Many of the moral theories that survive to this day from their historical
origins do so as relics of world attitudes that did not survive the
Enlightenment era of scientific and philosophical change. One interesting
aspect to modern theories of rights is that they owe at least part of their
origin to theories now known to be mistaken in some serious fashion. This
is not to suggest that these theories of morality do not have modern
defenders. It's difficult to find any philosophical argument that doesn't
have a modern defender somewhere. But, for the most part, such theories
have been discarded by the majority of philosophers in favor of revised
opinions on such matters.
The fact that human beings went on to devise modern theories of morality,
law and government on the foundation of logically flawed metaethical
theories is, in a way, quite remarkable. The human capacity for making
things work that ought not to work due to some fatal flaw in their design is
a tribute to the power of belief. It is also, it seems to me, a tribute to
the human habit of using philosophical arguments as excuses and not as
reasons. A full discussion of that aspect of human nature goes beyond the
intention of this series of essays, but I cannot help but note it in
passing. One moralist in designing a list of characteristics that all moral
systems should possess was wise enough to include "publicity" as one of the
salient features of any workable system. She wondered if any moral system
could survive that did not have such qualities as popular appeal,
'catchiness,' and various other Madison Avenue qualities.
Three moral points of view that were very marketable in their time are
Realism, Naturalism and Natural Law. Realism and Naturalism are very
closely related and Natural Law is a logical derivation of Naturalism. I
bring these terms up because of their historical connection with the concept
of Rights. Although I believe it is quite possible to arrive at a theory of
rights without reference to these concepts, that's not the way it actually
happened.
REALISM
A definition of realism varies depending on what aspect of philosophy is
being discussed. Even in morality, 'realism' is sometimes employed as a
sort of attitude one can take toward moral matters, a 'no nonsense' view of
life as it were. For our purposes, however, realism equates with the belief
that phenomena of a particular kind exist apart from how we think about
them, or whether we can describe them accurately, or even how we might feel
about them. Realism holds that certain things exist objectively and are
unchangeable whether we 'believe' they exist or not. More specifically,
with respect to morality, Moral Realism holds that there are immutable
'moral facts' that exist independently of our ability to describe them, our
attitude toward them, or our belief in them. An important corollary to this
theory is that of 'Semantic Realism.' Semantic Realism holds that every
declarative statement we can make has a definite truth value [it's either
true or false] even if there is no way for us to know whether it is true or
false.
By way of an example of realism, we can suppose that God decides that there
is such a thing as 'goodness.' Obviously, those who subscribe to this
belief hold that there must be 'goodness' in the world because God has said
that there is. The way in which such a belief is a realist belief is that
those who hold it would say that it doesn't make any difference whether or
not the rest of us---or any of us, in fact---can make provable logical
statements about 'goodness.' Nor does it matter whether we actually
understand the full scope of the word goodness. Nor does it matter whether
all of us actually believe that such a thing as 'goodness' exists. In
short, Realism holds that the existence of an entity is not predicated on
our ability to make statements about it, nor on our belief in it.
Moral Non-cognitivism is the principle competitor for realism, in that
non-cognitivism holds that since 'moral' statements are statements about ent
ities that cannot be reduced to true/false statements, such statements are
effectively meaningless as are systems or theories based on such statements.
Though this is obviously an contrasting point of view, it doesn't really
argue against realism so much as it merely denies it. Realism is saying
moral statements are about real things. Non-cognitivism is saying moral
statements are not about real things. If this were the only true state of
affairs we could simply put it down to a matter of pure opinion on both
sides and let it go as being unworthy of further discussion. Although
arguments frequently come down to trading 'I'm right and you're wrong'
assertions, such arguments are not philosophical in nature.
NATURALISM
In order to see why realists might be mistaken in their beliefs, it's
necessary to go on to a kindred group of views haphazardly grouped under the
omnium gatherum term of "Naturalism." Naturalists like Realists believe
that moral statements are real statements. In general, naturalists believe
that normative ethics is all about finding out all sorts of empirical facts
about human nature, social, biological, evolutionary, and so on.
Metaethically, Moral Naturalists believe that moral concepts should be
analysed in terms of scientific facts and natural properties. A typical
moral naturalist might believe that the best moral theory is based on man's
evolutionary background in that it should be built out of empirical facts
concerning man's biological propensities as an evolved and evolving
organism. The moral naturalist might argue that these biological facts have
moral significance because they say something about what is in man's best
interest as an evolving organism.
THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY AND HUME'S LAW
The main reason these various theories are called "Naturalism" is not
because they all have to do with moral systems that involve 'nature.' Some
of them do not. They are called naturalism because they are all examples of
a peculiar flaw in logic first identified by G.E. Moore in an important book
on morality called *Principia Ethica.* Moore called this flaw in logic the
"Naturalistic Fallacy." Moore gave several formulations of the fallacy. I
will give one that I think is the most understandable.
Part of what any metaethical theory does is attempt to define certain moral
terms such as "good/bad," "right/wrong," and so on. If we say that "a dog
is a mammal of the genus 'Canis' and the species 'familiaris' part of what
we're attempting to do is state those qualities that are a part of 'dogness'
that are not shared by other states of being that are not 'dogness.' A dog
shares his 'mammalness' with other mammals, but a dog does not share it's
Genus AND it's species with other mammals. Hence a definition attempts to
isolate what is defined from all other entities that we might define. In
the definition above, the word "is," is a way of informing us that being a
mammal of the genus Canis and the species familiaris ARE CONTAINED within
the idea of "dogness." Note, in particular, that they are not exactly the
same thing. There is more to being a dog than the qualities of genus and
species.
When we turn our attention to moral entities, a peculiar problem emerges.
If I was to say that "working hard is good" it wouldn't quite be the same as
our definition of a dog. We might automatically ask 'do you mean that it's
good to work hard or do you mean that working hard really IS good?' If
working hard IS good then goodness and working hard don't just share
characteristics, they're actually the same thing. If this is true then our
statement is the same as saying either "working hard is working hard" or
"good is good." Either way, we've failed to say anything meaningful. In
general, whenever a metaethical system of morality attempts to define a
moral goal such as "goodness" or "the right" in terms of something that is
not moral, we get this same Naturalistic Fallacy. Another way of putting it
was devised long ago in ancient Greece by Plato when he asked "is a thing
good because the gods will it, or do the gods will it because it is good?"
If an act is good solely because God wills it, then God's will and the
goodness of the act are exactly the same. "It's good to be kind because God
wills it" becomes "It's good to be kind because it's good to be kind." The
flip side of this very old and subtle argument is that: if the gods will
something BECAUSE it is good then it must be good independently of their
will. Since this is the case, the will of the gods alone cannot be
sufficient to explain WHY something is good.
There is another reason that naturalistic versions of reality are fatally
flawed. It was first introduced by one of the greatest philosophers, David
Hume and it has disconcerting consequences for all moral philosophies.
Hume noticed that whenever he read naturalistic arguments they always
started out with certain empirical facts such as 'this thing is true,' and
'that thing is true.' Somewhere along the line, he would always find that
suddenly the philosopher isn't using the word "is" anymore, but has
abandoned it in favor or the word "ought.' In the argument:
1. John is a human being.
Therefore John is mortal.
.....the word "is" appears in both the premise and the conclusion. Note
also that the same KIND of things, or 'terms,' appear in both the premise
and the conclusion. But in:
2. John is a human being
Therefore, John ought to be kind.
....the word "is" still appears in the premise, but has disappeared from the
conclusion. Worse, the KIND of terms that appear in the premise no longer
appear in the conclusion. The conclusion seems to be treating a very
different kind of term, a moral term.
This kind of phenomenon, which is common to all forms of naturalistic
argument, came to be known as "Hume's Law," sometimes paraphrased as "you
can't get from an "IS" to an "OUGHT.""
Because all naturalistic moral systems transgress both the Naturalistic
Fallacy and Hume's Law, none of these theories are logically acceptable.
Moral systems based on Man's nature as a biological creature, Man's nature
as a child of God, Man's nature as a thinking being and so on all commit
these two fallacies.
THE CHALLENGE OF REALISM
Which takes us back, in a roundabout way to realism with its claim that
moral entities exist regardless of our ability to express them. Many
philosophers discard realism out of hand as essentially meaningless. If we
cannot make statements about something that can be, in principle, true or
false, why make statements at all? This is particularly true with respect
to Semantic Realism which holds that all statements have a truth value,
irrespective of our ability to 'know' that they do. If such is the case, if
it is true that I can never 'know' that some statements are true or false in
principle, then there seems little point in making the statements at all.
This all harkens back to the 'brains in the vats' question of Classical
Skepticism. If some aspect of reality is closed to us on principle, then it
effectively is NOT a part of OUR reality.
A more fundamental problem with realism comes by way of recognizing that one
of the jobs of morality is to furnish us with reasons for doing things.
It's nearly impossible to talk about reasons for doing things without
talking about desires. And it's quite impossible to talk about desires
without noticing that most desires are subjective. If this is true, and it
seems to be so, the idea that there is some objective and unchangeable moral
reality that exists apart from our subjective viewpoint appears to be
unlikely.
NATURAL LAW
The belief that man's nature should inform us of moral truths ultimately
gave rise, in ancient Greek philosophy as well as the writings of Thomas
Aquinas [among others], of the idea of Natural Law. Since man's morality is
due in part to his nature [god-given or otherwise], a natural law of
morality is universal and not based on some local laws or customs. For
Aquinas and most medieval philosophers, this law took the form of a
universal expression of the force of God's will. Aristotle contrasted his
concept of Natural Law, which he felt was an expression of man's biological
function in the world with human conventions which were moral only in so far
as they adequately mirrored Natural Law.
Modern Natural law, which harkens back to Grotius, has as its central
beliefs the free and equal nature of man. This view is behind Locke's *Two
Treatises of Civil Government,* is echoed in Rousseau's *Contract social,*
and is carried over virtually untouched into the Declaration of
Independence. Natural Law here perceives human beings as natural
sovereigns. Sovereignty demands respect much as a sovereign state demands
respect. In this view, violations of that sovereignity can only be "lawful"
if they are entered into by agreement. Otherwise they are morally, not just
legally wrong. Since Natural Law always comes before conventional law, it
can be used as the basis for rebellion against standing laws. Religious
components can be a part of Natural Law but they don't have to be.
TWO OBJECTIONS TO NATURAL LAW
Is everything that happens naturally for the best? Grandparental
protestations of "it's all for the best" to one side, it seems relatively
obvious that leaving things alone and letting "nature" take its course is,
after all, not what society is about. Societies are in many senses overtly
non-natural and for what seem like very good reasons. The Lockean version
of Natural Law has been objected to because it leads to
over-individualization and is effectively anti-social. Worse, because
Natural Laws are not codified and available to all, some of the worst
atrocities could be and have been committed in the name of Natural Law.
Hitler's version of the 'natural destiny' of the German people was a version
of natural law that very effectively sealed the fate of all those so
misfortunate as to be born something other than German.
A more theoretical, logical objection to Natural Law reiterates what we have
already said concerning the naturalistic fallacy and Hume's Law. What sort
of thing is 'natural law?' What kind of statements can we make about it?
We know there is such a thing as nature and we know that WE create laws. We
also know that in trying to decipher the way nature works, we often refer to
things we call 'laws' of nature. But how do we get from US to Nature? Does
nature actually have social rules that we can emulate but not otherwise
define or know? If this is the case, how could we know it to be the case?
And if we cannot make statements about natural law or how it might have come
to be, why bother with it at all? Remember, again, that one of the
principle duties of morality is to give us good reasons for doing the things
we do. If Natural Law is beyond our ability to reason, how can it serve as
a firm foundation for our actions?
I have no answer to these questions. That Natural Law, like Naturalism and
Realism is theoretically flawed is without question. But it is also beyond
question that doctrines of "inherent rights" arose from such theories. It
would seem that if we insist that Rights are only understandable as facets
of these beliefs, the belief in Rights must fail.
But it is by no means necessary that we make that connection. A principle
of rights may well be able to stand on its own without reference to its
historical antecedents.
Naturalism-Is when your bowels move in the morning with relief!
And Natural Law is-Eat or be eaten survival of the fittest!
Morality is something that no lofty liberal can create it comes from the
Bible and lives in the Soul.
"What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not warned
from time to time that the people preserve the spirit of resistance?
