Framework for Ethical Decision Making & Justification of Ethical Standards
Immortalist
Feelings provide important
information for our ethical
choices.
Ethics is not religion.
Many people are not religious,
but ethics applies to everyone.
Ethics is not following the law.
A good system of law does incorporate
many ethical standards, but law can
deviate from what is ethical.
Ethics is not following culturally
accepted norms. Some cultures are
quite ethical, but others become
corrupt -or blind to certain
ethical concerns.
Ethics is not science. Social and natural
science can provide important data to
help us make better ethical choices.
----------------------------------------------------
Why Identifying Ethical Standards is Hard
----------------------------------------------------
There are two fundamental problems in identifying the ethical standards
we are to follow:
1. On what do we base our ethical
standards?
2. How do those standards get applied
to specific situations we face?
If our ethics are not based on feelings, religion, law, accepted social
practice, or science, what are they based on? Many philosophers and
ethicists have helped us answer this critical question. They have
suggested at least five different sources of ethical standards we
should use.
-------------------------------------------
Five Sources of Ethical Standards
-------------------------------------------
1. The Utilitarian Approach: the ethical action is the one that
provides the most good or does the least harm, or, to put it another
way, produces the greatest balance of good over harm.
2. The Rights Approach: the ethical action is the one that best
protects and respects the moral rights of those affected.
3. The Fairness or Justice Approach: all equals should be treated
equally ...ethical actions treat all human beings equally-or if
unequally, then fairly based on some standard that is defensible.
4. The Common Good Approach: life in community is a good in itself and
our actions should contribute to that life ...the interlocking
relationships of society are the basis of ethical reasoning and that
respect and compassion for all others-especially the vulnerable-are
requirements of such reasoning.
5. The Virtue Approach: ethical actions ought to be consistent with
certain ideal virtues that provide for the full development of our
humanity. These virtues are dispositions and habits that enable us to
act according to the highest potential of our character and on behalf
of values like truth and beauty. Honesty, courage, compassion,
generosity, tolerance, love, fidelity, integrity, fairness,
self-control, and prudence are all examples of virtues.
-------------------------------------------
Putting the Approaches Together
-------------------------------------------
Each of the approaches helps us determine what standards of behavior
can be considered ethical. There are still problems to be solved,
however.
The first problem is that we may not agree on the content of some of
these specific approaches. We may not all agree to the same set of
human and civil rights.
We may not agree on what constitutes the common good. We may not even
agree on what is a good and what is a harm.
The second problem is that the different approaches may not all answer
the question "What is ethical?" in the same way. Nonetheless, each
approach gives us important information with which to determine what is
ethical in a particular circumstance. And much more often than not, the
different approaches do lead to similar answers.
----------------------------------------------------
A Framework for Ethical Decision Making
----------------------------------------------------
Recognize an Ethical Issue
1. Is there something wrong personally, interpersonally, or socially?
Could the conflict, the situation, or the decision be damaging to
people or to the community?
2. Does the issue go beyond legal or institutional concerns? What does
it do to people, who have dignity, rights, and hopes for a better life
together?
Get the Facts
3. What are the relevant facts of the case? What facts are unknown?
4. What individuals and groups have an important stake in the outcome?
Do some have a greater stake because they have a special need or
because we have special obligations to them?
5. What are the options for acting? Have all the relevant persons and
groups been consulted? If you showed your list of options to someone
you respect, what would that person say?
-------------------------------------------------
Evaluate Alternative Actions From
Various Ethical Perspectives
-------------------------------------------------
6. Which option will produce the most good and do the least harm?
Utilitarian Approach: The ethical action is the one that will produce
the greatest balance of benefits over harms.
7. Even if not everyone gets all they want, will everyone's rights and
dignity still be respected?
Rights Approach: The ethical action is the one that most dutifully
respects the rights of all affected.
8. Which option is fair to all stakeholders?
Fairness or Justice Approach: The ethical action is the one that treats
people equally, or if unequally, that treats people proportionately and
fairly.
9. Which option would help all participate more fully in the life we
share as a family, community, society?
Common Good Approach: The ethical action is the one that contributes
most to the achievement of a quality common life together.
10. Would you want to become the sort of person who acts this way
(e.g., a person of courage or compassion)?
Virtue Approach: The ethical action is the one that embodies the habits
and values of humans at their best.
----------------------------------------
Make a Decision and Test It
----------------------------------------
11. Considering all these perspectives, which of the options is the
right or best thing to do?
12. If you told someone you respect why you chose this option, what
would that person say? If you had to explain your decision on
television, would you be comfortable doing so?
Act, Then Reflect on the Decision Later
13. Implement your decision. How did it turn out for all concerned? If
you had it to do over again, what would you do differently?
http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/decision/framework.html
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Chapter 6 - The Problem of Justifying an Ethical Standard
- - - http://www.ditext.com/cornman/corn6.html - - -
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
A) Evaluating Actions versus Evaluating People
B) Method of Critically Evaluating Ethical Theories
C) Theological Ethics
1) Objection: We Must Justify Religious
Claims by Ethical Claims
D) Ethical Relativism
1) Action Relativism versus
Standard Relativism
2) Definition of Ethical Relativism
3) The Argument from Differing
Ethical Judgments
4) The Argument from Different
Ethical Standards
5) Ethical Relativism Defended:
A Modified Argument
E) Ethical Nihilism
1) The Argument from Different
Ethical Standards
2) The Argument from the Lack
of Justification
F) The "No-Standard" Theory
1) The Argument from Exceptions
2) Objection to the No-Standard Theory:
Not Every Ethical Standard
Has Exceptions
3) A Second Objection to the No-Standard
Theory: Nonmoral Agreement but
Moral Disagreement
G) Ethical Skepticism
H) Ethical Egoism
I) Egoistic Hedonism
1) The Argument from
Psychological Egoism
2) Objection to Psychological Egoism:
People Sometimes Act Benevolently
3) Reply: People Always Act Out
of Self-Love
4) Final Objection: People Do Not
Always Act Out of Self-Love
5) The Argument from Good Reasons
6) Objection: Desiring To Do Something
Does Not Justify Doing It
7) Rejection of Egoistic Hedonism:
It Prescribes Morally Repugnant Acts
J) Nonhedonistic Ethical Egoism
1) Objection to Ethical Egoism: It
Prescribes Morally Repugnant Acts
K) Conclusion About Ethical Egoism:
It Should Be Rejected
L) Utilitarianism: Bentham's Version
1) The Principle of Utility
2) Arguments for the Principle of Utility
3) Direct Proofs for the Principle of
Utility: Deriving 'Ought' from 'Is'
- Hume's Objection: No 'Ought'
Is Deducible from 'Is'
- A Further Objection: Naturalistic
(Definist) Fallacy
4) Bentham's Indirect Proof of
the Principle of Utility
- Objection to Bentham's Proof: It
Does Not Disprove All Opposing Views
- The Hedonic Calculus
- An Objection to Bentham's
Principle: Sadistic Pleasures
M) Utilitarianism: Mill's Version
1) Quality versus Quantity of Pleasure
N) An Objection to Utilitarianism:
Special Duties
O) Another Objection to Utilitarianism:
The Problem of Justice
P) Deontological Ethics: Kant's Theory
1) The Highest Good: A Good Will
2) The Moral Law and the
Categorical Imperative
3) The First Formulation of
the Categorical Imperative
- Objection to First Formulation:
Which Maxims to Universalize?
