Effectuationism Considered
Peter Kinane
Peter Kinane <pki...@iol.ie> wrote in message
news:7_Yq7.1203$j22....@news.iol.ie...
> loudbuzz <loud...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
> news:fd10ec71.01092...@posting.google.com...
> > "Peter Kinane" <pki...@iol.ie> wrote in message
> news:<nVEq7.1112$j22....@news.iol.ie>...
>
> > Only with a sense of trepidation do I respond to you, Peter. You seem
> > to be very resistant to inquiry; typical of skeptical postmodern
> > thinkers. You are quite harsh. {But, like Bush said...'it is a
> > choice between freedom and fear.'} Ironically, it sort of reminds me
> > of the critique you made about the 'verbal felonies' of "the
> > experienced dialectic." Here is what you had to say:
> >
> > "He can stun and paralyze the mind of any susceptible person he meets.
> > He has the power to annihilate the thoughts of everyone else, and he
> > glories in it. Dialectics is a procedure for destroying the mind of an
> > adversary. This is just another way of saying he can brain wash anyone
> > who will talk to him and believe him. This power is its own
> > fascination. It requires only rhetorical experience, and it ignores
> > Nature. The victims suffer from dialectism in that they are
> > susceptible to unfounded logic and cannot distinguish the abstract
> > from the concrete. Dialectic logic is an assault on the intellect of
> > an antagonist. It is a verbal felony! The defense to such an assault
> > is verified knowledge to which there is no valid contradiction."
>
> I have never seen this before, much less written it, as I expect you will
> see if you check out its origins. You seem to have character enough to
come
> back to me on this.
>
??
> >
> > I have read some of your previous posts...and I, like many people, I
> > assume, have tried to read your website and understand what
> > Effectuationism is about. Obviously, in responding to you now, I do
> > not, by any means, suggest to you or to anyone that I have a thorough
> > knowledge of this system of philosophy. Any statements or assertions
> > I make should really be viewed as questions.
>
> I understand.
>
> >
> > My cursory review, to this point, is that Effectuationism is some form
> > of affirmative or skeptical postmodernism.
>
> Actually my expertise on the detail that distinguishes other philosophical
> writing is very limited.
>
> It is a system of
> > epistomological, ethical and cultural relativism.
>
> I believe there is an important difference between "relational vaue" and
> "relativism". However, I'm rather busy today,and cannot go into a detailed
> reply to you, today. Also, if you consider my few comments below, this may
> become clearer.
Let's have your definition of "relativism", or "epistomological [ ]
relativism", and I'll get back to you with that of "relational value".
>
> Let me go down my
> > checklist. Truth is solely relational; reality is not composed of
> > discrete, irreducible units or things, but relationships - it is
> > organic, not atomistic.
>
> Rather correct.
>
> There is a disappearance of the subject
> > (identity) in structure...
>
> There is a disappearance of the _categorical_ subject (identity) in
> structure...
>
> and yet, the structure I am talking about is
> > not the universal, unchanging order of things. Not only does the
> > meaning of words (text/world) slip...but reality and truth slip with
> > it. General notion has replaced specificity and definition.
>
> You've lost me, or I you.
My mistake; you're correct in that it is, as I have claimed "a new paradigm
system", which is to say that categoriclalist connotations of concepts such
as "reality and truth" do not feature. The term "slip" suggests a certain
prejudice. I would not agree with the "General notion" point, unless you
mean what I say, that "value is an indefinitely dynamically demarcatory
interactivity".
>
> There is
> > a vigorous denial of absolute knowledge...and a deconstruction of the
> > building blocks of knowledge: uniqueness in sameness, difference, and
> > matching. Because of this, we cannot use our basic tools of knowledge
> > building: 1. our names and definitions (differentiation); 2. our
> > categories and classes, our concepts and generalizations (sameness);
> > 3. our theories and explanations (matching).
>
> We seem to have connected again.
"[K]nowledge", as a concept, I believe, is overdue for retirement. I do not,
however, leave its position vacant; I feature value, and as "indefinitely
dynamically demarcatory interactivity". (As such, the world, "knowledge", or
value is rather less simplistic, and more coherent and true to life). So,
perhaps you are now ready to progress from, your apparent lamentation of my
"vigorous denial of absolute knowledge", to comment on value as
"indefinitely dynamically demarcatory interactivity, which, inferentially,
is multi-faceted"?
>
> No categorical thinking
> > means no knowledge....
>
> No categorical thinking means no _categorical_ knowledge...
>
> > and no theory
>
> There is the system, Effectuationism.
>
> It is the death of philosophy.
I hope it is the death of Categoricalist philosophy - which was probably
'embraced' for reasons of political pragmatism, by the Athenians at a time
of political defeat. Times of political crisis can lead to such choices.
> > Oh, well...God has died too! This is the cursory sense that I have of
> > Effectuationism. Is my sense, in any fashion, correct?
Yes, it' very good.
> >
> > Osama bin Laden seems to be an absolutist or dogmatic / dual_logical /
> > tribalistic thinker on a quest for complete power.
>
> Pretty much so.
>
You may want to review the points below in light of my reply?
> How would
> > Effectuationism, if it was featured in his thinking, alter his quest?
> > Rather, wouldn't ethical relativism serve to justify his actions?
> > With Effectuationism, how could bin Laden become pluralisticly (or
> > critically) rational?
>
>
> See my points of reaction above.
>
> >
> > Thank you...and peace.
> >
>
> And to you.
>
Note: I take some support from Laurent's neighbouring thread, THE HOLISTIC
PARADIGM:
For example, in chemistry it is often very difficult to grow a
new crystalline compound for the first time; but, after one
laboratory succeeds, it is easier for others to accomplish this,
even at remote locations. [And crystals cannot type and read].
Peter
--
http://www.effectuationism.com
Fix the bug; get beyond Categoricalist good and evil to Effectuationism.
Wash your sweet potatoes.
loudbuzz
> Perhaps a new thread is in order.
>
> Peter Kinane <pki...@iol.ie> wrote in message
> news:7_Yq7.1203$j22....@news.iol.ie...
> > loudbuzz <loud...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
> > news:fd10ec71.01092...@posting.google.com...
> > > "Peter Kinane" <pki...@iol.ie> wrote in message
> > news:<nVEq7.1112$j22....@news.iol.ie>...
> > >
> > > "He can stun and paralyze the mind of any susceptible person he meets.
> > > He has the power to annihilate the thoughts of everyone else, and he
> > > glories in it. Dialectics is a procedure for destroying the mind of an
> > > adversary. This is just another way of saying he can brain wash anyone
> > > who will talk to him and believe him. This power is its own
> > > fascination. It requires only rhetorical experience, and it ignores
> > > Nature. The victims suffer from dialectism in that they are
> > > susceptible to unfounded logic and cannot distinguish the abstract
> > > from the concrete. Dialectic logic is an assault on the intellect of
> > > an antagonist. It is a verbal felony! The defense to such an assault
> > > is verified knowledge to which there is no valid contradiction."
> >
> > I have never seen this before, much less written it, as I expect you will
> > see if you check out its origins. You seem to have character enough to
> come
> > back to me on this.
Of course...pardon me...I am sorry Peter. This was taken from
something else I was studying:
http://www.seanet.com/~realistic/chpt4.html (written by Richard Hall).
Again, I apologize.
> > >
> > > My cursory review, to this point, is that Effectuationism is some form
> > > of affirmative or skeptical postmodernism.