LET THEM TAKE ARMS"
- Thomas Jefferson -US Ambassador to France.
God Bless America!
Stew
http://www.geocities.com/ensey_in_2000/bor1.html
http://www.civicsandpolitics.com/#Cool
http://www.davehitt.com/dec00/green1.html
http://americanfreedomnews.com
http://www.libertystory.net/
http://www.sas-aim.org/
Jefferson was an extremely well-studied intellectual, wildly read on the
philosophy of his time, and he would have been the first to call you an
idiot.
I can only follow suit.
>Morality is something that no lofty liberal can create it comes from the
>Bible and lives in the Soul.
How's that?
First you have to prove whatever the Bible says is "truth"
So far, none of you thumpers have managed to do that.
After all, acceptance of it is a function of "faith", not evidence.
Therefore, it's not incumbent upon me to accept, as truth, YOUR
beliefs as evidence.
====================================================
Poor, pathetic, DIMWIT DANA, blusterers thusly:
IT PROVES YOU ARE A HYPOCRITE.
Hey ASSHOLE no one but you cares about this,
but it does show you are a hypocritical LOON.
Come on Roseasshole tell us what town you live in,
or are you to chicken to fight.
I am in Phoenix, and my number is listed,
come on chicken man, make your hat.
To late for me to repily now beyond saying I'm a natural law fan in
some instances. Thanks for all these good posts.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
"In the end they will lay their freedom at our feet and say to us,
'Make us your slaves, but feed us.'" -- Dosteovsky
I have never made but one prayer to God, a very short one:
"O Lord, make my enemies ridiculous." And God granted it.
--Voltaire
"You can never really own more than you can carry with two hands while
running at full speed." -- Robert A. Heinlein
Joseph R. Darancette
res0...@verizon.net
Thank you, Captain. Thanks for taking the time to read them.
It's appreciated greatly.
citizen wrote:
> Morality is something that no lofty liberal can create it comes from the
> Bible and lives in the Soul.
Why should one necessarily believe the claims of any particular
religious sect?
What about - "This statement is false"?
>By way of an example of realism, we can suppose that God decides that there
>is such a thing as 'goodness.' Obviously, those who subscribe to this
>belief hold that there must be 'goodness' in the world because God has said
>that there is. The way in which such a belief is a realist belief is that
>those who hold it would say that it doesn't make any difference whether or
>not the rest of us---or any of us, in fact---can make provable logical
>statements about 'goodness.' Nor does it matter whether we actually
>understand the full scope of the word goodness. Nor does it matter whether
>all of us actually believe that such a thing as 'goodness' exists. In
>short, Realism holds that the existence of an entity is not predicated on
>our ability to make statements about it, nor on our belief in it.
>
>Moral Non-cognitivism is the principle competitor for realism, in that
>non-cognitivism holds that since 'moral' statements are statements about ent
>ities that cannot be reduced to true/false statements, such statements are
>effectively meaningless as are systems or theories based on such statements.
>Though this is obviously an contrasting point of view, it doesn't really
>argue against realism so much as it merely denies it. Realism is saying
>moral statements are about real things. Non-cognitivism is saying moral
>statements are not about real things. If this were the only true state of
>affairs we could simply put it down to a matter of pure opinion on both
>sides and let it go as being unworthy of further discussion. Although
>arguments frequently come down to trading 'I'm right and you're wrong'
>assertions, such arguments are not philosophical in nature.
>
Exactly. So which is wrong philosophy or non-cognitivism?
Kinda blows moral theory sky high.
I've never seen a reasonable definition of 'the good'.
>There is another reason that naturalistic versions of reality are fatally
>flawed. It was first introduced by one of the greatest philosophers, David
>Hume and it has disconcerting consequences for all moral philosophies.
>
He also refuted all proof of any kind, saying that all the facts will
never come in, therefore cause and effect are merely theories.
He is the devil.
This doesn't account for a person doing
the 'right' thing even when it hurts.
Desires come in layers, battle one another,
and emerge in a strange tangle.
In the end we are all selfish even if we value
our self esteem greater than our physical benefit.
I don't think Hitler made any more murderers than there already were.
He just allowed them free exercise of their passions. The idea
that Hitler was able to make non-aryans seem non-human is
not peculiar to Nazi Germany. We had it during slavery and
even today. Now we have just killed thousands of civilians
in Afganistan and don't worry much about it. We didn't worry
at all about the genocide in Ruanda. What happened in
Yugoslavia took a long time to get our attention, even
though it happened in Europe. What it is is people
are just no damn good, mostly.
At least in the USA
we have the constitution (if we can keep it)
to give us the necessary protection of the laws.
However, if you ask the man on the street (as has been
done many times) he will object to most of the bill
of rights. The ACLU is despised by a significant
portion of the population.
>A more theoretical, logical objection to Natural Law reiterates what we have
>already said concerning the naturalistic fallacy and Hume's Law. What sort
>of thing is 'natural law?' What kind of statements can we make about it?
>We know there is such a thing as nature and we know that WE create laws. We
>also know that in trying to decipher the way nature works, we often refer to
>things we call 'laws' of nature. But how do we get from US to Nature? Does
>nature actually have social rules that we can emulate but not otherwise
>define or know? If this is the case, how could we know it to be the case?
>And if we cannot make statements about natural law or how it might have come
>to be, why bother with it at all? Remember, again, that one of the
>principle duties of morality is to give us good reasons for doing the things
>we do. If Natural Law is beyond our ability to reason, how can it serve as
>a firm foundation for our actions?
>
Can morality yield to logic?
Paradox is built into language and logic and even arithemetic.
>I have no answer to these questions. That Natural Law, like Naturalism and
>Realism is theoretically flawed is without question. But it is also beyond
>question that doctrines of "inherent rights" arose from such theories. It
>would seem that if we insist that Rights are only understandable as facets
>of these beliefs, the belief in Rights must fail.
>
Everyone believes he has rights. That's why crime is crime -
the violation of one's rights. Do we have a right to believe this?
Logically not, but you can't reason anybody out of his rights.
As a social animal humans have acquired what is necessary
to get along with one another. We all have a sense of justice
concerning our own rights at least. Some people extend
the same rights to others. Those that don't come to a bad
end, as society will demand some sort of justice. You find
this even in the most primitive societies (that still exist, because
those without such morality have destroyed themselves).
The breakdown of social justice was illustrated in the
african Ik tribe. Deprived of their land and confined in
an infertile place they became utterly selfish and lawless.
Families broke down. Everyone stole from everyone.
Violence became a source of amusement.
No survival value in any of that.
Natural rights are 'natural'. They can't be forced on
anyone or removed by anyone. They certainly weren't
the invention of a logical thinker with the godlike power to
transform society to his blueprint of 'the good'.
So much for "rational explanations", I suppose.
Mmmmm!
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
-"Gandalf Grey" <ganda...@infectedmail.com> wrote in message
-news:a25hif$pls$1...@slb0.atl.mindspring.net...
->
->
-Realism-Is when the rice patty brown water turns red from the bleeding
-wounded!
-
-Naturalism-Is when your bowels move in the morning with relief!
-
-And Natural Law is-Eat or be eaten survival of the fittest!
-
-
-Morality is something that no lofty liberal can create it comes from the
-Bible and lives in the Soul.
So when are YOU going to start reading the Bible?
-
==============================================================
"It sometimes happens that men who preach most vehemently about evil and
the punishment of evil, so that they seem to have practically nothing else
on their minds except sin, are really unconscious haters of other men.
They think that the world does not appreciate them, and this is their way
of getting even.
祈a. Thomas Merton, New Seeds of Contemplation, p. 93
==============================================================
Ninure Saunders aka Rainbow Christian
The Lord is my Shepherd and He knows I'm Gay
http://www.geocities.com/ninure
The world's second most subversive document
http://www.geocities.com/ninure/declaration.html
-
Universal Fellowship of Metropolitan Community Churches
http://www.ufmcc.com
To send e-mail, remove nohate from address
Who's quote your's?
And start learning and comprehending what you have read of the Bible!
-snip of intro for space, though I agreed with it-
BTW, I'm not sure the best way to respond to these. I tend to
give reactions to the argument as you make it, while it may be
better to do as others do and collect my thoughts and simply make
a full post. I like the way I do it because it has the feel of a
conversation, though it can be a bit complex and long. Anyway...
> REALISM
>
> A definition of realism varies depending on what aspect of philosophy is
> being discussed. Even in morality, 'realism' is sometimes employed as a
> sort of attitude one can take toward moral matters, a 'no nonsense' view of
> life as it were. For our purposes, however, realism equates with the belief
> that phenomena of a particular kind exist apart from how we think about
> them, or whether we can describe them accurately, or even how we might feel
> about them. Realism holds that certain things exist objectively and are
> unchangeable whether we 'believe' they exist or not.
The best way I've heard this explained is to use a philosophy of
science comparison. Philosophical realism can posit certain
subatomic particles as really existing even if never actually
measured because they need to exist for the theory. Pragmatists
might say they only are a theoretical device. In social science
an example of realism is the acceptance of that 'social
structures' (structured relations between individuals, defining
the powers and capacities of those individuals) are 'real,' even
though a behavioralist might say that only the actions of two
individuals are real.
> More specifically,
> with respect to morality, Moral Realism holds that there are immutable
> 'moral facts' that exist independently of our ability to describe them, our
> attitude toward them, or our belief in them. An important corollary to this
> theory is that of 'Semantic Realism.' Semantic Realism holds that every
> declarative statement we can make has a definite truth value [it's either
> true or false] even if there is no way for us to know whether it is true or
> false.
I can foresee a linguists reaction to the latter. The former
seems to rest on belief or a set of starting assumptions --
though ones I would share.
> By way of an example of realism, we can suppose that God decides that there
> is such a thing as 'goodness.' Obviously, those who subscribe to this
> belief hold that there must be 'goodness' in the world because God has said
> that there is. The way in which such a belief is a realist belief is that
> those who hold it would say that it doesn't make any difference whether or
> not the rest of us---or any of us, in fact---can make provable logical
> statements about 'goodness.' Nor does it matter whether we actually
> understand the full scope of the word goodness. Nor does it matter whether
> all of us actually believe that such a thing as 'goodness' exists. In
> short, Realism holds that the existence of an entity is not predicated on
> our ability to make statements about it, nor on our belief in it.
Yes -- and the universe may have a myriad of dimensions even if
we think the earth is God's crown jewel at the center of the
universe.
> Moral Non-cognitivism is the principle competitor for realism, in that
> non-cognitivism holds that since 'moral' statements are statements about ent
> ities that cannot be reduced to true/false statements, such statements are
> effectively meaningless as are systems or theories based on such statements.
> Though this is obviously an contrasting point of view, it doesn't really
> argue against realism so much as it merely denies it. Realism is saying
> moral statements are about real things. Non-cognitivism is saying moral
> statements are not about real things. If this were the only true state of
> affairs we could simply put it down to a matter of pure opinion on both
> sides and let it go as being unworthy of further discussion. Although
> arguments frequently come down to trading 'I'm right and you're wrong'
> assertions, such arguments are not philosophical in nature.
Well put -- it seems non-cognitivism is simply starting from a
different set of assumptions.
> NATURALISM
>
> In order to see why realists might be mistaken in their beliefs, it's
> necessary to go on to a kindred group of views haphazardly grouped under the
> omnium gatherum term of "Naturalism." Naturalists like Realists believe
> that moral statements are real statements. In general, naturalists believe
> that normative ethics is all about finding out all sorts of empirical facts
> about human nature, social, biological, evolutionary, and so on.
> Metaethically, Moral Naturalists believe that moral concepts should be
> analysed in terms of scientific facts and natural properties. A typical
> moral naturalist might believe that the best moral theory is based on man's
> evolutionary background in that it should be built out of empirical facts
> concerning man's biological propensities as an evolved and evolving
> organism. The moral naturalist might argue that these biological facts have
> moral significance because they say something about what is in man's best
> interest as an evolving organism.
That seems to be another set of assumptions, in contrast to the
above too. Clearly, ones' opening assumptions say a lot about
where one will end up. And, given the point you make in your
introduction, it demonstrates that if someone wants a particular
result from their moral theory, the best way to assure they get
it is to choose assumptions which will lead to where they want to
go.
