Reason and its Limitation
andy-k
All speculation is conceptual and therefore part of that framework.
It has been demonstrated that all concepts within the framework have only
a conventional existence and no inherent existence (terms already defined).
Concepts have meaning only by virtue of their embeddedness within the
conceptual framework -- i.e. any particular concept gains support from,
and lends support to, all other concepts. The postulation of a substrate
that grounds the framework is not necessary, not useful, and not coherent.
Reason, as the word is being used here, is a process that operates
on seemingly disparate parts of the framework to yield a more
encompassing view that unites those parts -- this is what I will call
"explanation". Explanation enables prediction, and correct prediction
engenders confidence in the explanation -- this is the closed-loop
that is at the heart of the Baconian model of science.
But note that this process operates on *parts of the framework*.
Since the conceptual framework is comprised of parts (i.e. concepts),
and parts are conceived as entering into the part/whole relationship,
the framework is conceived of as an extrapolation of that relationship
(the apex of the hierarchy as it were) -- i.e. as a conventional whole.
The framework has then been modeled within itself, and this is the decisive
step in the reasoning process where reason has overstepped its bounds.
And having taken that step, it is then considered reasonable to treat the
framework as though it has the conventional properties of beginning and end,
and of internal and external.
Only then can we ask misguided questions like "how did the world begin?",
and argue about whether or not there is a world that is independent of
(i.e. external to) our ideas about it. Such seemingly reasonable questions
are specious, and they are not so much "answered" as obviated by
understanding that the conceptual framework is not to be treated as
just another "thing" in a world full of things.
Anthony G. Rubino
>andy-k wrote:
>
>The conceptual framework, as far as it >extends, is all that is known.
>
framework?
Is its extension limited, or unlimited?
Is there anything external to it?
If the conceptual framework is all that is known, would that exclude
unknowns and new knowledge?
Tony, philosopher
http://www.geocities.com/trisector/
So many misconceptions, so little time.
turtoni
Philosophically we're ruled by "survival". Our symbolic systems have
likely conditioned us and dumbed us down somewhat in order to meet that
need.
gibbs
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
news:T3UNg.1104$2g5...@newsfe7-win.ntli.net...
> Only then can we ask misguided questions like "how did the world begin?",
> and argue about whether or not there is a world that is independent of
> (i.e. external to) our ideas about it. Such seemingly reasonable questions
> are specious, and they are not so much "answered" as obviated by
> understanding that the conceptual framework is not to be treated as
> just another "thing" in a world full of things.
It sounds to me like you've talked yourself into a hole that you can't climb
out.
Immortalist
turtoni wrote:
> andy-k wrote:
>> Since the conceptual framework is comprised of parts (i.e. concepts),
> > and parts are conceived as entering into the part/whole relationship,
> > the framework is conceived of as an extrapolation of that relationship
> > (the apex of the hierarchy as it were) -- i.e. as a conventional whole.
> > The framework has then been modeled within itself, and this is the decisive
> > step in the reasoning process where reason has overstepped its bounds.
> > And having taken that step, it is then considered reasonable to treat the
> > framework as though it has the conventional properties of beginning and end,
> > and of internal and external.
> >
> > Only then can we ask misguided questions like "how did the world begin?",
> > and argue about whether or not there is a world that is independent of
> > (i.e. external to) our ideas about it. Such seemingly reasonable questions
> > are specious, and they are not so much "answered" as obviated by
> > understanding that the conceptual framework is not to be treated as
> > just another "thing" in a world full of things.
>
> Philosophically we're ruled by "survival". Our symbolic systems have
> likely conditioned us and dumbed us down somewhat in order to meet that
> need.
Most of what we call "inference" and "reasoning" is performed by most
mammals, we just have some funny sounds to go along with this
"mammilian inferencial instinct"
Thats right folks, all this linguistic crap is only the frosting on the
"inferencial" cake, so don't go confusin' the frostin with the cake
(thought in the tone of Frank Zappa http://tinyurl.com/zebgc [mother
mary jesus and joseph!] loc)
More realistically we're probably not doing much more than a typical
mammal when we think of the probability of inference.
But not dumbed down but smartened up to managing the "best guess" and
"the quick reply with fingers crossed" this is all we're good at, as is
the typical mammal. Natural selection could possibly put in us the most
complex equations but we needed to survive, and on that part I agree
with you.
-------------------------------------------
A new theory of cognitive biases, called error management theory (EMT),
proposes that psychological mechanisms are designed to be predictably
biased when the costs of false-positive and false-negative errors were
asymmetrical over evolutionary history. This theory explains known
phenomena such as men's overperception of women's sexual intent, and it
predicts new biases in social inference such as women's underestimation
of men's commitment.
Buss comments on Error Management Theory. In an uncertain world, two
potential errors in thinking: a. partner having affair (but isn't) b.
partner isn't having affair (but is) The cost of making those two
errors are very different. Those making the first error have less cost
(from a reproductive success standpoint) than those who make the
second. Theoretically we evolved toward vigilance and are more likely
to make adaptive error. Explains why men and women sometimes have
delusions that a partner is unfaithful or might be. "It's not paranoia
if they're really out to get you!"
http://www.psychologicalscience.org/media/releases/2002/pr020103.cfm
Error Management Theory
Humans live in an uncertain world. We rely on our senses to pick up
information from the world, and then use our information processing
capacities to make inferences about the true state of the world. Real
threats to our survival and relationships are not always readily
apparent, given the ambiguity and uncertainty of the information.
Consider a relatively simple problem of walking through the woods and
fleetingly sensing a slithering object scurry underneath some leaves in
the path directly in front of you. There are two possible states of
reality: either there is a dangerous snake in your path or there is not
a dangerous snake in your path. Given the incomplete and uncertain
information that you have percieved, there are also two inferences you
could make. There is indeed a dangerous snake, and you act to avoid it.
Or you could conclude that there is no snake and continue walking down
the path.
There are also two possible ways that you could be wrong. You could
believe that there is a snake when in fact no snake exists. Or you
could believe that no snake when in fact a venomous rattler is lurking
right in your path. The costs of these two types of errors, however,
are vastly different. In the first case, your belief causes you to
incur the trivial metabolic cost of taking an unnecessary evasive
action. By giving a wide birth to the area that you believe harbors a
snake, you have merely gone out of your way a little, incurring a minor
delay in your walk. In the second case, however, failing to detect a
snake that is in fact lurking in your path can cost you your life. THe
two ways of being wrong carry substantially different costs.
Now imagine that this scenario not only repeats itself thousands and
thousands of times in your liftime, but billions and billions of times
over human evolutionary history. Those who made the first kind of
mistake tended to survive, whereas those who made the second kind of
mistake tended to die. As a result, modern humans have descended from a
line of ancestors whose inferences about the uncertain world erred in
the direction of believing that snakes existed more than they do. These
can be called adaptive errors.
Consider uncertainty about whether your romantic partner is having an
affair or is likely to have an affair.... Continued on page 76 The
Dangerous Passion - Why jealousy is necessary as love and sex - David M
Buss
The Dangerous Passion:
Why Jealousy Is As Necessary As Love and Sex
by David M. Buss
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0684850818/
----------------------------
The Dangerous Passion:
Why Jealousy Is As Necessary As Love and Sex
by David M. Buss
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0684850818/
99
It seems that you're simply saying what some philosophers have pointed
out in one manner or another for ages: That human knowledge is only a
utilitarian model of the ontic realm, a part of nature trying to
describe the rest (if they avoided dualism), and not the ontic realm
itself in flawless totality.
However, radical skepticism causes this simple understanding to
collapse into a muddled mess by desiring the phenomenal and the
epistemological to not be a map of any larger reality at all, but the
extent of "existence". Thus, there is only room for the microcosm of
the skeptic, and not mine or humanity's because there is no macrocosm
that her/his microcosm is trying to simulate and describe that the rest
of us epistemic processes (humanity) could even be included in. We are
only shallow images with no models of our own in the lone cosm of the
solipsist (which under that view should indeed be labeled the "cosm"
rather than microcosm or macrocosm).
,
turtoni
Do our symbolic systems represent us? Not really since they are only
the medium. But because our societies need to survive we live our lives
in those systems.
andy-k
> It seems that you're simply saying what some philosophers
> have pointed out in one manner or another for ages:
I've never claimed originality for this view.
> That human knowledge is only a utilitarian model of the ontic realm,
> a part of nature trying to describe the rest (if they avoided dualism),
> and not the ontic realm itself in flawless totality.
I'm saying more than that -- I'm saying that the idea of "the ontic realm
itself in flawless totality" is nonsense. The idea that "human knowledge
is only a utilitarian model of the ontic realm" presupposes the existence
of that realm.
> However, radical skepticism causes this simple understanding to
> collapse into a muddled mess by desiring the phenomenal and the
> epistemological to not be a map of any larger reality at all, but the
> extent of "existence". Thus, there is only room for the microcosm of
> the skeptic, and not mine or humanity's because there is no macrocosm
> that her/his microcosm is trying to simulate and describe that the rest
> of us epistemic processes (humanity) could even be included in. We are
> only shallow images with no models of our own in the lone cosm of the
> solipsist (which under that view should indeed be labeled the "cosm"
> rather than microcosm or macrocosm).
The solipsist answers the question "is there a world that is independent
of our ideas about it?" in the negative, the realist in the affirmative.
I'm claiming that the *question* is nonsense,
and so either one of these answers is also nonsense.
andy-k
>>andy-k wrote:
>>The conceptual framework, as far as it extends, is all that is known.
>
> Is there a knower, or knowers, within the extension of the conceptual
> framework?
Yes -- knower, knowing, and known arise in mutual dependence
within that framework -- i.e. they have a *conventional* existence
and not an *inherent* existence.
> Is its extension limited, or unlimited?
>
> Is there anything external to it?
Since the conceptual framework is comprised of parts (i.e. concepts),
and parts are conceived as entering into the part/whole relationship,
the framework is conceived of as an extrapolation of that relationship
(the apex of the hierarchy as it were) -- i.e. as a conventional whole.
The framework has then been modeled within itself, and this is the decisive
step in the reasoning process where reason has overstepped its bounds.
And having taken that step, it is then considered reasonable to treat the
framework as though it has the conventional properties of beginning and end,
and of internal and external.
Only then can we ask misguided questions like "how did the world begin?",
and argue about whether or not there is a world that is independent of
(i.e. external to) our ideas about it. Such seemingly reasonable questions
are specious, and they are not so much "answered" as obviated by
understanding that the conceptual framework is not to be treated as
just another "thing" in a world full of things.
> If the conceptual framework is all that is known,
> would that exclude unknowns and new knowledge?
*Look* at how words are *used*. We might want to say, e.g.,
"the identity of the assailant is unknown". In algebra we represent
the "unknowns" by symbols. Known and unknown exist by virtue
of their mutual dependence -- it would be meaningless to speak
of the "known" if it weren't for the unknown, and vice versa.
New knowledge is continually arising within the framework in the form
of new perceptions and in the form of new connections between ideas.
Bill Snyder
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
news:T3UNg.1104$2g5...@newsfe7-win.ntli.net...
THE "conceptual framework is not to be treated as just another "thing" in a
world full of things," how is it to be treated? Most of what you have done
in this series of posts has a negativistic flavor to it (that is not a
criticism; that is inevitable when one tries to do to Western philosophical
concepts what Nagajuna did to Buddhist concepts). But should I not be
looking forward to some expression of a positive take on "difference and
sameness" (things really are different from one another!) and the rest of
the concepts which you have discussed; and, in reference to this post, do we
not need a positive take on the proper use and function of reason.
You know my take on this, being the unapologetic pragmatist that I am. We
need to take the world as a structured collection of concrete, individual
things because our activity will not bear fruit if we do not (and yes,
within those assumptions we inevitably arrive at scientific theories which
point in other directions). One needs, at times, as a teacher to tell that
person to shut up (in one of the various ways one can do that; how I would
have loved to have available the paddle - I forget the Japanese - in my
classes at times, or to have been able to yell "Kwatz"), or else no progress
will be made in the endeavor at hand. But, is everything relative, then, to
this non-being (anatman) which is me? ?????????
BS
andy-k
<snip>
You make a valid point Bill -- the view does need balancing with a positive
take. However, it wasn't my aim to make a presentation of a rounded view but
rather to see if I could defend my understanding of the demolition process.