- Another Objection: Cannot
Derive Specific Duties
4) The Second Formulation of
the Categorical Imperative
- An Objection to Kant's Theory:
It Is Not Applicable in All Situations
- A Second Objection: Absolute
versus Prima Facie Duties
- A Third Objection: Kant's Theory
Cannot Resolve Conflicts of Duty
Q) Rule Utilitarianism
1) Acts, Laws, Judges, and Legislators
R) Six Requirements for a Satisfactory
Ethical Standard and an Examination
of Rule Utilitarianism
1) Objection to Rule Utilitarianism:
No Guarantee of Justice
S) A Proposal for a Satisfactory Standard:
A Utilitarian Kantian Principle
T) Conclusion
U) Exercises
- Relativism, Nihilism,
Skepticism, and Egoism
- 'Ought' and 'Is'
- The Definist Fallacy
- Utilitarianism
- Kantianism
- The Utilitarian Kantian Standard
Complete Chapter Here;
http://www.ditext.com/cornman/corn6.html
>From the Book;
Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction
by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/
http://hume.ucdavis.edu/phi102/lecmenu.htm
George Dance
On Jan 23, 5:32 pm, "Immortalist" <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> Ethics is not the same as feelings.
> Feelings provide important
> information for our ethical
> choices.
>
> Ethics is not religion.
> Many people are not religious,
> but ethics applies to everyone.
>
> Ethics is not following the law.
> A good system of law does incorporate
> many ethical standards, but law can
> deviate from what is ethical.
>
> Ethics is not following culturally
> accepted norms. Some cultures are
> quite ethical, but others become
> corrupt -or blind to certain
> ethical concerns.
>
> Ethics is not science. Social and natural
> science can provide important data to
> help us make better ethical choices.
>
Five examples of what 'ethics' is not; which one thinks would be
followed by an answer to the obvious question: "So, what is ethics,
then?" Yet this author does not even attempt a first approximation at
a definition, but jumps immediately to the question of 'ethical
standards'.
> ----------------------------------------------------
> Why Identifying Ethical Standards is Hard
> ----------------------------------------------------
>
> There are two fundamental problems in identifying the ethical standards
> we are to follow:
>
> 1. On what do we base our ethical
> standards?
This question is made much harder - some might think, impossible - if
the subject matter of ethics is left undefined.
> 2. How do those standards get applied
> to specific situations we face?
>
3. A third problem, that I've mentioned before is: how does one
justify a standard? The only possibilities are: (a) the standard is
not justified by anything; (b) the standard is justified by itself; or
(c) the standard is justified by some other principle. If (a), then
the standard is indistinguishable from a feeling. If (b), the
justification process is circular. (c) is also circular; if the
principle is justified by the standard; or contradictory if the other
principle is independent of the standard.
Only by begging the question that what the standards identify is
ethical.
> There are still problems to be solved,
> however.
>
> The first problem is that we may not agree on the content of some of
> these specific approaches. We may not all agree to the same set of
> human and civil rights.
That is only a problem if one believes the moral authority of a
standard depends on agreement. Many if not most of any of the
advocates of these different approaches would deny that; a far more
common claim is that ethical principles have universal validity,
meaning that they apply to both those who agree with them, and those
who do not.
> We may not agree on what constitutes the common good. We may not even
> agree on what is a good and what is a harm.
And of course, we may not 'agree' that the common good is an ethical
standard at all. Since no argument has been presented for it here,
failure to agree would not be all that surprising.
> The second problem is that the different approaches may not all answer
> the question "What is ethical?" in the same way.
Indeed; and any contradiciton between two answers is strong evidence
that the standard one of them uses is defective.
> Nonetheless, each
> approach gives us important information with which to determine what is
> ethical in a particular circumstance. And much more often than not, the
> different approaches do lead to similar answers.
Agreement between the answers given by applying two standards is much
weaker evidence that they are both correct (which, BTW, contradicts the
claim of each standards' adherents that it is the sincle standard).
However it is evidence that the determination is ethical.
>
[snip due to length]
Immortalist
> followed by an answer to the obvious question: "So, what is ethics,
> then?" Yet this author does not even attempt a first approximation at
> a definition, but jumps immediately to the question of 'ethical
> standards'.
>
> > ----------------------------------------------------
>From the provided link
Simply stated, ethics refers to standards of behavior that tell us how
human beings ought to act in the many situations in which they find
themselves-as friends, parents, children, citizens, businesspeople,
teachers, professionals, and so on.
It is helpful to identify what ethics is NOT:
http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/decision/framework.html
jer0en
>If our ethics are not based on feelings, religion, law, accepted
>social practice, or science, what are they based on?
I don't remember having done an ethical thing in my life if I didn't expect
either punishment or reward, in that following order.
So there's your answer. Either punishment or reward.
The field of ethics seems to be particularly relevant to the people in the
very specialised circumstance of being rewarded (paid) IN ADVANCE to be
ethical, usually even in a particular flavour. Like priests, politicians,
diplomats, judges, short everyone in public offices, and the ombudsman. It
seems to be rather impracticle if not hypocritical to pose ethics as
universal laws that would go for other people in other circumstances, let
alone anyone in any circumstance. They are the professional assets of peope
who are to make decisions in (semi) public cases, but no rules that govern
general philosophy, as far as I can see.
