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Jul 16, 1998, 3:00:00 AM7/16/98

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http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~ibel/stoa/stoa-atpc.htm

4 February 1998
Source: Hardcopy from STOA, Luxembourg
Thanks to Axel Horns, Ulf Möller and STOA

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

_________________________________________

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL OPTIONS ASSESSMENT

STOA

AN APPRAISAL OF TECHNOLOGIES
OF POLITICAL CONTROL

Working document
(Consultation version)

Luxembourg, 6 January 1998

PE 166 499

Directorate General for Research

Cataloguing data:
Title:
An appraisal of technologies for political control
Publisher:
European Parliament
Directorate General for Research
Directorate B
The STOA Programme
Author:
Mr. Steve Wright - Omega Foundation - Manchester
Editor:
Mr. Dick Holdsworth
Head of STOA Unit
Date:
6 January 1998
PE Number:
PE 166 499
This document is a working document. The current version is being
circulated for consultation. It is not an official
publication of STOA or of the European Parliament.
This document does not necessarily represent the views of the European
Parliament.

AN APPRAISAL OF THE TECHNOLOGY OF POLITICAL CONTROL

ABSTRACT

The report contains seven substantive sections which cover respectively:

(i) The role and function of the technology of political control;

(ii) Recent trends and innovations (including the implications of
globalisation, militarisation of police equipment, convergence of
control systems deployed worldwide and the implications of increasing
technology and decision drift);

(iii) Developments in surveillance technology (including the emergence of
new forms of local, national and international
communications interceptions networks and the creation of human recognition
and tracking devices);

(iv) Innovations in crowd control weapons (including the evolution of a 2nd.
generation of so called 'less-lethal weapons' from
nuclear labs in the USA).

(v) The emergence of prisoner control as a privatised industry, whilst state
prisons face increasing pressure to substitute
technology for staff in cost cutting exercises and the social and political
implications of replacing policies of rehabilitation with
strategies of human warehousing.

(v) The use of science and technology to devise new efficient mark-free
interrogation and torture technologies and their
proliferation from the US & Europe.

(vi) The implications of vertical and horizontal proliferation of this
technology and the need for an adequate political response by
the EU, to ensure it neither threatens civil liberties in Europe, nor
reaches the hands of tyrants.

The report makes a series of policy recommendations including the need for
appropriate codes of practice. It ends by
proposing specific areas where further research is needed to make such
regulatory controls effective. The report includes a
comprehensive bibliographical survey of some of the most relevant
literature.

AN APPRAISAL OF THE TECHNOLOGY OF POLITICAL CONTROL

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The objectives of this report are fourfold: (i) to provide Members of the
European Parliament with a guide to recent advances
in the technology of political control; (ii) to identify. analyze and
describe the current state of the art of the most salient
developments; (iii) to present members with an account of current trends,
both in Europe and Worldwide; and (iv) to develop
policy recommendations covering regulatory strategies for their management
and future control. The report includes a large
selection of illustrations to provide Members of Parliament with a good idea
of the scope of current technology together with a
representative flavour of what lies on the horizon. The report contains
seven substantive sections, which can be summarised as
follows:

THE ROLE & FUNCTION OF POLITICAL CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES

This section takes into account the multi-functionality of much of this
technology and its role in yielding an extension of the
scope, efficiency and growth of policing power. It identifies the continuum
of control which stretches from modem law
enforcement to advanced state suppression, the difference being the level of
democratic accountability in the manner in which
such technologies are applied.

RECENT TRENDS & INNOVATIONS

Taking into account the problems of regulation and control and the potential
possessed by some of these technologies to
undermine international human rights legislation, the section examines
recent trends and innovations. This section covers the
trend towards militarisation of the police technologies and the
paramilitarisation of military technologies with an overall
technological and decision drift towards worldwide convergence of nearly all
the technologies of political control. Specific
advances in area denial, identity recognition, surveillance systems based on
neural networks, discreet order vehicles, new arrest
and restraint methods and the emergence of so called 'less lethal weapons'
are presented. The section also looks at a darker
side of technological development including the rise of more powerful
restraint, torture, killing and execution technologies and
the role of privatised enterprises in promoting it.

The EU is recommended to: (i) develop appropriate structures of
accountability to prevent undesirable innovations emerging via
processes of technological creep or decision drift; (ii) ensure that the
process of adopting new systems for use in internal social
and political control is transparent, open to appropriate political scrutiny
and subject to democratic change should unwanted or
unanticipated consequences emerge; (iii) prohibit, or subject to stringent
and democratic controls, any class of technology
which has been shown in the past to be excessively injurious, cruel,
inhumane or indiscriminate in its effects.

DEVELOPMENTS IN SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY

This section addresses the rapid and virtually unchecked proliferation of
surveillance devices and capacity amongst both the
private and public sectors. It discusses recent innovations which allow
bugging, telephone monitoring, visual surveillance during
night or day over large distances and the emergence of new forms of local,
national and international communications
interceptions networks and the creation of human recognition and tracking
devices.

The EU is recommended to subject all surveillance technologies, operations
and practices to: (i) procedures ensuring
democratic accountability; (ii) proper codes of practice consistent with
Data protection legislation to prevent malpractice or
abuse; (iii) agreed criteria on what constitutes legitimate surveillance
targets, and what does not, and how such surveillance data
is stored, processed and shared. These controls should be more effectively
targeted at malpractice or illegal tapping by private
companies and regulation further tightened to include additional safeguards
against abuse as well as appropriate financial
redress.

The report discusses a massive telecommunications interceptions network
operating within Europe and targeting the telephone,
fax and email messages of private citizens, politicians, trade unionists and
companies alike. This global surveillance machinery
(which is partially controlled by foreign intelligence agencies from outside
of Europe) has never been subject to proper
parliamentary discussion on its role and function, or the need for limits to
be put on the scope and extent of its activities. This
section suggests that that time has now arrived and proposes a series of
measures to initiate this process of reclaiming
democratic accountability over such systems. It is suggested that all
telephone interceptions by Member States should be
subject to consistent criteria and procedures of public accountability and
codes of practice. These should equally apply to
devices which automatically create profiles of telephone calls and pattern
analysis and require similar legal requirements to those
applied for telephone or fax interception.

It is suggested that the rapid proliferation of CCTV systems in many Member
States should be subject to a common and
consistent set of codes of practice to ensure that such systems are used for
the purpose for which they were authorised, that
there is an effective assessment and audit of their use annually and an
adequate complaints system is in place to deal with any
grievances by ordinary people. The report recommends that such codes of
practice anticipate technical change including the
digital revolution which is currently in process, and ensure that each and
every such advance is subject to a formal assessment
of both the expected as well as the possible unforeseen implications.

INNOVATIONS IN CROWD CONTROL WEAPONS

This section addresses the evolution of new crowd control weapons, their
legitimation, biomedical and political effects. It
examines the specific introduction of new chemical, kinetic and electrical
weapons, the level of accountability in the decision
making and the political use of such technologies to disguise the level of
violence being deployed by state security forces. The
research used to justify the introduction of such technologies as safe is
reanalysed and found to be wanting. Areas covered in
more depth include CS and OC gas sprays, rubber and plastic bullets,
multi-purpose riot tanks, and the facility of such
technologies to exact punishment, with the possibility that they may also
bring about anti-state retaliatory aggression which can
further destabilise political conflict.

This section briefly analyses recent innovations in crowd control weapons
(including the evolution of a 2nd. generation of so
called 'less-lethal weapons' from nuclear labs in the USA) and concludes
that they are dubious weapons based on dubious and
secret research. The Commission should be requested to report to Parliament
on the existence of formal liaison arrangements
between the EU and the USA to introduce such weapons for use in streets and
prisons here. The EU is also recommended to
(i) establish objective common criteria for assessing the biomedical effects
of all so called less lethal weapons and ensure any
future authorization is based on independent research; (ii) ensure that all
research used to justify the deployment of any new
crowd control weapon in the EU is published in the open scientific press and
subject to independent scientific scrutiny, before
any authorization is given to deploy. In the meantime the Parliament is
asked to reaffirm its current ban on plastic bullets and
that all deployment of devices using peppergas (OC) be halted until such a
time as independent European research on its risks
has been undertaken and published.

NEW PRISON CONTROL SYSTEMS

This section reports on the emergence of prisoner control as a privatised
industry, whilst state prisons face increasing pressure
to substitute technology for staff in cost cutting exercises. It expresses
concern about the social and political implications of
replacing policies of rehabilitation with strategies of human warehousing
and recommends common criteria for licensing all
public and private prisons within the EU. At minimum this should cover
operators responsibilities and prisoners rights in regard
to rehabilitation requirements; UN Minimum Treatment of Prisoners rules
banning the use of leg irons; the regulation and use of
psychotropic drugs to control prisoners; the use of riot control, prisoner
transport, restraint and extraction technologies. The
report recommends a ban on (i) all automatic, mass. indiscriminate prisoner
punishment technologies using less lethal
instruments such as chemical

irritant or baton rounds; (ii) kill fencing and lethal area denial systems;
and (iii) all use of electro-shock, stun and electric restraint
technology until and unless independent medical evidence can prove that it
safe and will not contribute to either deaths in
custody or inhumane treatment, torture or other cruel and unusual
punishments.

INTERROGATION, TORTURE TECHNIQUES AND TECHNOLOGIES

This section discusses the use of science and technology to devise new
efficient mark-free interrogation and torture technologies
and their proliferation from the US & Europe. Of particular concern is the
use and abuse of electroshock devices and their
proliferation. It is recommended that the commercial sale of both training
in counter terror operations and any equipment which
might be used in torture and execution, should be controlled by the criteria
and measures outlined in the next section.

REGULATION OF HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION

The implications for civil liberties and human rights of both the vertical
and horizontal proliferation of this technology are literally
awesome. There is a pressing need for an adequate political response by the
EU, to ensure it neither threatens civil liberties in
Europe, nor reaches the hands of tyrants. The European Council agreed in
Luxembourg in 1991 and in Lisbon in 1992 a set of
eight Common Criteria for Arms Exports which set out conditions which should
govern all decisions relating to the issue of
licences for the export of arms and ammunition, one condition of which was
"the respect of human rights in the country of final
destination." Other conditions also relate to the overall protection of
human rights. However these eight criteria are not binding
on member states and there is no common interpretation on how they should be
most effectively implemented. However, a
code of conduct to achieve such an agreement was drawn up and endorsed by
over 1000 Non-Governmental Organizations
based in the European Union.

Whilst it is recognised that it is not the role of existing EU institutions
to implement such measures as vetting and issuing of
export licences, which are undertaken by national agencies of the EU Member
States, it has been suggested by Amnesty
International that the joint action procedure which was used to establish EU
regulations on Export of Dual use equipment could
be used to take such a code of practice further.

Amnesty suggest that the EU Member States should use the Joint Action
procedures to draw up common lists of (i) proscribed
military, security and police equipment and technology, the sole or primary
use of which is to contribute to human rights
violations; (ii) sensitive types of military, security or police equipment
and technology which has been shown in practice to be
used for human rights violations; and (iii) military, security and police
units and forces which have been sufficiently responsible
for human rights violations and to whom sensitive goods and services should
not be provided. The report makes
recommendations to help facilitate this objective of denying repressive
regimes access to advanced repression technologies
made or supplied from Europe.

FURTHER RESEARCH

The report concludes by proposing a series of areas where new research is
required including: (i) advanced area denial and
less-lethal weapon systems; (ii) human identity recognition and tracking
technologies; (iii) the deployment of 'dum-dum'
ammunition within the EU; (iv) the constitutional issues raised by the U.S.
National Security Agency's access and facility to
intercept all European telecommunications; (v) the social and political
implications of further privatisation of the technologies of
political control and (vi) the extent to which European based companies have
been complicit in supplying equipment used for
torture or other human rights violations and what new independent measures
might be instituted to track such transfers.

CONTENTS

Abstract
Executive Summary
Acknowledgements
Table of Charts and Figures
1
Introduction

1
2
Role and Function of Political Control Technologies

3
3
Recent Trends and Innovations

6
4
Developments in Surveillance Technology

15
5
Innovations in Crowd Control Weapons

22
6
New Prison Control Systems

40
7
Interrogation, Torture Techniques and Technologies

44
8
Regulation of Horizontal Proliferation

53
9
Conclusions

59
10
Notes and References

60
11
Bibliography [Not transcribed here]

73
Appendix 1. Military, Security & Police Fairs. [Not
provided with report]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Whilst sole responsibility for the accuracy and contents of this study rest
with the authors, the Omega Foundation would like to
thank the following individuals and organisations for providing information
and assistance to compile this report:

Professor Jonathan Rosenhead of the London School of Economics, London, U.K;
Simon Davies and David Banisar of the
London and Washington branches of Privacy International; Tony Bunyan &
Trevor Hemmings of Statewatch, London; John
Stevenson, House of Commons, London; Julian Perry Robinson of Sussex
University; Detlef Nogala of the University of
Hamburg; Heiner Busch Of CILIP, Berlin; Hilary Kitchin of the Local
Government Information Unit, London; The Committee
For The Administration of Justice, Belfast; David Eisenberg, Center For
Defense Information, Washington; Terry Allen of
Covert Action Quarterly, Washington; Brian Wood of the International
Secretariat of Amnesty International, London; Kate
O'Malley of Amnesty International U.K. Section London; Human Rights Watch,
Washington; Lora Lumpe and Steven
Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists, Washington; Brian Martin
of the University of Wollongong, Australia;
Cathy Rodgers of RDF Films, London; Martyn Gregory Films, London and Dr. Ray
Downs, Program Manager of Technology
Development, U.S. National Institute for Justice, Washington.

Thanks are due to the Press officers serving the Northern Ireland Office,
the British Army and RUC Information Offices
between 1976 - 1982, who provided the comprehensive statistical data
required to perform the quantitative analysis outlined in
section 5.

We would also like to thank David Hoffman for permission to use many of the
black and white images used to illustrate the
text.

Table of Charts

Chart
Title

Page

No.
1
Declining Legitimacy and Repressive State Violence

5
2
The Pattern of Revolution

7
3
The Main Chemical Riot Control Agents

12
4
Comparative Impact Effects of Various 'Less Lethal' Kinetic Impact
Weapons

13
5
US Human Engineering Laboratory Technology Assessment of Various
'Less Lethal' Kinetic
Weapons

26
6
Trends in Riot Weapon Use in Northern Ireland from 1969-1986

27
7
Impact of Introduction of New Riot Weapons on the Level of
Political Killings in Northern Ireland

28
8
Structure of Riot Weapon Use

29
9
Multi Variant Time Series Analysis of Northern Irish Conflict
1976-1981

30
10
Biderman's Chart of Coercion

48
11
Pre-Interrogation Treatment Used on Detainees

49
12
Techniques used by the British Army in Northern Ireland to Mimic
Sensory Deprivation

50
13
Police Torture Exports Licensed by the US Commerce Department
1991-1993

Table of Figures

[JYA Note: Figures were not provided with the report]

Section 3. Recent Trends and Innovations

1 Public Order - Tactical Options

2 Convergence of Police and Military Systems

3 Interception - Punishment

4 Cochrane Area Denial

5 Fingerprint Recognition Systems

6 Night Vision. From Vietnam to Belfast

7 Discreet Order Vehicles

8 New Arrest & Restraint Methods

9 Convergence and Riot Technology

10 Insect Like Images of Riot Police

11 US Peppergas Adverts

12 'Dum Dum' ammunition and effects

13 Wound effects of expanding ammunition

14 Frag 12. Pre-fragmented exploding ammunition

15 Typical forms of execution technology

16 Targetted Execution Technology

17 Special Force Killing

Section 4. Developments in Surveillance Technology

18 Parabolic Microphone

19 JAI Stroboscopic Cameras

20 Automated Vehicle Recognition Systems

21 US Made cameras in Tiananmen Square

22 CCTV in Tibet

23 Video Capture/Video Fit

24 Taps and Bugs

25 US/UK NSA European Communication Interception Network

Section 5. Innovations in Crowd Control Weapons

26 The Philosophy of Crowd Control Weapons

27 Israeli and Chinese Riot Weapons

28 Chemical Spray Backpack & Effects

Table of Figures (contd.)

Section 5. Contd.

29 Crowd Dispersion and Capture

30 French patients suffering severe burns from CS sprays

31 Capstun OC & Manufacture

32 British and German riot guns used in Northern Ireland

33 Injector Weapons

34 2nd Generation Less Lethal Weapons

35 Sticky Foam

36 Laser weapon systems

Section 6. New Prison Control Systems

37 Prison Control Technology

Section 7. Interrogation, Torture Techniques and Technology

38 Redress Trust Map of Torture States

39 Restraining Technology. Hiatt Leg Irons. Chinese Thumb Cuffs

40 British and Chinese Thumb Cuffs & Leg Irons

41 House of Fun

42 Hand Held Electro-shock Weapon

43 Electronic Shield

44 Taser Gun and Dart H

45 Tibetan Monk Palden Gyatso

46 Torture Techniques use in Uruguay

47 Chilean Torture Technique 1

48 Chilean Torture Technique 2

49 US Counter Insurgency Training at the School of the Americas

50 Chinese Electro-shock manufacture and quality control

51 Electro-shock weapons on display at Chinese Security Fairs

Table of Figures (contd.)

Section 8. Regulation of Horizontal Proliferation

52 Arwen Riot Control Weapon on display at COPEX

53 Electro-shock weapons offered at European Security Fairs

54 Supplying the security needs of authoritarian regimes in Latin America

55 Ispra Gas Riot Packs

56 SAE Alsetex Back Pack + on display at IDEF Military Exhibition in
Turkey, 1995

57 Foreign Internal Security Equipment on display at IDEF 1995 (Turkey)

AN APPRAISAL OF THE TECHNOLOGY OF POLITICAL CONTROL

PROJECT No I/STOA/RSCH/LP/POLITCON.1

1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to explore the most recent developments in the
technology of political control and the major
consequences associated with their integration into processes and strategies
of policing and internal control. A brief look at the
historical development of this concept is instructive.

Twenty five years ago, the British Society for Social Responsibility in
Science warned that a new technology of repression was
being spawned in an effort to contain the conflict in Northern Ireland.
(B.S.S.R.S., 1972). In 1977, members of BSSRS took
this concept further in a seminal work, the Technology of Political Control
(Ackroyd et. al., 1977). BSSRS analysed the role
and function of this technology in terms of a new apparatus largely created
as a result of research and development undertaken
as part of Britain's colonial wars, (most recently in the ongoing Northern
Ireland conflict), and whose main purpose was quelling
internal dissent. According to critical U.S. NGO research organisations of
that period such as NARMIC & NACLA, work on
this technology of political control was further enhanced by technical
developments achieved by the United States' military
industrial complex, largely as a result of the extended global military
interests of the U.S., and its deployment of highly
technocratic counter-insurgency doctrines, particularly during the.Vietnam
War.1

Up until that period, shrewd commentators on technology and society such as
Haabermas Ellul (1964) recognised the potential
risk of a specific loss of traditional freedoms and civil liberties
associated with broad technological advances in the future, such
as surveillance. However, BSSRS was the first group of scientists and
technologists to identify and characterise a whole class
of technology whose principal designated function was to achieve social and
political control.

In Ackroyd et. al (1977), BSSRS. defined the technology of political control
as "a new type of weaponry." "It is the product of
the application of science and technology to the problem of neutralising the
state's internal enemies. It is mainly directed at
civilian populations, and is not intended to kill (and only rarely does). It
is aimed as much at hearts and minds as at bodies." For
BSSRS, "This new weaponry ranges from means of monitoring internal dissent
to devices for controlling demonstrations; from
new techniques of interrogation to methods of prisoner control. The intended
and actual effects of these new technological aids
are both broader and more complex than the more lethal weaponry they
complement."

The concept of technology has many and varied interpretations. As emphasised
in the interim report (Omega 1996), the
definition adopted for the purposes of this work encompasses not just the
'hardware' - the tools, instruments, machines,
appliances, weapons and gadgets (i.e. the apparatus of technical
performance); but also the associated standard operating
procedures, routines, skills, techniques (the software); and the related
forms of rationalised human social organisations,
arrangements, systems and networks (the liveware) of any programme of
political control.2 In other words, it is insufficient to
describe developments in a purely technical sense, it is also necessary to
consider these technologies as social and political
factors.3

When first published in 1977, 'The Technology of Political Control'
anticipated that the deployment of these technologies in
Northern Ireland, which acted as a laboratory for their future development,
would spread to mainland Britain. For BSSRS,
governments would no longer reach for the machine gun when threatened at
home. It will have plastic bullets which kill only
occasionally, depth interrogation which tortures without leaving physical
scars. It uses electronics for telephone tapping and
night surveillance; computers to build files on actual or potential
dissidents. NARMIC also warned that this technology was not
just reserved for low intensity conflicts overseas but would return to be
used to quell dissent on the homefront.(NARMlC,
1971) Little by little this has happened.

There have been quite awesome changes in the technologies available to
states for internal control since the first BSSRS
publication, a quarter of a century ago. So many new technologies have been
created that specialist publications have emerged
to service the burgeoning market.4 In the limited space available here, it
is not possible to describe all the many new
technologies which have been developed. However, a broad selection of
illustrations have been incorporated (at the end of the
report), to give MEPs a good idea of the scope of the current technology and
a representative flavour of what lies on the
horizon. An extensive bibliography has been provided for those Members of
the European Parliament wishing to explore
specific areas and implications in more depth.5

For the purposes of this report and its focus on appraising subsequent
developments in the technology of political control, it is
worth focussing on the same areas of Technology covered by BSSRS, which have
not already been the subject of recent
STOA reports. Whilst the need to examine the critical role of Northern
Ireland in the evolution of some of these technologies
makes the overall assessment somewhat anglo-centric, every effort has been
made to show evidence of the proliferation and
impact of this technology in other European countries and worldwide by
naming the actual companies and corporations
involved in both manufacture and supply.

Taking into account the multi-functionality of much of this technology,
Section 2. of this report explores its role and function and
the continuum of control which stretches from modern law enforcement to
advanced state suppression. With specific reference
to problems of regulation and control and the potential some of these
technologies present for undermining international human
rights legislation, Section 3. provides a analysis of recent trends and
innovations. Section 4. explores current developments In
surveillance technology, from bugs and wiretapping to new global systems of
mass supervision and telecommunications
surveillance already approved by the European Union. Section 5. discusses
the political and biomedical implications of
innovations in crowd control weapons including the prospect of a 2nd.
generation of paralysing and disabling technologies
currently being developed by former US nuclear weapons laboratories,
together with the secret arrangements to incorporate
such technologies into EU policing practices and export markets. Section 6.
is devoted to the emergence of new prison control
systems and the prospects of privatised multinational prison corporations
transforming crime control into industry. Section 7.
presents evidence of Research & Development devoted to the creation of new
interrogation, torture techniques & technologies
which leave few marks and the growing role of EU member states and their
allies in creating export markets for supplying this
equipment to tyrannical states.

The report ends with an examination of the whole question of future
regulation of the vertical & horizontal proliferation of this
dual use technology, in the face of relatively weak

democratic controls on its manufacture, deployment and export. Some of these
technologies are highly sensitive politically and
without proper regulation can threaten or undermine many of the human rights
enshrined in international law, such as the rights
of assembly, privacy, due process, freedom of political and cultural
expression and protection from torture, arbitrary arrest,
cruel and inhumane punishments and extra-judicial execution. Proper
oversight of developments in political control technologies
is further complicated by the phenomena of 'bureaucratic capture' where
senior officials control their ministers rather than the
other way round Politicians both at European and sovereign state level, whom
citizens of the community have presumed will be
monitoring any excesses or abuse of this technology on their behalf, are
sometimes systematically denied the information they
require to do that job. Therefore possible areas of policy change are
presented at the end of each section, which could bring
much of this technology back within the reach of democratic control and
accountability, as well as suggesting some further areas
of future research.

2. THE ROLE & FUNCTION OF POLITICAL CONTROL
TECHNOLOGIES

Throughout the Nineties, many governments have spent huge sums on the
research, development, procurement and deployment
of new technology for their police, para-military and internal security
forces.6 The objective of this development work has been
to increase and enhance each agency's policing capacities. A dominant
assumption behind this technocratisation of the policing
process, is the belief that it has created both a faster policing response
time and a greater cost-effectiveness. The main aim of all
this effort has been to save policing resources by either automating certain
control, amplifying the rate of particular activities, or
decreasing the number of officers required to perform them.7

The resultant innovations in the technology of political control have been
functionally designed to yield an extension of the
scope, efficiency and growth of policing power. The extent to which this
process can be judged to be a legitimate one depends
both on one's point of view and the level of secrecy and accountability
built into the overall procurement and deployment
procedures. There are essentially two opposing schools of thought.

The first school of thought identifies developments in policing technology
with efficiency, cost-effectiveness and modernisation.
This school believes that the police and internal security agencies require
the most up to date forms of equipment to fight crime,
mob-rule and terrorism. Sophisticated law enforcement is viewed as value
free and state security agencies are considered to be
in the best position to determine their operational requirements. (See
Applegate 1969), New technologies aid the police by
ensuring that messages are rapidly received and dealt with, personnel are
freed for other duties and overall efficiency is
enhanced. Only those with something to hide need fear the enlarged data
gathering capacities of police computers. Modern riot
technology is presented as a much preferred non-lethal alternative to the
use of guns and the police should always be allowed to
use 'minimum force when dealing with actual or potential law breakers.
Existing controls and regulations governing the use of
this technology are considered by adherents of this school to have been
adequately designed to ensure that no misuse takes
place. Advanced police technology is therefore understood in this context as
an invaluable aid to upholding the freedoms
cherished as inalienable rights by citizens living in Western Liberal
democracies. Its export to other countries sharing the same
economic and ideological views, is viewed as an opportunity to help
modernise law enforcement and buttress mutual stability,
law and order.

The opposing school of thought on the other hand views police technology and
the associated 'policing revolution' quite
differently (See Manwaring-White, 1983). They believe that innovations in
political control technology has put powerful new
tools at the disposal of states in need of technical fixes for their most
pressing and intractable social and political problems. It is
at the point where authority fails that repression begins (Hoefnagels, 1977)
and at that point an illegitimate government will use
more force just to keep the lid on.(See Chart.1a.) As the crisis deepens,
further force is required and the role of technology in
such a situation is to act as a force amplifier. Once the shaded area is
reached (Chart.1b), terror becomes the only government
service.

New police technologies are perceived to be one of the most important
factors in attempting sub-state conflict control. Such
'control' is viewed as more apparent than real, but serves the purpose of
disguising the level of coercive repression being
applied. This school of thought argues that once operationally deployed,
these technologies exert a profound effect on the
character of policing. Whether these changes are symptom or cause of the
ensuing change in policing organisations, a major
premise of this school of thought is that a range of unforeseen impacts are
associated with the process of integrating these
technologies into a society's social, political and cultural control
systems.

The full implications of such developments may take time to assess but they
are often more important and far reaching than the
first order intended effects. It is argued that one impact of this process
is the militarisation of the police and the
para-militarisation of the army as their roles, equipment and procedures
begin to overlap. This phenomena is seen as having far
reaching consequences on the way that future episodes of sub-state violence
is handled, and influencing whether those involved
are reconciled, managed, repressed, 'lost' or efficiently destroyed. Police
telematics and their use of databanks (the subject of
an earlier STOA report in this area) for example, facilitate prophylactic or
pre-emptive policing as 'data-veillance' is harnessed
to target certain strata or classes of people rather than resolve individual
crimes. (E.g. the proposed introduction of the Eurodac
system which will utilise biometric information to control and restrict the
entry of all Asylum seekers into Europe, building in the
process a new technopolitics of exclusion).8 New surveillance technology can
exert a powerful 'chill effect' on those who might
wish to take a dissenting view and few will risk exercising their right to
democratic protest if the cost is punitive riot policing with
equipment which may lead to permanent injury or loss of life. As highlighted
in the interim report, the human response to the
deployment of such technologies may be counter-intuitive and render
progressive, deployments of newer more powerful
systems either obsolete or dysfunctional. This possibility is discussed in
greater detail below.