-no comment on the explanation of the naturalistic fallacy, so
I'll snip it for readability's sake-
> THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY AND HUME'S LAW
>
Agreed, and a number of us have of course made this kind of
argument in response to the natural rights crowd here. Thanks
for the detailed explanation.
> THE CHALLENGE OF REALISM
>
> Which takes us back, in a roundabout way to realism with its claim that
> moral entities exist regardless of our ability to express them. Many
> philosophers discard realism out of hand as essentially meaningless. If we
> cannot make statements about something that can be, in principle, true or
> false, why make statements at all?
I'm having trouble following the above. Again, using theoretical
physics and string theory as an example, the math tells
scientists that there are (might be, if the theory is correct)
multiple dimensions, some theories even
posit a different dimension for each quantum probability, which
would mean an ungodly number of new dimensions popping into
existence every nanosecond. We don't know what those dimensions
are like, what exactly it means to have a dimension beyond the
four we are used to (well, we know the 5th dimension is a late
sixties pop act), or very much about all of this. Such theories
may in fact
be fundamentally untestable, if dimensions cannot be
transgressed. Yet, the math says they may exist, and we can talk
about them and use them in theories even if we don't know what
precisely they are. It seems to me that believing moral
principles exist, even though we cannot express or describe them
simply reflects a starting assumption, or perhaps the consequence
of a theory (e.g., a religious theory). That doesn't make them
essentially meaningless, though it does make it problemmatic to
build a moral system upon something which is in essence a
starting assumption. At the very least the assumption, why it is
made, and what beliefs underlie it are important.
>This is particularly true with respect
> to Semantic Realism which holds that all statements have a truth value,
> irrespective of our ability to 'know' that they do. If such is the case, if
> it is true that I can never 'know' that some statements are true or false in
> principle, then there seems little point in making the statements at all.
> This all harkens back to the 'brains in the vats' question of Classical
> Skepticism. If some aspect of reality is closed to us on principle, then it
> effectively is NOT a part of OUR reality.
And of course is the type of issue philosophy of science has had
to deal with throughout modern history.
> A more fundamental problem with realism comes by way of recognizing that one
> of the jobs of morality is to furnish us with reasons for doing things.
> It's nearly impossible to talk about reasons for doing things without
> talking about desires. And it's quite impossible to talk about desires
> without noticing that most desires are subjective. If this is true, and it
> seems to be so, the idea that there is some objective and unchangeable moral
> reality that exists apart from our subjective viewpoint appears to be
> unlikely.
Unless, of course, the realist believes that our desires are in
part evidence of that objective moral belief. I don't want to
mesh it with naturalism here, but let's say a realist believes
there is an objective moral code that comes from God, or a Star
Wars like belief in a force. Desires need to be examined to see
which are deep and shared across cultures, which are not. Care
would have to be made to judge what are deep or fundamental
desires (a desire to feel content) and short term desires caused
by a misunderstanding of how to fulfill that deep desire (use of
heroin because it makes one feel content for awhile). I'm not
saying this won't have problems, only that a realist would not
necessarily see subjectivity as contrary to a belief in a true
moral code. In fact, without subjectivity, there would be no
need for a moral code. But, such a move does appear to be the
kind of trap you earlier discussed where people simply
rationalize their own perspectives rather than undertaking a real
investigation. Such a moral realist simply has to accept
starting assumptions on faith -- including faith that an
objective moral
code really exists. It's hard to argue with faith, or prove to
those not sharing such a faith that it is warranted. At best one
can make a 'plausible case' that could be convincing to some, but
not to others. At least such a moral realist view doesn't have
the audacity of the natural rights/law view in that they don't
seem to think they can figure it out simply by studying nature.
I'll move on to natural law in the next post.
> NATURAL LAW
>
> The belief that man's nature should inform us of moral truths ultimately
> gave rise, in ancient Greek philosophy as well as the writings of Thomas
> Aquinas [among others], of the idea of Natural Law. Since man's morality is
> due in part to his nature [god-given or otherwise], a natural law of
> morality is universal and not based on some local laws or customs. For
> Aquinas and most medieval philosophers, this law took the form of a
> universal expression of the force of God's will. Aristotle contrasted his
> concept of Natural Law, which he felt was an expression of man's biological
> function in the world with human conventions which were moral only in so far
> as they adequately mirrored Natural Law.
>
> Modern Natural law, which harkens back to Grotius, has as its central
> beliefs the free and equal nature of man. This view is behind Locke's *Two
> Treatises of Civil Government,* is echoed in Rousseau's *Contract social,*
> and is carried over virtually untouched into the Declaration of
> Independence. Natural Law here perceives human beings as natural
> sovereigns. Sovereignty demands respect much as a sovereign state demands
> respect. In this view, violations of that sovereignity can only be "lawful"
> if they are entered into by agreement. Otherwise they are morally, not just
> legally wrong. Since Natural Law always comes before conventional law, it
> can be used as the basis for rebellion against standing laws. Religious
> components can be a part of Natural Law but they don't have to be.
A side note: Grotius was the first I believe to extend the
concept of sovereignty to collective political units, thereby
laying the ground work for the development of the sovereign
territortial modern state, which many scholars date back to the
treaty of Westphalia in 1648.
> TWO OBJECTIONS TO NATURAL LAW
>
> Is everything that happens naturally for the best? Grandparental
> protestations of "it's all for the best" to one side, it seems relatively
> obvious that leaving things alone and letting "nature" take its course is,
> after all, not what society is about. Societies are in many senses overtly
> non-natural and for what seem like very good reasons. The Lockean version
> of Natural Law has been objected to because it leads to
> over-individualization and is effectively anti-social. Worse, because
> Natural Laws are not codified and available to all, some of the worst
> atrocities could be and have been committed in the name of Natural Law.
> Hitler's version of the 'natural destiny' of the German people was a version
> of natural law that very effectively sealed the fate of all those so
> misfortunate as to be born something other than German.
Your argument against natural law is persausive throughout this
and especially below. I have no desire to defend it, I've been
arguing against the 'natural rights' people for some time. But I
do have a few points, feel free to ignore them as I do not mean
them as counter arguments, just observations.
As for atrocities, a believer in natural rights would reject that
argument, noting that Hitler also used "science" to "prove" that
Jews and other racists were inferior to Germans. Of course, that
wasn't real science just a false claim of science. They could
say Hitler made a false claim about natural laws, acting against
evidence and logic. Still, your point is well taken: once
someone believes something is RIGHT and THE TRUTH, they will
often simply puruse that course with religious fervor.
As for over-individualization, I think its important to put
natural law and its development in a social context. Technology
was improving and people were starting to question the
societal/religious norms that governed their behavior. In
pre-modern times people lived in squalor and had lives we could
not imagine. Sometimes with a working vocabularly of less than
1000 words, often not going more than a few miles from where they
were born, their lives were usually mapped out by their place in
society. Yet, they also had a sense of belonging and meaning.
The village was a whole, and they got their identity and value
from being part of that collective. They had a religious
mythology to assure them that paradise awaited if they did their
duty, and an extended family to support them emotionally and
materially.
Modernism tore that away, liberating people from the
straightjacket of inflexible social norms, but starting a dynamic
that lead to capitalism, sweat shops, and workers acting more as
cogs in machines than anything else, with few social supports,
and certainly nothing like the sense of belonging the village
provided. Traditions were brushed aside, the family was weakened
considerably in terms of its function in a persons' life, and
reason came to dominate, weakening traditional ways of
understanding reality and organizing social life.
In this context, of which liberalism and natural law arguments
were a part, I'm not sure if they *caused* the alienation, or if
they were a *reaction to* changes, and perhaps even reactions
that had a positive impact, especially in terms of noting that
given the collapse of the old social order something had to be
developed that would prevent those with power from simply abusing
it and using others for their own gains. Natural law and natural
rights at least tried to develop this. Beyond that, natural law
tended to be used by a social class, the middle class, to wrestle
power from the landed nobility who had benefited from the
traditional way.
More succinctly: was natural law something that led to
over-individualization or anti-social cultural norms, or did it
react to the breakdown of old norms and in a sense "follow"
social norms and rationalize what was happening anyway, often in
ways that were used to try to promote social justice and
stability (especially when "new liberalism" arose in Great
Britain).
Finally, while I do NOT want to make an argument supporting
natural law, it seems that one could argue that the events of the
last hundred or so years demonstrate that the world was 'evolving
naturally' to a more individualist, capitalist, secular way of
life, and that the problem is not natural law, but a too small
number of people who understand and follow it. That, of course,
falls to the kind of fallacy you discuss (just because something
happens doesn't mean it ought to happen) and since this hasn't
happened in the same way in other cultures, it doesn't seem a
human absolute. This also opens up the possibility that natural
law will go a Social Darwinist route, much like the Hitler
example you give.
> A more theoretical, logical objection to Natural Law reiterates what we have
> already said concerning the naturalistic fallacy and Hume's Law. What sort
> of thing is 'natural law?' What kind of statements can we make about it?
> We know there is such a thing as nature and we know that WE create laws. We
> also know that in trying to decipher the way nature works, we often refer to
> things we call 'laws' of nature. But how do we get from US to Nature? Does
> nature actually have social rules that we can emulate but not otherwise
> define or know? If this is the case, how could we know it to be the case?
> And if we cannot make statements about natural law or how it might have come
> to be, why bother with it at all? Remember, again, that one of the
> principle duties of morality is to give us good reasons for doing the things
> we do. If Natural Law is beyond our ability to reason, how can it serve as
> a firm foundation for our actions?
Well put.
> "Gandalf Grey" <ganda...@infectedmail.com> wrote:
[...]
>> Semantic Realism holds that every
>>declarative statement we can make has a definite truth value [it's either
>>true or false] even if there is no way for us to know whether it is true or
>>false.
> What about - "This statement is false"?
Take the Boolean algebra constructed from the power domain
of true and false:
{true, false}
/ \
{true} {false}
\ /
{}
Interpret the values as solutions to equations; when
those equations are self-referential, take the fixed
point solutions. Then, "This sentence is false" can
be understood as "X = ~X", which has no solutions,
and its truth value is {}, i.e. the bottom element
of the lattice. Similarly, "This sentence is true"
can be understood as "X = X" which has two solutions,
both true and false, so its truth value is {true,false},
i.e. the top element of the lattice. It's a fairly
standard four-valued logic.
Is that what you meant? :-)
-"Ninure Saunders" <RainbowChri...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
-news:RainbowChristiannoh...@dialup-63.215.114.167.dial1.chi
-cago1.level3.net...
-> In article <u4ck8vg...@corp.supernews.com>, "citizen"
-> <stu...@hotmail.com> wrote:
->
-> -"Gandalf Grey" <ganda...@infectedmail.com> wrote in message
-> -news:a25hif$pls$1...@slb0.atl.mindspring.net...
-> ->
-> ->
-> -Realism-Is when the rice patty brown water turns red from the bleeding
-> -wounded!
-> -
-> -Naturalism-Is when your bowels move in the morning with relief!
-> -
-> -And Natural Law is-Eat or be eaten survival of the fittest!
-> -
-> -
-> -Morality is something that no lofty liberal can create it comes from the
-> -Bible and lives in the Soul.
->
-> So when are YOU going to start reading the Bible?
->
-Never stopped ,maybe you should start!
Perhaps then, I should suggest that you might consider putting some of the
"morality" found in the NT into practice?
-==============================================================
->
-> "It sometimes happens that men who preach most vehemently about evil and
-> the punishment of evil, so that they seem to have practically nothing else
-> on their minds except sin, are really unconscious haters of other men.
-> They think that the world does not appreciate them, and this is their way
-> of getting even.
-> >
-
-Who's quote your's?
Perhaps if you hadm't chosen to do a very dishonest snip, it would be
clear whose quote it was?
Let me repost it for you.
==============================================================
"It sometimes happens that men who preach most vehemently about evil and
the punishment of evil, so that they seem to have practically nothing else
on their minds except sin, are really unconscious haters of other men.
They think that the world does not appreciate them, and this is their way
of getting even.
祈a. Thomas Merton, New Seeds of Contemplation, p. 93
==============================================================
-
-And start learning and comprehending what you have read of the Bible!
I read and comprehend quite well, thank you, and do my best to put what I
read into PRACTICE.
-
-
===================================================
Romans 13: Let every soul be in subjection to the higher authorities, for
there is no authority except from God, and those who be are ordained by
God.
2 Therefore he who resists the authority, withstands the ordinance of God;
and those who withstand will receive to themselves judgment.