It would be interesting enough though to describe the different flavours of
ethics expected from priests, ombudsmen, diplomats, judges, resp., and how
these may contribute to the (im)balances in a particular society. Since
their offices are more accurately described as those of SPOKESMEN of
particular interest groups rather than the "universally" independent
councellors their ethical philosophies pretend them to be. Those just tell
us that they would be willing to expand their adminitrative powers
indefinitely. That would be within the scope of general philosophy, because
it would rid us of a universal lie.
In plain language, you come before a particular court, you get judged by a
particular flavour of ethics. If you were allowed to defend yourself, it
would be useful to be familiar with the particulars of the ethics. But not
outside of the court.
This would definitively settle the undying question if "you should always
have lemon tea" is, in fact, an ethical suggestion. Because, if some kind of
punishment were involved, it would be indeed.
You could even, quite redundantly, add it: You should always have lemon tea.
That was an ethical suggestion.
jer0en
"Immortalist" <reanima...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1169591535.7...@v45g2000cwv.googlegroups.com...
jer0en
relative to the question if I, or somebody else, were likely to kill you in
case you were to apply them, and in which way.
But that would be plain to a two-year old after it would have had its first
spanking, for having lit matches in the bedroom. It's definitely unethical
to set fire to the house.
There's hardly anything universal about non-professional ethics. In fact,
it's completely empirical.
jer0en
particular way, that would return us to the (im)balances in a particular
society that I've just mentioned.
And how economically interesting it would be to have a useful model
describing, in full detail, the likeliness of such repercussions in case any
hypothetical marketing strategy were to be applied.
That's the rub with ethics, they are the ultimate trade secret.
jer0en
ethical framework with particular key-figures in the group, and keep
everybody else uninformed, and wait for any adversary to offend against that
framework to an extent that would justify, to the key-figures, stabbing him
or her, quite legitimately, in the back. They are game rules, but by no
means public. So much ethics for the day.
jer0en
applied.
So long as they remain secret, ethics are the ultimate threat and a very
powerful weapon.
And that is probably the only universal thing there is to be said on ethics.
jer0en
This is where the pillar of Hammurabi comes in. With 3 ft. in diameter, it
was the first instance of (cuneiform) written law in history.
jer0en
The thing with ethics is
A. in the public interest they should be public
B. they should quit pretending to be universal or we shall all be dining
with the aliens.
jer0en
enemy is listening. Trouble is the enemy already has these facts. If anyone
it is us who are the ignorant. So here's the model of professional ethics.
Our society is divided into a finite number of interest groups, some of
which of course would overlap.
These interest groups have councellors, that may act as representatives in
courts on behalf of the members of the interest group they represent.
Court sessions are typically initiated by a councellor of one interest group
filing a COMPLAINT with another interest group.
The court itself never is a third party, but always belongs to, or better is
an institution of either of the two parties involved. Which one depends on
the mutual social status of the parties. The party with the highest status
provides the court.
The court applies a set of rules conceptually classified as ethics, that are
based on the notions and interests of the party it belongs to only, to
determine whether the complaint be admissable.
That's it.
jer0en
Immortalist
On Jan 27, 7:05 am, "jer0en" <jer...@freemail.nl> wrote:
> Immortalist wrote:
> >If our ethics are not based on feelings, religion, law, accepted
> >social practice, or science, what are they based on?
> I don't remember having done an ethical thing in my life if I didn't expect
> either punishment or reward, in that following order.
> So there's your answer. Either punishment or reward.
>
If what you just described is compliance are you saying you have never
made decisions based up "identification" and "internalization?" You
must be like a robot knee jerker reactionaryiary?
Responses to Social Influence
Thus far, I have been describing two kinds of conformity in more or
less commonsensical terms. This distinction was based upon (1) whether
the individual was being motivated by rewards and punishments or by a
need to know and (2) the relative permanence of the conforming
behavior. Let us move beyond this simple distinction to a more complex
and useful classification that applies not only to conformity but to
the entire spectrum of social influence. Instead of using the simple
term conformity, I would like to distinguish among three kinds of
responses to social influence: compliance, identification, and
internalization.
Compliance. The term compliance best describes the behavior of a
person who is motivated by a desire to gain reward or avoid
punishment. Typically, the person's behavior is only as long-lived as
the promise of reward or the threat of punishment. Thus, one can
induce a rat to run a maze efficiently by making it hungry and placing
food at the end of the maze. Chances are that a ruthless dictator
could get a percentage of his citizens to indicate their allegiance by
threatening them with torture if they don't comply or by promising to
feed and enrich them if they do. On the level of compliance, most
researchers see little difference between the behavior of humans and
other animals because all organisms are responsive to concrete rewards
and punishments. Thus, remove the food from the goal box and the rat
will eventually stop running; remove the food or the threat of
punishment and the citizens will cease showing allegiance to the
dictator.
Identification. Identification is a response to social influence
brought about by an individual's desire to be like the influencer. In
identification, as in compliance, we do not behave in a particular way
because such behavior is intrinsically satisfying; rather, we adopt a
particular behavior because it puts us in a satisfying relationship to
the person or persons with whom we are identifying. Identification
differs from compliance in that we do come to believe in the opinions
and values we adopt, although we do not believe in them very strongly.
Thus, if we find a person or a group attractive or appealing in some
way, we will be inclined to accept influence from that person or group
and adopt similar values and attitudes-not in order to obtain a reward
or avoid a punishment (as in compliance), but simply to be like that
person or group. I refer to this as the good-old-Uncle-Charlie
phenomenon. Suppose you have an uncle named Charlie who happens to be
a warm, dynamic, exciting person; ever since you were a young child,
you loved him and wanted to grow up to be like him. Uncle Charlie is a
corporate executive who has a number of strong opinions, including a
deep antipathy to social welfare legislation. That is, he is convinced
that anyone who really tries can earn a decent wage and that, by
handing money to people, the government only succeeds in eliminating
their desire to work. As a young child, you heard Uncle Charlie
announce this position on several occasions, and it has become part of
your system of beliefs-not because you thought it through and it
seemed right to you or because Uncle Charlie rewarded you for adopting
(or threatened to punish you for not adopting) this position. Rather,
it has become part of your belief system because of your liking for
Uncle Charlie, which has produced in you a tendency to incorporate
into your life that which is his.
Internalization. The internalization of a value or belief is the most
permanent, most deeply rooted response to social influence. The
motivation to internalize a particular belief is the desire to be
right. Thus, the reward for the belief is intrinsic. If the person who
provides the influence is perceived to be trustworthy and to have good
judgment, we accept the belief he or she advocates and we integrate it
into our system of values. Once it is part of our own system, it
becomes independent of its source and will become extremely resistant
to change.