Any evaluation of these opposing schools of thought needs to identify common
ground since few would doubt that there are
fundamental changes taking place in the types of tactics techniques and
technologies available to internal security agencies for
policing purposes. Yet many questions remain unanswered, unconsidered or
under-researched. Why for example did such a
transformation in the technology used for socio-political control
dramatically change over the last twenty five years? Is there any
significance in the fact that former communist regimes in the Warsaw Treaty
Organisation and continuing centralised economic
systems such as China, are beginning to adopt such technologies? What are
the reasons behind a global convergence of the
technology of political control deployed in the North and South, the East
and West? What are the factors responsible for
generating the adoption of such new policing technology - was it technology
push or demand pull? What new tools for

Chart 1. Declining Legitimacy & Repressive State
Violence

policing lie on the horizon and what are the dynamics behind the process of
innovation and the need for a vast arsenal of
different kinds of technology rather than just a few? Are the many ways this
technology affects the policing process fully
understood? Who controls the patterns of police technology procurement and
what are the corporate influences?

In deciding between these schools of thought, we need to determine the
extent to which future innovation is about the
maintenance of existing power relationships, rather than citizen protection
In other words, the extent to which their deployment
ensures that only certain permitted ways of behaving are allowed to continue
without interference. Since this technology
provides a continuum of flexible responses or options, perhaps the
overriding factor is the extent to which its development and
deployment is subject to democratic control. Is the process of regulation
democratically accountable or are there more hidden
processes at work? Do these technologies proliferate, if so why and how and
what are the most important mechanisms or
processes involved?

Since all this technology represents an unequal distribution of coercive
power, it is important for Members of the European
Parliament to be satisfied that sufficient democratic control is exercised
to ensure that such powers are not abused and that
unwanted technological and decision drift is adequately checked. Whilst the
Interim Report (Omega, 1996) provided a brief
analysis of the role and function of specific classes of political control
technology, what follows is an analysis of the state of the
art in certain key areas of this technology which the authors believe
warrant further scrutiny.

3. RECENT TRENDS & INNOVATIONS

Since the 'Technology of Political Control' was first written (Ackroyd et
al.,1977) there has been a profusion of technological
innovations for police, paramilitary, intelligence and internal security
forces. Many of these are simple advances on the
technologies available in the 1970's. Others such as automatic telephone
tapping, voice recognition and electronic tagging were
not envisaged by the original BSSRS authors since they did not think that
the computing power needed for a national
monitoring system was feasible. The overall drift of this technology is to
increase the power and reliability of the policing
process, either enhancing the individual power of police operatives,
replacing personnel with less expensive machines to
monitor activity or to automate certain police monitoring, detection and
communication facilities completely. A massive Police
Industrial Complex has been spawned to service the needs of police,
paramilitary and security forces, evidenced by the number
of companies now active in the market.9 An overall trend is towards
globalisation of these technologies and a drift to increasing
proliferation, without much regard to local conditions.

One core trend has been towards a militarisation of the police and a
paramilitarisation of military forces in Europe. Often this
begins via special units involved in crisis policing, such as the Special
Weapons and Tactics Squads such as the Grenz Schutz
Gruppe in Germany; the Gendarmeries National in France; the Carabinieri in
Italy; and the Special Patrol Group in the UK or
the federal police paramilitary teams in the United States (FBI, DEA & BATF)
that adopt the same weaponry as their military
counterparts. Then a growing percentage of ordinary police are trained in
public order duties and tactics which incorporate
some element of firearms training. The tactical training is often a mirror
image of the low intensity counter-revolutionary warfare
tactics adopted by the military (See Chart 2). In Britain, where 10% of
police on a revolving basis train according to a military
style manual,

Insurgent Phases
Sequence of Insurgent Action

Counter Action
Communist Concept
(Based on Sino-
Japanese War 1937)
British
Interpretation
With Aim of Achieving
Revolution

By security force
'Passive'
[Organizational]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Preparatory
Activity by anti-government
organisations, including
political agitation and manoevering
propaganda
activities. Formation of cells &
cadres, (political,
intelligence and military), and civil
and industrial unrest.
Infiltration into positions of
authority. In general covert
preparations by those whose aim is to
achieve a
revolution. Any overt military
preparations take place
in the remotest areas.

Civil &

Law

Enforcement

Activity
Active
Resistance

[Terrorism]
Civil disobedience, disturbances,
riots, strikes,
lawlessness. Sabotage, particularly
against
communications. Assassinations,
coercion and
terrorism on a limited scale. Use of
propaganda &
psychological means to discredit the
government.

Ambushes and minor insurgent activity
on a limited
scale. Increased terrorism, a climate
of dissidence,
civil and industrial disobedience is
engendered.

Internal

Security

[Guerilla
Warfare]
Operations involving the use of
guerrilla tactics by
local formed units have resulted in
the guerillas gaining
control over parts of the country.
Insurgent bases are
established in relatively safe areas.
Increased activity in
daylight. More ambitious operations
by formed units
with some perhaps from a neighbouring
country.

A whole series of operations ranging
up to actions
between formed units with a
simultaneous situation of
widespread guerrilla activity. Areas
dominated by
guerrillas may be enlarged and
declared liberated.

Counter

Insurgency

Operations
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Open Offensive
As above but having escalated to
include regular land
and perhaps sea and air forces of the
opposing sides.
The revolutionary movement now
assumes the form of
a peoples war against the government.
Large areas
dominated by the guerrillas.

Almost

using

the

techniques

of Limited

War
Counter
Offensive
Decision
Negotiations leading to a cessation
of hostilities with
the revolutionaries either in a
position to achieve their
aim without further fighting or with
the legal
government back in control.

Chart 2. The Pattern of Revolution

'Public Order - Tactical Options' using batons, shields and colonial style
military wedges (See Fig.1[No figures provided with
report]) (Northam, 1988). In the US, one study uncovered a pattern of former
and reserve soldiers being intimately involved in
police operations with almost 46% of trainees drawing expertise from "police
officers with special operations in the military."
(Krasker & Kapella, 1997).

In some European countries, that trend is reversed, e.g. Last year, the
Swiss government (Federal Council and the Military
Department) made plans to re-equip the Swiss Army Ordungsdienst with 118
million Swiss Francs of less-lethal weapons for
action within the country in times of crisis. (These include 12 tanks,
armoured vehicles, tear gas, rubber shot and handcuffs).
The decision was made by decree preventing any discussion or intervention.
Their role will be to help police large scale
demonstrations or riots and to police frontiers to 'prevent streams of
refugees coming into Switzerland'.10 A disturbing case of
police deploying riot weapons against a peaceful festival occurred last year
in Zurich on 1 May, using water cannon laced with
CN irritant and rubber bullets below the advised 20 metres threshold, shows
the process of convergence well.11

Convergence is the process whereby the technology used by police and the
military for internal security operations converges
towards being more or less indistinguishable. The term also describes the
trend towards a universal adoption of similar types of
technologies by most states for internal security and policing. Security
companies now produce weapons and communications
systems for both military and the police.(Fig.2). Such systems increasingly
represent the muscle and the nervous system of
public order squads. For example, according to BSSRS(1985), GCHQ's telephone
interception network was used to track
UK miners during the 1984-5 strike, so that when miner's cars were stopped,
police knew who they were and punishment or
dissuasion could be targeted appropriately.(See Fig.3)

3.1 Area Denial replaces personnel guarding either areas or perimeters. It
has involved deploying technology which can either
create punishment when its limits are infringed or systems with built in
intelligence which can both locate the point of
infringement and activate a corrective response.12 Sophisticated varieties
incorporate punishment mechanisms which vary from
pain induced by electroshock to kill fences and fragmentation mines. Many
European companies make electrified razor coil stun
fences e.g. Bollore, Cogny & Santerne in France; Birmingham Barbed Tape,
Gallagher and Armbell, in UK; Reinaet
Electronics in the Netherlands. Many South African companies remain in the
market from the 'snake of fire' days, e.g., Edair;
Grinaker; Microfence.13 Nowadays, the South African Government has
introduced new regulations on the maximum voltage
for stun fences and new criteria for not mixing barbed wire and stun
capacities - if snagged a victim can't be repelled and
continues receiving current. Europe needs to adopt best practice in this
regard. It would also be useful if existing research
justifying company claims for sub-lethality of stun fences should be made
public. These systems are not cattle fences and the
same criteria cannot be used.

Neural networks with semi-intelligence are being introduced to protect
sensitive control zones. Systems produced by
companies, such as Productivity Systems in France and Cambridge
Neurodynamics in the UK, can allow pattern recognition
and an ability to learn. Neural systems will play an increasing role in
sentinel duties as robot technology improves Already
prototypes known as insectoids are being evolved to cheaply replace
personnel on routine guard duties that require 24 hours
cover and can be programmed to track the fence and carry either lethal or
sub-lethal weapons (Knoth, 1994).

The Non-lethal Warfare programmes discussed in 5.6 below are also exploring
area denial technology. For example, Defense
Week reported (19/11/96) that Alliant Tech Systems (USA) is working on
alternatives to anti-personnel land mines. One of
these is a wire barrier system dispersed by the Volcano Mine System. The
company received a 10 month contract in early
August [1996] from the Army Armament, Research, Development and Engineering
Center at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey.
The company is still to decide what kind of wire to use for the
canister-launched area-denial weapon system, but the general
idea is that the Volcano system will shoot out thin wire with something like
fish hooks along it in enough mass to cover a
soccer-field sized area. "It's intended to snag. It's not going to kill you"
said marketing manager Tom Bierman.

3.2 Surveillance Technologies are one of the fastest growing areas of the
technology of political control and a key problem is
how to deal with the torrent of information it yields The term covers a vast
range of products and devices but the overall trend
is towards miniaturization, more precise resolution through the adoption of
digital technology and increasing automation so that
the technology can be more effectively targeted. The technology also
parallels political shifts in targeting so that instead of
investigating crime, a reactive activity, the fastest growing trend is
towards tracking certain strata, social classes and races of
people living in red-lined areas before any crime is committed. Such a form
of proactive policing is based on military models of
gathering huge amounts of low grade intelligence. With new systems such as
Memex, it is possible to quickly build up a
comprehensive picture of virtually anyone by gaining electronic access to
all their records, cash transactions, cars held, etc.
Such pre-emptive policing means the majority are ignored and policing
resources are more tightly focused on certain groups.
Such powerful forms of artificial intelligence need continuous assessment.
They have an important role to play in tracking
criminals. The danger is that their infrastructure is essentially a massive
machinery of supervision that can be retargeted fairly
quickly should the political context change.

Automatic fingerprint readers are now common place, and many European
companies make them14 (see Fig 5). But any
unique attribute of anatomy or personal style can be used to create a human
identity recognition system. For example
Cellmark Diagnostics(UK) can recognise genes; Mastiff Security Systems(UK)
can recognise odour, Hagen Cy-Com(UK)
and Eyedentify Inc.(USA) can recognise the pattern of capillaries at the
back of the retina; whilst AEA Technology (UK) are
capable of signature verification. Over 109 companies in Europe are known to
be supplying such biometric systems.
DNA fingerprinting is now a reality and Britain has set up the first DNA
databank, and is already carrying out mass dawn
raids of over 1000 people at targeted suspects.15 Plans are being drawn up
by at least one political party to DNA profile the
nation from birth.16 The leading edge companies are racing towards
developing face recognition systems which they see as
being able to revolutionise crime customs and intruder detection as well as
service access control. Whilst fully reliable systems
are perhaps five years off, prototype systems have been developed in
France17, Germany18 the UK19 and the USA20.

Night vision technology developed as a result of the Vietnam war has now
been adapted for police usage (See Fig.6).
Particularly successful are heli-tele surveillance versions which allow
cameras to track human heat signatures in total
darkness. The art of bugging has been made significantly easier by a rapidly
advancing technology and there is a burgeoning
European market.21 Many systems described in Section 4 (below), do not even
require physical entry into the home or office.
For those who can secure access to their target room,

there is a plethora of devices, many pre-packaged to fit into phones, look
like cigarette packets or light fittings and some, like
the ever popular PK 805 and PK 250, that can be tuned into from a suitable
radio. However, the next generation of covert
audio bugs are remotely operated, for example the multi-room monitoring
system of Lorraine Electronics called DIAL (Direct
Intelligent Access Listening) allows an operator to monitor several rooms
from anywhere in the world without effecting an illegal
entry. Up to four concealed microphones are connected to the subscribers
line and these can be remotely activated by simply
making a coded telephone call to the target building. Neural network bugs go
one step further. Built like a small cockroach,
as soon as the lights go out they can crawl to the best location for
surveillance.22 In fact Japanese researchers have taken this
idea one step further, controlling and manipulating real cockroaches by
implanting microprocessors and electrodes in their
bodies. The insects can be fitted with micro cameras and sensors to reach
the places other bugs can't reach.23 Passive
Millimeter Wave Imaging developed by the US Millitech corporation can scan
people from up to 12 feet away and see
through clothing to detect concealed items such as weapons, packages and
other contraband. Variations of this
through-clothing human screening under development (by companies such as the
US Raytheon Co.), include systems which
illuminate an individual with a low-intensity electromagnetic pulse. A three
side very-low X ray system for human useage, in
fixed sites such as prisons, is being developed by Nicolet Imaging Systems
of San Diego. Electronic monitoring of offenders
or 'tagging', where the subject wears an electronic bracelet which can
detect if they have relocated from their home after
certain hours etc, has entered into use in the 1990's after being developed
to regulate prison populations in the USA. (Schmidt,
1988). Satellite tracking of VIPs, vehicles, etc., is now facilitated by the
once military Global-Positioning System(GPS)
which is now available for commercial uses. Vehicle recognition technologies
are discussed in Section 4 below.

3.3 Data-veillance - The use of telematics by the police has revolutionised
policing in the last decade and created the shift
towards pre-emptive policing. It is properly the focus of an earlier STOA
report on the technology of political control. Some of
the most recent trends are discussed in Section 4 below. A comprehensive
analysis of how such equipment has led to
widespread abuse of civil liberties and human rights has been published by
Privacy International (1995) and includes 100 pages
of all the companies involved in servicing the security requirements of the
regimes mapped in Fig.38.

Using data profilers, torturing states have used these systems to compile
death lists. For example, the Tadiran computer
supplied to Guatemala and installed in the control center of the national
palace. According to a senior Guatemalan military
official, "the complex contains an archive and a computer file on
journalists, students, leaders, people on the left, politicians and
so on." Meetings were held in the annex to select assassination victims. A
US priest who fled the country after appearing on
such a death list said, "They had printout lists at the border crossings and
at the airport. Once you got on that - then its like
bounty hunters."24 Within Europe, systems, such as that produced by
Harlequin, allow the automatic production of maps of
who phoned whom to show friendship networks. Other companies such as Memex
described above, allow entire life profiles
of virtually anyone in a state having an official existence. Photographs and
video material can be included in the record and
typically up to 700 other databases can be hoovered at any one time, to
extend the data profile in real time.25 Significant
changes in the capacity of new surveillance systems can be anticipated with
the advent of new materials such as Buckminster
Fullerene, which will lead to minaturisation of systems by several orders of
magnitude.26

3.4-Discrete Order Vehicles - Hundreds of companies are now manufacturing
police and internal security vehicles in
Europe.27 The newer companies entering the market for law enforcement
vehicles tend to manufacture for both military and
police purposes (e.g., armoured personnel carriers, patrol, riot control,
mobile prison, perimeter patrol etc.) and configured to
have a 'non-aggressive design'. In real terms this means that their external
appearance rather than their operational
characteristics are modified to give a non-threatening appearance. Such
'discreet order vehicles' look benign - like ambulances,
whilst retaining a retaliatory capacity, capable of dispersing, containing
or capturing dissident groups or individuals.(See Fig.7
Savage, 1985). Some models such as the Amac vehicle and more recently the
Talon incorporate repellant electrified panels as
well as a weapons capacity such as water cannon. Such vehicles are
frequently used to seal people into a dispersal zone where
the riot squads are at work, rather than chase them out.

3.5 Less-lethal Weapons - For reasons explained more fully in Section 5
(below), the essential role of new crowd control
weapons and tactics is to amplify the level of aggression that can be
unleashed by an individual officer. Thus the same rationale
lies behind the use of the new US side handle batons, the use of horse, riot
shield charges using riot wedges and snatch squads
and the new martial arts style arrest techniques which entered European
policing training in the mid 1980's.28 (see Fig 8). The
biggest growth area however, has been in what used to be called 'non-lethal
weapons.' The fact that some of these weapons
kill, blind, scalp and permanently maim led the authorities and
manufacturers to act - they came up with a new name -
"less-lethal weapons" - i.e. they only sometimes kill. Again a PR objective
is catered for in the names which sound as if the
security forces are using relative restraint. Whether it be in Belfast or
Beijing, these technologies are converging around the
same design types. (See Fig 8). One of the authors of the 'Technology of
Political Control' (Ackroyd, 1977) Professor
Jonathan Rosenhead, believed that the emergence of such technology in China
vindicated their original thesis. That is, after the
Tiananmen Square massacre, the Chinese authorities needed weapons options
which would not excite international criticism,
particularly when some much lucrative foreign investment was entering the
Tiger economies of the Pacific Rim.29

As described in Section 5 below, this area has seen prodigious innovation
including a second generation of new weapon types
being produced in the former nuclear weapon laboratories of the US in
conjunction with big business.30 The Council for
Science & Society explained the phenomenon in terms of technological and
decision drift (CSS, 1978). BSSRS argued that
such processes were integral to any attempt to apply technical fixes - an
alternative explanation is that the riot control arsenal is
never complete. Much of a weapon's effect lies in creating a sense of
uncertainty.31 Even the insectoid appearance of riot squad
members is part of the threat impact despite its ostensible purpose of
personal protection.(See Fig 10).

Individually these weapons are becoming more powerful, for example each new
riot agent is more powerful than the one it
replaces. Thus CS is nearly 20 times more powerful than the CN it replaced;
CR is more than 30 times more powerful than
CN and the newest and most aggressively marketed agent OC, (See Fig.11), the
most powerful of them all (Chart 3). Little
notice has been taken of the professional hazard assessments of the most
commonly used kinetic impact weapons deployed in
Europe and USA which have consequences in the 'dangerous or severe damage
region'. (See Chart 4).

Chemical Name and
Formula
Code
Form
Melting
Point C°
Effects

Relative

Power

ICt50

(mg

min/m3)

(1)
1-Chloroacetophenone

_
// \\_C_CH2CI
\ _ / |
_ |
O

CN
White
Solid
59
Burning sensation in
the eyes. Blisters at
very heavy
concentration.
Salivation, nausea
and headaches.
1

20
2-Chlorobenzylidene
malonitrile

_
// \\_CH=C(CN)2
\ _ /
_ \
CI

CS
White
Solid
94
Strong lachrymation
with involuntary
closing of the eyes.
Burning sensation
on moist skin, 2nd
degree burns.
Coughing and
vomiting at higher
concentrations.
5

3.6
Dibenz
(b.f.)-1,4-oxazepine

_ o
/ \/ \/ \
| | | ||
\ /\ /\\/
N=CH

CR
Pale
Yellow
Solid
72
Very intense skin
pain particularly
around moist areas.
Involuntary closing
of eyes resulting in
temporary blindness
which may induce
panic or hysteria.
30

0.7
Oleoresin Capsicum
OC
Colourless
65
Uncontrollable
coughing and
gasping for breath.
Eyes close
immediately. Loss
of body motor
control. Intense
burning sensation on
skin. Leads to
immediate
incapacitation.

Most

powerful

(exact figs

unavailable)

N/A
(1) ICt50 The mean incapacitating dose. The dose that will affect 50% of
the test population.

Chart 3. The Main Chemical Riot Control Agents

Weapons (2)
Manufacturer
Country
Weight of
Projectile
Range

Impact Energy /

Joules (1)
L5A3 Plastic Bullet
Royal Ordinance
UK
135g
25-60m

150-210
'Cross Cartridge'
Heckler and Koch
Germany
179g
up to 30m

above 125
Flash Ball
Verney Carron
France
28g
12m

200
Jelly Baton
Crown
Aircartridge
Netherlands
N/A
N/A

265
Bean Bag
MK Ballistics
USA
40g
10-30m

120
'Cease and Desist'
Milstor Corp
USA
N/A
Less than 18m

130

Impact Energy
Severity of Injury
Under 20 Joules
Safe/low
Between 40-122 Joules
Dangerous
Over 122 Joules
Severe damage region

Notes:
(1) Testing of kinetic energy projectiles was carried out at the Aberdeen
Proving Grounds in the USA in 1975 to assess
their safety and the likelihood, and type, of injuries that might result
from their use (see Technical Report Number 24-75:
Evaluation of the Physiological Effects of a Rubber Bullet, a Baseball and
a Flying Baton, Wargovich, et al., US Army
Land and Warfare Laboratory, September 1975.) The results showed that for
kinetic energy projectiles at different
energies the level of injury was as shown above. (J. Rosenhead, New
Scientist, 16/12/76, pp. 672-74)

(2) Information taken from manufacturers product data, updated to modern
measurement units where required.

Chart 4. Comparative Impact Effects of Various Kinetic 'Less
Lethal' Weapons

3.5 Lethal Weapons - Police Forces in Europe have acquired many of the
weapons normally associated with the military i.e.
hand guns, rifles and submachine guns, e.g., the Heckler & Koch MP5.
Shotguns are increasingly favoured by police forces
because their wide spread of shot enables a blast to hit more than one
target and in the US, shotguns are standard issue for a
wide range of tasks including anti-terrorist and riot control. Indeed many
shotguns and holsters specially adapted for police use
have appeared on the market. E.g., those by Ithaca, Mossberg, Remington,
Sage International and Wilson Arms. Many of
these are literally sawn off shotguns and their wider spread increases the
number of likely targets. For example, the Witness
shotgun has a barrel of only 12.5 inches. Specialist shotgun ammunition
enables some of these weapons to smash the cylinder
block off a car or literally cut a human in half. The shotgun 'bolo round'
advert e.g. claims "it slices - it dices". Shotgun
ammunition leaves no evidence of what weapon was used to fire it. Similarly
caseless cartridges do not leave "a spent cartridge
signature" and this has significant implications for associating a
particular weapon with a specific crime.

In theory, police weapons should have a different level of lethality and
penetration compared with those used by the military. In
urban settings there is always the risk of hitting passers-by and if a round
has high velocity and penetration, it will easily pass
through an intended target and continue penetrating walls and go on perhaps
to kill innocents beyond the observed fire zone. To
obviate this problem, manufacturers are increasingly producing hollow point,
expanding, or 'dum-dum' ammunition for police
and special forces use.(See Fig 12). Paradoxically, the Hague Declaration
(IV,3) of 1989, which prohibited the use of hollow
point or dum dum ammunition, does not apply to the policing of civil
conflicts. Soft nosed ammunition which mushroom in the
body, cause far more serious damage than ordinary ammunition. Dum-dums would
take an arm or a leg off, whereas ordinary
ammunition would sail through leaving a relatively clean hole.(See Fig.13).
Some these weapons like Winchester's Black Talon
or the high explosive filled pre-fragmented Frag 12 (see Fig.14) cause
horrific injuries and raise serious questions about due
process and the right to a fair trial since without immediate medical
attention, a target would be effectively an extra-judicial
execution. Many companies are now producing these bullets in Europe.

3.6 Execution technologies - The equipment illustrated in (Fig.16) are not
just museum pieces. In the USA, companies such
as Leutcher Associates Inc of Massachussetts supplies and services American
gas chambers, as well as designing, supplying
and installing electric chairs, auto-injection systems and gallows. The
Leutcher lethal injection system costs approx. $30,000
and is the cheapest system the company sells. Their electrocution systems
cost £35,000 and a gallows would cost
approximately $85,000. More and more states are opting for Leutcher's
$100,000 "execution trailer" which comes complete
with a lethal injection machine, a steel holding cell for an inmate, and
separate areas for witnesses, chaplain, prison workers and
medical personnel.34 Some companies in Europe have in the past offered to
supply such devices as gallows (Michael Huffey
Ltd, UK) or tender designs for the construction of 'Libyan Rehabilitation
centre" complete with stainless steel execution bays.
(Observer, 5/84). A fuller picture is unavailable, but what is known is that
European designers are tendering for Middle Eastern
prison building work with all the attendant requirements to cater for
Islamic shari'a laws and requisite punishments and
amputations. Modern target acquisition aids such as laser sights, coupled
with silenced weapons technology also make
extra-judicial execution much easier (see fig. 16) or if the deed must be
achieved in public, systems like 'syncrofire' (fig.16) take
the guilt away from the execution squad by allowing the firemaster to
achieve it by pushbutton. Special forces are of course
taught how to achieve such executions (See Fig.17 and this is one of the
areas of expertise transfer that needs to be brought
back within democratic control. (see Section 8 below)

3.1 RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) Given the civil liberties implications associated with new
technologies of political control, there is a pressing
need to avoid the risks of such technologies developing faster than any
regulating legislation. Therefore the EU
should develop appropriate structures of accountability to prevent
undesirable innovations emerging via processes
of technological creep or decision drift.

(2) In principle, the process of innovation of new systems for use in
internal social and political control should be
transparent, open to appropriate public scrutiny and be subject to
change should unwanted and unanticipated
consequences emerge.

(3) Any class of technology which has been shown in the past to be
excessively injurious, cruel, inhumane or
indiscriminate in its effects, should be subject to stringent and
democratic controls. Therefore within Europe:-

(a) No development or deployment of blinding laser weapons and
ancillary devices for police and
internal security purposes should be permitted;

(b) No deployment of 'sub-lethal' area denial mine systems such as
the Volcano (discussed above),
should be allowed for law enforcement or correctional purposes;

(c) Police personnel should not be routinely armed with 'dum-dum'
bullets, use of which is banned in
international armed conflicts. Further research should be
commissioned by the European Parliament
to clarify the legal situation particularly in relation to the
suggestion that such ammunition can bypass
the legal process and effect extra-judicial execution.

(d) Further measures should be developed to regulate electrified
'stun' & 'kill' fences. Dual function
fences with a kill function should not be permissable as their use
violates the right to life and the right
to a fair trial.

4. DEVELOPMENTS IN SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY

Surveillance technology can be defined as devices or systems which can
monitor, track and assess the movements of
individuals, their property and other assets. Much of this technology is
used to track the activities of dissidents, human rights
activists, journalists, student leaders, minorities, trade union leaders and
political opponents.

"Subtler and more far reaching means of invading privacy have become
available to the government.
Discovery and invention have made it possible for the government, by
means far more effective than
stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is
whispered in the closet."