3 For rulers are not a terror to the good work, but to the evil. Do you
desire to have no fear of the authority? Do that which is good, and you
will have praise from the same,
4 for he is a servant of God to you for good. But if you do that which is
evil, be afraid, for he doesn't bear the sword in vain; for he is a
minister of God, an avenger for wrath to him who does evil.
Not FAIR! All they were told was to read it. Nobody said anything about
Life giving a quiz!
You don't know much about natural law, do you?
> Morality is something that no lofty liberal can create it comes from the
> Bible and lives in the Soul.
Or history, ethnology, and morality either, apparently.
You dare to compare yourself to Jefferson?
Realism and Naturalism a lofty liberal ploy!
I have been reading the writings of Thomas Jefferson since I was a little
boy!
"Nothing... is unchangeable but the inherent and unalienable rights of
man." --Thomas Jefferson to John Cartwright, 1824. ME 16:48
Inalienable Rights are not up for debate!
Remember the link dink?
http://etext.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/jeff0100.htm
You better buy yourself a rain goat and wear it all the time!
For you don't have the since to walk out of the rain:>))
"What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not warned
from time to time that the people preserve the spirit of resistance?
LET THEM TAKE ARMS"
- Thomas Jefferson -US Ambassador to France.
God Bless America!
I like it. It has a Socratic feel to it. < : )
Anyway...
>
> > REALISM
> >
> > A definition of realism varies depending on what aspect of philosophy is
> > being discussed. Even in morality, 'realism' is sometimes employed as a
> > sort of attitude one can take toward moral matters, a 'no nonsense' view
of
> > life as it were. For our purposes, however, realism equates with the
belief
> > that phenomena of a particular kind exist apart from how we think about
> > them, or whether we can describe them accurately, or even how we might
feel
> > about them. Realism holds that certain things exist objectively and are
> > unchangeable whether we 'believe' they exist or not.
>
> The best way I've heard this explained is to use a philosophy of
> science comparison. Philosophical realism can posit certain
> subatomic particles as really existing even if never actually
> measured because they need to exist for the theory. Pragmatists
> might say they only are a theoretical device. In social science
> an example of realism is the acceptance of that 'social
> structures' (structured relations between individuals, defining
> the powers and capacities of those individuals) are 'real,' even
> though a behavioralist might say that only the actions of two
> individuals are real.
One of the more modern viewpoints toward morality is to treat moral
statements as an "as if" hypothisis. So in Rights for example, we could
make the argument, "if there is such a thing as a right, it would have these
qualities....."
> > Moral Non-cognitivism is the principle competitor for realism, in that
> > non-cognitivism holds that since 'moral' statements are statements about
ent
> > ities that cannot be reduced to true/false statements, such statements
are
> > effectively meaningless as are systems or theories based on such
statements.
> > Though this is obviously an contrasting point of view, it doesn't really
> > argue against realism so much as it merely denies it. Realism is saying
> > moral statements are about real things. Non-cognitivism is saying moral
> > statements are not about real things. If this were the only true state
of
> > affairs we could simply put it down to a matter of pure opinion on both
> > sides and let it go as being unworthy of further discussion. Although
> > arguments frequently come down to trading 'I'm right and you're wrong'
> > assertions, such arguments are not philosophical in nature.
>
> Well put -- it seems non-cognitivism is simply starting from a
> different set of assumptions.
The important thing being, particularly in a largely political group such as
this, to remember that---at least in philosophy---the fact that there is an
opposite view on any theory is NOT a refutation of that theory.
Theoretically, either view could be correct or they could both be wrong
[unless you're a subjectivist in which case, they're both right as long as
they're sincere, or you're a strong skeptic in which case they're both wrong
by definition.]
> > Because all naturalistic moral systems transgress both the Naturalistic
> > Fallacy and Hume's Law, none of these theories are logically acceptable.
> > Moral systems based on Man's nature as a biological creature, Man's
nature
> > as a child of God, Man's nature as a thinking being and so on all commit
> > these two fallacies.
>
> Agreed, and a number of us have of course made this kind of
> argument in response to the natural rights crowd here. Thanks
> for the detailed explanation.
No problem. Hume's Law is definitely one of the "gotcha!" rules of
philosophy. Some say it even 'got' it's creator.
The key phrase in your statement is: "......Yet the math says they may
exist." Recognize that in philosophy one is generally working with
everything there is to work with. Metaphysical and metaethical questions in
particular can look for no help from surrounding sciences or some heretofore
unlooked for human discovery. If philosophical proof says we cannot make
statements about some subject, we've essentially killed the subject. This
presents a problem for two fundamental reasons that I can think of at the
moment.
1. Harkening back to the 'brains in the vats' argument of classical
skepticism, the refutation of a classical view toward the impossibility of
'knowing' anything consists of the recognition that IF we are isolated from
some reality so that there is no way we can 'know' the truth and IF the only
reality we can know is the 'reality' being piped into the vat, THEN our
reality IS the reality of the vat and suppositions about some yet more
external reality are meaningless. This has relevance to the realm of ethics
because IF there is some objective moral principle that we CANNOT know, even
in principle, then that moral principle effectively does not exist for the
purposes of human discourse.
Let me use a hypothetical [and quite impossible] example to illustrate. We
all know that our eyes are attuned to being able to perceive and transmit
information to our brain concerning certain wavelengths of the
electromagnetic spectrum. We perceive these wavelengths as light in a
variety of colors. We also know that there are wavelengths that we cannot
perceive because experiments, theories, and various forms of instrumentation
tell us this is so. But what if there was yet another wavelength we could
not see? What if this wavelength could not be measured by any form of
instrumentation? What if this wavelength could not be accounted for by any
theory of physics that we either understand or COULD understand. What if
its properties were not only unknown, but unknowable? What if this
wavelength were "in principle" undetectable? How could we know it? How
could we speculate about it? What could there ever be about our "knowledge"
of this wavelength that was anything other that pure imagination? Now, is
what is purely imaginary real?
2. Remember that a moral theory needs to tell us what is right [the
metaethical aspect] but also what we should do that is right and why we
should do what is right [which is the normative aspect of ethics]. That
being said, we must ask ourselves what is the value of a good that cannot be
expressed or even considered as being true or false? If we could somehow
make statements about it, it's at least conceivable that we could go on to
fashion rules of behavior which operated in accordance with its principles.
But how can we make such rules if we cannot know what the rules relate to?
It's as if some god told us "do thus and so and I'll tell you later why I
wanted you to do it." But it gets worse, because if we cannot make
true/false statements about a moral principle, how can we know even WHAT we
ought to do, much less WHY we ought to do it? What logicians get upset at
can be easily illustrated by simply constructing a non-truth assignable
value to a moral statement, such as "abortion is goodbad." Now, how are we
to proceed normatively from this statement? As I've pointed out in another
post, various manipulations have been made with this problem, such as
defining personal opinion "I THINK abortion is good/bad," or using
prescriptivism or emotivism "Abortion: Yeah!" or "Abortion! Boo!" None of
them is very satisfactory.
> > A more fundamental problem with realism comes by way of recognizing that
one
> > of the jobs of morality is to furnish us with reasons for doing things.
> > It's nearly impossible to talk about reasons for doing things without
> > talking about desires. And it's quite impossible to talk about desires
> > without noticing that most desires are subjective. If this is true, and
it
> > seems to be so, the idea that there is some objective and unchangeable
moral
> > reality that exists apart from our subjective viewpoint appears to be
> > unlikely.
>
> Unless, of course, the realist believes that our desires are in
> part evidence of that objective moral belief. I don't want to
> mesh it with naturalism here, but let's say a realist believes
> there is an objective moral code that comes from God, or a Star
> Wars like belief in a force. Desires need to be examined to see
> which are deep and shared across cultures, which are not. Care
> would have to be made to judge what are deep or fundamental
> desires (a desire to feel content) and short term desires caused
> by a misunderstanding of how to fulfill that deep desire (use of
> heroin because it makes one feel content for awhile).
This is a view held by Russell in his later life that I am rather fond of
myself. Another way of saying it is that most of what we BELIEVE are
fundamental moral disagreements are not in fact fundamental. In most cases
they are either disagreements over what basic moral principles actually
mean, or they are disagreements that are really about Means and not Ends.
This is not a particularly easy point of view to hold, but I feel that it's
the most constructive.
Look up "follow suit."
>
>
> Realism and Naturalism a lofty liberal ploy!
That's a highly ignorant remark since most individuals who hold with either
of these two forms of moral philosophy are at least morally conservative.
Since contractarianism of the Lockean variety is a direct outgrowth of
Natural Law and since Natural Law is a direct implication of both Realism
and Naturalism, you seem to have blown off both of your feet with one shot.
>
>
> I have been reading the writings of Thomas Jefferson since I was a little
> boy!
You should try him in something other than the graphic novel version. After
awhile you might not even miss the thought balloons.
Actually, there is little new to modern moral philosophy. The main
thrust of what was inovative in modern philosophy is/was positivist
and not terribly concerned about morality. Mostly it is a rehash of
old skepticism that existed all the way back in Plato's day. The
concept of universality and the possibility of formal moral philosophy
(Kant) is probably the most "advanced".
>Three moral points of view that were very marketable in their time are
>Realism, Naturalism and Natural Law. Realism and Naturalism are very
>closely related and Natural Law is a logical derivation of Naturalism. I
>bring these terms up because of their historical connection with the concept
>of Rights. Although I believe it is quite possible to arrive at a theory of
>rights without reference to these concepts, that's not the way it actually
>happened.
>
>REALISM
>
>A definition of realism varies depending on what aspect of philosophy is
>being discussed. Even in morality, 'realism' is sometimes employed as a
>sort of attitude one can take toward moral matters, a 'no nonsense' view of
>life as it were. For our purposes, however, realism equates with the belief
>that phenomena of a particular kind exist apart from how we think about
>them, or whether we can describe them accurately, or even how we might feel
>about them. Realism holds that certain things exist objectively and are
>unchangeable whether we 'believe' they exist or not. More specifically,
>with respect to morality, Moral Realism holds that there are immutable
>'moral facts' that exist independently of our ability to describe them, our
>attitude toward them, or our belief in them. An important corollary to this
>theory is that of 'Semantic Realism.' Semantic Realism holds that every
>declarative statement we can make has a definite truth value [it's either
>true or false] even if there is no way for us to know whether it is true or
>false.
You are making a false dichotomy between nominalism and realism. It
is at least conceivable that there are propostions that are
objectively true or false but where the objects they discuss do not
exist (except as ideas).
>
>By way of an example of realism, we can suppose that God decides that there
>is such a thing as 'goodness.' Obviously, those who subscribe to this
>belief hold that there must be 'goodness' in the world because God has said
>that there is. The way in which such a belief is a realist belief is that
>those who hold it would say that it doesn't make any difference whether or
>not the rest of us---or any of us, in fact---can make provable logical
>statements about 'goodness.' Nor does it matter whether we actually
>understand the full scope of the word goodness. Nor does it matter whether
>all of us actually believe that such a thing as 'goodness' exists. In
>short, Realism holds that the existence of an entity is not predicated on
>our ability to make statements about it, nor on our belief in it.
>
>Moral Non-cognitivism is the principle competitor for realism, in that
>non-cognitivism holds that since 'moral' statements are statements about ent
>ities that cannot be reduced to true/false statements, such statements are
>effectively meaningless as are systems or theories based on such statements.
>Though this is obviously an contrasting point of view, it doesn't really
>argue against realism so much as it merely denies it. Realism is saying
>moral statements are about real things. Non-cognitivism is saying moral
>statements are not about real things. If this were the only true state of
>affairs we could simply put it down to a matter of pure opinion on both
>sides and let it go as being unworthy of further discussion. Although
>arguments frequently come down to trading 'I'm right and you're wrong'
>assertions, such arguments are not philosophical in nature.
>
Incidentally, moral skepticism is just as old as moral objectivism (or
whatever you want to call it). You cannot say that moral skepticism
is the modern theory and moral objectivism goes back to the
enlightenment.
In fact, the kind of moral realism that you discuss is more
appropriate for ancient times. The enlightenment brought a lot of
ideas like conceptualism and compatibilism into vogue.
>NATURALISM
>
>In order to see why realists might be mistaken in their beliefs, it's
>necessary to go on to a kindred group of views haphazardly grouped under the
>omnium gatherum term of "Naturalism." Naturalists like Realists believe
>that moral statements are real statements.