Let us discuss some of the important distinguishing characteristics of
these three responses to social influence. Compliance is the least
enduring and has the least effect on the individual because people
comply merely to gain reward or to avoid punishment. The complier
understands the force of the circumstance and can easily change his or
her behavior when the circumstance no longer prevails. At gunpoint, I
could be made to say almost anything; but with the threat of death
removed, I could quickly shrug off those statements and their
implications. If a child is kind and generous to his younger brother
in order to obtain a cookie from his mother, he will not necessarily
become a generous person. He has not learned that generosity is a good
thing in itself; what he has learned is that generosity is a good way
to get cookies. When the cookie supply is exhausted, his generous
behavior will eventually cease unless that behavior is bolstered by
some other reward (or punishment). Rewards and punishments are
important means of inducing people to learn and perform specific
activities but they are very limited techniques of social influence
because they must be ever present to be effective-unless the
individual discovers some additional reason for continuing the
behavior. This last point will be discussed shortly.
Continuous reward or punishment is not necessary for the response to
social influence I call identification. The person with whom the
individual identifies need not be present at all; all that is needed
is the individual's desire to be like that person. For example, if
Uncle Charlie moves to a different city and months (or even years) go
by without your seeing him, you will continue to hold beliefs similar
to his as long as (1) he remains important to you, (2) he still holds
the same beliefs, and (3) these beliefs are not challenged by
counteropinions that are more convincing. But, by the same token,
these beliefs can be changed if Uncle Charlie has a change of heart or
if your love for Uncle Charlie begins to fade. They can also change if
a person or group of people who are more important to you than Uncle
Charlie profess a different set of beliefs. For example, suppose you
are away at college and you find a group of new, exciting friends who,
unlike Uncle Charlie, are strongly in favor of social welfare. If you
admire them as much as (or more than) your uncle, you may change your
beliefs in order to be more like them. Thus, a more important
identification may supersede a previous identification.
The effect of social influence through identification can also be
dissipated by a person's desire to be right. If you have taken on a
belief through identification and you are subsequently presented with
a convincing counterargument by an expert and trustworthy person, you
will probably change your belief. Internalization is the most
permanent response to social influence precisely because your
motivation to be right is a powerful and self-sustaining force that
does not depend upon constant surveillance in the form of agents of
reward or punishment, as does compliance, or on your continued esteem
for another person or group, as does identification.
It is important to realize that any specific action may be due to
either compliance, identification, or internalization. For example,
let us look at a simple piece of behavior: obedience of the laws
pertaining to fast driving. Society employs highway patrol officers to
enforce these laws, and as we all know, people tend to drive within
the speed limit if they are forewarned that a certain stretch of
highway is being carefully scrutinized by these officers. This is
compliance. It is a clear case of obeying the law in order to avoid
paying a penalty. Suppose you were to remove the highway patrol. As
soon as people found out about it, many would increase their driving
speed. But some people might continue to obey the speed limit; a
person might continue to obey because Dad (or Uncle Charlie) always
obeyed the speed limit or always stressed the importance of obeying
traffic laws. This, of course, is identification. Finally, people
might conform to the speed limit because they are convinced that speed
laws are good, that obeying such laws helps to prevent accidents, and
that driving at a moderate speed is a sane and reasonable form of
behavior. This is internalization. And with inter-nalization you would
observe more flexibility in the behavior. For example, under certain
conditions-at 6 o'clock on a Sunday morning, with perfect visibility
and no traffic for miles around- the individual might exceed the speed
limit. The compliant individual, however, might fear a radar trap, and
the identifying individual might be identifying with a very rigid
model; thus, both would be less responsive to important changes in the
environment.
Let us look at the major component in each response to social
influence. In compliance, the important component is power-the power
of the influencer to dole out the reward for compliance and punishment
for noncompliance. Parents have the power to praise, give love,
provide cookies, scream, give spankings, withhold allowances, and so
on; teachers have the power to paste gold stars on our foreheads or
flunk us out of college; and employers have the power to praise,
promote, humiliate, or discharge us. The U.S. government has the power
to increase economic aid to or withhold it from a dependent nation.
Thus, the government can use this technique to persuade a small
country in Latin America to hold a more or less democratic election.
Rewards and punishments are effective means for producing this kind of
compliance, but we might ask whether or not mere compliance is
desirable: To induce a nation to hold a democratic election is easier
than to induce the rulers of that nation to think and rule
democratically.
In identification, the crucial component is attractiveness-the
attractiveness of the person with whom we identify. Because we
identify with the model, we want to hold the same opinions that the
model holds. Suppose a person you admire takes a particular stand on
an issue. Unless you have strong feelings or solid information to the
contrary, there will be a tendency for you to adopt this position.
Incidentally, it is interesting to note that the reverse is also true:
If a person or group that you dislike announces a position, there will
be a tendency for you to reject that position or adopt the opposite
position. Suppose, for example, that you dislike a particular group
(say, the Nazi party in the United States), and that group speaks out
against raising the minimum wage. If you know nothing about the issue,
your tendency will be to favor raising the minimum wage-all other
things being equal.
In internalization, the important component is credibility-the
credibility of the person who supplies the information. For example,
if you read a statement by a person who is highly credible- that is,
someone who is both expert and trustworthy-you would tend to be
influenced by it because of your desire to be correct. Recall our
earlier example of the diplomats at the Freedonian dinner party. Your
acceptance of their expertise made their behavior (belching after the
meal) seem the right thing to do. Accordingly, my guess is that this
behavior (your tendency to belch after a meal at the home of a
Freedonian dignitary) would become internalized; you would do it,
thereafter, because you believed it to be right.
Recall the experiment on conformity performed by Solomon Asch, in
which social pressure induced many subjects to conform to the
erroneous statements of a group. Recall further that, when the
subjects were allowed to respond in private, the incidence of
conformity dropped considerably. Clearly, then, internalization or
identification was not involved. It seems obvious that the subjects
were complying with the unanimous opinion of the group in order to
avoid the punishment of ridicule or rejection. If either
identification or internalization had been involved, the conforming
behavior would have persisted in private.