> >
> > Actually my expertise on the detail that distinguishes other philosophical
> > writing is very limited.
> >
> > It is a system of
> > > epistomological, ethical and cultural relativism.
> >
> > I believe there is an important difference between "relational vaue" and
> > "relativism". However, I'm rather busy today,and cannot go into a detailed
> > reply to you, today. Also, if you consider my few comments below, this may
> > become clearer.
>
> Let's have your definition of "relativism", or "epistomological [ ]
> relativism", and I'll get back to you with that of "relational value".
My Def: epistomological relativism - epistemological norms like
rationality, objectivity, truth are no more than social conventions,
historically variable, and hence without claim to universality.
The fact that you claim that there exists "value" allows me to refrain
from calling your philosophy "nihilism."
> > Let me go down my
> > > checklist. Truth is solely relational; reality is not composed of
> > > discrete, irreducible units or things, but relationships - it is
> > > organic, not atomistic.
> >
> > Rather correct.
Truth, then, is a transitive verb, requiring an object noun as well as
a subject noun to produce a match.
> > There is a disappearance of the subject
> > > (identity) in structure...
> >
> > There is a disappearance of the _categorical_ subject (identity) in
> > structure...
Yes...but also personal identity (ontology). A person becomes
alienated from the world/text (neologism)...and even self-alienated
(schizoid) or separated from one's own essence or nature; forced to
lead a life in which that nature has no opportunity to be fulfilled or
actualized.
> > and yet, the structure I am talking about is
> > > not the universal, unchanging order of things. Not only does the
> > > meaning of words (text/world) slip...but reality and truth slip with
> > > it. General notion has replaced specificity and definition.
> >
> > You've lost me, or I you.
>
> My mistake; you're correct in that it is, as I have claimed "a new paradigm
> system", which is to say that categoriclalist connotations of concepts such
> as "reality and truth" do not feature. The term "slip" suggests a certain
> prejudice. I would not agree with the "General notion" point, unless you
> mean what I say, that "value is an indefinitely dynamically demarcatory
> interactivity".
Instead of "interactivity," may I suggest "intersubjectivity."
> > There is
> > > a vigorous denial of absolute knowledge...and a deconstruction of the
> > > building blocks of knowledge: uniqueness in sameness, difference, and
> > > matching. Because of this, we cannot use our basic tools of knowledge
> > > building: 1. our names and definitions (differentiation); 2. our
> > > categories and classes, our concepts and generalizations (sameness);
> > > 3. our theories and explanations (matching).
> >
> > We seem to have connected again.
>
> "[K]nowledge", as a concept, I believe, is overdue for retirement. I do not,
> however, leave its position vacant; I feature value, and as "indefinitely
> dynamically demarcatory interactivity". (As such, the world, "knowledge", or
> value is rather less simplistic, and more coherent and true to life). So,
> perhaps you are now ready to progress from, your apparent lamentation of my
> "vigorous denial of absolute knowledge", to comment on value as
> "indefinitely dynamically demarcatory interactivity, which, inferentially,
> is multi-faceted"?
I am familiar with the Polynomic System of Value:
http://www.friesian.com/domain.htm
In effectuationism, what value is there other than aesthetic value?
> > No categorical thinking
> > > means no knowledge....
> >
> > No categorical thinking means no _categorical_ knowledge...
Knowledge and categorical knowledge are one and the same.
Theory, then, as Stanley Fish said, "does not provide direction; it is
not the basis for praxis or action because it is rather an ad hoc
justification, a generalization of previous practice." {Hmmm...Does
the term "general notion" ring a bell?} Distinctions and explanations
become confused. The citation of an effect can be presented as an
explanation.
> > > and no theory
> >
> > There is the system, Effectuationism.
Theory is a truth claim, which like all truth claims, must operate
within the confines of language. Language categories and socially
defined meanings are, therefore, inescapable.
Effectuationism, though, is NOT a system of actions, rules, or
beliefs, right?
> > How would
> > > Effectuationism, if it was featured in his thinking, alter his quest?
> > > Rather, wouldn't ethical relativism serve to justify his actions?
> > > With Effectuationism, how could bin Laden become pluralisticly (or
> > > critically) rational?
Man can be seen as a person or a thing. Now, even the same thing,
seen from different points of view, gives rise to two entirely
different descriptions, and the descriptions give rise to two entirely
different theories, and the theories give rise to two entirely
different sets of action. In this regard, relativism says 'my
perspective [the one I have right now] is always right.' Conversely,
plural rationalism says 'there are different ways to look at something
so let's try to look at this one thing at different angles.' It looks
at an object three-dimensionally rather than two-dimensionally.
Unlike relativism, plural rationalism says that some ways of looking
at a thing are not the right ways to look at that thing.
> Note: I take some support from Laurent's neighbouring thread, THE HOLISTIC
> PARADIGM:
> For example, in chemistry it is often very difficult to grow a
> new crystalline compound for the first time; but, after one
> laboratory succeeds, it is easier for others to accomplish this,
> even at remote locations. [And crystals cannot type and read].
Here is a word that comes to mind: CHOMSKY - This adjective
"characterizes the attempt to derive very broad philosophical
conclusions from very specialized scientific results, as in 'The
conclusions drawn from Gödel's Theorem are even chomskier than those
drawn from Heisenberg's Principle.'" Chomsky projects are often
undertaken by aging Nobelists, on whom it has dawned that their own
discipline (and, as it happens, their very own contribution to that
discipline) provides the Clue to Everything.
Peace to you, Peter.
loudbuzz
Peter Kinane
loudbuzz <loud...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
news:fd10ec71.01092...@posting.google.com...
> "Peter Kinane" <pki...@iol.ie> wrote in message
news:<ad5r7.1339$j22....@news.iol.ie>...
> > Perhaps a new thread is in order.
> >
> > Peter Kinane <pki...@iol.ie> wrote in message
> > news:7_Yq7.1203$j22....@news.iol.ie...
> > > loudbuzz <loud...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
> > > news:fd10ec71.01092...@posting.google.com...
> > > > "Peter Kinane" <pki...@iol.ie> wrote in message
> > > news:<nVEq7.1112$j22....@news.iol.ie>...
> > > Here is what you had to say:
> > > >
> > > > "He can stun and paralyze the mind of any susceptible person he
meets.
>
>
> Of course...pardon me...I am sorry Peter. This was taken from
> something else I was studying:
> http://www.seanet.com/~realistic/chpt4.html (written by Richard Hall).
> Again, I apologize.
No problem.
> > > It is a system of
> > > > epistomological, ethical and cultural relativism.
> > >
> > > I believe there is an important difference between "relational vaue"
and
> > > "relativism". However, I'm rather busy today,and cannot go into a
detailed
> > > reply to you, today. Also, if you consider my few comments below, this
may
> > > become clearer.
> >
> > Let's have your definition of "relativism", or "epistomological [ ]
> > relativism", and I'll get back to you with that of "relational value".
>
>
> My Def: epistomological relativism - epistemological norms like
> rationality, objectivity, truth are no more than social conventions,
> historically variable, and hence without claim to universality.
Re "are no more than social conventions":
This, as a definition, provides very little substance. However, further down
you supply some real 'beef':
> Man can be seen as a person or a thing. Now, even the same thing,
> seen from different points of view, gives rise to two entirely
> different descriptions, and the descriptions give rise to two entirely
> different theories, and the theories give rise to two entirely
> different sets of action. In this regard, relativism says 'my
> perspective [the one I have right now] is always right.'