All statements are real statements. And generally any declarative
statement is a statement about reality.
> In general, naturalists believe
>that normative ethics is all about finding out all sorts of empirical facts
>about human nature, social, biological, evolutionary, and so on.
>Metaethically, Moral Naturalists believe that moral concepts should be
>analysed in terms of scientific facts and natural properties. A typical
>moral naturalist might believe that the best moral theory is based on man's
>evolutionary background in that it should be built out of empirical facts
>concerning man's biological propensities as an evolved and evolving
>organism. The moral naturalist might argue that these biological facts have
>moral significance because they say something about what is in man's best
>interest as an evolving organism.
>
>THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY AND HUME'S LAW
>
>The main reason these various theories are called "Naturalism" is not
>because they all have to do with moral systems that involve 'nature.' Some
>of them do not. They are called naturalism because they are all examples of
>a peculiar flaw in logic first identified by G.E. Moore in an important book
>on morality called *Principia Ethica.* Moore called this flaw in logic the
>"Naturalistic Fallacy." Moore gave several formulations of the fallacy. I
>will give one that I think is the most understandable.
>
Incidentally, Moore was a realist and a 20th century philosopher.
Hume was an enlightenment philosopher and a skeptic. This is exactly
the opposite of what you are trying to conclude.
Hume would be barely read if it were not for Kant who answered him.
So before you spend all your time on hume as if he had established the
foundation of the modern progress made in moral philosophy, you should
note that Kant popularizd him and rebutted him. Moore follows Kant
more than Hume and is often hailed as setting the pace for 20th
century moral philosophy.
You must first reject realism and then conclude that moral statements
are not true or false. You seem to suggest that it is the other way
around.
Incidentally, you are effectively expressing the same view that the
logical postivists had. It has been more thoroughly discredited than
any other world view.
> This is particularly true with respect
>to Semantic Realism which holds that all statements have a truth value,
>irrespective of our ability to 'know' that they do.
It is widely known and accepted (so much so that you would hardly have
to discuss it professionally) that epistemological undecidability does
not imply metaphysical indeterminism. Sadly, scientists don't seem to
know the difference between epistemology and metaphysics, but any
mathematician or philosopher should appreciate the difference. For
instance, it is not held that mathematics is now up for grabs and
there is no truth in math just because of Godel's incompleteness
theorems.
>If such is the case, if
>it is true that I can never 'know' that some statements are true or false in
>principle, then there seems little point in making the statements at all.
>This all harkens back to the 'brains in the vats' question of Classical
>Skepticism. If some aspect of reality is closed to us on principle, then it
>effectively is NOT a part of OUR reality.
>
See math. No one in their right mind thinks (or at least it certainly
isn't modern or mainstream) that mathematical facts have no truth
value, is and empirical science or is not part of our reality.
>A more fundamental problem with realism comes by way of recognizing that one
>of the jobs of morality is to furnish us with reasons for doing things.
>It's nearly impossible to talk about reasons for doing things without
>talking about desires. And it's quite impossible to talk about desires
>without noticing that most desires are subjective. If this is true, and it
>seems to be so, the idea that there is some objective and unchangeable moral
>reality that exists apart from our subjective viewpoint appears to be
>unlikely.
>
You are confusing personal motivation with moral obligation. It may
well be the case that one has no personal motivation to be moral in a
certain situation. In such a situation one should expect them to act
immorally. If this didn't happen very often, then morality would
scarcely be an issue.
Well, if I am to construe what you are saying as supposed to apply to
the idea of natural law. I might ask you if anything is truly
unnatural. Perhaps you think that society is supernatural? I didn't
think so.
>The Lockean version
>of Natural Law has been objected to because it leads to
>over-individualization and is effectively anti-social.
What? This is not any kind of serious philsoophical objection to it.
At best it is just a mere disputation: "I object to natural law
primarliy because I think it is wrong."
> Worse, because
>Natural Laws are not codified and available to all,
Natural laws are held to be available to all by those that advocate
such a position. They are not codified, of course, since no such
thing could be in principle available to all.
> some of the worst
>atrocities could be and have been committed in the name of Natural Law.
>Hitler's version of the 'natural destiny' of the German people was a version
>of natural law that very effectively sealed the fate of all those so
>misfortunate as to be born something other than German.
I don't think so. Natural law has almost nothing to do with the
Nazis. Moral skepticism, on the other hand, ....
>
>A more theoretical, logical objection to Natural Law reiterates what we have
>already said concerning the naturalistic fallacy and Hume's Law. What sort
>of thing is 'natural law?' What kind of statements can we make about it?
I would note the weakness of such an objection. You can lodge it on
anything. "We don't know very much about this thing, therefore
knowledge of this thing is impossible."
Perhaps we should stop pursuing knowledge altogether. Science is not
nailed down. Math has been shown to have serious philosophical issues
at its foundations.
>We know there is such a thing as nature and we know that WE create laws.
There is no such thing as nature? What? Are you some sort of extreme
idealist? Or, do you really think that natural law advocates think
that Nature is a being of some sort?
We certainly create laws, but that is hardly relevant as a riposte to
natural law.
>We
>also know that in trying to decipher the way nature works, we often refer to
>things we call 'laws' of nature. But how do we get from US to Nature? Does
>nature actually have social rules that we can emulate but not otherwise
>define or know?
Obviously a natural law theorist would say that we can know them and
that we certainly don't define them ourselves.
> If this is the case, how could we know it to be the case?
The same way we would know anything -- by thinking about it. We
probably wouldn't be able to figure every last aspect out, but it
seems unlikely that we couldn't come to meaningful conclusions that
are likely to be true.
>And if we cannot make statements about natural law or how it might have come
>to be, why bother with it at all? Remember, again, that one of the
>principle duties of morality is to give us good reasons for doing the things
>we do. If Natural Law is beyond our ability to reason, how can it serve as
>a firm foundation for our actions?
No it isn't. Morality doesn't also have to motivate us personally.
If we insist that it, by its very nature, does, then we have a heavy
burden of showing how immorality is even possible. If immorality is
not possible, then we aren't really talking about morality.
In fact, setting morality as an end in itself was thought by Kant to
be virtuous which subjective and distinct from the issue of justice.
>
>I have no answer to these questions. That Natural Law, like Naturalism and
>Realism is theoretically flawed is without question. But it is also beyond
>question that doctrines of "inherent rights" arose from such theories. It
>would seem that if we insist that Rights are only understandable as facets
>of these beliefs, the belief in Rights must fail.
>
>But it is by no means necessary that we make that connection. A principle
>of rights may well be able to stand on its own without reference to its
>historical antecedents.
>
It is one thing to believe that it has all been done before. I
generally wouldn't advocate such a view. However, I think the
opposite view -- that nothing has been done before -- is also not
terribly appropriate. What is the case is that people will always
dispute a given view. If you are looking for the most "advanced"
metaethical theory, in terms of being the most recently proposed
theory or the end of the most complicated reasoning, then that would
likely be some variant of Kantian ethics. Everything else is much
older than that.
> A side note: Grotius was the first I believe to extend the
> concept of sovereignty to collective political units, thereby
> laying the ground work for the development of the sovereign
> territortial modern state, which many scholars date back to the
> treaty of Westphalia in 1648.
It's not a particularly large step from that concept to the concept of
individual rights.
The terrible thing about Natural Law is that it isn't all that natural for
those who disagree even when 'science' is brought in as a witness. Do you
remember McPhillips' recent foray into morality? Hopefully at least one of
his comments on the 'properly formed conscience' got through to you on one
of my responses to him. He quoted as follows:
"Moral good is objective and a properly formed conscience
can perceive it." John Paul II, 8/14/93
What is a properly formed conscience and how are we to know that it is
properly formed? What could science or theology tell us that would
demonstrate the existence of a properly formed conscience's ability to
perceive Natural Law? If Natural law is valid and says something about
"moral good," we should all know it. But, evidently, we do not all
'perceive it, and we do not do so because our consciences are not 'properly
formed.'
This is a very representative Natural Law assertion of a particularly
small-minded type, and it points out precisely what's dangerous about
Natural Law. Anyone can make a statement about it and no one can
effectively argue otherwise because Natural Law is not 'someplace' where we
can look it up and check assertions against it for independent verification
of what really is Natural Law and what is not really Natural Law.
In a sense, this is a sort of moral grandfather of Howard Hughe's comment
that 'if you have to ask how much it costs, you can't afford it." Those who
defend Natural Law along ill-informed theological lines [there are GOOD
theological arguments for Natural Law] generally state that Natural Law is
'self-evident.' But if it is, why is there so much disagreement about it?
This is not the conception of Natural Law as it was envisoned by the ancient
Greeks nor Thomas Aquinas. Though the origin of Natural Law for Aquinas was
unquestionably theological, its understanding was always accessable to the
rational mind. God deliberately ordained that it would be so for He
intended, as Paul explains it, that the facts about Him should be evident to
believers and unbelievers alike.
What we see in the group here is more like the following:
"How can I know that rights are real?"
"They're real because they are ordained by Natural Law."
"But how can I know Natural Law is real?"
"It's self-evident."
"But if it's self-evident, why isn't it evident to me that it's
self-evident?"
"If you had a properly formed conscience it would be self-evident."
Such obscurantist rubbish doesn't even rise to the level of philosophical
argument. It's the kind of thing that even the worst of the Sophists would
have turned their backs on as being too obvious.
>
> More succinctly: was natural law something that led to
> over-individualization or anti-social cultural norms, or did it
> react to the breakdown of old norms and in a sense "follow"
> social norms and rationalize what was happening anyway, often in
> ways that were used to try to promote social justice and
> stability (especially when "new liberalism" arose in Great
> Britain).
That's a purely sociological/historical question that I can't answer. From
the standpoint of philosophy, I would consider it to be a very bad sign if
the latter was the case. Whenever it becomes apparent to me that
philosophical theories seem to take on the primary role of rationalizations
for pre-existing conduct, so much the worse for the theories.
>
> Finally, while I do NOT want to make an argument supporting
> natural law, it seems that one could argue that the events of the
> last hundred or so years demonstrate that the world was 'evolving
> naturally' to a more individualist, capitalist, secular way of
> life, and that the problem is not natural law, but a too small
> number of people who understand and follow it. That, of course,
> falls to the kind of fallacy you discuss (just because something
> happens doesn't mean it ought to happen) and since this hasn't
> happened in the same way in other cultures, it doesn't seem a
> human absolute. This also opens up the possibility that natural
> law will go a Social Darwinist route, much like the Hitler
> example you give.
Yes. Such an insight seems more like evolutionary ethics than Natural Law.
One other argument that I find very disconcerting in the Natural Law
controversy is the idea that this Natural Law could be so incredibly
fundamental, so absolutely necessary to man's most basic survival needs that
no one realizes its existence until yesterday, historically speaking. And
one of its most self-evident features, Rights, are so self-evident and so
fundamental that not only has man done nicely without them for nearly the
whole of his social existence, but many cultures in the world don't even
have a word for the notion. With respect to theological variations, that
such a notion as individual sovereignty and inalienable rights is so
important to God that he didn't bother to include the concept in the whole
of Hebrew or New Testament law rather boggles the mind with its
underwhelming nature.
Rights can and do have important implications in what I consider to be any
valid moral principle, but to suggest that there is something self-evident
about rights in either a theological or bio/sociological sense is stretching
credulity too far. That rights are anything other than a derived concept
seems very unlikely.
Not interested in Hoil:>))
>
> >
> >
> > Realism and Naturalism a lofty liberal ploy!
>
> That's a highly ignorant remark since most individuals who hold with
either
> of these two forms of moral philosophy are at least morally conservative.
> Since contractarianism of the Lockean variety is a direct outgrowth of
> Natural Law and since Natural Law is a direct implication of both Realism
> and Naturalism, you seem to have blown off both of your feet with one
shot.
>
Again you mess the point!
Go ahead a debate left right up and down all day ,Jefferson's statements
concerning "Natural Law" that emulate Inalienable Rights.
It's just a bunch of blow hard liberals trying to explain what's already
written in stone!
Inalienable Rights are not up for debate!