So said US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, way back in 1928.
Subsequent developments go far beyond anything
which Brandeis could have dreamt of. New technologies which were originally
conceived for the Defence and Intelligence
sectors, have after the cold war, rapidly spread into the law enforcement
and private sectors. It is one of the areas of
technological advance, where outdated regulations have not kept pace with an
accelerating pattern of abuses. Up until the
1960's, most surveillance was low-tech and expensive since it involved
following suspects around from place to place and
could use up to 6 people in teams of two working 3 eight hour shifts. All of
the material and contacts gleaned had to be typed
up and filed away with little prospect of rapidly cross checking. Even
electronic surveillance was highly labour intensive. The
East German police for example employed 500,000 secret informers, 10,000 of
which were needed just to listen and
transcribe citizen's phone calls.

By the 1980's, new forms of electronic surveillance were emerging many of
these were directed towards automation of
communications interception. This trend was fuelled in the U. S. in the
1990's by accelerated government funding at the end of
the cold war, with defence and intelligence agencies being refocussed with
new missions to justify their budgets, transferring
their technologies to certain law enforcement applications such as anti-drug
and anti-terror operations. In 1993, the US
department of defence and the Justice department signed memoranda of
understanding for "Operations Other Than War and
Law Enforcement" to facilitate joint development and sharing of technology.
According to David Banisar of Privacy
International, "To counteract reductions in military contracts which began
in the 1980's, computer and electronics companies
are expanding into new markets - at home and abroad - with equipment
originally developed for the military. Companies such
as E Systems, Electronic Data Systems (founded by Ross Perot ) and Texas
Instruments are selling advanced computer
systems and surveillance equipment to state and local governments that use
them for law enforcement, border control and
Welfare administration."36

According to Banisar, the simple need for increased bureaucratic
efficiency - necessitated by shrinking budgets has been a
powerful imperative for improved identification and monitoring of
individuals. "Fingerprints, ID cards, data matching and other
privacy invasive schemes were originally tried on populations with little
political power, such as welfare recipients, immigrants,
criminals and members of the military, and then applied up the socioeconomic
ladder. One in place, the policies are difficult to
remove and inevitably expand into more general use."37 These technologies
fit roughly into three broad categories. namely
surveillance, identification and networking, and are often used in
conjunction as with video cameras and face recognition or
biometrics and ID cards. For Banisar, "They facilitate mass and routine
surveillance of large segments of the population without
the need for warrants and formal investigations. What the East German secret
police could only dream of is rapidly becoming a
reality in the free world."38

4.1 Vehicle Recognition Systems

A huge range of surveillance technologies has evolved, including the night
vision goggles discussed in 3 above; parabolic
microphones to detect conversations over a kilometre away(see Fig.18); laser
versions marketed by the German company PK
Electronic, can pick up any conversation from a closed window in line of
sight; the Danish Jai stroboscopic camera (Fig.19)
which can take hundreds of pictures in a matter of seconds and individually
photograph all the participants in a demonstration or
March; and the automatic vehicle recognition systems which can identify a
car number plate then track the car around a city
using a computerised geographic information system.(Fig.20) Such systems are
now

commercially available, for example, the Talon system introduced in 1994 by
UK company Racal at a price of £2000 per unit.
The system is trained to recognise number plates based on neural network
technology developed by Cambridge
Neurodynamics, and can see both night and day. Initially it has been used
for traffic monitoring but its function has been
adapted in recent years to cover security surveillance and has been
incorporated in the "ring of steel" around London. The
system can then record all the vehicles that entered or left the cordon on a
particular day.39

Such surveillance systems raise significant issues of accountability
particularly when transferred to authoritarian regimes. The
cameras in Fig 21 in Tiananmen Square were sold as advanced traffic control
systems by Siemens Plessey. Yet after the 1989
massacre of students, there followed a witch hunt when the authorities
tortured and interrogated thousands in an effort to ferret
out the subversives. The Scoot surveillance system with USA made Pelco
camera were used to faithfully record the protests.
the images were repeatedly broadcast over Chinese television offering a
reward for information, with the result that nearly all
the transgressors were identified. Again democratic accountability is only
the criterion which distinguishes a modern traffic
control system from an advanced dissident capture technology. Foreign
companies are exporting traffic control systems to
Lhasa in Tibet, yet Lhasa does not as yet have any traffic control problems.
The problem here may be a culpable lack of
imagination.(Fig.22) Several European countries are manufacturing vehicle
and people tracking technologies, including
France40, Germany41, The Netherlands42 and the UK43.

4.2 CCTV Surveillance Net Works

In fact the art of visual surveillance has dramatically changed over recent
years. of course police and intelligence officers still
photograph demonstrations and individuals of interest but increasingly such
images can be stored and searched. (Fig. 23) The
revolution in urban surveillance will reach the next generation of control
once reliable face recognition comes in. It will initially be
introduced at stationary locations, like turnstiles, customs points,
security gateways, etc., to enable a standard full face
recognition to take place. However, in the early part of the 21st. century,
facial recognition on CCTV will be a reality and those
countries with CCTV infrastructures will view such technology as a natural
add-on.

It is important to set clear guidelines and codes of practice for such
technological innovations, well in advance of the digital
revolution making new and unforeseen opportunities to collate, analyze,
recognise and store such visual images. Such regulation
will need to be founded on sound data protection principles and take
cognizance of article 15 of the 1995 European Directive
on the protection of Individuals and Processing of Personal Data.44
Essentially this says that:

"Member States shall grant the right of every person not to be subject
to a decision which produces legal effects
concerning him or significantly affects him and which is based solely
on the automatic processing of data."

The attitude to CCTV camera networks varies greatly in the European Union,
from the position in Denmark where such
cameras are banned by law to the position in the UK, where many hundreds of
CCTV networks exist. Nevertheless, a
common position on the status of such systems where they exist in relation
to data protection principles should apply in general.
A specific consideration is the legal status of admissibility as evidence,
of digital material such

as those taken by the more advanced CCTV systems. Much of this will fall
within data protection legislation if the material
gathered can be searched, e.g., by car number plate or by time. Given that
material from such systems can be seamlessly
edited, the European Data Protection Directive legislation needs to be
implemented through primary legislation which clarifies
the law as it applies to CCTV, to avoid confusion amongst both CCTV data
controllers as well as citizens as data subjects.
Primary legislation will make it possible to extend the impact of the
Directive to areas of activity that do not fall within
community law. Articles 3 and 13 of the Directive should not create a
blanket covering the use of CCTV in every circumstance
in a domestic context.

A proper code of practice should cover the use of all CCTV surveillance
schemes operating in public spaces and especially in
residential area. The Code of Practice should encompass:- a) a purpose
statement covering the key objectives of the scheme;
b) a consideration of the extent to which the scheme falls within the scope
of Data Protection legislation; c) the responsibilities
of the owner of the scheme and those of local partners; d) the way the
scheme is to be effectively managed and installed; e) the
principles of accountability; f) the availability of public information on
the scheme and the principles of its operation in residential
areas; g) the formal approaches to be used to assess, evaluate and audit the
performance of both the scheme and the
accompanying Code of Practice; h) mechanisms for dealing with complaints and
any breaches of the Code including those of
security; i) detailing the extent of any police contacts or use of the
scheme; and j) the procedures for democratically dealing with
proposals of technological change.

Given that the United Kingdom has one of the most advanced CCTV network
coverage in Europe and that the issues of
regulation and control have been perhaps more developed that elsewhere, it
is suggested that the Civil Liberties Committee
formally consider the model Code of Practice for CCTV produced by the Local
Government Information Unit (LGIU, 1996)
in London (A Watching Brief) at a future meeting of this committee, with a
view to recommending it for adoption throughout the
EU.

4.3 Bugging & Tapping Devices

A wide range of bugging and tapping devices have been evolved to record
conversations and to intercept telecommunications
traffic. (See Fig. 24) In recent years the widespread practice of illegal
and legal interception of communications and the planting
of 'bugs' has been an issue in many European states. For example, Italy,
France, Sweden,45 Belgium,46 Germany,47 Norway,48
the Netherlands49 and the U.K.50 The level and scale of some of these
illegal activities is astonishing. For example, a court
meeting on 30 September 1996 was told that the Presidential Palace's
anti-terrorist unit was tapping six former Mitterand
administration officials, including ex-cabinet chief Giles Manage.51 An
official panel, the independent Commission for the
Control of Security Interceptions, said that 100,000 telephone lines are
illegally tapped each year in France and that state
agencies may be behind much of the eavesdropping. They found that curbs
imposed by official bodies may have tempted them
to farm out their illegal bugging to private firms.52

However, planting illegal bugs like the one shown in (Fig 24) is yesterday's
technology. Modern snoopers can by specially
adapted lap top computers like that shown in (Fig.24), and simply tune in to
all the mobile phones active in the area by
cursoring down to their number. The machine will even search for numbers 'of
interest' to see if they are active. However,

these bugs and taps pale into insignificance next to the national and
international state run interceptions networks.

4.4 National & International Communications Interceptions Networks

Modern communications systems are virtually transparent to the advanced
interceptions equipment which can be used to listen
in. Some systems even lend themselves to a dual role as a national
interceptions network. For example the message switching
system used on digital exchanges like System X in the UK supports an
Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) Protocol.
This allows digital devices, e.g. fax to share the system with existing
lines. The ISDN subset is defined in their documents as
"Signalling CCITT1-series interface for ISDN access. What is not widely
known is that built in to the international CCITT
protocol is the ability to take phones 'off hook' and listen into
conversations occurring near the phone, without the user being
aware that it is happening. (SGR Newsletter, No.4, 1993) This effectively
means that a national dial up telephone tapping
capacity is built into these systems from the start. (System X has been
exported to Russia & China) Similarly, the digital
technology required to pinpoint mobile phone users for incoming calls, means
that all mobile phone users in a country when
activated, are mini-tracking devices, giving their owners whereabouts at any
time and stored in the company's computer for up
to two years. Coupled with System X technology, this is a custom built
mobile track, tail and tap system par
excellence.(Sunday Telegraph, 2.2.97).

Within Europe, all email, telephone and fax communications are routinely
intercepted by the United States National Security
Agency, transferring all target information from the European mainland via
the strategic hub of London then by Satellite to Fort
Meade in Maryland via the crucial hub at Menwith Hill in the North York
Moors of the UK. The system was first uncovered in
the 1970's by a group of researchers in the UK (Campbell, 1981). The
researchers used open sources but were subsequently
arrested under Britain's Official Secrets legislation. The 'ABC' trial that
followed was a critical turning point in researcher's
understanding both of the technology of political control and how it might
be challenged by research on open sources.(See
Aubrey,1981 & Hooper 1987) Other work on what is now known as Signals
intelligence was undertaken by researchers such
as James Bamford, which uncovered a billion dollar world wide interceptions
network, which he nicknamed 'Puzzle Palace'. A
recent work by Nicky Hager, Secret Power, (Hager,1996) provides the most
comprehensive details to date of a project
known as ECHELON. Hager interviewed more than 50 people concerned with
intelligence to document a global surveillance
system that stretches around the world to form a targeting system on all of
the key Intelsat satellites used to convey most of the
world's satellite phone calls, internet, email, faxes and telexes. These
sites are based at Sugar Grove and Yakima, in the USA,
at Waihopai in New Zealand, at Geraldton in Australia, Hong Kong, and
Morwenstow in the UK.

The ECHELON system forms part of the UKUSA system but unlike many of the
electronic spy systems developed during the
cold war, ECHELON is designed for primarily non-military targets:
governments, organisations and businesses in virtually every
country. The ECHELON system works by indiscriminately intercepting very
large quantities of communications and then
siphoning out what is valuable using artificial intelligence aids like
Memex. to find key words. Five nations share the results with
the US as the senior partner under the UKUSA agreement of 1948, Britain,
Canada, New Zealand and Australia are very
much acting as subordinate information servicers.

Each of the five centres supply "dictionaries" to the other four of
keywords, phrases, people and places to "tag" and the tagged
intercept is forwarded straight to the requesting country. Whilst there is
much information gathered about potential terrorists,
there is a lot of economic intelligence, notably intensive monitoring of all
the countries participating in the GATT negotiations.
But Hager found that by far the main priorities of this system continued to
be military and political intelligence applicable to their
wider interests. Hager quotes from a"highly placed intelligence operatives"
who spoke to the Observer in London. "We feel we
can no longer remain silent regarding that which we regard to be gross
malpractice and negligence within the establishment in
which we operate." They gave as examples. GCHQ interception of three
charities, including Amnesty International and
Christian Aid. "At any time GCHQ is able to home in on their communications
for a routine target request," the GCHQ source
said. In the case of phone taps the procedure is known as Mantis. With
telexes its called Mayfly. By keying in a code relating
to third world aid, the source was able to demonstrate telex "fixes" on the
three organisations. With no system of accountability,
it is difficult to discover what criteria determine who is not a target.

In February, The UK based research publication Statewatch reported that the
EU had secretly agreed to set up an international
telephone tapping network via a secret network of committees established
under the "third pillar" of the Mastricht Treaty
covering co-operation on law and order. Key points of the plan are outlined
in a memorandum of understanding, signed by EU
states in 1995.(ENFOPOL 112 10037/95 25.10.95) which remains classified.
According to a Guardian report (25.2.97) it
reflects concern among European Intelligence agencies that modern technology
will prevent them from tapping private
communications. "EU countries it says, should agree on "international
interception standards set at a level that would ensure
encoding or scrambled words can be broken down by government agencies."
Official reports say that the EU governments
agreed to co-operate closely with the FBI in Washington. Yet earlier minutes
of these meetings suggest that the original initiative
came from Washington. According to Statewatch, network and service providers
in the EU will be obliged to install "tappable"
systems and to place under surveillance any person or group when served with
an interception order. These plans have never
been referred to any European government for scrutiny, nor one suspects to
the Civil Liberties Committee of the European
Parliament, despite the clear civil liberties issues raised by such an
unaccountable system. We are told that the USA, Australia,
Canada, Norway and Hong Kong are ready to sign up.All these bar Norway are
parties to the ECHELON system and it is
impossible to determine if there are not other agendas at work here. Nothing
is said about finance of this system but a report
produced by the German government estimates that the mobile phone part of
the package alone will cost 4 billion D-marks.

Statewatch concludes that "It is the interface of the ECHELON system and its
potential development on phone calls combined
with the standardisation of "tappable communications centres and equipment
being sponsored by the EU and the USA which
presents a truly global threat over which there are no legal or democratic
controls."(Press release 25.2.97)

Clearly, there needs to be a wide ranging debate on the significance of
these proposals before further any further political or
financial commitments are made. The following recommendations have that
objective in mind.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

(i) All surveillance technologies, operations and practices should be
subject to procedures to ensure democratic accountability
and there should be proper codes of practice to ensure redress if
malpractice or abuse takes place. Explicit criteria should be
agreed for deciding who should be targeted for surveillance and who should
not, how such data is stored, processed and
shared. Such criteria and associated codes of practice should be made
publicly available.

(ii) All requisite codes of practice should ensure that new surveillance
technologies are brought within the appropriate data
protection legislation.

(iii) Given that data from most digital monitoring systems can be seamlessly
edited, new guidance should be provided on what
constitutes admissible evidence. This concern is particularly relevant to
automatic identification systems which will need to take
cognizance of the provisions of Article 15, of the 1995 European Directive
on the Protection of Individuals and Processing of
Personal Data.

(iv) Regulations should be developed covering the provision of electronic
bugging and tapping devices to private citizens and
companies, so that their sale is governed by legal permission rather than
self regulation.

(v) Use of telephone interception by Member states should be subject to
procedures of public accountability referred to in (i)
above. Before any telephone interception takes place a warrant should be
obtained in a manner prescribed by the relevant
parliament. In most cases, law enforcement agencies will not be permitted to
self-authorise interception except in the most
unusual of circumstances which should be reported back to the authorising
authority at the earliest opportunity.

(vi) Annual statistics on interception should be reported to each member
states' parliament. These statistics should provide
comprehensive details of the actual number of communication devices
intercepted and data should be not be aggregated. (This
is to avoid the statistics only identifying the number of warrants, issued
whereas organisations under surveillance may have many
hundreds of members, all of whose phones may be subject to interception).

(vii) Technologies facilitating the automatic profiling and pattern analysis
of telephone calls to establish friendship and contact
networks should be subject to the same legal requirements as those for
telephone interception and reported to the relevant
member state parliament.

(viii) The European Parliament should reject proposals from the United
States for making private messages via the global
communications network (Internet) accessible to US Intelligence Agencies.
Nor should the Parliament agree to new expensive
encryption controls without a wide ranging debate within the EU on the
implications of such measures. These encompass the
civil and human rights of European citizens and the commercial rights of
companies to operate within the law, without
unwarranted surveillance by intelligence agencies operating in conjunction
with multinational competitors.

(ix) The Committee should commission a more detailed report on the
constitutional issues raised by the National Security
Agency (NSA) facility to intercept all European telecommunications and the
impact this supervisory capacity has on a) any
existing

constitutional safeguards protecting individuals or organisations from
invasion of privacy such as those extant for example in
Germany, b) the political, cultural and economic autonomy of European member
states. This report should also cover the social
and political implications of the EU/FBI proposals made to operate a global
telecommunications surveillance network as
discussed above. This report should also analyze the financial and
constitutional implications of the proposals and provide an
update of the work undertaken so far and the status of political approval.

(x) Relevant committees of the European Parliament considering proposals for
technologies which have civil liberties
implications for example the Telecommunications Committee in regard to
surveillance, should be required to forward all
relevant policy proposals and reports to the Civil Liberties Committee for
their observations in advance of any political or
financial decisions on deployment being taken.

(xi) All CCTV surveillance schemes operating in public spaces and especially
in residential areas should be governed by a
comprehensive Code of Practice which encompasses:- a) a purpose statement
covering the key objectives of the scheme; b) a
consideration of the extent to which the scheme falls within the scope of
Data Protection legislation; c) the responsibilities of the
owner of the scheme and those of local partners; d) the way the scheme is to
be effectively managed and installed; e) the
principles of accountability; f) the availability of public information on
the scheme and the principles of its operation in residential
areas; g) the formal approaches to be used to assess, evaluate and audit the
performance of both the scheme and the
accompanying Code of Practice; h) mechanisms for dealing with complaints and
any breaches of the Code including those of
security; i) detailing the extent of any police contacts or use of the
scheme; and j) the procedures for democratically dealing with
proposals of technological change. It is suggested that the Civil Liberties
Committee formally consider adopting the model
Code of Practice for CCTV, produced by the Local Government Information Unit
(LGIU) in London (A Watching Brief,
1996).

5. INNOVATIONS IN CROWD CONTROL WEAPONS

The original development of riot weapons goes back to Paris before the first
World War, where the police began chemical
crowd control using bombs filled with ethyl bromoacetate, an early form of
teargas. The British colonies proved to be the
forcing ground for the wide range of chemical and kinetic impact weapons
which followed. The irritant CS for example was first
used in Cyprus in 1956, and between 1960 and 1965, CN and CS were used on
124 occasions in the colonies. (Ackroyd et
al, 1977).The growing demands of counter-insurgency and urban warfare
generated a first generation of new riot weapons
serviced by a growing police industrial complex.

Thus plastic and rubber bullets were products of British colonial experience
in Hong Kong where the flying wooden teak baton
round became the template for future kinetic weapons. The concept was one of
a flying truncheon which could disperse a
crowd without using small arms. They were however regarded as too dangerous
for use on white people, so in 1969, Porton
Down came up with a 'safer' version for use in Northern Ireland in 1970.
Just as plastic bullets were considered far too
dangerous for use in mainland Britain until 1985 when they proliferated
throughout the UK's police forces,so were wooden
baton rounds regarded as too dangerous for the residents of Northern Ireland
but not Hong Kong. Now plastic bullets have
been deployed in virtually every continent from the USA to Argentina, from
South Africa

to Israel and China. Obviously, the shift in whether or not a riot weapon
was appropriate or safe had nothing to do with
differences in physiology. Wooden and plastic baton rounds created injuries
which did not take account of generation or race.
A predominant concern appears to have been what can be portrayed as
politically safe in a particular context.

The seductive notion of soft and gentle knockout weapons is recent but not
new. It has its roots back in the 1970's when so
called 'non-lethal' weapons formed the holy grail of riot weapon Research &
Development. During that decade, then
Congressman James Scheur outlined a new philosophy of crowd control
weapons.(see Fig.26). He saw such developments
resulting from 'spinoffs from medical, military, aerospace and industrial
research' and expressed the view that: 'We are now in
the process of developing devices and products capable of controlling
violent individuals and entire mobs without injury.'53 The
veracity of this assessment is briefly examined below, particularly the
assertion that control is achieved without harm.

Some idea of the range and variety of riot control weapons under
consideration at that time can be gleaned from the 1972 US
National Science Foundation's Report on Non-lethal Weapons. (NSF, 1972).
Altogether it listed 34 different weapons,
including chemical and kinetic weapons; electrified water jets; combined
stroboscopic light and pulsed sound weapons;
infrasound weapons; dartguns which fire drug-filled flight stabilized
syringes; stench parts which give off an obnoxious odour;
the taser which fires two small electrical contacts discharging 50,000 volts
into the target; and instant banana peel which makes
roads so slippery, they are impassable.

Many of these weapons were then only partly developed or had problems of
public acceptability:others have since achieved
operational status. They include: incapacitation weapons such as the
electronic riot shields and electro-shock batons (discussed
in Sections 6,7, & 8 below); Bulk chemical irritant distributor systems,
(delivered by watercannon such as the UK made
Tactica or the many back pack sprays like those made by the Israeli company
Ispra (Fig.27 or the German Heckler 8 Koch
(Fig.28); New forms of irritant such as OC (or peppergas); kinetic impact
weapons like the German & UK plastic bullet guns
(shown in Fig32) or the South African hydraulically fired, TFM Slingshot
rubber bullet machine; biomedical weapons, such as
the compressed air fired drug syringe now commercially available both in the
US & China(shown in Fig.33).

The range of weapons currently deployed for crowd control is vast indeed and
defies any attempts to be comprehensive. In
Britain, since the first use of CS gas, rubber bullets and water cannon at
the beginning of the Northern Irish Conflict in 1969,
there has been a globalisation of such public order technologies. To our
knowledge some 856 companies across 47 countries
have been or are currently active in the manufacture and supply of such
weapons. This proliferation has been fuelled by private
companies wishing to tap lucrative security markets, a process which has led
to both vertical and horizontal proliferation of this
technology. (See Appendix 1 [not provided with report]) For example, one
company, Civil Defence Supply, who provide
nearly all UK police forces with sidehandled batons, boast of an
international riot training programme, having trained the entire
Mexican Police Granaderos with armadillo linked riot shields, CS and baton
firing guns like the Arwen and what they call the
complete 'Early Resolution System', for its elite forces.

To understand why this arsenal of crowd control weapons has been developed,
it is vital

to understand the thinking which underlies their construction. An important
task in assessing new crowd control technologies is
to examine the criteria used to evaluate just what is an 'acceptable' police
weapon, and to whom. In the discussion below, an
attempt is made to clarify why the theory of 'non-lethal' weapons used for
'minimum force' policing, does not match the reality
of para-militarised riot squad approaches to 'peacekeeping'. Governments
themselves have been using Technology Assessment
to evaluate the relative effectiveness of such weapons. For example, since
1963, there has been an exchange of information on
public order weapons between the US, Canada, Britain & Australia, allowing
Porton Down to share technical evaluation of
proposed non-lethal hardware, with US military scientists. Virtually all the
most recent US government projects on this
weaponry have been classified as "special access" (see 5.6 below) but the
early work is quite revealing. Military scientists
working at the US Army Human Engineering Laboratory in the early 1970's
elaborated a systematic set of procedures to
evaluate the desirable and undesirable effects of particular weapons.(See
Chart 5(a), covering a comparative assessment of
both the medical and physiological consequences of each weapon type,
together with an evaluation of public acceptability.(See
Chart 5b).54

5.1 Cost-Effective Crowd Control Weapons

The simplistic theory which underlies the use of riot weapons assumes that a
'minimum force' strategy of area denial or dispersal
can actually contain deep seated conflicts. The problem with this approach
is that real peace can never be simply defined as an
absence of anyone remaining in the conflict zones. 'Minimum force' is an
elastic concept, particularly when the force deploying it
no longer enjoys widespread legitimacy.

A dominant assumption behind the acquisition of new police weapons, is the
belief that they will create both a faster policing
response time and a greater cost-effectiveness. Again, a key aim has been to
save policing resources by either automating
certain control functions, amplifying the rate of particular control
activities, or decreasing the number of officers required to
perform them. Consequently, nearly all the weapons discussed in this report,
have been functionally designed to yield an
extension of the scope, efficiency and growth of policing power. New riot
weapons enable police, paramilitary and state
security forces to distribute more coercion to a greater number of people.
Therefore they allow a fewer number of officers to
threaten a larger number of people in a crowd and over a distance. Hence,
riot weapons allow fewer officers to break up a
disturbance than when using unarmed personnel, or a larger gathering to be
tackled than could otherwise be taken on. The
basis of this cost-effectiveness criterion has been neatly summed up by the
then Brigadier, Sir Frank Kitson:

"For example, three or four times as many troops might be required, if
they were only allowed persuasion,
as would be needed if they were allowed to use batons and gas; and
three or four times as many troops
might be needed if they were restricted to using batons and gas, as
would be required if they were allowed
to use small arms." (Kitson, 1971,p. 90).

However, although in the short term, it may seem that these weapons can
contain overtly violent conflict, their use in the longer
term may feed or exacerbate the processes responsible for its development. A
study undertaken at the Richardson Institute at
the University of Lancaster, described evidence of such processes at work in
Northern Ireland.(Wright, 1987)55 The study
found that less-lethal weapons used in the context of a phased deployment of
counter-insurgency strategies, could lead to more
force being used. In the beginning this was

evidenced by the deployment of higher numbers of riot weapons, then the
substitution of each new less-lethal weapon by a
more severe type. The initial use of water canon thus gave way to the use of
CS gas. This was augmented by rubber bullets
which were then replaced by the harder hitting PVC variety.(See Chart 6) and
in greater quantities. Further empirical work
suggested that because these riot systems were being deployed in the context
of a phased set of counter-insurgency tactics, the
resistance they bred led to a successive deployment of each subsequent and
more violent phase of the low intensity conflict
programme. In effect they bred the dissent they were designed to 'fix".
(Wright, 1981 ) Graphing the deployment of less-lethal
weapons against the crude indicator of political killings in Northern
Ireland revealed a pattern which appeared to corroborate
this finding. As each new weapon deployment was associated with an upsurge
in the death count (See Chart 7). Over longer
time periods, another study detected predictable levels of weapon
utilization.(Wright, 1981)

For example, fairly constant levels of munitions were used as if the supply
itself was the greatest determinant of usage. (See
Chart 8). A new form of multivariant time series analysis was evolved to
describe the effect of deployments of these weapons
and tactics.(Wright, 1987). What emerged was a complex set of causal
influences which locked the participants into their own
violent behaviour. During the period when this conflict broke down,
variables indicating violent behaviour of the various
participants, were most influenced by their own previous behaviour.(See
Chart 9) Paradoxically, whilst these weapons were
meant to provide a new series of flexible responses, their ultimate effect
was to programme their targets into traditional
anti-state activities and procedures. In other words, their most invidious
characteristic may be to undermine non-violence as a
means of public protest.(Wright, 1992) The real physical effects of these
weapons described below, may go some way to
explaining their dysfunctional impact on conflict behaviour.

5.2 Harmless Weapons? - The Scientific Evidence

Statements made by military scientists and police chiefs about "non-lethal"
weapons and "minimum force", have led the public to
believe that crowd control weapons were designed for humanitarian reasons
and are in fact harmless. Such sentiments have
been echoed by many governments and reinforced by reports from laboratories
and the manufacturers actually creating the
technology of political control.