I rather thought you might mean by "relativism" something such as that.
In contrast, I mean by "relational value" 'that' which effects through (or
as) a tension of forces; that one, or value is / am 'what is'. Note the
inverted commas (or parenthises, or whatever) around 'what effects' - 'that'
and 'what is / am'. This is to convey, to try to emphasise that I am not
expressing the conventional notion of "a person or a thing. [] even the same
thing". That is something of a subject - object model. My system expresses
value, or relational value as effecting through a tension, or relationship
of forces, and 'is / am' indefinitely dynamically demarcatory interactivity,
I - Other, and inferentially is multi-faceted. One / Value 'am' not either
subject or object, but 'what is / am'. (As such, one / 'it' 'am' not the
easiest concept to talk _about_. But I hope I have reached you to some
degree).
(Rather more loosely, for purpose of communication, and please don't expect
me to defend this:
So, value is quite real, but is not an entity out there for to be "seen from
different points of view". 'It' is a kind of first person phenomenon /
concept, and inferentially is multi-faceted. We can refer eachother to
stuff, thereby effecting a tension of forces of the person being referred
and 'that' to which they are referred, thereby effecting value - in effect
that your tree or rock is not mine or anyone else's, but nonetheless we can
talk about tress or rocks as if they were "a person or a thing. [] even the
same thing". We can also, through interaction, develop degrees of
connotational empathy with eachother (about 'stuff').
(Again, please don't hold me to this, as it is very corrupted with
Categoricalism)).
>
> The fact that you claim that there exists "value" allows me to refrain
> from calling your philosophy "nihilism."
>
I am snipping most of the remainder, due to the understanding of "relational
value" problem. You may always reinclude it, if you find it is still
relevant.
> > > How would
> > > > Effectuationism, if it was featured in his thinking, alter his
quest?
> > > > Rather, wouldn't ethical relativism serve to justify his actions?
> > > > With Effectuationism, how could bin Laden become pluralisticly (or
> > > > critically) rational?
>
>
> Man can be seen as a person or a thing. Now, even the same thing,
> seen from different points of view, gives rise to two entirely
> different descriptions, and the descriptions give rise to two entirely
> different theories, and the theories give rise to two entirely
> different sets of action. In this regard, relativism says 'my
> perspective [the one I have right now] is always right.' Conversely,
> plural rationalism says 'there are different ways to look at something
> so let's try to look at this one thing at different angles.' It looks
> at an object three-dimensionally rather than two-dimensionally.
> Unlike relativism, plural rationalism says that some ways of looking
> at a thing are not the right ways to look at that thing.
>
Peter
Peter Kinane
> In contrast, I mean by "relational value" 'that' which effects through (or
> as) a tension of forces; that one, or value is / am 'what is'. Note the
> inverted commas (or parenthises, or whatever) around 'what effects' -
'that'
> and 'what is / am'. This is to convey, to try to emphasise that I am not
> expressing the conventional notion of "a person or a thing. [] even the
same
> thing". That is something of a subject - object model. My system expresses
> value, or relational value as effecting through a tension, or relationship
> of forces, and 'is / am' indefinitely dynamically demarcatory
interactivity,
> I - Other, and inferentially is multi-faceted. One / Value 'am' not either
> subject or object, but 'what is / am'. (As such, one / 'it' 'am' not the
> easiest concept to talk _about_. But I hope I have reached you to some
> degree).
It may help if I add that as an indefinite tension of forces, I - Other,
multi-faceted value effects. As such a tension of values, value 'exists'.
Likewise, inferentially value effects. However, such value is not
independent of an observer, about which we can identify with each other. It
is 'value' to 'which' we can refer each other. Also we can develop
connotational empathy about 'our values'. And such values can be forces in
tension with each other.
This pretty much would seem to get us to the familiar world, but with a new
understanding of it.
> > > > How would
> > > > > Effectuationism, if it was featured in his thinking, alter his
> quest?
> > > > > Rather, wouldn't ethical relativism serve to justify his actions?
> > > > > With Effectuationism, how could bin Laden become pluralisticly (or
> > > > > critically) rational?
> >
loudbuzz
This is where I am at this point with my understanding, Peter...thanks
to your explanations. Hopefully, I am somewhere near you
conceptually.
EFFECTUATIONISM - Your philosophical system
SYSTEM = A collection of identifiably separate entities acting in
dynamic interaction to perform tasks in concert that cannot be
accomplished separately.
VALUE = "What is / am" (current reality)
TRUTH = Rooting our ways we limit or deceive ourselves from seeing
"what is / am"; challenging our theories of why things are the way
they are.
FORCES = "vision" (i.e., a specific destination or a picture of a
desired future.)
TENSION = The source of creative energy. The (perceived) gap between
"what is / am" and "FORCES" (i.e, I acknowledge that my vision is at
odds with current reality)...the wider the gap, the more tension there
is.
RELATIONAL VALUE = Taking actions to bring "VALUE" into line with
"FORCES" (i.e., taking actions to bring reality into line with
vision.)
INFERENTIAL VALUE = Common or shared "VALUE" (i.e., common or shared
reality); the basis for compassion and empathy.
I-OTHER = Taking actions to bring "INFERENTIAL VALUE" into line with
"a relationship of FORCES" (i.e., taking actions to bring shared
reality in line with shared vision).
If I am in the "ballpark," let me ask you two things:
1. Vision needs a purpose behind it...what or where is the role of
purpose in your philosophy?
2. TENSION can be relieved though a lowering or eroding of our goals
or "FORCES"; how can we avoid doing this, so that we improve our
situation?
Peace,
loudbuzz
Peter Kinane
loudbuzz,
Unfortunately, there is still quite a bit to go.
>
> EFFECTUATIONISM - Your philosophical system
Right.
> SYSTEM = A collection of identifiably separate entities acting in
> dynamic interaction to perform tasks in concert that cannot be
> accomplished separately.
Sorry, probably not - see below.
> VALUE = "What is / am" (current reality)
Right.
> TRUTH = Rooting our ways we limit or deceive ourselves from seeing
> "what is / am"; challenging our theories of why things are the way
> they are.
"current reality" 'am' 'what am', and is truth.
> FORCES = "vision" (i.e., a specific destination or a picture of a
> desired future.)
"Forces" should be 'forces', my mistake, and tension of 'these' effects
Being or value. As such 'the forces' do not exist - it is that effected
through 'their' tension that exists; the tension is perception, and albeit
only of faint degree, consciousness. The effected value, or forces in turn
interact and effect value - "current reality", and so on...
> TENSION = The source of creative energy. The (perceived) gap between
> "what is / am" and "FORCES" (i.e, I acknowledge that my vision is at
> odds with current reality)...the wider the gap, the more tension there
> is.
No, sorry; the tension is "'what is / am'" - if you like, perception.
> RELATIONAL VALUE = Taking actions to bring "VALUE" into line with
> "FORCES" (i.e., taking actions to bring reality into line with
> vision.)
That which effects through relationship of 'forces'.
> INFERENTIAL VALUE = Common or shared "VALUE" (i.e., common or shared
> reality); the basis for compassion and empathy.
This is our knowledge that other effectuations exist - e.g. I know that you
have a concepts of stuff, although I do not precisely identify with you
about them, or e.g. pain. (This inferential stuff perhaps is best omitted
until one is clear about 'self' awareness).
