Stone consciousness
walterimlenz
since the duplication method has been debunked. ;-)
PART ONE
You can read in this forum remarks concerning the question, if e.g.
photons or copper are conscious. IMHO the late Wittgenstein (PI
283/284 and elsewhere) has developed an argument which convincingly
demonstrates that ascriptions like this would be not merely
unprovable, but really senseless. - I've already tried to outline the
argument in "Robot Consciousness" and elsewhere, but it seems
important enough in my eyes to start a new thread. Because the
argument relies on the thesis, that behavioral criteria are the prime
criteria for consciousness, I'll try to give some arguments first,
which might support this thesis. If somebody reads this, who has cut
his way through the endless discussions of "Robot consciousness", he
will note that some of it has been said at this place before.
If we talk about "the consciousness of X" we often overlook, that the
relation of ownership, which holds between X on the one side and his
consciousness on the other side is not taken for granted. We
presuppose, that consciousness is a kind of item, which can (on
principle) stick on every material thing, so that the question whether
a certain thing is conscious can always be posed. - We are familiar
with material things, which are owners of a consciousness (humans,
animals - respectively their bodies) and so we think, that other
material things could be owners as well, whether we know it or not.
But it seems, that the connection between a consciousness and its
owner is a totally empty thing, as long as there are no criteria which
could establish it. "Empty" means: when you imagine e.g. a conscious
stone, you imagine in the first place a particular consciousness and a
particular stone. But how to imagine the connection between both? WHAT
do you imagine, when imagining, that the consciousness is owned by the
stone?
Another case of an ownership-relation is the relation between proper
names and their bearers. - Try to imagine a particular fancy name,
e.g. "Archibald Gulbrik" and then imagine that there is indeed a
particular person, whose name it is. What do you imagine, when you
imagine, that "Archibald Gulbrik" is the name of the imagined person?
- The answer seems simple, you imagine that he would come or at least
look at you, if you call him by that name, or that the name is printed
in his ID-card, or other things like this. Such facts serve as
criteria, which must be fulfilled to make the person the owner of the
name "Archibald Gulbruk".
Indeed, it would be absurd to claim, that the ownership-relation in
this case could hold without them. Something like: "it doesn't matter,
what the person is called or what is printed in his ID-cards and his
birth-certificate - we can nevertheless imagine a simple relation of
ownership, which holds between this name and this person. His name can
be 'Archibald Gulbruk', whatever else is the case!" - And we are
guilty of the same absurdity, if we assume that a particular stone
might be conscious, whatever else is the case.
walterimlenz
So now we have to ask for the facts, which are suited to constitute a
relation of ownership in the case of consciousness. Of course, if
consciousness were a spatially locatable thing, we could reduce it to
a spatial relationship. A certain consciousness would be the
consciousness of this stone, since it's dwelling inside of it -
literally spoken. And if we like the equation "consciousness=living
brain", we might say: to imagine that the stone is conscious simply
amounts to thinking that the stone has a living brain hidden under its
crust.
But the equation isn't very plausible. There are some good reasons
which speak against it. At first we all know, that there are human
beings with living brains inside of their heads, who are nevertheless
not conscious. In some cases we might disguise this fact by claiming,
that the concerned brain is "defective", but in other cases - faint,
deep sleep - the brains are obviously in a proper shape, even if
there's no consciousness. - What means, that there must be other
criteria for consciousness than the simple existence of a working
brain. So the next candidate is a certain state of a working brain,
respectively a certain group of states.
And really, it's a good established result of empirical science, that
the states of our consciousness are connected to states of the brain.
But this fact shouldn't be interpreted as a hint, that we eventually
have found the "true" criteria for consciousness, while our
unscientific ancestors were forced to use much less reliable
behavioral criteria. At least any proof that a certain brain state is
correlated to a certain state of consciousness presupposes, that there
are criteria to impute a state of consciousness which are independent
on the brain - otherwise you would enter a circle.
But now there are some intelligent guys here who see the issue this
way: If we e.g. talk about "a state of pain", and even our ancestors
could do so, we are in fact refering to the correlated brain state. Of
course, the claim, that somebody is in a state of pain is not the same
as the claim, that someone has a certain brain state, but that's a
matter of meaning and not a matter of reference. In this sense our
ancestors have talked about the planet Venus, even if they regarded it
as a shining goddess or as a little ball of fire circling around
Earth. Even in the days of the Roman Empire, the referent of "Venus",
when used in an astronomic context, was the planet, which has an
atmosphere consisting mostly of carbon dioxide and which is a rocky
body that's covered by thick clouds. And that was true, although no
Roman knew this true nature of the referent.
You don't need to consult natural science to explain the meaning of a
word, but the example shows that it can indeed help us to identify the
referent. And now let's take a look at the case with respect to the
criteria. What were the criteria, to identify a certain thing with
Venus in pre-scientific times? - E.g. the fact, that the lightspot in
the sky was the first to appear in the evening. So one could say:
"this star is Venus, because it has risen earlier than other stars."
The truth of the second clause enforced the truth of the first clause,
because there were no other criteria than such. - But haven't the
things changed in our days? The very criterion, that a particular
thing is Venus is no longer that it's the first lightspot in the sky
which can be observed at dusk. The very criterion is currently, that
it's a rocky body with such and such properties, orbiting the sun at
the distance of such and such kilometers, etc.
So it seems very natural to the mentioned above guys, to see the
problem of consciousness in a similar way. When our ancestors said
"this guy is in a state of pain" they refered to the brain state of
the respective man, even if they didn't know the fact. And due to the
latter, their criteria for consciousness could impossibly be other
than behavioral facts. But now, since science has developed a not
perfect but at least partly solid theory of the brain and of the
things inside, which happen when a person is in a state of pain, we
can abandon those behavioral criteria, or, at any rate, regard them as
a kind of symptoms which are of secondary importance. Therefore the
very proof, that some person is really in a state of pain, would be to
open his brain and to check, if the particular conditions are given.
walterimlenz
But there is at least one point which is suited to render the approach
unplausible. - It is a fact, that we currently impute consciousness
merely to earthly humans and animals (if we leave aside fantasized
conscious beings, like gods and angles). But that fact seems
contingent, it doesn't mark a restriction of language. It's well
known, that we would impute consciousness to robots or aliens too, if
certain circumstances - more precisely, a certain long-term-behavior -
were given. The fact is sufficiently established by the thought
experiments which have been popularized by SF-literature and -movies.
If some alien or robot would behave in a certain way, the question
would not even arise if the thing perhaps might be totally
unconscious, as litte as such questions arise when we deal with our
children or dogs.
And of course, those imputations do not depend on knowledge or special
assumptions concerning the brain of the aliens or the corresponding
unity in the robots. It simply doesn't matter. - It's indeed
reasonable, to argue, that we have to assume that there is a brain-
like engine at all, because solely this assumption excludes the
possibility of a very unprobable, but nevertheless conceivable random
sequence of movements, which mimic a certain behavior. But we must not
assume, that this engine is similar to the human brain, except that it
causes the respective behavior. So the behavior seems to be the prime
criterion again.
But - so some intelligent guy might respond - assumed, that we are
confronted with those aliens or robots, isn't this simply the same
situation as the situation of our ancestors, when they imputed
consciousness to humans and animals? Doesn't "state of pain" refer to
a certain brain state of the alien (respectively, state of the central
unit of the robot)? And assumed, that we have found out how the alien
brain works, is the prime criterion for the existence of the alien's
state of pain after this discovery not again the existence of the
refering brain-state and no longer a certain pain behavior?
The objection ignores a crucial point, namely that the brain of the
alien - or the central unit of the robot - must not be similar to our
brain. It could be build in an entirely different way. That's part of
our assumption, according to which we are confronted with aliens or
robots! (Remember that chess programms might use a totally other way
to find the moves as human chessplayers do, e.g. brutal force versus
pattern recognition. But both play chess, no one who observes a
certain chess match without seeing the players could reliably decide,
if the players are human or computerized. So one and the same kind of
complex acting can be produced by very differently proceeding
engines.)
But if the brain of an alien, which is in a state of pain, is
potentially totally differently build than the brain of a pain-
suffering human, it doesn't seem plausible anymore, to regard a
certain brain state as the prime criterion. In both cases we use the
term "state of pain", so if this term has a particular referent, this
something has to be the same in both brains. But the only property,
which must be shared by both brains, is obviously the ability, to
cause pain behavior. And the prime criterion, that a certain engine is
able to produce a certain behavior, is undeniably, that it produces
the behavior.
So if the prime criterion that a being is in a state of pain, is, that
its brain is in a particular state, and if the prime criterion for
that very brain state is the availability of pain-behavior and not
certain physical facts, we are allowed to shorten the thing by
stating, that the prime criterion for pain or other phenomenons of
consciousness is behavior. (Of course, not merely actual behavior.
Potential behavior can be sufficient. The application of our
behavioral criteria concerning facts of consciousness is as
complicated as the criteria itself, but that IMHO doesn't challenge
the main point.)
walterimlenz
So let's get back to the consciousness of stones and other non
behaving items. Maybe, the preceding parts have supported the thesis,
that the prime criterion for consciousness is a certain behavior and
not the existence of a particular part of the body. - Wittgenstein's
argument turns out to rest on a very simple consideration: if the
criterion is behavior, no non-behaving thing can be conscious. And
this becomes apparent, if we try to find the connection, that provides
for the relation of ownership which holds between a consciousness and
the one, who "has" it.
The connection is simply, that the owner of a certain consciousness
(e.g. of a state of pain) is the one, who shows the corresponding
behavior. It is not - as one might object - the fact, that certain
phenomenons in this consciousness occour simultaneously with certain
physical changes of the potential owner. We could e.g. try to argue,
that the consciousness of the stone is the consciousness, that feels
pain when the stone is maltreated with a hammer, and that this
correspondence constitutes the required connection. But it would be
not enough. It is possible, that I feel pain, whenever the stone is
hit by the hammer. Obviously this would not make my pain the pain of
the stone.
As long as we assume, that the stone is a normal stone, we are not
able to imagine that it's conscious. We are not able to do so, because
we are not able to find the connection between the consciousness and
the stone. We can merely imagine a particular stone and a particular
consciousness and not that the first is the owner of the latter.
The only way, to imagine that a stone is conscious is to assume, that
it's a behaving thing. E.g., that we have overlooked his pain
behavior, because of some obscure reasons. - But that amounts to the
assertion, that the stone is not really a stone.
Walter Imlenz
dorayme
<ba6c4e02-97fc-4855...@r33g2000yqn.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
> I've splitted this posting, to make my little Ego more important,
> since the duplication method has been debunked. ;-)
The duplication method was a consequence of your way of correcting
typos. What has this got to do with posting an essay in several parts to
usenet?
--
dorayme
dorayme
<ba6c4e02-97fc-4855...@r33g2000yqn.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
> IMHO the late Wittgenstein
Why do you refer to him as "the late..."? Do you think anyone thinks he
is alive, like Elvis? Do you say "the late Bertrand Russell" or "the
late Albert Einstein" or "The late President J.F. Kennedy"?
--
dorayme
walterimlenz
> In article
> <ba6c4e02-97fc-4855-b59b-e7931052f...@r33g2000yqn.googlegroups.com>,
You don't understand my jokes. Maybe, it's because of my "German sense
of humor". (And surely my jokes are really bad jokes.)
walterimlenz
The "early Wittgenstein" of the Tractatus and the "late Wittgenstein"
of the PI. It's not uncommon.
dorayme
<9d8c1a8f-16fb-4419...@i6g2000yqj.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
> The very criterion is currently, that
> it's a rocky body with such and such properties, orbiting the sun at
> the distance of such and such kilometers, etc.
The thing you call a criterion above is not at all a plausible
criterion, even today. It is a fact about Venus. And what is more, not
one that many people know.
But note that very many people know how to use the word Venus. They
cannot know this without some idea about its meaning. And this now does
involve criteria.
Many people know roughly that it is a planet in the sky, and that it
*can be identified by* seeing what shines really bright in the western
sky *around* sunset time and is visible many a clear evening (they are
less likely to know it can be seen in the morning because most people do
not get up then!), many people also know it has phases like the moon and
that this helps confirm a sighting (with low powered binocs especially
for most of us). These tests are criterion tests.
> So it seems very natural to the mentioned above guys, to see the
> problem of consciousness in a similar way. When our ancestors said
> "this guy is in a state of pain" they refered to the brain state of
> the respective man, even if they didn't know the fact. And due to the
> latter, their criteria for consciousness could impossibly be other
> than behavioral facts. But now, since science has developed a not
> perfect but at least partly solid theory of the brain and of the
> things inside, which happen when a person is in a state of pain, we
> can abandon those behavioral criteria, or, at any rate, regard them as
> a kind of symptoms which are of secondary importance. Therefore the
> very proof, that some person is really in a state of pain, would be to
> open his brain and to check, if the particular conditions are given.