If safety was the prime consideration, we might expect the research on such
weapons to be especially thorough prior to their
authorization. Since most future developments are still essentially
modifications of existing chemical or kinetic impact weapons,
it is worth reexamining the historical research which has permitted and
legitimised this research in respect to the European state
which has used these weapons the most, i.e. the United Kingdom.

5.3 Harmless Kinetic Impact Weapons?

In January 1977, the then Secretary of State For defence, was asked about
the research on the likely death and injury rates
from rubber and plastic bullets carried out prior to their introduction. The
reply referred to a report produced by four surgeons
working at the Victoria Hospital in Belfast in 1972, (two years after rubber
bullets had been used in Northern Ireland), and
said that comparable information for plastic bullets was not available.56

Chart 5. US Human Engineering Laboratory Technology
Assessment of various 'less lethal' kinetic
weapons

Chart 6. Trends in Riot Weapon use in Northern Ireland
from 1969 - 1986

Chart 7. Impact of introduction of new riot
weapons on
the level of political killings in Northern
Ireland

Chart 8. Structure of riot weapon use

Chart 9. Multi variant time series analysis of Northern Irish
conflict 1976 - 1981

The Belfast surgeons report makes stark reading.(Millar et al, 1972). It
informs us that of 90 patients who sought hospital
treatment after being hit by rubber bullets, 41 needed in patient treatment.
Their injuries included three fractured skulls, 32
fractures of the facial bones (nose,jaw, cheek etc.), eight ruptured eye
globes (all resulting in blindness), three cases of severe
brain damage, seven cases of lung injury, and one case of damage to liver,
spleen and intestine. The overall role call included
one death, two people blinded in both eyes, five with severe loss of vision
in one eye and four with sever disfigurement of the
face. The surgeons also found evidence of rubber bullets being fired at much
closer ranges than those for which they were
designed. Rubber bullets were not meant to be fired at distances of less
than 25 metres but the surgeons found that half of those
brought into hospital had been shot at less than 15 metres and one third at
less than 5 metres. Part of the problem is that such
area dispersal weapons are meant to create a dispersal zone. If anyone is
unfortunate enough to be in such a zone, there may
not be much choice in avoiding being targeted by such weapons, since part of
their threat is the fear of becoming a random
victim.

In the 1970's, military researchers in the US undertook their own research
on kinetic weapons. They concluded that rubber
bullets had an extremely high probability of undesirable effects in any
scenario for their possible operational use. The US Army
research undertaken on live animals, found that impact weapons with energy
levels of above 90 ft. lbs., caused injuries, "in the
severe damage region."(Thein, et al, 1974; Wargovitch, et al, 1975). A
member of BSSRS, Jonathan Rosenhead, was able to
use the comparative kinetic energy/damage figures in the US literature, to
establish that given their muzzle velocity (about 293 ft.
lbs.), for most if not all of its range, the rubber bullet is in the severe
damage region. (Rosenhead, 1976).

It is worth noting that for the purposes of this present study, sample
kinetic riot weapons from the USA, the UK, Germany, and
the Netherlands were assessed using the original US military criteria on
impact effects. It was found that all these weapons were
in either the dangerous or severe damage region categories. (See Chart 4)

Plastic bullets totally replaced rubber bullets in Northern Ireland by 1975.
Although authoritative sources such as Jane's
Infantry Weapons (1976), asserted that rubber bullets were withdrawn because
the disability and serious injury rates 'were not
considered acceptable', the official explanation was simply the plastic
baton round's greater accuracy.57 Rosenhead argued that
given the even higher muzzle velocity of the plastic bullet, it was even
more dangerous, especially at close range.

His analysis has been amply born out by the history of injuries and deaths
caused by plastic bullets in Northern Ireland. A
survey undertaken by Mr Laurance Rocke, (Senior Registrar at the Royal
Victoria Hospital in Belfast), reported in the Lancet
during 1983, that plastic bullets are even more deadly than the rubber
bullets they replaced.(Rocke, 1983). They cause more
severe injuries to the skull and brain and therefore more deaths. Despite
the security forces rule that baton rounds must be
aimed below the waist, 31 of the 99 plastic bullet victims covered in the
Rocke survey suffered head injuries, He attributed the
difference in the respective injuries and deaths for rubber and plastic
bullets to their corresponding ballistic characteristics.
Plastic bullets caused serious injuries less often than rubber bullets
because the latter was less stable in flight and tended to hit a
victim sideways. Plastic bullets resulted in more fractured skulls,
lacerated scalps and deaths.

More worrying are the human faces behind these statistics. Between May 1973
and August

1984, 12 people were killed by plastic bullets. Inquests have found that six
of the twelve fatalities were not involved in any civil
disturbances when they were shot and seven of the twelve victims were
children aged under 15.58

During August 1981, an international commission of enquiry, sponsored by the
Association of Legal Justice, travelled to Belfast
to investigate the use of plastic bullets. One of its members was senior
British research scientist, Dr. Tim Shallice, who wrote in
the New Statesman, "The conclusion seemed inescapable to members of the
commission: the Northern Ireland authorities
were knowingly allowing widespread, indiscriminate and illegal use of a
weapon whose lethal potential was well known
"(Shallice, 1981).

Since then it has been very much business as usual. Just last summer in
Northern Ireland, the RUC used the now British owned
Heckler and Koch anti-riot weapon to fire thousands of plastic bullets.
Whilst an immediate inquiry was called, few reports
emerged of the way that innocent residents out for a night socialising were
corralled by Landrovers and fired upon as all escape
exits were sealed off.

Evidence Gathered by the Committee for the Administration of Justice in
Northern Ireland (CAJ), suggests a serious flouting of
official guidelines for the RUC use of plastic bullets, when over 6002
plastic bullets were fired in just one weekend (July,
1996). CAJ recorded instances of the RUC firing indiscriminately when no
disturbances were going on (including people being
injured by plastic bullets as they were coming out of a disco); young people
being shot by plastic bullets as they left a fast food
restaurant; CAJ observers and journalists shot at by plastic bullets; people
who were clearly attempting to leave areas of
disturbance were also targeted. Victims of the conflict seeking medical
attention at Altnagelvin Hospital were subject to a baton
charge by riot police who had entered the casualty area dressed in full riot
gear with dogs. Witness statements were gathered
which suggested that many people refused to seek treatment from injuries
they sustained from baton rounds for fear of
arrest.(CAJ, 1996)

In such circumstances, the indiscriminate deployment of plastic bullets
removes people's rights of assembly and may remove
their rights to freedom of movement and in some situations their right to
life. The provisions of the UN Code of Conduct for
Law Enforcement Officers in regard to the principle of proportionality
appear to have been breached last summer by the RUC,
(as well as their duty not to use excessive force if it is possible to use
non-violent means before resorting to force and firearms).
We can think of no reason to challenge the European Parliament's decision of
May, 1982 which called for a ban on the use of
plastic bullets within the EU, and recommend that the European Parliament
reaffirm their call for a total ban on this weapon.

5.4 Harmless Chemical Irritant Weapons?

We know that over 300 companies are currently manufacturing and marketing
chemical incapacitants to military, security,
prison and police forces around the world and a vast range of equipment is
available, including cartridges, grenades, backpack
sprays and hand held aerosols. Yet the safety of the commonly used riot
control agents is also questionable. In high doses they
can kill, a reality harshly brought home by deaths of children in South
Africa during the apartheid years. Even in lower doses,
there are a range of very unpleasant side effects including bronchitis,
asthma, lung and eye damage, contact dermatitis and
prolonged diarrhoea. An examination of the actual research undertaken on CS
prior to its authorization

for use in the Derry riots of 1969 reveal some gross omissions and
assumptions. The claim that CS did not harm people with
breathing ailments rested on a study of two bronchitic rabbits; possible
effects on the unborn child were tested by the response
on fertilised chicken eggs when injected with CS.59 Inadequate evidence had
been gathered on its effects on those suffering
from heart complaints and experiments to determine whether or not CS was
carcinogenic, were not completed until two years
after it had been intensively used in Northern Ireland.

After the 1969 Derry riots, a committee of inquiry was set up, (the
Himsworth Committee) to look at the medical and
toxicological effects of CS. Although it drew heavily on existing Porton
studies, the Himsworth Committee accepted that under
certain circumstances CS can kill and that it can also produce highly
unpleasant but non-fatal injuries to the lungs. Himsworth
made the sensible recommendation that in future, riot agents should be
regarded more akin to drugs than weapons and the
authorities should publish the results of safety tests, in the scientific
press, in full, prior to any authorization. (HMSO, Cmnd
4775, 1971). This is such a clear and reasonable precautionary stance, that
we recommend that the European Parliament adopt
it as the baseline criterion for all the chemical irritants which might ever
be deployed in the EU.

Alas, for the amount of attention the UK government paid to this
recommendation, we have only to look at the circumstances
surrounding the introduction for use throughout the UK in certain special
circumstances, of CR in 1973. CR is an incapacitant
which causes temporary blindness. According to one Porton report, it feels
like being thrown blindfolded into a bed of stinging
nettles. (See Fig.28)60 In 1977 the Secretary of State for Defence was
challenged to withdraw authorization for CR until the
Himsworth recommendations were complied with. The Minister refused, claiming
this was already the case and went on to
quote a string of articles all except one of which was published after 1973.
None of these articles addressed the issue of
carcinogenicity, an important consideration for chemicals that are intended
for direct spraying on the skin. If research on these
new weapons was not fully completed before they were used then the idea that
they were deployed because of safety
considerations must be rejected. Less-lethal weapons of this type are also
presented as more acceptable alternatives to guns.
But these weapons augment rather than replace the more lethal weapons in
police arsenals. Euphemistic labels such as
watercannon, teargas and rubber bullets are used to create the impression
that these weapons represent soft and gentle forms
of control, CS is never referred to by the authorities as vomit gas, in
spite of its capacity to cause violent retching.

A further danger of stronger incapacitating chemicals sprayed directly on to
crowds is the impact it can have on changing police
practices. In the 1960's crowd dispersion was seen as the key requirement so
that the a provision of escape routes was part of
the training packages used. With the advent of new paralysing systems, crowd
capture becomes a possibility as foam barriers
to seal off all escape routes become a precursor for mass arrest. This
tactic was deployed against German anti-nuclear
protestors in Wackendorf, over ten years ago, when 7,000 police were used to
ring a crowd of 1000 activists.61 (See Fig 29).
On this occasion chemical foam was used in area denial rather than capture
so the example is illustrative. However, with the
back pack sprayers now being produced, much fewer personnel could achieve
the same tactic. This is part of the problem on
the horizon.

5.5 Harmless Irritant Gas Sprays?

The introduction of hand held gas irritant sprays into Europe into countries
such as Germany, France and most recently, the
UK, has yielded an offensive as well as a defensive capacity. Again1 in the
UK we might have assumed they would be
governed by existing UK policy on the introduction of new chemical weapons
for domestic control.

Until the nineties, despite intensive research, only four chemical agents
were primarily used for such purposes, namely CN, CS,
CR and most recently (Peppergas) OC. This is because there are real
difficulties in marrying an agent with low toxicity and high
effectiveness. CN and CS (developed by Porton Down in the fifties) are in
fact war gases and hundreds of deaths are
attributed to their use in the Vietnam conflict where they were used to
flush out Vietcong in tunnels.62

Porton scientists have always been quite realistic about the possible
dangers of new chemical weapons for public order control.
"As with other foreign chemicals to which man may be exposed, no matter how
detailed, extensive and carefully effected are
the pre-clinical toxicity investigations and observations in controlled
human exposures, there can be no complete guarantee from
such studies that there is absolute safety in use for a given chemical."63
Such caution about weapons designed to be sprayed
directly in the face is well founded. Their use in riot control is based on
an assumption that the level of irritant will be dispersed
because they will be deployed in wide open spaces. There are special dangers
associated with using chemical aerosols in tight
confines where dangerous concentrations can build up. As another scientist
has commented, "Politician and scientist alike must
accept the inescapable conclusion that any substance capable of producing an
intolerable irritation at low concentrations must
also produce a concomitantly high toxicity. In other words, the existence of
ideal riot agents of sufficient safety not to impair the
health of rioters or accidently exposed innocents is merely notional."64

As we have seen, there is evidence that CS can cause permanent but
non-lethal lung damage at comparatively low doses65, as
well as second degree burns with blistering and severe dermatitis.66 In
situations where high exposure to CS has occurred,
heart failure, hepatocellur damage and death have been reported (HMSO,
1971). Some evidence also exists that people
subject to repeated doses of CS develop tolerance, further increasing their
level of exposure.67 One study has concluded that a
single exposure to high level of respiratory irritants similar to CS have
led to the development of 'reactive airways disease
syndrome' in some individuals, characterised by prolonged cough and
shortness of breath.68 New restraint tactics used
alongside gas sprays are a potential recipe for fatalities.

It is revealing that when tests on French made (SAE Alsetex) CS spray took
place in the UK, a Metropolitan police inspector
suffered burns to his eyes during tests in Northampton - thought to be due
to the propellant.69 It also emerged that Dr Jill Tan,
the Home Office scientist who gave these devices the all clear, suffered
blisters to her face when sprayed with the CS product
during tests. Self-Defence expert Inspector Pete Boatman who was training
the instructors when the accident happened has
now been banned from training officers outside his region because his Chief
Constable is worried about being sued by people
injured by the incapacitant.70 Throughout the CS trials in the UK, which
began on March 1, 1996, the public were constantly
reassured about the safety of this product based on French studies, studies
undertaken in the USA and military research
conducted at Porton Down. A UK Channel 4 Dispatches programme revealed
serious flaws in these assumptions.(Liberty,

1996). The French gendarmerie keep no statistics or records of CS use to
suggest it is safe. Indeed Professor Jean Claud
Roujeau of the Hospital Henri Mondor in Paris can quote much evidence to the
contrary. "I have to disagree because we have
seen, in the last few years, several cases of patients suffering from severe
skin reactions to these spray. These reactions look
like acute burns, they are very spectacular and sometimes need
hospitalisation for several days, and can reach 10-20 per cent
of the body surface area of the patient. (See Fig.30) It is generally agreed
that above 20 per cent there is a risk of death, so I
think it is impossible to consider these products as generally safe and
harmless." (Liberty, opp cit)

The British Government also cited work by the US National Toxicology
Programme (NTP) in Boston, but one of the world's
leading toxicologists Professor Howard Hu said, "The NTP was purely designed
to assess whether CS can cause cancer in
laboratory animals. It was not designed to see whether CS could cause
pulmonary (breathing) problems of a non carcinogenic
nature, or skin problems and it really says nothing about the potential of
CS to cause health problems in vulnerable people."
Professor Hu also said that CS may actually cause asthma. "One of the
conditions that CS may cause is commonly referred to
as RADS, a variant of asthma caused by a very high, brief intense exposure
to an irritant like CS". He also said that CS may be
linked to chromosomal mutation - damage to the body's DNA itself.

In fact, the French made spray was given a specification in the UK which
demanded that it be a 5% solution and release 5
centileters of fluid per burst which compares with U.S. versions which
contain a 1% solution and release a 1% burst. In other
words the French Sprays adopted by the UK were 25 times as strong as those
used in the United States. It is perhaps
somewhat revealing that the UK Government gave the go ahead for deployment
of these sprays before the trials were complete
and before all the relevant research was published in the scientific press.

In fact the safety concerns outlined above, are even more pressing in regard
to this newly introduced disabling chemical,
Oleoresin Capsicum (OC), or 'peppergas'. OC is a new irritant based on
extracts from Chile pepper. As a plant toxin it is
banned for use in war by the 1972 Biological Weapons convention but not for
internal security use.

Porton Down began researching analogues of capsicum after it was used as a
military harassing agent in World War I in the
form of acylated vanillylamide and its more potent homologues such as VAN as
a possible replacement for the riot agent CN.
However, the agent was predominantly used in the seventies for Porton funded
studies in the neurophysiology of pain such as
those conducted in 1975 by Foster and Ramage at Manchester University's
Medical School.71 However, it was in the USA
that companies transformed this irritant into a commercial product which is
now widely used by both police, corrections
departments and private citizens.

The effects of peppergas are far more severe, including temporary blindness
which last from 15-30 minutes, a burning sensation
of the skin which last from 45 to 60 minutes, upper body spasms which force
a person to bend forward and uncontrollable
coughing making it difficult to breathe or speak for between 3 to 15
minutes.

For those with asthma, taking other drugs, or subject to restraining
techniques which restrict the breathing passages, there is a
risk of death. The Los Angeles Times has reported at least 61 deaths
associated with police use of pepper spray since 1990 in
the USA,72 and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) documented 27
deaths in custody of people

sprayed with peppergas in California alone, since 1993.73

Whilst peppergas has been widely adopted in the US and Canada so far it has
not seen widespread usage in Europe.
Nevertheless, several European companies such as France,74 Germany,75
Spain76 and the UK77 are known to be either
marketing their own brand or importing OC sprays and backpacks from the USA.
However, the US Army concluded in a
1993 Aberdeen Proving Ground study that pepper spray could cause "Mutagenic
effects, carcinogenic effects, sensitization,
cardiovascular and pulmonary toxicity, neurotoxicity, as well as possible
human fatalities .There is a risk in using this product on
a large and varied population" (Salem, 1993) However, the pepper spray got
the go ahead despite the reservations of the US
military scientists after FBI tests gave it the all clear.

It has subsequently been revealed that the head of the FBI's Less-Than
lethal Weapons Programme, Special Agent Thomas
WW Ward, took a $57,000 bribe from a peppergas manufacturer to give the Zarc
product Capstun, the all clear. British
researchers highlighted the conflict of scientific evidence to the South
California branch of ACLU who then took vigourous
action to have the agent withdrawn. Berkley's Police Commission voted for a
60 day moratorium on Peppergas.78 ACLU is
now looking at the legal implications and has asked the FBI to immediately
retract and rescind all research documentation.
Allan Parachini, Public Affairs Director of ACLU has said "The Ward Scandal
in some ways exceeds the Rodney King
beatings in terms of its potential impact on law enforcement, since FBI
research helped convince police departments across the
country that pepper spray was a safe and effective way to subdue suspects."
In fact the breach of trust is much more serious
since many other countries as disparate as Australia and India have
subsequently adopted peppergas on the back of US
research.

Not surprisingly, recent company marketing has focused on providing training
and certification to insulate officers from lawsuits
associated with deaths in custody cases. The effects of OC are so severe
that companies such as Bioshield & Foxguard have
started to market decontamination wipes to meet peppergas "post application
requirements which in turn reduces the potential
for litigation".

In the face of such findings, any European Member State who permits the
deployment of the OC irritant, may well find
themselves facing legal action in the future, if fatalities or other unusual
impacts emerge. It is recommended that the European
Parliament errs on the side of caution and calls for a moratorium on the
acquisition, sale and deployment of Oleoresin Capsicum
irritant sprays, until independent research is undertaken on its safety and
published in full in the scientific press for peer review.

5.6 Second Generation Incapacitation Weapons

In the Nineties, the revolution in so called 'non-lethal weapons' was given
fresh impetus by new US programmes to fight internal
conflicts - ostensibly without casualties. The US Government was driven
towards finding a universal panacea because of a
series of embarrassing and widely publicised debacles including the Rodney
King beating, the Waco siege and their unfortunate
experiences in Somalia, where they failed in crowd control operations with
only lethal technology. The new policy was avidly
pushed in the States by the likes of Col. John Alexander (who made his name
as part of the Phoenix Assassination programmes
during the Vietnam war) and science fiction writers such as Alvin Toffler
(Toffler,1994) and Janet and Chris Morris, (Morris &
Morris, 1990, 1994) and picked up by the

DoD and Justice Department.

Thus a second generation of kinetic, chemical, optico-acoustic, microwave,
disabling and paralysing technologies is on the
horizon, to join the existing arsenal of weapons designed for public order
control. Much of the initial new work has been
undertaken in US nuclear laboratories such as Oak Ridge, Lawrence Livermore
and Los Alamos. Many cynics see the work
as a rice bowl initiative with scientists looking for new weapons projects
to justify their future careers as the cold war made
their old skill redundant. Already they have come up with a pandora's box of
new technologies. These include:

* Ultra-sound generators, which cause disorientation, vomiting and
involuntary defecation, disturbing the ear
system which controls balance and inducing nausea. The system which
uses two speakers can target individuals in
a crowd.

* Visual stimulus and illusion techniques such as high intensity
strobes which pulse in the critical epileptic
fit-inducing flashing frequency and holograms used to project active
camouflage.

* Reduced energy kinetic weapons. Variants on the bean bag philosophy
which ostensibly will result in no damage
( similar claims were once made about plastic bullets). (See Fig 32)

* New disabling, calmative, sleep inducing agents mixed with DMSO which
enables the agent to quickly cross the
skin barrier and an extensive range of pain causing, paralysing and
foul-smelling area-denial chemicals. Some of
these are chemically engineered variants of the heroin molecule. They
work extremely rapidly, one touch and
disablement follows. Yet one person's tranquillization may be another's
lethal dose. (See Fig.33)

* Microwave and acoustic disabling systems. (see Fig.34)

* Human capture nets which can be laced with chemical irritant or
electrified to pack an extra disabling punch.
(See Fig 34)

* Lick 'em and stick 'em technology such as the Sandia National
Laboratory's foam gun which expands to
between 35-50 times its original volume. Its extremely sticky, gluing
together any target's feet and hands to the
pavement. (See Fig 35)

* Aqueous barrier foam which can be laced with pepper spray

* Blinding laser weapons and Isotrophic radiator shells which use
superheated gaseous plasma to produce a
dazzling burst of laser like light. (See Fig.36)

* Thermal guns which incapacitate through a wall by raising body
temperature to 107 degrees.

* Magnetosphere gun which delivers what feels like a blow to the head.

We are no longer at a theoretical stage with these weapons. US companies are
already piloting new systems, lobbying hard and
where possible, laying down potentially lucrative patents. For example, last
year New Scientist reported that the American
Technology Corporation (ATC) of Poway California has used what it calls
acoustical heterodyning technology to target
individuals in a crowd with infra-sound to pinpoint an individual 200-300

metres away. The system can also project sonic holograms which can conjure
audio messages out of thin air so just one person
hears.79 Meanwhile, Jane's reported that the US Army Research Laboratory has
produced a variable velocity rifle for lethal or
non lethal use a new twist to flexible response.80 Other companies are
promoting robots for use in riot and prison control.

The National Institute of Justice in the US is now actively soliciting new
ideas for such weapons from corporate bodies,81 and
corporate US has responded with bodies like SPIE (The International Society
For Optical Engineering), which have
enthusiastically responded with a special conference on 'Enabling
Technologies for Law Enforcement and Security' at the Hynes
Convention centre in Boston, Nov 19-21, 1996. The panel on less than lethal
technologies has experts talking on subjects such
as: The non-lethal laser baton; design of a variable velocity gun system for
law enforcement applications; sticky shocker;
definition of lethality thresholds for KE less-lethal projectiles; violence
reduction and assailant control with laser sighted police
pistols; directed energy technologies: weaponisation and barrier
applications; pepper spray projectile for countering hostage
and barricade situations; aqueous foam as a less than lethal technology for
prison applications etc. A formal Pentagon policy on
the use of non-lethal weapons was prepared last year in response to
Congressional instructions to initiate a joint acquisitions
programme. Whilst there are practical problems regarding whether it is
preferable to leave an enemy or a citizen dead rather
than permanently maimed, and whether or not hallucinogenic or other
psychotropic 'calmative' agents fall foul of the Chemical
Weapons Convention, the spending call was for $15 million annually over the
next three years, to fund new and existing
projects.82

Critics of such projects suggest that non-lethal war is a contradiction in
terms. Many of the so called non-lethal weapons are in
reality are far from non-lethal. They can and have killed, maimed, blinded
and scalped innocent bystanders. There is a real
danger that they will make conflicts more lethal by enraging crowds and by
paralysing people making them more vulnerable to
other operations by the military and security forces. In that sense these
weapons could be considered pre-lethal and actually
lead to higher casualty rates. (See above) In fact the US proponents of
these weapons are under no illusions. Their focus is 'not
to replace lethal munitions but to augment existing and future capabilities
which will provide a spectrum of force response
options.'83 The area most commentators have not addressed is the extent that
such weapons will help the military create new
roles for themselves as part of internal policing operations.

Most of the debate has been about their role in war. We know from the
proceedings of the Non Lethal Defence II conference,
(organised by The American Defence Preparedness Association held in March
last year), that the that the Joint Program Office
of Special Technology Countermeasures (JPO-STC) have developed a
multi-service co-ordination strategy that incorporates
both the HQ Allied Forces of Southern Europe and the 'Doctrine & Training
HQ' of the United Kingdom.84 Other formal
liaison links between the USA non-lethal research community and Member
States are anticipated but little public information
has emerged.

The work done so far has led to dubious weapons based on dubious research,
strongly influenced by commercial rather than
humanitarian considerations. There is a pressing need for a wide ranging
debate in the European Parliament of the humanitarian
and civil liberties implications of allowing these weapons on to European
soil to become part of the technology of political
control in the EU. Much of the work that has been undertaken in secret, but
part of the bibliography of the present report
covers a representative sample of the available literature. What is required
is a much more detailed assessment of these
weapons than space

permits here and it is recommended that a new study be commissioned to
achieve this work. In the meantime, it would be
useful to ask for the European Commission to report on existing liaison
arrangements between Member States and the US on
Non-lethal weapons and the nature and extent of any joint activities.

5.6 RECOMMENDATIONS

(i). Informed by principle 3 of the United Nations Basic Principles on The
Use of Force & Firearms (which states that: " the
development and deployment of non-lethal incapacitating weapons should be
carefully evaluated in order to minimise the risk of
endangering uninvolved persons, and the use of such weapons should be
carefully controlled.") and principle 4 (which require
governments to take steps to ensure that arbitrary or abusive use of force
is not used by law enforcement officers, and that
force is used "only if other means remain ineffective"), the committee
should consider asking the European Parliament to
reaffirm its demand of May 1982, for a ban on the use of plastic bullets.

(ii). In the light of last summer's events at Drumcree in Northern Ireland,
the Committee is advised to seek confirmation from
the Commission that: Member States are fully aware of their responsibilities
under Principles 3 and 4 of the United Nations
Basic Principles on the Use of Force & Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials
and to ask for clarification of exactly what
steps individual Member States are taking to ensure that these are fully met
as the power of "less-lethal weapons" changes and
whether consistent standards apply.

(iii). The European Parliament should be asked to establish objective
criteria for assessing the biomedical effects of so called
non-lethal weapons that are independent from existing commercial or
governmental research undertaken to-date. It is also
recommended that further research is commissioned on the range and types of
technologies which have been developed by the
US non-lethal doctrine so far, together with an assessment of their
anticipated and unforeseen social and political implications.

(iv). The Commission should be requested to report on the existing liaison
arrangements for the second generation of non-lethal
weapons to enter European Union from the USA and call for an independent
report on their alleged safety as well as their
intended and unforeseen social and political effects. During the interim
period, deployment by the police, the military or
paramilitary special forces, of US made or licensed chemical irritant,
kinetic, acoustic, laser, electromagnetic frequency,
capture, entanglement, injector or electrical disabling and paralysing
weapons, should be prohibited within Europe.

(v). The European Parliament should: (a)Note the biased research on
Peppergas (OC) undertaken by corrupt FBI officials and
the continuing use of FBI safety assurances in other countries on the basis
of this flawed research; (b) Call for a ban on
Peppergas (OC) deployment or usage within EU Member States, until new
independent research on OC is undertaken.