> I-OTHER = Taking actions to bring "INFERENTIAL VALUE" into line with
> "a relationship of FORCES" (i.e., taking actions to bring shared
> reality in line with shared vision).
Sorry, this is "'What is / am'" - indefinite and dynamic 'self'.
Perhaps you should take a look at this stuff as it is in the Thesis,
http://www.effectuationism.com/thesis.htm
Thanks for your work,
Peter
loudbuzz
Hi Peter,
I have some more questions for you.
> > VALUE = "What is / am" (current reality)
> Right.
Value is not conceptual, it is empirical?
> "Forces" should be 'forces', my mistake, and tension of 'these' effects
> Being or value. As such 'the forces' do not exist - it is that effected
> through 'their' tension that exists; the tension is perception, and albeit
> only of faint degree, consciousness.
The tension is perception. Perception first, reflection last.
What do you mean "only a faint degree, consciousness"? In order to
have perception or reflection, don't you have to be conscious? Is
there any knowledge that is unconscious? Is there knowledge that is
neither believed or thought, or explicitly presented to us? Do we
know that we actually don't know what we know? Is there any coherence
without conscious? Consciousness is the only basis of certainty, is
it not? Or is it?
I have heard of "unconscious competence"...where we don't know that we
can do something until we do it. I have also heard of "unconscious
incompetence", too. Is there three parts of knowledge: intuition
(empirical), mediate (derived, not generated), and non-intuitive
immediate knowledge?
On a different, but related subject...
Your stance (as I have read your older posts), I think, has been that
mediate knowledge / concepts are meaningless without an
epistemological existent. I understand that concepts need external
grounding, but your views resonate like logical positivism, to me.
One thing that I have argued with logical positivists (I don't know
how successfully) - is that one cannot empirically verify or falsify
everything that is meaningful. Some knowledge is localized in the
sense that one is aware of something when it happens and happens to be
where it happens. History is sometimes difficult to verify or
falsify. A lot of history remains unknown...but I believe (which is
derived, not generated knowledge) that even unknown things/events that
occured can have an effect upon the present. Some structures are not
seen...yet they effect systems. Have you ever heard the maxim, in
business: "structures determine systems; systems do not determine
structures"???
Peace,
loudbuzz
Peter Kinane
loudbuzz <loud...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
news:fd10ec71.0109...@posting.google.com...
> "Peter Kinane" <pki...@iol.ie> wrote in message
news:<fxMr7.1567$j22....@news.iol.ie>...
> > loudbuzz <loud...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
> > news:fd10ec71.0109...@posting.google.com...
>
> Hi Peter,
>
> I have some more questions for you.
That's the spirit.
>
> > > VALUE = "What is / am" (current reality)
> > Right.
>
> Value is not conceptual, it is empirical?
I express that value or perception precedes conceptualisation, and therefore
concepts, and that there is no distinction between "conceptual [and]
empirical" - through one comes the other, and vica versa.
For example, (although I'm venturing into unfamiliar territory), at a
quantum level we've got a photon. Such a photon is a tension of forces
(whatever 'they' in turn are / were - and ultimately stuff is interactive
and holistic) and there-in / there-as is a degree of perception - until the
tension resolves. Such tensions (photons or perceptions) recur, albeit not
precisely - being indefinite dynamic demarcatory interactivities, (although
we may not be able to identify such subtle distinctions). Through such
indefinite dynamic recurrences, whether at the photon level or more
primally, conceptualisation effects, i.e. a sense, however elementary of I -
Other (which perhaps is, "am I state one or state two" - apparently these
photons can exist in either state. But 'it' would be chiefly concerned with
holding the moment, and there-in prolonging its influence on, or tension
with other 'matter').
So, I'm expressing value / perception as the most elementary 'state of
being', and I am not featuring a distinction between "conceptual [and]
empirical" - it's a holistic system. Next effects conceptualisation, again
however elementary. This development 'progresses' into the evolution of
organisms, and on and on... - remaining holistic.
Eventually this development may effect the diverse world of - 'known to' -
humans, etc., and even to the formulation of same into different philosophy
systems - albeit not all of equal coherence, etc.
I hope I may snip the remainder. Of course you are welcome to get back to me
about it, or anything else.
Thanks,
loudbuzz
Hi Peter,
A couple more questions...and a lot more rambling. (Hopefully you saw
my other recent post).
> > INFERENTIAL VALUE = Common or shared "VALUE" (i.e., common or shared
> > reality); the basis for compassion and empathy.
> This is our knowledge that other effectuations exist - e.g. I know that you
> have a concepts of stuff, although I do not precisely identify with you
> about them, or e.g. pain. (This inferential stuff perhaps is best omitted
> until one is clear about 'self' awareness).
We have a sense of awareness in intuition. We percieve things
presented to us empirically. How do we perceive things not presented
to us empirically, such as 'self'? Is the awareness of 'self'
intuitive? Is 'self perception' perception or an object of
reflection? How do we solve the riddle of "reflected consciousness"?
Hmmm. According to you (if I understand this correctly), 'Self' is
not an empirical object, yet, it is a 'value'...i.e., 'inferential
value'...a value of reflection - the knowledge of which - is derived
(and not generated)?
But let's ask the question: if 'self' is derived, would that also
indicate that 'self' is heteronomous rather than autonomous? My'Self'
can indeed be "indefinite and dynamic", but my knowledge of 'self' as
'indefinite and dynamic' could determined by 'forces' outside of me?
'Self' would then be public, rather than private. Lacan and Hegel
both said, "Desire is the desire of the other." But what would be the
point of 'democracy'? Does 'democracy' necessarily imply autonomy of
'self'?
Sorry about my ramblings, Peter. Maybe I am making an error in logic.
Maybe I am equating knowledge of 'self' with 'self'...but maybe there
is no difference, if 'self' and 'knowledge' are both mediated.
> > I-OTHER = Taking actions to bring "INFERENTIAL VALUE" into line with
> > "a relationship of FORCES" (i.e., taking actions to bring shared
> > reality in line with shared vision).
> Sorry, this is "'What is / am'" - indefinite and dynamic 'self'.
'Self' is empirical (thus we can percieve it) or mediated (thus we
reflect or derive it)????
loudbuzz
Peter Kinane
> "Peter Kinane" <pki...@iol.ie> wrote in message
news:<fxMr7.1567$j22....@news.iol.ie>...
> > loudbuzz <loud...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
> > news:fd10ec71.0109...@posting.google.com...
>
>
> Hi Peter,
>
> A couple more questions...and a lot more rambling. (Hopefully you saw
> my other recent post).
Yeah, but apparently you have not seen the reply.
> We have a sense of awareness in intuition. We percieve things
>
> But let's ask the question: if 'self' is derived, would that also
> indicate that 'self' is heteronomous rather than autonomous? My'Self'
> can indeed be "indefinite and dynamic", but my knowledge of 'self' as
> 'indefinite and dynamic' could determined by 'forces' outside of me?
> 'Self' would then be public, rather than private. Lacan and Hegel
> both said, "Desire is the desire of the other." But what would be the
> point of 'democracy'? Does 'democracy' necessarily imply autonomy of
> 'self'?
>
>
> > > I-OTHER = Taking actions to bring "INFERENTIAL VALUE" into line with
> > > "a relationship of FORCES" (i.e., taking actions to bring shared
> > > reality in line with shared vision).
> > Sorry, this is "'What is / am'" - indefinite and dynamic 'self'.