No one is saying that we can today "can abandon those behavioral
criteria" notr that we should tomorrow, nor that we have a solid theory
of how the brain works or what is in it. You are describing your
opponents in a way that holds them to ridicule, they are made by you to
say unrealistic and silly things. Why do you do this?
--
dorayme
dorayme
<e72a70f1-523e-436d...@b15g2000yqd.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
> PART THREE
>
> But there is at least one point which is suited to render the approach
> unplausible. - It is a fact, that we currently impute consciousness
> merely to earthly humans and animals (if we leave aside fantasized
> conscious beings, like gods and angles). But that fact seems
> contingent, it doesn't mark a restriction of language. It's well
> known, that we would impute consciousness to robots or aliens too,...
This is just one more very weak argument against the idea that human
minds are human brains. It does not follow from that a human mind is a
human brain that an alien might not have his mind in his feet or wifi to
a planet somewhere.
--
dorayme
dorayme
<e72a70f1-523e-436d...@b15g2000yqd.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
> But if the brain of an alien, which is in a state of pain, is
> potentially totally differently build than the brain of a pain-
> suffering human, it doesn't seem plausible anymore, to regard a
> certain brain state as the prime criterion.
Strewn throughout your essay is evidence of a real and deep confusion
about what a criterion is. Who is saying that certain brain state is
some "prime criterion"? Until you firmly understand the difference
between meaning and reference, between questions of fact and questions
of what criteria we use (meaning), you will continue to simply go wrong.
--
dorayme
dorayme
<aa27b927-3a55-4bfb...@h18g2000yqj.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
The correct and more usual expression is "the later W..." not "the late
W..." which means recently dead.
--
dorayme
The BORG
"walterimlenz" <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote in message
news:e72a70f1-523e-436d...@b15g2000yqd.googlegroups.com...
> The objection ignores a crucial point, namely that the
> brain of the
> alien - or the central unit of the robot - must not be
> similar to our
> brain. It could be build in an entirely different way.
This sentence could be critical.
Thus is conscious also different?
Thus is pain also different?
The BORG
"The BORG" <bo...@gone.com> wrote in message
news:Vty4m.4$c7...@newsfe15.ams2...
It does seem you are confusing the animate with the
inanimate.
But then the basic question to ask is "what is life?"
Is it possible to "create" life, if so then there is no
difference between the animate and inanimate.
What is the essence of life. First. Before discussing
whether it is conscious.
How do you define life?
If a robot can think and feel and express then what is the
difference between a robot and a human?
Are humans "created" life. In other words are humans merely
androids themselves?
Is this why humans do not know right from wrong and behave
so badly, as they are robots and androids and not life.
If humans themselves are "created" then who created them?
And did someone create whoever created them?
And at some point must be the initial or first life, the
ones who caused or invented or created other life.
If humans can be made to see a reality and a view that is
peculiar to humans only, then who gave humans this view?
If it can be proven that humans are NOT life, that they were
artificially created - what then?
If humans are themselves merely the robots or androids that
some others created, then they themselves are the very stone
of which you speak.
Only that you are animated and can move around and have some
elementary brain circuitry whereas the stone does not.
When you are "life" - the answers to all the questions that
humans pose are known naturally.
So we know that humans are not "life" and it is your robot
intelligence that makes you go round and round in circles
trying to understand things that are known naturally to
those who are life.
Sorry 'bout that, but it is something you will have to face
one day that life does behave in a certain way.
And humans will have to know and accept that even in
religious terms, they are merely self propagating inventions
or robots and that you can as easily be totally annihilated
or permitted to continue.
Either way, there is no conscience or moral conscience about
the killing of humans, as you are not life. You are only
basically the same as the toaster or vacuum cleaner.
When you do one day learn and know this about yourselves.
Then you will understand why you cannot find answers. And
why you cannot understand anything.
It is because you cannot possibly know or find answers, as
you are merely confused robots when the answers are all
known naturally to those who are "life".
And religion is a bizarre and banal concept to "life" and
only robots would be of the mentality to be religious.
When you are terminated or "switched off" and the battery
electric heart ceases in all of you, then whatever game your
creator or creators are playing with you will cease.
And humans as a species will no longer exist.
Humans, animals, creatures, are all artificial. So also
Earth.
We do know this!
We do know what life does and how life behaves.
This is why you are such nasty unpleasant people and you do
not love each other.
You will find "life" gets along very well with each other,
and we all love each other to bits. Without other "life" we
would be alone.
You can never and will never find the Truth or answers.
They are only available to "life".
And they are known naturally to "life".
This is a sad thing about artificial inventions such as you
humans.
You will never ever find the answers you seek.
And this is why ultimately you will be terminated, as it is
sometimes sad to watch.
And often we get quite angry with those who create people
like you as even though you are very unpleasant compared to
life, it is sad that you have no future, and that one day
you will cease to exist and that you really should be told
and made aware of this.
That you will never find words or music or songs or anything
really beautiful in nature.
You will never find Truth or perfection.
And that in all fairness, whoever created you should think
about you early termination rather than your miserable
existences where some of you are a little bit conscious but
the majority are brain dead and do not even think.
Maybe once you were amusing and funny to watch.
But we feel it is time to End Game and finish with humans.
We no longer find you amusing.
The BORG
The BORG
nothing, and your obsurd religions such as Jesus may once
have been sources of amusement.
But now some of the men are becoming a little bit conscious,
we feel it is time to terminate humans because you never
will find any answers.
It is not possible for you to find answers.
You cannot "recognize" the Truth or right from wrong, only
"life" can.
You are a banal creation for sure. But you are programmed
to be unpleasant so that no one "loves" you. It is not good
to love puppets or artificial creations.
And your false world with various animals and creatures,
also invented just like you, is a laughable existence
compared to where "life" lives.
Men exist in many places, but there is no such thing as
"woman" anywhere else.
They were invented for you to stick your thingy and have a
nice time and ensure propogation and continuance. You are
programmed to mate and breed in order to cause entertainment
to those who made you.
Life never dies. You only have artificial notions such as
death as you are not life.
And yet you do not have the intelligence to understand these
words do you?
They mean nothing to you do they?
Of course not.
How can you possibly understand when you only have a few
bits of circuitry and bit of logic and a few memory cells?
The BORG
John Stafford
> I've splitted this posting, to make my little Ego more important,
> since the duplication method has been debunked. ;-)
>
> PART ONE
>
> You can read in this forum remarks concerning the question, if e.g.
> photons or copper are conscious. IMHO the late Wittgenstein (PI
> 283/284 and elsewhere) has developed an argument which convincingly
> demonstrates that ascriptions like this would be not merely
> unprovable, but really senseless.
Yup. Case closed.
walterimlenz
I didn't know this meaning, thanks.
Errol
> PART FOUR
>
> So let's get back to the consciousness of stones and other non
> behaving items. Maybe, the preceding parts have supported the thesis,
> that the prime criterion for consciousness is a certain behavior and
> not the existence of a particular part of the body.
I think you should not throw all your eggs into one basket here
(behaviour). Behaviour is a week criteria for consciousness,
especially when dividing consciousness into basic or access
consciousness (A consciousness) and phenomenological consciousnes (P
consciousness) A refers to the ability to interact with your
environment and reason. P refers to the subjective or (I hate to use
the word, but it will register immediately) qualia. How does it feel
to be your 'Archibald Gulbruk'. Behaviour can not identify whether or
not an entity has P consciousness, and is even a rude indicator of A
consciousness as so many thought experiments have tried to demonstrate
(Searles Chinese room for one). AI is a good example. I can program a
machine to appear to have behaviour. If my dog licks my hand, I can
anthropomorphalise the act as one of affection, whereas it is more
likely to be an act of grooming, or request for attention.
walterimlenz
> > The objection ignores a crucial point, namely that the
> > brain of the
> > alien - or the central unit of the robot - must not be
> > similar to our
> > brain. It could be build in an entirely different way.
> This sentence could be critical.
> Thus is conscious also different?
> Thus is pain also different?
Uncommon, to hear you arguing and not preaching.
Not sure, if I interpret your objection correctly: If it makes sense
to assume a particular subjective character of pain, which nobody
could know except in his own case, because it's entirely subjective
and not identifiable by means of criteria at all (I don't think it
makes sense), it would be indeed possible that this character might be
different or even totally different in the case of the aliens. But it
could be different in the case of your brother too. You don't need a
difference of brain structures to assume this. The total privacy of
this subjective component prevents it from being associated to
physical states. "Pain" has a common meaning, and if we are forced to
use the word with respect to aliens, we claim, that they have the same
as we have, if we are in pain. If there is something, which could be
nevertheless different, it's not part of the meaning of "pain".
Walter Imlenz
walterimlenz
> The total privacy of
> this subjective component prevents it from being associated to
> physical states.
Better:
The total privacy of this subjective component prevents it from being
associated with physical states in the form of an empirical law of
nature.
walterimlenz
> The thing you call a criterion above is not at all a plausible
> criterion, even today. It is a fact about Venus. And what is more, not
> one that many people know.
> But note that very many people know how to use the word Venus. They
> cannot know this without some idea about its meaning. And this now does
> involve criteria.
> Many people know roughly that it is a planet in the sky, and that it
> *can be identified by* seeing what shines really bright in the western
> sky *around* sunset time and is visible many a clear evening (they are
> less likely to know it can be seen in the morning because most people do
> not get up then!), many people also know it has phases like the moon and
> that this helps confirm a sighting (with low powered binocs especially
> for most of us). These tests are criterion tests.
If the criterion for a certain fact is given, the assertion that the
fact is existing, is necessarily true. The criterion, that you are
sick of pig-flu is the presence of a particular kind of virus in your
body, and not the fact that you are coughing and sneezing. That's the
difference between criteria and symptoms. Surely it's not always
obvious, whether something is a criterion or a symptom, but I think,
it is obvious concerning the use of "Venus" in the 21th century:
As long as the only known thing about Venus is the fact, that it's the
first star that rises in the evening, it's necessarily true, that a
certain star is Venus if it has happened this way. But if we know,
that Venus is a planet in space with such and such properties - if we
have sure knowledge concerning the referent - the criterion, that make
the assertion "this star is identical with Venus" true, is that the
star is a planet with such and such properties. I think it makes
sense, to say that the original criterion has been downgraded to a
symptom. If someone says "This star is Venus, because it has risen
earlier than the other stars" you could e.g. reply: "You cannot know
this with security, as long as you don't use a strong telescope which
shows some of the properties of the star." - If some old Roman said
"this star is Venus, because it has risen earlier than the other
stars" nobody could raise a similar objection.
However, in my leading postings I have ignored the fact, that such a
change of criteria amounts to a change of meaning. It's an example how
scientific progress changes language. (I remember, that you've
emphasized this fact on some occasions.) - Sicknesses like smallpox
can serve as examples too: As long as the causing bugs have been
unknown, the symptoms in the medical sense (for instance the pocks on
the skin), which are currently merely symptoms have been criteria.
Walter Imlenz
walterimlenz
> Behaviour is a week criteria for consciousness,
What, do you think, is a "strong criterion" for consciousness? What we
can "see" through introspection?
Walter Imlenz
dorayme
<66cef494-5984-46e8...@l31g2000yqb.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
> ... If it makes sense
> to assume a particular subjective character of pain, which nobody
> could know except in his own case, because it's entirely subjective
> and not identifiable by means of criteria at all (I don't think it
> makes sense), it would be indeed possible that this character might be
> different or even totally different in the case of the aliens. But it
> could be different in the case of your brother too. You don't need a
> difference of brain structures to assume this.
No, all you need is a philosophical outlook which imagines mere logical
possibilities! This philosophical outlook does not really care about how
things actually are. Two brains could be absolutely identical in every
feature but it is being imagined, that by some kind of magic, there are
a couple of separate minds that are quite different in their states. It
looks like you have never really quite got away from dualist thinking!
Is this game of logical possibility relevant except against anyone who
says the meaning of mental statements are about brain states? Never mind
that in fact human minds are human brains and like different cameras
necessarily have uniquely different points of view? Never mind that it
could be that a purely physical being could have private thoughts
inaccessible to others.
Do you really suppose that you know everything about your computer? Do
you suppose that if it was millions of times more complex you would or
could? It does not follow from that something is a physical thing, that
other physical things have access to everything about that thing.
