CIA employee pay scale? GS?
Tim
paid on the General Schedule (GS) like other federal employees?
If so, what do most college grads start in the Directorate of
Operations as? GS-7, 11, ???
Allen Thomson
The CIA's career service is outside the GS, but imitates it. So the
answer is basically GS, with some variations not much different than
those in the GS. For people who have five years' overseas service and
20 (? I'm not sure of the number) total service, there is the possibility
of retirement at age 50 with full benefits under the CIARDS system.
DO is generally undergraded relative to the DI and DST, so entry at
GS-7 or less with a BA is probably a better estimate than GS-11. I know
that, over the span of a couple of decades, newly graduated MA/MS hires
in the DI and DST came on as GS-8s, give or take a grade. A freshly
minted PhD or similar degree would typically be hired as a GS-11.
HOOVER
>
> Does any one know what the pay scale for CIA employees is? Are they
> paid on the General Schedule (GS) like other federal employees?
>
> If so, what do most college grads start in the Directorate of
> Operations as? GS-7, 11, ???
AS a college grad, plan to start out around a GS-9 or so...but if you're in the DO
the odds of you ever getting past a 12 are slim.
Tim
>AS a college grad, plan to start out around a GS-9 or so...but if you're in the DO
>the odds of you ever getting past a 12 are slim.
Why would DO have such a limited career track? Also, are there
other "incentive pays" out there such as overseas allowances to
sweeten the pot like DHS (Defense HUMINT) pays? If not, I don't see
how DO can compete for the college/grad school educated people (who
most likely have massive student loans)
Mark W. McBride, President/CEO
<3646f6d2...@news.pipeline.com>, our ether buddy
(Tim)airborne(at)hotmail.com (Tim) spaketh thusly:
:)sweeten the pot like DHS (Defense HUMINT) pays? If not, I don't see
:)how DO can compete for the college/grad school educated people (who
:)most likely have massive student loans)
The incentive is they can take their paychecks and buy stock using the
insider information they've gathered and who's going to be the wiser.
Cite me just one case of a U.S. intelligence officer being nailed by the
SEC for insider trading using the secrets obtained on the job. How would
the SEC know ... it's SECRET.
Let's take a fictitious example. Clint Eastwood steals a Firefox with
its advanced technology from the USSR. Yes, that aircraft gives the U.S.
equality in defense technology. But whoever gets the contract to build
that aircraft for the U.S. is going to be making money hand over fist.
Does the technology in the Firefox have non-defense applications? Video
displays for video games? High strength metal for use in toys? Etc.
What if one obtained information that copper in a certain South American
country would be nationalized? Start buying copper futures. What if you
knew that the U.S. was sending CIA guns and money to overthrow the
country that nationalized a private enterprise? Sell those futures.
Over the long haul, and with discretion, a newly minted intelligence
officer should be able to at least multiply his/her investment tenfold.
John M. Hansen
underpaid and under appreciated workers in the federal Government. Those
people working for DIA are equally as bad off.
They are not caught doing insider trading as they really have no
secrets to trade on. Example - they will never learn who the contractor is
who is going to make the money by taking technology from the firefox they
steal. Life does not replicate the movies.
If you want to make enough money to support a family, and you like the
intelligence field, go to work for the Pinkertons. You will make more money
and you will get a better pension over a twenty or thirty year period than
you will at the CIA.
Many CIA officers retire in the foreign countries where they last
served because only there can their pension stretch enough to cover the
costs of such basic things as food clothing and shelter.
CIA retirement in certain areas is mandatory as well. Which means
that you might not get the years toward your pension that you thought you
would. You will then have to try and become a self employed consultant to
earn a buck. If you think that pays well, just look and see how many
'Former CIA Officers' there are in the field now.
For a real laugh, compare the CIA pay scales with the equivalent KGB pay
scales. You will quickly see what the difference is in terms of desiring
to have good field operations officers.
This inequality goes back a long time. Able, the famous soviet spy, of
the 1950's was offered 10,000 per year to defect and tell all, when he was
making the equivalent of 25,000 per year, even though he was imprisoned in
the US. He laughed, and said nothing, but he did not take the CIA up on the
offer. The case officers talking to him were making much less, and
wondered why he did not jump at the chance.
