Kant and the A Priori
Publius
get it into one, with a more descriptive title.
"galathaea" <gala...@gmail.com> wrote in
news:1169342043.7...@38g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:
> i understand the desire for a foundations
> that at least assumes its certainty
>
> kant is often brought into discussions of axiomatics
> for precisely this reason
>
> but
> are axioms necessary?
Good question! I'll give my answer later, but first:
> the only thing necessary for information exchange
>
> is correlation
>
> -*-*- -*-*- -*-*-
>
> the "noisy channel theorem"
> is crucial to understand how this is possible
> how information can be transferred with imperfect correlation
>
> shannon's fundamental theorem
> provides a foundation for evolutionary theory
> by explaining how metadynamic symbols are possible
The problem is not with noisy channels. Information theory deals with the
quantitative aspects of information transfer, including how *data* can be
extracted from background noise. But *data* is not, strictly speaking,
information. Before data can become information it must be interpreted. A
string of bits is not, *per se*, information. It only becomes information
when it is decoded, using the same algorithm at the sink that was used to
encode it at the source. Often one can discover that encoding algorithm by
trial and error, and hypothesis testing (provided one has *some* information
about the source). But the message may remain permanently (for human
purposes) indecipherable. Unless the sink can decode the message (using the
same algorithm as the source), there will be *no* correlation in behavior.
Public key cryptography depends upon this intrinsic ambiguity in any string
of bits. Any longish string of bits can represent millions of possible
messages. Without the Rawlinson text (or something similar) the Sumerian
tablets would remain meaningless (and even with it much of the "meaning"
imputed is guesswork). They would contain data, but no information.
>> No, no! Can't make that move. All languages, all of their syntax and
>> semantics, are contingent. But in order to make an argument (or to
>> carry on any kind of interpersonal communication) one must assume some
>> common fund of semantics and syntax exists between speaker and hearer.
>> That includes some logical rules. Suggesting that the LOC can be
>> interpeted differently cannot be used to invalidate any argument which
>> assumes it. It can only render communication between those speakers
>> impossible.
>
> this is mathematically incorrect
>
> communication is still possible
*Data* is still transferred. *Information* is not (because the data is not
being decoded using the encoding algorithm). You can discuss and challenge
the rules of an object language using a metalanguage. But then you and your
hearer must agree on the rules of that metalanguage, or you will not
communicate (you will not transfer information).
> our sensations
> and cognitions
> can be one transformation system
> and still be fallible
> and be honest about that fallibility
No disagreement there. As far as I can recall (and I haven't scoured Kant
today to verify this) Kant never says that *a priori* intuitions are
"infallible." Indeed, that sounds very un-Kantian. He only says that we
cannot conceive them to be false. He is making a claim about us, not the
universe. Nor is he making a claim about eternity, but only about present
humans contemplating present problems.
As I've suggested in other posts, I think the best way to think of the
synthetic *a priori* is as conceptual models of a set of low-level (and some
not so low-level) encoding routines ("microcodes") which have evolved in
tandem with our nervous systems. They can change in time. They can be
overridden for any given dataset by higher-order routines. The aim
throughout is to encode some dataset with an algorithm --- to compress it,
to extract order from chaos. And that requires arranging that data into some
kind of deductive structure, so that it becomes manageable and predictable.
Are axioms necessary? Yes, for any deductive structure. But there is always
a choice of structures to apply to a dataset. We adopt the simplest one with
the most predictive power (until we devise a better one). When such a
structure collapses we retreat to the simplest structures we have, and begin
building anew. Those simplest structures are the built-in "microcodes" which
we represent conceptually as various SAPs. Below those we cannot go.
mikeg...@xtra.co.nz
Publius wrote:
> This conversation has been scattered over several threads. Though I'd try to
> get it into one, with a more descriptive title.
What knowledge of reality, (by reality I mean things existing and not
requiring imagination e.g. god and the socialist's *the greater good*
are two examples entirely founded upon imagination, I digress) what
knowledge of reality can be obtained with *a priori* which is not
directly linked to and or which can not, in its origin of meaning, be
reduced right back down to an irreducible and sensory level of
perception?
For example, the origin of the concept of the meaning of time is, its
direct link to sensory existence is, its a relational concept,
specifically it is used to measure the duration of action, one or more
entities in motion / action in relationship to each.
Michael Gordge
alkaline
defend their radical empiricism by simply proclaiming that experience
follows lawful patterns in brute fashion. There's no need for normally
undetected substrates of neurons, atoms, and etc to actually be real,
which would undermine the phenomenal world in human perception as mere
appearances. Nature would only act as if everything emerged from such
microchemistry and Democritean entities (in fact, this seems to have
been the position of the Machian neutral monists, who were inspired by
Hume).
Yet, while they might be able to defend their views, they still
couldn't eliminate the a priori slash metaphysical folks. As Bertrand
Russell once pointed-out (but not at all in these exact words), naive
realism eventually screws itself by leading to things like
neuroscience, particle physics, and general relativity --providing
direct or indirect evidence for such. One can still assert naive
realism is possible, but naive realism traitorously allows indirect
realism to be possible too.
mikeg...@xtra.co.nz
alkaline wrote:
>. As Bertrand
> Russell once pointed-out
Oh my gawd, please dont tell me that you reckon that the idiot *set of
all set* bimbo Russelll is any different at all in his process of
reasoning to any other brain dead Kantian.
MG
Publius
news:1169449848.6...@s34g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:
> What knowledge of reality, (by reality I mean things existing and not
> requiring imagination e.g. god and the socialist's *the greater good*
> are two examples entirely founded upon imagination, I digress) what
> knowledge of reality can be obtained with *a priori* which is not
> directly linked to and or which can not, in its origin of meaning, be
> reduced right back down to an irreducible and sensory level of
> perception?
Your question is (*ahem*) question-begging. You implicitly define "reality"
as meaning knowledge gained from sensory experience ("things existing and not
requiring imagination"). Then you ask "What knowledge of reality is gained *a
priori*?"
Well, none, of course, because *a priori* knowledge is not gained via the
senses. Hence, by your definition, any knowledge known *a priori* would not
be knowledge of "reality."
However, much knowledge of "reality" (by your definition) existed in the
imagination long before it was encountered empirically. E.g., Riemannian
Geometry existed as an *a priori* construct of the imagination long before it
was found to describe the universe as portrayed by General Relativity.
Indeed, every invention exists in someone's imagination before it is ever
instantiated in the physical world.
> For example, the origin of the concept of the meaning of time is, its
> direct link to sensory existence is, its a relational concept,
> specifically it is used to measure the duration of action, one or more
> entities in motion / action in relationship to each.