The trichotomy of compliance, identification, and internalization is a
useful one. At the same time, it should be made clear that, like most
ways of classifying the world, it is not perfect; there are some
places where the categories overlap. Specifically, although it is true
that compliance and identification are generally more temporary than
internalization, there are circumstances that can increase their
permanence. For example, permanence can be increased if an individual
makes a firm commitment to continue to interact with the person or
group of people that induced the original act of compliance. Thus, in
an experiment by Charles Kiesler and his colleagues, when subjects
believed that they were going to continue interacting with an
unattractive discussion group, they not only complied publicly, but
they also seemed to internalize their conformity-that is, they changed
their private opinions as well as their public behavior. This kind of
situation will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.
Permanence can also result if, while complying, we discover something
about our actions, or about the consequences of our actions that makes
it worthwhile to continue the behavior even after the original reason
for compliance (the reward or punishment) is no longer forthcoming.
This is called a secondary gain. For example, in behavior modification
therapy, an attempt is made to eliminate unwanted or maladaptive
behavior by systematically punishing that behavior, by rewarding
alternative behaviors, or both. For example, various attempts have
been made to use this technique as a way of helping people kick the
cigarette habit. Individuals might be given a series of painful
electric shocks while performing the usual rituals of smoking - that
is, while lighting a cigarette, bringing it up to their lips,
inhaling, and so on. After several trials, the individual will refuse
to smoke. Unfortunately, it is fairly easy for people to notice a
difference between the experimental situation and the world outside:
They realize they will not be shocked when smoking outside of the
experimental situation. Consequently, a person may later experience a
little residual anxiety when lighting a cigarette, but because
electric shocks are clearly not forthcoming, the anxiety eventually
fades. Thus, many people who temporarily cease smoking after this form
of behavior modification will eventually smoke again after electric
shock is no longer a threat. How about those who stay off cigarettes
after behavior modification? Here is the point: Once we have been
induced to comply, and therefore do not smoke for several days, it is
possible for us to make a discovery. Over the years, we may have come
to believe it was inevitable that we awaken every morning with a
hacking cough and a hot, dry mouth, but after refraining from smoking
for a few weeks, we may discover how delightful it feels to have a
clear throat and a fresh, unparched mouth. This discovery may be
enough to keep us from smoking again. Thus, although compliance, in
and of itself, usually does not produce long-lasting behavior, it may
set the stage for events that will lead to more permanent effects.
The Social Animal - Elliot Aronson - 8th Edition 1999
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0716733129/
ZerkonX
> On what do we base our ethical standards?
On what is 'right'. Most agree on this.
What is 'right'? Most disagree on this since 'right' is relative
(gasp!) to many things.
Maybe the next tangible step from ethics is justice in it's broadest sense.
Both imply a consideration of another outside of pure self-interest but
inside of a code written or unwritten. In whatever case there has to be an
element of selflessness.
Maybe an ethical standard is codified empathy.
jer0en
(underdeveloped) sense. As to compassion, that is just the fear of society
allowing the same thing to happen to you.
By acting on compassion, you subconsciously think you are making a deal with
society to have compassion on you, in case you are in the same position.
That would be the reward.
By not acting on compassion, you subconsciously think you are striking a
deal with society to have compassion on you, in case you are in the same
position. That would be the punishment.
Such deals are not just in your mind, they are quite real. If someone would
witness you not having the required level of compassion where society feels
it is proper, he would use it to eliminate you immedeately, with reasonable
chances of succes. This explains why you would feel bad about it, because
you anticipate the seriousness of the situation quite accurately.
There's no harm in going for the reward. In fact I wouldn't recommend
anything else. You sleep like a baby. But there's no harm in having a
realistic concept of ethics either.
jer0en
>Immortalist wrote:
>If our ethics are not based on feelings, religion, law, accepted social
practice, or science, what are they based on?
>jer0en wrote:
>I don't remember having done an ethical thing in my life if I didn't expect
either punishment or reward, in that following order. So there's your
answer. Either punishment or reward.
>Immortalist wrote:
>If what you just described is compliance are you saying you have never made
decisions based up "identification" and "internalization?" You must be like
a robot knee jerker reactionaryiary?
I haven't a clue what internalization means, but as to the robot knee jerker
reactionaryiary I'm afraid you're right. But what is more, I think that you
are, just a confused one. So for both our sakes, a more leniant verdict
would be in place.
As to the compliance, that's in the social contract. Our lives belong to
society, which in Europe would be plain from the fact that you recognise
police authority to the extent of not carrying a weapon. If you die because
of this, there will be justice, just not for you. Anyone could take your
life at any time, and you would not have any rights to prevent it. So if I'm
a sitting duck for society, I might as well comply with its other written
rules. As to the unwritten ones, I remain, your obediant servant,
jer0en
Publius
news:1d70c$45ce1774$3ea303fd$20...@news.chello.nl:
> As to the compliance, that's in the social contract. Our lives belong to
> society, which in Europe would be plain from the fact that you recognise
> police authority to the extent of not carrying a weapon.
Er, what social contract is that? Where can I get a copy? Why wasn't I given
a copy when I signed it?
jer0en
"Publius" <m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote in message
news:G7SdneyQaqr7o1PY...@comcast.com...
Don't ask me. Ask the cops.
They won't give you one, by the way. But if your interested, the social
contract is one of the key issues in social philosophy. People have asking
for a copy for centuries.
jer0en
Well my mail bounced, so here's a copy.
I don't know where you can get a copy. Ask the cops.
They won't give you one, I'm afraid. But if you're interested, the social
contract is one of the key issues in social philosophy. People have been
Publius
@news.chello.nl:
>> Er, what social contract is that? Where can I get a copy? Why wasn't I
> given
>> a copy when I signed it?
>>
>
> Don't ask me. Ask the cops.
>
> They won't give you one, by the way. But if your interested, the social
> contract is one of the key issues in social philosophy. People have asking
> for a copy for centuries.
Then perhaps it's time to conclude there isn't one, and to invent a new
rationale for state power.
jer0en
jer0en
would testify to it. I'm afraid that if you were to insist on the notion
that a social contract weren't to exist, sooner or later you would be due
for social punishment. And I wouldn't overestimate the likelihood. But
leaving ethics, written or unwritten, alone, no of course there isn't a
social contract. And if you would have the means you could seize power right
now. Have you?
Publius
news:b91fa$45ce5aba$3ea303fd$26...@news.chello.nl:
> O there's a social contract allright. If you would do a pole, the
> majority would testify to it.
But could they produce it?