>
> 'Self' is empirical (thus we can percieve it) or mediated (thus we
> reflect or derive it)????
>
> loudbuzz
As you do not seem to have read my last post yet, I'll be very brief:
Self awareness would seem to effect through the tension of the indefinite
tensions that am I - Other.
If this is not satisfactory, please get back to me.
Peter
loudbuzz
Hi Peter,
Thank you for your replies to both postings. Trust me, I do read what
you say, even repeatedly...so that I can understand the meanings of
your words. The problem is my host server: deja.com. Whenever I post
something, it tells me that I must wait 3 to 9 hours before I see it
in a news group!!! Your response to my first post actually came after
I sent my second post.
I have much to do and think about...hopefully we can continue later...
I do appreciate it when you explain things in a meta-language that I
can understand. I want to be able to speak your language; I am
drawing upon any resource I can to visualise things like 'forces' and
'tensions' and figure out how I can relate these terms to, either, my
everyday experience or, to a concept I have read about and already
understand. It is tough. I have to know what the rules are before I
can join...and I do not want to judge effectuationism by the rules of
some other system. Until I can do what I have explained above, your
replies, like the one below, remain somewhat cryptic.
I have adopted this quote as my motto: "We do not see first, then
define. We define first, then see." - Walter Lippman.
What philosophers had the greatest impact upon you, in shaping your
ideas?
Sincerely,
loudbuzz
BTW, the word 'forces', by the way you use that term, seem to be
epiphenomenon.
Peter Kinane
>
>
> BTW, the word 'forces', by the way you use that term, seem to be
> epiphenomenon.
>
Let's say that it is through (the tension of) 'forces' that perception or
value effects. 'Those forces' in tension would not be the same as 'they'
were before effecting 'the particular / current' perception (which one am),
and as this
perception one cannot claim to know 'the forces' as they were.
Peter
loudbuzz
> loudbuzz <loud...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
> news:fd10ec71.01092...@posting.google.com...
> > "Peter Kinane" <pki...@iol.ie> wrote in message
> news:<%nKs7.1876$j22....@news.iol.ie>...
Hi Peter,
I have been reading Hegel's Phemonology of Spirit, chapter 3..."Force
and the Understanding." It too is difficult reading...but I see a lot
of similarities between what Hegal writes and what you are writing.
I am also examining Derrida. It is all very interesting. Thank you.
loudbuzz
Peter Kinane
> [] Thank you.
>
>
> loudbuzz
My pleasure, thank you.
Peter
loudbuzz
What is the difference between a "subject phenomenon" and an "object
phenomenon?" I did not think you believed in such a duality.
Is there such a thing as a "Thing-in-itself?" or "noumena"?
Since I have been reading Hegel...I hope you don't mind if I ask you
more questions from time to time.
Thanx.
loudbuzz
Peter Kinane
> Peter,
>
> What is the difference between a "subject phenomenon" and an "object
> phenomenon?" I did not think you believed in such a duality.
In my system, as it reaches the stage of sensory organisms, we are into the
more familiar concepts of subject and object world, having progressed from
'the cognitive beings' inferential perceptions of the quantum world and
chemical world of indefinitely dynamically demarcatory interactivity
effecting as I - Other. We are into the world of the sensory level organism,
or even a central nervous system organism, with a sense of a definite self,
and identifying definite objects - a world of categorical value. And, in the
case of the central nervous system organism, these definite values may be
seen as relative; that what is good to eat may be painful to capture.
At the level of the cognitive organism one sees beyond the definte value
perceptions of the sensory organism thereby perceiving the indefinitely
dynamically demarcatory interactivity nature of value effecting as I -
Other.
Value is relational; depends on the featuring forces.
>
> Is there such a thing as a "Thing-in-itself?" or "noumena"?
I hope I have just answered that, other than to emphasise that for a
'primal' organism there is, but, if I may, as a cognitve organism one
perceives that value is relational - the concept you mention would not
really feature.
>
> Since I have been reading Hegel...I hope you don't mind if I ask you
> more questions from time to time.
>
No, I dare say it's good for me.
loudbuzz
> loudbuzz <loud...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
> news:fd10ec71.01100...@posting.google.com...
> > Peter,
> >
> > What is the difference between a "subject phenomenon" and an "object
> > phenomenon?" I did not think you believed in such a duality.
>
> In my system, as it reaches the stage of sensory organisms, we are into the
> more familiar concepts of subject and object world, having progressed from
> 'the cognitive beings' inferential perceptions of the quantum world and
> chemical world of indefinitely dynamically demarcatory interactivity
> effecting as I - Other. We are into the world of the sensory level organism,
> or even a central nervous system organism, with a sense of a definite self,
> and identifying definite objects - a world of categorical value. And, in the
> case of the central nervous system organism, these definite values may be
> seen as relative; that what is good to eat may be painful to capture.
I am just thinking "out-loud" here in this post.
Hmmm...I see this type of thing in Hegel...(especially B below)
A. Logic (thesis)
1. Being (thesis)
2. Essence (anti-thesis)
3. Concept (synthesis)
B. Nature (anti-thesis)
1. Mechanics (thesis)
2. Physics (anti-thesis)
3. Organics (synthesis)
C. Spirit (synthesis)
1. Subjective Spirit (thesis)
2. Objective Spirit (anti-thesis)
3. Absolute Spirit (synthesis)
This begs the question: Are these laws of nature you describe or laws
of reason that you force on nature?
______
> At the level of the cognitive organism one sees beyond the definte value
> perceptions of the sensory organism thereby perceiving the indefinitely
> dynamically demarcatory interactivity nature of value effecting as I -
> Other.
>
> Value is relational; depends on the featuring forces.
>
> >
> > Is there such a thing as a "Thing-in-itself?" or "noumena"?
>
> I hope I have just answered that, other than to emphasise that for a
> 'primal' organism there is, but, if I may, as a cognitve organism one
> perceives that value is relational - the concept you mention would not
> really feature.
So, then, reason does not lead us directly to things-in-themselves as
Kant believed. In other words, you are saying that there are not
"real" things that are outside of my experience. Of course, phenomena
is a content of consciousness. Is there any danger in thinking that
there is nothing better or more perfect than what appears in
phenomena? (in essence, idealism) To me, that means one could be in
danger of nihilism or utopianism. If I remember correctly, I did, in
my cursory review of your system, refrain from calling
effectuationalism a form of nihilism...but I could see the danger
then.
______
Let me quickly reexamine a few things said previously:
Here is what you said 9/23:
"(Rather more loosely, for purpose of communication, and please don't
expect me to defend this: So, value is quite real, but is not an
entity out there for to be "seen from different points of view". 'It'
is a kind of first person phenomenon / concept, and inferentially is
multi-faceted. We can refer each other to stuff, thereby effecting a
tension of forces of the person being referred and 'that' to which
they are referred, thereby effecting value - in effect that your tree
or rock is not mine or anyone else's, but nonetheless we can talk
about trees or rocks as if they were "a person or a thing. [] even the
same thing". We can also, through interaction, develop degrees of
connotational empathy with eachother (about 'stuff'). (Again, please
don't hold me to this, as it is very corrupted with Categoricalism))."
"...we can talk about trees or rocks as if they were "a person or a
thing. [] even the same thing" is, among other things,
hypostatization. What is universal is "real." Abstract properties
come to life and walk among us out of necessity??? Necessity is that
tension, isn't it? Meaning, or necessity, is governed by experience
or "Law of Constraints"?