If I can't do that then I'm not in a strong position to start rebuilding.
Craig Franck
> "99" wrote:
>> However, radical skepticism causes this simple understanding to
>> collapse into a muddled mess by desiring the phenomenal and the
>> epistemological to not be a map of any larger reality at all, but the
>> extent of "existence". Thus, there is only room for the microcosm of
>> the skeptic, and not mine or humanity's because there is no macrocosm
>> that her/his microcosm is trying to simulate and describe that the rest
>> of us epistemic processes (humanity) could even be included in. We are
>> only shallow images with no models of our own in the lone cosm of the
>> solipsist (which under that view should indeed be labeled the "cosm"
>> rather than microcosm or macrocosm).
>
> The solipsist answers the question "is there a world that is independent
> of our ideas about it?" in the negative, the realist in the affirmative.
> I'm claiming that the *question* is nonsense,
> and so either one of these answers is also nonsense.
I've been reading that Wittgenstein book, and I now think I can formulate
a response that works within the framework you've laid out in this
thread.
We get tricked into thinking metaphysical questions make sense
because they have a form that is logical and does work, *but only
when applied to satisfactory concepts*.
So, say, I have a computer program that regulates a system that is
external to the program itself. I have data structures that correspond to
hardware, and by manipulating data, it operates the system. All this
makes perfect sense because everything is inside my conceptual
framework and raises no metaphysical issues.
Now imagine my expert system one day asks me if anything exists
external to itself. It's achieved consciousness, and is pondering that
all it has access to is its own states, and wants to know if there is
hardware that corresponds to its software-based conceptual scheme.
I ask whatever caused it to think about this, and I'm told, last week,
it developed a black line through its visual field; then a technician
replaced something, and now its gone: was the black line in "it"
or "the outside world"?
I tell the computer that the line was due to a hardware defect, and,
rest assured, there was no black line running through everything in
my world last week. But -- all that talk is about concepts that I'm
manipulating.
Now: why can't it's concept of "outside world" simply map onto my
concept of "outside world external to the computer program"? So
I simply create a concept of some world external to all my concepts,
and say *that's* what I'm referring to when I wonder about solipsism.
I really think this should make sense out of such a question. The way
the logical positivists handled this was to state that there was a real
world external to our concepts, but it just doesn't mean what the
average person thinks it does when they ask the question and get
a positive response.
--
Craig Franck
craig....@verizon.net
Cortland, NY
Craig Franck
> "Anthony G. Rubino" wrote:
>> If the conceptual framework is all that is known,
>> would that exclude unknowns and new knowledge?
>
> *Look* at how words are *used*. We might want to say, e.g.,
> "the identity of the assailant is unknown". In algebra we represent
> the "unknowns" by symbols. Known and unknown exist by virtue
> of their mutual dependence -- it would be meaningless to speak
> of the "known" if it weren't for the unknown, and vice versa.
>
> New knowledge is continually arising within the framework in the form
> of new perceptions and in the form of new connections between ideas.
But sometimes you need to deal with new knowledge that goes
beyond the framework itself. If the framework evolved over time,
there must have been things external to it that became integrated.
This is a problem for your system because the criteria for meaningful-
ness is so strict. Algebra itself is a generalization of arithmetic.
2 + 3 = 3 + 2 is conceptually different than a + b = b + a. You
can't get one from the other without a conceptual leap. Which is
fine for most systems; but according to you, a + b = b + a should
be meaningless if it's doesn't work in the old conceptual system.
A great example is the concept of "color" to a congenitally blind
person. It is phenomenological external to him; but he learns to
use color words such as "Grass is green." It's completely beyond
the conceptual system, but the words are used properly. His
color sentences should be completely meaningless and
correspond to nothing; but they obviously work perfectly fine for
a sighted person.
1Z
andy-k wrote:
> The conceptual framework, as far as it extends, is all that is known.
Nope. We know things through concepts. We don't know
concepts instead of things.
gibbs
"1Z" <peter...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1158195146....@i42g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
Indeed, we can easily look to the animal world and note that there are
animals with pre-conceptual and pre-linguistic capacties that our own minds
must have evolved from. Animals can distinguish objects, identify species
members and non-members, note change in space, remember, note that things
that are done can lead to other things being done, etc. Consciousness is a
biological phenomenon pre-conceptually and pre-reflectively situated in the
world. Our own capacities of conceptualizing, reasoning, and using language
must have evolved from hominids or other primates that operated without
conceptual schemes. Conceptual schemes and linguistic representations are
tools added on to a creature already hooked into its world by birthright.
In other words, we've evolved to know thing through concepts, not to know
concepts.
99
The world progressed along quite well before humans and their ideas
ever emerged, so this conclusion of "the *question* is nonsense, and so
either one of these answers is also nonsense" qualifies as dogmatic
nonsense in itself (or: postmodernism in the broadest sense welcomes
you, its latest recruit). Furthermore, while our cultural-embedded
systems of understanding of the world may change (that is, our
conceptual and linguistic descriptions of it) our phenomenal system
(barring mental illness or LSD) is very stubborn about its
regularities. Apples didn't sprout wings yesterday and start flying
around, and I very seriously doubt they will do so tomorrow.
We may describe the regularity known as gravity differently a hundred
years from now, but that again underlines that the human model of the
universe is not the universe itself (only part of it), and it will
continue to be revised or augmented because that model can never
flawlessly be the universe itself.
I could be misrepresenting you in some areas here, but that would serve
the purpose of demonstrating that there is something independent of me
that my map isn't wholly representing accurately. ;-)
,
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote
>> New knowledge is continually arising within the framework in the form
>> of new perceptions and in the form of new connections between ideas.
>
> But sometimes you need to deal with new knowledge that goes
> beyond the framework itself. If the framework evolved over time,
> there must have been things external to it that became integrated.
You're working to a *picture* -- the picture of all things having an inside
and an outside. You're treating the conceptual framework as just another
"thing", and thereby picturing it as having an inside and an outside.
I'm saying that the picture is wrong because the conceptual framework
must not be treated as just another thing in a world full of things.
> This is a problem for your system because the criteria for meaningful-
> ness is so strict. Algebra itself is a generalization of arithmetic.
> 2 + 3 = 3 + 2 is conceptually different than a + b = b + a. You
> can't get one from the other without a conceptual leap. Which is
> fine for most systems; but according to you, a + b = b + a should
> be meaningless if it's doesn't work in the old conceptual system.
>
> A great example is the concept of "color" to a congenitally blind
> person. It is phenomenological external to him; but he learns to
> use color words such as "Grass is green." It's completely beyond
> the conceptual system, but the words are used properly. His
> color sentences should be completely meaningless and
> correspond to nothing; but they obviously work perfectly fine for
> a sighted person.
I don't understand why you think these examples are analogous to my claim.
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote
It's precisely that mode of thinking that makes the question seem
reasonable -- you're working to a *picture* that can't be applied to the
conceptual framework itself.
andy-k
> andy-k wrote:
>> The solipsist answers the question "is there a world that is independent
>> of our ideas about it?" in the negative, the realist in the affirmative.
>> I'm claiming that the *question* is nonsense,
>> and so either one of these answers is also nonsense.
>
> The world progressed along quite well before humans and their ideas
> ever emerged, so this conclusion of "the *question* is nonsense, and so
> either one of these answers is also nonsense" qualifies as dogmatic
> nonsense in itself (or: postmodernism in the broadest sense welcomes
> you, its latest recruit).
The idea that "the world progressed along quite well before humans and
their ideas ever emerged" is just that -- another *idea* in the conceptual
framework. That idea does not justify treating the framework as just another
thing in a world full of things.
> Furthermore, while our cultural-embedded systems of understanding of the
> world may change (that is, our conceptual and linguistic descriptions of
> it) our phenomenal system (barring mental illness or LSD) is very stubborn
> about its regularities. Apples didn't sprout wings yesterday and start
> flying around, and I very seriously doubt they will do so tomorrow.
>
> We may describe the regularity known as gravity differently a hundred
> years from now, but that again underlines that the human model of the
> universe is not the universe itself (only part of it), and it will
> continue to be revised or augmented because that model can never
> flawlessly be the universe itself.
Yes indeed -- there are regular patterns in the framework. That much
is not in dispute. What is in dispute is the justification for treating the
framework as just another thing in a world full of things.
> I could be misrepresenting you in some areas here, but that would serve
> the purpose of demonstrating that there is something independent of me
> that my map isn't wholly representing accurately. ;-)
Neither is this an issue -- the "me" to which you refer is another idea in
the conceptual framework, and stands in contrast to its environment
(see my thread entitled "The Self and its World").
gibbs
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
> Yes indeed -- there are regular patterns in the framework. That much
> is not in dispute. What is in dispute is the justification for treating
> the
> framework as just another thing in a world full of things.
I think you have it quite backwards. Given what we know about the world,
about other living creatures, about evolution what is in need of
justification is the notion that we are somehow trapped and live our lives
in a "conceptual scheme", so to speak. There are many good reasons for
believing that the world is quite independent of our representations but not
vice versa.
gibbs
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
> It's precisely that mode of thinking that makes the question seem
> reasonable -- you're working to a *picture* that can't be applied to the
> conceptual framework itself.
What is this monolithic "the conceptual framework"? Whose conceptual
framework are you talking about anyhow? Yours, mine, his, hers, this
discipline, that discipline, etc? There are many conceptual frameworks, at
least in the way the phrase "conceptual framework" is normally used.
gibbs
"99" <opti...@draze.com> wrote in message
news:1158245365.4...@p79g2000cwp.googlegroups.com...
> The world progressed along quite well before humans and their ideas
> ever emerged, so this conclusion of "the *question* is nonsense, and so
> either one of these answers is also nonsense" qualifies as dogmatic
> nonsense in itself (or: postmodernism in the broadest sense welcomes
> you, its latest recruit). Furthermore, while our cultural-embedded
> systems of understanding of the world may change (that is, our
> conceptual and linguistic descriptions of it) our phenomenal system
> (barring mental illness or LSD) is very stubborn about its
> regularities. Apples didn't sprout wings yesterday and start flying
> around, and I very seriously doubt they will do so tomorrow.
Excellent, see my reply to 1Z. From what we know about the world and animal
consciousness it isn't far-fetched to conclude that we are locked in a world
of our own concepts.
Anthony G. Rubino
>andy-k wrote
>You're working to a *picture* -- the
>picture of all things having an inside and
>an outside. You're treating the
>conceptual framework as just another
>"thing", and thereby picturing it as having
>an inside and an outside. I'm saying that
>the picture is wrong because the
>conceptual framework must not be
>treated as just another thing in a world
>full of things.
>
Instead of turning everything inside out, does your position turn the
outside in ?
andy-k
>andy-k wrote
>>You're working to a *picture* -- the
>>picture of all things having an inside and
>>an outside. You're treating the
>>conceptual framework as just another
>>"thing", and thereby picturing it as having
>>an inside and an outside. I'm saying that
>>the picture is wrong because the
>>conceptual framework must not be
>>treated as just another thing in a world
>>full of things.
>
> It that then a conceptual-framework-in-itself?
No -- there is no conceptual framework in the absence of concepts.
> Instead of turning everything inside out,
> does your position turn the outside in ?
Outside and inside are conventional designations pertaining to *parts* of
the conceptual framework. Those designations are misappropriated when
applied to the framework itself.
Anthony G. Rubino
>
>Outside and inside are conventional
>designations pertaining to *parts* of the
>conceptual framework. Those
>designations are misappropriated when
>applied to the framework itself.
>
What distinguishes "conventional designations" from other designations?
How, or by whom, is that determined?
Craig Franck
> "Craig Franck" wrote:
>> "andy-k" wrote
>>> New knowledge is continually arising within the framework in the form
>>> of new perceptions and in the form of new connections between ideas.
>>
>> But sometimes you need to deal with new knowledge that goes
>> beyond the framework itself. If the framework evolved over time,
>> there must have been things external to it that became integrated.
>
> You're working to a *picture* -- the picture of all things having an
> inside
> and an outside. You're treating the conceptual framework as just another
> "thing", and thereby picturing it as having an inside and an outside.
> I'm saying that the picture is wrong because the conceptual framework
> must not be treated as just another thing in a world full of things.
So it was given all at once, with no development? How does a child
develop into an adult with no framework expansion? This seems to
be an irrefutable objection (assuming I "get it," of course) Einstein
was born knowing relativity theory?