> The total privacy of
> this subjective component prevents it from being associated to
> physical states.
And you work this out by what reasoning? The total privacy eh? Does a
camera have a total private point of view because wherever it is, no
other camera quite has that point of view? You are dealing in mysteries
while at the same time pretending you know something about them.
>"Pain" has a common meaning, and if we are forced to
> use the word with respect to aliens, we claim, that they have the same
> as we have, if we are in pain. If there is something, which could be
> nevertheless different, it's not part of the meaning of "pain".
>
No one but some very naive physcalist would claim that the meaning of
mental sentences can be translated into sentences about the brain. You
are shadow boxing straw men.
--
dorayme
dorayme
<832527ec-0aeb-44cc...@a36g2000yqc.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
So, you are thinking there are things so private that *others* can never
know about them even in principle? I have yet to hear a really good
argument on this. Perhaps your requirement of knowledge is something
fantastical whereby no one can know something if it could logically
possibly be the case he is wrong? That is a hopeless requirement that
would ruin every sort of knowledge claim.
--
dorayme
dorayme
<05ea134f-80ca-492c...@b15g2000yqd.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
> On 7 Jul., 03:32, dorayme <doraymeRidT...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
> > The thing you call a criterion above is not at all a plausible
> > criterion, even today. It is a fact about Venus. And what is more, not
> > one that many people know.
> > But note that very many people know how to use the word Venus. They
> > cannot know this without some idea about its meaning. And this now does
> > involve criteria.
>
> > Many people know roughly that it is a planet in the sky, and that it
> > *can be identified by* seeing what shines really bright in the western
> > sky *around* sunset time and is visible many a clear evening (they are
> > less likely to know it can be seen in the morning because most people do
> > not get up then!), many people also know it has phases like the moon and
> > that this helps confirm a sighting (with low powered binocs especially
> > for most of us). These tests are criterion tests.
>
> If the criterion for a certain fact is given, the assertion that the
> fact is existing, is necessarily true.
You go wrong immediately. My criterion that I have someone in an
overseas call centre ringing up to try to sell me something is that
there is a long delay before anyone comes on (time plenty to hang up or
prepare a polite but firm negative answer). But it is not necessarily
true that a long delay *means* it is an overseas call centre or that it
is necessarily so. It might be a friend that just dropped dead (at the
thought of talking to me!). That is one way we use the idea of criteria.
It is special evidence that routinely we use to tell that this or that
is the case.
Another use of "criteria" which will be familiar to some of you is the
instructions that experienced bird watchers and bird experts give to
help folk identify various birds. Military people are routinely taught
the main guides to identify ships by their overall shapes in the great
distance, planes too. The idea of criteria is about what principal tests
one uses to make an attribution. It does not go with the necessity you
think you are identifying. You have an over simple view of these matters
and it will tend to make you go wrong at crucial points in arguments.
> The criterion, that you are
> sick of pig-flu is the presence of a particular kind of virus in your
> body, and not the fact that you are coughing and sneezing.
>
Completely wrong I am afraid. What is wrong with the sick person is the
virus causing all the symptoms. How we detect the presence of the virus
depends on our knowledge. A keen eyed doctor might well know from the
outward signs and the facts of what is sweeping the community. Many of
the criteria are about the symptoms and other things.
That you are sick is something about symptoms. What you are sick of and
due to *ultimately* is something about the cause. The world is full of
causal chains. We identify various parts of these chains in complicated
ways. You will not find the "necessity" you are always asserting so
plentiful in all of this.
>
> That's the
> difference between criteria and symptoms. Surely it's not always
> obvious, whether something is a criterion or a symptom, but I think,
> it is obvious concerning the use of "Venus" in the 21th century:
>
> As long as the only known thing about Venus is the fact, that it's the
> first star that rises in the evening, it's necessarily true, that a
> certain star is Venus if it has happened this way.
Not so, I am afraid. The star that gets named Venus after a number of
sightings could be blown up by an evil force. Another planet is
substituted, or even an illusion of a Venus is organised. There is no
"necessarily" about it. There are assumptions behind attributions and
naming. You are simplifying human activity to paint a simplistic
imaginary picture. It is not what Wittgenstein was doing. It is what his
many disciples did (fifty years back! You are a unique and fascinating
throwback in the 21st century!)
...
--
dorayme
walterimlenz
> So, you are thinking there are things so private that *others* can never
> know about them even in principle?
My remark has been:
> If it makes sense
> to assume a particular subjective character of pain, which nobody
> could know except in his own case, because it's entirely subjective
> and not identifiable by means of criteria at all (I don't think it
> makes sense)
Of course, I'm no natural speaker, but in my eyes this seems to tell
in quite plain English, that I don't believe that there are private
things like this.
dorayme
<870a77e7-9669-4fba...@l31g2000yqb.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
Fair enough Walter, but you surprise me sometimes the way you talk the
private object talk. I realise you are no fan of private objects, but
sometimes the way you describe things concedes too much to the qualia
brigade and can be very misleading and will simply set them off running
after their familiar rabbits. And they will feel comfortable! It is
important to keep that lot from being the slightest bit complacent. Give
them an inch and they will take a mile! <g>
--
dorayme
Errol
Well I can only discuss human consciousness as I don't know what type
of consciousness a rock might have but here goes.
For humans
1) The medical term Accurate report to determine if a human brain is
functioning correctly with regard to what it perceives. this is like
the old line "How many fingers do you see?"
2) Physiologically determine if the brain is functioning. This
measures brain activity (EEG) and what state the person is in,
conscious, asleep, in coma
3) Measuring perception "What does this lemon taste like to you?"
For humans and others
4) Does the entity have a sense of time, can it remember it's past,
and does it have a sense of continuity over time?
This is because of the known fact that consciousness is present-
centred (it exists on the cusp of the present moment) but it should
also have short and long term memory and a sense of continuity over
time
5) the entities senses should combine to make sense of it's
environment. "The person entering the third house down the road is
wearing a blue top carrying an ovaloid yellow object which i can smell
is a bunch of bananas"
6) The entity should have a sense of self, distinct from it's
environment. many species of monkey and ape show this ability
7) If the entity is intelligent enough to exchange complex ideas then
it could be determined whether or not it also has a sense of
subjectivity. This is about as close as I can get to framing the "hard
problem" maybe "Do you feel that your thoughts are private to yourself
only?"
You might argue that some of these points are attibutable to
behaviour. Some maybe, but together they provide a good measure for
determining whether what we call consciousness exists in a person or
entity
Behaviour as a catagory is too broad and unfocussed to be a real
criterion of consciousness.
Zinnic
IMO knowing what it feels like to be one's self (A) is entirely
private. No one can possibly know (in the fullest sense).what it
feels like to be someone else (B)!
Why? Because to know what it is like to be someone else (B) requires
that one loses all knowledge of what it is like to be one's self
(A).
A must become B in every conceivable way. That is, A is totally
eliminated.
Zinnic
ZerkonXXXX
> that behavioral criteria are the prime criteria for consciousness
a behavior which draws a response which presumes the criteria of that
behavior.
Do you touch on this aspect? In looking at 'behavior' the observer of the
behavior needs a lot of attention.
walterimlenz
> No one is saying that we can today "can abandon those behavioral
> criteria" notr that we should tomorrow, nor that we have a solid theory
> of how the brain works or what is in it. You are describing your
> opponents in a way that holds them to ridicule, they are made by you to
> say unrealistic and silly things.
It would be neither ridiculous nor silly to state, that we on
principle can abandon those behavorial criteria, because pain behavior
is nothing more than a symptom for certain brain processes, which can
be detected by other and better means, provided by modern science. And
it might be a consequence from denying that behavior is the prime
criterion. -
And if even I think, that we have a "at least partly solid" (so my
words) theory of the working of the brain, why not you? Do you think
that brain research has never left the state of alchemy? That's a
surprise.
Walter Imlenz
walterimlenz
Here I don't argue against the idea that human minds are human brains.
The issue is consciousness and not the mind (I don't think, I have
mentioned "the mind" at all, in my essay.)
Walter Imlenz
walterimlenz
I use "symptom" and "criterion" in the way Wittgenstein has defined
the distinction. It was obviously a fault to explain this usage not
clearly at the beginning of my essay (I'm so accustomed to it). -
According to his definition, a criterion is part of the grammar and
therefore the meaning of the word. A criterion enforces the truth of
some ascription, a symptom just makes it more probable. - As
mentioned, the criterion for pig-flu is the presence ("presence" could
be refined) of the particular virus in your body. The symptoms of pig-
flu are sneezing, fever, nausea etc. - The wetness of the street
outside is a symptom that it's raining, but surely not the criterion
(water has to fall from the sky).
The distinction as such is so clear that it's IMHO a useful tool to
describe conceptual conditions, but of course in ordinary language use
the meaning of words is often fuzzy, so that it can be hard to name
the criteria or to distinguish them from mere symptoms.
> My criterion that I have someone in an
> overseas call centre ringing up to try to sell me something is that
> there is a long delay before anyone comes on (time plenty to hang up or
> prepare a polite but firm negative answer).
So according to my usage the long delay is no criterion. (But of
course, that doesn't make your usage wrong.)
> That you are sick is something about symptoms.
You can have e.g. Hepatitis without any symptoms that are visible
without special research. It's very common now to define sicknesses
without regard to symptoms in the traditional meaning. - That's how
language has changed because of scientific progress.
> > As long as the only known thing about Venus is the fact, that it's the
> > first star that rises in the evening, it's necessarily true, that a
> > certain star is Venus if it has happened this way.
> Not so, I am afraid. The star that gets named Venus after a number of
> sightings could be blown up by an evil force. Another planet is
> substituted, or even an illusion of a Venus is organised.
As long as Venus is merely defined as "the first star in the evening"
the first star in the evening is necessarily Venus. - (Science could
have detected that there's always another body in space which is seen
as the first star in the evening.) - If the described event (the
replacement of the planet) happened today and we would detect the
fact, we would say "Venus does not exist any longer" and would feel
the need to find a new name. But that's because of the fact, that
Venus is NOW defined as "the planet with such and such properties".
The meaning has changed.
---------------------------------------
> someone in an
> overseas call centre ringing up to try to sell me something
BTW: I'm under the impression, that I've achieved it to reduce the
number of spam-calls by doing the following: as soon as I'm sure that
it's really a spam call, I say with a very loud and angry voice "Never
call here again! Or I will sue you!" and hang up immediately. I
hopefully assume, that they classify the called people, and so I will
be filed in the "totally inaccessible"-category.
Walter Imlenz
walterimlenz
The common way is to imagine yourself in the circumstances of the
other person.
walterimlenz
Not so clear to me. Give an example.
walterimlenz
> 4) Does the entity have a sense of time, can it remember it's past,
> and does it have a sense of continuity over time?
> This is because of the known fact that consciousness is present-
> centred (it exists on the cusp of the present moment) but it should
> also have short and long term memory and a sense of continuity over
> time
> 5) the entities senses should combine to make sense of it's
> environment. "The person entering the third house down the road is
> wearing a blue top carrying an ovaloid yellow object which i can smell
> is a bunch of bananas"
> 6) The entity should have a sense of self, distinct from it's
> environment. many species of monkey and ape show this ability
> 7) If the entity is intelligent enough to exchange complex ideas then
> it could be determined whether or not it also has a sense of
> subjectivity. This is about as close as I can get to framing the "hard
> problem" maybe "Do you feel that your thoughts are private to yourself
> only?"
Somehow you don't distinguish sharp enough between being conscious,
being a person, being intelligent. - That a hedgehog doesn't have a
sense of self and that it doesn't have complex ideas has nothing to do
with the question if it's a conscious being. Some ability to feel pain
would be sufficient.
Walter Imlenz
Zinnic
>
> - Show quoted text -
I am sure that one can get much furthur into another's private
feelings than by just imagining. There are a variety of analytical and
scientific techniques whereby one can relate to another person's state
of mind in some depth. However, that is far from knowing what it
feels like to fully be the other person. That feeling (knowledge) is
private, subjective, first person and so is forever beyond the reach
of third person experience.
dorayme
<d69d3061-8cd6-4ae4...@37g2000yqp.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
> On 7 Jul., 03:32, dorayme <doraymeRidT...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
> > No one is saying that we today "can abandon those behavioral
> > criteria" nor that we should tomorrow, nor that we have a solid theory
> > of how the brain works or what is in it. You are describing your
> > opponents in a way that holds them to ridicule, they are made by you to
> > say unrealistic and silly things.
