Ethnic Conflicts (review)
Tatu Vanhanen
ISBN 978-0-9573913-1-4Ulster Institute for Public Research
UK £23 hard cover, £18 paperback
By Robert Henderson
This is not a book designed for easy bedtime reading. It is an
academic’s work written first and foremost for academics with a fair
amount of statistics in it. Having said that, if a prospective
reader managed to get to grips with, say, The Bell Curve they should
be able to absorb the important messages of Prof Vanhanen’s book and
understand how he arrives at them. It is worth making the effort
because he deals with the most fundamental sociological aspect of
being human: how do we manage the challenges produced by heterogeneous
societies?
The Profesor’s first aim was to measure the relationship between
the ethnic heterogeneity of a society and ethnic conflict.. There
are considerable difficulties in doing this not least because what
may be thought of as ethnic conflict by one person may be seem by
another as conflict based on something else such as class. For
example, an ethnic group which is black and poor and rebels against
the better off in society who are white (a not uncommon state in
Latin America) could be represented as being either ethnically
motivated or class motivated.
There is also the general problem of what constitutes ethnicity.
Prof Vanhanen’s definition is very broad and includes racial type,
nation, tribe, language and religion. While these are undoubtedly
all distinctions which cause people to exhibit what might be loosely
called tribal behaviour, its breadth does raise the question of
whether racial type, nation, tribe, language and religion are
really comparable in terms of how people respond to those inside and
outside the group . For example, it may be that where the ethnic
division is one of religion between those of the same racial type and
general culture representative government will mitigate ethnic
tensions, while if the division is racial, representative government
may do nothing to stop discord.
There is a further cause for confusion in that more than one of Prof
Vanhanen’s ethnic criteria is frequently shared by an ethnic group
or even more confusingly by two conflicting ethnic groups. Muslims
are a good example. In theory there is meant to be no distinctions
made between Muslims on the grounds of sectarian allegiance, racial
type, tribe or nationality. In the real world there are marked
divisions within the theology of Islam and tribal and national
allegiances which often override the supposed unity of Muslims. The
danger with the very broad definition the Professor uses is that the
process of defining reduces the world to so many different
ethnicities that it becomes difficult to distinguish between ethnic
conflict and non-ethnic violence which he ascribes to the “endless
struggle for permanently scarce resources”.
Having made those qualifications, of which Prof Vanhanen is well
aware, the project does not utterly founder on them. It is a mistake
to imagine that nothing valuable can be gleaned from using criteria
which have a fuzziness about them. That is especially so if the
sample is large enough because a large sample in social science
projects digests anomalies. As there are few societies now which do
not have some basis for significant ethnic conflict the professor is
able to cast his net very widely amongst 176 countries, around nine
tenths of those currently existing.
But the Professor wants not only to test whether ethnic
heterogeneity is correlated with ethnic conflict; he also wishes to
see if ethnic nepotism is a driver of ethnic conflict: “My argument
is that ethnic cleavages divide the population into groups that are,
to some extent, genetically different.” (p7). The concept of ethnic
nepotism which is based on the idea that it is an extension of family
nepotism, that those belong to the same ethnic group favour those
within the group over outsiders. (It is important to bear in mind
that Prof Vanhanen does not claim that ethnic nepotism is the cause
of all group based conflict, merely that it explains why conflict
in many societies is so often based on ethnic divisions).
To test this hypothesis Prof Vanhanen devised his own scales of
ethnic heterogeneity and ethnic conflict and compares them with non-
ethnic measures devised by others such as the Human Development Index
and The Index of Democratisation”. He found only weak correlations
between the non-ethnic measures but a strong correlation between
ethnic heterogeneity and ethnic conflict (p214). In other words his
research suggests that the greater the ethnic diversity in a society
the greater the ethnic strife, although there are significant
variations between the various traits which he includes in his
definition of ethnicity.
I have something of a problem with the concept of ethnic nepotism in
the context of Prof Vanhanen’s definition of ethnicity because it
includes non-genetic differences such as language and religion. It
is true that those who are racially similar will be genetically closer
than those who are racially different. It is also true that those who
form a large tribe or a nation in the cultural sense will in practice
be genetically closer than those outside the group. The possession
of a particular language by a group is also a strong pointer to
close genetic links unless there is some obvious difference such as
race or the language spoken not as a native would speak it. Religion
is more problematic because that is something that can be simply
acquired. If a man says he is a Catholic or Muslim it does not
necessarily say anything about his genetic connection with other
Catholics or Muslims. Nonetheless, if the Catholic or Muslim comes
from the same country or even supranational area, there is a decent
chance that he will have a closer genetic relationship with other
Catholics and Muslims from the area than would be expected purely from
chance.