Perhaps reading Wittgenstein wasn't hasn't helped, after all. I don't
see why, logically, I can't have a concept that includes all concepts
or one that is external to all concepts. It seems you should be able
to manipulate conceptual frameworks the same way you do sets.
By making the external world is a logical construction you are freed
from metaphysical considerations. It seems the conceptual framework
is a logical construction, as well. It's certainly not an empirical reality
because I can't imagine an experiment to see if it is correct or not.
>> A great example is the concept of "color" to a congenitally blind
>> person. It is phenomenological external to him; but he learns to
>> use color words such as "Grass is green." It's completely beyond
>> the conceptual system, but the words are used properly. His
>> color sentences should be completely meaningless and
>> correspond to nothing; but they obviously work perfectly fine for
>> a sighted person.
>
> I don't understand why you think these examples are analogous to my claim.
To a person blind since birth, the concept of color is external to
their conceptual framework. Yet color-statements are not nonsense.
If they were given vision at some point later in life: bingo! you just
expanded the conceptual framework since it now include colors.
andy-k
> >andy-k wrote:
>>Outside and inside are conventional designations pertaining to *parts* of
>>the conceptual framework. Those designations are misappropriated when
>>applied to the framework itself.
>>
> What distinguishes the "framework itself" from the conceptual parts?
The relationship "comprised of".
> What distinguishes "conventional designations" from other designations?
Conventional designation stands in contrast to inherent existence.
> How, or by whom, is that determined?
The identity of a thing is determined by the identities of all other things.
Craig Franck
> "Craig Franck" wrote:
>> I really think this should make sense out of such a question. The way
>> the logical positivists handled this was to state that there was a real
>> world external to our concepts, but it just doesn't mean what the
>> average person thinks it does when they ask the question and get
>> a positive response.
>
> It's precisely that mode of thinking that makes the question seem
> reasonable -- you're working to a *picture* that can't be applied to the
> conceptual framework itself.
You might have covered this in another post, but I don't see why
there is this restriction.
I objected to this in another thread: *my* conceptual framework lets
me do this. It's in my conceptual universe.
Are you claiming my world is not the conceptual external world
of the computer system? It seems you should be able to have
nested conceptual systems. The computer's concepts are a subset
of my concepts. They must be, because I'm thinking about the
computer!
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote
>> inside and an outside. You're treating the conceptual framework as just
>> another "thing", and thereby picturing it as having an inside and an
>> outside. I'm saying that the picture is wrong because the conceptual
>> framework must not be treated as just another thing in a world full of
>> things.
>
> So it was given all at once, with no development? How does a child
> develop into an adult with no framework expansion? This seems to
> be an irrefutable objection (assuming I "get it," of course) Einstein
> was born knowing relativity theory?
Einstein is a *part* of the conceptual framework (see below).
> Perhaps reading Wittgenstein wasn't hasn't helped, after all. I don't
> see why, logically, I can't have a concept that includes all concepts
> or one that is external to all concepts. It seems you should be able
> to manipulate conceptual frameworks the same way you do sets.
You not only *can* have such a concept, but you *do* have. That is the root
of the problem -- once the conceptual framework has been conceived, then of
course it has an inside and an outside like any other concept. Then the
process proliferates -- you go on to say that this is "my" conceptual
framework, and that is "your" conceptual framework, as though there were
more than one conceptual framework, whilst all the time "mine" and "yours"
are simply more concepts in the conceptual framework.
> By making the external world is a logical construction you are freed
> from metaphysical considerations.
The postulate of the external world *is* a metaphysical construction,
so to adopt that postulate is certainly not to be freed from metaphysical
considerations.
> It seems the conceptual framework is a logical construction, as well.
> It's certainly not an empirical reality because I can't imagine an
> experiment to see if it is correct or not.
There are concepts, and concepts relate to one another in a network
or framework. Which part of this claim would you dispute and why?
> To a person blind since birth, the concept of color is external to
> their conceptual framework. Yet color-statements are not nonsense.
>
> If they were given vision at some point later in life: bingo! you just
> expanded the conceptual framework since it now include colors.
The problem here is that the example you cite is not the conceptual
framework but *part* of the conceptual framework, so the internal/external
division is appropriately conferred. It is misappropriated when it is
applied to *the conceptual framework*.
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote
>> reasonable -- you're working to a *picture* that can't be applied to the
>> conceptual framework itself.
>
> You might have covered this in another post, but I don't see why
> there is this restriction.
>
> I objected to this in another thread: *my* conceptual framework lets
> me do this. It's in my conceptual universe.
>
> Are you claiming my world is not the conceptual external world
> of the computer system? It seems you should be able to have
> nested conceptual systems. The computer's concepts are a subset
> of my concepts. They must be, because I'm thinking about the
> computer!
There are nested conceptual systems, but I have stipulated that I'm using
the phrase "conceptual framework" in the sense of that framework *as far as
it extends* -- i.e. inclusive of all such nestings. And that also means
inclusive of the concepts of "me", "mine", "you", and "yours".
Craig Franck
> "andy-k" wrote
>> Yes indeed -- there are regular patterns in the framework. That much
>> is not in dispute. What is in dispute is the justification for treating
>> the
>> framework as just another thing in a world full of things.
>
> I think you have it quite backwards. Given what we know about the world,
> about other living creatures, about evolution what is in need of
> justification is the notion that we are somehow trapped and live our lives
> in a "conceptual scheme", so to speak. There are many good reasons for
> believing that the world is quite independent of our representations but
> not vice versa.
I've gone down this path before. His system is Armour-plated against
objections like this. Your talk about evolution or the BB is on a par
with the claim it's okay for an FBI agent to go through their neighbor's
mail because Mulder used to do it all the time on the X-Files.
I recently read "Mysticism and Philosophy," by W.T Stace, and the
problem seems to be on his analysis is Andy-k sees the conceptual
framework as *every conceivable idea*: study philosophy, physics,
whatever for ten years, take three hits of acid, and your *still* not
getting
beyond the "conceptual framework" because it is everything you are
capable of thinking of.
Stace puts forth the idea that if it is an all encompassing system, then it
must be able to support paradoxes such as we run into when analyzing
mystical experiences: God is identical with the universe, but with a
difference; all is unity and plurality *simultaneously,* etc.
So I see statements about the "outside world" from andy-k's position
as paradoxical in nature: we know what they mean perfectly well, but
they are nonsensical at the same time.
Craig Franck
> "Craig Franck" wrote:
>> To a person blind since birth, the concept of color is external to
>> their conceptual framework. Yet color-statements are not nonsense.
>>
>> If they were given vision at some point later in life: bingo! you just
>> expanded the conceptual framework since it now include colors.
>
> The problem here is that the example you cite is not the conceptual
> framework but *part* of the conceptual framework, so the internal/external
> division is appropriately conferred. It is misappropriated when it is
> applied to *the conceptual framework*.
Okay, I think I understand you perfectly now:
Every conceivable thought you could possibly have is part of the
framework. I'm surprised it took so long because I just read a book
that went along these lines.
The book I read (I mentioned it in a reply to gibbs) resolved this by
having any absolutely-anything-you-could-conceive-of" system as
being able to support paradoxes, for the technical reason logic within
the system breaks down when applied to the system as a whole,
but it is almost irresistible to try and apply it since it works so well
on anything within the system.
So talk of an external world seems to makes perfect sense, but is in
fact nonsensical because "the framework" is a unique category with
no analogy due to being everything capable of being thought of.
gibbs
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
> There are nested conceptual systems, but I have stipulated that I'm using
> the phrase "conceptual framework" in the sense of that framework *as far
> as it extends* -- i.e. inclusive of all such nestings. And that also means
> inclusive of the concepts of "me", "mine", "you", and "yours".
"The conceptual framework" is also a concept. Does this concept represent
something external to itself? If it does, than there is something external
to it that it represents and a concept can represent what is external to it.
If it doesn't, than there is nothing that is "the conceptual scheme".
gibbs
"Craig Franck" <craig....@verizon.net> wrote in message
news:I8mOg.2531$SQ1.1889@trndny09...
> Every conceivable thought you could possibly have is part of the
> framework.
It doesn't follow from this by any logic that those thought do not refer to
anything or that my experiences of the world are of things that are not
themselves my experiences or my concepts.
The thought of "the conceptual scheme" is a concept. If this concept
represents something external to itself than a concept can represent what is
external to it. If it doesn't represent something external to itself, then
there is no "the conceptual scheme"; i.e., it represents nothing.
andy-k
<snip>
Wholeness and the Implicate Order.
David Bohm.
"I regard the essence of the notion of process as given by the statement:
Not only is everything changing, but all _is_ flux. That is to say, _what
is_ is the process of becoming itself, while all objects, events, entities,
conditions, structures, etc., are forms that can be abstracted from this
process." (p48)
"[A]ny describable event, object, entity, etc., is an abstraction from an
unknown and undefinable totality of flowing movement. This means that no
matter how far our knowledge of the laws of physics may go, the content of
these laws will still deal with such abstractions, having only a relative
independence of existence and independence of behaviour. So one will not be
led to suppose that _all_ properties of collections of objects, events,
etc., will have to be explainable in terms of some knowable set of ultimate
substances. At any stage, further properties of such collections may arise,
whose ultimate ground is to be regarded as the unknown totality of the
universal flux [...] Clearly, to be consistent, one has to say that
knowledge, too, is a process, an abstraction from the one total flux, which
latter is therefore the ground both of reality and of knowledge of this
reality." (p49)
"[W]hat have been commonly called mind and matter are abstractions from the
universal flux, and [...] both are to be regarded as different and
relatively autonomous orders within one whole movement." (p53)
"[I]t is commonly believed that the content of thought is in some kind of
reflective correspondence with 'real things', perhaps being a kind of copy,
or image, or imitation of things, perhaps a kind of 'map' of things, or
perhaps (along lines similar to those suggested by Plato) a grasp of the
essential and innermost forms of things.
Are any of these views correct? Or is the question itself not in need of
further clarification? For it presupposes that we know what is meant by the
'real thing' and by the distinction between reality and thought. But this is
just what is not properly understood (e.g., even the relatively
sophisticated Kantian notion of 'thing in itself' is just as unclear as the
naive idea of 'real thing')." (pp53-4)
"[T]he word 'thing' arose as a highly generalized indication of any form of
existence, transitory or permanent, that is limited or determined by
conditions." (p54)
"It is of course implicit that what is thought about has an existence that
is independent of the process of thought [...] Of course, the real thing has
more in it than can ever be implied by the content of our thought about it,
as can always be revealed by further observations. Moreover, our thought is
not in general completely correct, so that the real thing may be expected
ultimately to show behaviour or properties contradicting some of the
implications of our thought about it. These are, indeed, among the main ways
in which the real thing can demonstrate its basic independence from thought.
The main indication of the relationship between thing and thought is, then,
that when one thinks correctly about a certain thing, this thought can, at
least up to a point, guide one's actions in relation to that thing to
produce an overall situation that is harmonious and free of contradiction
and confusion.
If the thing and the thought about it have their ground in the one
undefinable and unknown totality of flux, then the attempt to explain their
relationship by supposing that the thought is in reflective correspondence
with the thing has no meaning, for both thought and thing are forms
abstracted from the total process. The reason why these forms are related
could only be in the ground from which they arise, but there can be no way
of discussing reflective correspondence in this ground, because reflective
correspondence implies knowledge, while the ground is beyond what can be
assimilated in the content of knowledge." (pp54-5)
"What is required here, then, is not an _explanation_ that would give us
some knowledge of the relationship of thought and thing, or of thought and
'reality as a whole'. Rather, what is needed is an _act of understanding_;
in which we see the totality as an actual process that, when carried out
properly, tends to bring about a harmonious and orderly overall action,
incorporating both thought and what is thought about in a single movement,
in which analysis into separate parts (e.g., thought and thing) has no
meaning." (p56)
1Z
Nice.
Craig Franck
> "Craig Franck" wrote
>> Every conceivable thought you could possibly have is part of the
>> framework.
>
> It doesn't follow from this by any logic that those thought do not refer
> to anything
Those thoughts are experiences that refer to other experiences.
The logic involved is such that looking for "an external world behind
my experiences" makes as much sense as looking for "an external
world at right angles to my experiences"; it is simply not defined.