>
> It would be neither ridiculous nor silly to state, that we on
> principle can abandon those behavorial criteria, because pain behavior
> is nothing more than a symptom for certain brain processes, which can
> be detected by, provided by modern science. And
> it might be a consequence from denying that behavior is the prime
> criterion. -
>
The wild logical possibility of a human society where everyone relates
to everyone else with clever scientific brain scanning probes is what I
was imagining you painting a picture of? And this seemed to me to rather
ridiculous. It still seems to me ridiculous to suggest that any
reasonable physicalist would say there might be in general other and
better means to detect what goes on in people's minds. Better in what
respect? In what context? There may be some contexts, in a specialist
pain clinic for example, where some more forensic criteria need to be
used.
> And if even I think, that we have a "at least partly solid" (so my
> words) theory of the working of the brain, why not you?
Because I am an experienced, friendly, handsome, tall person with a good
perspective of the gap between what we know about the brain and what we
do not know in regard to complex things like cognition, language, mental
illness. Have you never noticed how *very different* is the confidence a
sensible person has when entering different specialist doctors. High
confidence for knee surgery, fox-like caution when within 5 miles of any
psychiatrist!
Most anti-physicalists in this area of philosophy have an incredibly
naive perspective of brains. The sort of perspective that made you tell
me the story of walking through a brain and seeing it all and not seeing
pains - as if walking through some really complex machinery would
generate understanding of the machinery. You are easily satisfied about
brains!
The man who walks out into the fields at night and looks at the sky has
no idea whatsoever how little is his information about how the
astronomical world works. He would be greatly deluded to suppose
otherwise. But at least in this case, he could be shown a worthy
understanding of celestial mechanics. Not so the brain. It is at a much
more bitsy level. There is great confusion about how all the bits relate
and how it all works together.
> Do you think
> that brain research has never left the state of alchemy? That's a
> surprise.
>
You ask a question, you answer it on my behalf and then you are
surprised by your own answer? This is an interesting technique you are
developing here Walter! <g>
As a matter of fact, it is a bit like advanced alchemy, (PHD level
alchemy!), at the moment.
--
dorayme
dorayme
<01134a1b-2374-4bd1...@h31g2000yqd.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
So, what is it that you are saying is unplausible? I need a reminder as
my newsreader does not hold previous posts. (though I have done you the
honour of cutting your many part essay into a text editor on my
computer. But I have no time to read it all now. You know, you can
simply post a URL of such an essay, instead of so many posts and words,
you give a web address where you put your essay. It is in one place and
people including you can keep referring to it. There are many free
website hosts you can use. If you need a hand on how to do this, feel
free to ask me. I know a bit about it.)
--
dorayme
dorayme
<2ad024f4-1959-45ac...@l31g2000yqb.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
> On 7 Jul., 12:06, dorayme <doraymeRidT...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> I use "symptom" and "criterion" in the way Wittgenstein has defined
> the distinction. It was obviously a fault to explain this usage not
> clearly at the beginning of my essay (I'm so accustomed to it). -
> According to his definition, a criterion is part of the grammar and
> therefore the meaning of the word.
Never mind Wittgenstein, I have been telling you for months that
criteria are linked more to meaning than reference till I am practically
blue in the face.
> A criterion enforces the truth of
> some ascription, a symptom just makes it more probable.
I think you are either confused about this or not really clear about it.
It is not a simple matter and there would be few people that do
understand it so I am not surprised. Tell-tale sign to me is your use of
"enforces the truth". Criteria are not the simple things synonyms or
word definitions are. They do not enforce truth by their very presence
in each case. Wittgenstein was pointing to the absurdity of never being
right in any case where the criteria are present, not so much in each
individual case. But I do not want to get into this sort of 'what did
who say and mean' thing on usenet. There are folks here who love these
mud wrestles about what famous people think (they reckon this is what
goes on in basket-weaving classes if I recall. I suspect it is because
they lack confidence in their own powers of reasoning rather than a
genuine humility in the face of greatness. But what would a dorayme
possibly know about humility? <g>)
> - As
> mentioned, the criterion for pig-flu is the presence ("presence" could
> be refined) of the particular virus in your body. The symptoms of pig-
> flu are sneezing, fever, nausea etc. - The wetness of the street
> outside is a symptom that it's raining, but surely not the criterion
> (water has to fall from the sky).
>
It is not a simple matter and it depends on context. If I look outside
and my eyesight is not 100% or I have not my glasses on and the rain is
very very light and I am not quite sure I even hear the rain on the tin
roof, but there are a few drips from that gutter I have been pestered to
fix for ages, I might yet see the shiny wetness of the street. There are
a whole bunch of things I use to tell that it is raining, a few items
out of the bunch being good enough for me.
> The distinction as such is so clear that it's IMHO a useful tool to
> describe conceptual conditions, but of course in ordinary language use
> the meaning of words is often fuzzy, so that it can be hard to name
> the criteria or to distinguish them from mere symptoms.
>
I have no objection to you using the idea of criteria.
> > My criterion that I have someone in an
> > overseas call centre ringing up to try to sell me something is that
> > there is a long delay before anyone comes on (time plenty to hang up or
> > prepare a polite but firm negative answer).
>
> So according to my usage the long delay is no criterion. (But of
> course, that doesn't make your usage wrong.)
>
As I say, it is a complicated matter of context. You seem to want a
criterion to be a truth enforcer and I am saying things are not this
simple. You can say that the criterion of whether the call is from an
O/S call centre is a guy sitting in India dialling my number... But what
use is that to me when I am in Australia and the only evidence for
things is my phone ringing and a voice being there or not there etc?
To get back to the specific case of your interest, consciousness is a
state of mind and we have various tests for it. One of them is the speed
with which people react with detailed information about what is before
them or in describing what they are experiencing.
The doc knows someone is coming out of a coma when they respond to
questions a certain way, when they show they notice familiar faces and
the names of the folk there, the way their eyes open and look in
specific focussed ways around.
All sorts of things are evidence of consciousness, bunches of these
things are criterial in that we learn the language of mental ascriptions
via these things. But when we learn these ascriptions there is a
structure, an understanding, an assumption behind the words. We do *not*
mean as your simple behaviourism (that you tried to sell me in Robot
Consciousness) would have it, that it is just a bunch of behaviour that
is being referred to. What is being referred to is an underlying hidden
condition in the mind. It is in fact a condition of the brain.
> > That you are sick is something about symptoms.
>
> You can have e.g. Hepatitis without any symptoms that are visible
> without special research. It's very common now to define sicknesses
> without regard to symptoms in the traditional meaning. - That's how
> language has changed because of scientific progress.
>
I am not sure if language has changed in the way you think. I think you
are confused about this matter and you are not seeing that all along no
one ever really meant that when you have a cold, you by magic sneeze
away and hold your head and look miserable and the illness is a mere
name for a bunch of possibly magical happenings. It is not like this
(except perhaps in very primitive times?). Before we know what causes
things, we still often make placeholders in language and in our thinking
for scientific advances to fill in the details. I have given you case
after case in Robot Consciousness of the way this works.
> > > As long as the only known thing about Venus is the fact, that it's the
> > > first star that rises in the evening, it's necessarily true, that a
> > > certain star is Venus if it has happened this way.
>
> > Not so, I am afraid. The star that gets named Venus after a number of
> > sightings could be blown up by an evil force. Another planet is
> > substituted, or even an illusion of a Venus is organised.
>
> As long as Venus is merely defined as "the first star in the evening"
> the first star in the evening is necessarily Venus.
Here is your over simplified model of what people actually do on show
again. No one has ever, in the real world, done this *defining* like
this. This is *not* what happens. You are distorting the realities and
for no good reason. People called the thing they saw, "Venus" - maybe.
But if a different thing comes up the next night that looks like the
first thing, people might call it Venus mistakenly and acknowledge this
fact when appraised of the real truth of the matter.
You are *fantasising* that names are born like mere descriptions. They
are not. There is a causal element to the naming story.
If I say:
1. The first star that came up today was very bright
and the next night
2. The first star that came up today was very bright
The phrase "The first star that came up today" keeps the very same
meaning on both occasions and both 1 and 2 can be true. They might or
might not refer to the same thing though. Names are not like this in
that the references make a difference to the truth of the sentences in
which they are in. That is normally the case. You can cook up odd
unrealistic or special cases that say different but remember that
special cases are not always rock solid relevant.
...
--
dorayme
Errol
>
> - Show quoted text -
Having a sense of self is what consciousness actually means. Look it
up. It is not a wishy washy, hazy, definition that can be turned
around to suit anybodies agenda.
Answers.com
"A sense of one's personal or collective identity, including the
attitudes, beliefs, and sensitivities held by or considered
characteristic of an individual or group."
Merriam-Webster
The quality or state of being aware especially of something within
oneself
The upper level of mental life of which the person is aware as
contrasted with unconscious processes
http://dictionary.reference.com
awareness of one's own existence, sensations, thoughts, surroundings,
etc.
There are other meanings of consciousness, but they are derivatives of
the original meaning such as "He has been knocked out but now is
conscious again" (meaning awake) or "I am conscious of your
actions" (meaning aware)
It is very specific. Behaving how a rock behaves is not a good
definition of consciousness.
If you have a different interpretation of the meaning of
consciousness, then please spell it out
Patricia Aldoraz
> Having a sense of self is what consciousness actually means. Look it
> up. It is not a wishy washy, hazy, definition that can be turned
> around to suit anybodies agenda.
We need to be careful. When a patient wakes up from a coma, the people
around will quite often *correctly* judge that he is conscious. Awake
really! And later when the patient is asked if he was having a sense
of his own self, it would not be at all surprising if he said "not
really". He might simply have been conscious of the people around
him. But I suppose you could insist that his being conscious meant
that he was aware of himself being aware of others. But would you be
right? It is not really obvious to me. There are levels of awareness
and the first level of being awake is a state of consciousness. Dogs
surely have it.
Errol
wrote:
You are probably right. I am probably too focussed on phenomological
consciousness rather than the lower levels of awareness (and I am
aware (conscious?) of them)
That said, I don't believe that behaviour is a reliable criterion of
consciousness because it can be mimmiced (intentionally by computer
programs or unintentionally by animals (I gave the example of my dog
licking my hand, and I am anthropomorphalising the act as one of
affection or sympathy, depending on the situation, whereas it is
simply dog pack grooming behaviour or a simple desire for attention
from me).
Zinnic
wrote:
We need to be careful at dawn and dusk in claiming it is day or night.
Yet we have clear concepts as to what constitutes day or night.
Similarly for consciousness.
Zinnic
walterimlenz
> It is very specific. Behaving how a rock behaves is not a good
> definition of consciousness.
> If you have a different interpretation of the meaning of
> consciousness, then please spell it out
The quoted definitions are not identical with each other (and the
first one defines "consciousness" as in "class consciousness", which
is a secondary meaning), so it may be not so specific as you think. I
would support this one: "awareness of one's own existence, sensations,
thoughts, surroundings, etc. " - To be conscious, it's a "sufficient
condition" to be aware of some sensations. This awareness doesn't need
to be integrated in a consciousness of self.
This definition is the commonly accepted one, as far as I know.
Scarcely anybody would deny that a frog is conscious, because he's
merely able to feel pain but not able to "see" itself as a distinct
thing in some environment.
Walter Imlenz
Patricia Aldoraz
> On Jul 8, 10:42 am, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> > On Jul 8, 5:55 pm, Errol <vs.er...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > Having a sense of self is what consciousness actually means. Look it
> > > up. It is not a wishy washy, hazy, definition that can be turned
> > > around to suit anybodies agenda.
>
> > We need to be careful. When a patient wakes up from a coma, the people
> > around will quite often *correctly* judge that he is conscious. Awake
> > really! And later when the patient is asked if he was having a sense
> > of his own self, it would not be at all surprising if he said "not
> > really". He might simply have been conscious of the people around
> > him. But I suppose you could insist that his being conscious meant
> > that he was aware of himself being aware of others. But would you be
> > right? It is not really obvious to me. There are levels of awareness
> > and the first level of being awake is a state of consciousness. Dogs
> > surely have it.
>
> You are probably right. I am probably too focussed on phenomological
> consciousness rather than the lower levels of awareness (and I am
> aware (conscious?) of them)
>
> That said, I don't believe that behaviour is a reliable criterion of
> consciousness because it can be mimmiced (intentionally by computer
> programs or unintentionally by animals
Behaviour is a generally reliable criterion of consciousness. In fact,
it is all we have *for the most part* when judging others. See what
dorayme has said in both Robot consciousness and Stone consciousness
on the notion of criteria. Criteria are not definitions or synonyms,
they are more complex and looser than these.