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal;
that they are endowed by their Creator with inherent and inalienable rights;
that among these, are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to
secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their
just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of
government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people
to alter or abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its
foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to
them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and
happiness." --Declaration of Independence as originally written by Thomas
Jefferson, 1776. ME 1:29, Papers 1:315
"Nothing... is unchangeable but the inherent and unalienable rights of
man." --Thomas Jefferson to John Cartwright, 1824. ME 16:48
"Man [is] a rational animal, endowed by nature with rights and with an
innate sense of justice." --Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson, 1823. ME
15:441
"A free people [claim] their rights as derived from the laws of nature, and
not as the gift of their chief magistrate." --Thomas Jefferson: Rights of
British America, 1774. ME 1:209, Papers 1:134
"What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not warned
from time to time that the people preserve the spirit of resistance?
LET THEM TAKE ARMS"
- Thomas Jefferson -US Ambassador to France.
God Bless America!
Since this series of essays leads only to and revolves around a discussion
of 'rights' that shouldn't be all that much of a problem.
citizen wrote:
>
> Inalienable Rights are not up for debate!
Obviously that is a false statement since the existence of such
rights are being debated, and in fact no real strong argument has
been made for them.
Or do you mean that they are not up for debate because nobody has
been able to support them adequately?
> "We hold these truths to be self-evident,
"We hold" expresses a belief, an opinion. Opinions are always up
for debate.
And quoting opinions of people dead for a couple hundred years
doesn't say whether or not their opinions were right.
> > > > Jefferson was an extremely well-studied intellectual, wildly read on
> the
> > > > philosophy of his time, and he would have been the first to call you
> an
> > > > idiot.
> > > >
> > > > I can only follow suit.
> > >
> > > You dare to compare yourself to Jefferson?
> >
> > Look up "follow suit."
>
> Not interested in Hoil:>))
It's 'Hoyle.'
> >
> > >
> > >
> > > Realism and Naturalism a lofty liberal ploy!
> >
> > That's a highly ignorant remark since most individuals who hold with
> either
> > of these two forms of moral philosophy are at least morally
conservative.
> > Since contractarianism of the Lockean variety is a direct outgrowth of
> > Natural Law and since Natural Law is a direct implication of both
Realism
> > and Naturalism, you seem to have blown off both of your feet with one
> shot.
> >
>
> Again you mess the point!
I didn't even 'miss' the point. Nor did you miss your feet.
On the other hand, natural law is a theory about what a state can
coherently view as legally binding. Some natural rights theorists
like Locke also take the position that the law automatically bends to
natural rights. Whatever rights we have logically negate bad laws as
not legally binding. It is kind of hard to necessarily understand
what is meant by that, but the safe way of looking at it is to assume
that he measn that such laws are, in fact, literally not really laws
at all.
Kant, on the other hand, seems to have a completely different attitude
about this. No matter how illegitimate a sovereign is, one is duty
bound to abide by that soveriegns commands. Unjust laws can be
legally binding, apparently, if not even morally compelling simply
because they are laws. (Obviously, abiding by the civil law might be
superceded by the right moral laws, the point is that even if a king
is violently deposed, it is not morally permissible, according to
Kant, to violently depose him in return, say, even if you are
recapturing the throne.)
I am not much of an natural law theorist. I am a strong adherent to
the idea of natural rights.
Then that contradicts one of your main theses that natural rights has
been "debunked". It has only been debunked inasmuch as any modern
moral world view has. What _has_ been debunked by modern standards,
if anything, is moral skepticism, specifically the view that moral
statements have no propositional content.
And if anything the prevelant theories are like those of Rawls --
rights theories. Martha Nussbaum paid a large homage to him in the
recent Symposium on her philosophy in Ethics. He is perhaps the most
famous political philosopher alive. (Of course, I don't like him that
much, but that is a different matter...)
Has the original Declaration of Independence been destroyed?
Has the Declaration of Independence been remove from high school and college
books?
If the answer is no then there is proof that Inalienable Rights exists!
And the "Declaration of Independence" was signed,witness for all time.
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal;
that they are endowed by their Creator with inherent and inalienable rights;
that among these, are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to
secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their
just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of
government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people
to alter or abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its
foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to
them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and
happiness." --Declaration of Independence as originally written by Thomas
Jefferson, 1776. ME 1:29, Papers 1:315
The fact that inalienable rights exists is written in stone and Liberal
Universaties can descuss debate till the cows come home and the fact will
always be there ,written by the founders the "Declaration of Independence"
with it's " Inalienable rights" the foundation of the "Constitution" and
the "Bill of Rights" America for all time!
It does not matter what you believe!
Where is your proof that Inalienable rights don't exists.
I have more proof that they do:>))
Inalienable Rights are not up for debate!
10w30 or straight wieght?
>
> > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Realism and Naturalism a lofty liberal ploy!
> > >
> > > That's a highly ignorant remark since most individuals who hold with
> > either
> > > of these two forms of moral philosophy are at least morally
> conservative.
> > > Since contractarianism of the Lockean variety is a direct outgrowth of
> > > Natural Law and since Natural Law is a direct implication of both
> Realism
> > > and Naturalism, you seem to have blown off both of your feet with one
> > shot.
> > >
> >
> > Again you mess the point!
>
> I didn't even 'miss' the point.
You go ahead and debate Inalienable Rights out of the Declaration of
Independence and see if it dissapears:>))
You messed the point!
I have had size nines for supper many time ,but not this time!
No I don't ,you just hope that it is not!
citizen wrote:
>
> "Scott D. Erb" <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
> news:3C478522...@worldnet.att.net...
> >
> >
> > citizen wrote:
> > >
> > > Inalienable Rights are not up for debate!
> >
> > Obviously that is a false statement since the existence of such
> > rights are being debated,
>
> Has the original Declaration of Independence been destroyed?
>
> Has the Declaration of Independence been remove from high school and college
> books?
>
> If the answer is no then there is proof that Inalienable Rights exists!
Do you know how stupid that argument is? Why on earth does the
existence of a document that expresses an opinion prove something
exists? In the Soviet Union Marxist ideals were printed in high
school and college books, did that prove his theories right?
Sorry, your logic is totally flawed. Try again.
-snip-
> It does not matter what you believe!
>
> Where is your proof that Inalienable rights don't exists.
You want me to prove a negative? LOL!
> I have more proof that they do:>))
>
> Inalienable Rights are not up for debate!
You're wrong there, they are being debated, and your position is
a minority, its also not logical.
Too bad for you.
And you can find proof that Spiderman exists at any drugstore comic rack.
Great work, genius.
So you have no proof that Inalienable Rights donot exists?
Why on earth does the
> existence of a document that expresses an opinion prove something
> exists? In the Soviet Union Marxist ideals were printed in high
> school and college books, did that prove his theories right?
Do the Soviet Union Marxist ideals have anything to do with the Declaration
of Independence and Inalienable Rights?
>
> Sorry, your logic is totally flawed.
Your unsubstantiated opinion no drought!
Try again.
Why can't handle the reality of written fact sighen and witnessed?
>
> -snip-
>
> > It does not matter what you believe!
> >
> > Where is your proof that Inalienable rights don't exists.
>
> You want me to prove a negative? LOL!
No show me where it is written your proof?
>
> > I have more proof that they do:>))
> >
> > Inalienable Rights are not up for debate!
>
> You're wrong there, they are being debated, and your position is
> a minority, its also not logical.
Your unsubstantiated opinion again!
>
> Too bad for you.
How cute a blow hard liberal's last comment:>))
I could care less what comic books you read:>))
You go on and debate your Realism, Naturalism, and Natural Law and then go
and read the "Declaration of Independence" and if "Inalienable Rights" are
gone so is the proof that they ever existed!
Until then find some proof that they don't exists other than your Your
unsubstantiated opinion !
>
> Great work, genius.
Thanks it's about time:>))
> Until then find some proof that they don't exists other than your Your
> unsubstantiated opinion !
Find a good detox center and go there.
Sore loser:>))
citizen wrote:
>
> "Scott D. Erb" <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
> news:3C47A482...@worldnet.att.net...
> > Do you know how stupid that argument is?
>
> So you have no proof that Inalienable Rights donot exists?
I don't have to prove a negative. You prove they exist. There
have been arguments in this thread by Gandalf and others,
including myself, on why such a proposition is not very sound.
You seem to believe it, but your defense of your position is only
that people believed it 200 years ago.
Oh well, you can believe what you want. Just don't be surprised
if thinking people don't follow along unless you provide your
rationale.
Gandalf Grey wrote:
>
> Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
> news:3C470FF1...@worldnet.att.net...
> >
> > Gandalf Grey wrote:
> >
> > -snip of intro for space, though I agreed with it-
> >
> > BTW, I'm not sure the best way to respond to these. I tend to
> > give reactions to the argument as you make it, while it may be
> > better to do as others do and collect my thoughts and simply make
> > a full post. I like the way I do it because it has the feel of a
> > conversation, though it can be a bit complex and long.
>
> I like it. It has a Socratic feel to it. < : )
I sometimes don't know how much to snip. I try to snip older
bits so as to make it readable, but I know people dropping in
might want to look back a few steps in the conversation. When is
the balance between having an advantage of looking back in the
post rather than clicking back to the earlier post offset by
having too much old stuff. Well...
Actually, realistically (not to be confused with realism) most
theories are wrong since historically very few scientific or
political theories have stood the test of time. In science, as
one colleague told me from the science department, most of what
we *know* today to be true will probably be replaced in a few
centuries by new and better theories; some mere refinements, but
most likely to be something wholly unexpected.
Geez, if we are that unclear about the true nature of a world we
can measure and test, how close can we be towards finding
something as elusive as a true morality? That seems a big hit to
the natural law theory, they seem to want science to come up
with. That reflects the optimism of science in the 19th century
that all could be measured and understood -- but that faded away
with Einstein and Heisenberg.
> > Agreed, and a number of us have of course made this kind of
> > argument in response to the natural rights crowd here. Thanks
> > for the detailed explanation.
>
> No problem. Hume's Law is definitely one of the "gotcha!" rules of
> philosophy. Some say it even 'got' it's creator.
Turnabout is fair play!
OK, but if one doesn't take the radical skepticist view and
treats morality in the same way as philosophy of science
approaches knowledge of the world, they could say "we can't KNOW
that our moral theory is right, but if we find evidence and make
solid arguments, we can accept a moral theory."
> Let me use a hypothetical [and quite impossible] example to illustrate. We
> all know that our eyes are attuned to being able to perceive and transmit
> information to our brain concerning certain wavelengths of the
> electromagnetic spectrum. We perceive these wavelengths as light in a
> variety of colors. We also know that there are wavelengths that we cannot
> perceive because experiments, theories, and various forms of instrumentation
> tell us this is so. But what if there was yet another wavelength we could
> not see? What if this wavelength could not be measured by any form of
> instrumentation? What if this wavelength could not be accounted for by any
> theory of physics that we either understand or COULD understand. What if
> its properties were not only unknown, but unknowable? What if this
> wavelength were "in principle" undetectable? How could we know it? How
> could we speculate about it? What could there ever be about our "knowledge"
> of this wavelength that was anything other that pure imagination? Now, is
> what is purely imaginary real?
That seems an awful lot like the kind of stuff theoretical
physics deals with. Their goal is to find ways to test or
measure their theories, but at this point they remain
"imaginary."
Reminds me of a poem:
"I look towards infinity
Outer space, unexplored horizons
An unknown reality
Unexplained by our science
We observe the happenings
We say we understand it
But we don't know anything
About the truth behind it
All that our eyes can see
All that our ears can hear
A small band of energy
Electromagnetic in nature
Everything else is hidden
Everything else is beyond us
No answer to this riddle
Just more hints to confound us..."
> 2. Remember that a moral theory needs to tell us what is right [the
> metaethical aspect] but also what we should do that is right and why we
> should do what is right [which is the normative aspect of ethics]. That
> being said, we must ask ourselves what is the value of a good that cannot be
> expressed or even considered as being true or false? If we could somehow
> make statements about it, it's at least conceivable that we could go on to
> fashion rules of behavior which operated in accordance with its principles.
> But how can we make such rules if we cannot know what the rules relate to?