The closest logical analogy I can think of is that of integers and the
set of all integers, which is an infinity.What introduces the paradoxes
is the set of all integers doesn't behave like an integer. I can add one
to it, and it doesn't get any larger, for example.
> or that my experiences of the world are of things that are not themselves
> my experiences or my concepts.
My interpretation is, because this is a paradox, it is meaningless
and in some sense "true" or "special nonsense." The phrase "not
themselves my experiences or my concepts" is as useless as saying
"The state of California is not a prime number." It's true, but you can
only apply prime-ness to numbers, so it's nonsense all the same.
> The thought of "the conceptual scheme" is a concept. If this concept
> represents something external to itself than a concept can represent what
> is external to it. If it doesn't represent something external to itself,
> then there is no "the conceptual scheme"; i.e., it represents nothing.
The least attractive thing about this sort of system is it is totally
self-referential. I have memories of past events, but there is no way
I can go back in time and compare the memory with the event itself.
This makes statements about past events paradoxical as well. All
I am saying is the present is a walled-off as the past.
But the notion that "the conceptual scheme" must represent some-
thing external to itself or it represents nothing is false. Representations
can refer to other representations. There doesn't have to be terminal
points which points to something beyond. The "outside world" is
simply a logical construction inside the scheme. The mathematization
of space turned it into a set of points, but that made it simply a
logical fiction.
turtoni
Interesting post.
gibbs
> The logic involved is such that looking for "an external world behind
> my experiences" makes as much sense as looking for "an external
> world at right angles to my experiences"; it is simply not defined.
This betrays a misunderstanding of what experience is (and the logic of
experience). Experience is experience of something, that is, consciousness
is intentional. We don't experience experiences, we don't have to look for
anything behind experiences because experiences are already the revelation
of what is experience. In English, this means that, for example, if I see a
cat, I see a cat. I don't see an experience of a cat. That's the sort of
mistaken understanding that generates the unsavory notions of "things in
themselves" and all the rest of the Kantian hullabaloo. Of course, how
experiences are from a human point of view and are colored by human
concepts. From this we can't conclude though that we have to imagine or go
looking for something behind experiences.
> But the notion that "the conceptual scheme" must represent some-
> thing external to itself or it represents nothing is false.
> Representations
> can refer to other representations. There doesn't have to be terminal
> points which points to something beyond. The "outside world" is
> simply a logical construction inside the scheme. The mathematization
> of space turned it into a set of points, but that made it simply a
> logical fiction.
The very phrase "representations can refer to other representations" is just
another way of saying that concepts can represent something other than
themselves. It doesn't matter what is represented. If we didn't have the
concept of "the conceptual scheme" would there still be a conceptual scheme?
Realism boils down to the claim that there is a way things are independent
of how we represent the way things are. It doesn't make a claim as to
exactly what makes up the world. The "outside world" isn't a logical
construction but a background for rationality. The grand conveyor of our
concepts, language, operates assumes this background so that we can make
sense of one another when we communicate.
Even to say that "the conceptual scheme" is just a description implies that
there is a way things are that can be described using concepts.
1Z
Craig Franck wrote:
> "gibbs" wrote
>
> > "Craig Franck" wrote
>
> >> Every conceivable thought you could possibly have is part of the
> >> framework.
> >
> > It doesn't follow from this by any logic that those thought do not refer
> > to anything
>
> Those thoughts are experiences that refer to other experiences.
So what does the thought "non experiential" refer to ?
> But the notion that "the conceptual scheme" must represent some-
> thing external to itself or it represents nothing is false. Representations
> can refer to other representations.
The notion that because representations can represent other
representation, they must represent other representation
is false.
> There doesn't have to be terminal
> points which points to something beyond. The "outside world" is
> simply a logical construction inside the scheme.
You don't know that. (To be more precise, there
obviously is such a mental construct, but you don't
know that it fails to reference or intend anything non-mental.
You only have an argument to the effect that it *might* fail to)
> The mathematization
> of space turned it into a set of points, but that made it simply a
> logical fiction.
There are no real spatial points for the mathematial construct to refer
to ? You don't know that.
Craig Franck
> "Craig Franck" wrote
>> The logic involved is such that looking for "an external world behind
>> my experiences" makes as much sense as looking for "an external
>> world at right angles to my experiences"; it is simply not defined.
>
> This betrays a misunderstanding of what experience is (and the logic of
> experience). Experience is experience of something, that is,
> consciousness is intentional. We don't experience experiences, we don't
> have to look for anything behind experiences because experiences are
> already the revelation of what is experience. In English, this means
> that, for example, if I see a cat, I see a cat. I don't see an experience
> of a cat.
It is true that we don't experience our experiences; all there is is an
experience. I also believe that objects as external entities are given
phenomenalogically. But the notion of consciousness as an opaque
representation is not given. That comes from analysis.
According to the best science available, all we can really know is the
states of our nervous systems. So we have an experience of a cat.
But that experience is not the cat itself. So it must be on the basis of
animal intuition (no pun intended) that we experience a cat external
to our own mind.
> That's the sort of mistaken understanding that generates the unsavory
> notions of "things in themselves" and all the rest of the Kantian
> hullabaloo. Of course, how experiences are from a human point of view and
> are colored by human concepts. From this we can't conclude though that we
> have to imagine or go looking for something behind experiences.
But the way those statements are being interpreted by andy-k
suggests we do.
>> But the notion that "the conceptual scheme" must represent some-
>> thing external to itself or it represents nothing is false.
>> Representations
>> can refer to other representations. There doesn't have to be terminal
>> points which points to something beyond. The "outside world" is
>> simply a logical construction inside the scheme. The mathematization
>> of space turned it into a set of points, but that made it simply a
>> logical fiction.
>
> The very phrase "representations can refer to other representations" is
> just another way of saying that concepts can represent something other
> than themselves. It doesn't matter what is represented. If we didn't
> have the concept of "the conceptual scheme" would there still be a
> conceptual scheme?
I believe so, because most of it, even in reflective people, is
unconsciously expressed. That's why so much of it is in the form
of intuitions of some sort or another: A baby *knows* its mother has
a mind similar to its own, even though such a *conception* requires a
massive philosophical leap.
> Realism boils down to the claim that there is a way things are independent
> of how we represent the way things are. It doesn't make a claim as to
> exactly what makes up the world. The "outside world" isn't a logical
> construction but a background for rationality. The grand conveyor of our
> concepts, language, operates assumes this background so that we can make
> sense of one another when we communicate.
That's how I look at it myself. But there is no refuting andy-k once
you've completely understood his system. This is why Russell
claimed the external world was a logical construction: it then
becomes irrefutable itself because it makes no metaphysical claims.
> Even to say that "the conceptual scheme" is just a description implies
> that there is a way things are that can be described using concepts.
Yes, but the relationship between the conceptual scheme and "the way
things are" is such that any particular conceptual scheme can represent
a huge number of possible "way things are." Two scientific theories
can contradict one another and both seem to work perfectly fine.
Craig Franck
> Craig Franck wrote:
>> "gibbs" wrote
>>
>> > "Craig Franck" wrote
>>
>> >> Every conceivable thought you could possibly have is part of the
>> >> framework.
>> >
>> > It doesn't follow from this by any logic that those thought do not
>> > refer
>> > to anything
>>
>> Those thoughts are experiences that refer to other experiences.
>
> So what does the thought "non experiential" refer to ?
I'm not sure what the point of this question is, but I'd say it
refers to a vegetative state.
>> But the notion that "the conceptual scheme" must represent some-
>> thing external to itself or it represents nothing is false.
>> Representations
>> can refer to other representations.
>
> The notion that because representations can represent other
> representation, they must represent other representation
> is false.
True.
>> There doesn't have to be terminal
>> points which points to something beyond. The "outside world" is
>> simply a logical construction inside the scheme.
>
> You don't know that. (To be more precise, there
> obviously is such a mental construct, but you don't
> know that it fails to reference or intend anything non-mental.
> You only have an argument to the effect that it *might* fail to)
Correct. If someone were to claim that the universe was created,
more or less as is, last Tuesday, all representations about things
that occurred previous to that day would not represent anything
but themselves. They would refer to nothing but fictional constructs.
You could accuse them of silliness or sophistry, but you couldn't
refute them logically.
>> The mathematization
>> of space turned it into a set of points, but that made it simply a
>> logical fiction.
>
> There are no real spatial points for the mathematial construct to refer
> to ? You don't know that.
No one has ever detected a "geometrical point" in space since it
has no size. The quantum fluxuations would be infinite. This is
why the equations for "point particles" explode into infinities.
mikeg...@xtra.co.nz
Craig Franck wrote:
> Two scientific theories
> can contradict one another and both seem to work perfectly fine.
Goodgod do you and IZ and that other bozo, all seriously believe that
you are all saying anything fundametally philosophically different to
each other?
Prove the above trash of yours as being a statement of absolute 100%
fact, give *two contradicting scientific theories*, about the exact
same existent item of sensory matter, that both work perfectly fine.
Michael Gordge
1Z
Craig Franck wrote:
> "gibbs" wrote
>
> > "Craig Franck" wrote
>
> >> The logic involved is such that looking for "an external world behind
> >> my experiences" makes as much sense as looking for "an external
> >> world at right angles to my experiences"; it is simply not defined.
> >
> > This betrays a misunderstanding of what experience is (and the logic of
> > experience). Experience is experience of something, that is,
> > consciousness is intentional. We don't experience experiences, we don't
> > have to look for anything behind experiences because experiences are
> > already the revelation of what is experience. In English, this means
> > that, for example, if I see a cat, I see a cat. I don't see an experience
> > of a cat.
>
> It is true that we don't experience our experiences; all there is is an
> experience. I also believe that objects as external entities are given
> phenomenalogically. But the notion of consciousness as an opaque
> representation is not given. That comes from analysis.
>
> According to the best science available, all we can really know is the
> states of our nervous systems.
Completely wrong.
If you look at someone else's nervous system
through a microscope, or an MRI scan,
you are looking at an external object. Nervous systems
are not revealed by introspection. Neuroloscience is posited
on the real existence of external objects.
> > Realism boils down to the claim that there is a way things are independent
> > of how we represent the way things are. It doesn't make a claim as to
> > exactly what makes up the world. The "outside world" isn't a logical
> > construction but a background for rationality. The grand conveyor of our
> > concepts, language, operates assumes this background so that we can make
> > sense of one another when we communicate.
>
> That's how I look at it myself. But there is no refuting andy-k once
> you've completely understood his system.
I have always found him to be highly refutable.
> This is why Russell
> claimed the external world was a logical construction: it then
> becomes irrefutable itself because it makes no metaphysical claims.
>
> > Even to say that "the conceptual scheme" is just a description implies
> > that there is a way things are that can be described using concepts.
>
> Yes, but the relationship between the conceptual scheme and "the way
> things are" is such that any particular conceptual scheme can represent
> a huge number of possible "way things are."
Not representing a single determinate world, and not representing a
an external world at all ,are two completely different issues.
1Z
It is of course very difficult to formulate two signifcantly different
theories
that make exactly the same predictions, have exactly the same
level of generality, and have exactly the same level of ontological
parsimony.
We have multiple theories, where we do,
because they are better in one respect and worse in another.
1Z
Craig Franck wrote:
> "1Z" wrote
>
> > Craig Franck wrote:
>
> >> "gibbs" wrote
> >>
> >> > "Craig Franck" wrote
> >>
> >> >> Every conceivable thought you could possibly have is part of the
> >> >> framework.
> >> >
> >> > It doesn't follow from this by any logic that those thought do not
> >> > refer
> >> > to anything
> >>
> >> Those thoughts are experiences that refer to other experiences.
> >
> > So what does the thought "non experiential" refer to ?
>
> I'm not sure what the point of this question is, but I'd say it
> refers to a vegetative state.
So is a vegatative state an experience?
> >> But the notion that "the conceptual scheme" must represent some-
> >> thing external to itself or it represents nothing is false.
> >> Representations
> >> can refer to other representations.
> >
> > The notion that because representations can represent other
> > representation, they must represent other representation
> > is false.
>
> True.
> >> There doesn't have to be terminal
> >> points which points to something beyond. The "outside world" is
> >> simply a logical construction inside the scheme.
> >
> > You don't know that. (To be more precise, there
> > obviously is such a mental construct, but you don't
> > know that it fails to reference or intend anything non-mental.