> But leaving ethics, written or unwritten, alone, no of
> course there isn't a social contract.
Ethics? What has that to do with majority testimonies?
> And if you would have the means
> you could seize power right now. Have you?
No. Guess I'll have to invent a social contract.
But then, since I don't want power, I won't bother.
jer0en
> "jer0en" <jer...@freemail.nl> wrote in
> news:b91fa$45ce5aba$3ea303fd$26...@news.chello.nl:
>
> >
jer0en wrote:
>O there's a social contract allright. If you would do a pole, the
>majority would testify to it.
>Publius wrote:
>But could they produce it?
No. It's an artefact of the public mind legitimising (contentedness with)
state rule.
>jer0en wrote:
>But leaving ethics, written or unwritten, alone, no of
>course there isn't a social contract.
>Publius wrote:
>Ethics? What has that to do with majority testimonies?
In the above (Re:s) I've described ethics to be the sum of professional or
written rules applied in courts, and the non-professional or unwritten rules
individuals have to deal with in groups. Though the social contract would be
a set of rules to follow inside the political institution, they are, as yet,
unwritten as such and therefore could only qualify as belonging to the
second category. My point is that it isn't very valid as an unwritten rule
either.
>jer0en wrote:
>And if you would have the means you could seize power right now. Have you?
>Publius wrote:
>No. Guess I'll have to invent a social contract.
>But then, since I don't want power, I won't bother.
Like you said yourself, I wouldn't recommend assuming a social contract in
any situation. No one in his right mind wants power, unless he is gently
tucked in in an invinceable army. In any other position it would be a
sacrifice, if anything, not seldom involving your life. The trouble is you
need power to bring about change.
jer0en
and we ask ourselves how much of it is actually real? If we consider the
possibility that indeed 100% of it is real, it may not be in the sense that
most people would understand it to be.
So what is real compassion? A girl crying for a dying butterfly? Best case
scenario would probably be she's just fulfilling the expectations of others
that follow from her role as a good girl. Because that's what she's doing,
she's constantly monitoring how the others react to her playing out this
role. I doubt the butterfly has any other part than a prop. Ask any mother.
If it would be her mother dying, she would of course be crying because she
is afraid of being left alone.
If ethics are to be understood as based on real, unadulterated feelings for
others, I can show you were ethics belong. Perhaps real unadulterated
compassion may be found as an allegory in a painting, or as a metaphore in a
book, but you won't find it on earth. On earth, feelings for others are not
mainly but merely feelings for ourselves. They are the results of the system
or complex of our expectations for reward or punishment from others. And so
are ethics.
The concept of this altruļstic puritanism people profess ethics to be, is
basicly born from a poor understanding of our own fears. If people were to
better understand their fears this would probably make for better ethics as
well. This doesn't of course mean that we should all suddenly deny all our
fears. There are times that we have to show courage and times that we do
definitely not. Whether that be on top of a scyscaper or when someone
threatens to kill your wife and children is, IMHO, still within the scope of
the obvious.
Phil Roberts, Jr.
jer0en wrote:
>
> If ethics are to be understood as based on real, unadulterated feelings for
> others, I can show you were ethics belong. Perhaps real unadulterated
> compassion may be found as an allegory in a painting, or as a metaphore in a
> book, but you won't find it on earth. On earth, feelings for others are not
> mainly but merely feelings for ourselves. They are the results of the system
> or complex of our expectations for reward or punishment from others. And so
> are ethics.
I would argue that an essential ingredient in morality would
be the capacity to experience a sense of one's own worthlessness
when failing to "measure us" to one's self-imposed ethical
standards. Here was my response to a similar question framed
in terms of the evolutionary function of a conscience over at
sci.bio.evolution:
Conscience (the superego) is a maladaptive manifestation of
our need to justify our existence, in this case by conforming
to a shared subconscious theory of rationality in which
'being rational' is simply a matter of 'being objective',
as exemplified in the moral maxim, 'Love (intrinsically
value) your neighbor as you love (intrinsically value)
yourself'. Although none of us can actually measure up
to this standard, we nonetheless come to experience
feelings of worthlessness (guilt) along with a
corresponding reduction in the will to survive
(depression) when we deviate from the standard to an
unreasonable degree. In other words, conscience is a
part of the price we humans have had to pay for having
become a little too objective for our own good.
ZerkonX
> I think you confuse empathy and compassion.
No I did not.
> Empathy by itself is just an
> (underdeveloped) sense. As to compassion, that is just the fear of society
> allowing the same thing to happen to you.
Sorry, we are so far out of agreement here that we would spend too much
time arguing over basic definitions.
ZerkonX
> I don't remember having done an ethical thing in my life if I didn't expect
> either punishment or reward...
Do you believe then that no one else can?
sacs...@aol.com
>
> If ethics are to be understood as based on real, unadulterated feelings for
> others, I can show you were ethics belong. Perhaps real unadulterated
> compassion may be found as an allegory in a painting, or as a metaphore in a
> book, but you won't find it on earth. On earth, feelings for others are not
> mainly but merely feelings for ourselves. They are the results of the system
> or complex of our expectations for reward or punishment from others. And so
> are ethics.
>
from someone else, then you are not making your own decisions. My dog
is capable of such Pavlovian responses.
sacs...@aol.com
> I would argue that an essential ingredient in morality would
> be the capacity to experience a sense of one's own worthlessness
> when failing to "measure us" to one's self-imposed ethical
> standards. Here was my response to a similar question framed
> in terms of the evolutionary function of a conscience over at
> sci.bio.evolution:
>
> Conscience (the superego) is a maladaptive manifestation of
> our need to justify our existence, in this case by conforming
> to a shared subconscious theory of rationality in which
> 'being rational' is simply a matter of 'being objective',
> as exemplified in the moral maxim, 'Love (intrinsically
> value) your neighbor as you love (intrinsically value)
> yourself'. Although none of us can actually measure up
> to this standard, we nonetheless come to experience
> feelings of worthlessness (guilt) along with a
> corresponding reduction in the will to survive
> (depression) when we deviate from the standard to an
> unreasonable degree. In other words, conscience is a
> part of the price we humans have had to pay for having
> become a little too objective for our own good.
I would argue that morality requires a sense of competence to
distinguish right from wrong and that rationality is also a matter of
logical reasoning. And I believe guilt is a consequence of not having
the self-control to do what a person determines is the right thing.