(vi). That all research on chemical irritants should be published in open
scientific journals before authorization for any usage is
permitted and that the safety criteria for such chemicals should be treated
as if they were drugs rather than riot control agents.

(vii). Research on the alleged safety of existing crowd control weapons and
of all future innovations in crowd control weapons
should be placed in the public domain prior to any decision towards
deployment.

6. NEW PRISON CONTROL SYSTEMS

Some of the equipment described above, such as the surveillance, area
denial, surveillance and crowd control technologies,
also finds a ready use inside permanent prisons and houses of correction.
Other devices such as the area denial, perimeter
fencing systems such as portable coils of razor wire, prison transport
vehicles with mini cage cells, and tagging equipment are
used to create temporary holding centres.

Permanent prisons are however, literally custom built control environments,
where every act and thing, including the
architecture, the behaviour of the prison officers and daily routines, are
functionally organised with that purpose in mind.
Therefore many of the technologies discussed above are built in to the
prison structure and integral to policing systems used to
contain their inmates. For example, area denial technology, intruder
detection equipment and surveillance devices are
instrumental in hermetically sealing high security prisons. Everything from
electronically operated prison gates and cell doors, to
razor wire and video surveillance on the perimeter walls, serve this end.

If disturbances develop within a prison, the riot technologies and tactics
outlined above, are also available for use by prison
officers. The trend has been to train specialized MUFTI (Minimum Force
Tactical Intervention ) squads for this purpose.
Outside Europe, irritant gas has been used not only to crush revolt but also
to punish political detainees,85 or to eject reticent
prisoners from their cells before execution.86 Anyone deemed to be a trouble
maker may become the potential target for further
containment, the type and variety of which, depend to a large extent on the
prevailing norms and political climate. Thus physical
restraint equipment covers a range from straitjackets and body-belts at one
end of the spectrum to thumbcuffs and leg shackles
at the other. Recently, the International Observatory on Prisons criticized
Spain's so called Register of Special Treatment
Prisoners held in solitary confinement for prolonged periods and said this
could be infringing the European Convention against
Torture.87

Other approaches include special stripped and padded cells, segregated units
which have been used Inverness in Scotland to
form a cage within a cage;88 isolation units like the now abandoned system
used at Wakefied Jail;89 the Tote Trakt cells used to
imprison the Bader Meinhof gang in Germany, which were designed to mimic
sensory deprivation; or entire blocks of
segregated isolation cells like the 750 Security Housing Units and 3,000
maximum security cells run by the California House of
Corrections department at the punitive warehousing prison at Pelican Bay.90
The Pelican Bay complex is a good example of
where a lack of proper accountability can bring widespread systematic abuse,
even if the prison is one of the most modern. In
1995, Judge Thelton E. Henderson said the prison was one of the most abusive
and that prison officers not only ignored the
abuses but "also followed a management strategy that permitted the use of
excessive force for the purpose of management and
deterrence." The Judge informed the Federal District Court of guards who
assaulted prisoners in cells with batons, high voltage
taser guns, chained them up for hours in "fetal restraints" with their
wrists bound to their ankles for 22 hours a day.91

Apart from mechanical restraint, prison authorities also have access to
pharmacological approaches for immobilising inmates,
colloquially known as 'the liquid cosh.' These vary from psychotropic drugs
such as anti-depressants, sedatives and tranquilliser
to powerful hypnotics. Drugs like largactil or Seranace offer the chemical
equivalent of a strait jacket and their usage is
becoming increasingly controversial as prison populations rise and larger
numbers on inmates are 'treated'. In the United States,
the trend for punishment to become therapy reaches its apotheosis with
'behaviour modification' which uses Pavlovian reward
and

punishment routines to recondition behaviour. Drugs like anectine, (a curare
derivative), which produce either fear or pain, are
used in aversion therapy. In prisons, the possibilities of testing new
social control drugs are extensive, whilst actual controls are
few. Houses of correction form the new laboratories for developing the next
generation of drugs for social reprogramming,
whilst the pharmacology laboratories of both the universities and the
military provide scores of new psychoactive drugs each
year.92

Way back in the 1970's, J.A Meyer of the US Defence Department suggested a
countrywide network of transceivers for
monitoring all prisoners on parole, via an irremovable transponder.93 The
idea was that parolees movements could be
continuously checked and the system would facilitate certain areas or hours
to be out of bounds, whilst having the economic
advantage of cutting down on the costs of clothing and feeding the prisoner.
If prisoners go missing, the police can automatically
home in on their last position. The system came into operation use in
America in the mid 1980's when some private prisons
started to operate a transponder based parole system.94 The system has now
spread into Canada and Europe where it is
known as electronic tagging. Whilst the logic of tagging is difficult to
resist, critics have argued that whilst tagging carries the
promise of being an effective alternative to prison, a look at the
criminological literature, this assertion is
questionable.(MacMahon, 1996). The clientele appears not to be offenders who
would have been imprisoned but rather low
risk offenders who are most likely to be released into the community anyway.
Because of this, the system is not cheaper since
the authorities gain the added expense of supplying monitoring devices to
offenders who would have been released anyway.
Electronic tagging is however beneficial to the companies who sell such
systems. Tagging also has a profitable role inside
prisons in the U.S. and in some prisons, notably, DeKalb County Jail near
Atlanta, all prisoners are bar coded.(Christie, 1993,
p. 96)

Critics such as Lilly & Knepper (1992, 186-7) argue that in examining the
international aspects of crime control as industry,
more attention is needed to the changing activities of the companies which
used to provide supplies to the military. At the end of
the cold war, "with defence contractors reporting declines in sales, the
search for new markets is pushing corporate decision
making, it should be no surprise to see increased corporate activity in
criminal justice." Where such companies previously
profited from wars with foreign enemies, they are increasingly turning their
energy to the new opportunities afforded by crime
control as industry.(Christie, 1994). Increasingly in the U.S, we witness
the trend toward private prisons and the critical issue
here is can the privatisation of prison control create a rehabilitation
process if its dominant raison d'etre is profit from control
systems and hence cost cutting.

Many European countries are now experiencing a rapid process of
privatisation of prisons by corporate conglomerations,
predominantly from the USA. Many of the prisons run by these organisations
in the US have cultures and control techniques
which are alien to European traditions. Such a process of privatisation can
lead to a bridgehead for importing U.S. corrections
mentality, methods and technologies into Europe and there is a pressing need
to ensure a consensus on what constitutes
acceptable practice. There is a further danger that such privatisation will
lead to cost cutting practices of human warehousing,
rather than the more long term beneficial practice of prisoner
rehabilitation.

In some European countries, particularly Britain, where changes in penal
policy are leading to a rapid rise in prison population
without additional resources being applied to the sector, the imperative is
to cut costs either through using technology or by
privatising prisons.95 Already, the UK Prison Service has compiled a
shopping list of computer based options with existing
CCTV surveillance systems being complemented by geophones, identity

recognition technology and forward looking infra-red systems which can spot
weapons and drugs.96 Alongside such proactive
technologies, UK prisons will face increasing pressure to tool up for
trouble. Much this weaponry including the contract for
between £950,000 and £2,500,000 of side handled batons, kubotans, riot
shields etc. made by the Prison Service in March
1995, are likely to be originally manufactured in the United States.97

The U.S.A adopts a far more militarised prison regime than anywhere in
Europe outside of Northern Ireland. A massive prison
industrial complex has mushroomed to maintain the strict control regimes
that typify American Houses of Correction. The future
prospect is of that alien technology coming here, with very little in the
way of public or parliamentary debate. A few examples
of US prison technologies and proliferation illustrate the dangers.

Many US prisons now use peppergas. The Department of Justice and every
Federal Court that has looked at its use in
correctional facilities has found abuses. For example at the privately run
West Tennessee Detention Facility, prison guards
pumped peppergas into two dormitories seized by inmates.98 In late 1994, the
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division,
investigated a County Jail in Syracuse, New York, and reported "an
unacceptably high and improper use of pepperspray . . .
Nearly every inmate told of excessive and improper use . . . particularly
when inmates are not resistant and after the inmate has
been restrained and presents no danger." One suicidal inmate in Syracuse was
restrained with three cans of pepperspray and
died shortly afterwards of positional asphyxia.99 In the US, Federal
Laboratories are already marketing a remote control
systems (TG Guard), which can automatically dispense peppergas through
specific zones in a prison complex from a remote
firing location.100 (See Fig. 37).

Many prisons in the U.S, use Nova electronic 50,000 volt extraction shields,
electronic stun prods and most recently the
REACT remote controlled stunbelts. In 1994, the US Federal Bureau of Prisons
decided to use remote-controlled stunbelts on
prisoners considered dangerous to prevent them from escaping during
transportation and court appearances. By May 1996,
the Wisconsin Department of Corrections said that no longer will inmates be
chained together "but will be restrained by the use
of stunbelts and individual restraints." Stun Tech of Cleveland Ohio has
said that it wants to see its stunbelts introduced into the
chain gang programs of Alabama, Florida and Louisiana. In fact by 1996, it
was reported that the US Marshals service and
over 100 county agencies have obtained such belts as well as 16 state
correctional agencies including Alaska, California,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Ohio and Washington (Amnesty
International, 1997).

Stun Tech literature claims that its high pulse stunbelt can be activated
from 300 feet. After a warning noise, the Remote
Electronically Activated Control Technology (REACT) belt inflicts a 50,000
volt shock for 8 seconds. This high pulsed current
enters the prisoners left kidney region then enters the body of the victim
along for example blood channels and nerve pathways.
Each pulse results in a rapid body shock extending to the whole of the brain
and central nervous system. The makers promote
the belt "for total psychological supremacy . . . of potentially troublesome
prisoners." Stunned prisoners lose control of the
bladders and bowels. "After all, if you were wearing the contraption around
your waist that by the mere push of a button in
someone's hand, could make you defecate or urinate yourself, what would you
do from the psychological standpoint?"101
Amnesty International wants Washington to ban the belts because they can be
used to torture, and calls them, "cruel, inhuman
and degrading." Some officials say the belts can save money because fewer
guards would be needed. But human rights activists
and some jailers oppose them as the most degrading new measure in an
increasingly barbaric field." (Kilborn,1997) Already,
some European countries are in the process of evaluating stunbelt systems
for use here. (Marks, 1996)

The U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons is responsible for a prison population of
some 101,000 inmates experiencing according to
their Chief of Security, Jim Mahan, a 25% overcrowding effect within the 81
feral prisons across the U.S.A. An additional 17
new facilities are under construction and 10 others will be privatised. As a
result of rising tensions within US jails and the need
to respond, the Federal Bureau of Prisons has become a formal part of the
new research programme on less-lethal weapons.
Disturbance control squads are specialised units used in US jails to quell
riots and Mahan identified future needs in term of (a)
aqueous foams; (b) containment nets; (c) anti-traction devices; (d)
aesthetic darts/pellets; (e) chemical area dispensers; (f) noise
weapons such as acoustic generators; (g) infra-ultrasound; (h) low energy
lasers; (i) optical munitions in addition to the kinetic
energy, chemical and electrical weapons they now deploy.102

Without proper licensing and a clear consensus on what is expected from
private prisons in Europe, multinational private prison
conglomerations could act as a bridgehead for similar sorts of technology to
enter the European crime control industry. Proper
limits need to be set when a licence is granted with a comprehensive account
taken of that company's past track record in terms
of civil liberties, rehabilitation and crisis management rather than just
cost per prisoner held.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee should ask the Commission to:

(i). Ensure that the UN Minimum treatment of prisoners rules banning the use
of leg irons on prisoners are implemented in all
EU correctional facilities.

(ii). Implement a ban on the introduction of inbuilt gassing systems inside
European gaols on the basis of the manufacturers
warnings of the dangers of using chemical riot control agents in enclosed
spaces. Restrictions should also be made on the use of
chemical irritants from whatever source in correctional facilities wherever
research has shown that a concentration of that irritant
could either kill or be associated with permanent damage to health.

(iii). Ensure that all private prison operations within the European Union
should be subject to a common and consistent licensing
regime by the host member. No licence should be granted where proven human
rights violations by that contractor have been
made elsewhere. Any failure to secure a licence in one European state should
debar that private prison contractor from bidding
for other European contracts (pending evidence of adequate human rights
training and appropriate improvements in standard
operating procedures and controls by that corporation or company).

(iv). Seek agreement between all Member States to ensure that:

(a) All riot control, prisoner transport and extraction technology
which is in use or proposed for use in all prisons,
(whether state or privately run), should be subject to prior approval
by the competent member authorities on the
basis of independent research;

(b) Automated systems of indiscriminate punishment such as built in
baton round firing mechanisms. should be
prohibited.

(c). The use of electroshock restraining devices or other remote
control punishment devices including shock-
shields should be immediately suspended in any private or public prison
in the European Union, until and unless
independent medical evidence

can clearly demonstrate that their use will not contribute to deaths in
custody, torture or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.

(v) The European Parliament should be requested to establish a rigorous
independent and impartial inquiry into the use of stun
belts, stunguns and shields, and all other types and variants of
electroshock weapons in Member States, to assess their medical
and other effects in terms of international human rights standards
regulating the treatment of prisoners and the use of force; the
inquiry should examine all known cases of deaths or injury resulting from
the use of these instruments, and the results of the
inquiry should be published without delay

(vi). Prohibit the use of kill fencing and lethal area denial systems in any
prison whether private or public, within the European
Union.

7. INTERROGATION, TORTURE TECHNIQUES & TECHNOLOGIES

Millennia of research and development have been expended in devising ever
more cruel and inhumane means of extracting
obedience and information from reluctant victims or achieving excruciatingly
painful and long-drawn-out deaths for those who
would question or challenge the prevalent status quo. What has changed in
more recent times is (i) the increasing requirement
for speed in breaking down prisoners' resistance; (ii) the adoption of
sophisticated methods based on a scientific approach and
(iii) a need for invisible torture which leaves no or few marks which might
be used by organisations like Amnesty International
to label a particular government, a torturing state.103 According to
Amnesty, there is also an increasing trend for torture and ill
treatment to directed at common criminal suspects and social 'underdogs'
such as immigrants and members of racial minorities
(Forrest, 1996). Today, the phenomena of torture has grown to a worldwide
epidemic. A report by the Redress Trust in 1995,
found that 151 countries were involved in torture, inhuman or degrading
treatment (Fig.38), despite the fact that 106 states
have ratified, acceded to or signed the Convention Against Torture.104

The advent of modern torture technique can be traced back to the Russian
NKVD, which used sensory deprivation and
multiple levels of brutality to induce stress before 'conveyor'style
questioning by relays of interrogators for days on end, thereby
industrialising state terror. These approaches had the dual requirement of
extracting information and breaking down personality
in order to elicit public confessions as the era of the 'show trial' opened
up.105 There is a continuum between such coerced
confessions and torture.106

These techniques can themselves be regarded as part of an evolving
technology which can be further researched and developed
before being transferred elsewhere. Again, like all the technology of
political control, torture technology has three components,
hardware, software and liveware (the human elements), which are all woven
together to form manipulative programmes of
socio-political control. The hardware can include both modern and medieval
prisoner restraining, disabling and repressive
technologies, for example leg shackles, thumbcuffs, and suspension
equipment, which despite being prohibited by Rule 33 of
the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules For the Treatment of
Prisoners(United Nations, 1955),107 are still being
manufactured(Fig.39 & Fig.40);108 it also encompasses blunt trauma-inducing
drugs (e.g. Aminazin, apomorphine, curare,
suxamethonium, haloperidol, insulin, sulfazin, triftazin, tizertsin,
sanapax, etaperazin, phrenolong, trisedil, mazjeptil, seduksin and
motiden-depo (Plate and Darvi, 1981). After World War II, the USA, for
example, undertook considerable research on the
use of drugs for obtaining intelligence from interrogees independent from
their volition, for example, project Chatter.109 This
research was expanded during the Korean War and included laboratory
experiments on animals and

humans using Anabasis aphylla, scoplamin and mescaline in order to determine
their speech inducing qualities. Overseas
experiments were conducted as part of the project."110 The CIA later
expanded this work in what became known as Projects
Bluebird and Artichoke. A whole series of projects were then initiated under
Projects MKDELTA and MKULTRA which
were concerned with "the research and development of chemical, biological
and radiological materials capable for employment
in clandestine operations to control human behaviour."111 Much of the CIA
work on behaviour modification was later adapted
towards less-lethal disabling chemicals.112 More recently, Spain has been
accused of using vagrants to test the use of
anaesthetic drugs to make it easier for the security forces to kidnap
guerillas of the Basque separatist organisation ETA.113

7.1 Torture Hardware

Other torture hardware includes electroshock weapons, electrically heated
hot tables, whips, iron-chain filled rubber hoses,
cat-o'-nine-tails, clubs, canes, specially designed torture devices and
interrogation rooms using white noise (Fig.41) (Sweeney
1991a and 1991b) and stroboscopic UV light (New Scientist, 1973). Much of
this equipment is home made but some of the
newer technologies are purpose built and may be used by successive law
enforcement agencies after one torturing regime is
replaced by another. For example, the 'Apollo machine' which was devised by
SAVAK, the Shah's secret police in Iran (it
delivered an electric shock to sensitive parts of the body, while a steel
helmet covered prisoners' heads to amplify their
screams), was also used by the succeeding regime's religious
police.(Mather,1982)

Helen Bamber, Director of the British Medical Foundation for the Treatment
of the Victims of Torture, has described
electroshock batons at 'the most universal modern tool of the torturers'.
(Gregory, 1995) Recent surveys of torture victims have
confirmed that after systematic beating, electroshock is one of the most
common factors (London, 1993); (Rasmussen, 1990).
If one looks at the country reports of Amnesty International, electroshock
torture is the Esperanto of the most repressive states.
Many examples of its use have been reported including Austria,114 Greece
(Council of Europe, 1994); China (Amnesty
International 1992b), Ballantyne, 1992,1995); and Saudi Arabia (Amnesty
International, 1994). Amnesty International has just
published a survey of fifty countries where electric shock torture and ill
treatment has been recorded since 1990.115

According to the manufacturers, the new pulsed variants of electroshock
weapon were developed in the 1980's on the basis of
biomedical research. They come in several variants including hand held prods
and batons, (Fig. 42) electrified riot shields (Fig.
43) and electrified dart systems like the Taser (Fig. 44.). Electroshock
weapons work on the induction coil principle. They are
battery powered devices which step up the voltage several thousand fold to
produce a high voltage low amperage shock that
affects the victim's muscle control. As well as severe pain and a temporary
paralysis, such weapons also achieve a
psychological effect because of the dancing display of crackling blue
lightning which traverses the electrodes of both shields and
prods.

An independent survey by the UK Forensic Science Service (FSS) (commissioned
by the British Home Office), examined the
possible hazardous effects of a range of different electroshock devices on
the human body (Robinson, et al., 1990). The FSS
study reported that receiving a typical discharge from an electroshock prod
up to half a second startles and repels the victim;
one to two seconds and the victim loses the ability to stand up; three to
five seconds and loss of skeletal muscle control is total
and immobilization occurs. The effect can last for between five and fifteen
minutes. The FSS study also reported that modern
pulsed electroshock weapons are more powerful than the old fashioned cattle
prods by nearly two

orders of magnitude.

Portable electrified riot shields have been manufactured since the
mid-1980's for prisoner capture and control. They comprise a
transparent polycarbonate plate through which metal strips are interlaced. A
button activated induction coil in the handle sends
40,000 - 100,000 volts arcing across the metal strips, accompanied by
intermittent indigo flashing sparks and an intimidating
crackle as the air between the electrodes is ionized. They work by charging
up and then instantly discharging a capacitor, to
produce a chain of high impulse shocks. A sales video shows how the victim
can be instantaneously thrown to the ground on
impact, completely incapacitated.

Manufacturers' claims that these products are "safe" are open to
interpretation. Deaths have been reported from both Tasers116
and from shock shields.117 One of the key experts used by manufacturers of
electroshock weapons to justify claims of the
generic safety of these devices has refuted such an interpretation.118 There
is also the need to take into account the political
context in which many of these weapons are used since push button torture
may be just one methodology applied as part of an
entire spectrum of abuse.

7.2 Torture Software

Apart from such hardware, there are also numerous standard operating
procedures which form the 'software' component of
torture. Examples of training supplied to authoritarian regimes include the
low intensity conflict training used to capture, stress
and 'soften up' dissidents (Watson 1980), advisory support and technical
assistance, including teaching of scientific methods of
'deep interrogation' procedures and the more brutal forms of human
destruction.

Research and development in modern torture techniques and technologies has
focused upon methods which cause suffering and
intimidation without leaving much in the way of embarrassing long-term
visible evidence of brutality. However, researchers in
torture rehabilitation are gradually evolving more sophisticated methods for
detecting and verifying the use of torture
(Karlsmark, et al., 1988; Rasmussen and Skylv, 1993).

A vast range of torture techniques have been evolved.119 The names of these
techniques signify how systematized this
behaviour has become. Some torturing states evolve their own lexicon of
systematized abuse. For example, in China there are
dian ji (electrical assault), gui bian (down on knees whipping), jieju
(chains and fetters), shouzhikao (finger cuffs), zhiliaio (rod
fetters), menbanliao (shackleboard) (Figs. 39, 40, & 45.) and so on, (Human
Rights Watch, 1992; Amnesty International,
1992b).120 A similar set of routinized torture techniques emerged in Latin
America in the 1970's. (Figs. 46, 47 & 48).

The flow of modern repressive 'technique' includes expertise in courses on
low intensity conflict management in operations
deemed to be 'counter terror' or operations other than war. Some of these
approaches are formally coded.121 In January 1997,
for example, a CIA 'Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual' was
released in response to a FOIA request and detailed
torture methods against suspected subversives during the 1980's refuting
claims by the agency that no such methods were
taught there.122

Intense interrogation methodologies border on torture, particularly when
they incorporate scientific approaches based on
psycho-pharmacology or sensory deprivation, or involve levels of physical
terror and softening-up processes of intimidation
which sap the will of the prisoner to resist. What has evolved from this
quest for ever more powerful techniques to break the

human spirit is a classical form of operant conditioning designed to teach
the target psyche debilitation, dependence and dread
(Biderman & Zimmer, 1965). (See Chart 10). Just occasionally, hard evidence
of such research comes to light (Anon, 1993).
In the case of Northern Ireland, BSSRS member Tim Shallice was probably the
first to identify a scientific methodology at
work in the pre-interrogation treatments (See Chart 11) used on detainees in
the first wave of internment introduced into
Northern Ireland in 1971. Shallice identified the real nature of the special
treatment dished out to a selected few - associating it
with sensory deprivation techniques (Shallice, 1973) (See Chart 12), and an
experiment where those targeted were "guinea
pigs" according to McGuffin (1974).

In Northern Ireland, the findings of pioneer sensory isolation pioneers such
as Hebb, 1958; Smith & Lensky, 1959, Lilly, 1955
and Zubek and Solomon, et al. 1959, were modified by the British Army to
create a new process of coercive and debilitating
torture which left no marks.123 Hebb found that after leaving such
experiments, volunteers were disorientated and very
suggestible to propaganda. We can conclude that in the far more disturbing
conditions of arrest, the anxiety created by these
techniques would confuse the victims' thought processes so much that they
would fall easy prey to the bad man-good man act.
The works of Lilly, Smith and Lensky showed that among the after-effects of
sensory deprivation experiences were loss of
identification, feelings of unreality and disorientation. Fear and panic
were found to be common in anyone remaining in an
environment of perceptual deprivation for more than two hours. As was
apparent from the psychological research, anything
over 24 hours 'at the wall' would be sufficient to induce psychotic
breakdown. It has now been established that the long term
effects of such experiences are traumatic neuroses comparable to shell shock
or in modern parlance, it rapidly induced post
traumatic stress syndrome.124

We know that such approaches are designed to intimidate the wider population
rather than just to extract specific information
from any one individual; they are heuristic and can be taught to others (See
McHardy, 1976 and the Times, 1980). The
parallels of the British techniques with those of the CIA Human Resource
Training Manual discussed above are striking. The
CIA manual discusses using intense fear, deep exhaustion, solitary
confinement, unbearable anxiety, standing to attention for
long periods of time, sleep and food deprivation, stripping suspects naked
and keeping them blindfolded in windowless, dark
interrogation rooms with no toilet. Only in January of 1997, did the CIA
formally renounce and prohibit its agents from using
these torture manuals.125 In the meantime, variants of this methodology have
appeared elsewhere, e.g., by the Palestinian
Authority which was set up in May 1994.126

Some interrogation techniques are intended to kill. For example the use of a
heavy wooden roller to crush the limbs of
detainees in Kashmir. This practice results in the release of myoglobin,
heme and other related muscle proteins and toxins
(Rhabdomyolysis) which leads to acute renal failure. In the absence of
kidney dialysis, the results are fatal.127 Other regimes
have resorted to delayed poisoning of their dissidents who die after their
release from incarceration, e.g. by the use of Thallium
which was deployed against Kurds in Iraq and most recently (according to the
ongoing Truth Commission), by South Africa's
Apartheid regime.128

7.3 Torture Liveware

In any bureaucracy of repression, there are personnel schooled in the
ideological attitudes necessary to keep such systems in
operation (Fig.49). In some cases this schooling takes place literally, for
example at the infamous School of the Americas based
at Fort Benning in

General Method
Effects (Purposes)

Variants
1. Isolation.
Deprives victim of all social
support of
his ability to resist. Develops and
intense
concern with self. Makes victim
dependent upon interrogator.
Complete solitary
confinement. Complete
isolations. Semi
isolation.
Group isolation.
2. Monopolisation of
Perception.
Fixes attention upon immediate
predicament. Fosters introspection.
Eliminates stimuli competing with
those
controlled by captor. Frustrates all
action not consistent with
compliance.
Physical isolation.
Darkness or bright light. Barren
environment.
Restricted movement.
Monotonous food.
3. Induced Debility
Exhaustion
Weakens mental and physical
ability to
resist.
Semi-starvation.
Exposure. Exploitation of
wounds. Induced
illness.
Sleep deprivation.
Prolonged constraint.
Prolonged
interrogation.
Forced writing.
Over-exertion.
4. Threats.
Cultivates anxiety and despair.
Threats of death.
Threats of non return. Threats of
endless
interrogation and
isolation. Threats against family.
Vague threats.
mysterious changes
of treatment.
5. Occasional indulgences.
Provides positive motivation for
compliance. Hinders adjustment to
deprivation.
Occasional favors.
Fluctuations of interrogators's
attitudes.
Promises. Rewards
for partial compliance.
Tantalising.
6. Demonstrating
'Omnipotence'.
Suggests futility of resistance.
Confrontation.
Pretending co-operation taken for
granted.
Demonstrating
complete control over victim's fate.
7. Degradation.
Makes cost of resistance more
damaging to self esteem than
capitulation. Reduces prisoner to
'animal level' concerns.
Personal hygiene
prevented. Filthy infested
surrounds.
Demeaning
punishments. Insults and taunts. Denial
of privacy.
8. Enforcing Trivial
Demands.
Develops habits of compliance.
Forced writing.
Enforcement of minute rules.

Chart 10. Biderman's Chart of Coercion

CHART 11: PRE-INTERROGATION TREATMENTS USED ON DETAINEES

1. General assault with truncheons and knuckledusters. Kicks to testicles
and stomach. Faces slapped, ears drummed,
arms twisted, chest hair pulled. Nose, chest, mouth and throat were held.
During these attacks, detainees were
alternatively threatened and bribed.