Yes it is indeed so used. But unless we had that concept *a priori* we could
not recognize those relationships. It is what allows us to distinguish
present from past. Likewise with "space."
George Dance
mikeg...@xtra.co.nz wrote:
> Publius wrote:
> > This conversation has been scattered over several threads. Though I'd try to
> > get it into one, with a more descriptive title.
>
> What knowledge of reality, (by reality I mean things existing and not
> requiring imagination e.g. god and the socialist's *the greater good*
> are two examples entirely founded upon imagination, I digress) what
> knowledge of reality can be obtained with *a priori* which is not
> directly linked to and or which can not, in its origin of meaning, be
> reduced right back down to an irreducible and sensory level of
> perception?
Tell us what sense you used to learn that A is A, Mike.
mikeg...@xtra.co.nz
Publius wrote:
>
> Your question is (*ahem*) question-begging. You implicitly define "reality"
> as meaning knowledge gained from sensory experience ("things existing and not
> requiring imagination").
Nope other way round, I define knowledge as man's grasp of reality, and
sensory reality exists as it exists independent of man's mind, and it
exists in reality without contradiction, therefore non-contradictory
*identification* of what exists is an excellent standard to have to
determine man's knowledge of what is real.
I say that reason is man's only means of knowledge, reason I have
defined as, *non-contradictory identification and integration of the
perceptions of man's senses,*
(note I realize you Kantians all say that is not the definition of
reason and yet you all fail to give one, and also note, that IS the
meaning of reason I use)
There has to be something existing to experience, to gain the knowledge
of, you cant gain knowledge of nothing in reality.
Which is the fact of reality that Kant's expression *man's knowledge
comes from experience* ignores, e.g. the mystics claim knowledge of god
by claiming they have experienced it, and the mere fact they have had
an *experience* qualifies it as knowledge, according to Kant's silly
standard.
Knowledge is always the ***result*** of a *process*, I am saying that
*process*, to claim real knowledge, must be, non-contradictory
indentification of what exists in sensory reality as it exists, without
contradiction anyway.
> However, much knowledge of "reality" (by your definition) existed in the
> imagination long before it was encountered empirically.
Thats just silly, man cant claim knowledge of nothing in reality,
mystics and Kantians excluded of course.
Knowledge doesn't result from imagination it results from
identification of reality.
> E.g., Riemannian
> Geometry existed as an *a priori* construct of the imagination long before it
> was found to describe the universe as portrayed by General Relativity.
Rubbish, geometry is a branch of mathematics, mathematics is the use of
numbers, numbers started out as a way to measure the quantity of
existent units, see if you can define the meaning and origin of
geometry without any link to sensory existence to test that idea.
> Indeed, every invention exists in someone's imagination before it is ever
> instantiated in the physical world.
Nonsense, you are confusing imagination with a deliberate conscious
intent to identify and solve problems existing in sensory reality, each
and every invention starts out as man endevouring to solve a problem
existing originating in sensory reality.
The invention of numbers to measure existing units is a classic
example, the invention of the clock is another.
Existence is the axiom / primacy, then perceptions / experience, and
then non-contradictory identification and intergration of those
perceptions form knowledge, there are no short cuts, unless of course
you are Kantian, mystic, Zeno, Poppereen Bertran Russell, to name but a
few POC twits.
Michael Gordge
galathaea
> "galathaea" <gala...@gmail.com> wrote in
> news:1169342043.7...@38g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:
> >
> > is correlation
> >
> > -*-*- -*-*- -*-*-
> >
> > the "noisy channel theorem"
> > is crucial to understand how this is possible
> > how information can be transferred with imperfect correlation
> >
> > shannon's fundamental theorem
> > provides a foundation for evolutionary theory
> > by explaining how metadynamic symbols are possible
>
> The problem is not with noisy channels. Information theory deals with the
> quantitative aspects of information transfer, including how *data* can be
> extracted from background noise. But *data* is not, strictly speaking,
> information. Before data can become information it must be interpreted. A
> string of bits is not, *per se*, information. It only becomes information
> when it is decoded, using the same algorithm at the sink that was used to
> encode it at the source.
one thing i notice
is a fear of formalism
one of those "cues"
is that jos and knucmo and you, publius
have been reluctant to post to sci.math
or even sci.logic
but that is where this is formalised
and a well-developed theory is practised by some in those groups
so if you mistrust any formalism
do not fear putting it to the greatest inspection
it increases the chance of everyone learning something new
^^^^^%%%%%%%
the operationalist approach
looks to answer certain meaningful forms of questions:
WHAT CAN ONE LEARN FROM EXPERIENCE?
WHAT
it explores possible ontologies
-* what can we name?
CAN
possible
ONE LEARN
it studies the process of learning
what does it mean to learn something?
FROM EXPERIENCE
sensation
the source
?
!!!!!!#########
there appears process
one can describe the acquisition of information structures
there are very good models of
channels of information acquisition (sensory systems)
how these can be learned by various algorithms
our internal manipulations appears highly symbolic
with symbols of muscle awareness and sensory forms
very good models connect these with a central system of processing
we map our internal symbologies
allowing us to metaphorically associate category errors
categories of utterance
and categories of sight
or
categories of smell
and categories of action
or
...
-------++++++++++++==
this system of transformation
is our decision process
it is our rationality
the symbols it forms
the information it receives
is well formalised
information is
every information transformation
is noise in the channel
that is extremely important to stress
information transformation is noise
you speak of interpretation and insist an a priori
yet
every neuron to neuron transmission
every dynamic of ion potentials
is contingent
it varies over time
and among all animals with the system
our symbols vary even in our own understanding
we can form meanings in contradiction
and often do
%%%%^* @@@@@@$$) %%%%^*
we find the noise helps
we don't need to maintain all the information
we can abstract
lie
distort into some symbolic form
and conceive a predictive model
symbols change
meanings change
but we can play games to agree on external symbols
this is the origin of language, economics, mathematics...
this is what kant wanted to do
he wanted to explain all of this
but all of this is contingent
you can go all the way down to the fundamental transfer
that is the information channel of our cognitions
and attempt to claim
this ontology is necessary
but that fails
every transformation could be otherwise
large scale regional structures still give structure
to this transformation process
and give the contingency tendencies towards usefulness
but there is no teleology
no necessity
no purpose
every transformation
is an accident of history
a result of evolutionary process
in a local thermodynamic cascade
there is no ground
no base absolute
in our cognitions
our perceptions
our epistemology
all a matter of error and learning
noise and transformation
> Often one can discover that encoding algorithm by
> trial and error, and hypothesis testing (provided one has *some* information
> about the source). But the message may remain permanently (for human
> purposes) indecipherable. Unless the sink can decode the message (using the
> same algorithm as the source), there will be *no* correlation in behavior.