_____
You also said this:
"It may help if I add that as an indefinite tension of forces, I -
Other,
multi-faceted value effects. As such a tension of values, value
'exists'.
Likewise, inferentially value effects. However, such value is not
independent of an observer, about which we can identify with each
other. It
is 'value' to 'which' we can refer each other. Also we can develop
connotational empathy about 'our values'. And such values can be
forces in tension with each other."
More of the same: i.e., knowledge of objects is immanent in
experience and dependent on subjective existence. This aspect of your
system could be considered "empirical idealism."
I-Other is not about "me" it is about "I"
_____
One other thing: On 9/27, you wrote the following...although, I
realize, that presenting it here, now, effectively takes these quotes
out of its normal context.
"Through such indefinite dynamic recurrences, whether at the photon
level or more primally, conceptualisation effects, i.e. a sense,
however elementary of I -Other (which perhaps is, "am I state one or
state two" - apparently these photons can exist in either state."
To me...you make an interesting statement about I-Other: a sense is
an elementary form of I-Other. Sense - and I-Other - can be defined
then by attributing predicates. Hmmm. Okay...just for fun...I will
make two statements.
1. I am blue.
2. I am white.
"Blue" and "white" are two abstract properties or senses. Properties
are universal in the sense that they can apply to anything. "I " is
what is being referred to in both senses. Thus, in this example,
"blue" and the "white" have the same reference, namely I, but they
have different senses, namely, "I am sad" and "I am Caucasian."
Oh...that is not the extentionality you expected...well, what does
that say about extentionality...perhaps one could say that the concept
of I-Other does not fit well with physics! Just a thought.
______
> > Since I have been reading Hegel...I hope you don't mind if I ask you
> > more questions from time to time.
> >
>
> No, I dare say it's good for me.
>
> Peter
I confess...this has been very good for me as well. I have been
reading about a lot of things I would have never read about or
struggled to understand. Thanx.
I should be asking more substantive stuff later. My key questions
above were: Are these laws of nature you describe or laws of reason
that you force on nature? Is there any danger in thinking that there
is nothing better or more perfect than what appears in phenomena?
loudbuzz
Peter Kinane
> "Peter Kinane" <pki...@iol.ie> wrote in message
news:<e1Av7.2847$j22....@news.iol.ie>...
> > loudbuzz <loud...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
> > news:fd10ec71.01100...@posting.google.com...
> > > Peter,
> > >
> > > What is the difference between a "subject phenomenon" and an "object
> > > phenomenon?" I did not think you believed in such a duality.
> >
> > In my system, as it reaches the stage of sensory organisms, we are into
the
> > more familiar concepts of subject and object world, having progressed
from
> > 'the cognitive beings' inferential perceptions of the quantum world and
> > chemical world of indefinitely dynamically demarcatory interactivity
> > effecting as I - Other. We are into the world of the sensory level
organism,
> > or even a central nervous system organism, with a sense of a definite
self,
> > and identifying definite objects - a world of categorical value. And, in
the
> > case of the central nervous system organism, these definite values may
be
> > seen as relative; that what is good to eat may be painful to capture.
>
>
> I am just thinking "out-loud" here in this post.
OK, I am not entirely surprised.
>
> Hmmm...I see this type of thing in Hegel...(especially B below)
> A. Logic (thesis)
> 1. Being (thesis)
> 2. Essence (anti-thesis)
> 3. Concept (synthesis)
> B. Nature (anti-thesis)
> 1. Mechanics (thesis)
> 2. Physics (anti-thesis)
> 3. Organics (synthesis)
> C. Spirit (synthesis)
> 1. Subjective Spirit (thesis)
> 2. Objective Spirit (anti-thesis)
> 3. Absolute Spirit (synthesis)
>
> This begs the question: Are these laws of nature you describe or laws
> of reason that you force on nature?
Without implying that I remotely understand the A, B, C above:
First of all, I do not posit a distinction between me and nature, or between
"laws of nature [I] describe or laws of reason that [I] force on nature". My
comments are 'an' effectuation of 'what am'. It seems to me that philosophy
trades in perceptions / concepts - and that in doing so this is 'an'
effectuation of 'what am'.
Also, as same is 'what am' and is relational one may not comment
categorically on same (in an Effectuationist system); one has to stay within
the realm of relationality. So, with respect, I do not it see that it begs
your question. (However, residues, or relapses of categoricalism may do).
> ______
>
> > At the level of the cognitive organism one sees beyond the definte value
> > perceptions of the sensory organism thereby perceiving the indefinitely
> > dynamically demarcatory interactivity nature of value effecting as I -
> > Other.
> >
> > Value is relational; depends on the featuring forces.
So, perhaps my comments above elucidate this? I concede that the words "sees
beyond" leave room for confusion.
> >
> > >
> > > Is there such a thing as a "Thing-in-itself?" or "noumena"?
> >
> > I hope I have just answered that, other than to emphasise that for a
> > 'primal' organism there is, but, if I may, as a cognitve organism one
> > perceives that value is relational - the concept you mention would not
> > really feature.
>
>
> So, then, reason does not lead us directly to things-in-themselves as
> Kant believed.
Without claiming knowledge of Kant, no, value is relational.
Perhaps you should elaborate here about your "things-in-themselves":
Do you mean "things-in-themselves" regardless of whether they are
'observed', or "things-in-themselves" if people universally identify with
each other about same, or ...
The concept to me is rather meaningless, other than for a sensory organism -
for / as which would feature such perceptions / concepts.
In other words, you are saying that there are not
> "real" things that are outside of my experience.
Do you propose to talk of "real" things outside of your experience?
Can you tell me where you(r experience) stop(s)?
Also, keep in mind the phenomenon of inference, that stuff is multi-faceted,
which is given through what I call The Constraints Principle to interaction.
Of course, phenomena
> is a content of consciousness. Is there any danger in thinking that
> there is nothing better or more perfect than what appears in
> phenomena? (in essence, idealism)
Given my comments above, would this now mean:
Is there any danger in thinking that there is nothing better or more perfect
than what appears in 'what am'?
To me, that means one could be in
> danger of nihilism or utopianism.
(As near top:
"Also, as same is 'what am' and is relational one may not comment
categorically on same (in an Effectuationist system); one has to stay within
the realm of relationality"). I don't really see a problem: Value is a
tension of forces. There is no shortage of such forces / tensions. These
forces can bash each other over the head, or, as in our case, by posting
back and forth potentially achieve greater degrees of connotational
empathy - greater knowledge of each other's respective forces / values.
(Such interaction would imply that we would change).
If I remember correctly, I did, in
> my cursory review of your system, refrain from calling
> effectuationalism a form of nihilism...but I could see the danger
> then.
I might add that concepts do not translate or transfer across systems, they
transform.
>
> ______
>
> _____
>
>
> More of the same: i.e., knowledge of objects is immanent in
> experience and dependent on subjective existence. This aspect of your
> system could be considered "empirical idealism."
>
Again, with respect, "knowledge of objects is immanent in experience" seems
to be loaded with categoricalist connotations.
> I-Other is not about "me" it is about "I"
> _____
>
> One other thing: On 9/27, you wrote the following...although, I
> realize, that presenting it here, now, effectively takes these quotes
> out of its normal context.
>
> "Through such indefinite dynamic recurrences, whether at the photon
> level or more primally, conceptualisation effects, i.e. a sense,
> however elementary of I -Other (which perhaps is, "am I state one or
> state two" - apparently these photons can exist in either state."