2. Men were forced to run barefoot over broken glass and stones whilst
being beaten .

3. Some men were dropped blindfold from helicopters hovering near the
ground.

4. Alsatian dogs were used to savage some of the men.

5. Torturous exercises were imposed - up to 48 hours for some men.

6. Men were forced to stand against a wall for many hours with their legs
akimbo.

7. Detainees were repeatedly awakened as soon as they fell asleep.

8. Food and drink were withheld.

9. Bags were kept over the heads of some of the prisoners for up to six
days.

10. On certain occasions an electric cattle prod was used.

11. Some victims had their testicles manually compressed.

12. Others were burned with matches and candles.

13. Detainees were urinated upon.

14. Injections of amphetamine drugs were given to some of the prisoners

15. Psychological tortures were used such as: Russian roulette; firing
blanks, blindfolding; the use of stockings and surgical
masks by the assailants; forcing men to stare at a white perforated wall
in a small cubicle.

CHART 12: TECHNIQUES USED BY THE BRITISH ARMY IN
NORTHERN IRELAND TO MIMIC SENSORY DEPRIVATION

1. Prisoners were hooded before interrogation.

2. A sound machine was used to produce a constant hiss of 'white noise'.

3. Long periods of immobilization in the 'stoika' position, i.e., being
forced to lean against a wall with legs wide apart
standing on the toes, with only the fingertips touching the wall.
Detainees who collapsed from exhaustion were beaten
back into position.

4. Little or no food or drink.

5. Prisoners were forced to wear loose overalls several sizes too big.

6. In addition these men were deprived of sleep for days on end.
EFFECTS OF THESE PROCEDURES

Although these processes were not technically the same as sensory
deprivation, the purpose guiding their use was the
deliberate production of related effects.

Measures 1, 2, 3 and 5 cause visual, auditory, tactile and kinaesthetic
deprivation and thus mimic sensory deprivation.
Measures 1, 4, and 6, deprive the brain of the sugar and oxygen necessary
for normal functioning. Measures 1, 4 and 6,
may also disturb normal body metabolism. Applied together in conditions of
high physical and psychological stress, they
could effect rapid nervous breakdown.

Georgia, otherwise known at the 'School of the Assassins' or 'La escuela del
golpe' (the coup school). It has been accused of
training death squads in Guatemala and Honduras, e.g. Battalion 3-16
(Walker, 1994). In 1995, the Baltimore Sun obtained
Freedom Of Information Act documents on Battalion 3-16, (which used
electroshock and rubber suffocation devices on
prisoners in Honduras), that confirmed that the Unit had been trained in
interrogation techniques by the CIA (Baltimore Sun,
11 June 1995). Last year, further manuals were released under FOIA on
Project X, part of the US Foreign Intelligence
Assistance Programme which reveal that until the 1980's, the US military ran
an intelligence training programme in Latin
America and elsewhere, that taught foreign officers to offer bounties for
captured or killed insurgents, spy on non-violent
political opponents, kidnap rebels' family members, blackmail unwanted
informants and the use of drugs to facilitate
interrogation. Project X manuals were distributed by the US Army School of
Americas but their use was stopped only in 1991
when the Defense Intelligence Agency raised ethical and legal questions.129

Thus the creation of a bureaucracy practising systematic human rights
violation will often include external 'liveware', e.g., the
various foreign technical advisers, counter-insurgency and low intensity
conflict strategists, paramilitary, intelligence and internal
security police as well as the 'white collar mercenaries' who act as key
technical operators in any administrative policy of
repression. This 'liveware' category includes all the people who are
conditioned by fear or training to actually put into practice
the software and hardware components of a particular policy of
repression.130 For the last decade, he export of such 'security'
training has become a highly profitable commercial proposition (Gordon,
1987) and it is a characteristic of the trade in torture
technology and expertise that it has become so intensely privatised (Klare
and Arnson, 1981). Such technologies are now
entering Europe from the USA.

7.4 International Controls On The Export Of electroshock & Stun Technology

In theory, a substantial body of international human rights obligations
should effectively prevent such transfers, including: the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 7 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 5 of the
African Charter on Human and People's Rights; Article 5 of the American
Convention on Human Rights; Article 3 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
freedoms; UN Convention Against Torture; the
UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement
Officials and the UN Standard Minimum Rules
For the Treatment of Prisoners. Yet in January 1995, it was possible for a
UK investigative reporter working for UK Channel
4 Dispatches, to obtain the enthusiastic willingness of several British
companies to supply such devices, which are in fact
banned under UK law (Gregory 1995).

7.5 The European Torture Trail

Until the Channel 4 Programme, 'The Torture Trail' was shown, it was not
widely realized that such an extensive European
electroshock manufacturing and supply base existed. Undercover TV actors
were given privileged access to a secret network
of companies making electroshock weapons and to come away with orders worth
over £3 million (consisting of 10,000
electroshock shields and 5000 shock batons from British Aerospace (BAe) and
15,000 electroshock units from ICL Technical
Plastics). But perhaps the insights this programme gave into the procurement
and proliferation of electro-control technology is
even more astonishing. Philip Morris, the Sales Manager for Royal Ordnance,
agreed to use the Royal Ordnance's worldwide
procurement network to bring the electroshock deal together, irrespective of
the equipment's country of origin or its eventual
destination; Ordnance would organise the whole package. Royal Ordnance's
parent company, invited their clients to meet up at
the secretive

Covert Operation & Procurement Exhibition (COPEX), held at Sandown Park
racecourse In November 1994. A wide range
of internal security was on display. Foreign invitees included delegations
from China, Algeria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colombia,
Iran Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka and Turkey.

The Dispatches team followed through that rendezvous with a meeting at the
Royal Ordnances own offices in Lancashire,
where they were shown a 40,000-volt shock baton made in Eire, together with
an electronic riot shield made in Tennessee,
USA, by Nova Technologies, which could immobilise 120 people without a
battery change. While the deal was struck, Royal
Ordnance made an extraordinary confession, that they had sold 8000 german
electroshock batons as part of the Al Yamamah
deal to Saudi Arabia.131

A further insight into the complicity of companies involved in this business
was afforded by the programme's interview with the
manager of ICL Technical Plastics in Glasgow, Frank Stott.132 He claimed
that he used to sell shock batons to the apartheid
regime in South Africa, and to Abu Dhabi for the Gulf States; and a year
after the Tiananmen Square massacre, he sold
electric-shock weapons to the Chinese authorities via Hong, with the UK
government's blessing, and said that the trip was
supported by the Department of Trade & Industry. Mr. Stott claimed that the
Chinese had an ulterior motive for buying his
electroshock weapons: they wanted to copy them. (China has a prodigious
electroshock weapon manufacturing industry (for
example, the Tianjin Bohai Radio Works manufactures 80,000 shock instruments
a year - all quality controlled (Fig. 50). It is
instructive to note that one of the products photographed in China for this
programme, an extending electroshock probe (See
Fig. 51), has been awarded a British patent (no. GB214906A).133

7.6 RECOMMENDATIONS

(i). New regulations on the nature of in-depth interrogation training should
be agreed which prohibit export of such techniques
to forces overseas known to be involved in gross human rights violation.

(ii). All training of foreign military, police, security and intelligence
forces in interrogation techniques, should be subject to
licence, even if it is provided outside European territory .

(iii). Restrictions on visits to European MSP related events by
representatives of known torturing states should be effectively
implemented.

(iv) The Commission should be requested to achieve agreement between member
States to:

(a) immediately prohibit the transfer of all electroshock stun weapons
to any country where such weapons are
likely to contribute to unlawful killings, or to torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment, for example by
refusing any export licence where it is proposed that electroshock
weapons will be transferred to a country where
persistent torture or instances of instances of electric shock torture
and ill treatment have been reported;

b) introduce and implement new regulations on the manufacture, sale and
transfer of all electroshock weapons
from and into Europe, with a full report to the European Parliament's
Civil Liberties committee made each year.
[Special consideration should be given to controlling the whole
procurement process, covering even the making of
contracts of sale, (to prevent a purchase deal made in a European
country being met by a supplier or subsidiary
outside of the EU, in an effort to obviate extant controls)].

(c). Ensure that the proposed regulations should cover patents and
prohibit the patenting of any device whose sole
use would be the violation of human rights, via torture or the creation
of unnecessary suffering. The onus should be
on the patent seeker to show that his patent would not lead to such
outcomes.

(v) The European Parliament should look at commissioning new work to
investigate how existing legislation within member
states of the EU, can be brought to bear to prosecute companies who have
been complicity in the supply of equipment used for
torture as defined by the UN convention of torture. This new work should
examine, in conjunction with the Directorate of
Human Rights:

(a) The extent to which such technology produced by European companies
is being transferred to human rights
violators and the role played by international military, police and
security fairs organised both inside and outside
European Borders;

(b) The possible measures that could be set in place to monitor and
track any technology transfer within this
category and any potential role in this endeavour that might be played
by recognised Non-Governmental
Organisations.

8. REGULATION OF HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION

The last Gulf War was in many ways an exception to the changing character of
political conflict. With the end of the Cold War,
the future lies increasingly in a bewildering array of separatist and
counter-insurgency wars; border disputes; ethnic and religious
violence; coups d'etat; national security and counter-revolutionary
operations - what the military once called "low intensity
conflicts" and now call "operations other than war." Civil conflicts in
Somalia, Kashmir, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Rwanda, the
former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, South Korea and most recently,
Albania, being cases in point.

8.1 The European Trade in Repression

Many of the major arms companies also have a paramilitary/internal security
operation and diversification into these markets, is
increasingly taking place. Weapons specifically designed to quell dissent
are incredibly cheap compared to their major warfare
counterparts like ships, aircraft and tanks, and have the market advantage
of being used almost continuously against the enemy
within. The move into a post-Cold War world has been accompanied by a change
in the nature of warfare. Military scientists
are on the threshold of dramatic weapons and technologies destined to
transform internal political control. The clients most
enthusiastically seeking this technology are the torturing states outlined
in Figure 38. In those contexts we can accurately
describe the technology of political control, as technology of repression
and identify exports of these commodities as a
repression trade.134

NGO's like Amnesty International, have begun to catalogue the trade in
specialised military, security and police technologies, to
measure its impact on industrialising repression, globalising conflict,
undermining democracy and strengthening the security
forces of torturing states to create a new generation of political
prisoners, extra-judicial killings and 'disappearances'. (Amnesty
International, 1996). The key issue for Members of the European Parliament
is how they will deal with the human and political
fall out of what is a systemic process of exporting repression: either
importing a tidal wave of dispossessed refugees, or keeping
them in desperation at the borders of Europe. In the longer term, it is
important to

examine the role and function of specific technologies in crushing dissent
and to analyze the trade in repression and its correlates
in terms of human displacement - huge numbers of nonpersons which some
country must import. Such refugees will themselves
become targets for further political control and exclusion in the newly
moulded Fortress Europe, now well on the way to putting
whole societies under surveillance, in an effort to deny them permanent
residence. The export of the technology of political
control and the flow of refugees must be understood as part of the same
process. There is an urgent need for greater
transparency and democratic control of such exports and a clearer
recognition of their frequent linkage with gross human rights
violations in their recipient states.

As discussed above, this arsenal of control includes area denial
technologies such as razor wire to seal off selected zones,
surveillance, telephone and fax tapping networks used to track dissidents;
computerised communications, command and control
systems linked to data banks and remote terminals(in security vehicles,
border checkpoints etc.); automatic vehicle recognition
and tracking equipment; riot technology including whips, sawn-off shotguns,
incapacitating and less-lethal weapons, such as
water cannon, stun grenades, multi-shot riot guns, plastic bullets, chemical
irritants, injector weapons, sound, light and
electromagnetic zapping technologies; pre-fragmented exploding ammunition,
dum-dum bullets, stroboscopic cameras which
can photograph every participant in a demonstration in seconds; helicopter
mounted crowd monitoring equipment; public order
vehicles; identity recognition systems; silenced sub-machine guns and
assassination rifles; precision laser and night target
acquisition aids; prison and restraining technologies as well as blunt
trauma inducing drugs and specially designed implements of
torture.

To many of the suppliers attending the specialised paramilitary, police and
security fairs, the answer to the question would you
sell your equipment to countries on the Redress Trust s map of the torturing
states (Fig. 38), would be a resounding yes please'
In fact MSP technologies are aggressively marketed at a series of special
fairs and exhibitions which take place all over the
world (See Appendix 1.) Potential customers get an opportunity to sample the
latest wares. (Fig. 52) Weapons are sometimes
on display that are banned for use in many European states (Fig. 53) and
some clue is afforded to the dynamics behind
proliferation and conversion of these technologies as European Fairs
organisers target other continents such as Latin America.
(Fig. 54). Equipment on display at such fairs one month sometimes finds a
ready application on the streets soon after. (Fig. 55)
At Turkey's IDEF exhibition, European gas back packs were on display (Fig.
56) as well as a flypast by the UK flying team the
Red Arrows, British licensed production internal security vehicles were
exhibited alongside Russian helicopter attack gunships.
(Fig. 57)

In the wake of growing evidence that MSP transfers from the European Union
have contributed to the deliberate and
indiscriminate killing of civilians, disappearances, torture, and ill
treatment on a mass scale, there is widespread public disquiet
at the apparent inaction of the governments of the European Union to address
this concern.135 A few examples examining the
MSP transfers to just two human rights violating countries are sufficient to
illustrate the nature of this trade, i.e., European
companies based in:- Austria136; Belgium137; Denmark138; Finland139;
France140; Germany141; Greece142; Italy143;
Netherlands144; Sweden145; & the UK146; exporting MSP supplies to Indonesia;
or European companies based in Belgium147;
France148; Germany149; Italy150; Netherlands151; and the UK152; exporting
MSP goods to Turkey.

Similarly, many companies in the UK; Belgium: Switzerland; Germany; Austria;
Sweden and Finland are arranging licensed
production through joint ventures with companies in third countries. For
example:Land Rover153; GKN Defence154(UK); FN
Nouvelle Herstal155(Belgium);

Heckler &Koch156(Germany); Steyr-Mannlicher157(Austria); FFV
Ordnance158(Sweden); PT Pindad159(Indonesia) and
Pilatus160(Switzerland). These arrangements have the effect of circumventing
European or Member State strategic export
controls.

8.2 European Electroshock Weapon Exports

Pierre Sane, Secretary General of Amnesty International, speaking on 'The
Torture Trail' called for all governments to
investigate and to put in place new mechanisms, such as public disclosure in
advance, to halt the trade in electroshock
equipment which use it to torture. In response to the disclosures on the
programme the European Parliament made a resolution
on the 19 January 1995, which called on the Commission to bring forward
proposals to incorporate these technologies within
the scope of the arms export controls and ensure greater transparency in the
export of all military, security and police
technologies to prevent the hypocrisy of governments who themselves breach
their own export bans.(Doc
EN\RE\264264474)161

The ineffectiveness of any action subsequently taken can be judged by the
fact that the same team of TV researchers returned
to the torture trail in 1996 and found it was very much business as usual.
Despite the furor created by the first Dispatches
Torture Trail programme, on their second expedition 'Back On The Torture
Trail' the undercover team found that of the eight
British companies contacted only two were unwilling to quote for a new order
of 300 electroshock batons. The most
enthusiastic companies featured in this programme were not put off by the
fact that the intended destination was Zaire. None of
the companies featured bothered to check out the fake company's bona fides.
In fact they were faxing their quotations to a
public fax bureau machine at a railway station in Switzerland. Some of these
companies said they could get around legal
restrictions by transhipping them so that they would not enter the UK and
seemed well rehearsed in getting around European
restrictions. For example, SDMS's chairman said that they and their South
African associates had previously sold electroshock
products to Libya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Angola, Mexico, Peru, Burma &
Indonesia. Another company offered to avoid
export regulation by selling Dispatches undercover research team, 300 shock
batons made by the Macoisa company of
Mexico City at a cost of $25,000. Macoisa's boss, Alfredo Aguilla, told the
undercover team he could export the 40,000 volt
batons on behalf of his British client anywhere they chose. Aguilla told the
programme's producer that bad human rights record
were no problem.162

'Back to the Torture Trail' marked a turning point in human rights
organisations understanding of the implications of loopholes in
existing strategic exports controls legislation. Speaking in the programme,
the Secretary Of Amnesty International, Pierre Sane
said: "It is not just good enough to prohibit the manufacture of this
equipment in the UK, or the sale or possession of this
equipment in the UK. Legislation should also prohibit companies from
engaging in offshore sale of this equipment (Gregory,
1996).

8.3 Export Of Implements of Torture From The U.S.A.

Sadly, it no longer comes as a surprise to discover that other leading
Western Liberal Democracies have been colluding with
the torture trade. Yet during the 1980's some clues were afforded by reports
that US companies such as Technipol were freely
advertising thumbcuffs, leg irons and shackles (Klare & Amson, 1981). The
Danish Medical Group of Amnesty found that
electronic prods manufactured by the US Shok-Baton Company had been used in
the violation of human rights,163 and a
repentant Uruguayan torturer confessed that he had used US-made electroshock
batons.(Cooper, 1984).164 In fact scores of
US companies either manufacture or supply electroshock devices, thumbcuffs
and leg irons.165

Chart 13. Police torture exports licensed by
US Commerce Department 1991 - 1993

Recipient no./value of licenses no./value of licenses Recipient
no./value of licenses no./value of licenses
for cmdty. OA82C1 for cmdty. OA84C1
for cmdty. OA82C1 for cmdty. OA84C1
____________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________

ALBANIA 2/$1,240 LIECHTENSTEIN
1/$5,250
ALGERIA 1/$35 2/$370 LITHUANIA
7/$453,593
ANDORRA 1/$37,500 7/$704,552 MACAO
3/$4,619 4/$3,220
ARGENTINA 26/$7,367,559 104/$10,041,640 MALAYSIA
3/$660,123 16/$150,519
AUSTRALIA (2) 5/$91,408 MALTA
1/$1,778
AUSTRIA 11/$448,068 78/$3,996,467 MEXICO
33/$1,755,366 34/$3,157,455
BAHAMAS 3/$9,978 MONTSERRAT
1/$1,710
BAHRAIN 1/$1,527 MOZAMBIQUE
1/$2,435
BANGLADESH 3/$90 6/$15,704 NEPAL
2/$579
BARBADOS 8/$13,224 THE NETHERLANDS
(2) 1/$3,232
BELGIUM (2) 4/$1,312,394 NETH. ANTILLES
1/$3,969 8/$35,228
BELIZE 1/$5,037 8/$18,824 NEW CALEDONIA
11/$30,021
BENIN 1/$1,371 NICARACUA
14/$591,478
BERMUDA 1/$3,112 NIGERIA
3/$2,428,710 6/$89,625
BOLIVIA 9/$655,845 25/$1,084.933 NORWAY
1/$306 7/$76,967
BOTSWANA 3/$7,255 OMAN
3/$7,449 1/$467
BRAZIL 48/$252,334 PAKISTAN
2/$2,759,234 37/$7,069,539
BULGARIA 10/$566,428 PANAMA
11/$111,794 58/$1,566,633
CHILE 20/$260,908 40/$1,208,813 PAPUA NEW
GUINEA 5/$33,313 10/$64,417
CHINA 1/$32,250 PARAGUAY
3/$66,000 57/$2,875,177
COLOMBIA 2/$65,500 18/$949,543 PERU
1/$12,881 27/$2,300,885
COSTA RICA 12/$114,624 27/$488,122 PHILIPPINES
1/$37,500 41/$3,865,650
CYPRUS 2/$140 4/$18,749 POLAND
2/$659,332 7/$550,404
CZECH REPUBLIC 2/$47,090 7/$68,025 QATAR
1/$49 4/$167,875
DOMINICA 5/$40,489 ROMANIA
6/$130,128
DOM. REPUBLIC 6/$144,740 90/$1,070,584 RUSSIA
39/$7,349,121
ECUADOR 11/$315,016 63/$1,111,575 RWANDA
1/$404
EGYPT 4/$1,190 4/$8,041 SAUDI ARABIA
14/$5,060,804 14/$5,478,476
EL SALVADOR 66/$707,171 SEYCHELLES
1/$79
ESTONIA 7/$1,704,997 SINGAPORE
7/$5,589 25/$433,443
FINLAND 5/$22,714 52/$2,895,730 SLOVAKIA
1/$270,000
FRANCE (2) 4/$88,237 SLOVENIA
1/$8,934 1/$125,000
FRENCH GUIANA 2/$120,000 SOUTH AFRICA
7/$837,991
THE GAMBIA 2/$2,100 SPAIN
(2) 1/$18,379
GEORGIA 1/$210,500 SRI LANKA
1/$9,663
GERMANY (2) 3/$42,925 SURINAM
7/$32,589
GHANA 2/$22,200 12/$1,174,602 SWEDEN
4/$8,911 77/$9,419,883
GRENADA 1/$726 SWITZERLAND
13/$444,243 93/$4,441,647
GUATEMALA 6/$170,771 55/$2,531,484 TAIWAN
1/$6,990
GUINEA 1/$11,500 2/$195,201 TANZANIA
2/$2,005
GUYANA 9/$9,750 THAILAND
3/$396,714 135/$6,134,985
HONDURAS 4/$121,588 TRINIDAD &
TOBAGO 5/$17,568 21/$29,651
HONG KONG 7/$49,646 49/$1,265,271 TUNISIA
4/$39,043
HUNGARY 3/$358,500 12/$1,159,371 TURKEY
(2) 2/$154,000
ICELAND (2) 1/$540 UAE
2/$21,062 14/$531,261
INDONESIA 3/$7,076 4/$36,201 UGANDA
1/$1,293
IRAN 1/$219 UKRAINE
5/$2,253,875
IRELAND 15/$214,821 UNITED KINGDOM
(2) 5/$50,387
ISRAEL 21/$160,189 41/$3,689,794 URUGUAY
3/$48,443 48/$1,449,694
ITALY (2) 2/$105,500 VENEZUELA
51/$1,609,012 220/$9,691,215
JAMAICA 11/$110,151 ZAMBIA
1/$3,668
JORDAN 3/$12,400 9/$329,300 ZIMBABWE
8/$20,988
KENYA 1/$2,988
_____________________________________________________
KOREA (SOUTH) 9/$362,666 10/$592,982 TOTALS
365/$27,638,035 2083/$117,270,285
KUWAIT 9/$785,283 13/$767,114
KAZAKHSTAN 24/$3,831,270 Notes: (1) For
explanation of the commodity categories see p. 1.
LATVIA 2/$304,082 (2) Australia,
Japan, New Zealand and NATO members do not require
LEBANON 1/$28,140 2/$11,518 validated
licences to import commodity 0A82C items.
Source: Department
of Commerce, personal correspondence,
21 April 1995
(available upon request).

Back in 1984, it emerged that US export regulations even had special customs
codes form such items as 'specially designed
instruments of torture' (US Department of Commerce, 1984) There was even
some suggestion (in para 376.14) that the US
government could distance itself from human rights violations through
'judicious use of export controls'. (US Department of
Commerce, 1983). Concerned by the possible scale of the trade in such
technologies and the possibility they could be
exported on via Europe which has much laxer arms export controls and
transparency than the US, the UK human rights
organisation, the Omega Foundation, sought comprehensive US export trade
statistics. A Freedom of Information request was
put down on Omega's behalf by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS).

What emerged was that the new category codes in the export administration
regulations have if anything been extended to
include, inter alia:

* 'saps,thumbcuffs,thumbscrews, leg irons, shackles and handcuffs,
specially designed implements of torture,
straight jackets etc. (OA82C)' and

* 'stun guns, shock batons, electric cattle prods and other
immobilization guns (OA84C)' (United States
Department of Commerce 1994).

The statistics of the export licences of such repressive equipment show that
from September 1991 to December 1993, the US
Commerce Department approved over 350 export licences under commodity
category OA82C. The further category OA84C
aggregates together data on electric shock batons with shotguns and shells.
Over 2000 licences were granted from September
1991 to December 1993. (See Chart 13) As feared, the list names many EU
Member States including Austria, Belgium,
France, Germany; Iceland, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain and the
United Kingdom. While the licenses represent a
snapshot of permissions for the sale to go forward, they do not indicate
actual delivery, nor are they comprehensive since
countries in NATO, such as Turkey, do not require a licence (Arms Sales
Monitor, 1995). FAS has pointed out that
aggregating data in this way, by lumping noncontroversial data on equipment
such as those on helmets with controversial data
on equipment often used for torture such as shock batons, effectively
frustrates public oversight. Given the nature of some of
the recipients - Saudi Arabia for example, where Amnesty has already
recorded instances of Iraqis being tortured with electric
shock batons (Amnesty International, 1994), many observers feared the
worst.166 Pressure to desegregate such categories in
the US eventually proved successful but there remains a lack of effective
checking and some items which should be in the
amended category, are still slipping through.167

8. 4 Controlling The Spread of Push-Button Torture

Alarmed by new information emerging on the extent of the worldwide trade in
torture technologies, the International Secretariat
of Amnesty launched a worldwide campaign against 'Arming the Torturers,
Electroshock Torture and the Spread of Stun
Technology', as this report was being finalized in March 1997 (Amnesty
International 1997). Amnesty's report identified over
100 companies willing to supply modem stun weapons since 1990168, in twenty
countries, including members of the EU,
(Belgium169, France170, Germany171, Luxembourg172, Netherlands173, Spain174
and the United Kingdom175). The proposals
made by Amnesty International to halt this trade in bush-button torture,
have been incorporated into the policy
recommendations below.

8. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission should be requested to achieve agreement between Member
States to undertake changes to their respective
strategic export controls so that:

(i) All proposed transfers of security or police equipment are publicly
disclosed in advance, especially electroshock weapons,
(including those arranged on European territory where the equipment
concerned remains outside Member States' borders) so
that the human rights situation in the intended receiving country can be
taken into consideration before any such transfers are
allowed.;

(ii) Reports are issued on the human rights situation in receiving
countries;

(iii) Member States Parliaments are notified of all information necessary to
enable them to exercise proper control over the
implementation of the law, including information on human rights from
non-governmental organisations;

(iv) Member States monitor and regulate all exhibitions promoting the sale
of security equipment and technology to ensure that
any proposed transfers such as electroshock weapons, will not contribute to
unlawful killings, or to torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment;

(v) All military, police and security exhibitions are required to publish
guest lists, names of exhibitors, products and services on
display and no visas or invitations should be issued to governments or
representatives of security forces, known to carry out
human rights violations.

(vi)The sender should take legal responsibility for the stated use of
military, security and police transfers in practice, for example
making future contracts dependent on adherence to human rights criteria and
that such criteria are central to the regulatory
process.

(vii) The European Parliament should explore the possibilities of using the
Joint Action procedures used to establish the EU
regulations on the export of Dual Use equipment to draw up common lists of
(a) proscribed military, security, police
(MSP)technology and training, the sole or primary use of which is to
contribute to human rights violations; (b) sensitive MSP
technologies which have been shown in the past to be used to commit human
rights violations; and (c) military, security and
police units and forces which have been sufficiently responsible for human
rights violations and to whom sensitive goods and
services should not be supplied.

(viii) The European Parliament should commission new research into the
extent to which European companies are complicity in
supplying MSP equipment used to commit human rights violations and the
prospects of instituting independent measures of
monitoring the level and extent of such sales whilst tracking their
subsequent human rights impacts and consequences.