this is actually wrong
information is transmitted in either case
and this is a very simple and fundamental result
in the formalisation of information theory
predictability is still possible
models of finite kolmogorov complexity
help us improve expectations even without interpretation
this is why the operationalist approach meaning in the way they do
meaning is possible with error
if an interpretation fails to bisimulate experience
we may still have had good prediction
newton?
the a priori is not even "microcode"
it is not this statement against the a priori
i have been wrong many times
and will be wrong many more
that does not support your position
it is possible to have support without certainty
meaning with contingency
> Public key cryptography depends upon this intrinsic ambiguity in any string
> of bits. Any longish string of bits can represent millions of possible
> messages. Without the Rawlinson text (or something similar) the Sumerian
> tablets would remain meaningless (and even with it much of the "meaning"
> imputed is guesswork). They would contain data, but no information.
wrong
finite information is on the tablet
we know the information is of a particular finite size
and that the symbols are arranged in a given string with a given
distribution
there are first-order symbol statistics
and correlation and higher statistics
that can be calculated from the message
the
---
\
/ p( stat ) log( p( stat ) )
---
bits
where stat varies over the statistical objects explored
(symbols, 2-symbol correlates, ...)
information transfer anyways
cryptography mixes a message entropically
increasing the possible interpretations
and hiding a "key" to the noise
it adds information to conceal
> >> No, no! Can't make that move. All languages, all of their syntax and
> >> semantics, are contingent. But in order to make an argument (or to
> >> carry on any kind of interpersonal communication) one must assume some
> >> common fund of semantics and syntax exists between speaker and hearer.
> >> That includes some logical rules. Suggesting that the LOC can be
> >> interpeted differently cannot be used to invalidate any argument which
> >> assumes it. It can only render communication between those speakers
> >> impossible.
> >
> > this is mathematically incorrect
> >
> > communication is still possible
>
> *Data* is still transferred. *Information* is not (because the data is not
> being decoded using the encoding algorithm). You can discuss and challenge
> the rules of an object language using a metalanguage. But then you and your
> hearer must agree on the rules of that metalanguage, or you will not
> communicate (you will not transfer information).
the modern models of information disagree
perhaps you would give your definition of information
are its units bits?
does it give a metric?
is it formally reproducible?
> > our sensations
> > and cognitions
> > can be one transformation system
> > and still be fallible
> > and be honest about that fallibility
>
> No disagreement there. As far as I can recall (and I haven't scoured Kant
> today to verify this) Kant never says that *a priori* intuitions are
> "infallible." Indeed, that sounds very un-Kantian. He only says that we
> cannot conceive them to be false. He is making a claim about us, not the
> universe. Nor is he making a claim about eternity, but only about present
> humans contemplating present problems.
i do not understand how one can be certain of things
one admits may be wrong
kant certainly says he is certain of particular statements
universal truths
they are apodictically certain
some of the other kantian positions in these discussions
are defending that interpretation of kant
kant himself goes into this certainty of the a priori
in his ethics
and even explores teleology in his "critique of judgement"
in pure reason
though
he says
(A104-5)
" We find, however, that our thought of the relation of all cognition
to its object carries something of necessity with it, since namely
the latter is regarded as that which is opposed to our cognitions
being determined at pleasure or arbitrarily rather than being
determined _a_priori_, since insofar as they are to relate to an
object our cognitions must also necessarily agree with each
other in relation to it, i.e., they must have that unity that
constitutes the concept of an object. "
concepts do not necessarily agree
people can be self-contradictory
over time
there might be a reinterpretation of the term "a priori"
to mean something like "a posteriori"
and maybe "necessary" comes to be better understood as "contingent"
it is possible that kant's mathematical examples
can be reinterpreted in this new understanding
and my objections to his philosophy might be shown misguided
but even this supports my position
and not kant's
admitting error is not a slippery slope into relativism
there are still metrics
prediction
health
things to base decisions off of
> As I've suggested in other posts, I think the best way to think of the
> synthetic *a priori* is as conceptual models of a set of low-level (and some
> not so low-level) encoding routines ("microcodes") which have evolved in
> tandem with our nervous systems. They can change in time. They can be
> overridden for any given dataset by higher-order routines. The aim
> throughout is to encode some dataset with an algorithm --- to compress it,
> to extract order from chaos. And that requires arranging that data into some
> kind of deductive structure, so that it becomes manageable and predictable.
currently
i use a priori in a way that many other philosophers do
so i can play the game with them
i believe the way kant used a priori
would have allowed him to play the game with me too
if it varies among instances
it is not universal
it is not necessary
it is contingent
something i am assured "a priori" is not
> Are axioms necessary? Yes, for any deductive structure. But there is always
> a choice of structures to apply to a dataset. We adopt the simplest one with
> the most predictive power (until we devise a better one). When such a
> structure collapses we retreat to the simplest structures we have, and begin
> building anew. Those simplest structures are the built-in "microcodes" which
> we represent conceptually as various SAPs. Below those we cannot go.
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
galathaea: prankster, fablist, magician, liar
mikeg...@xtra.co.nz
George Dance wrote:
> Tell us what sense you used to learn that A is A, Mike.
Typical Kantian asking questions without any context.
e.g. to give 1 a meaning in reality, then it must be linked to a
existent single unit.
Sooooo what *A* are you talking about? be specific.
In *A is A* A represents the same existent in reality, e.g. a dog (A)
and a cat (B) can not both exist where the other exists at the same
instant. i.e. Only A can be where A is at the same instant.
So not enough context George, the first *A* has to be related to
something in sensory reality and non-contradictory identification gives
the confirmation of the *is A*
A dog is not a cat, its a dog.
Alway directly link what you say to a sensory existent in reality
George, because if you dont then its come from your fucking Kantian
brain dead mind, e.g. god.
Michael Gordge
mikeg...@xtra.co.nz
galathaea wrote:
> WHAT CAN ONE LEARN FROM EXPERIENCE?
Typical Kantian asking a question without context.
Experience of WHAT? You cant experience nothing, so describe it, does
it smell, does it move, does it have legs, is it animal vegetable or
mineral? check the infomation of your perceptions against what you
already know, is there a contradiction etc etc etc.
If there's nothing in sensory reality that you are tryng to identify
then UP GO THE RED FLAGS ***BEWARE*** because it could be a mystic or
Kantian trying to get you to accept an idea born nowhere but inside
their heads.