>
> To me...you make an interesting statement about I-Other: a sense is
> an elementary form of I-Other. Sense - and I-Other - can be defined
> then by attributing predicates. Hmmm. Okay...just for fun...I will
> make two statements.
>
> 1. I am blue.
> 2. I am white.
It's more like "I am the tension of the forces blue and white acting on each
other"; it's a two-ing and fro-ing, or a tension of waves. I - Other Other -
I.
>
> "Blue" and "white" are two abstract properties or senses. Properties
> are universal in the sense that they can apply to anything. "I " is
> what is being referred to in both senses. Thus, in this example,
> "blue" and the "white" have the same reference, namely I, but they
> have different senses, namely, "I am sad" and "I am Caucasian."
>
> Oh...that is not the extentionality you expected...well, what does
> that say about extentionality...perhaps one could say that the concept
> of I-Other does not fit well with physics! Just a thought.
> ______
>
> > > Since I have been reading Hegel...I hope you don't mind if I ask you
> > > more questions from time to time.
> > >
> >
> > No, I dare say it's good for me.
> >
> > Peter
>
>
> I confess...this has been very good for me as well. I have been
> reading about a lot of things I would have never read about or
> struggled to understand. Thanx.
>
> I should be asking more substantive stuff later.
This is as substantive as it gets.
My key questions
> above were: Are these laws of nature you describe or laws of reason
> that you force on nature? Is there any danger in thinking that there
> is nothing better or more perfect than what appears in phenomena?
>
> loudbuzz
And thank you,
loudbuzz
This means, to me, that you are saying your system cannot be
critically examined. No one is a neutral observer. Even a neutral
observer effects or "stay(s) within the realm of relationality,"
especially in relation to the objective object of observation.
Effectuationism deals with self-reflection. You are also telling me
that your system is not a system of science, because - I would contend
- it is Speculative (more perhaps in part 2). What I want to
determine is: What ground is there for this "realm of relationality"
/ reason?
> > > At the level of the cognitive organism one sees beyond the definte value
> > > perceptions of the sensory organism thereby perceiving the indefinitely
> > > dynamically demarcatory interactivity nature of value effecting as I -
> > > Other.
> > >
> > > Value is relational; depends on the featuring forces.
Or relative criteria.
> So, perhaps my comments above elucidate this? I concede that the words "sees
> beyond" leave room for confusion.
>
> > >
> > > >
> > > > Is there such a thing as a "Thing-in-itself?" or "noumena"?
> > >
> > > I hope I have just answered that, other than to emphasise that for a
> > > 'primal' organism there is, but, if I may, as a cognitve organism one
> > > perceives that value is relational - the concept you mention would not
> > > really feature.
> >
> >
> > So, then, reason does not lead us directly to things-in-themselves as
> > Kant believed.
>
> Without claiming knowledge of Kant, no, value is relational.
>
> Perhaps you should elaborate here about your "things-in-themselves":
> Do you mean "things-in-themselves" regardless of whether they are
> 'observed',
yes.
> or "things-in-themselves" if people universally identify with
> each other about same, or ...
>
> The concept to me is rather meaningless, other than for a sensory organism -
> for / as which would feature such perceptions / concepts.
When I think of "things-in-themselves," I don't think of relations or
appearances (which - as representations - can be imagined); I think of
the real conditions of existence. What is real is NOT in some way
confined to or related to the contents of our own minds.
If I had to put a term to my philosophy, I would call it
"Transcendental Realism." Truth is not something we create, it is
something revealed to us. Knowledge of an object can be independent
of experience, hence "Transcendental." An object's being is
independent of my experience or my existence, hence "Realism."
Reason, to me, deals with truths that are independent of private
judgment, i.e., truths that can be understood and shared; like
history.
I also agree with "Socratic Absolutism" in that I believe there is one
TRUTH, regardless of whether or not we understand what that truth is.
It is the belief that relativism is false; but it does not claim that
we possess, or can possess, any absolute knowledge. Our consciousness
- and therefore our certainty - is limited; self-consciousness is not
the ultimate criterion for determining what truth is or is not. (Of
course, consciousness IS our only certainty for understanding). My
philosophy, as such, is at odds with existentalism and idealism.
Hegel's philosophy (and I am actively trying to determine on what
grounds Effectuationism), being dialectic, give people, as I
understand it, the false impression that they will evolve their
self-conscious - effectively constructed through a system of logic -
to the point where they will reach Absolute Spirit / Knowledge. Maybe
that is not the goal of your system, though.
> In other words, you are saying that there are not
> > "real" things that are outside of my experience.
>
> Do you propose to talk of "real" things outside of your experience?
> Can you tell me where you(r experience) stop(s)?
> Also, keep in mind the phenomenon of inference, that stuff is multi-faceted,
> which is given through what I call The Constraints Principle to interaction.
Right, I know (or should I say - I think I understand). Everything in
consciousness is necessarily confined, by your system, to this realm
of experience (or reason or relationality). Nothing meaningful or
'real' is outside of experience. Experience (or reason) is the
constraining principle or "driving force" or "determining value."
Tension - or necessity - is a function of relating one value
(criteria) of experience with another.
> > Of course, phenomena
> > is a content of consciousness. Is there any danger in thinking that
> > there is nothing better or more perfect than what appears in
> > phenomena? (in essence, idealism)
>
> Given my comments above, would this now mean:
> Is there any danger in thinking that there is nothing better or more perfect
> than what appears in 'what am'?
>
> To me, that means one could be in
> > danger of nihilism or utopianism.
>
Problems will arise whenever we sublimate / replace / deny "real
essence" (the real nature of things, even what we cannot see or know)
with "nominal essence" (the nature we know about). Interestingly
enough, monotheism (not a form of idealism) says, 'Lean not on your
own understanding, but trust (place your faith) in something you
cannot see, namely, 'God' (or "real essense", perhaps)' My
philosophy, as I understand it, does not lead me down the path to
monism - which idealism leads many. A very good article on idealism
is at http://www.xrefer.com/entry/552363 Here, you can see the
pathway to monism illuminated.
> (As near top:
> "Also, as same is 'what am' and is relational one may not comment
> categorically on same (in an Effectuationist system); one has to stay within
> the realm of relationality"). I don't really see a problem: Value is a
> tension of forces. There is no shortage of such forces / tensions. These
> forces can bash each other over the head, or, as in our case, by posting
> back and forth potentially achieve greater degrees of connotational
> empathy - greater knowledge of each other's respective forces / values.
> (Such interaction would imply that we would change).
>
> If I remember correctly, I did, in
> > my cursory review of your system, refrain from calling
> > effectuationalism a form of nihilism...but I could see the danger
> > then.
>
> I might add that concepts do not translate or transfer across systems, they
> transform.
>
> >
> > ______
> >
>
> >
> > More of the same: i.e., knowledge of objects is immanent in
> > experience and dependent on subjective existence. This aspect of your
> > system could be considered "empirical idealism."
> >
>
> Again, with respect, "knowledge of objects is immanent in experience" seems
> to be loaded with categoricalist connotations.
>
> > I-Other is not about "me" it is about "I"
"I" - ego - self-consciousness
SOLIPSISM (Narcissism) - Consciousness determines reality. The self is
the only thing that can be known and verified. Everything depends on
you. You create the whole universe. You are the 'You-niverse.'
