or a blockade ordained by Brussels could be taken for granted.
Once there were serious widespread breaches of EU law and
administration, all member states would be encouraged by this to
concentrate on their national interest rather than the wider EU
interest, a development which would fragment the EU in fact if not in
name. This fragmentation would become a self-sustaining trend as the
member states took ever greater control of their own affairs and the EU
became ever less relevant to the actual process of government.
There are some very big “ifs” in those scenarios, but what is
certain is that if circumstances arise such as these which frighten our
politicians enough, most of them would convert to the "out of
Europe" cause without blinking, for political elites as a class have
only one settled principle, namely, to do whatever is necessary to
maintain their power and privilege
The EU increasingly bears worrying similarities to the Soviet Union. It
wishes to submerge nations into a larger whole by both the accretion of
power to the centre and the promotion of regions. Classic divide and
rule. It seeks to create a "European Citizen" just as the USSR sought
to create the "Soviet Man". It centralises decision making in a
manner uncannily like Lenin's democratic centralism. It favours a
division of labour whereby the individual economies of the
constituent members become more and more specialised in certain
economic fields and less and less self-sufficient. It brooks no
debate about what is the "right" view on how its citizens should
live. The term Euroviet Union would not be out of place.
Anyone who believes in democratic control should be running away
screaming from the EU and back to the safety of the nation state.
The latter, for all its faults, is the largest social grouping which
has ever delivered any meaningful degree of democratic control. It is
never democracy as such, of course, but what academics are pleased to
call elective oligarchy, a system whereby the masses get the chance
to choose between competing parts of the elite. But at least within
the nation state the politicians have to take responsibility for their
policies and actions. Within the EU they are literally irresponsible.
-- k
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Robert Henderson
Personal website: http://www.anywhere.demon.co.uk