9. CONCLUSIONS

With proper accountability and regulation, some of the technologies
discussed above do have a legitimate law enforcement
function; without such democratic controls they provide powerful tools of
oppression. The unchecked vertical and horizontal
proliferation of the technologies of political control described in this
report, present a powerful threat to civil liberties in Europe
in the s [as written] century, particularly if the political context of
freedoms of expression changes in the next century, as many
times as it has in the last. Whilst there are sufficient real abuses of
power by the police, internal security and intelligence agencies
to keep the conspiracy theorists busy for the foreseeable future,
technological and decision drift will have an equal if not more
powerful role to play if current trends develop unchecked. The real threat
to civil liberties and human rights in the future, is as
likely to arise from an incremental erosion of civil liberties, than it is
from some conscious plan. The rate of such erosion is
speeding up and is rapidly being fuelled by the pace of innovation in the
technology of political control. An arsenal of new
weapons and technologies of political control has already been developed or
lies waiting on the horizon for a suitable
opportunity to find useful work.

As the globalisation of political control technologies increases, Members of
the European Parliament have a right and a
responsibility to challenge the costs, as well as the alleged benefits of so
called advances in law enforcement. This report has
sought to highlight some of the areas which are leading to the most
undesirable social and political consequences (such as
advances in so called 'non-lethal weapons' or the emergence of a vast
international machinery of communications supervision)
and where a return to a fuller form of democratic control is seen as
desirable. The social and political implications of other
innovations mentioned above such as human recognition and tracking
technologies, are under explored and further work should
be undertaken. In the meantime, urgent action is required by other
Directorates, to ensure European technology of political
control does not get into the hands of tyrannical and repressive regimes, as
it so often does today. Members of the Committee
are requested to consider the policy recommendations provided in the report
as just a first step to help bring the technology of
political control, back under democratic control.

NOTES & REFERENCES

[JYA Note: A few of the citations lack the year; shown as written.]

1. For a detailed analysis of NARMIC & NACLA's work in this area, see for
example. Police on the Home Front (NARMIC,
1971). Also see Iron Fist &Velvet Glove: An Analysis of the US Police, 1976
Published by the Center for Research on
Criminal Justice, Berkley.

2. Based on a definition from Winner, 1974.

3. For a discussion of the perspective in terms of the role technology plays
in the future of policing, see (Nogala, D. 1995).

4. A general reader interested in the overall state of the art should
consult annual publications such as Jane's Security & Co-In
(Counter-Insurgency ) Catalog [provides a wide range of product
information]; British Defence Equipment Catalogue
[produced in association with UK MoD]; International Defence Equipment
Catalogue [very detailed catalogue leaning towards
the military and paramilitary end of the spectrum produced by Monch
publications, Germany]; International Defence Directory
[very useful index of companies and products, e.g., listing
batons-electronic. Also provides some useful detail on companies
representatives within other countries]; or periodicals which deal with
certain market sectors such as Intersec, Jane's Defence
Review, Jane's Defence Weekly; CCTV Today; Police & Government Security
Technology; Cross Border Control -
International, Military Technology; or for a more radical updating of news,
the CILIP report of Berlin, the Statewatch
publication from London or the Fortress Europe newsletter from Sweden. The
Exhibition catalogues of the fairs listed here as
Appendix 1, also provide a revealing insight into what is being traded, by
who to whom.

5. For a critical evaluation of the utility of the various commercial and
public domain information sources on military, security
and police technologies, see Abel, 1997.

6. Whilst it remains impossible to put an exact figure on the global worth
of sales of the technology of political control, most
commentators agree that it is rapidly growing . This trend accelerated at
the end of the Cold War when many military
companies diversified their product range into the civilian internal
security market. For example, one estimate suggested that the
US market for 'low intensity conflict merchandise' would increase from $1
billion in fiscal 1991 to $1.5 billion in fiscal 1996.
This was contrasted sharply with a projected 25% decrease in US Department
of Defense (DoD) expenditure on conventional
weaponry during the same period.(Frost & Sullivan International, 1991)

7. A process which reached an apotheosis with the introduction of robot
policemen patrols in the United States. (Davie, 1984).
This work has continued into the Nineties with the evolution of 'insectoids'
for guard duty functions. (see Section 3. on
area-denial)

8. An explanation of the role and function of Eurodac is provided in the
consultants final report to the Council of The European
Union general Secretariat, 'The Eurodac System For Recording Asylum Seekers'
Fingerprints', (O/Ref.:(EUD2/JPB/1&C)
Paris, October 11, 1995. For a discussion of the implications of Eurodac,
see Fortress Europe, circular letter No. 46, Sweden,
August 1996. A more detailed explanation of the concept of a technopolitics
of exclusion within the context of an evolving
Fortress Europe, is presented in (Abel, et. al. 1991).

9. Klare garnered information on a few score companies (Klare & Arnson,
1981); Wright managed a few hundred (Wright,
1987); Whereas the Omega Foundation now has details on over 5,000 companies.

10. Statewatch, October, 1996, pp. 6-7.

11. Einsatz der Stadtpolizei bei den Auseinandersetzungen vom 1 Mai 1996.
bericht der Geschaftsprufngskommission an den
Gemeinderat der Stadt Zurich, Zurich, February 1997, p. 190.

12. For example the CLASSIC (Covert Local Area Sensor System) system built
by Racal UK, which is used detect illegal
immigrants attempting to enter Hong Kong.

13. The snake of fire was the electrified border fence which guarded South
Africa's border with Mozambique and Zimbabwe.
According to the South African Bureau for Refugees, it killed more refugees
in three years than the Berlin Wall killed in its
entire history. (New Scientist. 27 Jan 1990)

14. E.g., Morpho systemes in France; Siemens Automatisierungstechnik in
Germany; Security Systems International in
Switzerland; ICL DESC, Ferranti and Unysis in the U.K.

15. The Guardian, May 3, 1995 .

16. Sylvester, R, 1996, Labour Plans DNA test for everyone from Birth,
Telegraph, July 22.

17. E.g., by Avenire Technologie International and Tour Bull:Worldwide
Information Systems.

18. E.g., by helling Kommanditgesellschaft fur Industrieprodukte.

19. E.g., by Aspley LtD, BAeSEMA Ud, Bel Tech Security products, Belgrave
Group, Cambridge Neurodynamics, DelTech
Security Ltd, Electronics Graphics, GEC Traffic Automation LtD, IO Research
Ltd, Keygrove Marketing, Noble Campion
Ltd, NPS Photograph Storage and retrieval System, Picdar Ud, SD-Scicon UK,
Solarray Identification Systems (SIS),
Strategic Imaging Systems(SISYS).

20. E.g., by Axiom Research Co., Compu-Colour, Edicon, Epic solutions,
Identikit Co Inc, Kyber Group, Neurometric
Visions Systems, Precision Dynamics Corp, Sirchie Fingerprint Labs,
Technology Recognition Systems (TRS), Visatex
Corporation.

21. Via companies such as PratiElectro in Belgium; Spectronic & SST in
Denmark; Compagnie Francause d'Exportation;
Crelec Electronique; Data Mast; DLD SA; Elecktron France SA; Export Trading
Services SARL, Protex Arms, Societie des
Laboratoires Mouillard, Transtel Transmissions; VK Electronic in France; HP
Marketing & Consulting Wust; HABRA
Electronik; Hussains International; KDM; Micro and Security Electronic; PK
Electronic and Rennhak Nachtsichtsysteme in
Germany; ATET SRi in Italy; ALphaSafety in Luxembourg; Reinaert Electronics
in the Netherlands; Defex in Spain and
Spycatcher, Soundex, Lorrraine Electronics PK Electronics, CAZ, Counterspy;
and TR Associates in the UK.

22. Davies, S, (1997), Police tap into the secrets of technology, Daily
telegraph, January 28, p. 7.

23. Whymant, R (1977), 6-legged superspy scuttles to our aid, Times, 29
January.

24. Quoted from Jane Hunter, Israeli Foreign Policy, South African and
Central America, South End Press. 1987.

25. See, The Surveillance Society, Sci-Files, BBC, broadcast, BBC2, 3 March
1997 .

26. This new form of carbon will enable current CRAY type super computers to
be carried in the pocket, the implications of
having such storage capacity for policing purposes are barely assessed since
the trend is towards suppressed demand - i.e.,
police forces use up whatever capacity they are provided with. (Sci-Files,
BBC, UK, 'The Last Nobel', 17,3,97.)

27.Typical examples include those made by Sicherheits Transport in Austria;
Beherman Demoen & FN Nouvelle Herstal in
Belgium; Timoney Technologies in Eire; Renault, Saviem and Panhard in
France; Bonowi Mercedes Benz, Rheinstahl and
Thyssen in Germany; Alma in Greece; Fiat and Inveco in Italy; Alphasafety in
Luxembourg; DAF Special Products Division in
the Netherlands; Nauteknik Defence & Security in Norway; Bravia -- Sodedade
Luso-Brasileira & ITB in Portugal; DEFEX
and Santa Barbara SA in Spain; Hagglunds Vehicles in Sweden; Bucher Guyer
and MOWAG in Switzerland; Aselan Military,
FMC & Octobus in Turkey; Alvis, GKN, Glover Webb, Land Rover, Short
Brothers, Transac and Trojan vehicles in the UK.

28. E.g., by the end of 1983 70 martial arts instructors were teaching
London police officers Japanese martial arts techniques -
the old techniques were viewed as two pedestrian. These new techniques go
hand in hand with mini-truncheon usage. The
techniques were evolved originally for use in Northern Ireland according to
Brigadier Michael Harvey, the military trainer
responsible for teaching them,

because of "the inadequacy of techniques used in Northern Ireland where six
soldiers were often needed to make one arrest."
(Sunday Telegraph, 7.7.85)

29. Interview with Professor Rosenhead, January 1997.

30. For example the Lawrence Livermore laboratory has developed a pulsed
light weapon and a projectile launcher with
impact velocity control; Delta Defence has created a pepper Spray Launcher:
Foster Miller a Diabling Net and Launcher
system; Sandia Laboratories have produced the sticky foam gun. Some of these
have already been approved for example,
DEFTEC's semi-lethal shot gun rounds; Alliant's non-lethal launched ordnance
and the Volcano fish-hook mine system, Olin's
vehicle stopper.

31. "As soon as a new non-lethal weapon has been used, the shock effect will
be reduced in future." (Deane-Drummond,
1975).

32. For an excellent discussion, see Sugarman S & Rand, K, Cease Fire,
Rolling Stone, March 10, 1994, pp. 31-39.

33. E.g., Hirtberger, Austria; Cartridge Factory Lapua, Sako Ltd, Finland;
Laboratoire Arcane, Societe Francaise de
Munitions (SFM, France; Dynamit Nobel, Germany; Norma Projectilfabrik,
Sweden; SM Swiss Munition Enterprise;
Beechwood, Cobra, Conjay Arms Co., Edgar brothers, Parker Hale Ltd. in the
UK. The development of these weapons has
in fact gone hand in hand with their converse - guns like the Belgium FN
Herstal's Five-seven pistol which can penetrate 48
layers of Kelvar. Such developments lead to a ratchet-like arms race between
the police and their adversaries on who can out
gun whom since it may be the opposition who acquire the hi-tech first.

34. Guardian, 10/2/96 and the Atlantic 2/90.

35. Speech by Hansjourg Geiger, German Federal Commission for the Stasi
Files, April 14, 1993.

36. David Banisar, Covert Action Quarterly, No. 56, Spring 1996.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. 'Your number may be up', Times, May 13, 1994. Company Press release
17,5, 94.

40. For example, Compagnie Francaise d'Exportation, DLD SA, Elektron France
SA, IN SNEC, Positive, SAGEM.
Thomson CSF Securite.

41. E.g., Bosch & HABRA Elecktronic.

42. E.g., Gatsometer BV.

43. E.g., Action Information management, Arkonia Electronics, CCS UK, MAtra
Marconi, McCue, Micromill, Navstar
Systems, Pearpoint, Primary Image, Racal, Radmec, Sarasota Automation,
Securicor Datatrak, Siemens Plessey Controb,
Strategi Imaging Systems, Symonds Travers Morgan, Terrafix, and The
Integrated Security Group.

44. Common Position EC No/95, Adopted by the Council on 20 February 1995,
Directive 95/EC of the European Parliament
and the Council, 'On the Protection of Individuals, With Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement
of Such Data'.

45. E.g., debate re use of bugging and other unconventional methods against
motorcycle gangs. (Statewatch, September,
October 1996.

46. E.g., the revelations in the De Morgen newspaper on 24 April 1996, that
the Belgium Intelligence service "Abemene Dienst
Inlichtingen en Veiligheid", had decided to create regional networks based
in various Army barracks to spy on the activities of
Belgian citizens.

47. An intense debate has gone on since 1995 about allowing bugging of
personal homes which would need to amend article
13 of the constitution on the inviolability of residence. (Unverletzlichkeit
der Wohnung).

48. Where a judicial inquiry into secret surveillance, by the Norwegian
surveillance police, was appointed by the Norwegian
Parliament on 1 February, 1996 (Statewatch, May-June. 1996, p. 5)

49. Dutch politicians called for an inquiry in January 1996, after reports
that one of the country's largest banks was intercepting
staff calls. Financial Times, 18.1.96.

50. Where new legislation for both MI5 and for ordinary police has created
new powers to bug and burgle. (See Statewatch,
February 1996 and the Guardian, 30 Nov 1996)

51. Reuters World Report, 30 September 1996.

52. For further information, see the annual reports of the Commission
nationale de controle des interceptions de securite, Paris.

53. Quoted from NARMIC, 1971, p .17, (who refer to Scheurer's own book
(undated), To Walk the Streets Safely, p. 81,

54. These tables are taken from the papers of Thein,1974; Egnar, 1976 and
Wargovitch, 1975. Whilst immediate political
consequences were factored into the equation, little systematic evaluation
seems to have been devoted to the longer-term
political consequences of deploying these weapons. The official view
filtered out any consideration of hidden or dysfunctional
impacts of these weapons.

55. These concepts were formally laid out as follows:

(i) The use of less-lethal weapons constitutes an aggressive act. If
those who are targeted with these technologies
make this interpretation, there is a possibility that further use will
lead them to reply with retaliatory aggressive
responses.

(ii) If (i) is so, then in certain circumstances, the use of
less-lethal weapons may be considered as an
overcorrective response. Overcorrective responses can bring about an
opposite effect to the one intended, e.g.,
uncontrollable conflict and further polarization.

(iii) If powers of control were lost because of these dysfunctional
processes, a resurgence of the phenomena
under attempted control may develop as the fix loses its potency. If
such processes were applicable to the case of
less lethal weapons and the nature of the underlying dynamic was not
recognised, reliance on ever even more
powerful fixes would prove counterproductive. (Wright, 1978, 1987)

56. Hansard, Written Answers, 21 January 1977, col 331.

57. Hansard Written Answer, Friday 28 January, 1977, No. 54 .

58. An account of the circumstances surrounding these deaths is provided in
'A Report On the Misuse of the Baton Round in
the North of Ireland, Submission to the Mitchell Commission, United Campaign
Against Plastic Bullets, 1995 and Curtis, L,
They Shoot Children, Information on Ireland, 1982.

59. Upshall, DG, 'The effects of CN & CS on the developing chicken embryo',
quoted by Himmsworth, (HMSO, 1971).

60. CR, nicknamed firegas, was developed in the early seventies as a
substitute for CS. It can be dissolved in water and thus
fired from watercannon. The UK company Schermuly marketed a hand held CR
SPAD spray at the British Army Equipment
Exhibition in 1988. Although authorised throughout the UK since 1973, apart
from a reported use in the Maze Prison which the
authorities have always denied, CR is thought to remain a special forces
weapon.

61. From the Guardian, 27.7.1986.

62. SIPRI, the problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol 1, 1971, p.
64.

63. Ballantyne B. 'Riot Control Agents - Biomedical and Health Aspects of
the Use of Chemicals in Civil Disturbances,
Medical Annual (1977), pp.7-41.

64. Jones,R (1973), 'Return To Riot Control', New Scientist, May 31, pp.
546-547.

65. See Leonard Jason-Lloyd, CS gas - an indiscriminate weapon?, New Law
Journal, July 26, 1991. pp. 1043-1045. Earlier
inhalation toxicology studies indicate that at high levels of CS exposure to
cause chemical pneumonitis and fatal pulmonary
edema (whats that [as written]). Ref. Ballantyne B, Callaway S., 'Inhalation
toxicology and Pathology of animals exposed to
o-chloro-benzylidene malononitrile (CS)', Med. Sci. & Law, 1972; 12:43-65.
Kacmarek B, Gaszynski W., Ultrastructure of
the rabbits lung tissue after administration of CS preparation. Acta Med
Pol. 1977; 18:327-328.

66. A Parneix-Spake et Al, Severe Cutaneous Reactions to Self Defence
Sprays, Arch Dermatol Vol 1 29, July 1993, p. 913.

67. The development of tolerance to CS has been reported by Porton
researchers in studies on human volunteers (Beswick
FW, Holland P, Kemp KH, 'Acute effects of exposure to
orthochloro-benzylidene malononitrile (CS) and the development of
tolerance'. Br. J. Ind. Medicine. 1972; 29: 298-306.

68. Hu H., Fine J., Epstein P., Kelsey K., Reynolds P., Walker B., 'Tear
gas - Harassing Agent or Toxic Chemical Weapon',
JAMA, August 4, 1989 - Vol 262, No. 5.

69. Gibbons S., Training accident delays street trials of CS spray., Police
Review, 16 June 1995.

70. Chief Constable Ted Crew is reported in the Independent as saying, "I am
advised that were there to be a civil claim
resulting from the use of CS spray, I might find that because we had trained
the officers using it, I had some liability.' (29)

71.Foster, RW and Ramage, AG, 'Observations on the Effects of
Dibenzoxazepine (CR) & Nonoyl Vanillyaamide (VAN) on
Sensory Nerves', The British Journal of Pharmacology, March 1975, pp. 436-7.

72. Los Angeles Times June 18, 1995.

73. ACLU, Oleoresin Capsicum, - Pepper Spray Update, More Fatalities, More
Questions, June, 1995, p. 2.

74. SAE Alsetex.

75. Defense Technology GmbH (Def-Tec) & IDC Chemie Handels GmbH.

76. Nitspy Defensa Y Contraespionaje.

77. ALM International UD; Civil Defence Supply; Edgar Brothers; & Safeguard
Technology. In June 1994, at an ACPO
Drugs Conference, Civil Defence Supply admitted they were already importing
peppergas sprays and were working on their
evaluation with the Home Office and ACPO.

78. Nancy Rhodes, Pepper Spray, Product Liability and Cops, Policing By
Consent, No.11, August 1 996.

79. See 'Perfect Sound from Thin Air, New Scientist, 7 September 1996, p.
22.

80 See Jane's International Defense Review, 9, September 96, p. 20.

81. See National Institute of Justice Solicitation For Law Enforcement,
Courts and Corrections Technology, Development,
Implementation and Evaluation, August 1996.

82. Barbara Starr, USA defines policy on non-lethal weapons, Jane's Defence
Weekly, March 6, 1996.

83. Comment from Hildi S. Libby, systems manager of the Non-Lethal Program,
US ARDEC, to the American Defense
Preparedness Association Non-lethal Defence II conference, 6-7 March 1996.

84. Proceedings of the Non Lethal Defence II conference organised by The
American Defence Preparedness Association, held
at Maclean, Virginia, 6-7 March 1996.

85. For example, by Israeli warders against Palestinian detainees at
Ramallah and Jnaid prisons. For accounts, see Schwartz
M, (1984) Israel's Gas Chamber, The Middle East, June., and a report by the
West Bank Amliate of the International
Commission of Jurist, Jnaid - The New Israeli Prison in Nabulus - An
Appraisal, October 1984.

86. In South Africa, such a case was reported in 1981, when four condemned
men were subdued with 'teargas' before being
taken to the gallows, (see the Guardian, 16 July 1981).

87. See Statewatch, March-April, 1996, p. 9.

88. A detailed account of this system is given in Wilson, A, 'How Rebels Are
Silenced', Observer, 27 Feb. 1977 and Guardian
August 8, 1979.

89. These Units were secretly maintained with full details of their
operation only coming to light when a court case was brought
by a civil liberties group, (Guardian, April 8,1980).

90. Covert Action Quarterly, Summer 1993.

91. New York Times, 13 January 1995.

92. Jessica Mitford's, The American Prison Business, Penguin 1977, provided
a good discussion of early behaviour
modification techniques tested in US gaols.

93. Meyer, JAT (1971) Crime Deterrent Transponder System IEEE AES-7, No. 7,
January.

94. Used in New Mexico based home punishment schemes. See Guardian Nov 8,
1984 for details and the Adam Smith
Institute, 'Justice Policy 1984', for a case arguing the need for such
schemes in Europe.

95. For example last year the UK treasury announced enforced cutbacks of
some 3,000 prison jobs. With the UK prison
population expected to grow by 20,000 over the next 10 years due to the
sentencing changes introduced by Home Secretary
Michael Howard, staffing levels are sliding back to those prevailing at the
time of the prison riots in the late 1980's. In these
circumstances, the shortsighted prospect is one of expensive wardens being
replaced with cheaper and more malleable
technology, both passive and punitive.

96. Warren P, 'Prisons go shopping in face of staff cuts', Computing, 25
January 1996.

97. Restricted Contract Procedure (CC3160) for Her Majesty's Prison Service,
Supply and Transport Services, Tenders
Electronic Daily, Luxembourg.

98. Inmates demand return, Houston Chronicle, Oct. 30, 1995,

99. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, 'Investigation of Onondaga
Country Jail, Oct 18, 1994. pp. 2-3.

100. Law Enforcement Product News. 9.10.95, p. 42.

101. Quoted in Amnesty International, United States of America - Use of
electro-shock belts. June 1996.

102. Presentation to the Non-lethal Defence II conference, held by the
American Defense Preparedness Association March
1996.

103. Much of the information used in this section is extracted from Wright
1996 and Amnesty International, 1997(a), which is
largely based on company documentation held by the Omega Foundation.

104. Fig. 1 is taken from the 1996 Annual Report of the Redress Trust. The
mission of the Redress Trust (which is based at 6
Queen Square in London WC1 N 3AR, UK), is 'to promote the rehabilitation and
protection of people who are or at any time
have been victims of torture anywhere in the world, and to help them, and
when appropriate, their families to gain redress for
their suffering.'

105. Such were the successes of the coercive interrogations practiced in the
former Soviet Union that the US Rand
Corporation at that time explored the possibility that the 'Russians have
developed and are now using some form of hypnosis
possibly in conjunction with drugs and other treatments, as a technique for
eliciting confessions from persons who, under
ordinary forms of duress, would not be likely to comply with demands for a
public recantation'. (See Janis, 1949)

106. See (Gudjonnson, G. 1996) for a discussion of this process. Gudjonnson
quotes R.A. Leo's account of the changing
nature of police interrogation in the USA from the 1930's onwards. Leo, for
example, identified 6 interrogation methods which
focussed on pain, discomfort and torture. These consisted of 'brute force';
'physical torture'; 'deniable physical and
psychological coercion'; (e.g. rubber hoses which left no marks);
'incommunicado interrogation', i.e., isolation from lawyers,
family and friends); 'physical duress' (e.g. food /sleep deprivation);
'threats of harm'. (Leo 1992) found that these methods
declined from the 1930's to be replaced by psychological methods of
interrogation relying on trickery, manipulation and
deception. (See Inbrau, et al. 1986)

107. See United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners (United Nations, 1955) which apply to both
leg irons and to stun belts, section 33 says: Instruments of restraint such
as handcuffs, chains, irons and straitjackets should
never be applied as punishment. Furthermore, chains and irons should not be
used as restraints. Other instruments of restraint
should not be used except in the following circumstances: (a) as a
precaution against escape during a transfer, provided that
they shall be removed when the prisoner appears before a judicial or
administrative authority.

108. Leg irons, restraints, etc., are supplied in Canada by Shackles; in
China by Chengdushi Mensuochang, Jing An Import &
Export Co., Shandong Muping General Lockware Plant; in France by Equipol, GK
Productions International, Rivolier; in
Germany by Bonowi, Clemen & Jung Inh. V& K Pleithner, Dipl. Ing H. Wallfass,
Electron - Import & Export Co., Helling
Kommanditgesellschaft fur Industrieprodukte, Nowar Security Equipment; in
Luxembourg by AlphaSafety; in Spain by
Larranaga Y Elorza; in Taiwan by Pan Right; in the U.K. by Group 4 Total
Security, Hiatt & Co., M.P. Supplies Co.; and in
the USA by A.E Nelson Leather, AEDEC, AETCO, American Handcuff, Arms Tech
Inc, Badge Co of New Jersey, Bianchi
International, Hiatt Thompson Co., Law Enforcement Associates, Monadock
Lifetime Products, Peerless Handcuffs, Smith &
Wesson and Techopol International, to name but a few.

109. Project Chatter was begun by the US Navy in 1947 in coordination with
the Army, the Air Force, the CIA and FBI and
for security reasons, handled outside the usual committee machinery of the
Research & Development Board. (Document
submitted in evidence to the joint hearings of the Senate Labor and Public
Welfare Committee on Health & the Senate
Judiciary Sub-Committee on Administrative Practice & procedure, Biomedical
and Behavioural Research, Nov. 1975, pp.
988-990.

110. U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report:
Foreign & Military Intelligence, 26 April 1976, report no. 94-755 book 1,
pp. 385-422, 'Testing and use of chemical and
biological agents by the intelligence community.'

111. There were 149 MKULTRA subprojects concerned with behaviour
modification, drug acquisition. and testing and
administering drugs surreptiously. (CIA Inspector General, memorandum for
Director of Central Intelligence dated 26 July
1963, Report of Inspection of MKULTRA, submitted in evidence to the joint
hearings of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare
Subcommittee on Health and the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Administrative Practice and Procedure, Biomedical and
Behavioural Research, 1975, 10,12 September and November 1975, pp. 879-905.

112. According to documentation made available to a Congressional Inquiry, a
portion of the Research & Development
Programme of the the TSS/Chemical Division was aimed towards the discovery
of the following materials and methods: (i)
Substances which will promote illogical thinking and impulsiveness to the
point where the recipient would be discredited in
public; (ii)materials which will render the induction of hypnosis easier;
(iii) materials and physical methods which will produce
amnesia for events preceding and during their use; (iv) physical methods of
producing shock and confusion over extended
periods of time and capable of surreptious use; (v) substances which produce
physical disablement such as paralysis of the legs,
acute anaemia etc.; (vi) substances which alter personality structure in
such a way that the recipient becomes dependent on
another person; (vii) material which will cause mental confusion making it
difficult for an individual to maintain a fabrication
under questioning; (viii) substances which lower ambition and working
efficacy when administered in undetectable amounts; (ix)
substances which promote weakness or distortion of eyesight or hearing; (x)
knockout pill which can be surreptiously
administered; (xi) a material whose use in very small amounts makes it
impossible to perform any physical activity whatsoever.
(US Senate Committee on Intelligence and Human Resources Subcommrttee on
Health and Scientific Research, joint hearing:
Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behaviour Modification, 3
August 1977, pp. 123-4).

113. The daily El Mundo quoting military intelligence files said the 1988
experiments in which a beggar died, had been dubbed
"Operation Mengele" within the service after Nazi death-camp doctor Josef
Mengele. (Reuter September 17, 1996) It should
be noted that in 1980 Amnesty International reported the use of LSD and
sensory deprivation methods against ETA suspects
held in La Salve Police Station. (See New Statesman, 11 December 1981, pp.
12-13.)