Regards,
John M Hansen
Mark W. McBride, President/CEO
<7299g3$s57$1...@autumn.news.rcn.net>, our ether buddy "John M. Hansen"
<jmha...@erols.com> spaketh thusly:
:) CIA employees, especially those in 'Field Work' at the DO are the most
:)underpaid and under appreciated workers in the federal Government. Those
:)people working for DIA are equally as bad off.
:) They are not caught doing insider trading as they really have no
:)secrets to trade on. Example - they will never learn who the contractor is
:)who is going to make the money by taking technology from the firefox they
:)steal. Life does not replicate the movies.
As I recall, submarines are sole sourced by General Dynamics/Electric
Boat, a publicly traded company. The U-2 and SR-71 are sole-sourced by
Lockheed, a publicly traded company. Those are just two very obvious
examples. If the officer _couldn't_ figure out who the end
recipient/beneficiary of the information was, I would say he/she should
take early retirement. Analysts that blind we don't need.
From an earlier post:
FWD: From The (Baltimore) Sun:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mixing business with spying
Secret information is passed routinely to U.S. companies
------------------------------------------------------------------------
By Scott Shane
SUN STAFF
At least once a day, a CIA courier stops by the Department of Commerce
in downtown Washington with a packet of top-secret information, gathered
around the globe by satellites picking up phone calls, agents inside
foreign governments and American spies posing as businessmen abroad.
The Central Intelligence Agency packets have gotten fatter in recent
years, as U.S. spies have shifted their focus from Soviet missiles to
international trade. And the nuggets of information inside can be used
not only to make policy but to make a buck.
In the case of John Huang, the international businessman turned Commerce
Department official turned Democratic Party fund-raiser, there is no
evidence or allegation that he misused secret intelligence he was given
on the job.
But the scrutiny of Huang's position at Commerce has opened a rare
window on the department's growing role as a link between the
intelligence agencies and the business world.
"There's greater potential for conflict of interest when the information
can be used for direct economic benefit," said Jeffrey T. Richelson,
author of several books on U.S intelligence. "You have prohibitions on
insider trading on the stock market. This is just a different kind of
insider information."
Security laws prohibit passing secret intelligence directly to outsiders
who lack the proper clearance. But former intelligence officials and
other experts say tips based on spying nonetheless regularly flow from
the Commerce Department to U.S. companies to help them win contracts
overseas. And there are few specific guidelines governing the practice.
"I think the government has got a major weakness there," said Loch K.
Johnson, a historian and author who served on the staff of the Brown
Commission, which recommended intelligence reforms last March. "At
Commerce, there's no code or book to consult to say when and what
information can be passed to a U.S. company."
Huang served from 1994 until early this year as the principal deputy
assistant secretary of commerce for international economic policy. In a
deposition this week, Huang denied that while at the Commerce Department
he had "any commercial dealing, any involvement" with his former
employer, the Indonesia-based Lippo Group, which paid him nearly
$900,000 in the year before he took his government job.
But Huang, like other top political appointees at the Commerce
Department, came from and returned to a private sector where a morsel of
information can be turned into a feast of profit. Documents released by
the department this week underscore how routine the mingling of Commerce
officials and CIA analysts has become.
One such document consists of minutes from an August 1994 Commerce
Department meeting attended by Huang to identify major contracts open
for bid in Indonesia in order to help U.S. companies win the work. A CIA
employee, Bob Beamer, spoke at the meeting; five of the 16 people on the
routine distribution list for the minutes were from the CIA.
Commerce officials say Huang had a top-secret security clearance and
received weekly intelligence briefings. The briefings were conducted by
the department's Office of Executive Support -- a new name for the
office previously known as Intelligence Liaison -- which receives
information from the CIA and distributes it to officials with the proper
clearances.
Since Huang was the principal deputy to the assistant secretary of
commerce for international economic policy, his interests "covered the
world" but had an East Asia focus, the Commerce Department statement
said. Huang "was provided copies of relevant intelligence material," it
added.