An idea born in the head and not in any way linked to sensory reality
is something to be very dubious of, e.g. god of course and silly Kant
and George and Timmmm and knucmo and immortal and chazzzzz and oh dear
there's far too many to name, so please dont feel bad if I've left you
out, claiming that the existents in reality giving rise to the concepts
of space and time cant be sensed, what fucking idiots.
Michael Gordge
George Dance
> George Dance wrote:
<unsnip>
mikeg...@xtra.co.nz wrote:
what knowledge of reality can be obtained with *a priori* which is not
directly linked to and or which can not, in its origin of meaning, be
reduced right back down to an irreducible and sensory level of
perception? </us>
> > Tell us what sense you used to learn that A is A, Mike.
>
> Typical Kantian asking questions without any context.
>
I restored the context that you snipped.
> e.g. to give 1 a meaning in reality, then it must be linked to a
> existent single unit.
>
> Sooooo what *A* are you talking about? be specific.
'A is A;' is something you claim to know. I'm asking what sense you
used to learn it.
> In *A is A* A represents the same existent in reality, e.g. a dog (A)
> and a cat (B) can not both exist where the other exists at the same
> instant. i.e. Only A can be where A is at the same instant.
>
We can use that example. How did you discover that "a dog and a cat
can not both exist where the other exists at the same instant" by
sensory perception?
> So not enough context George, the first *A* has to be related to
> something in sensory reality and non-contradictory identification gives
> the confirmation of the *is A*
>
Non-contradictory identification is not a sense, Mike. So: what sense
did you use to discover 'non-contradctory identification'?
> A dog is not a cat, its a dog.
>
> Alway directly link what you say to a sensory existent in reality
> George
Well, then; tell us what sense you used to discover 'non-contradictory
identification'.
Immortalist
Publius wrote:
> This conversation has been scattered over several threads. Though I'd try to
> get it into one, with a more descriptive title.
>
1. a priori:
All bachelors are unmarried.
All triangles have three sides.
2. a posteriori:
That bachelor is tall.
This triangle is blue.
The terms "a priori" and "a posteriori" are used in philosophy to
distinguish between two different types of propositional knowledge.
Thus, attempts to define clearly or explain a priori and a posteriori
knowledge are part of a central thread in epistemology, the study of
knowledge. Since the definitions and usage of the terms are disputed
and have evolved in the history of philosophy, it is difficult to
provide proper definitions of them.
Rough and oversimplified explanations are as follows:
a priori knowledge is independent of experience,
while a posteriori knowledge is dependent
on experience.
Lawyers sometimes use "a priori" to describe a step in an argument the
truth of which can be deduced entirely from the truth of the premises.
"A posteriori", on the other hand, requires a bit more evidence.
The intuitive distinction
Although definitions and usage of the terms have varied in the history
of philosophy, they have been consistently intended to demarcate two
separate epistemological notions. The intuitive distinction between a
priori and a posteriori knowledge can be seen in examples of what is
supposed to fall under each concept. To borrow from Jerry Fodor (2004),
take, for example, the proposition expressed by the sentence, "George V
reigned from 1910-1936". This is something that one must come to know a
posteriori (assuming that it is knowledge), because it expresses an
empirical fact that one cannot come to know of by reason alone. By
contrast, consider the proposition expressed by the sentence, "If
George V reigned at all, then he reigned for a while". This is
something that one knows a priori, because it expresses a fact that is
non-empirical and that one can come to know by reason alone.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_priori_and_a_posteriori_%28philosophy%29
APRIORI [B:xvii] Kant opposes a priori and empirical knowledge. He
distinguishes between pure theoretical reason, pure practical reason,
and mathematics, all of which are sources of a priori knowledge, and he
also claims that we have a peculiar kind of a priori knowledge of the
self. For Kant, a priori knowledge is certain, and the possibility of a
priori knowledge about concepts and intuitions is grounded on his
so-called "Copernican Revolution", according to which "we suppose that
objects must conform to our knowledge"--Kant argues that the "rules" of
sensibility and the understanding are "in me prior to being given to
me, and therefore as given a priori". It is the possibility of such a
priori knowledge, he thinks, that "promises to metaphysics...the secure
path of a science". His programme involves (1) "explaining how there
can be knowledge a priori" and (2) "furnishing satisfactory proofs of
the laws which form the a priori basis of nature" (thereby showing in
what sense objects must conform to our knowledge). He insists that a
priori speculative (theoretical) knowledge is limited to possible
experience (and thus to the realm of appearances, and their
construction by the faculties of our minds); however, it is possible
through practical a priori knowledge to "pass beyond the limits of all
possible experience"
[A2/B3] Kant gives the general definition of a priori knowledge as
"knowledge absolutely independent of all experience. Opposed to it is
empirical knowledge, which is knowledge possible only a posteriori ,
that is, through experience. A priori modes of knowledge are entitled
pure when there is no admixture of anything empirical [but not all a
priori propositions are pure, e.g., the causal maxim is a priori but
not pure]".
--------------------------
D. Rationalism vs. Empiricism
Theories of knowledge divide naturally, theoretically and historically
into the two rival schools of rationalism and empiricism. Neither
rationalism nor empiricism disregards the primary tool of the other
school entirely. The issue revolves on beliefs about necessary
knowledge and empirical knowledge.
1. Rationalism
Rationalism believes that some ideas or concepts are independent of
experience and that some truth is known by reason alone.
a. a priori
This is necessary knowledge not given in nor dependent upon experience;
it is necessarily true by definition. For instance "black cats are
black." This is an analytic statement, and broadly, it is a tautology;
its denial would be self-contradictory.
2. Empiricism
Empiricism believes that some ideas or concepts are independent of
experience and that truth must be established by reference to
experience alone.
b. a posteriori
This is knowledge that comes after or is dependent upon experience. for
instance "Desks are brown" is a synthetic statement. Unlike the
analytic statement "Black cats are black", the synthetic statement
"Desks are brown" is not necessarily true unless all desks are by
definition brown, and to deny it would not be self-contradictory. We
would probably refer the matter to experience.
Since knowledge depends primarily on synthetic statements -- statements
that may be true or may be false -- their nature and status are crucial
to theories of knowledge. The controvercial issue is the possibility of
synthetic necessary knowledge -- that is, the possibility of having
genuine knowledge of the world without the need to rely on experience.
Consider these statements:
1) The sum of the angles of a triangle is 180 degrees.
2) Parallel lines never meet.
3) A whole is the sum of all its parts.
Rationalism may believe these to be synthetic necessary statements,
universally treu, and genunie knowledge; i.e., they are not merely
empty as the analytic or tautologous statemenst (Black cats are black)
and are not dependent on experience for their truth value.