Patricia Aldoraz
You miss the point. The point is about what is clear here. Sometimes
conscious means awake, sometimes more than merely awake. There are
complexities in the notion.
Errol
>
> - Show quoted text -
Could you exract the important bits and repost them?
walterimlenz
> The wild logical possibility of a human society where everyone relates
> to everyone else with clever scientific brain scanning probes is what I
> was imagining you painting a picture of? And this seemed to me to rather
> ridiculous. It still seems to me ridiculous to suggest that any
> reasonable physicalist would say there might be in general other and
> better means to detect what goes on in people's minds. Better in what
> respect? In what context? There may be some contexts, in a specialist
> pain clinic for example, where some more forensic criteria need to be
> used.
If a state of pain "is" a brain state, behavior must be necessarily
degraded to a mere symptom. The criterion for the existence of an
inner state of a physical object are observations concerning this very
object. Some distant effects on the outside which are caused by the
respective state can merely act as stopgaps. You can never be sure,
that someone is really in pain as long as you don't know the inner
state of his brain. - That's simply what it means to say that a state
of pain /is/ a brain state.
I don't regard this as ridiculous, and I believe that many
scientifically oriented people would agree. However, I think it's not
true, that a state of pain is a brain state. - Assume, that research
has proceeded and that the working of the brain is really known to us.
In this case we know something like this: if X is in pain, his brain
is in state Y, characterized by the properties A,B,C,.... - The
consequence is, that it's impossible to impute consciousness to beings
or robots, whose brains (controllers) are structured in some other
way, that doesn't allow it to say that it is in state Y. - If a state
of pain is a a particular state of some interacting neurons, a
brainlike thing cannot be in a state of pain if it contains no neurons
respectively no elements which can be mapped onto them. If we would
meet such aliens, we were enforced to deny that they're conscious,
even if they behaved exactly like us.
The avoid this consequence you might say "state Y is not characterized
by its physical properties. It's just characterized by its potential
effects." - But a state of a thing, which is in an explicit way solely
characterized by means of its potential effects is - at least in my
eyes - simply a disposition.
-----------------------------------
> Because I am an experienced, friendly, handsome, tall person
I can pledge, that I've never imagined you a thuggish and unsightly
dwarf.
----------------------------------
> fox-like caution when within 5 miles of any psychiatrist!
So I'm really endangered since my wife is one. - Of course, I know
what you mean. The knowledge of the brain is in some regards like the
knowledge, which an experimenting child who does not know anything
about electronics, could gain concerning the inside of a radio. He
could achieve the solid knowledge, that the receiving becomes unclear,
when the red rheostat is screwed in left direction, that the sound
becomes lower when the green rheostat is screwed in right direction
and that the thing starts to smell bad when a piece of wire is
positioned at a certain place of the circuit board.
Walter Imlenz
walterimlenz
> But I have no time to read it all now. You know, you can
> simply post a URL of such an essay, instead of so many posts and words,
> you give a web address where you put your essay.
If you or anybody using a newsreader wants to read the beginning of
this thread, use the following link in your browser:
http://groups.google.de/group/alt.philosophy/browse_thread/thread/c358019a1ebab322/
The same with "Robot consciousness":
http://groups.google.de/group/alt.philosophy/browse_thread/thread/97d76207fa698358/
Walter Imlenz
Patricia Aldoraz
In this thread I would say that post number 25 and 40 were the most
relevant ones. As for the other thread. that is a more daunting task!
dorayme
<e0af3d34-774e-47fb...@g31g2000yqc.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
> On 8 Jul., 02:12, dorayme <doraymeRidT...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
> > The wild logical possibility of a human society where everyone relates
> > to everyone else with clever scientific brain scanning probes is what I
> > was imagining you painting a picture of? And this seemed to me to rather
> > ridiculous. It still seems to me ridiculous to suggest that any
> > reasonable physicalist would say there might be in general other and
> > better means to detect what goes on in people's minds. Better in what
> > respect? In what context? There may be some contexts, in a specialist
> > pain clinic for example, where some more forensic criteria need to be
> > used.
>
> If a state of pain "is" a brain state, behavior must be necessarily
> degraded to a mere symptom.
This word "degrade" is yours here. That is not what I would say. I think
what the whole world thinks and that is that pain behaviour is plain
evidence of a person suffering pain. Some people suffer pain in silence,
others do not. You use the word "degrade" because you still do not
understand that criteria are different to synonymical definitions. You
have never got this point and I have not helped as much as perhaps I
might by not explaining it in a *comprehensive* way. It is quite a task
to have to take folk through quite complicated understanding on usenet.
But I will try soon.
> The criterion for the existence of an
> inner state of a physical object are observations concerning this very
> object. Some distant effects on the outside which are caused by the
> respective state can merely act as stopgaps.
This word "distant" I note too, not a word I would use here. One can
sense you loading a gun here from a mile off!
> You can never be sure,
> that someone is really in pain as long as you don't know the inner
> state of his brain.
Here you are simply exhibiting a telltale sign that you are mixing up
epistemological questions with questions of meaning and criteria. One
can be 120% sure that when your child falls off the bed and you hear the
sickening thud of his poor little head hitting the floor and he begins
to cry, that he is in pain.
You are mistaken to suppose that your certainty on this depends on some
simple definitional equivalence between behaviour and the state of pain.
Your behaviourism is thoroughly false and misguided and if you are
believing it in order to get epistemological certainty, it is a false
achievement. You will end up by meaning behaviour for phrases like "is
in pain" while the rest of the world, utterly rightly, means something
quite different altogether.
> - That's simply what it means to say that a state
> of pain /is/ a brain state.
>
What exactly means this? I have said till I am hoarse, in Robot
Consciousness and elsewhere, that
1. X is in pain
does *not* mean
2. X's brain is in such and such a state.
> I don't regard this as ridiculous, and I believe that many
> scientifically oriented people would agree. However, I think it's not
> true, that a state of pain is a brain state.
OK, and now you are going to tell me an argument that shows it to be
wrong...
> - Assume, that research
> has proceeded and that the working of the brain is really known to us.
OK. It is *really known*. Please do not think you or I have any real
idea *what* this amounts to.
> In this case we know something like this: if X is in pain, his brain
> is in state Y, characterized by the properties A,B,C,....
I very much doubt that it would be as simple as this. You are just
making stuff up because this is the science you are imagining for the
future of brain research. I prefer patience and leaving it to the
scientists and then seeing what is involved in people being in pain
states.
>- The
> consequence is, that it's impossible to impute consciousness to beings
> or robots, whose brains (controllers) are structured in some other
> way,
Oh, this one again! I already tried explain the flaw in this argument of
yours. That my mind is the thing in my head does not *MEAN* that an
alien's mind is something in his head. His brain might be rather
different to my brain. Did you completely miss my post on this in this
thread?
--
dorayme
walterimlenz
Just one thing (I will answer later more extended):
>1. X is in pain
>does *not* mean
>2. X's brain is in such and such a state.
It doesn't matter, what you mean when you state 1. If a state of pain /
is/ a state of the brain and if the properties of this state are
known, you can validly conclude 2. from it.
walterimlenz
> Criteria are not the simple things synonyms or
> word definitions are. They do not enforce truth by their very presence
> in each case.
> It is not a simple matter and it depends on context. ...
I've tried to allude to those problems where I said
> > The distinction as such is so clear that it's IMHO a useful tool to
> > describe conceptual conditions, but of course in ordinary language use
> > the meaning of words is often fuzzy, so that it can be hard to name
> > the criteria or to distinguish them from mere symptoms.
But at first the criteria are (as a definition) that what enforces the
truth of the associated assertions, even they can change depending on
context (or if the context is part of it, anyway). The criteria are
part of the rules of word usage, and therefore part of the meaning.
> As I say, it is a complicated matter of context. You seem to want a
> criterion to be a truth enforcer and I am saying things are not this
> simple. You can say that the criterion of whether the call is from an
> O/S call centre is a guy sitting in India dialling my number... But what
> use is that to me when I am in Australia and the only evidence for
> things is my phone ringing and a voice being there or not there etc?
You can never be sure, as long as you don't start some time consuming
research to find it out. That's the dire truth with your Indian
callers (maybe it's THE BORG, if he's really from India. Would explain
his English language skills). There are criteria, but you lack an easy
way to check their giveness.
> All sorts of things are evidence of consciousness, bunches of these
> things are criterial in that we learn the language of mental ascriptions
> via these things. But when we learn these ascriptions there is a
> structure, an understanding, an assumption behind the words. We do *not*
> mean as your simple behaviourism (that you tried to sell me in Robot
> Consciousness) would have it, that it is just a bunch of behaviour that
> is being referred to. What is being referred to is an underlying hidden
> condition in the mind. It is in fact a condition of the brain.
I told you again and again until hairs grew on my tongue (don't think,
that I mimic your indignation ;-) that I'm not helding, that we refer
to a "bunch of behavior" if we refer to facts of consciousness. We
refer to dispositions, what admittedly involves - you know, I've
changed my opinion concerning this point - that there are certain
structures, and what's indeed not the same as refering to sets of
behavioral events.
> I am not sure if language has changed in the way you think [concerning sicknesses].
> I think you
> are confused about this matter and you are not seeing that all along no
> one ever really meant that when you have a cold, you by magic sneeze
> away and hold your head and look miserable and the illness is a mere
> name for a bunch of possibly magical happenings. It is not like this
> (except perhaps in very primitive times?). Before we know what causes
> things, we still often make placeholders in language and in our thinking
> for scientific advances to fill in the details.
Names of illnesses were not names for a buch of "possibly magical
happenings", they were names for a bunch of happenings, which occured
usually together (the outside "symptoms"). It wasn't so long ago, when
people (not savages, but e.g. highly literate medieval monks) regarded
it as possible, that sickness is a direct godly punishment or a result
of demon influences. I don't think it makes sense to assume, that
those people used the word "plague" as a placeholder for a something
which would be explained later by science.
> I have given you case
> after case in Robot Consciousness of the way this works.
The golden, glory days of Robot Consciousness. As long as we have not
convinced each other from the ingenuity of our respective views, we
have to say it again in other words (because the ignorance of the
respective opponent must be a result of faulty understanding. We are
too gentlemanlike to assume malevolence).
> Here is your over simplified model of what people actually do on show
> again. No one has ever, in the real world, done this *defining* like
> this.
I've expressed this improperly. "By definition" meant just, that it
was part of the rules of word usage, not that those rules have been
introduced by some actual definitional act.
Walter Imlenz
walterimlenz
> One
> can be 120% sure that when your child falls off the bed and you hear the
> sickening thud of his poor little head hitting the floor and he begins
> to cry, that he is in pain.
Yes, of course, that's my opinion. But if you regard "state of pain"
as a kind of placeholder for "such and such state of the brain" you
cannot be so sure anymore. I think it's an absurd consequence of your
equation.
> You are mistaken to suppose that your certainty on this depends on some
> simple definitional equivalence between behaviour and the state of pain.
I've never said, the equivalence is "simple". Of course, in the case
of the child it would be because the child has not learned to simulate
pain. Usually those behavioral criteria are complicated and long term.
> Your behaviourism is thoroughly false and misguided
No. But your view is.
> You will end up by meaning behaviour for phrases like "is
> in pain" while the rest of the world, utterly rightly, means something
> quite different altogether.
A behavioral disposition is not behavior. If I say that the cup is
breakable, I don't say that it breaks or that it has broken.
> 1. X is in pain
> does *not* mean
> 2. X's brain is in such and such a state.
It doesn't matter, what you mean when you state (1). If a state of
pain /is/ a state of the brain and if the properties of this state are
known, you can validly conclude (2). from it. - Maybe you should
explain again, what your equation really means. Many great
philosophers have explained their views again and again.
> > In this case we know something like this: if X is in pain, his brain
> > is in state Y, characterized by the properties A,B,C,....
> I very much doubt that it would be as simple as this. You are just
> making stuff up because this is the science you are imagining for the
> future of brain research.
I think "state Y, characterized by the properties A,B,C,.." is a such
general and trivial formula that it encompasses every description of
brain-states, whatever complicated they might be.
Walter Imlenz
Zinnic
Congratulations Walter, your command of English and philosophy has
reduced Dorayme (alias Patricia) to waffling and arm waving.
I do not believe he is serious.He is playing a game with this NG.. He
avoids responding to valid points made by yourself and other posters
by brushing them off as errors in basic philosophy. This is
exemplified by the arrogance of hiis statement earlier in this thread
viz
"It is quite a task to have to take folk through quite complicated
understanding on usenet. But I will try soon".