But I agree that this could be a problem if a person sets their-self
unrealistic standards.
tg
If you make a decision based on whether or not it conforms to some
rule, then how are you different from the dog? (Perhaps you
misunderstand what Pavlovian response is?)
-tg
a_friend
I've always been curious about the philosopher's need or desire to be
ethical or moral.
Publius
news:1174838149.6...@y66g2000hsf.googlegroups.com:
>> If you base your decisions of right or wrong on reward or punishment
>> from someone else, then you are not making your own decisions. My dog
>> is capable of such Pavlovian responses.
> If you make a decision based on whether or not it conforms to some
> rule, then how are you different from the dog? (Perhaps you
> misunderstand what Pavlovian response is?)
Dogs do not understand rules, or how to validate them.
Mike
The Pavlovian response is conditioned by reward or punishment. The
difference is that not all of my (and my dog's) decisions conform "to
some rule".
tg
But a conditioned response isn't a case of 'basing a decision....on
reward or punishment" as you put it. If I think about robbing a bank,
I might decide not to do it based on fear of punishment. But if I
don't rob banks 'because it is wrong", then I am just following a
rule. This is the equivalent of a conditioned response---there is no
intermediate decision-making.
-tg
Publius
@l75g2000hse.googlegroups.com:
> But a conditioned response isn't a case of 'basing a decision....on
> reward or punishment" as you put it. If I think about robbing a bank,
> I might decide not to do it based on fear of punishment. But if I
> don't rob banks 'because it is wrong", then I am just following a
> rule. This is the equivalent of a conditioned response---there is no
> intermediate decision-making.
You've already done the decision-making when you evaluated and validated the
rule.
Publius
If you *didn't* evaluate and validate the rule, and merely adopted it via
social osmosis, then you are indeed Pavlov's dog. Or perhaps a parrot.
Mike
I prefer to decide for myself what is right or wrong rather than
follow someone else's rules. However, I would agree that most of our
decisions are conditioned by both someone else's rules and our own
rules. But situations are sometimes unique and exceptions need to be
allowed for. I read about a blind taste test between Coke and Pepsi
where Pepsi was usually chosen (it tastes a little better), but if the
labels were shown most people chose Coke (the article cited nostalgic
reasons since the area of the brain associated with memory was
active). This conditioning can be justified as a means of "delegating"
tasks such as driving a car. When you first learn how to drive you
have to concentrate on everything you do, but after a few years of
experience you hardly think of what you are doing.
tg
I hope you understand this as an expression of frustration rather than
hostility---but why in the world are you talking about Pepsi and
driving cars in a discussion about the nature of morality or ethics?
You aren't the firsrt person to do this---I mean setting up some
strange analogy instead of a real example. How about:
1) You believes that homosexual acts are immoral.
2) A gay person is making a pass at you.
3) You find yourself physically aroused.
Are you suggesting that you will simply respond "no thanks" because
you have practiced saying "no thanks" many times before---like
shifting gears or parallel parking? It comes very close to being a
circular argument, in the sense that someone who has declined
consistently in the past is likely to decline again. And then you can
say that someone who does engage in homosexual acts simply hasn't
practiced "not doing it" enough.
There has to be some first time, though, and you aren't explaining
that at all. Why would you decide, without outside input, that
homosexual acts are immoral?
-tg
Mike
> On Mar 26, 11:23 am, "Mike" <sacsca...@aol.com> wrote:
> > On Mar 25, 6:12?pm, "tg" <tgdenn...@earthlink.net> wrote:
> > > But a conditioned response isn't a case of 'basing a decision....on
> > > reward or punishment" as you put it. If I think about robbing a bank,
> > > I might decide not to do it based on fear of punishment. But if I
> > > don't rob banks 'because it is wrong", then I am just following a
> > > rule. This is the equivalent of a conditioned response---there is no
> > > intermediate decision-making.
>
> > I prefer to decide for myself what is right or wrong rather than
> > follow someone else's rules. However, I would agree that most of our
> > decisions are conditioned by both someone else's rules and our own
> > rules. But situations are sometimes unique and exceptions need to be
> > allowed for. I read about a blind taste test between Coke and Pepsi
> > where Pepsi was usually chosen (it tastes a little better), but if the
> > labels were shown most people chose Coke (the article cited nostalgic
> > reasons since the area of the brain associated with memory was
> > active). This conditioning can be justified as a means of "delegating"
> > tasks such as driving a car. When you first learn how to drive you
> > have to concentrate on everything you do, but after a few years of
> > experience you hardly think of what you are doing.
>
> I hope you understand this as an expression of frustration rather than
> hostility---but why in the world are you talking about Pepsi and
> driving cars in a discussion about the nature of morality or ethics?
I thought we were discussing conditioning rather than your
frustration.
> You aren't the firsrt person to do this---I mean setting up some
> strange analogy instead of a real example.
They were real examples.
> How about:
> 1) You believes that homosexual acts are immoral.
> 2) A gay person is making a pass at you.
> 3) You find yourself physically aroused.
>
> Are you suggesting that you will simply respond "no thanks" because
> you have practiced saying "no thanks" many times before---like
> shifting gears or parallel parking? It comes very close to being a
> circular argument, in the sense that someone who has declined
> consistently in the past is likely to decline again. And then you can
> say that someone who does engage in homosexual acts simply hasn't
> practiced "not doing it" enough.
>
> There has to be some first time, though, and you aren't explaining
> that at all. Why would you decide, without outside input, that
> homosexual acts are immoral?
I wouldn't. Why would you require a hard-on to distinguish morality
from immorality?
tg
I sense that you are annoyed because I am trying to pin down just what
you are trying to say. You don't have to have a hard-on to decide that
something is immoral, but you do have to have a hard-on to act
morally. If you aren't interested in having sex with the guy, then
your morality doesn't come into play at all.
But maybe I am mistaken that you are saying that morality is a form of
conditioning. If you'd like to clarify, great. You seem to be saying
that you decide on what is immoral on your own, and my question was
aimed at understanding how that works. If there's something you think
is immoral, perhaps you could give that as an example. Up to you.
-tg
Mike
>
> I sense that you are annoyed because I am trying to pin down just what
> you are trying to say. You don't have to have a hard-on to decide that
> something is immoral, but you do have to have a hard-on to act
> morally.
Pass the Viagra.
> If you aren't interested in having sex with the guy, then
> your morality doesn't come into play at all.
Unless you beat the shit out of him for being gay.