"The specter it raises is that Mr. Huang, after getting his intelligence
briefing, could have picked up the phone and called his old colleagues
at Lippo and said: `Why don't you sell this, or buy that, based on what
I heard?' " said Matthew M. Aid, a Washington researcher writing a book
on the National Security Agency, whose eavesdropping provides much of
the most important commercial intelligence.
For most Asian and European governments, such sharing of intelligence
with corporations "is a very common practice," Aid said. "If you're in
the Suharto government, you see increasing the wealth of Lippo as
increasing the wealth of Indonesia."
Johnson, the staff member of the intelligence reform commission chaired
by former Defense Secretary Harold Brown, said providing
intelligence-based information to a foreign company would always be
inappropriate, if not illegal. But officials at the departments of
Commerce, Treasury and State sometimes pass information to U.S.
companies without revealing the intelligence source, he said.
If, for instance, a government official learned that a foreign
competitor was about to win a contract sought by a U.S. company,
"someone in Commerce might call a U.S. executive and say, `Look, you
might have a better shot at that contract if you sweetened your bid a
little,' " Johnson said. "They pass on the information. But they usually
do it in a very veiled fashion."
Former CIA Director Robert M. Gates said the decision to share with a
company information derived from spying should never be made by an
official on his own.
"The decision to assist a U.S. company should be made openly, on a
policy level," Gates said. "Among other things, you have to find a way
to sanitize the material to protect sources and methods."
William E. Odom, a former NSA director who is now at the Hudson
Institute in Washington, said the intelligence agencies and the Commerce
Department collaborated throughout the Cold War to prevent U.S.
companies from exporting products with military applications to the East
Bloc.
"You could use that information to catch the bad guys," Odom said. "But
you don't make money off that kind of information."
Now, with Commerce officials trying to turn the billions spent on
intelligence to the benefit of U.S. business, "it doesn't take a great
deal of imagination to see the potential for abuse," Odom said. "You
finally just have to have honest officials."
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally Published on 11/01/96 -- Copyright 1996 The Baltimore Sun
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
John, I don't mean to demean every U.S. intelligence officer. All I want
to point out is that the potential for a conflict of interest IS present
and that it's fact that the U.S. intelligence agencies help out specific
companies in the U.S., regardless of whether the officer agrees with the
policy or not. If you operated a company that competed with the friends
of Dept. of Commerce/CIA/NSA/NRO/DIA/DNC/RNC, and that information
obtained by these agencies was used to give your competitors a
significant market advantage, how the hell would you feel? If the
information is used to win a multi-million dollar contract overseas,
where is that multi-million dollars spent? In the U.S., helping the
friends of the Dept. of Commerce/CIA/NSA/NRO/DIA/DNC/RNC wipe out their
competition.
It may sound patriotic on the surface, but it's not. It's economic. And
U.S. companies suffer because of it with no recompense.
John M. Hansen
sensitive information of economic value they might learn to their stock
broker. These are the guys that spend their time in another (usually
unfriendly) nation trying to learn something or do something that may be of
value to the US down the road.
With out giving away anything that is not known, an American spent five
years in a foreign electronics factory, working his way up to foreman. He
was able to arrange for the shipment of one of the first super whamo gadget
that the factory built, under their top secret rules, to be picked up by
another American, who had spend many years in the same nation as a truck
driver. The device was smuggled over several boarders to our intelligence
organization, where we were able to find out just what they were doing in
that area of gadgetry. He was not only out of reach of his family for over
eight years, he was definitely out of contact with his stock broker.
Field operatives or 'contract field workers' or whatever else you want
to call them are intelligence collectors. They are not analysts. They are
the people I was writing about. They get paid less, and noticed less than
any other employee of the Federal government. Because of the various skills
that they have to have, (such as being able to communicate fairly well in at
least six or eight languages and being fluent as a native in at least two)
they could usually make more money in the civilian job market. They
frequently have to have a high degree of technical skill as well. Being an
Ms.E.E., and P.E. is not unusual in this calling. Instead, these men and
women willingly go on assignments, often lasting years, in nations that
would execute them in a moment if they were caught, to do what they can to
insure the security of the United States.