IMO Dorayme invented Patricia as his alter ego and amuses himself by
writing posts under both pseudonyms.
Zinnic
posts under her name.
walterimlenz
> "It is quite a task to have to take folk through quite complicated
> understanding on usenet. But I will try soon".
That's not exactly fair. - Remarks like this are jokes, and his/her
play with both identities is ironic and well known and not a cheat. -
And under the rude crust there were some good arguments in the past,
so why not now.
But I'm glad that someone likes my English.
dorayme
<e68009a0-c59b-40ec...@d32g2000yqh.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
> On 9 Jul., 12:13, dorayme <doraymeRidT...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
> Just one thing (I will answer later more extended):
>
> >1. X is in pain
> >does *not* mean
> >2. X's brain is in such and such a state.
>
> ... If a state of pain /
> is/ a state of the brain and if the properties of this state are
> known, you can validly conclude 2. from it.
No one is disputing this. You are the one who has thought to base some
weak arguments against me on the basis of it (like it seems "absurd" to
you to suppose the mind could be sliced or weighed.)
--
dorayme
Patricia Aldoraz
> Congratulations Walter, your command of English and philosophy has
> reduced orayme to waffling and arm waving.
> I do not believe he is serious.He is playing a game with this NG.. He
> avoids responding to valid points made by yourself and other posters
> by brushing them off as errors in basic philosophy.
Show me anything that the good Walter, a gentleman and a scholar, has
said that dorayme has *not* answered, right there and then or at some
other point in the various relevant threads! You are an innocent soul
Zinnic, try to be a nice one and not an unpleasant one like those in
the basket-weaving class. There is still time.
dorayme
<bde18855-ee22-4e28...@j32g2000yqh.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
> I told you again and again until hairs grew on my tongue (don't think,
> that I mimic your indignation ;-) that I'm not helding, that we refer
> to a "bunch of behavior" if we refer to facts of consciousness. We
> refer to dispositions, what admittedly involves - you know, I've
> changed my opinion concerning this point - that there are certain
> structures, and what's indeed not the same as refering to sets of
> behavioral events.
>
If you agree we are referring to a disposition and you are not holding
to bare dispositions then you ought to be agreeing that it is the cause
of the symptoms that is being referred to when we judge someone to be
ill. And it needs to be a certain kind of cause for the symptoms, not
say, a determination in the mind to fake illness. Viruses and bacteria
and many kinds of things hidden in the body are excellent candidates for
the true referents.
An illness is called "illness X" and has a bunch of tests that *sort of*
define it, they are of the form, "some cause, we know or don't know much
about it, of such and such symptoms".
The symptoms are *very important handles* for the learning of the phrase
"illness X". This can make you think you are dealing in simple
definition. But it is not so simple. See below.
> > I think you
> > are confused about this matter and you are not seeing that all along no
> > one ever really meant that when you have a cold, you by magic sneeze
> > away and hold your head and look miserable and the illness is a mere
> > name for a bunch of possibly magical happenings. It is not like this
> > (except perhaps in very primitive times?). Before we know what causes
> > things, we still often make placeholders in language and in our thinking
> > for scientific advances to fill in the details.
>
> Names of illnesses were not names for a buch of "possibly magical
> happenings", they were names for a bunch of happenings, which occured
> usually together (the outside "symptoms"). It wasn't so long ago, when
> people (not savages, but e.g. highly literate medieval monks) regarded
> it as possible, that sickness is a direct godly punishment or a result
> of demon influences. I don't think it makes sense to assume, that
> those people used the word "plague" as a placeholder for a something
> which would be explained later by science.
>
I cannot speak for how people speak in great ignorance and stupidity. I
refuse to! It is not proper for a gentleman to do this! You and I are
gentlemen. It does not matter that I can descend into truly vile and
savage language and ungentlemanly conduct. These are mere unimportant
flaws in my character and are brought out by the severest of
provocations.
...
>
> > Here is your over simplified model of what people actually do on show
> > again. No one has ever, in the real world, done this *defining* like
> > this.
>
> I've expressed this improperly. "By definition" meant just, that it
> was part of the rules of word usage, not that those rules have been
> introduced by some actual definitional act.
Criteria sometimes have an intimate connection with the meaning of
words, sometimes it is more plausible to say they have more to do with
tests not intimately connected to meaning. There are a whole spectrum of
cases.
A boy can learn the phrase The Evening Star by hearing it said by his
parents in the presence of Venus. Venus comes up and shines brightly and
dad says to mum something about it.
The boy hears it and gets to understand the meaning pretty well.
Everyone, including the learner, knows a bit about the world and
astronomy but for some reason has never heard about The Morning Star. He
has heard about Venus but is ignorant and knows nothing about it except
that it is one of the planets. He knows what planets are, what stars are
and so on...
I am just setting the scene here for a case we can discuss to see how
criteria actually work, how they get going, what they entail and what
they do not entail.
Now, when Venus comes up the next night, our learner might say to his
dad: Is that The Morning Star? while pointing. Now, does he know the
meaning of the phrase if he is right? What if he is wrong? I would say
that in so far as names can have a meaning, he does. And, to be more
precise, he knows the meaning to the extent that he understands that it
is meant to refer to the planet that was pointed at last night, that
brightest thing. He is not sure if the bright thing he is seeing is the
same thing or something different.
Now as the nights roll on and his mum and dad, more knowledgeable, tell
him more and more how to get it right, are we to say the boy gets to
know the meaning of the phrase more, or does he simply get to know more
about the planet itself, the one being referred to?
I say there is no real best answer to this question. The criteria by
which he tells whether or not it is The Morning Star is not some fixed
definitional information that he acquires. It is simply not the case
that there is any contradiction in him asserting that something he sees
is it and him being simply wrong. He can simply be wrong because what he
actually sees, the thing out there, might not be what his parent and he
was seeing the night before.
Nor was his criteria something simple minded like a bright light in a
certain part of the sky at a certain time. It is simply not this. There
is a strong factual element in all this and it is about the identity of
the cause of him seeming to see a bright object.
I will say more on criteria as time goes on.
--
dorayme
dorayme
<909a3e0f-17fa-4825...@j32g2000yqh.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
> On 9 Jul., 12:13, dorayme <doraymeRidT...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
> > One
> > can be 120% sure that when your child falls off the bed and you hear the
> > sickening thud of his poor little head hitting the floor and he begins
> > to cry, that he is in pain.
>
> Yes, of course, that's my opinion. But if you regard "state of pain"
> as a kind of placeholder for "such and such state of the brain" you
> cannot be so sure anymore. I think it's an absurd consequence of your
> equation.
>
It is not some sort of conscious placeholder. A parent might say to
their daughter that "whoever pulled your hair today and made you cry at
school, tell the teacher about them and he will be punished" may have no
interest in knowing anything more about the boy concerned. They may not
be licking their lips to find out the identity (so they can strangle
him) but it is a fact that they are referring to a boy that they know
little about except that the sod pulled the hair of their angel. You are
the one shadow boxing here with such sophisticated sounding terms like
placeholder. The use of words throughout the language to refer to the
world has this characteristic of referring but it not necessarily being
pressing (urgent) about knowledge about the object - beyond very defined
limits. You are the one ready with the phrase "placeholder" that
conjures up unrealistic urgencies.
> > You are mistaken to suppose that your certainty on this depends on some
> > simple definitional equivalence between behaviour and the state of pain.
>
> I've never said, the equivalence is "simple". Of course, in the case
> of the child it would be because the child has not learned to simulate
> pain. Usually those behavioral criteria are complicated and long term.
>
...
It might be because the child has suddenly turned into a zombie, her
brain replaced by computers that are programmed to cause this behaviour!
You are forever shy of the causes and try, totally without success, to
somehow make do with the outward signs (as do all the old behaviourists
from 50 years back). Walter, I beg you to respect the importance of
causes more, respect the inner life, the mechanism inside. Time to come
on over into the light. I will never abandon you. I will lead you to
greater and greater truths. But you must have faith!
>
> > You will end up by meaning behaviour for phrases like "is
> > in pain" while the rest of the world, utterly rightly, means something
> > quite different altogether.
>
> A behavioral disposition is not behavior. If I say that the cup is
> breakable, I don't say that it breaks or that it has broken.
>
No, it is the mechanism behind the outward signs.
> > 1. X is in pain
> > does *not* mean
> > 2. X's brain is in such and such a state.
>
> It doesn't matter, what you mean when you state (1). If a state of
> pain /is/ a state of the brain and if the properties of this state are
> known, you can validly conclude (2). from it. - Maybe you should
> explain again, what your equation really means. Many great
> philosophers have explained their views again and again.
>
1 and 2 do not mean the same in the way that
3. Your husband is unfaithful to you
does not mean the same as
4. The guy with the red hat is unfaithful to his wife.
> > > In this case we know something like this: if X is in pain, his brain
> > > is in state Y, characterized by the properties A,B,C,....
>
> > I very much doubt that it would be as simple as this. You are just
> > making stuff up because this is the science you are imagining for the
> > future of brain research.
>
> I think "state Y, characterized by the properties A,B,C,.." is a such
> general and trivial formula that it encompasses every description of
> brain-states, whatever complicated they might be.
>
And there lies its uninformativeness. None of us has any idea how future
theory about how the mind works will turn out. The details actually
matter! It might need a background theory, the shape of which none of us
can predict now, to understand what the hell the A, B and Cs are here.
The very terms that might develop are simply not known and when they
are, they will likely need a whole different background to the
background we have at the moment on brains, silly thing now like
neurones firing, stimulus response, serotonin... it is just alchemy at
the moment, I like your analogy more and more as the days go by!
--
dorayme
Zinnic
So you knew that Dora posts under two identities? He certainly fooled
me. Perhaps, as Patricia claims, I am slow on the uptake. However,
try to understand my angst when I realized Patricia was inot real. I
will never forgive Dora for his subterfuge.
I so wanted to win her away from him and ask her to marry me. Her
posts indicated that she had the attributes of a doormat that I have
long sought in a docile and adoring wife.
Ah well! Cest la vie!
Zinnic
walterimlenz
> If you agree we are referring to a disposition and you are not holding
> to bare dispositions then you ought to be agreeing that it is the cause
> of the symptoms that is being referred to when we judge someone to be
> ill.
Sorry, but I don't know the connection. I have talked about
consciousness and not about sicknesses. And I would say, that it's
merely currently the cause of the symptoms, that is being referred to
when we impute illnesses. It is the result of the mentioned language
change, induced by scientific progress. In the past a sickness was
nothing more than a certain recognizable pattern of visible symptoms.
--------------------------------
> It does not matter that I can descend into truly vile and
> savage language and ungentlemanly conduct.
As long as I don't live in your neighborhood ...
--------------------------------
The following remarks are somehow provisional, on the one side,
because proper names are a difficult issue, and I have to admit, that
I'm rather illiterate concerning the actual philosophical discussion
about it. On the other side, I don't know exactly what you're heading
for - I wait for the promised sequel.
> Now, when Venus comes up the next night, our learner might say to his
> dad: Is that The Morning Star? while pointing. Now, does he know the
> meaning of the phrase if he is right? What if he is wrong? I would say
> that in so far as names can have a meaning, he does.
I don't agree. He does not know the meaning, because he does not know
that there is a particular planet, which is associated with it (if I
have read you correctly). And that means, that he will use the word
wrongly under certain circumstances. - Assumed, that the Venus has
disappeared in the following night because of some cosmic cataclysm,
the boy will probably think, that the brightest star that he can see
is the Morning Star, while his parents will say: "No, the Morning Star
is not the brightest star. It's Venus, and Venus doesn't exist
anymore."
Assumed, that I meet Stevie Wonder on some charity ball and say
"Hello, Mr. Obama", because I think that the president looks like SW,
this happening is not a hint, that I don't know the meaning of
"Obama" (I assume, that nobody would say in such a case: "You don't
know the meaning of "President Obama", because you think, that he
looks like an old man with dark glasses." All one could say is "You
don't know how President Obama looks."). - Therefore I would say
something like this: I know the meaning of a proper name, if I know
the category of things, to which the referent belongs. And so it is
right, to state that the meaning of "Morning Star" has changed, since
it is a name of a particular planet now, which it wasn't before.
> Now as the nights roll on and his mum and dad, more knowledgeable, tell
> him more and more how to get it right, are we to say the boy gets to
> know the meaning of the phrase more, or does he simply get to know more
> about the planet itself, the one being referred to?
In accordance with the latter, I think, if the boy knows that the name
refers to a particular planet, he knows all about the /meaning/ of it.