> > You only have an argument to the effect that it *might* fail to)
>
> Correct. If someone were to claim that the universe was created,
> more or less as is, last Tuesday, all representations about things
> that occurred previous to that day would not represent anything
> but themselves. They would refer to nothing but fictional constructs.
And if not, not. Your argument is still nothing but a "maybe".
> You could accuse them of silliness or sophistry, but you couldn't
> refute them logically.
There is nothing to refute. They don't know the world was
created last Tuesday.
> >> The mathematization
> >> of space turned it into a set of points, but that made it simply a
> >> logical fiction.
> >
> > There are no real spatial points for the mathematial construct to refer
> > to ? You don't know that.
>
> No one has ever detected a "geometrical point" in space since it
> has no size.
No-one has detected anything, according to you. Why pick on points ?
Has anyone detected a finite volume of empty space.
> The quantum fluxuations would be infinite.
If it is possible that the world was
created last tuesday,
it is posible that quantum mechanics is wrong.
Why are sceptics too dim to realise they have pulled ut the rug from
under their onwn feet.?
> This is
> why the equations for "point particles" explode into infinities.
But the equations of QM are just another mental construct, blah, blah,
balh,
zzzzzzzz
Craig Franck
.
> Craig Franck wrote:
>> "gibbs" wrote
>> > This betrays a misunderstanding of what experience is (and the logic of
>> > experience). Experience is experience of something, that is,
>> > consciousness is intentional. We don't experience experiences, we
>> > don't
>> > have to look for anything behind experiences because experiences are
>> > already the revelation of what is experience. In English, this means
>> > that, for example, if I see a cat, I see a cat. I don't see an
>> > experience
>> > of a cat.
>>
>> It is true that we don't experience our experiences; all there is is an
>> experience. I also believe that objects as external entities are given
>> phenomenalogically. But the notion of consciousness as an opaque
>> representation is not given. That comes from analysis.
>>
>> According to the best science available, all we can really know is the
>> states of our nervous systems.
>
> Completely wrong.
I've been told that before.
> If you look at someone else's nervous system
> through a microscope, or an MRI scan,
> you are looking at an external object. Nervous systems
> are not revealed by introspection. Neuroloscience is posited
> on the real existence of external objects.
I grasp your point.
My point was the volume of space that makes up the visual field
that you perceive object embedded in -- is inside your visual cortex.
You see with your brain.
You infer that external objects cause most of the perceptions you
experience when you look about you. So the MRI scan is a
representation of a state of affairs:
http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/Representationalism.html#DEBATES
>> That's how I look at it myself. But there is no refuting andy-k once
>> you've completely understood his system.
>
> I have always found him to be highly refutable.
I'm sure, but I believe most of your refutations rest on one sort of
misunderstanding or another. Witness above.
>> > Even to say that "the conceptual scheme" is just a description implies
>> > that there is a way things are that can be described using concepts.
>>
>> Yes, but the relationship between the conceptual scheme and "the way
>> things are" is such that any particular conceptual scheme can represent
>> a huge number of possible "way things are."
>
> Not representing a single determinate world, and not representing a
> an external world at all ,are two completely different issues.
That's true, but it raises the point of what it means to "represent the
world." "Hasn't been demonstrated not to be the case yet" is often as
close as we can get.
Craig Franck
> Craig Franck wrote:
>
>> Two scientific theories
>> can contradict one another and both seem to work perfectly fine.
>
> Goodgod do you and IZ and that other bozo, all seriously believe that
> you are all saying anything fundametally philosophically different to
> each other?
I believe so, but I must admit I don't know who "bozo" specifically
refers to.
> Prove the above trash of yours as being a statement of absolute 100%
> fact, give *two contradicting scientific theories*, about the exact
> same existent item of sensory matter, that both work perfectly fine.
The classic example is a Newtonian vs. Relativistic treatment of
gravity.
mikeg...@xtra.co.nz
Craig Franck wrote:
> The classic example is a Newtonian vs. Relativistic treatment of
> gravity.
YOUR claim is.
"Two scientific theories can contradict one another and both seem to
work perfectly fine."
Give the relativistic scientific theory on gravity that contradicts
Newton's theory on gravity.
Craig Franck
Large velocities or gravitational fields cause Newton's treatment to
breakdown. Under conditions we are most familiar with on Earth,
Newton works fine, but it can't be correct. When you take into
account quantum theories of gravity, neither work. So something
else entirely must be the case:
http://csep10.phys.utk.edu/astr161/lect/history/einstein.html
gibbs
> It is true that we don't experience our experiences; all there is is an
> experience. I also believe that objects as external entities are given
> phenomenalogically. But the notion of consciousness as an opaque
> representation is not given. That comes from analysis.
> According to the best science available, all we can really know is the
> states of our nervous systems. So we have an experience of a cat.
> But that experience is not the cat itself. So it must be on the basis of
> animal intuition (no pun intended) that we experience a cat external
> to our own mind.
Geez, Craig, this is a philosophic error, not a scientific one. No doubt we
have nervous states that we describe as "experiences". But if you and I are
talking about a book we read or a girl we see we're talking about things in
the world we've experienced and know about. Our scientific analysis will
describe how this gets done (it doesn't now, except in a very rough way),
but to make the claim that the best science available says that all we know
are states of our nervous systems is mistaken. The mistake isn't about
nervous systems, but what we mean by "knowledge". (The reliance on a
mysterious "intuition" sounds to me like hand-waving.)
Why isn't it an experience of a cat? If you and I are talking about a cat,
why aren't we talking about a cat instead of our "intuitions"?
Does a baby know that??
>> Realism boils down to the claim that there is a way things are
>> independent of how we represent the way things are. It doesn't make a
>> claim as to exactly what makes up the world. The "outside world" isn't a
>> logical construction but a background for rationality. The grand
>> conveyor of our concepts, language, operates assumes this background so
>> that we can make sense of one another when we communicate.
> That's how I look at it myself. But there is no refuting andy-k once
> you've completely understood his system. This is why Russell
> claimed the external world was a logical construction: it then
> becomes irrefutable itself because it makes no metaphysical claims.
The problem with Russell is that his system really never explained how we
know about the world. The logically coherent alternative, that we actually
perceive things instead of sense-data, does.
>> Even to say that "the conceptual scheme" is just a description implies
>> that there is a way things are that can be described using concepts.
> Yes, but the relationship between the conceptual scheme and "the way
> things are" is such that any particular conceptual scheme can represent
> a huge number of possible "way things are." Two scientific theories
> can contradict one another and both seem to work perfectly fine.
The fact that you can compare two scientific theories assumes that there is
an external are that they successfully talk about. Realism is essential for
intelligibility; it is not a truth condition.
1Z
No, there isn't a volume of space inside my brain -- at least I hopne
not, as it would be a sign of severe dgenerative condition.
> You see with your brain.
"With", yes. That does does not mean I see neural activity instead
of objects. In fact neural activity does not show up
introspectively at all. The ancients believed thought took plac
eint he heart.
> You infer that external objects cause most of the perceptions you
> experience when you look about you. So the MRI scan is a
> representation of a state of affairs:
>
> http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/Representationalism.html#DEBATES
Yes -- a representation of something, a representationof something
external.
> >> That's how I look at it myself. But there is no refuting andy-k once
> >> you've completely understood his system.
> >
> > I have always found him to be highly refutable.
>
> I'm sure, but I believe most of your refutations rest on one sort of
> misunderstanding or another. Witness above.
I haven't misunderstood anything.
> >> > Even to say that "the conceptual scheme" is just a description implies
> >> > that there is a way things are that can be described using concepts.
> >>
> >> Yes, but the relationship between the conceptual scheme and "the way
> >> things are" is such that any particular conceptual scheme can represent
> >> a huge number of possible "way things are."
> >
> > Not representing a single determinate world, and not representing a
> > an external world at all ,are two completely different issues.
>
> That's true, but it raises the point of what it means to "represent the
> world." "Hasn't been demonstrated not to be the case yet" is often as
> close as we can get.
The Andy/Russel position is incoherent because it is based on
3rd-persons descriptions
of external objects such as brains and neurons, although it ultimately
concludes that they are as non-existent as any other external object.
(And then there is the error problem, the causal stability problem...).
gibbs
"1Z" <peter...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1158491228.7...@k70g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
> The Andy/Russel position is incoherent because it is based on
> 3rd-persons descriptions
> of external objects such as brains and neurons, although it ultimately
> concludes that they are as non-existent as any other external object.
It is not only incoherent but is misunderstanding of how the body works.
Experience is the product of the interaction of the human body and its
nervous system and world. Concepts enhance experience, but not always: in
pathological states, as agnosia, there is still sensory experience but the
ability to interpret sensory experience is absent.
1Z
Craig Franck wrote:
> Large velocities or gravitational fields cause Newton's treatment to
> breakdown. Under conditions we are most familiar with on Earth,
> Newton works fine, but it can't be correct. When you take into
> account quantum theories of gravity, neither work. So something
> else entirely must be the case:
>
> http://csep10.phys.utk.edu/astr161/lect/history/einstein.html
Indeed. And we can tell that because there is a real world
to test theories against.
Ed
Just jumping in the middle here; you speak of "the conceptual
framework"; is there necessarily only one? If there were intelligent
aliens, would their conceptual framework be identical to our conceptual
framework?
Ed
andy-k
Well howdy Ed -- long time no see.
This is copied from a conversation with Craig in this thread:
[Craig:]
> I don't see why, logically, I can't have a concept that includes all
> concepts or one that is external to all concepts. It seems you should be
> able to manipulate conceptual frameworks the same way you do sets.
[Andy:]
You not only *can* have such a concept, but you *do* have. That is the
root of the problem -- once the conceptual framework has been conceived,
then of course it has an inside and an outside like any other concept.
Then the process proliferates -- you go on to say that this is "my"
conceptual framework, and that is "your" conceptual framework, as though
there were more than one conceptual framework, whilst all the time "mine"
and "yours" are simply more concepts in the conceptual framework.
1Z
andy-k wrote:
> "Ed" wrote:
> > Just jumping in the middle here; you speak of
> > "the conceptual framework"; is there necessarily only one?
> > If there were intelligent aliens, would their conceptual
> > framework be identical to our conceptual framework?
>
> Well howdy Ed -- long time no see.
> This is copied from a conversation with Craig in this thread:
>
> [Craig:]
> > I don't see why, logically, I can't have a concept that includes all
> > concepts or one that is external to all concepts. It seems you should be
> > able to manipulate conceptual frameworks the same way you do sets.
>
> [Andy:]
> You not only *can* have such a concept, but you *do* have. That is the
> root of the problem -- once the conceptual framework has been conceived,
> then of course it has an inside and an outside like any other concept.
Concepts have referents rather than "insides" or "outsides" Those
are misleading metaphors. The concpet of a conceptual
framework has a referent, which is a conceptual framework --
that is: one element in the framewrok refers to all of it.
> Then the process proliferates -- you go on to say that this is "my"
> conceptual framework, and that is "your" conceptual framework, as though
> there were more than one conceptual framework, whilst all the time "mine"
> and "yours" are simply more concepts in the conceptual framework.
Concepts with referents.
Craig Franck
> Craig Franck wrote:
>> My point was the volume of space that makes up the visual field
>> that you perceive object embedded in -- is inside your visual cortex.
>
> No, there isn't a volume of space inside my brain -- at least I hopne
> not, as it would be a sign of severe dgenerative condition.
The perceptual volume. Visual space is strongly non-Euclidian. No
one in neuroscience believes the space they see around them is
the space of science and mathematics.
>> You see with your brain.
>
> "With", yes. That does does not mean I see neural activity instead
> of objects.
If you see a color, you are seeing the result of neurons firing. (Why
the structure of experience is so different from brain physiology is
a fascinating mystery.)
> In fact neural activity does not show up
> introspectively at all.
Introspection *is* neural activity according to identity theorists.
>The ancients believed thought took plac
> eint he heart.
I don't believe that's relevant.
>> You infer that external objects cause most of the perceptions you
>> experience when you look about you. So the MRI scan is a
>> representation of a state of affairs:
>>
>> http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/Representationalism.html#DEBATES
>
> Yes -- a representation of something, a representationof something
> external.
That is one interpretation, which I happen to agree with. But it seems
you have a somewhat naive idea of how the brain functions.
Craig Franck
> Craig Franck wrote:
>> You could accuse them of silliness or sophistry, but you couldn't
>> refute them logically.