> > _____
> >
> > One other thing: On 9/27, you wrote the following...although, I
> > realize, that presenting it here, now, effectively takes these quotes
> > out of its normal context.
> >
> > "Through such indefinite dynamic recurrences, whether at the photon
> > level or more primally, conceptualisation effects, i.e. a sense,
> > however elementary of I -Other (which perhaps is, "am I state one or
> > state two" - apparently these photons can exist in either state."
> >
> > To me...you make an interesting statement about I-Other: a sense is
> > an elementary form of I-Other. Sense - and I-Other - can be defined
> > then by attributing predicates. Hmmm. Okay...just for fun...I will
> > make two statements.
> >
> > 1. I am blue.
> > 2. I am white.
>
> It's more like "I am the tension of the forces blue and white acting on each
> other"; it's a two-ing and fro-ing, or a tension of waves. I - Other Other -
> I.
Okay, let's take this further in "part 2." I have to breakaway at
this point in time. Remember, Peter, I may not see your reply to
"part 1" before I write "part 2". Thank you.
Peace,
loudbuzz
Peter Kinane
Hi loudbuzz,
> Hi Peter,
> > > This begs the question: Are these laws of nature you describe or laws
> > > of reason that you force on nature?
> >
> > Without implying that I remotely understand the A, B, C above:
> > First of all, I do not posit a distinction between me and nature, or
between
> > "laws of nature [I] describe or laws of reason that [I] force on
nature". My
> > comments are 'an' effectuation of 'what am'. It seems to me that
philosophy
> > trades in perceptions / concepts - and that in doing so this is 'an'
> > effectuation of 'what am'.
> >
> > Also, as same is 'what am' and is relational one may not comment
> > categorically on same (in an Effectuationist system); one has to stay
within
> > the realm of relationality. So, with respect, I do not it see that it
begs
> > your question. (However, residues, or relapses of categoricalism may
do).
>
>
> This means, to me, that you are saying your system cannot be
> critically examined.
Correct, depending on what you mean by "critically examined". I am
presenting my system to the reader to consider if it impresses by their
standards of formidably coherent and true-to-life. Based on the reader's
standards, they would each decide whether or nor to espouse it. How it
fares, therefore, depends on the standards with which it impacts - it's
value is (would be) relational, and one might say, at least inferentially,
of multiprismatic points of view.
No one is a neutral observer. Even a neutral
> observer effects or "stay(s) within the realm of relationality,"
> especially in relation to the objective object of observation.
Yes, no neutral observer, in the sense in which I outline above. But there
is _not_ an "objective object of observation". What anything is is a tension
of forces; *'it' varies with different featuring forces - that is why there
is are a variety of reactions to 'it'. Value is relational - that is why I
have said in my last post:
"It's more like "I am the tension of the forces blue and white acting on
each
other"".
*Note: We can refer each other to "it", or to stuff, and we can develop
degrees of connotational empathy about 'it..
> Effectuationism deals with self-reflection. You are also telling me
> that your system is not a system of science, because - I would contend
> - it is Speculative (more perhaps in part 2). What I want to
> determine is: What ground is there for this "realm of relationality"
> / reason?
Re "What ground is there for this "realm of relationality"":
As I say above, I am presenting a system as formidably coherent and
true-to-life, to be considered by whatever standards the reader brings to
bear, and I am proposing the system as the "ground [] for this "realm of
relationality"".
>
>
> > > > At the level of the cognitive [sentient] organism one sees beyond
the definte value
> > > > perceptions of the sensory organism thereby perceiving the
indefinitely
> > > > dynamically demarcatory interactivity nature of value effecting as
I -
> > > > Other.
> > > >
> > > > Value is relational; depends on the featuring forces.
>
>
> Or relative criteria.
No, I see, and am suggesting a difference between "relative" and
"relational" - no "objective object of observation".
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Is there such a thing as a "Thing-in-itself?" or "noumena"?
> > > >
> > > > I hope I have just answered that, other than to emphasise that for a
> > > > 'primal' organism there is, but, if I may, as a cognitve organism
one
> > > > perceives that value is relational - the concept you mention would
not
> > > > really feature.
> > >
> > >
> > > So, then, reason does not lead us directly to things-in-themselves as
> > > Kant believed.
> >
> > Without claiming knowledge of Kant, no, value is relational.
> >
> > Perhaps you should elaborate here about your "things-in-themselves":
> > Do you mean "things-in-themselves" regardless of whether they are
> > 'observed',
>
>
> yes.
>
>
> > or "things-in-themselves" if people universally identify with
> > each other about same, or ...
> >
> > The concept to me is rather meaningless, other than for a sensory
organism -
> > for / as which would feature such perceptions / concepts.
>
>
> When I think of "things-in-themselves," I don't think of relations or
> appearances (which - as representations - can be imagined); I think of
> the real conditions of existence. What is real is NOT in some way
> confined to or related to the contents of our own minds.
Given what I say above, perhaps you can now see that I am proposing
something quite different.
> >
> > Do you propose to talk of "real" things outside of your experience?
> > Can you tell me where you(r experience) stop(s)?
> > Also, keep in mind the phenomenon of inference, that stuff is
multi-faceted,
> > which is given through what I call The Constraints Principle to
interaction.
>
>
> Right, I know (or should I say - I think I understand). Everything in
> consciousness is necessarily confined, by your system, to this realm
> of experience (or reason or relationality). Nothing meaningful or
> 'real' is outside of experience. Experience (or reason) is the
> constraining principle or "driving force" or "determining value."
> Tension - or necessity - is a function of relating one value
> (criteria) of experience with another.
This seems a bit closer to my position than heretofore, and hopefully what
I've said above will progress things further.
>
>
> > > Of course, phenomena
> > > is a content of consciousness. Is there any danger in thinking that
> > > there is nothing better or more perfect than what appears in
> > > phenomena? (in essence, idealism)
> >
> > Given my comments above, would this now mean:
> > Is there any danger in thinking that there is nothing better or more
perfect
> > than what appears in 'what am'?
> >
> > To me, that means one could be in
> > > danger of nihilism or utopianism.
> >
>
> Problems will arise whenever we sublimate / replace / deny "real
> essence" (the real nature of things, even what we cannot see or know)
> with "nominal essence" (the nature we know about). Interestingly
> enough, monotheism (not a form of idealism) says, 'Lean not on your
> own understanding, but trust (place your faith) in something you
> cannot see, namely, 'God' (or "real essense", perhaps)' My
> philosophy, as I understand it, does not lead me down the path to
> monism - which idealism leads many. A very good article on idealism
> is at http://www.xrefer.com/entry/552363 Here, you can see the
> pathway to monism illuminated.
> >
> > Again, with respect, "knowledge of objects is immanent in experience"
seems
> > to be loaded with categoricalist connotations.
> >
> > > I-Other is not about "me" it is about "I"
This is your statement, so you seem to be replying to yourself in the next
line.
>
>
> "I" - ego - self-consciousness
Replying to yourself?
>
> SOLIPSISM (Narcissism) - Consciousness determines reality. The self is
> the only thing that can be known and verified. Everything depends on
> you. You create the whole universe. You are the 'You-niverse.'
Replying to yourself?
>
>
> > > _____
>
>
> Okay, let's take this further in "part 2." I have to breakaway at
> this point in time. Remember, Peter, I may not see your reply to
> "part 1" before I write "part 2". Thank you.
>
> Peace,
>
> loudbuzz
Peter