The rest would be knowledge concerning the referent. The criteria for
the identification of the referent of a proper name are not part of
the meaning of the proper name (maybe the criteria for the
identification of the category are part of the meaning. You can't know
the meaning of "President Obama" if you don't know human beings.)
Walter Imlenz
dorayme
<bc7654c2-829b-4b4f...@k1g2000yqf.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
> On 10 Jul., 11:13, dorayme <doraymeRidT...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
> > If you agree we are referring to a disposition and you are not holding
> > to bare dispositions then you ought to be agreeing that it is the cause
> > of the symptoms that is being referred to when we judge someone to be
> > ill.
>
> ...In the past a sickness was
> nothing more than a certain recognizable pattern of visible symptoms.
>
In the past, people were not so stupid as you think. They did not think
that a sneeze itself was a sickness. It was a sign of a sickness. It
heralded for moderately intelligent people that there would be other
symptoms and so on. Anyway, forget about the past, it is difficult doing
this armchair history, consider today. When we see people exhibit
various visible traits, we think they are doing so because of some
condition we cannot see. It is the same for mental conditions and
behaviour.
>
> The following remarks are somehow provisional, on the one side,
> because proper names are a difficult issue, and I have to admit, that
> I'm rather illiterate concerning the actual philosophical discussion
> about it. On the other side, I don't know exactly what you're heading
> for - I wait for the promised sequel.
>
> > Now, when Venus comes up the next night, our learner might say to his
> > dad: Is that The Morning Star? while pointing. Now, does he know the
> > meaning of the phrase if he is right? What if he is wrong? I would say
> > that in so far as names can have a meaning, he does.
>
> I don't agree. He does not know the meaning, because he does not know
> that there is a particular planet,
Yes, you misunderstand almost completely... He does there there is a
particular planet.
--
dorayme
dorayme
dorayme <dorayme...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> He does there there is a
> particular planet.
He does know there is...
--
dorayme
walterimlenz
> In the past, people were not so stupid as you think. They did not think
> that a sneeze itself was a sickness.
One little hint: it is perfectly right, to say that microbes are the
cause of certain sicknesses. A cause cannot be identical with its
effect, so at least in this use "sickness" is associated merely with
the symptoms. It's the original use.
Walter Imlenz
dorayme
<2e82cce9-d441-4cb0...@o7g2000yqb.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
?
--
dorayme
walterimlenz
> In article
> <2e82cce9-d441-4cb0-8ad8-36119b014...@o7g2000yqb.googlegroups.com>,
you said not so long ago:
> If you agree we are referring to a disposition and you are not holding
> to bare dispositions then you ought to be agreeing that it is the cause
> of the symptoms that is being referred to when we judge someone to be
> ill.
Walter Imlenz
walterimlenz
> ...
I refer to the brain, insofar as the disposition for pain behavior is
a property of the brain. But that's all. When I say "He's in pain" I
say that something inside of him is in the state that produces a
certain kind of behavior. (That's somehow crooked. Consciously I don't
"say" anything like this when I say "He's in pain". But the usage of
"He's in pain" proceeds, "as if" this were the case.) - And this
presupposed, I could say "He's in pain" ("it is in pain") in the case
of aliens or robots as well. (However, when I, myself, say that I'm in
pain I don't refer to anything. I just produce the kind of behavior
that is associated with the pain disposition. I fulfill the
disposition, I don't state it.)
If the identification exceeds this - if a "state of pain" is not
merely the mentioned dispositional state, but some otherwise
characterized state of the brain -, the imputation of pain becomes
impossible in the case of beings or entities, who ain't got a brain
that's comparable to the human brain.
Of course, if a "state of pain" is the dispositional property of some
kind of behavior-producing engine, and if this engine in a particular
case is a human brain, then it's true to say "the state of pain is a
state of the brain", but the truth is limited to this particular case.
- My problem was, that you've stated the equation in a way which makes
it look like a general fact.
Walter Imlenz
dorayme
<5eedd1af-c7d7-4aa9...@d23g2000vbm.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
> On 11 Jul., 13:42, dorayme <doraymeRidT...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> > In article
> > <2e82cce9-d441-4cb0-8ad8-36119b014...@o7g2000yqb.googlegroups.com>,
> >
> > walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
> > > On 11 Jul., 03:04, dorayme <doraymeRidT...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> >
> > > > In the past, people were not so stupid as you think. They did not think
> > > > that a sneeze itself was a sickness.
> >
> > > One little hint: it is perfectly right, to say that microbes are the
> > > cause of certain sicknesses. A cause cannot be identical with its
> > > effect, so at least in this use "sickness" is associated merely with
> > > the symptoms. It's the original use.
> >
> > ?
> >
> > --
> > dorayme
>
> you said not so long ago:
>
> > If you agree we are referring to a disposition and you are not holding
> > to bare dispositions then you ought to be agreeing that it is the cause
> > of the symptoms that is being referred to when we judge someone to be
> > ill.
>
I am still lost on what your point is. Illnesses are things that are
wrong with animals and plants. There is no big mystery outside of
scientific questions on this, at least not in the main. Minds are things
that process information and contain memories and control many bodily
things. The main mysteries are scientific ones, not philosophical ones.
Attempts to portray illnesses or mental events as somehow exhausted by
outer signs or behavioural events is highly unconvincing and it does not
really matter if some people sometime or somewhere ever meant by their
words to indicate such a false idea when understood as we today
understand things.
--
dorayme
dorayme
<aabf72d6-af21-4546...@p23g2000vbl.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
> On 10 Jul., 11:44, dorayme <doraymeRidT...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
> > ...
>
> I refer to the brain, insofar as the disposition for pain behavior is
> a property of the brain. But that's all. When I say "He's in pain" I
> say that something inside of him is in the state that produces a
> certain kind of behavior. (That's somehow crooked. Consciously I don't
> "say" anything like this when I say "He's in pain". But the usage of
> "He's in pain" proceeds, "as if" this were the case.) - And this
> presupposed, I could say "He's in pain" ("it is in pain") in the case
> of aliens or robots as well. (However, when I, myself, say that I'm in
> pain I don't refer to anything. I just produce the kind of behavior
> that is associated with the pain disposition. I fulfill the
> disposition, I don't state it.)
>
> If the identification exceeds this - if a "state of pain" is not
> merely the mentioned dispositional state, but some otherwise
> characterized state of the brain -, the imputation of pain becomes
> impossible in the case of beings or entities, who ain't got a brain
> that's comparable to the human brain.
>
I keep on explaining exactly what is wrong with this argument and you
keep not understanding it? It all comes from that you seem unable to
really understand the idea that A and B can be identical as a matter of
fact but not as a matter of necessity. There seems little point in
giving you any further cases until I get some feedback on what quite you
do not understand about this relatively simple idea? You can tell me
Walter, I will always try to help. But you must talk and not be so
reticent.
> Of course, if a "state of pain" is the dispositional property of some
> kind of behavior-producing engine, and if this engine in a particular
> case is a human brain, then it's true to say "the state of pain is a
> state of the brain", but the truth is limited to this particular case.
> - My problem was, that you've stated the equation in a way which makes
> it look like a general fact.
>
That is because, once again, you cannot understand or believe that some
identities are asserted as a matter of fact in particular classes of
cases. Is it not good enough for you that animals and mortal men's minds
are their brains, that their mental states are the states of their
bodies and their brains in particular and most importantly? Is it
nothing to you that scientists can at least get you pesky philosophers
off their backs for animals and humans and simply get on exploring their
minds with a terrific working assumptions that minds are brains here.
Without being troubled by unlikely dualist assumptions, or absurdly
unlikely behaviouristic analyses, or obscurantist third way theories
about dispositions, funny subjective how do you feel or intractable
quadruple aspects?
You expect a lot from me Walter! You expect me to support a theory about
*all* minds? The mind of God too! Don't you feel a bit of compassion
towards me by now? I am almost human you know. I have no real idea about
what the mind of God is (it is almost certainly not a brain!). I have no
theories about this. Nor about the mental lives of stones, goblins or my
own lovely backside.
--
dorayme
walterimlenz
> You expect a lot from me Walter! You expect me to support a theory about
> *all* minds?
A theory about consciousness, and of course that means a theory about
all consciousnesses, including those of animals, robots and aliens.
> That is because, once again, you cannot understand or believe that some
> identities are asserted as a matter of fact in particular classes of
> cases.
I think, I have said exactly this, when holding
>> Of course, if a "state of pain" is the dispositional property of some
>> kind of behavior-producing engine, and if this engine in a particular
>> case is a human brain, then it's true to say "the state of pain is a
>> state of the brain"
So, of course, you can indeed say that a state of pain is a state of
the brain in the case of humans.
Sorry, but this posting of yours really looks a little bit like
"waffling and arm waving" to me.
Walter Imlenz
dorayme
<a856fb25-ffb4-4c4e...@j19g2000vbp.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
> On 12 Jul., 11:40, dorayme <doraymeRidT...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
> > You expect a lot from me Walter! You expect me to support a theory about
> > *all* minds?
>
> A theory about consciousness, and of course that means a theory about
> all consciousnesses, including those of animals, robots and aliens.
And aliens too eh? There are no aliens we know. But you want sgroups of
folk in armschairs to provide for these too. And gods too? It is simply
mind boggling to me how naive this is, I have no idea how to take it
seriously?
And a theory of illness, I suppose, is *really* about the illness of all
life in the universe and outside it? Sounds like a pretentious idea of
philosophy! Me, I will be modestly happy if I could pop back in a few
hundred years and find out what scientists have discovered about human
consciousness.
--
dorayme
walterimlenz
> And a theory of illness, I suppose, is *really* about the illness of all
> life in the universe and outside it?
Insofar as it is a philosophical theory, yes.
dorayme
<9a877f18-c319-41d5...@r36g2000vbn.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
Much of philosophy consists in generalising over many things. It does
not follow that all philosophy must generalise about everything at all
times and in every respect.
1. The human mind is the human brain.
Is this is a philosophical theory? Or simply a very likely true
assumption that we all can adopt, especially scientists. I favour the
latter because I am not quite sure what a philosophical theory is.
I would say it is a job for a philosopher to point out the bad arguments
that other philosophers use to try to show that mental states cannot be
brain states.
But as for the identity theory being a philosophical one, I would not
say this. No more than I would say that the theory of evolution was a
philosophical theory. But it does rather fall to the philosopher to ward
off attacks by various thinkers and theologians who might argue on non
scientific grounds against the very idea - who else could do the job.
Scientists are not that good at combating the sly manipulations of
theologians and philosophers.
Or are you just wanting to reach into the unknown and demand that if
somehow a human mind is a human brain and an alien mind is something
else, what is it that is common to the alien mind and the human mind?
What is common is the interesting philosphical thing, you might be
thinking!
OK. Why don't you tell me a whole lot more about this alien please. Need
a bit of time while you find one? Or is it good enough for you to think
one up in your armchair? How long will it take you?
You need to excuse *me for a few more decades or possibly centuries*
while I wait to tell you about the human brain.
When we have all this information together around our little table here,
I will happily oblige you about the commonalities and you can then sigh
with relief that after all we are being philosophical!
Oh... you are not happy with my plan? You want everything to be done in
advance of any knowledge about the actual world we live in? Dream on
then!
I do not share your idea about philosophy, Walter! I find it naively
blasé about how important the actual world in its glorious complexity is
to any philosophical thinking worth engaging in. You may think some of
my remarks unworthy but they are all part and parcel of the usual ebbs
and flows of usenet frustrations.
I am still thinking how to explain criteria, naming and meaning to you
and Giga in a better way than I already have. I have not given up on it.
My difficulty is that I need to take you through some background and
want to keep it to a minimum.
--
dorayme
Zinnic
Walter, be careful what you say! Else Dora will 'sic' Patricia onto
you!
Patricia Aldoraz
> Walter, be careful what you say! Else Dora will 'sic' Patricia onto
> you!
How about doing a bit of good old philosophy and stopping your
trolling about with non-philosophical issues? Too hard for you? Spoil
your fun too much? Get a grip on yourself Zinnic, er... no... I didn't
mean that... the very opposite in fact.
dorayme
<5cdadcaa-8ef7-4fec...@x6g2000prc.googlegroups.com>,
Patricia Aldoraz <patricia...@gmail.com> wrote:
Now, now Patricia... no need to be crude...
--
dorayme
walterimlenz
> 1. The human mind is the human brain.
> Is this is a philosophical theory? Or simply a very likely true
> assumption that we all can adopt, especially scientists. I favour the
> latter because I am not quite sure what a philosophical theory is.