Empiricism denies that these statements are synthetic and necessary.
Strict empriicism asserts that all such statements only appear to be
necessary or a priori. Actually, they derive from experience.
Logical empiricism admits that these statements are ncessary but only
because they are not really synthetic statements but analytic
statements, which are true by definition alone and do not give us
genuine knowledge of the world.
GENUINE KNOWLEDGE
Rationalism includes in genuine knowledge synthetic necessary
statements (or, if this term is rejected, then those analytic necessary
statements that "reveal reality" in terms of universally necessary
truth; e.g., "An entity is what it is and not something else.")
Empiricism limits genuine knowledge to empirical statements. Necessary
statements are empty (that is, they tell us nothing of the world).
Logical empiricism admits as genuine knowledge only analytic necessary
(Black cats are black) or synthetic empirical statements (desks are
brown). But the anyalytic necessary statements or laws of logic and
mathematics derive from arbitrary rules of usage, definitions, and the
like, and therefore reveal nothing about reality. (This is the
antimetaphysical point of view).
http://www.theology.edu/logic/logic4.htm
mikeg...@xtra.co.nz
George Dance wrote:
> 'A is A;' is something you claim to know.
Yes thats right George, the letter A is not the letter B its the letter
A.
You can even uses one of your senses.
Look seeeee, use your eyes George, they even look different.
Construct the letter A and B in 3D form, or chisel them into a rock or
tree and they would even feel different too.
> I'm asking what sense you
> used to learn it.
Lots and lots and lots e.g.
I sensed that a tree is not a dog. A dog is not a cow. A bus is not a
scooter.
As a baby I recall learning, via a few of my senses, that the table was
not my mum even though the table had legs.
> How did you discover that "a dog and a cat
> can not both exist where the other exists at the same instant" by
> sensory perception?
Oh that was one of the simplist lessons in life, many have learnt it
well, the fucking cat scratched the living shit out of me, but I was
only three at the time, some lessons of the senses are learnt the hard
way.
> Non-contradictory identification is not a sense, Mike.
Thats right George, its the other foot of the total process of the
faculty of REASON, its called logic, its an art or process, a tool
required for man's knowledge that he cant live without.
Not a lot of point in the senses doing their bit if the data they
perceive isn't put through a process of non-contradictory
identification is there? Unless of course you are a mystic and or
Kantian, in which case you are required to ignore the fact that reason
has two feet and neither can function without the other.
As a human being it is in your nature George, so you cant help that, so
you just might as well learn to identify it as what it is and learn HOW
to use it.
A is A
> So: what sense
> did you use to discover 'non-contradctory identification'?
Lots and lots and lots, scratched by a cat taught me dont try and
contradict the dog's space while the dog is there, the hood of a truck
slammed on my hand taught me to use a better prop.
> Well, then; tell us what sense you used to discover 'non-contradictory
> identification'.
Oh not again far canal, aren't you reading? just 5 lines above Georger
read it again.
Michael Gordge
Publius
@m58g2000cwm.googlegroups.com:
> Thats right George, its the other foot of the total process of the
> faculty of REASON, its called logic, its an art or process, a tool
> required for man's knowledge that he cant live without.
>
> Not a lot of point in the senses doing their bit if the data they
> perceive isn't put through a process of non-contradictory
> identification is there?
Hm. Sounds like Mike is a closet Kantian.
Publius
news:1169536314.5...@a75g2000cwd.googlegroups.com...
> The problem is not with noisy channels. Information theory deals with
>> the quantitative aspects of information transfer, including how *data*
>> can be extracted from background noise. But *data* is not, strictly
>> speaking, information. Before data can become information it must be
>> interpreted. A string of bits is not, *per se*, information. It only
>> becomes information when it is decoded, using the same algorithm at the
>> sink that was used to encode it at the source.
>
> one thing i notice
> is a fear of formalism
>
> one of those "cues"
> is that jos and knucmo and you, publius
> have been reluctant to post to sci.math
> or even sci.logic
There are many other NGs to which I don't post also. A couple hundred
thousand, last time I checked. alt.phil is the only group to which I post,
although when responding to a msg that has been cross-posted, I leave the
OP's groups in. That's because I'm a philosopher, and most of the issues in
which I'm interested are philosophical, not mathematical.
> but that is where this is formalised
> and a well-developed theory is practised by some in those groups
>
> so if you mistrust any formalism
> do not fear putting it to the greatest inspection
Formalisms, like data, are meaningless until interpreted. Formalisms can
give clues to the shape of a problem, but it is in the interpretation that
philosophical problems arise. Formalisms are, by definition, formal; they
lack content.
> this system of transformation
> is our decision process
> it is our rationality
>
> the symbols it forms
> the information it receives
>
> is well formalised
>
> information is
>
>
> every information transformation
> is noise in the channel
>
> that is extremely important to stress
> information transformation is noise
I'm not sure what point you are making there. "Information is . . ." ?
I doubt we disagree that we can produce models of neural information
processing, and that eventually we'll have one that is fairly predictive.
> you speak of interpretation and insist an a priori
>
> yet
>
> every neuron to neuron transmission
> every dynamic of ion potentials
>
> is contingent
> it varies over time
> and among all animals with the system
We don't know that, Galathaea. We only know that many of them are. But even
if it is the case, it doesn't settle the question of *a priori* knowledge.
That is because knowledge (concepts, and the truth or falsity of
propositions constructed from those concepts), is not identifiable with any
particular neural structures or ensembles. So the stability or instability
of any particular structures does not imply stability or instability of any
particular knowledge. Indeed, the neural plasticity to which you refer
renders making those correlations more difficult.
> we don't need to maintain all the information
> we can abstract
> lie
> distort into some symbolic form
> and conceive a predictive model
We abstract *instead of* maintaining all information. We create an idealized
model of the world (and ourselves) from the datastreams available.
> this is what kant wanted to do
> he wanted to explain all of this
>
> but all of this is contingent
>
> you can go all the way down to the fundamental transfer
> that is the information channel of our cognitions
> and attempt to claim
> this ontology is necessary
> but that fails
No ontologies are necessary. Kant's claims regarding the synthetic *a
priori* are not ontological claims. Only the noumena (about which we can
know nothing) is ontologically necessary. What is necessary are some
methodologies. And even those are contingent in the long run (that latter is
my take, not Kant's). (I'd argue that even the ontological necessity of the
noumena is a methodological claim. But that is another issue.)