>
> There is nothing to refute. They don't know the world was
> created last Tuesday.
It appears we are having two completely different conversations.
Craig Franck
> Why isn't it an experience of a cat? If you and I are talking about a
> cat, why aren't we talking about a cat instead of our "intuitions"?
The argument is when we dream of a cat or have a hallucination of
a cat, *there is no cat present*. So now I must intuit which of my
experiences are "real" as opposed to imaginary.
> "Craig Franck" wrote:
>> That's how I look at it myself. But there is no refuting andy-k once
>> you've completely understood his system. This is why Russell
>> claimed the external world was a logical construction: it then
>> becomes irrefutable itself because it makes no metaphysical claims.
>
> The problem with Russell is that his system really never explained how we
> know about the world. The logically coherent alternative, that we
> actually perceive things instead of sense-data, does.
When he was advocating his sense-data theory he believed causal
chains of events caused us to have perceptions of objects in the
environment. There were separate perceptual and physical spaces
that interacted.
You also need to take into account the environment he formed his
philosophical opinions in. Wittgenstein was holding that when you
dream of a cat, there is an actual cat present. Not having dogmatic
metaphysical beliefs forces you to address the logic of an argument
rather than responding in what you believe are revealed truths about
the world
1Z
Craig Franck wrote:
> "1Z" wrote
>
> > Craig Franck wrote:
>
> >> My point was the volume of space that makes up the visual field
> >> that you perceive object embedded in -- is inside your visual cortex.
> >
> > No, there isn't a volume of space inside my brain -- at least I hopne
> > not, as it would be a sign of severe dgenerative condition.
>
> The perceptual volume. Visual space is strongly non-Euclidian.
Visual "space" is a virtual space.
> No
> one in neuroscience believes the space they see around them is
> the space of science and mathematics.
No one in neurscience believes brains are a figment of the mind.
> >> You see with your brain.
> >
> > "With", yes. That does does not mean I see neural activity instead
> > of objects.
>
> If you see a color, you are seeing the result of neurons firing. (Why
> the structure of experience is so different from brain physiology is
> a fascinating mystery.)
Neurons firing as an end result of photons bouncing off external-world
objects.
> > In fact neural activity does not show up
> > introspectively at all.
>
> Introspection *is* neural activity according to identity theorists.
And it does not seem like neural activity. Which disproves the
crudest forms of identity theory.
> >The ancients believed thought took plac
> > eint he heart.
>
> I don't believe that's relevant.
The point is that we know differently fro
investigating the brain as a 3rd-person,e xternal world
objects. Youare appealing to the fruits
of that investigation while trying to conclude
that there are no external-world objects.
> >> You infer that external objects cause most of the perceptions you
> >> experience when you look about you. So the MRI scan is a
> >> representation of a state of affairs:
> >>
> >> http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/Representationalism.html#DEBATES
> >
> > Yes -- a representation of something, a representationof something
> > external.
>
> That is one interpretation, which I happen to agree with. But it seems
> you have a somewhat naive idea of how the brain functions.
"Hey man, reality is, like, in your head!" is naive. Most people
get past it by the their twenties.
1Z
Craig Franck wrote:
> "gibbs" wrote
>
> > Why isn't it an experience of a cat? If you and I are talking about a
> > cat, why aren't we talking about a cat instead of our "intuitions"?
>
> The argument is when we dream of a cat or have a hallucination of
> a cat, *there is no cat present*. So now I must intuit which of my
> experiences are "real" as opposed to imaginary.
The maximal consistent set is real. But that's not really intuition.
1Z
Craig Franck wrote:
> "1Z" wrote
>
> > Craig Franck wrote:
>
> >> You could accuse them of silliness or sophistry, but you couldn't
> >> refute them logically.
> >
> > There is nothing to refute. They don't know the world was
> > created last Tuesday.
>
> It appears we are having two completely different conversations.
Just because A is possible and B is possible, does not mean
there is nothing to choose between them. Some possibilities are
near enough facts ofr all practical purposes, others are as
near enough falsehoods.
Craig Franck
> Craig Franck wrote:
>> "1Z" wrote
>> > Craig Franck wrote:
>> >> My point was the volume of space that makes up the visual field
>> >> that you perceive object embedded in -- is inside your visual cortex.
>> >
>> > No, there isn't a volume of space inside my brain -- at least I hopne
>> > not, as it would be a sign of severe dgenerative condition.
>>
>> The perceptual volume. Visual space is strongly non-Euclidian.
>
> Visual "space" is a virtual space.
Yes. Consciousness virtualizes the physical environment. This is
precisely why it causes metaphysical problems.
>> No
>> one in neuroscience believes the space they see around them is
>> the space of science and mathematics.
>
> No one in neurscience believes brains are a figment of the mind.
Most scientists believe in some form of scientific realism. But the
fact there is no test for it demonstrates it is not an empirical belief
and hence not science but metaphysics.
>> > In fact neural activity does not show up
>> > introspectively at all.
>>
>> Introspection *is* neural activity according to identity theorists.
>
> And it does not seem like neural activity. Which disproves the
> crudest forms of identity theory.
Any theory that doesn't explain the duality will be inadequate.
>> >The ancients believed thought took plac
>> > eint he heart.
>>
>> I don't believe that's relevant.
>
> The point is that we know differently fro
> investigating the brain as a 3rd-person,e xternal world
> objects. Youare appealing to the fruits
> of that investigation while trying to conclude
> that there are no external-world objects.
I understand you can't use science to disprove the external world
when science requires an external world for scientific statements
to be valid.
I am claiming science has no opinion since this is not an empirical
issue.
>> >> You infer that external objects cause most of the perceptions you
>> >> experience when you look about you. So the MRI scan is a
>> >> representation of a state of affairs:
>> >>
>> >> http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/Representationalism.html#DEBATES
>> >
>> > Yes -- a representation of something, a representationof something
>> > external.
>>
>> That is one interpretation, which I happen to agree with. But it seems
>> you have a somewhat naive idea of how the brain functions.
>
> "Hey man, reality is, like, in your head!" is naive. Most people
> get past it by the their twenties.
I won't debate how prevalent this view is.
But you again misunderstand my argument: the statement that
"reality is all in your head" is nonsensical.
Craig Franck
> Craig Franck wrote:
>> "gibbs" wrote
I agree with that; but then there is the issue of whether another
state of consciousness that was just as consistent as our normal
waking state would render a different reality.
A spider exists in another kind of reality, but that standard.
> But that's not really intuition.
I believe it is because most people intuit what's real and what's not.
This sort of philosophical analysis doesn't enter into most people's
consideration.
Craig Franck
> Craig Franck wrote:
That's true, but irrelevant.A large part of the argument is you
can't mix metaphysics and empiricism.
1Z
Craig Franck wrote:
> "1Z" wrote
>
> > Craig Franck wrote:
>
> >> "1Z" wrote
>
> >> > Craig Franck wrote:
>
> >> >> My point was the volume of space that makes up the visual field
> >> >> that you perceive object embedded in -- is inside your visual cortex.
> >> >
> >> > No, there isn't a volume of space inside my brain -- at least I hopne
> >> > not, as it would be a sign of severe dgenerative condition.
> >>
> >> The perceptual volume. Visual space is strongly non-Euclidian.
> >
> > Visual "space" is a virtual space.
>
> Yes. Consciousness virtualizes the physical environment. This is
> precisely why it causes metaphysical problems.
Poor thinking is what causes metaphysical problems.
> >> No
> >> one in neuroscience believes the space they see around them is
> >> the space of science and mathematics.
> >
> > No one in neurscience believes brains are a figment of the mind.
>
> Most scientists believe in some form of scientific realism. But the
> fact there is no test for it demonstrates it is not an empirical belief
> and hence not science but metaphysics.
Don't confuse lack of smoking-gun proof with lack
of evidence. The alternatives to realism are deeply flawed.
> >> > In fact neural activity does not show up
> >> > introspectively at all.
> >>
> >> Introspection *is* neural activity according to identity theorists.
> >
> > And it does not seem like neural activity. Which disproves the
> > crudest forms of identity theory.
>
> Any theory that doesn't explain the duality will be inadequate.
Yes. But idealism is monism. It can't explain neurons.
> >> >The ancients believed thought took plac
> >> > eint he heart.
> >>
> >> I don't believe that's relevant.
> >
> > The point is that we know differently fro
> > investigating the brain as a 3rd-person,e xternal world
> > objects. Youare appealing to the fruits
> > of that investigation while trying to conclude
> > that there are no external-world objects.
>
> I understand you can't use science to disprove the external world
> when science requires an external world for scientific statements
> to be valid.
That is itself a form of proof. The posit of an external
world has explanatory value, as the whole of
science shows. Don't assume
that empirical evidence means foundational evidence.
> I am claiming science has no opinion since this is not an empirical
> issue.
...too late.
> >> >> You infer that external objects cause most of the perceptions you
> >> >> experience when you look about you. So the MRI scan is a
> >> >> representation of a state of affairs:
> >> >>
> >> >> http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/Representationalism.html#DEBATES
> >> >
> >> > Yes -- a representation of something, a representationof something
> >> > external.
> >>
> >> That is one interpretation, which I happen to agree with. But it seems
> >> you have a somewhat naive idea of how the brain functions.
> >
> > "Hey man, reality is, like, in your head!" is naive. Most people
> > get past it by the their twenties.
>
> I won't debate how prevalent this view is.
> But you again misunderstand my argument: the statement that
> "reality is all in your head" is nonsensical.
Then what are we arguing about ?
1Z
Craig Franck wrote:
> "1Z" wrote
>
> > Craig Franck wrote:
>
> >> "gibbs" wrote
>
> >> > Why isn't it an experience of a cat? If you and I are talking about a
> >> > cat, why aren't we talking about a cat instead of our "intuitions"?
> >>
> >> The argument is when we dream of a cat or have a hallucination of
> >> a cat, *there is no cat present*. So now I must intuit which of my
> >> experiences are "real" as opposed to imaginary.
> >
> > The maximal consistent set is real.
>
> I agree with that; but then there is the issue of whether another
> state of consciousness that was just as consistent as our normal
> waking state would render a different reality.
It's not much of an issue unless such a state can be produced.
Again, the fact that various alternatives to realism are (just about)
possible does not mean we should take them seriously, or
that realism vs. idealism is a 50:50 issue.
> A spider exists in another kind of reality, but that standard.
>
> > But that's not really intuition.
>
> I believe it is because most people intuit what's real and what's not.
> This sort of philosophical analysis doesn't enter into most people's
> consideration.
Maybe the intuition is just a short-cut. Maybe it is possible
to reconstruct the intuitive proces as an explicit, rational process.
Sphere
andy-k wrote:
> "Anthony G. Rubino" wrote:
> >>andy-k wrote:
> >>The conceptual framework, as far as it extends, is all that is known.
> >
> > Is there a knower, or knowers, within the extension of the conceptual
> > framework?
>
> Yes -- knower, knowing, and known arise in mutual dependence
> within that framework -- i.e. they have a *conventional* existence
> and not an *inherent* existence.
>
>
> > Is its extension limited, or unlimited?
> >
> > Is there anything external to it?
>
> Since the conceptual framework is comprised of parts (i.e. concepts),
> and parts are conceived as entering into the part/whole relationship,
> the framework is conceived of as an extrapolation of that relationship
> (the apex of the hierarchy as it were) -- i.e. as a conventional whole.
> The framework has then been modeled within itself, and this is the decisive
> step in the reasoning process where reason has overstepped its bounds.
> And having taken that step, it is then considered reasonable to treat the
> framework as though it has the conventional properties of beginning and end,
> and of internal and external.
>
> Only then can we ask misguided questions like "how did the world begin?",
> and argue about whether or not there is a world that is independent of
> (i.e. external to) our ideas about it. Such seemingly reasonable questions
> are specious, and they are not so much "answered" as obviated by
> understanding that the conceptual framework is not to be treated as
> just another "thing" in a world full of things.
I'm still absorbing what you are saying, but I think
there is a more direct answer. The question "is
there anything external to it?" assumes that 'it' is
in actuality a self-contained whole rather than a
conventional designation. To talk of an 'external'
one first has to assume an 'internal'. If the internal
is not assumed (that is, is not a part of one's system
of belief) then the question of externality becomes
meaningless.