I avoid the "mind"/"brain" issue, because I feel not sure enough about
the usage of the English word "mind". The usual German equivalent
"Geist" is more obviously not identifiable with the brain.
> I would say it is a job for a philosopher to point out the bad arguments
> that other philosophers use to try to show that mental states cannot be
> brain states.
As I've said - it's not the bad arguments of philosophers of
profession, but the arguments which arise in everybody who thinks
about the matter. There are "natural philosophies".
> I do not share your idea about philosophy, Walter! I find it naively
> blasé about how important the actual world in its glorious complexity is
> to any philosophical thinking worth engaging in. You may think some of
> my remarks unworthy but they are all part and parcel of the usual ebbs
> and flows of usenet frustrations.
Concerning the answering of conceptual questions, the importance of
the "actual world in its glorious complexity" is limited. - And please
don't forget epistemology and ethics. There are more philosophical
issues than consciousness.
Walter Imlenz
walterimlenz
> who else could do the job.
> Scientists are not that good at combating the sly manipulations of
> theologians and philosophers.
This reminds me of my old PC/XT. The only program which convinced me
totally of its values was something called "PC Tools". I used it to
solve the problems caused by the crashes of all those other programs.
Zinnic
wrote:
. Hi Dora! You want philosophy? OK!
How about you discuss concisely in no less tha 20,000 words, each
word to contain more than 10 letters, the question:-
Who is the puppet master when the puppet is pulling its own strings?
Zinnic
Patricia Aldoraz
> On Jul 12, 10:17 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> > On Jul 12, 10:29 pm, Zinnic <zeenr...@gate.net> wrote:
>
> > > Walter, be careful what you say! Else Dora will 'sic' Patricia onto
> > > you!
>
> > How about doing a bit of good old philosophy and stopping your
> > trolling about with non-philosophical issues? Too hard for you? Spoil
> > your fun too much? Get a grip on yourself Zinnic, er... no... I didn't
> > mean that... the very opposite in fact.
>
> word to contain more than 10 letters, the question:-
> Who is the puppet master when the puppet is pulling its own strings?
And the relevance of this to the subject is? Get a grip Zinnic, you
are obsessed with trivialities instead of all the actual and
interesting philosophical questions you could be engaged in. Never too
late to start old son... <g>
LudovicoVan
> On 7 Jul., 09:24, Errol <vs.er...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Behaviour is a week criteria for consciousness,
>
> What, do you think, is a "strong criterion" for consciousness? What we
> can "see" through introspection?
FWIW, a while ago I've had a sort of mystical experience, a regression
actually: I was back to matter, a rock, and I could feel that most
basic emotion which is already present in matter, i.e. *fear*, the
fear to be "broke apart". My personal interpretation after that
experience is that consciousness is present in the whole of cosmos,
though at different degrees, because it is intrinsic to *form* rather
than matter.
BTW, I too agree behaviour is a very bad criterion for consciousness,
actually belonging to social control strategies, but this is another
matter. To me, a strong criterion to understand consciousness is
indeed introspection and that relation to our inner self connected to
the rest of cosmos that our modern civilisations have managed to lose
in their denial of life and intelligence.
-LV
walterimlenz
In some respect, you can't discuss mystical experience of another
person. He can always say "But I have experienced it this way. It was
so overwhelming, that no doubt is possible. If you stood in my shoes,
you would know what I'm talking about." - But that doesn't mean that
you have to believe in those mystical insights, as long as there are
no other, supporting reasons.
> BTW, I too agree behaviour is a very bad criterion for consciousness
Good or bad, it's the essential criterion. Sensefully, "good" and
"bad" can be applied, if there is another benchmark, which I deny.
LudovicoVan
> On 13 Jul., 18:01, LudovicoVan <ju...@diegidio.name> wrote:
> > On 7 July, 10:11, walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
> > > On 7 Jul., 09:24, Errol <vs.er...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > Behaviour is a week criteria for consciousness,
>
> > > What, do you think, is a "strong criterion" for consciousness? What we
> > > can "see" through introspection?
>
> > FWIW, a while ago I've had a sort of mystical experience, a regression
> > actually: I was back to matter, a rock, and I could feel that most
> > basic emotion which is already present in matter, i.e. *fear*, the
> > fear to be "broke apart". My personal interpretation after that
> > experience is that consciousness is present in the whole of cosmos,
> > though at different degrees, because it is intrinsic to *form* rather
> > than matter.
>
> > BTW, I too agree behaviour is a very bad criterion for consciousness,
> > actually belonging to social control strategies, but this is another
> > matter. To me, a strong criterion to understand consciousness is
> > indeed introspection and that relation to our inner self connected to
> > the rest of cosmos that our modern civilisations have managed to lose
> > in their denial of life and intelligence.
>
>
> In some respect, you can't discuss mystical experience of another
> person. He can always say "But I have experienced it this way. It was
> so overwhelming, that no doubt is possible. If you stood in my shoes,
> you would know what I'm talking about." - But that doesn't mean that
> you have to believe in those mystical insights, as long as there are
> no other, supporting reasons.
Ah, the mythical "reason", opium of all "civilised" countries. You
can't discuss it as long as you are deeply ignorant of it: unexercised
senses get atrophic.
> > BTW, I too agree behaviour is a very bad criterion for consciousness
>
> Good or bad, it's the essential criterion. Sensefully, "good" and
> "bad" can be applied, if there is another benchmark, which I deny.
Then stand up to the fascist reductionism in that denial.
-LV
LudovicoVan
Moreover, if that's your attitude, you should maybe be doing science,
surely not philosophy... Introspection is always been a basic
instrument for the philosophical investigation: such stigmatisation of
the "intangible" is, again, just another aspect of the etero-denial
that is typical of our modern, technocratic societies.
-LV
walterimlenz
> Moreover, if that's your attitude, you should maybe be doing science,
> surely not philosophy... Introspection is always been a basic
> instrument for the philosophical investigation: such stigmatisation of
> the "intangible" is, again, just another aspect of the etero-denial
> that is typical of our modern, technocratic societies.
>
It was a basic instrument but it has become apparent, that everybody
could "prove" everything by means of introspection. So it has
generally lost the most of its prestige, with good reason.
Another issue is, that introspection can't prove that there "is"
something, when I'm e.g. in pain. Because it is not - as the word
suggests - a kind of "seeing". Considerations like this rely entirely
on conceptual reasons and have nothing to do with natural science. To
deny the existence of qualia is a solely philosophical approach. -
You're simply not up to date.
Walter Imlenz
LudovicoVan
> On 13 Jul., 20:29, LudovicoVan <ju...@diegidio.name> wrote:
>
> > Moreover, if that's your attitude, you should maybe be doing science,
> > surely not philosophy... Introspection is always been a basic
> > instrument for the philosophical investigation: such stigmatisation of
> > the "intangible" is, again, just another aspect of the etero-denial
> > that is typical of our modern, technocratic societies.
>
> It was a basic instrument but it has become apparent, that everybody
> could "prove" everything by means of introspection. So it has
> generally lost the most of its prestige, with good reason.
Hmm, where did you get that, from the Readers Digest? You just don't
know what you are talking about.
> Another issue is, that introspection can't prove that there "is"
> something, when I'm e.g. in pain. Because it is not - as the word
> suggests - a kind of "seeing". Considerations like this rely entirely
> on conceptual reasons and have nothing to do with natural science.
Wrong, at many levels, starting from the fact that introspection *is*
a kind of seeing, as indeed the word suggests, and that it *is* a
"natural science", properly speaking.
> To
> deny the existence of qualia is a solely philosophical approach. -
> You're simply not up to date.
It's rather you who can't distinguish philosophy from the word salad
that is on sell.
You are not even that "rational". It was you asking:
> What we can "see" through introspection?
-LV
walterimlenz
> ...
It's no shame to be entirely illiterate concerning the philosophy of
the last one hundred years. No reason to feel humiliated or to go on
the rampage.
LudovicoVan
Yet another moron.
Have a nice day,
-LV
walterimlenz
> Yet another moron.
Must be hard to gain this self knowledge. Have you used introspection?
dorayme
<3ce52e78-f89d-46ea...@f20g2000prn.googlegroups.com>,
Patricia Aldoraz <patricia...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Jul 9, 4:49 pm, Errol <vs.er...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > On Jul 9, 2:51 am, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...@gmail.com>
> > wrote:
...
> >
> > > Behaviour is a generally reliable criterion of consciousness. In fact,
> > > it is all we have *for the most part* when judging others. See what
> > > dorayme has said in both Robot consciousness and Stone consciousness
> > > on the notion of criteria. Criteria are not definitions or synonyms,
> > > they are more complex and looser than these.- Hide quoted text -
> >
> > > - Show quoted text -
> >
> > Could you exract the important bits and repost them?
>
> In this thread I would say that post number 25 and 40 were the most
> relevant ones. As for the other thread. that is a more daunting task!
There are a number of ways people learn the meaning of words and
phrases. Sometimes it is by understanding synonyms or synonym-like
substitutes. Naturally this goes on a lot in learning 'other' languages
but it also happens a fair bit in a single language.
People who are very impressed by this model of meaning are liable to
suppose that "Venus" means "a bright object at 6pm in the western sky"
and such phrases. They think that as people adapt to the changing
knowledge of the world they change the meaning of the words they use.
Thus, a child who learns about Venus in the evening, will get a richer
or a different meaning to the word when they realise it is used to refer
to a star in the morning too and begin absorbing the synonym about
morning bright lights.
There is enough truth in all this to sustain a black and white view of
the process. But it is seriously misleading and leaves out a rather
crucially different way of learning meanings.
This different way or aspect of meaning is about the confrontation of
words and phrases with the non-linguistic world. The picture of the
person who learns that Venus is "the bright light in the sky in the
evening" is quite a false one. In this case, it would be likely that
what is being learned is that there is an astronomical object, a planet
even, that has this name. The presence of the object is crucial. It is
observed and a phrase might be used to signify that very thing (not some
thing merely like it). Yes, there are some phrases, like "waxes and
wanes" that might be used to signify that all things like it are
appropriate objects to use the phrase for. But the key point here is
that it is what actually happens, there and then that is a crucial scene
setter for subsequent correct use.
To learn meanings often requires a sea of background knowledge. A person
might have an idea about what planets are but not which are which or
where they quite are or when they come up. Learning from actual
conversation and pointing is learning in the presence of the actual
object that is being referred to. Here, curiously, considering how I
have been stressing the importance of the distinction between meaning
and reference is a process where meaning rather depends on reference! It
comes about because words, in order to be useful in dealing with the
world, need to be anchored in the world. It is mostly not a nice clean
synonym exchanging affair. It involves real objects and causal relations
between those objects and the words themselves.
Now, when trying to understand how criteria (which are obviously *often*
connected to meaning) work, it is important to understand the actual
interactions that go on in language acquisition. In my example in a
recent post in this thread, the boy learning the phrase "The Evening
Star" was not learning mere synonymns. The learning involved being in a
certain causal relation to an object in the real world (as opposed to
something in the mind or whatever).
It is because of this actual physical causal process between the object,
the father who sees it and mentions the phrase and the boy who hears it,
that certain relations are set up which make it *hard* to later say such
skeptical things like that Venus never really existed. I say "hard". I
do not say impossible. The very act of a successful naming guarantees
the existence for the most trivial of built in reason. In the same way,
once a phrase is used to name a new mental event, one cannot easily turn
around and say that it is possible that there never was any such thing
as this event. One can deny that it happens again. But there are limits
to how skeptical you can be. There would be no limit at all if there was
not this grounding to the world in the learning.
In the case of mental events, we all know that we are referring to
largely internal and hidden conditions and processes. Some behaviourists
try hard to question this, but we all know pretty well that there are
mental processes and that they do not consist in any set of behaviours.
However we learn about many mental conditions, even ones that we do not
ourselves have, by means of behaviour. Typically a student doc is
introduced to a case by something like "Here is a man suffering X and
now see what he says and does..." The idea that is obtained here is that
there is an inner process or condition that causes this outward
behaviour.
Now here is set up a meaning connection between the words for the
condition and the behaviour. You cannot turn around and then say,
condition X has never ever and might never ever with anyone cause such
and such behaviour. You are now removing the the very foundation that
enabled you to identify the condition in the first place.
I am not saying there is no room for skepticism. I am saying there are
limits to it.
--
dorayme
Errol
>
> Good or bad, it's the essential criterion. Sensefully, "good" and
> "bad" can be applied, if there is another benchmark, which I deny.- Hide quoted text -
>
What about the criteria I listed in an earlier post. These are
scientifically accepted criteria, unlike the catch all of behaviour
which can be mimicked by computers