> large scale regional structures still give structure
> to this transformation process
> and give the contingency tendencies towards usefulness
>
> but there is no teleology
> no necessity
> no purpose
>
> every transformation
> is an accident of history
> a result of evolutionary process
> in a local thermodynamic cascade
I agree!
>> Often one can discover that encoding algorithm by
>> trial and error, and hypothesis testing (provided one has *some*
>> information about the source). But the message may remain permanently
>> (for human purposes) indecipherable. Unless the sink can decode the
>> message (using the same algorithm as the source), there will be *no*
>> correlation in behavior.
>
> this is actually wrong
>
> information is transmitted in either case
> and this is a very simple and fundamental result
> in the formalisation of information theory
Well, we have a philosophical disagreement. I think. Information is
transmitted *as information theorists now use that term*. But that is not
the ordinary use of that term, and it is not the philosophically important
one.
Information is data:
1) From which *knowledge can be extracted*, and
2) The knowledge extracted relates to states of affairs *beyond the data*.
If all we can learn from a datastream is the sequence of bits that compose
it, and perhaps some mathematical or statistical properties of that stream,
we have extracted no information from it. It is merely a sequence of bits
with certain properties. It is (per a paper I read years ago) an
"information-formation," i.e., a physical or mathematical structure capable
of conveying information.
A message (say, "Paris is the capital of France") conveys information
because it tells me something about Paris and France. It also tells me that
message is composed of several distinct symbols arranged in a particular
way, etc. But I am interested in those facts only instrumentally, if at all.
It is interesting that Shannon's original paper was entitled "A Mathematical
Theory of Communication" --- not a "theory of information". It dealt with
*communicating* information-formations over channels with various
parameters. Whether that communication carries any information (in the above
sense) is a separate question, and cannot be decided by examining the
datastream alone.
>> Public key cryptography depends upon this intrinsic ambiguity in any
>> string of bits. Any longish string of bits can represent millions of
>> possible messages. Without the Rawlinson text (or something similar)
>> the Sumerian tablets would remain meaningless (and even with it much of
>> the "meaning" imputed is guesswork). They would contain data, but no
>> information.
>
> wrong
>
> finite information is on the tablet
Heh. Wrong! Finite *information-formations* are on the tablet.
> we know the information is of a particular finite size
> and that the symbols are arranged in a given string with a given
> distribution
>
> there are first-order symbol statistics
> and correlation and higher statistics
> that can be calculated from the message
Yup. And none of that conveys any information whatever. It will tell us
nothing about what the Sumerians ate for lunch.
> cryptography mixes a message entropically
> increasing the possible interpretations
> and hiding a "key" to the noise
Yup.
> perhaps you would give your definition of information
> are its units bits?
> does it give a metric?
> is it formally reproducible?
Just did (above). The units of information *per se* are various types of
propositional structures, e.g., R(x) ("x is red"), xLy ("x is to the left
y"), a>b ("a is greater than b"), etc. That information is then mapped onto
some information-formation in order to be expressed, stored, or
communicated. The information-formation has units and a metric. Bits are the
simplest and most general unit we're likely to come up with.
You *almost* seem to be implying that datastreams carry intrinsic meaning.
You're not, are you?
All datastreams must be interpreted to extract information from them. Even
DNA is not information, but an information-formation. Insert human DNA in a
frog ovum and nothing will happen. The machinery in that cell (the sink)
lacks the tools (enzymes) required to decode that message. It is meaningless
in that environment. It is data, but not information. It is "All Greek."
> i do not understand how one can be certain of things
> one admits may be wrong
Sure you can, if "may be wrong" means "not logically necessary" and the
certainty does not rest on logic. E.g., I am very certain water is H2O. But
that is not logically necessary, and thus could be otherwise (one of
Kripke's "necessary a posteriori" examples). The certainty is epistemic; the
contingency logical.
> in pure reason
> though
> he says
>
> (A104-5)
> " We find, however, that our thought of the relation of all cognition
> to its object carries something of necessity with it, since namely
> the latter is regarded as that which is opposed to our cognitions
> being determined at pleasure or arbitrarily rather than being
> determined _a_priori_, since insofar as they are to relate to an
> object our cognitions must also necessarily agree with each
> other in relation to it, i.e., they must have that unity that
> constitutes the concept of an object. "
>
> concepts do not necessarily agree
Cognitions that constitute our concept of an object must agree, or we are
not satisfied with that concept. They must result in a unity.
Publius
news:1169533746.8...@m58g2000cwm.googlegroups.com:
> Nope other way round, I define knowledge as man's grasp of reality, and
> sensory reality exists as it exists independent of man's mind, and it
> exists in reality without contradiction, therefore non-contradictory
> *identification* of what exists is an excellent standard to have to
> determine man's knowledge of what is real.
You don't know what exists "independently of man's mind" (and senses), and
have no way of knowing. All you have is the data delivered by your senses,
and the structures your brain constructs from that data. How accurately or
faithfully that data represents "reality" is impossible for you or anyone
else to determine. You take what you get, and try to organize it in a way
that best allows you to predict the future.
> There has to be something existing to experience, to gain the knowledge
> of, you cant gain knowledge of nothing in reality.
Yes. Something must exist independently of us. That is what Kant called the
"noumena." But we have no direct access to it, and hence cannot say anything
about it. All we have are sense data (phenomena).
galathaea
"Publius" <m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
[...]
!! I'm a philosopher, and most of the issues in
!! which I'm interested are philosophical, not mathematical.
i am surprised you find a distinction
[...]
!!
!! > you speak of interpretation and insist an a priori
!! >
!! > yet
!! >
!! > every neuron to neuron transmission
!! > every dynamic of ion potentials
!! >
!! > is contingent
!! > it varies over time
!! > and among all animals with the system
!!
!! We don't know that, Galathaea. We only know that many of them are. But even
!! if it is the case, it doesn't settle the question of *a priori* knowledge.