Ask yourself what it would take you get you to go to (for example)
Zambia, and open an outdoor fruit stand, run it for seven years so that you
could earn the trust of the natives, and be able to report on the affairs of
those politicians who visit you to buy fruit. These politicians having come
to trust you, now openly talk to you about their problems. ( I use Zambia
because it has never been penetrated in this way)
Remember, you are not only away from home, you have no contact with anyone
who you even knew in your 'prior life' as an American. The nature of
'Tradecraft' means that you never see the person your information goes to.
No embassy receptions either.
I bet you would want more than $35,000.00 per year, especially as while
you are there you are going to be living in your earnings selling fruit.
The 'perfumed people' at the top of the heap who can sell this
information are a different story altogether. It is the 'field worker,'
who when mandatory retirement hits is told that he has no applicable
experience for a civilian job that I am speaking of.
Anyone who thinks that this so called intelligence business is a James
Bond world has been seeing too many movies.
Best Wishes,
John M. Hansen
.
Евгений Ожогин
John M. Hansen пишет в сообщении <7299g3$s57$1...@autumn.news.rcn.net> ...
> This inequality goes back a long time. Able, the famous soviet spy, of
>the 1950's was offered 10,000 per year to defect and tell all, when he was
>making the equivalent of 25,000 per year, even though he was imprisoned in
>the US. He laughed, and said nothing, but he did not take the CIA up on
the
>offer. The case officers talking to him were making much less, and
>wondered why he did not jump at the chance.
That's an interesting observation, really. However, Rudolf Abel (not Able),
whose real name was William Fischer (you might want to read Conon Molody
(a.k.a. Lonsdale) memoir), didn't jump at the proposal not only because he
knew how much he was pulling in yearly (though it might be a consideration
too) but, mostly, because of his real patriotism. Lonsdale said in his
memoir he met Abel circa 1943 when he - a lad of 20 or something - was sent
over the frontline to snoop in the Gerrys' rear area. His papers looking
suspicious to some Wehrmacht soldat, he found himself in front of an Oberst
who checked his papers carefully, grabbed him by the collar, dragged him out
into the street and gave him the mightiest kick in the butt Lonsdale ever
experienced. Twenty plus years later, Lonsdale - fresh from the Britidh
gaol - was walking along the KGB HQ corridors when he run into a strangely
famous face. Guess who the other guy was. Yeah, him, Abel - fresh from
Aamerican jail.
For more detail see Conon Molody (Lonsdale) memoir - worth reading.
Regards.
Ivan the Bear
...nothing per-r-rsonal, just business...
Unknown
<jmha...@erols.com> wrote:
> First off, DO and DIA 'field workers' do not have much chance to pass on
>sensitive information of economic value they might learn to their stock
>broker. These are the guys that spend their time in another (usually
>unfriendly) nation trying to learn something or do something that may be of
>value to the US down the road.
OK, how about those guys with "official cover" who act like diplomats
but do DO work instead? You gave an example of "unofficial cover"
activity (which the French tend to do much better than Americans), but
the pseudo-diplomat collector's lifestyle sure seems to be good with
locality pay, diplomatic status, embassy housing, US military base
PX/commissary/rec facilities use privileges overseas, and use of the
intel contingency funds for work-related entertainment. I would
suspect these guys make far more than your average GS-12/13/14 or
FS-2/3 when all of the perks are figured in.
Not criticizing what you said, but I'm just curious if you have an
opinion about the above scenario. I've worked in US embassies before,
but not in a CIA job. However, I could easily tell who most of the
"diplomat" CIA guys were.
birdhaex
John M. Hansen wrote in message <72augg$nb1$1...@autumn.news.rcn.net>...
> With out giving away anything that is not known, an American spent five
>years in a foreign electronics factory, working his way up to foreman. He
>was able to arrange for the shipment of one of the first super whamo gadget
>that the factory built, under their top secret rules, to be picked up by
>another American, who had spend many years in the same nation as a truck
In sum, I think as your example points out, the motivation for people
getting into this line of work (Ames types aside) is not money, but
old-fashioned patriotism. That said, while I think that such "economic
espionage" can be justified, I am not sure that we should -- as others do --
be in the business of passing such info directly on to U.S. companies (and
despite reports about the Office of Intelligence Liaison in Commerce, I'd be
willing to be that if indeed it has happened, it is the exception rather
than the rule). The only exception, and this would have to be done quite
carefully, would be in cases where you have only one U.S. firm, for
instance, bidding on a major infrastructure project -- something that has
implications for the shape of a market in a country for the long term -- and
evidence of foreign firms using less-than "fair, open, and transparent"
tactics that might obviate a tender being awarded on the basis of technical
and comerical merits.
