Truly it is an evil to be full of faults; but it is a still greater evil to
be full of them and to be unwilling to recognise them, since that is to add
the further fault of a voluntary illusion. We do not like others to deceive
us; we do not think it fair that they should be held in higher esteem by us
than they deserve; it is not, then, fair that we should deceive them and
should wish them to esteem us more highly than we deserve.
Thus, when they discover only the imperfections and vices which we really
have, it is plain they do us no wrong, since it is no
17. Rivers are roads which move, and which carry us whither we desire to go.
18. When we do not know the truth of a thing, it is of advantage that there
should exist a common error which determines the mind of man, as, for
example, the moon, to which is attributed the change of seasons, the
progress of diseases, etc. For the chief malady of man is restless curiosity
about things which he cannot understand; and it is not so bad for him to be
in error as to be curious to no purpose.
The manner in which Epictetus, Montaigne, and Salomon de Tultie wrote is the
most usual, the most suggestive, t