> It's as if some god told us "do thus and so and I'll tell you later why I
> wanted you to do it." But it gets worse, because if we cannot make
> true/false statements about a moral principle, how can we know even WHAT we
> ought to do, much less WHY we ought to do it? What logicians get upset at
> can be easily illustrated by simply constructing a non-truth assignable
> value to a moral statement, such as "abortion is goodbad." Now, how are we
> to proceed normatively from this statement? As I've pointed out in another
> post, various manipulations have been made with this problem, such as
> defining personal opinion "I THINK abortion is good/bad," or using
> prescriptivism or emotivism "Abortion: Yeah!" or "Abortion! Boo!" None of
> them is very satisfactory.
I see your point.
> > Unless, of course, the realist believes that our desires are in
> > part evidence of that objective moral belief. I don't want to
> > mesh it with naturalism here, but let's say a realist believes
> > there is an objective moral code that comes from God, or a Star
> > Wars like belief in a force. Desires need to be examined to see
> > which are deep and shared across cultures, which are not. Care
> > would have to be made to judge what are deep or fundamental
> > desires (a desire to feel content) and short term desires caused
> > by a misunderstanding of how to fulfill that deep desire (use of
> > heroin because it makes one feel content for awhile).
>
> This is a view held by Russell in his later life that I am rather fond of
> myself. Another way of saying it is that most of what we BELIEVE are
> fundamental moral disagreements are not in fact fundamental. In most cases
> they are either disagreements over what basic moral principles actually
> mean, or they are disagreements that are really about Means and not Ends.
>
> This is not a particularly easy point of view to hold, but I feel that it's
> the most constructive.
I agree.
Gandalf Grey wrote:
>
> Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
> news:3C470FF9...@worldnet.att.net...
> >
> > Gandalf Grey wrote:
> >
>
> > A side note: Grotius was the first I believe to extend the
> > concept of sovereignty to collective political units, thereby
> > laying the ground work for the development of the sovereign
> > territortial modern state, which many scholars date back to the
> > treaty of Westphalia in 1648.
>
> It's not a particularly large step from that concept to the concept of
> individual rights.
Good point.
I remember a year ago he was defending the 'golden rule' as the
right moral principle. Given how he treats those he disagrees
with here, I had to assume that if he's living by his principle
he wants people to start attacking him personally in response.
Either that or he's a hypocrite. Either way, I figured he wasn't
worth much time. Plus, the way some of these guys obsess on
people (either real or unreal -- some so obsessed with that
Richard Hansen guy that they imagine you to be him), well, that's
not normal.
> Hopefully at least one of
> his comments on the 'properly formed conscience' got through to you on one
> of my responses to him. He quoted as follows:
>
> "Moral good is objective and a properly formed conscience
> can perceive it." John Paul II, 8/14/93
>
> What is a properly formed conscience and how are we to know that it is
> properly formed?
Well, if you're John Paul you use the Bible and your religious
principles to make that determination, I guess. Someone can make
a statement like that from within a religion, so could Bin Laden
or Gandhi. But if one doesn't share those religious beliefs,
well, those questions don't have self-evident answers by any
stretch of the imagination.
> What could science or theology tell us that would
> demonstrate the existence of a properly formed conscience's ability to
> perceive Natural Law? If Natural law is valid and says something about
> "moral good," we should all know it. But, evidently, we do not all
> 'perceive it, and we do not do so because our consciences are not 'properly
> formed.'
With a quote like that, it's a matter of faith, and that suits
religion fine. But step outside that religion, and it doesn't
work.
> This is a very representative Natural Law assertion of a particularly
> small-minded type, and it points out precisely what's dangerous about
> Natural Law. Anyone can make a statement about it and no one can
> effectively argue otherwise because Natural Law is not 'someplace' where we
> can look it up and check assertions against it for independent verification
> of what really is Natural Law and what is not really Natural Law.
Agreed.
> In a sense, this is a sort of moral grandfather of Howard Hughe's comment
> that 'if you have to ask how much it costs, you can't afford it." Those who
> defend Natural Law along ill-informed theological lines [there are GOOD
> theological arguments for Natural Law] generally state that Natural Law is
> 'self-evident.' But if it is, why is there so much disagreement about it?
>
> This is not the conception of Natural Law as it was envisoned by the ancient
> Greeks nor Thomas Aquinas. Though the origin of Natural Law for Aquinas was
> unquestionably theological, its understanding was always accessable to the
> rational mind. God deliberately ordained that it would be so for He
> intended, as Paul explains it, that the facts about Him should be evident to
> believers and unbelievers alike.
Yes, and that's why I was responding in that way -- Hitler's
ideology was actually relativist (power = truth, truth has no
inherent value except that which those with power dictate), even
though he "sold" it as 'natural.' That's the danger and
ironically the benefit of natural law. It can be used to
convince people to create international human rights and argue
that mistreatment of some is wrong, but it can just as easily be
used to try to implement something evil, which causes suffering.
> What we see in the group here is more like the following:
>
> "How can I know that rights are real?"
> "They're real because they are ordained by Natural Law."
> "But how can I know Natural Law is real?"
> "It's self-evident."
> "But if it's self-evident, why isn't it evident to me that it's
> self-evident?"
> "If you had a properly formed conscience it would be self-evident."
Or: Thomas Jefferson wrote it and it's in high school libraries
so it must be real! :)
> Such obscurantist rubbish doesn't even rise to the level of philosophical
> argument. It's the kind of thing that even the worst of the Sophists would
> have turned their backs on as being too obvious.
Yeah, I wonder sometimes if these guys know how foolish they are
and are just trying to provoke, or if they really can't handle a
challenge to their beliefs and react emotionally and personally
against the one who challenges their assumptions, rather than
deal with the issues.
> > More succinctly: was natural law something that led to
> > over-individualization or anti-social cultural norms, or did it
> > react to the breakdown of old norms and in a sense "follow"
> > social norms and rationalize what was happening anyway, often in
> > ways that were used to try to promote social justice and
> > stability (especially when "new liberalism" arose in Great
> > Britain).
>
> That's a purely sociological/historical question that I can't answer. From
> the standpoint of philosophy, I would consider it to be a very bad sign if
> the latter was the case. Whenever it becomes apparent to me that
> philosophical theories seem to take on the primary role of rationalizations
> for pre-existing conduct, so much the worse for the theories.
Yeah, but arguably that happens a lot in political philosophy.
The best light one can put on it is a 'necessity is the mother of
invention' argument, or that if practices get to the point that
problems are immense, philosophers deal with issues they ignored
before.
> >
> > Finally, while I do NOT want to make an argument supporting
> > natural law, it seems that one could argue that the events of the
> > last hundred or so years demonstrate that the world was 'evolving
> > naturally' to a more individualist, capitalist, secular way of
> > life, and that the problem is not natural law, but a too small
> > number of people who understand and follow it. That, of course,
> > falls to the kind of fallacy you discuss (just because something
> > happens doesn't mean it ought to happen) and since this hasn't
> > happened in the same way in other cultures, it doesn't seem a
> > human absolute. This also opens up the possibility that natural
> > law will go a Social Darwinist route, much like the Hitler
> > example you give.
>
> Yes. Such an insight seems more like evolutionary ethics than Natural Law.
> One other argument that I find very disconcerting in the Natural Law
> controversy is the idea that this Natural Law could be so incredibly
> fundamental, so absolutely necessary to man's most basic survival needs that
> no one realizes its existence until yesterday, historically speaking.
A lot of people have a very ahistorical view of things, and don't
acknowledge the diversity of cultural perspectives out there,
they have internalized their cultural norms so much they believe
those cultural norms are 'natural' norms.
>And
> one of its most self-evident features, Rights, are so self-evident and so
> fundamental that not only has man done nicely without them for nearly the
> whole of his social existence, but many cultures in the world don't even
> have a word for the notion. With respect to theological variations, that
> such a notion as individual sovereignty and inalienable rights is so
> important to God that he didn't bother to include the concept in the whole
> of Hebrew or New Testament law rather boggles the mind with its
> underwhelming nature.
Or that capitalism is natural, but Jesus preached an
anti-materialist philosophy.
> Rights can and do have important implications in what I consider to be any
> valid moral principle, but to suggest that there is something self-evident
> about rights in either a theological or bio/sociological sense is stretching
> credulity too far. That rights are anything other than a derived concept
> seems very unlikely.
Thanks for the response!
First you can not prove that Inalienable Rights do not exists.
Just like you you can not prove that God does not exists.
Your non beleifs are no proof to anyone but you!
This line that Martin Luther King so eloquently spoke!
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal;
that they are endowed by their Creator with inherent and inalienable rights;
that among these, are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"
What the state does not give, it cannot take away. If human rights are
natural rights their being rights by natural endowment makes them
inalienable and untouchable as stated by Jefferson and emulated in the
"Declaration of Independence".
Wise and Noble Owl
"Nothing... is unchangeable but the inherent and unalienable rights of
man." --Thomas Jefferson to John Cartwright, 1824. ME 16:48
>
> You seem to believe it, but your defense of your position is only
> that people believed it 200 years ago.
Here go read this it's why your "Living Constitution" concept is pure
"bunk"!
http://www.geocities.com/ensey_in_2000/bor1.html
>
> Oh well, you can believe what you want.
And you can disbelieve as you must.
Just don't be surprised
> if thinking people don't follow along unless you provide your
> rationale.
You provide your rationale!
I don't see anyone cheering your ideas on.
Just a few liberals trying to out do Jefferson.
Can't be done by the likes of what I have seen here:>))
Yeah. Another poster made a remark that led me to believe that this whole
thing is futile. There's always the 'continental school' of
philosophy---Sartre, Heidegger, Derrida---questioning the 'point' of
Analytical Philosophy. That's the tradition I was brought up in. I could
have gotten into that I suppose. I would have been pretty far afield of
Rights. And, to be frank, my heart wouldn't be in it. The continentals are
right in that Analytical Philosophy spends too much time messing with its
logic and too little time constructing anything with it, but continental
philosophy for me has always been far too often obscurantist and fearful of
being looked at.
Then there's the modern mode of simply denying that theories have any value
at all. Of course, we're really talking about how Rights came to be here,
so that's not too much of a problem, but I've read those "theories" too and
been largely unimpressed. In every society in every time there seems to
have been a group that said [in my day] "print is dead" or something very
much like it. I woke up to that fact when I realized that there was such a
group around to bother even people like Aristotle and Plato. Extreme forms
of skepticism and various forms of nihilistic thought have always been
around. I think, on the whole, that it's a good thing. It shocks people
into wondering what things might be like if all their cherished paradigms
just disappeared. It's a forced look down the road, so to speak. But on
the whole, the "print is dead" people are generally wrong. I think people
should spend as much time as they can discussing such things as Rights,
ethics, social progress and so on. Old arguments, new arguments, any kind
of rational arguments. 2500 plus years of philosophy is really a drop in
the bucket. It's only yesterday that the only book in town was the bible
chained to pulpit at the local cathedral. There's a lot ahead of us that we
can agree on.
> >
> > 1. Harkening back to the 'brains in the vats' argument of classical
> > skepticism, the refutation of a classical view toward the impossibility
of
> > 'knowing' anything consists of the recognition that IF we are isolated
from
> > some reality so that there is no way we can 'know' the truth and IF the
only
> > reality we can know is the 'reality' being piped into the vat, THEN our
> > reality IS the reality of the vat and suppositions about some yet more
> > external reality are meaningless. This has relevance to the realm of
ethics
> > because IF there is some objective moral principle that we CANNOT know,
even
> > in principle, then that moral principle effectively does not exist for
the
> > purposes of human discourse.
>
> OK, but if one doesn't take the radical skepticist view and
> treats morality in the same way as philosophy of science
> approaches knowledge of the world, they could say "we can't KNOW
> that our moral theory is right, but if we find evidence and make
> solid arguments, we can accept a moral theory."
That's pretty much what it will always come down to. Rational people will
have to agree on a preponderance of evidence and persuasive argument and
that will have to be enough. Acceptance is what it's about as well as a
realization that ethics will never be like a science. I see morality as
offering parameters where science hopefully offers specific facts. Science
tells you exactly where the bullseye is, the exact geometric point in space.
A valid moral principle gives you a window, and it might be a relatively
wide one, that gives a sense of direction even though it doesn't tell you
exactly where you going. That comes home to me because, regardless of the
disagreements between cultures, there is always a surpising level of
agreement about moral ends. It isn't that much of a leap for me to believe
that most human beings want the same kind of things.
Cool. Very cool.
> > The terrible thing about Natural Law is that it isn't all that natural
for
> > those who disagree even when 'science' is brought in as a witness. Do
you
> > remember McPhillips' recent foray into morality?