!! That is because knowledge (concepts, and the truth or falsity of
!! propositions constructed from those concepts), is not identifiable with any
!! particular neural structures or ensembles. So the stability or instability
!! of any particular structures does not imply stability or instability of any
!! particular knowledge. Indeed, the neural plasticity to which you refer
!! renders making those correlations more difficult.
the correlations are already in the literature
to a very real and meaningful extent
these questions already have good models
today
this timidity about accepting models
is a good and cautious first response
but do acknowledge what our correlations appear to be today
we have very good models on how our nervous system originated
muscular structures originally rhythmic
forming organisational coordination
to control locomotion and other muscular activities
this model fits the observation
that plants and fungi do not have muscular systems
and also did not organise nervous systems
in the manner of neurons
they do appear to have growth organised to sense
so they do appear to have active information processing
but not the rhythmic muscular locomation
or the complex conceptual models
we can model what starfish normally do
over 99% of their time
these models already describe concept formation
we have models of how frogs visually locate prey
or pattern recognise larger fearful action schemas
of possible predators
and if prey
to launch the activity off the tongue
in a learned accuracy of use
these models have concept formation
as something they already interpret
the models understand much of ring processing
and correlate with experiment quite well
mRNA expression techniques
and the various near-field and NMR-based imaging
have given us very strong experminetal techniques
that justify much of the neuroarchitectonic models
-+-+-+-+_
the concepts that these brain models form
though
are not the kantian concepts
they do not obey a strict logic
they are influenced by sense
to learn a good concept model
in this formalism concepts are attractor basins
in dynamics over the neural state space
the neural state space is often just some linear vector space
in these models
recursive feedback loops
allow iterative processing
concept strings and steps of logical modelling
and it is here local languages
grow
compete
and integrate
to our fractured world views
unlike the kantian notion
these senses sense information
_real_information_
in the sense of information theory
in units of threshold signalling
it appears that possibly early
in the evolution of the brain
some modularisation of reflexivity
in order to reflect on movements
and utterances
in model and recall
the mirror neurons are one form
but the mechanism appears more primitively
and appears to allow concepts to become second-order
to "think of themselves"
science and symbology
for prediction and expectation
discovering an i
********^^^^^^^^..
concepts as attractor basins
becomes relevant to mereology here
attractor basins form the basic connectives for a logic
and
or
complement
but only in a topological sense allowing nonexclusion
truth here is not an absolute
but a dynamic information appraisel
that may or may not have constancy
or noncontradiction
it is influenced by potentiation signalling
possibly some like NO backpropagating
we have a sense of our muscles
as yoga has insisted for thousands of years
%%%%%####### .. #######$$
i know it is taboo to have a theory of epistemology
that refers to our metaphysical models of science
but i insist this is the only meaningful way to do epistemology
we learn how we learn from everything we learn
not just the blurry sunsets and dull warm heat of the summer night
not just the smell of salt flats
the taste of the cherry pits
but all the symbols of information we process
including the scientific experiments
i insist this is epistemology
that kant himself proposed ontological models
but his ontology included very vague notions
like intuitions and transcendental ideas
with very little predictive power
but that is all we are talking about here
ontologies of concepts
how do they play?
looking at the explanation of perception and conception
found in the modern models
and how it explains so many meaningful questions of the process
with such good prediction
in earlier systems
i am more likely to trust experimental predictions
from a mathematical neuroarchitectonicist
than from a kantian
[...]
!! >> Often one can discover that encoding algorithm by
!! >> trial and error, and hypothesis testing (provided one has *some*
!! >> information about the source). But the message may remain permanently
!! >> (for human purposes) indecipherable. Unless the sink can decode the
!! >> message (using the same algorithm as the source), there will be *no*
!! >> correlation in behavior.
!! >
!! > this is actually wrong
!! >
!! > information is transmitted in either case
!! > and this is a very simple and fundamental result
!! > in the formalisation of information theory
!!
!! Well, we have a philosophical disagreement. I think. Information is
!! transmitted *as information theorists now use that term*. But that is not
!! the ordinary use of that term, and it is not the philosophically important
!! one.
!!
!! Information is data:
!!
!! 1) From which *knowledge can be extracted*, and
!!
!! 2) The knowledge extracted relates to states of affairs *beyond the data*.
!!
!! If all we can learn from a datastream is the sequence of bits that compose
!! it, and perhaps some mathematical or statistical properties of that stream,
!! we have extracted no information from it. It is merely a sequence of bits
!! with certain properties. It is (per a paper I read years ago) an
!! "information-formation," i.e., a physical or mathematical structure capable
!! of conveying information.
!!
!! A message (say, "Paris is the capital of France") conveys information
!! because it tells me something about Paris and France. It also tells me that
!! message is composed of several distinct symbols arranged in a particular
!! way, etc. But I am interested in those facts only instrumentally, if at all.
!!
!! It is interesting that Shannon's original paper was entitled "A Mathematical
!! Theory of Communication" --- not a "theory of information". It dealt with
!! *communicating* information-formations over channels with various
!! parameters. Whether that communication carries any information (in the above
!! sense) is a separate question, and cannot be decided by examining the
!! datastream alone.
modern models of cognition
have sensation only receiving such input
symbols
signals
over neural nets
they explain the formation of meaning
as a learned association of information categories
habitual use
repeatability
knowledge is only found in such information
as the symbols supply
the interpretations associated internally
are the models of expectation and prediction
that allow evaluation
evaluation allows computational exchange of information
in the information theoretic manner
to provide meaning
this is abstracted in modern agent theory
[...]
!! > we know the information is of a particular finite size
!! > and that the symbols are arranged in a given string with a given
!! > distribution
!! >
!! > there are first-order symbol statistics
!! > and correlation and higher statistics
!! > that can be calculated from the message
!!
!! Yup. And none of that conveys any information whatever. It will tell us
!! nothing about what the Sumerians ate for lunch.
it actually gives us a good start
normally when we receive information
it helps to have a model of _why_ we received that information
was it a surprise?
is someone else trying to communicate?
is this nonverbal sensation of nature?
were they trying to communicate to you?
rawlinson's text tells very little
of what sumerians had for lunch
instead it concerns itself with dar-i-us' rise to power
as a stabilising emperor after the chaotic death of cambyses
these types of texts are common
as are accounting tabs on goats and other goods
some of which we already knew about before rawlinson
rarely in this period are there
descriptions of sexual sadism in settings of existential ennui
those were a later development
so knowledge allows us to assign probabilities
to interpretations of information
that allow prediction
without assuming an interpretation before hand
that is the key reversal
we are back to antikant empiricism
even if we are categorising innately
because that innate state is empirical
possibly contradictory
dynamic
*****((((((((
expecting a message type
even weird messages like
"one fish two fish red fish blue fish"
is only a matter of experience
[...]
!! > perhaps you would give your definition of information
!! > are its units bits?
!! > does it give a metric?
!! > is it formally reproducible?
!!
!! Just did (above). The units of information *per se* are various types of
!! propositional structures, e.g., R(x) ("x is red"), xLy ("x is to the left
!! y"), a>b ("a is greater than b"), etc. That information is then mapped onto
!! some information-formation in order to be expressed, stored, or
!! communicated. The information-formation has units and a metric. Bits are the
!! simplest and most general unit we're likely to come up with.
!!
!! You *almost* seem to be implying that datastreams carry intrinsic meaning.
!! You're not, are you?