> But maybe I am mistaken that you are saying that morality is a form of
> conditioning. If you'd like to clarify, great. You seem to be saying
> that you decide on what is immoral on your own, and my question was
> aimed at understanding how that works. If there's something you think
> is immoral, perhaps you could give that as an example. Up to you.
Most of our morality is learned or cultural behavior, but at some
point a child becomes an autonomous being required to make its own
decisions. If you can't understand how to decide for yourself than I
fail to see how you can have responsibility for yourself and that is
immoral.
Mike
> If you can't understand how to decide for yourself than I
> fail to see how you can have responsibility for yourself and that is
> immoral.
I'd like to revise that; basically I believe it would be immoral to
preempt another human being's autonomy. It follows that it is immoral
to refuse to take responsibility for yourself, since you force another
person to preempt your autonomy.
tg
I would rather stick with the first sentence than the second---you are
saying there that it is immoral to force another person to act in a
way which you consider immoral, which gets too complicated.
But we have first:
"Most of our morality is learned or cultural behavior, but at some
point a child becomes an autonomous being required to make its own
decisions."
If you've learned a behavior, then how is it that you are making
decisions? (The 'conditioning' problem.)
In other words, if you are *conditioned* to respond to homosexual
advances with violent rage, then hasn't morality preempted your
autonomy?
-tg
Mike
> On Mar 27, 12:27 am, "Mike" <sacsca...@aol.com> wrote:
> > On Mar 26, 5:17?pm, "Mike" <sacsca...@aol.com> wrote:
> > > If you can't understand how to decide for yourself than I
> > > fail to see how you can have responsibility for yourself and that is
> > > immoral.
> > I'd like to revise that; basically I believe it would be immoral to
> > preempt another human being's autonomy. It follows that it is immoral
> > to refuse to take responsibility for yourself, since you force another
> > person to preempt your autonomy.
> I would rather stick with the first sentence than the second---you are
> saying there that it is immoral to force another person to act in a
> way which you consider immoral, which gets too complicated.
Let me try to simplify it for you; it is immoral to force another
person.
> But we have first:
> "Most of our morality is learned or cultural behavior, but at some
> point a child becomes an autonomous being required to make its own
> decisions."
>
> If you've learned a behavior, then how is it that you are making
> decisions? (The 'conditioning' problem.)
Since you seem to have such a hard time with making decisions let me
make a suggestion; if you are faced with a choice between two actions,
pick one.
> In other words, if you are *conditioned* to respond to homosexual
> advances with violent rage, then hasn't morality preempted your
> autonomy?
Responding with violent rage is not autonomous, it is animalistic and
it's purpose is to preempt another person's autonomy. But let me try
to simplify it for you; its bad.
tg
Right, but the question is how you can both have a conditioned
behavior *and* make a choice. Which is what I have been asking you to
explain. If you have been conditioned always to act a certain way,
then you are not acting autonomously when you act that way. The only
way that you are making a moral *decision* is if you have the
situation.
1) You believe x is wrong.
2) You would like to do x.
3) You choose not to do x because of 1) You believe x is wrong.
So I'm still trying to understand how you got to "it would immoral to
preempt another person's autonomy". I assume you are not saying that
your parents gave you electric shocks every time you preempted another
person's autonomy. Are you saying that you arrived at this conclusion
on your own, after you became an autonomous adult?
-tg
Mike
> On Mar 27, 10:46 am, "Mike" <sacsca...@aol.com> wrote:
> > Since you seem to have such a hard time with making decisions let me
> > make a suggestion; if you are faced with a choice between two actions,
> > pick one.
>
> Right, but the question is how you can both have a conditioned
> behavior *and* make a choice. Which is what I have been asking you to
> explain.
1) You cry because your mother usually comforts you when you cry.
2) Your mother isn't there or you just get tired of crying.
3) You stop crying.
> If you have been conditioned always to act a certain way,
> then you are not acting autonomously when you act that way.
Then you would be acting like an automaton, even my dog doesn't act
that way.
> The only
> way that you are making a moral *decision* is if you have the
> situation.
>
> 1) You believe x is wrong.
> 2) You would like to do x.
> 3) You choose not to do x because of 1) You believe x is wrong.
Unless you didn't believe x is wrong. The idea is that you would like
to do what is right.
> So I'm still trying to understand how you got to "it would immoral to
> preempt another person's autonomy". I assume you are not saying that
> your parents gave you electric shocks every time you preempted another
> person's autonomy. Are you saying that you arrived at this conclusion
> on your own, after you became an autonomous adult?
Every time someone tried to preempt my autonomy. Do your parents give
you electric shocks?
tg
> On Mar 27, 7:41?am, "tg" <tgdenn...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>
> > On Mar 27, 10:46 am, "Mike" <sacsca...@aol.com> wrote:
> > > Since you seem to have such a hard time with making decisions let me
> > > make a suggestion; if you are faced with a choice between two actions,
> > > pick one.
>
> > Right, but the question is how you can both have a conditioned
> > behavior *and* make a choice. Which is what I have been asking you to
> > explain.
>
> 1) You cry because your mother usually comforts you when you cry.
> 2) Your mother isn't there or you just get tired of crying.
> 3) You stop crying.
>
You think that crying is a conditioned response? Can you explain how
it is that babies cry when they first come out of the womb?
I get the sense that you aren't interested in having a philosophical
discussion but in stating how you 'feel' about things. That's fine,
but not interesting.
bye.
-tg
Mike
> On Mar 27, 4:33 pm, "Mike" <sacsca...@aol.com> wrote:
>
> > On Mar 27, 7:41?am, "tg" <tgdenn...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>
> > > On Mar 27, 10:46 am, "Mike" <sacsca...@aol.com> wrote:
> > > > Since you seem to have such a hard time with making decisions let me
> > > > make a suggestion; if you are faced with a choice between two actions,
> > > > pick one.
>
> > > Right, but the question is how you can both have a conditioned
> > > behavior *and* make a choice. Which is what I have been asking you to
> > > explain.
>
> > 1) You cry because your mother usually comforts you when you cry.
> > 2) Your mother isn't there or you just get tired of crying.
> > 3) You stop crying.
>
> You think that crying is a conditioned response? Can you explain how
> it is that babies cry when they first come out of the womb?
They open their mouths and exhale.
> I get the sense that you aren't interested in having a philosophical
> discussion but in stating how you 'feel' about things. That's fine,
> but not interesting.
I thought we were discussing your frustration.