The difficulty is that although a significant genetic linkage will
commonly exist because of the way human beings live in groups,
whether that is a small band or a modern nation, it does not
automatically follow that the genetic similarity is what causes the
ethnic nepotism. It could be that the simple fact of growing up with
people creates a tribal feeling rather than genetic closeness.
Moreover, what are we to make of the “imagined community” of any group
where the numbers are too great to allow personal knowledge of all
those in the group? I do not doubt that differences of religion,
nation, tribe, language and race do act as triggers for the
separation of groups in competing entities, but with the exception of
race I cannot see that genetic influence is proven to be other than
accidental. Where there are divisions in a society based on clear
racial lines that is a different matter because there is self-
evidently a genetic cause for the preference for one class of person
in a society over another class of person.
The book ignores what I would describe as the most basic ethnic
conflict, that is, the behaviour of individuals to disadvantage
someone of a different ethnicity without there being any deliberate
group decision or action. A good example is the grossly
disproportionate number of black rapes and murders of whites in the
USA. That situation is clearly driven by racial feelings with blacks
either harbouring a general resentment of whites or simply seeing
whites as outside their group and thus not of consequence. However,
the latter explanation does not hold much water because blacks do not
attack Asians with the same frequency.
Are there remedies for ethnic strife? Prof Vanhanen suggests four:
biological mixing, institutional reforms, democratic compromises and
partition. Of these only partition even in theory offers a complete
solution to ethnic strife with the prospect of a completely ethnically
homogeneous society or at least one in which the minorities are so
small as to barely matter. The problem with partition is that it is
probably never possible to simply divide a territory because mixed
populations are generally not neatly parcelled up in convenient parts
of the territory.
By institutional reforms he means most particularly the legal and
democratic structures which ostensibly protect the interests of each
ethnic group and by democratic compromises the satisfying of each
ethnic group’s aspirations to at least a point where violence is
avoided. The Professor finds some evidence that democratic
institutions can reduce the amount of ethnic violence, although he
allows that “the willingness of competing ethnic groups to solve their
interest conflicts by democratic compromises and power-sharing is
limited” (p227).
The fourth of his remedies – biological mixing – is the one I have the
most difficulty with. He claims (p222) that biological mixing
would reduce ethnic violence because it would “undermine the basis
and importance of ethnic nepotism”. He further observes “ My
argument is that the relatively low level of ethnic violence in most
Latin American countries is causally related to the fact that racially
mixed people constitute a significant part of the population in these
countries”. (P221).
I think most people would be surprised at his judgement that there is
a “relatively low level of ethnic violence in Latin American
countries”. I am very dubious indeed about the idea that many of the
conflicts which arise in the region are often not ethnic in origin
using the Professor’s own definitions. To take just one example:
amongst those with black ancestry, whether that is wholly black or
black mixed with other races especially the white, there is in Latin
America and Caribbean a customary hierarchy of colour with the
lightest skin signifying standing at the top of the social status
ladder and the darkest at the bottom. Look at Brazil as an example.
This country is beloved by white liberals as a prime example of a
colour-blind country. The reality is that the reins of power and
privilege are still held overwhelmingly by whites. The great Brazilian
footballer Pele complained publicly about this some years ago.
The likely outcome of biological mixing on any scale would be for
those of mixed parentage to find their natural group amongst those
from who most resemble themselves. This is actually what happens in
practice. In Britain the children of one black and one white parent
almost invariably represent themselves as black. It would at best
simply change the balance of races within a society and at worst add
to ethnic conflict with those of mixed parentage added to the groups
competing within the same territory.
Professor Vanhanen’s overall conclusion is a gloomy one: “The central
message of this study is that ethnic conflict and violence, empowered
by ethnic nepotism and the inevitable struggle for scarce resources,
will not disappear from the world. It is more probable that the
incidence of ethnic violence will increase in the more and more
crowded world” (p230).
The moral of this book is beautifully simple: ethnically/racially
heterogeneous societies are a recipe for discord and violence. That
should give the propagandists of mass immigration pause for thought.
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Published orignially in the Quarterly Review
http://www.quarterly-review.org/?p=1610
NB The Quarterly Review is now an online journal only.
Read more at
http://livinginamadhouse.wordpress.com/2013/04/30/ethnic-conflicts-review/