[snip]
>No embassy receptions either.
I though you were pointing out the downside . . .
birdhaex
Robert wrote in message <364a1433...@news.pipeline.com>...
>
>Not criticizing what you said, but I'm just curious if you have an
>opinion about the above scenario. I've worked in US embassies before,
>but not in a CIA job. However, I could easily tell who most of the
>"diplomat" CIA guys were.
Probably because most were "declared," don't you think? As to your listing
of what economic benefits these folks get, you are likely not far off the
mark. But then compare that to private sector expats working in a developed
country and you see a rather drastic difference. Plus tha the "diplomat" is
also likely to be the subject of terrorist targeting, technical
surveillence, etc., etc.
John M. Hansen
to the civilian marketplace is a matter that is to be decided by political
agencies. I do not believe that it is something that should be left in the
hands of the person gathering the information.
There are several civilian organizations which do an excellent job of
performing commercial intelligence and economic espionage. They are world
wide organizations, and can provide all kinds of useful resources for any
commercial organization that wishes to engage their services. It is not
necessary to go through a government agency for this, especially as these
civilian organizations do a much better job of it.
Best Wishes,
John M Hansen
Mark W. McBride, President/CEO
<72ccj4$i7v$1...@autumn.news.rcn.net>, our ether buddy "John M. Hansen"
<jmha...@erols.com> spaketh thusly:
:) I think that the transfer of information from the intelligence community
:)to the civilian marketplace is a matter that is to be decided by political
:)agencies.
Yes, and we've witnessed what kind of result that gives us, ala Lippo et
al. Politicians reward their contributors and friends, be it a contract
or market advantage through knowledge and technology. What pisses me off
is the fact that Uncle Sam was and is stacking the deck in favor of
political cronies while inviting micro-enterprises into the game
unawares of the double-dealing.
:) There are several civilian organizations which do an excellent job of
:)performing commercial intelligence and economic espionage. They are world
:)wide organizations, and can provide all kinds of useful resources for any
:)commercial organization that wishes to engage their services. It is not
:)necessary to go through a government agency for this, especially as these
:)civilian organizations do a much better job of it.
The fact that these organizations exist indicate some incongruence with
a previous statement of yours:
>It is the 'field worker,' who when mandatory retirement hits is told
>that he has no applicable experience for a civilian job that I am
>speaking of.
At worst case, this field worker gets federal retirement pay. What
happens to those employees of the small company put out of business
because the inside track was passed by CIA via Commerce/DNC to their
larger and more heavily funded competitor? Something most don't think
about, blinded by the sense of their own patriotism. It's easy to say
"It's good for the USA" that someone else got screwed when you're
sitting in your Reston-brown split-level collecting retirement checks.
Mark W. McBride, President/CEO
<72augg$nb1$1...@autumn.news.rcn.net>, our ether buddy "John M. Hansen"
<jmha...@erols.com> spaketh thusly:
:) First off, DO and DIA 'field workers' do not have much chance to pass on
:)sensitive information of economic value they might learn to their stock
:)broker. These are the guys that spend their time in another (usually
:)unfriendly) nation trying to learn something or do something that may be of
:)value to the US down the road.
I wasn't referring to contract agents ... I was referring to officers.
But, as you note below, if the contract agent is bright enough to:
1.) Earn an M.S.E.E. or P.E.,
2.) Be fluent in several languages,
3.) Hide this intelligence enough to "act" as a fruit seller and
4.) Cajole information from politicians sifting through kiwi fruit.
the contract agent would be bright enough to put 2 and 2 together and
come up with 10b.5.