All that can be said is that whatever is without
our thinking it so is undiscussable. Any
discussion of an "external reality" must by the
very nature of discussion be embedded within
the realm of ideas, and therefore colored by whatever
structuration our ideas happen to have. There is
no "objective reality" for the simple reason that both
'objective' and 'reality' are ideas.
>
>
> > If the conceptual framework is all that is known,
> > would that exclude unknowns and new knowledge?
>
> *Look* at how words are *used*. We might want to say, e.g.,
> "the identity of the assailant is unknown". In algebra we represent
> the "unknowns" by symbols. Known and unknown exist by virtue
> of their mutual dependence -- it would be meaningless to speak
> of the "known" if it weren't for the unknown, and vice versa.
>
> New knowledge is continually arising within the framework in the form
> of new perceptions and in the form of new connections between ideas.
---
No essence. No permanence. No perfection.
1Z
Says who ? Metaphysics has always dealt with problems raised
by empiricism.
Sphere
> beyond the framework itself. If the framework evolved over time,
> there must have been things external to it that became integrated.
This assumes a self-contained it for which externality applies.
Basically, you are assuming that there is something special
about ideas. If ideas are assumed to function in basically
the same manner as everything else then there is no
well defined boundary between the inside and the outside
of an idea. There is only the locus of action which is
viewed "from the inside" as an idea and "from the outside"
as the firing of neurons.
>
> This is a problem for your system because the criteria for meaningful-
> ness is so strict. Algebra itself is a generalization of arithmetic.
> 2 + 3 = 3 + 2 is conceptually different than a + b = b + a. You
> can't get one from the other without a conceptual leap. Which is
> fine for most systems; but according to you, a + b = b + a should
> be meaningless if it's doesn't work in the old conceptual system.
???
>
> A great example is the concept of "color" to a congenitally blind
> person. It is phenomenological external to him; but he learns to
> use color words such as "Grass is green." It's completely beyond
> the conceptual system, but the words are used properly. His
> color sentences should be completely meaningless and
> correspond to nothing; but they obviously work perfectly fine for
> a sighted person.
Does the little green men who do not exist exist?
1Z
Sphere wrote:
> All that can be said is that whatever is without
> our thinking it so is undiscussable. Any
> discussion of an "external reality" must by the
> very nature of discussion be embedded within
> the realm of ideas, and therefore colored by whatever
> structuration our ideas happen to have. There is
> no "objective reality" for the simple reason that both
> 'objective' and 'reality' are ideas.
And ideas have referents. Next!
Sphere
1Z wrote:
> Craig Franck wrote:
> > "1Z" wrote
> >
> > > Craig Franck wrote:
> >
> > >> My point was the volume of space that makes up the visual field
> > >> that you perceive object embedded in -- is inside your visual cortex.
> > >
> > > No, there isn't a volume of space inside my brain -- at least I hopne
> > > not, as it would be a sign of severe dgenerative condition.
> >
> > The perceptual volume. Visual space is strongly non-Euclidian.
>
> Visual "space" is a virtual space.
>
> > No
> > one in neuroscience believes the space they see around them is
> > the space of science and mathematics.
>
> No one in neurscience believes brains are a figment of the mind.
>
> > >> You see with your brain.
> > >
> > > "With", yes. That does does not mean I see neural activity instead
> > > of objects.
> >
> > If you see a color, you are seeing the result of neurons firing. (Why
> > the structure of experience is so different from brain physiology is
> > a fascinating mystery.)
>
> Neurons firing as an end result of photons bouncing off external-world
> objects.
For the most part, neurons firing is the end result
of neurons firing. The state of the brain is a very
significant fraction of what the brain's computational
power is devoted to.
Sphere
What duality? Sit inside a house and look out,
then sit outside a house and look in.
Although...I do wonder what it feels like to be
an atom...
Craig Franck
> Craig Franck wrote:
>> "1Z" wrote
>> > Just because A is possible and B is possible, does not mean
>> > there is nothing to choose between them. Some possibilities are
>> > near enough facts ofr all practical purposes, others are as
>> > near enough falsehoods.
>>
>> That's true, but irrelevant.A large part of the argument is you
>> can't mix metaphysics and empiricism.
>
> Says who ? Metaphysics has always dealt with problems raised
> by empiricism.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_positivism
The gist of the argument is all metaphysical statements are
nonsensical: A scientists going on and on about Realism is
just as confused as a philosopher going on and on about
Idealism or Solipsism.
Craig Franck
> Craig Franck wrote:
I see this more as discussion.
The logic of it is this:
If statement S is nonsense
then statement Not S is nonsense as well.
Statements about there being or not being an external world
are both nonsense.
Sphere
1Z wrote:
> Craig Franck wrote:
> > "1Z" wrote
> >
> > > Craig Franck wrote:
> >
> > >> "1Z" wrote
> >
> > >> > Craig Franck wrote:
> >
> > >> >> My point was the volume of space that makes up the visual field
> > >> >> that you perceive object embedded in -- is inside your visual cortex.
> > >> >
> > >> > No, there isn't a volume of space inside my brain -- at least I hopne
> > >> > not, as it would be a sign of severe dgenerative condition.
> > >>
> > >> The perceptual volume. Visual space is strongly non-Euclidian.
> > >
> > > Visual "space" is a virtual space.
> >
> > Yes. Consciousness virtualizes the physical environment. This is
> > precisely why it causes metaphysical problems.
>
> Poor thinking is what causes metaphysical problems.
>
> > >> No
> > >> one in neuroscience believes the space they see around them is
> > >> the space of science and mathematics.
> > >
> > > No one in neurscience believes brains are a figment of the mind.
> >
> > Most scientists believe in some form of scientific realism. But the
> > fact there is no test for it demonstrates it is not an empirical belief
> > and hence not science but metaphysics.
>
> Don't confuse lack of smoking-gun proof with lack
> of evidence. The alternatives to realism are deeply flawed.
I'm still trying to figure out what "realism" is, but I
don't see where considering whatever is without
our thinking it so undiscussable is particularly
flawed -- other than the standard flaw of trying to
discuss the undiscussable.
It might be uncomfortable to some to completely
reject all notions of a fundament and all notions
of an absolute, but I don't see where this is
"flawed."
One does have to base their philosophy upon
usefulness rather than upon Truth -- but that's no
great loss.
Learn to stand firmly upon quicksand, and things
get much clearer.
Sphere
1Z wrote:
> Craig Franck wrote:
> > "1Z" wrote
> >
> > > Craig Franck wrote:
> >
> > >> "gibbs" wrote
> >
> > >> > Why isn't it an experience of a cat? If you and I are talking about a
> > >> > cat, why aren't we talking about a cat instead of our "intuitions"?
> > >>
> > >> The argument is when we dream of a cat or have a hallucination of
> > >> a cat, *there is no cat present*. So now I must intuit which of my
> > >> experiences are "real" as opposed to imaginary.
> > >
> > > The maximal consistent set is real.
> >
> > I agree with that; but then there is the issue of whether another
> > state of consciousness that was just as consistent as our normal
> > waking state would render a different reality.
>
> It's not much of an issue unless such a state can be produced.
>
> Again, the fact that various alternatives to realism are (just about)
> possible does not mean we should take them seriously, or
> that realism vs. idealism is a 50:50 issue.
What is this 'idealism' such that you can divide
"the fabric" in terms of either 'realism' or idealism'?
It seems to me that perceptions arise, and that doing
other than accepting this arising is pure folly. Beyond
that, everything is a creation of human culture (even
the human culture). Any description will have to be
in terms of words, and is therefore restricted by what
words are capable of conveying. We simply cannot
provide an exact and complete description of anything
at all. To talk of something being 'real' outside our
space of thought is to pretend that our absolute
statements can be both perfect and privileged; which
is absurd. We can only provide useful descriptions which
capture some aspects of our arisen perceptions, and
claiming more is metaphysics.
>
> > A spider exists in another kind of reality, but that standard.
> >
> > > But that's not really intuition.
> >
> > I believe it is because most people intuit what's real and what's not.
> > This sort of philosophical analysis doesn't enter into most people's
> > consideration.
>
> Maybe the intuition is just a short-cut. Maybe it is possible
> to reconstruct the intuitive proces as an explicit, rational process.
>
> > --
> > Craig Franck
> > craig....@verizon.net
> > Cortland, NY
Sphere
Care to explain how ideas are fundamentally any
different from any other form of action?
Sphere
Care to explain how ideas are fundamentally any
different from any other form of action?
Sphere
andy-k wrote:
> The conceptual framework, as far as it extends, is all that is known.
> It has been demonstrated that all concepts within the framework have only
> a conventional existence and no inherent existence (terms already defined).
> Concepts have meaning only by virtue of their embeddedness within the
> conceptual framework -- i.e. any particular concept gains support from,
> and lends support to, all other concepts. The postulation of a substrate
> that grounds the framework is not necessary, not useful, and not coherent.
>
> Reason, as the word is being used here, is a process that operates
> on seemingly disparate parts of the framework to yield a more
> encompassing view that unites those parts -- this is what I will call
> "explanation". Explanation enables prediction, and correct prediction
> engenders confidence in the explanation -- this is the closed-loop
> that is at the heart of the Baconian model of science.
> But note that this process operates on *parts of the framework*.
>
> Since the conceptual framework is comprised of parts (i.e. concepts),
> and parts are conceived as entering into the part/whole relationship,
> the framework is conceived of as an extrapolation of that relationship
> (the apex of the hierarchy as it were) -- i.e. as a conventional whole.
> The framework has then been modeled within itself, and this is the decisive
> step in the reasoning process where reason has overstepped its bounds.
> And having taken that step, it is then considered reasonable to treat the
> framework as though it has the conventional properties of beginning and end,
> and of internal and external.
>
> Only then can we ask misguided questions like "how did the world begin?",
> and argue about whether or not there is a world that is independent of
> (i.e. external to) our ideas about it. Such seemingly reasonable questions
> are specious, and they are not so much "answered" as obviated by
> understanding that the conceptual framework is not to be treated as
> just another "thing" in a world full of things.
I don't think it is useful to pretend that thought is
somehow privileged. Thought differers in no fundamental
way from any other form of action (karma), although from
a human perspective intention is of supreme importance;
which is the domain of ethics. (This explains why many
consider 'karma' to mean 'intention', when in fact it
means 'action'.)
1Z
LP isn't "just true". In fact it is pretty much an abandoned programme.
1Z
Craig Franck wrote:
> "1Z" wrote
>
> > Craig Franck wrote:
>
> >> But you again misunderstand my argument: the statement that
> >> "reality is all in your head" is nonsensical.
> >
> > Then what are we arguing about ?
>
> I see this more as discussion.
>
> The logic of it is this:
>
> If statement S is nonsense
>
> then statement Not S is nonsense as well.
>
> Statements about there being or not being an external world
> are both nonsense.
You haven't established either.
1Z
Craig Franck wrote:
> "1Z" wrote
>
> > Craig Franck wrote:
>
> >> "1Z" wrote
>
> >> > Just because A is possible and B is possible, does not mean
> >> > there is nothing to choose between them. Some possibilities are
> >> > near enough facts ofr all practical purposes, others are as
> >> > near enough falsehoods.
> >>
> >> That's true, but irrelevant.A large part of the argument is you
> >> can't mix metaphysics and empiricism.
> >
> > Says who ? Metaphysics has always dealt with problems raised
> > by empiricism.
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_positivism
>
> The gist of the argument is all metaphysical statements are
> nonsensical:
"Still, some readers may wonder whether in the course of responding to
the various counter-criticisms, the Vienna Circle's position has not
shifted considerably. This indeed is true: the attempt to show
metaphysics strictly meaningless for once and all did not suceed".
http://www.science.uva.nl/~seop/entries/vienna-circle/#CarLatMeaCriProRam
1Z
For present purposes, it is the claim that
concepts ahve referents, most of which
are not themsleves concepts.
> but I
> don't see where considering whatever is without
> our thinking it so undiscussable
> is particularly
> flawed -- other than the standard flaw of trying to
> discuss the undiscussable.
What is undiscussable? Who says so?
> It might be uncomfortable to some to completely
> reject all notions of a fundament and all notions
> of an absolute, but I don't see where this is
> "flawed."
Who said anything about fundaments and absolutes?
> One does have to base their philosophy upon
> usefulness rather than upon Truth -- but that's no
> great loss.
One of the flaws of anti-realism is that it is unable
to explain *why* some approaches are more useful than others.