114. In October 1996, the Austrian government approved the publication of a
report from the ECPT which contained
allegations that detainees of Austrian as well as foreign nationality were
at risk of grave ill treatment particularly while detained
at the Bureau of Security in Vienna. ECPT reported:

"From various sources the delegation received allegations according to
which people detained by the Bureau of
Security in Vienna during February and March 1994 had received electric
shocks inflicted with batons equipped
to administer an electric discharge. . . . These detainees all
described a similar instrument which was a portable
device the size of an electric razor one extremity of which had two
electrodes, a device which a police official
carried in a personal bag." (Amnesty International, 1997)

115. In its report Arming the Torturers (Amnesty International, 1997) named
the fifty countries where electroshock torture and
ill treatment had been carried out in prisons, police stations and detention
centres. They are:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Chad, Chile, China, Cyprus,
Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece,
Guatemala, Haiti, India Indonesia/East Timor,
Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco/Western Sahara, Nepal, Netherlands
Antilles, Nigeria, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Russian federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, South
Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Togo, Turkey,
USA, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia Kosovo province,
Zaire.

Amnesty recognises that the real figure is probably higher, "as the use of
these weapons in torture can be very difficult to
detect."

116. See for example, Ordog. et. al. 1987; Law & Order, 'Reviewing Taser
Usage 1992; Allen, T.B., 1991.

117. See Cusac, A.M, 1996, who quotes the engineer who examined the electric
shield associated with the death of Harry
Landis, a Texan Prison officer in December 1995. He said "The manufacturer
puts in its literature that the shields will not hurt
anyone, including people with heart conditions. But they have

not done studies on people at all They conducted their tests on animals -
anesthetized animals. Do you see the danger here? In
one word: adrenalin," That is the waking human response to electro-shock
which results in an adrenalin rush needs to be taken
into account in regard to any assertions of safety in devices of this type.

118. Prof Kaufman of Heinrich Heine University in Dusseldorf in a letter to
a member of Germany Amnesty MSP Group dated
2 November 1995 cautions that an opinion he gave on a particular product ten
years ago could not be used by others since his
"expert opinion referred explicitly to the model of the apparatus which was
presented to us in those days." In the light of "a
great number of changing manufacturers and distributors of such apparatus .
. . refer more or less directly to the above
mentioned opinion." Prof Kaufman's view is that this is "basically
inadmissable as from the point of view of the
electrophysiology, assertions on risks can only be made on the exact
knowledge of the respective operational data." He viewed
a US advert which used his work as "completely devious". . . "since the
models presented were examined only as far as safety
technics were concerned - we never participated in any sort of 'optimization
of the weapon' aimed at obtaining certain effects."
Prof Kaufman being aware that "as far as it appears from the manufacturers
prospectus - the apparatus offered on the market
nowadays differ widely in their operational data from the apparatus then
tested." In other words manufacturers are misusing
scientific data on one specific device to justify the safety of many new
electroshock weapons which is simply inadmissable.

119. See Forrest, 1996, Chap 5 & Chap 7 for a more detailed discussion.

120. The Tibetan monk featured in Fig. H, Palden Gyatso spent decades in
prison and labour camps and was systematically
tortured. At one desperate point he told a member of the Omega Foundation
that he ate his boots to survive. On his release he
managed to obtain the instruments used in torture by his Chinese captors and
smuggle them out of his country. He said of the
electroshock devices. "They use this on your body. If they press that button
your whole body will be in shock. If they do it for
too long you lose consciousness but you do not die. If they press this
button, you can die."

121. Excellent discussions on the codification of counter-terror procedures
and their proliferation in practice are provided by
Chomsky and Herman (1979) and McClintock 1985a; 1985b; 1992).

122. Quoted from the Baltimore Sun, 'Torture was taught by CIA, 27 January
1997. The Human Resources Exploitation
manual appears to have been based on a predecessor called KUBARK
Counterintelligence Interrogation, (July 1963) used in
the Vietnam period which was declassified at the same time.

123. The initial effects of the procedures in Fig. M are as follows:

Measures (1), (2), (3) and (5) cause visual, auditory, tactile and
kinaesthetic deprivation. Measures (1), (4), & (6)
deprive the brain of the sugar and oxygen necessary for normal
functioning. Measures (1), (4), & (6) may disturb
normal body metabolism.

124. For a further account of the sensory deprivation techniques used in
Northern Ireland see the British Medical Association,
1986. Allegations of continued ill treatment of detainees in Northern
Ireland have continued into the nineties, See for example,
Committee on The Administration of Justice, 1991 & 1993).

125. International Herald Tribune 29 January 1997.

126. The Palestinian Authority and its many police forces have been accused
by Amnesty of torturing detainees using, for
example, position abuse and sleep deprivation or interrogation via assaults
whilst a sack was placed over the victim's head.
(Amnesty International, Palestinian Authority, Prolonged political
detention, torture and unfair trials, London, 2 December
1996.

127. Personal communication to the authors from Dr. Siraj Shah of the
Kashmir Council for human rights, in London, dated 5
October, 1993.

128. Amnesty International reported evidence of thallium, a commercial rat
poison, being used by the Iraqi authorities to effect
delayed execution of their political detainees.(See Amnesty International,
Political Killings 1983.)

129. Quoted from Priest, D., 'Army's Project X Had Wider Audience',
Washington Post, March 5, 1997.

130. An excellent analysis of the training of torturers has been achieved by
TV producer Rex Bloomstein whose latest
programme on this subject, 'The Roots of Evil' is due to be screened by the
BBC during the autumn of 1997.

131. The Dispatches programme team concluded that given that the £500,000
cost of the electroshock deal was paid for in oil,
and because BAe would have had to invoice the MoD for payment and the UK
government would have had to issue an export
licence, they must have known what was going on (Lashmar, 1995).

132. Stott sits on the board and is a founding member of the Association of
Police and Public Security Suppliers, Britain's
foremost commercial promoter of police technology and internal security
equipment supplies.

133. Electroshock weapons are carried by all prison camp guards in China.
According to Pierre Sane, the Secretary General
of Amnesty International, the use of shock weapons in China today 'has
become so endemic that it is almost impossible to
document and follow the cases of the number of victims.'

134. The concept of a trade in the technology of political control was
originally described by NARMIC and NACLA and
formalised by Wright (1977, 1978) and Klare & Arnson, 1981).

135. European Union: human rights and military, security and police
transfers - When will established criteria be implemented?",
July 1994, p. 8.

136. Austria: Steyr Mannlicher supplied AUG 5.56mm assault rifles for
service with the Indonesian Parachute and
Counter-Terrorist police units (Military Powers 10/91).

137. Belgium: FN Herstal supplied M49 sub machine guns, FAL 7.62mm Assault
Rifles, Minimi 5.56mm light machine guns for
police and security force use (Military 10/91) and have a representative
office in Jakarta (Defence Manufacturers Association
ASEAN Report [DMA 8/90]).

138. Denmark: Dansk Industri Syndikat the Madsen sub-machine gun (made under
licence by IMBEL, Brazil) used by
Indonesian Police (DMA 8/90).

139.Finland:Sako supplied Valmet rifles to Security Forces (Jane's Security
& Counter-Insurgency Equipment 1990 [COIN
90]).

140. France: Acmat supplied wheeled armoured vehicles to the Indonesian
Police (Military Powers 10/91); Creusot Loire
supplied 205 AMX-13 tracked armoured vehicles (Military Powers 10/91); GIAT
supplied 20 105mm LGI MkII light guns
plus a significant quantity of ammunition (Jane's Defence Weekly [JDWI
21/5/94); Manurhin supplied SG540 SIG Assault
Rifles (DMA 8/90); Morpho Systems supplied an Automated Fingerprint
Recognition System (MiliPol 1993 Catalog); Panhard
supplied 18 VBL Light Amphibious Scout Cars (JDW 18/12/96).

141. Germany: Heckler 8 Koch supplied MP5 Sub machine guns used by the
Indonesian Special Forces and it was reported
that the Indonesian Marines were to take delivery of MSG 90 Military Sniper
Rifles (Asian Defence Journal 11/95) and police
& security forces were already equipped with G3 Rifles (DMA 8/90).

142. Greece: Pyrkal exported ammunition (Hellenic Defence Industries Catalog
96/7).

143. Italy: Beretta Model 12 Sub machine guns and BM-59 rifles used by
police & security forces (Military Powers 10/91).

144. Netherlands: NWM de Kruithoorn 20mm ammunition is largely supplied by
NWM (DMA 8/90).

145. Sweden: Bofors Indonesia's 40mm Bofors ammunition is obtained either
from Sweden of Chartered Industries of
Singapore (DMA 8/90); FFV (Sweden) sub-machine guns [produced under licence
in Egypt] supplied to Indonesia (COIN
90).

146. UK: GKN Defence 10 AT-10s Saxon GKN Wheeled armoured vehicles supplied
to the Indonesian Police (Military
Powers 10/91); Glover Webb Tactica Water Cannon. "Britain fuels Suharto
repression" (Observer 21/7/96); Interarms
Military and sporting armaments (FIS 93); Land Rover Indonesia purchased
1500 Land Rovers in 1979 which are popular and
still in wide use, including 10 for anti-riot duties and 2 for the
Presidential Guard (DMA 8/90); Amongst the British military and
security equipment sold to Indonesia in the last decade. was a prototype of
Siemens Plessey Defence Systems GENERICs -
the NATO command information system. GENERICs can display complex
information about events unfolding across a
landscape. It would enable the user to concentrate forces efficiently in
response to demonstrations and riots (Independent,
3/8/96, Technology that gives the edge to 'Big Brother').

147. Belgium: Cockerill Mechanical Industries $100 million subcontract to
build armoured infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs) for
Turkish Army (JDW 9/9/89); FN Herstal Minimi 5.56mm light machine gun used
in Turkey (JDW 15/7/89).

148. France: Euro Vectuer (GIAT) has set up a subsidiary in Turkey [Savunna
Sanayii] to oversee the firms contract for 515
Dragor turrets (JDW 4/2/95); Thomson-CSF the TRS 22XX long range mobile
(NATO Class 1 ) radar has been adopted by
Turkey. Local company Tefken is co-producing 14 examples (International
Defense Review [IDR] 9/96).

149. Germany: Alcatel (Radio & Defense Systems) - Aselsan Electronics
(Turkey) manufactures the Alcatel SEL RATAC-S
Surveillance radar under licence (IDR 6/96); Heckler & Koch - Turkey
manufactures H+K rifles and sub-machine guns under
licence (American Academy of Arts & Science 2/94); Thyssen Henschel Fox NBC
Reconnaissance vehicles supplied to
Turkey (JDW2/11/91).

150. Italy: Agusta SpA $19 million contract to supply Turkish Ministry of
Defence with 20 AB-206B Jet Ranger Helicopters.

151. Netherlands: DAF has received a S50 million subcontract to provide
weapon station and vehicle integration. The first 20
AIFVs will be assembled by DAF after which assembly will begin in Turkey
(JDW 9/9/89); Eurometaal - Eurometaal USA
listed as exporting several shipments of grenades to Turkey (PIERS 12/95),
Turkey will begin production of cluster bombs as
part of a joint venture between MCIA (Turkey) & Eurometaal. Under the ten
year agreement 206,000 cluster bombs will be
produced for Turkey and 103,000 for Holland (Arms Trade News 21/1/94).

152. UK: Burle Ltd listed as exporting CCTV equipment (FIS Turkey 94);
Chemring Ltd 32,355 complete round flare bombs
and IR Decoy and Chaff-S Ammunition (Turkey Contracts Bulletin 1/95); GEC
Marconi Communication Systems resolved
dispute with the Turkish Armed Forces regarding the contract for the
Scimitar H (HF-SSB) radios as part of a £96 million
contract started in 1990 (JDW4/2/95); GEC Marconi Secure Systems crypto
devices and spare parts (Turkey Contracts
Bulletin 2/95); Pilatus Britten Norman sold a Multi Sensor Surveillance
Aircraft (MSSA) to Turkey for Border Surveillance for
an undisclosed amount (Aerospace Daily 16/6/93); Racal Comsec Ud - CLASSIC
[Covert Local Area Sensor System for
Intruder Classification] was originally developed to detect illegal
immigrants attempting to enter Hong Kong. A total of 1700
systems have been ordered by 31 countries, of which 10 are NATO members
(including Canada, Portugal, Spain and Turkey)
(IDR 6/96); Short Brothers - recent customers for the Shorts Shorland
vehicles include 40 APCs (Armoured Personnel
Carriers) to the Turkish Ministry of Interior to be used by the Gendarmerie;
Transac supplied 'armoured vehicles' (FIS Turkey
94).

153. Land Rover (UK) have a licence production agreement with Otobus
Karoseri (Otokar) of Turkey. Since 1987, Otokar
has built Land Rover 4x4 vehicles under licence with production running at
approx. 2500 vehicles a year. The Scorpion has an
all welded steel hull with around 70% of the automobile components drawn
from the well known Land Rover Defender 90/100
(4x4). Machine gun, night vision and day vision equipment are standard (JDW
6/8/94). Export licence control is not exercised
as the UK Government classifies the Land Rover components as civilian spare
parts. This is despite the end product being a
highly maneuverable and lethal internal security vehicle. Additional reports
have shown how this type of third country licenced
production have allowed MSP transfers that would not be permitted direct
from the UK. It was reported in 1995 that Otokar
had obtained a $200 million deal to supply 700 Scorpion vehicles to Algeria
(Defense News 2616195). The UK currently has
a military embargo on Algeria.

154. GKN Defence (UK): produce Mowag (Switzerland) armoured and internal
security vehicles under licence. Also
produced in Chile and Canada (Armada International 4-5/96). Oman has
received the first batch of GKN Defence built
MOWAG Piranha 8x8 vehicles. (JDW 16/9/95). GKN Defence have also established
licenced production of its vehicles in the
Philippines.The first 7 Simba 4x4 APCs have been delivered to the
Philippines Armed Forces. 150 vehicles have been ordered
fitted with a 12.7mm Browning MG armed turret. Eight Simbas will supplied
from the UK, several as kits and the rest
assembled at the Subic Bay plant operated by the joint venture Asian
Armoured Vehicle Technologies Corp. A number of
variants will probably be developed.(JDW 30/4/94). It was reported in1989
that the Philippines is therefore set to become the
first ASEAN nation with an armoured vehicle manufacturing capability and
could act as a base for regional export sales. (JDW
16/12/89).

155. FN Nouvelle Herstal SA (Belgium) is helping to build an ammunition
producing factory in Eldoret, Kenya and is providing
much of the machinery. It is estimated that the factory has cost between
£6-170 million, but the Kenyan Government refuses to
discuss the financing arrangements. The factory will be capable of producing
20 million bullets a year. (Guardian 20/6/96).

156. Heckler and Koch (Germany). H+K small arms are produced under licence
in many countries throughout the world.
MKE MP5 A3 and MP5 K Sub machine guns for 9mm Parabellum ammunition are
produced by MKE under licence from
Heckler and Koch (Germany). Are very similar in almost all aspects to the
original Heckler & Koch version.(Police & Security
Equipment 96/7). In 1994, the American Academy of Arts & Science reported
that H+K rifles were produced under licence in
the following countries: France, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey,
UK, Mexico, Burma, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Thailand. H+K Sub-machine guns were produced under licence in:
Greece, Portugal, Turkey, UK, Iran, Saudi
Arabia.(AAAS 2/94). Such licenced production can mean in practice that
Heckler & Koch small arms are transferred to
countries that the European Union may have export restrictions on. For
example it was reported that in "late 1991, 50,000
Heckler & Koch G3 automatic rifles were also supplied to Sudan, probably via
Iran." (JDW 9/5/92).

157. Steyr Mannlicher (Austria): First batch of 1000 STEYR 5.56mm AUG
Assault rifles for Malaysian Armed forces
completed by SME Tools in Malaysia (Total of 65,000 rifles are to be
produced over 5 year period) (JDW 5/10/91).

158. FFV Ordnance (Sweden) 9mm Model 45 sub machine gun - generally known as
the Carl Gustaf. Made under licence in
Port Said, Egypt. A silenced version was used by US special forces in S.E.
Asia. The weapon was also copied & produced in
Indonesia - currently not in production. (COIN 90).

159. PT Pindad (Persero) (Indonesia): PT Pindad has signed a licence
agreement with Chartered Industries of Singapore to
produce the CIS 40-AGL 40mm automatic grenade launcher. (JDW 28/5/94). Also
reported as producing the following small
arms under licence production agreements: version of FNC rifle as SS1-V1 and
SS1-V2, version of Browning High Power
pistol - made under licence from FN, Belgium; version of Beretta 9mm Model
SMG - made under licence from Beretta, USA;
60mm Mortar - made under licence from Tampella, Finland; 81 mm Mortar
(Quantity 500) (Tampella, Finland); Model 38/49
SMG and Model 12 SMG - made under licence from Beretta, USA; Model 45 (Carl
Gustav) SMG - made under licence
from Sweden; FNC, FN FAL, FN MAG FN Mauser 98 carbine (used by police) -
made under licence from FN, Belgium;
FN Minimi SAW - made under licence from FN, Belgium. (Defence Manufacturers
Association 8/90: Indonesia - Police &
Security Equipment Holdings).

160. It was reported in 1994 that the Swiss company, Pilatus Flugzeugwerke
opened a military trainer production line at its UK
subsidiary on the Isle of Wight, called Pilatus Britten-Norman Ltd (UK), to
side step tough new arms-export regulations.(Flight
International 6/4/94). One reason suggested for the move was that the Swiss
aircraft company wanted to take advantage of
laxer British rules on arms exports. Pilatus Aircraft, a subsidiary of
Oerlikon-Buhrle, currently manufactures the PC-7 and
PC-9 in Stans, near Lucerne. The planes, originally developed for training,
have been widely sold to countries such as
Guatemala, Burma, Iraq, Iran and El Salvador. Swiss law prohibits military
sales to 'areas of conflict'. Pilatus has long claimed
that its planes are not military equipment and that, if armies buy them for
training, that is not the same as buying them for killing.
At least one company in Belgium openly offers gun ready conversion services.
(Observer 27/3/94). The UK subsidiary already
has a licenced production agreement with the Philippines, the PADC
(Philippines Aerospace Development Corporation) was
reported to be building the Islander light transport and passenger aircraft.
The Islander has A STOL capability and can be used
for cargo, passenger, survey, aerial spraying and in its Martime Defender
version, maritime surveillance operations. The original
agreement called for the transfer of 105 Islanders to the

PADC. The first 6 were built by Britten-Norman and sold by PADC. The next 14
were delivered unfinished, and the next 35
were assembled by PADC. After Britten-Norman was acquired by Swiss firm.
Pilatus, in 1979. The assembling licence was
suspended. But in March 1980 a new agreement was reached for the assembly of
12 more Islanders, including one turboprop
BN-2T Turbine Islander. In 1981, PADC were no longer just assembling the
Islander but building it from the ground up.
PADC hoped to become the exclusive distributor of the Pilatus Products in
the ASEAN region.(Arms Production 1984).

161.The full text of resolution Doc EM\RE\264264474 read:

- aware of the European Parliament's concerns regarding the export of
repressive technologies to repressive regimes that
violate human rights,

- disturbed at recent revelations that such technologies are being produced
in at least three European Union (EU) countries,
namely Germany, Ireland and the United Kingdom, companies such as Equipol,
France Selection Neral et Cie (France)
Tactical Arms International UK and British Aerospace are all known to have
supplied electroshock units,

- horrified at the information that these technologies have been exported
amongst others to Saudi Arabia, China, the Gulf
States and South Africa under the Apartheid regime,

- aware that these technologies have been used in gross violation of human
rights, aware of government complicity in these
transactions that have been formally banned by the governments concerned,
for example ICL Technical Plastics in Glasgow,
which produces electroshock weapons ,

1. Requests a statement from the governments concerned regarding the
allegations;

2. Urges support for Amnesty International's call for a full
investigation into the extent of the trade in
the EU;

3. Calls on the Commission to bring forward proposals to incorporate
those technologies within the scope of
arms export controls and ensure greater transparency in the export of
all military security and police technologies
to prevent the hypocrisy of governments who themselves breach their own
export bans;

4. Instructs the President to forward this resolution to the Council,
the Commission and the EU Member State
Governments.

162. For further details, see Ballantyne, 1996.

163. Amnesty International Danish Medical Group, 1987.

164. The image used in Fig.46 was taken by this man and supplied to Amnesty
International.

165. For example AB Electronics (electronic restraint devices); AFY
Distributors (electroshock batons);Amazing Concepts
(Intimidator electric shock weapons),; Armas No Mortales (electroshock
weapons); B.West Imports (paralyser Stun Batons);
Custom Armouring Corp (Nova Electronic riot equipment); Federal Laboratories
Division(Electronic batons); Hiatt Thompson
(restraint devices); Nova Technologies (electronic restraint and stun
devices); Paralyzer Protection (electric shock stun guns
and batons); Ranger Joes (stun guns); Reliapon Police Products (Nova
Electronic restraints and shields); S. & J. Products
(electronic restraint devices); SAS R&D Services (electronic batons);
Sherwood Communications Associates UD( Equaliser
and Lightning stun guns); Stun Tech Inc (Electronic immobilisation weapons
and the REACT belts); Taser Industries (electronic
dart shock weapons); The Edge Company (Thunderbolt stun gun); American
Handcuff Co., (leg irons); C&S Security (gang
transport chains); Smith & Wesson (belly chains and other restraining
equipment); Technipol International (leg irons and
thumbcuffs); Tobin Tool and Die (shackles); WS Darley (leg irons and belly
chains) - to name but a few companies who have
advertised their wares. This information has been collected from company
brochures, Police & Security News (various
volumes) and Thomas Register (1992).

166. Confirmation of these fears was provided by a secret list of licenses
issued by the Commerce Department over the last
decade that was obtained by the US magazine 'Counterpunch', (October 1,
1995), that was not made available to FAS. It
cited Air Parts International's export to Yemen of shock batons with high
voltage, Creative Security's export of shock batons to
Saudi Arabia; Jonas Aircraft and Arms export of saps - (lead bludgeons
covered with leather) to Egypt and shock batons to
Saudi Arabia in 1992; Nova Technologies export of electronic stun guns to
the Philippines; Premier Crown Corporation's
export of twenty six inch shock batons with hot centre to Saudi Arabia;
Smith & Wesson's export of shock batons and mace
batons to both Saudi Arabia & Yemen; Transtechnology Corporation's export of
riot shields with Arabic inscription to Yemen;
and Tri County Police Supplies export of shock batons to Thailand.

167. On November 13, 1995, The US Secretary of Commerce informed the speaker
of the House, Newt Gingrich, that he
had disaggregated these items to form a new ECCN. OA83D on the Commerce
Control List. Commerce also added a new
section to the Export Administration Regulations. Section 776.19,
"Implements of Torture" to further segregate these items.
(Brown, 1995). Yet even after this review took place, it was disclosed that
the US government had approved the sale of
thumbcuffs to Russia,; blackjacks, stun guns and shock batons to Lithuania,
Moldova, Panama and Tanzania; and electronic
riot shields and batons to Mexico.(Lelyveld, 1996).

168. Amnesty is careful to point out in its reports that it is not making
any accusation against any company of direct complicity
in torture but that these companies have offered to supply since 1990. It is
not a definitive list because of the difficulty in
obtaining data on the subject in many countries and because of the
inevitable business and market changes.

169. The Belgium companies are thought to be Belgium Business International
(BBI), Browning and Falcon Security &
Telecommunications. In June 1996, De Morgen newspaper quoted a BBI salesman,
'We work via other countries like Spain or
no . . . the easiest is Paris. But if you have your own transitoire
[middleman] we just deliver to them..We have several models.
The most useful is no bigger than two packs of cigarettes and gives shocks
of 150,000 volts. The problem with this type of
weapon is that you have to stretch your arm to come into contact with the
enemy. That's why I advise the mattracks
[truncheons] with two electrodes at the end - ideal for riot police or
presidential guards. Even last year, the central African
Presidential Guards were equipped with this. Yes, Belgium is rather strict,
but Africa and Latin America permit us to just export
it to a middle man and then we have it depart from there.'

170. The French companies are thought to be Auto F; Doursoux -Securitec
s.a.r.l; Equipol; France Selection; GK
Productions; Glam Securite; Le Protecteur; Nieral & Cie Sarl and SAE Alsetex
(See Fig. 53).

171. The German companies are thought to be Bonowi; Electron-Import &
Export; Enforcer (Pulz & Charbit) GmbH; M.S.C;
M.T.S.; M.V.S.; NOWAR Security Equipment GmbH; Otto Boenicke; PK Electronic;
Rennhak Nachtsichtsysteme;
Sicherheitstechnik Schmid (STS); Sipe Electronic GmbH; Solid Company
Sicherheitstechnik Import & Export; TEWI Textil
Wighardt; Tradimex Vertriebs GmbH; Waffenhandel Uwe Ulriche; Wapo Electronic
GmbH.

172.The company refered to is thought to be Alpha Safety which advertised
such products in 1993 but is thought to be no
longer trading.

173. The company referred to is thought to be Reinaert Electronics.

174. The company referred to is thought to be NitSpy Defensa Y
Contraespionaje.

175. The companies referred to were largely uncovered by the Channel 4
Dispatches programmes, referred to in the text.
(Gregory 1995,1996) They include British Aerospace Defence Ltd (Royal
Ordnance Division); CCS Communication, Control
Inc; Compass Safety International; ICL Technical Plastics UD; International
Procurement Services; J & S Franklin UD; PK
Electronic International UD; SDMS Security Products UD.

[JYA Note: Detailed bibliography of pages 74-100 omitted here. When
transcribed it will be offered as a
supplementary document.]

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and Technological Options Assessment (STOA) in
Luxembourg:

Fax number: 352-4300-22418

No electronic version is available from STOA. Draft reports remain in paper
format until finalized by the European Parliament.
For information see STOA's publications
Web site:

http://www.europarl.eu.int/dg4/stoa/en/publi/publi.htm

Hypertext by JYA/Urban Deadline

jks...@my-dejanews.com

unread,

Jul 17, 1998, 3:00:00 AM7/17/98

Well, the user's account has been deactivated and the page disappeared 12
hours after I posted it. I hope some of you read it, I know big brother did.

Jeff

-----== Posted via Deja News, The Leader in Internet Discussion ==-----
http://www.dejanews.com/rg_mkgrp.xp Create Your Own Free Member Forum

jks...@my-dejanews.com

unread,

Jul 17, 1998, 3:00:00 AM7/17/98

Hello,

Well, I hope you people got an opportunity to read this revealing information.
Approximately 12 hours after posting it, the user's account and page
disappeared, at least I have been unable to access it for the past 4 hours.
Apparently, big brother didn't like it too much.

aba...@cstone.net

unread,

Jul 18, 1998, 3:00:00 AM7/18/98

to jks...@my-dejanews.com

In article <6onr00$q44$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>,

jks...@my-dejanews.com wrote:
> Well, the user's account has been deactivated and the page disappeared 12
> hours after I posted it. I hope some of you read it, I know big brother did.
>
> Jeff

Yes, it is a very good report, well documented and direct on
the political realities.

The URL you posted:
http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~ibel/stoa/stoa-atpc.htm

The report is also available at
http://mprofaca.cro.net/atpc1.html
and
http://www.jya.com/stoa-atpc.htm

[The question is whether these posts will propagate
very far from DejaNews, which is the only place I have
seen your posts so far...]

Both sites above have many other interesting articles, BTW.

--
Allen L. Barker
http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~alb

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