:) With out giving away anything that is not known, an American spent five
:)years in a foreign electronics factory, working his way up to foreman. He
:)was able to arrange for the shipment of one of the first super whamo gadget
:)that the factory built, under their top secret rules, to be picked up by
:)another American, who had spend many years in the same nation as a truck
:)driver. The device was smuggled over several boarders to our intelligence
:)organization, where we were able to find out just what they were doing in
:)that area of gadgetry. He was not only out of reach of his family for over
:)eight years, he was definitely out of contact with his stock broker.
The assumption of this scenario is that the company receiving the
technology immediately benefitted on the bottomline ... and that
assumption isn't necessarily correct. Possession of the device however,
while in the interests of defense, would have an obvious economic
benefit to the company that acquired it - immediately through defense
contracting but later through privatization of that technology. There is
a boatload of technology that was accessible only to the military that
is now becoming commercialized and privatized: Night scopes, GPS, video
display, metallurgy, etc. The company that has the technology via the
military has the first opportunity to apply it in non-defense
applications.
:) Field operatives or 'contract field workers' or whatever else you want
:)to call them are intelligence collectors. They are not analysts. They are
:)the people I was writing about. They get paid less, and noticed less than
:)any other employee of the Federal government. Because of the various skills
:)that they have to have, (such as being able to communicate fairly well in at
:)least six or eight languages and being fluent as a native in at least two)
:)they could usually make more money in the civilian job market. They
:)frequently have to have a high degree of technical skill as well. Being an
:)Ms.E.E., and P.E. is not unusual in this calling. Instead, these men and
:)women willingly go on assignments, often lasting years, in nations that
:)would execute them in a moment if they were caught, to do what they can to
:)insure the security of the United States.
As I noted before, it's patriotism to some and economics to others. The
gadget was acquired to give the U.S. defense parity. It was necessary
and this would give anyone patriotic warm fuzzies. However, the company
in the U.S. receiving the gizmo and producing it would receive cash from
Uncle Sam to reproduce the gizmo, or produce something that would outdo
the gizmo. It ain't out of the goodness of their hearts. Call it cold
war profiteering if you want.
:) Ask yourself what it would take you get you to go to (for example)
:)Zambia, and open an outdoor fruit stand, run it for seven years so that you
:)could earn the trust of the natives, and be able to report on the affairs of
:)those politicians who visit you to buy fruit. These politicians having come
:)to trust you, now openly talk to you about their problems. ( I use Zambia
:)because it has never been penetrated in this way)
:)Remember, you are not only away from home, you have no contact with anyone
:)who you even knew in your 'prior life' as an American. The nature of
:)'Tradecraft' means that you never see the person your information goes to.
:)No embassy receptions either.
:) I bet you would want more than $35,000.00 per year, especially as while
:)you are there you are going to be living in your earnings selling fruit.
:) The 'perfumed people' at the top of the heap who can sell this
:)information are a different story altogether. It is the 'field worker,'
:)who when mandatory retirement hits is told that he has no applicable
:)experience for a civilian job that I am speaking of.
And they believe the person telling them they have "no applicable
experience for a civilian job?" Think about it. There is very, very
little difference between the intelligence gathered in the name of
patriotism and the intelligence gathered in the name of marketing and
new product development. The skillset is easily transferable because
it's the same -- you're obtaining information/product for a customer.
What's the difference between photographing a soviet space suit and
photographing anorexic models at a New York fashion show so the
knock-off makers can start pumping out clones for X-Mart?
:) Anyone who thinks that this so called intelligence business is a James
:)Bond world has been seeing too many movies.
You're right ... it's more like the movie "Wall Street."
Best, Mac
DLVntures
would help me obtain employment in the CIA?
I am currently a senior in college.
DLVntures
Jord86
Computer Science or Language
Jo
Christopher Harrington
Jord86 wrote in message <19981126153911...@ng113.aol.com>...
Not totally accurate. You are correct that because of a "retention"
problem a degree in computer science is very desirable. A language degree is
also a marketable one. However, the Office of General Counsel very
frequently hires attorneys. (check the Immediate Requirements section of the
CIA's employment page at http://www.odci.gov/cia/employment/posframe.htm and
you will see Attorney listed) Probably because of the same retention problem
that seem to be affecting many career paths in the IC. Their pay scale in
many cases does not match that of the private sector.
Christopher Harrington
Intelligence Students Association
www.intelstudents.org