>
> I remember a year ago he was defending the 'golden rule' as the
> right moral principle. Given how he treats those he disagrees
> with here, I had to assume that if he's living by his principle
> he wants people to start attacking him personally in response.
Actually, given Martin's problems, that would not really surprise me.
> Either that or he's a hypocrite. Either way, I figured he wasn't
> worth much time. Plus, the way some of these guys obsess on
> people (either real or unreal -- some so obsessed with that
> Richard Hansen guy that they imagine you to be him), well, that's
> not normal.
Looking back on Google, I came across one of McPhillips' old handles,
"abigreen.' It reminded me of the movie *Young Frankenstein,* when the good
doctor finds out that "Igor" dropped the brain he was supposed to bring and
took another one instead. When he asks him what the name was on the jar,
Igor says "Abbey."
"Abbey WHAT?"
"Abbey Normal."
>
> > Hopefully at least one of
> > his comments on the 'properly formed conscience' got through to you on
one
> > of my responses to him. He quoted as follows:
> >
> > "Moral good is objective and a properly formed conscience
> > can perceive it." John Paul II, 8/14/93
> >
> > What is a properly formed conscience and how are we to know that it is
> > properly formed?
>
> Well, if you're John Paul you use the Bible and your religious
> principles to make that determination, I guess. Someone can make
> a statement like that from within a religion, so could Bin Laden
> or Gandhi. But if one doesn't share those religious beliefs,
> well, those questions don't have self-evident answers by any
> stretch of the imagination.
An interesting point considering the fact that, unlike an isolated culture,
a religion makes its judgements from 'inside' on those 'outside.' For that
reason, a little 'Relativism" is not a bad thing.
> > This is not the conception of Natural Law as it was envisoned by the
ancient
> > Greeks nor Thomas Aquinas. Though the origin of Natural Law for Aquinas
was
> > unquestionably theological, its understanding was always accessable to
the
> > rational mind. God deliberately ordained that it would be so for He
> > intended, as Paul explains it, that the facts about Him should be
evident to
> > believers and unbelievers alike.
>
> Yes, and that's why I was responding in that way -- Hitler's
> ideology was actually relativist (power = truth, truth has no
> inherent value except that which those with power dictate), even
> though he "sold" it as 'natural.' That's the danger and
> ironically the benefit of natural law. It can be used to
> convince people to create international human rights and argue
> that mistreatment of some is wrong, but it can just as easily be
> used to try to implement something evil, which causes suffering.
ABSOLUTELY! That's it in a nutshell.
>
> > What we see in the group here is more like the following:
> >
> > "How can I know that rights are real?"
> > "They're real because they are ordained by Natural Law."
> > "But how can I know Natural Law is real?"
> > "It's self-evident."
> > "But if it's self-evident, why isn't it evident to me that it's
> > self-evident?"
> > "If you had a properly formed conscience it would be self-evident."
>
> Or: Thomas Jefferson wrote it and it's in high school libraries
> so it must be real! :)
That WAS great, no? It's comments like that keep me smiling.
>
> > Such obscurantist rubbish doesn't even rise to the level of
philosophical
> > argument. It's the kind of thing that even the worst of the Sophists
would
> > have turned their backs on as being too obvious.
>
> Yeah, I wonder sometimes if these guys know how foolish they are
> and are just trying to provoke, or if they really can't handle a
> challenge to their beliefs and react emotionally and personally
> against the one who challenges their assumptions, rather than
> deal with the issues.
I don't worry about that anymore. If it walks like a duck, etc. We all
deserve to be treated for the way we act. And if these people want to act
as dumb as a box of rocks, that's their absolute right.
>
> > > More succinctly: was natural law something that led to
> > > over-individualization or anti-social cultural norms, or did it
> > > react to the breakdown of old norms and in a sense "follow"
> > > social norms and rationalize what was happening anyway, often in
> > > ways that were used to try to promote social justice and
> > > stability (especially when "new liberalism" arose in Great
> > > Britain).
> >
> > That's a purely sociological/historical question that I can't answer.
From
> > the standpoint of philosophy, I would consider it to be a very bad sign
if
> > the latter was the case. Whenever it becomes apparent to me that
> > philosophical theories seem to take on the primary role of
rationalizations
> > for pre-existing conduct, so much the worse for the theories.
>
> Yeah, but arguably that happens a lot in political philosophy.
> The best light one can put on it is a 'necessity is the mother of
> invention' argument, or that if practices get to the point that
> problems are immense, philosophers deal with issues they ignored
> before.
I think we have to deal with things as they are. Nozick, an otherwise fine
philosopher, put together an idiot argument concerning rights doctrine and
it has to be dealt with as it is. Since it's the sole intellectual backing
for the conservative cause in America, it's certainly suspect. But on
another level, not. On one level, there's just the argument. I would
always prefer to deal with that, but I always remain attuned to WHY the
argument is being made. Consequences matter terribly. In my heart I'm a
Kantian, but in my head I'm a Utilitarian when it comes to any political
argument.
Gandalf Grey wrote:
>
> Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
> news:3C485F88...@worldnet.att.net...
-snip-
> > > "Moral good is objective and a properly formed conscience
> > > can perceive it." John Paul II, 8/14/93
> > >
> > > What is a properly formed conscience and how are we to know that it is
> > > properly formed?
> >
> > Well, if you're John Paul you use the Bible and your religious
> > principles to make that determination, I guess. Someone can make
> > a statement like that from within a religion, so could Bin Laden
> > or Gandhi. But if one doesn't share those religious beliefs,
> > well, those questions don't have self-evident answers by any
> > stretch of the imagination.
>
> An interesting point considering the fact that, unlike an isolated culture,
> a religion makes its judgements from 'inside' on those 'outside.' For that
> reason, a little 'Relativism" is not a bad thing.
Indeed. It becomes a tangled web when things that are 'proven'
based on assumptions from the 'inside' are used to try to assert
to the 'outside' that their particular position on morality, God,
etc. is correct. In its most base and silly form its the guy who
says to the atheist "You ask why believe in God? Well, the Bible
says God exists and the Bible is always right!" Or more recently
"Inalienable rights exist because the Declaration of Independence
says so." But it can also get complex and the fallacies less
transparent, thats when it can become dangerous.
> > > This is not the conception of Natural Law as it was envisoned by the
> ancient
> > > Greeks nor Thomas Aquinas. Though the origin of Natural Law for Aquinas
> was
> > > unquestionably theological, its understanding was always accessable to
> the
> > > rational mind. God deliberately ordained that it would be so for He
> > > intended, as Paul explains it, that the facts about Him should be
> evident to
> > > believers and unbelievers alike.
> >
> > Yes, and that's why I was responding in that way -- Hitler's
> > ideology was actually relativist (power = truth, truth has no
> > inherent value except that which those with power dictate), even
> > though he "sold" it as 'natural.' That's the danger and
> > ironically the benefit of natural law. It can be used to
> > convince people to create international human rights and argue
> > that mistreatment of some is wrong, but it can just as easily be
> > used to try to implement something evil, which causes suffering.
>
> ABSOLUTELY! That's it in a nutshell.
When one compares the ideas the Nazis had about politics with how
they propagandized their position, its clear that they held the
'common folk' in complete and utter disdain, it was almost like a
'revenge of the losers' against society. In an anti-Kantian move
they used the German people as a means for their end of power,
and were quite content to watch the entire state and population
get destroyed when they failed.
-snip-
> > Yeah, I wonder sometimes if these guys know how foolish they are
> > and are just trying to provoke, or if they really can't handle a
> > challenge to their beliefs and react emotionally and personally
> > against the one who challenges their assumptions, rather than
> > deal with the issues.
>
> I don't worry about that anymore. If it walks like a duck, etc. We all
> deserve to be treated for the way we act. And if these people want to act
> as dumb as a box of rocks, that's their absolute right.
It sure makes for an interesting dynamic at times.
> > > the latter was the case. Whenever it becomes apparent to me that
> > > philosophical theories seem to take on the primary role of
> rationalizations
> > > for pre-existing conduct, so much the worse for the theories.
> >
> > Yeah, but arguably that happens a lot in political philosophy.
> > The best light one can put on it is a 'necessity is the mother of
> > invention' argument, or that if practices get to the point that
> > problems are immense, philosophers deal with issues they ignored
> > before.
>
> I think we have to deal with things as they are. Nozick, an otherwise fine
> philosopher, put together an idiot argument concerning rights doctrine and
> it has to be dealt with as it is. Since it's the sole intellectual backing
> for the conservative cause in America, it's certainly suspect. But on
> another level, not. On one level, there's just the argument. I would
> always prefer to deal with that, but I always remain attuned to WHY the
> argument is being made. Consequences matter terribly. In my heart I'm a
> Kantian, but in my head I'm a Utilitarian when it comes to any political
> argument.
At the very least when irrational arguments are being used for
overtly political motives, they become propaganda rather than
philosophy.
Gandalf Grey wrote:
>
> Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
> news:3C485C68...@worldnet.att.net...
The printing press revolutionized life since suddenly it was
feasible for entire populations to read and deal with these
issues -- I think that's one reason Kant was so optimistic about
politics in the future -- if people were educated and could read,
they'd no doubt deal with these issues and choose the 'rational'
course of action. The reality, of course, is a lot of people
grabbed for yellow journalism and sensationalism, and one of the
reasons mass politics became so deadly was that real discourse on
issues like this got pushed aside. Now with computers and a new
revolution in communication, one that will likely change politics
and society as much as the printing press, the importance of
trying to emphasize rational discussion and talking about rights,
social progress, ethics, etc. is more important than ever. How
can you have a society that takes ethics seriously if it isn't
talked about? That only opens the doors to the snake oil dealers
with their pre-fab "the way things ought to be" emotional answer
book that the mentally lazy will just treat as a modern Bible.
Goebbels understood that decades ago. To the extent that
internet exchanges revolving around your essays help get some to
think about that, its a really important effort.
> That's pretty much what it will always come down to. Rational people will
> have to agree on a preponderance of evidence and persuasive argument and
> that will have to be enough. Acceptance is what it's about as well as a
> realization that ethics will never be like a science. I see morality as
> offering parameters where science hopefully offers specific facts. Science
> tells you exactly where the bullseye is, the exact geometric point in space.
> A valid moral principle gives you a window, and it might be a relatively
> wide one, that gives a sense of direction even though it doesn't tell you
> exactly where you going. That comes home to me because, regardless of the
> disagreements between cultures, there is always a surpising level of
> agreement about moral ends. It isn't that much of a leap for me to believe
> that most human beings want the same kind of things.
Agreed.
Luke 14:33
So likewise, whosoever he be of you that forsaketh
not all he hath, he cannot be my disciple.
If any Christian has not forsaken all, he is no
Christian.
If any Christian is not a communist, living a collectivist
lifstyle in a communist church, he is not following
the word of god as sent to mankind by the Holy Ghost,
as we find in Act.
Acts 4:31
And when they had prayed, the place was shaken where
they had assembled together, and they were all filled with the Holy
Ghost and the spoke the word of God with boldness.
And the multitude of them that believed were of one heart
and of one soul; neither said any of them that ought of what
he possessed was his own; but they had all things in common.
And with great power gave the apostles witness of the resurrestion
of the Lord Jesus and great grace was upon them all.
Neither was there any among them who lacked; for as many
as were possessors of houses or lands sold them and brought
the prices of the things that were sold;
And laid them down at the apostles feet; and distribution was
made unto every man as according he had need.
Luke 12:33,
So likewise, whosoever he be of you that forsaketh not all that he hath
cannot be a disciple of mine.
Matthew 19:24
Verily I say unto you, It is easier for a camel to go
through the eye of a needle than a rich man to enter
into the kingdom of heaven.
Pope Charles
SubGenius Pope of Houston
Slack!
"my disciple" is not the same thing as any christian, or really the general
body of people-he tells ya to pay taxes, fer cryin out loud.
its rather a spiritual desert.
if there is a lie in this, I have yet to find it in many years of looking
"Philosophy is the making up of bad reasons for things
we are going to believe anyway."
- C.E. Moore
I always liked this one, its in many ways, so true.
I like it too. Too often true and rather sad. You should read *Principia
Ethica* if you haven't already done so. G.E. Moore wrote one of the most
infuential books on ethics, and although, in its turn, its had its share of
criticism, it's still a powerful book.