Sphere
Go ahead and get caught up in infinite regress.
See if I care.
>
>
> > It might be uncomfortable to some to completely
> > reject all notions of a fundament and all notions
> > of an absolute, but I don't see where this is
> > "flawed."
>
> Who said anything about fundaments and absolutes?
>
> > One does have to base their philosophy upon
> > usefulness rather than upon Truth -- but that's no
> > great loss.
>
> One of the flaws of anti-realism is that it is unable
> to explain *why* some approaches are more useful than others.
Some approaches are more useful because
people find them more useful.
Anything else is talking about fundaments and
absolutes.
1Z
Actions have intentionality, too.
http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Intentionality
> No essence. No permanence. No perfection.
Chairs and tables, sticks and stones.
Sphere
1Z wrote:
> Sphere wrote:
> > 1Z wrote:
> > > Sphere wrote:
> > >
> > > > All that can be said is that whatever is without
> > > > our thinking it so is undiscussable. Any
> > > > discussion of an "external reality" must by the
> > > > very nature of discussion be embedded within
> > > > the realm of ideas, and therefore colored by whatever
> > > > structuration our ideas happen to have. There is
> > > > no "objective reality" for the simple reason that both
> > > > 'objective' and 'reality' are ideas.
> > >
> > > And ideas have referents. Next!
> >
> > Care to explain how ideas are fundamentally any
> > different from any other form of action?
>
> Actions have intentionality, too.
Where are you coming from here?
I'm quite willing to take the intentional stance as
proposed by Dennet. To say that the "lion seems
like it would like to eat me" adds nothing to the
description over "the lion wants to eat me," and
can even create added confusion -- even if the lion
actually was writing Haiku at the time. Saying
that genes "want to survive" makes for a much
cleaner description than saying that "the selective
forces favor genes which provide reproductive value
to their host."
1Z
Sphere wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> > Sphere wrote:
> > > 1Z wrote:
> > > > Sphere wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > All that can be said is that whatever is without
> > > > > our thinking it so is undiscussable. Any
> > > > > discussion of an "external reality" must by the
> > > > > very nature of discussion be embedded within
> > > > > the realm of ideas, and therefore colored by whatever
> > > > > structuration our ideas happen to have. There is
> > > > > no "objective reality" for the simple reason that both
> > > > > 'objective' and 'reality' are ideas.
> > > >
> > > > And ideas have referents. Next!
> > >
> > > Care to explain how ideas are fundamentally any
> > > different from any other form of action?
> >
> > Actions have intentionality, too.
>
> Where are you coming from here?
>
> I'm quite willing to take the intentional stance as
> proposed by Dennet. To say that the "lion seems
> like it would like to eat me" adds nothing to the
> description over "the lion wants to eat me,"
That's because "would like to" and "want to" are *both* intentional.
You haven't reduced the intentionality away, if you were trying to.
>and
> can even create added confusion -- even if the lion
> actually was writing Haiku at the time. Saying
> that genes "want to survive" makes for a much
> cleaner description than saying that "the selective
> forces favor genes which provide reproductive value
> to their host.
Read the rest of the discussion, It is about whether we can "get
beyond" our
"conceptual framework". My point is that since concepts are
intentional, have referents, that happens automatically.
If concepts didn't have intionality, thought wouldn't be thought, and
communication wouldn't be communication.
1Z
That concepts refer to non-concepts is just a fact.
Anyone who tries to communicate inplicitly appeals to it.
andy-k
> andy-k wrote:
>> "Anthony G. Rubino" wrote:
>> >>andy-k wrote:
>> >>The conceptual framework, as far as it extends, is all that is known.
>>>
>>>
>>> Is there anything external to it?
>>
>> Since the conceptual framework is comprised of parts (i.e. concepts),
>> and parts are conceived as entering into the part/whole relationship,
>> the framework is conceived of as an extrapolation of that relationship
>> (the apex of the hierarchy as it were) -- i.e. as a conventional whole.
>> The framework has then been modeled within itself, and this is the
>> decisive step in the reasoning process where reason has overstepped
>> its bounds. And having taken that step, it is then considered reasonable
>> to treat the framework as though it has the conventional properties of
>> beginning and end, and of internal and external.
>>
>> Only then can we ask misguided questions like "how did the world begin?",
>> and argue about whether or not there is a world that is independent of
>> (i.e. external to) our ideas about it. Such seemingly reasonable
>> questions are specious, and they are not so much "answered" as obviated
>> by understanding that the conceptual framework is not to be treated as
>> just another "thing" in a world full of things.
>
> I'm still absorbing what you are saying, but I think there is a more
> direct answer. The question "is there anything external to it?"
> assumes that 'it' is in actuality a self-contained whole rather than
> a conventional designation.
Yes -- it is to regard it as a "thing" in a world full of things,
and thereby to invite its treatment under the conventional
rules applicable to "things".
> To talk of an 'external' one first has to assume an 'internal'. If the
> internal is not assumed (that is, is not a part of one's system of belief)
> then the question of externality becomes meaningless.
To talk of an "external" one must first assume the internal/external
duality. That duality is appropriate to *parts* of the conceptual framework,
but is misappropriated when applied to the framework itself,
and so the question of externality becomes meaningless.
> All that can be said is that whatever is without our thinking it so is
> undiscussable.
This doesn't parse.
> Any discussion of an "external reality" must by the very nature of
> discussion be embedded within the realm of ideas, and therefore
> colored by whatever structuration our ideas happen to have.
Agreed.
> There is no "objective reality" for the simple reason that both
> 'objective' and 'reality' are ideas.
Hmm...
The concepts of subject and object arise in mutual dependence within
the conceptual framework, and so have only a *conventional* existence.
The word "objective" is used, according to one such convention, to denote
freedom from subjective bias. (No doubt ultimately this is an unachievable
goal, but the idea remains useful nonetheless.)
The concepts of real and unreal arise in mutual dependence within the
conceptual framework, and so have only a *conventional* existence.
The abstraction of the noun "reality" misleads us into entertaining
a picture of an *inherently existent* world that is independent of our
ideas about it, whilst all the time that picture is itself just another
*conventionally existent* idea.
andy-k
> I don't think it is useful to pretend that thought is somehow privileged.
What can't be thought can't be said.
> Thought differers in no fundamental way from any other form of action
> (karma), although from a human perspective intention is of supreme
> importance; which is the domain of ethics. (This explains why many
> consider 'karma' to mean 'intention', when in fact it means 'action'.)
"Thought" is more appropriately termed "thinking" -- i.e. used
as a verb (process) rather than a noun (thing). Thinking is the
process of carving up a process into things, and the idea of
"thoughts" results from the operation of that process upon itself.
Anthony G. Rubino
>1Z wrote:
>
>Actions have intentionality, too.
>
That proposition is an interesting one.
No one that I know, or have hearrd, about denies the existence of
action, or change, which implies action.
Many, however, have intentionally attempted to deny the existence of
intentionality.
The most likely reason for doing so is the necessary relationship or
implication of the existence of a will, or something like it by another
name, that not only provides intention, but also direction.
The most likely reason to intentionally deny will is the necessary
implications that lead back to a First Cause, since Will, or something
like it by another name, also provides the ability or potential to
create.
Tony, philosopher
http://www.geocities.com/trisector/
So many misconceptions, so little time.
1Z
andy-k wrote:
> The concepts of real and unreal arise in mutual dependence within the
> conceptual framework, and so have only a *conventional* existence.
The concepts may, but that doesn't mean their referents have to.
If the description "having more than conventional existence"
has a referent, it is a referent with more than conventional existence.
1Z
Sphere wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> > Craig Franck wrote:
> > > "1Z" wrote
> > >
> > > > Craig Franck wrote:
> > >
> > > >> "gibbs" wrote
> > >
> > > >> > Why isn't it an experience of a cat? If you and I are talking about a
> > > >> > cat, why aren't we talking about a cat instead of our "intuitions"?
> > > >>
> > > >> The argument is when we dream of a cat or have a hallucination of
> > > >> a cat, *there is no cat present*. So now I must intuit which of my
> > > >> experiences are "real" as opposed to imaginary.
> > > >
> > > > The maximal consistent set is real.
> > >
> > > I agree with that; but then there is the issue of whether another
> > > state of consciousness that was just as consistent as our normal
> > > waking state would render a different reality.
> >
> > It's not much of an issue unless such a state can be produced.
> >
> > Again, the fact that various alternatives to realism are (just about)
> > possible does not mean we should take them seriously, or
> > that realism vs. idealism is a 50:50 issue.
>
> What is this 'idealism' such that you can divide
> "the fabric" in terms of either 'realism' or idealism'?
"idealism:
the view that the existence of objects depends wholly or in part on the
minds of those perceiving them or that reality is composed of minds and
their states. There are many varieties of idealism, ranging from
Plato's doctrine of independently existing ideas or forms to Berkeley's
subjective idealism and Hegel's absolute idealism. Kant attempted to
combine empirical realism with transcendental idealism."
> It seems to me that perceptions arise, and that doing
> other than accepting this arising is pure folly. Beyond
> that, everything is a creation of human culture (even
> the human culture). Any description will have to be
> in terms of words, and is therefore restricted by what
> words are capable of conveying.
Words are capable of conveying the existence -- however
deplorably "conventional" -- of chairs and tables. That is
all I am seeking to establish.
> We simply cannot
> provide an exact and complete description of anything
> at all.
So what ? Who said we can ?
>To talk of something being 'real' outside our
> space of thought is to pretend that our absolute
> statements can be both perfect and privileged;
Being able to say something is real at all,
is quite different rom being able to describe it perfectly.
> which
> is absurd. We can only provide useful descriptions which
> capture some aspects of our arisen perceptions, and
> claiming more is metaphysics.
Claiming *that* is metpahysics, and none the worse
for it. Claiming the opposite is metaphsyics too.
1Z
Whatever. The rest is what puts me into casual contact with the
extra-cranial world.
1Z
Flapdoodle. There is no 50:50 subjective choice between
crossing the road with your eyes open or your eyes shut;
or between treating a headache with aspirin or with arsenic.
> Anything else is talking about fundaments and
> absolutes.
Nope, false dichotomy. You can have objectivity without
absolutes.
Craig Franck
> Craig Franck wrote:
>> "1Z" wrote
>> > Craig Franck wrote:
>> >> That's true, but irrelevant.A large part of the argument is you
>> >> can't mix metaphysics and empiricism.
>> >
>> > Says who ? Metaphysics has always dealt with problems raised
>> > by empiricism.
>>
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_positivism
>>
>> The gist of the argument is all metaphysical statements are
>> nonsensical:
>
>
> "Still, some readers may wonder whether in the course of responding to
> the various counter-criticisms, the Vienna Circle's position has not
> shifted considerably. This indeed is true: the attempt to show
> metaphysics strictly meaningless for once and all did not suceed".
>
> http://www.science.uva.nl/~seop/entries/vienna-circle/#CarLatMeaCriProRam
I am aware of this. I point it out practically every time I get involved
in a thread like this. I only posted that link because you gave the
impression it was a novel idea and were not aware of anyone who
held it.
The problem is they used verification as a criteria of meaning. My
modified position is to allow paradoxes where something has zero
empirical meaning, but everyone knows the sense of the statement.
"The world exited before I was born and will continue to exist after
I die." is an example. It is unverifiable, *but everyone I've ever talked
to knows exactly what it means*.
Craig Franck
> "Craig Franck":
>> I see this more as discussion.
>>
>> The logic of it is this:
>>
>> If statement S is nonsense
>>
>> then statement Not S is nonsense as well.
>>
>> Statements about there being or not being an external world
>> are both nonsense.
>
> You haven't established either.
How could I possibly do that? I am using a specific logical
standard for meaning that you obviously disagree with.
It's also part of my argument that you can't definitively determine
the meaning of metaphysical statements. This is like asking
me to establish an ink blot doesn't look like a bunny rabbit.
Craig Franck
> Read the rest of the discussion, It is about whether we can "get
> beyond" our
> "conceptual framework". My point is that since concepts are
> intentional, have referents, that happens automatically.
That it "happens automatically" is the problem. You are assuming
this conclusion at the very start as a metaphysical postulate.
> If concepts didn't have intionality, thought wouldn't be thought, and
> communication wouldn't be communication.
I don't see why conceptual entities can't communicate with one
another. By your reasoning, I shouldn't be able to have a dream
where I communicate with another person.