!!
!! All datastreams must be interpreted to extract information from them. Even
!! DNA is not information, but an information-formation. Insert human DNA in a
!! frog ovum and nothing will happen. The machinery in that cell (the sink)
!! lacks the tools (enzymes) required to decode that message. It is meaningless
!! in that environment. It is data, but not information. It is "All Greek."
information channels
your datastreams
are the only information sources in the modern models
all meaning comes from them
learning is what constructs meaning from information
there are no transcendental processes
in the neuroarchitectonic models
George Dance
On Jan 23, 4:39 pm, Publius <m.publ...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
> mikegor...@xtra.co.nz wrote in news:1169587567.607580.189950
Mike is definitely defending (consciously or not) Ayn Rand's view of
'axiomatic' knowledge - knowledge that did not depend on any particular
experience - and I don't see it as anything but a silly semantic game
to refuse to call that type of knowledge a priori, to distinguish it
from knowledge dependent on specific experiences. However, I'd dispute
your conclusion (possibly wrt to him, and definitely wrt myself) that a
belief in a priority makes one even a closet Kantian.
There are significant differences in Rand's 'axiomatic knowledge' and
Kant's 'a priori.' Here is a short summary, from an Objectivist point
of view:
<quote>
Answered by William Thomas
I am not a Kantian, nor an expert on Kantianism. But the common
understanding of "a-priori" is knowledge that can be established prior
to experience. As Bertrand Russell puts it in discussing Kant in his
"History of Western Philosophy": "An 'a-priori' proposition... is one
which, though it may be elicited by experience, is seen, when known, to
have a basis other than experience." (pp. 706-707) Traditionally, it is
thought that the a-priori has no necessary bearing on experience, which
is radically "contingent."
Rand's axiomatic concepts and her axioms are self-evident on the basis
of the content of any particular experience. Thus, the Objectivist
axioms are known by experience, but can be known from any experience.
They cannot be known prior to or independent of experience, however. It
is a contradiction in terms to posit consciousness with nothing to be
conscious of. Consciousness is an active faculty of awareness: it
exists to be aware of objects, and has no contents without them.
One sign of the difference between Objectivist axioms and Kantian
"a-priori" is that Kantian "a-priori" concepts are claimed based on
characteristics of language, mathematics, and logic. They are described
formalistically or based on appeal to an intuition about the necessary.
This basic approach thus examines the contents of a well-educated mind,
ignoring the world around it, to try to establish the "apriori."
The Objectivist axioms, by contrast, are established based the
characteristics of the objects of experience. That they exist, that
they are what they are, that one is aware of them, (which is the basis
of the axiomatic concepts of existence, identity, and consciousness)
are all statements that presuppose a relation between reality and the
mind of the knower, a relation that is self-evident in every
experience. Rand's most fundamental axiom is "Existence exists."
Non-contradiction, the point of logic that features prominently in
theories of the "a-priori," is a kind of corollary of what we observe
in existence. Thus logic is derived from our experience of existence.
</q>
http://www.objectivistcenter.org/ct-1247-APriori_and_Axioms.aspx
Publius
news:1169672844.1...@13g2000cwe.googlegroups.com:
> Rand's axiomatic concepts and her axioms are self-evident on the basis
> of the content of any particular experience. Thus, the Objectivist
> axioms are known by experience, but can be known from any experience.
> They cannot be known prior to or independent of experience, however. It
> is a contradiction in terms to posit consciousness with nothing to be
> conscious of. Consciousness is an active faculty of awareness: it
> exists to be aware of objects, and has no contents without them.
Kant says much the same thing. In order to become aware of the a priori, or
to grasp its form, we must have some sensory experience to work with. I.e.,
we can't grasp the form without something to serve as content. Rand presumes
the form is deduced from the content; Kant says it is there all along.
Might check my response in the "Kant - metaethics [etc.]" thread. Covers the
same ground.
George Dance
On Jan 22, 2:10 am, mikegor...@xtra.co.nz wrote:
> Publius wrote:
> > This conversation has been scattered over several threads. Though I'd try to
> > get it into one, with a more descriptive title.What knowledge of reality, (by reality I mean things existing and not
> requiring imagination e.g. god and the socialist's *the greater good*
> are two examples entirely founded upon imagination, I digress) what
> knowledge of reality can be obtained with *a priori* which is not
> directly linked to and or which can not, in its origin of meaning, be
> reduced right back down to an irreducible and sensory level of
> perception?
>
> For example, the origin of the concept of the meaning of time is, its
> direct link to sensory existence is, its a relational concept,
> specifically it is used to measure the duration of action, one or more
> entities in motion / action in relationship to each.
>
Observed motion is one bit of sensory evidence for time, but it's not
the only one. Observing any change - saki fermenting, plant growth,
the sky darkening at night, dust building up on objects - is all
sensory evidence of time.
Publius
news:galathaea-230...@10.0.1.2...
Sorry the delay --- your posts require bigger time blocks for responses than
most. :-)
> !! We don't know that, Galathaea. We only know that many of them are.
> But even !! if it is the case, it doesn't settle the question of *a
> priori* knowledge. !! That is because knowledge (concepts, and the truth
> or falsity of !! propositions constructed from those concepts), is not
> identifiable with any !! particular neural structures or ensembles. So
> the stability or instability !! of any particular structures does not
> imply stability or instability of any !! particular knowledge. Indeed,
> the neural plasticity to which you refer !! renders making those
> correlations more difficult.
>
> the correlations are already in the literature
Well, I'm very skeptical of that. Certain types or classes of knowledge
*depend upon* certain brain structures being intact. But that is not saying
much more than that the brain has to be in working order for us to know
anything. There is no identifiable neural structure or ensemble that
represents my knowledge that Paris is the capital of France, or my
preference for sharp Cheddar over Swiss.
I'm fairly familiar with the neurophys literature. Do you have a cite?
> but do acknowledge what our correlations appear to be today
The correlations do not relate *information* to structure; they only relate
*behavior* to structure. Of course I mean "information" in the sense I
defined.
> we have very good models on how our nervous system originated
>
> muscular structures originally rhythmic
> forming organisational coordination
> to control locomotion and other muscular activities
>
> this model fits the observation
> that plants and fungi do not have muscular systems
> and also did not organise nervous systems
> in the manner of neurons
>
> they do appear to have growth organised to sense
> so they do appear to have active information processing
> but not the rhythmic muscular locomation
> or the complex conceptual models
Yes.
> the concepts that these brain models form
> though
> are not the kantian concepts
>
> they do not obey a strict logic
> they are influenced by sense
> to learn a good concept model
There is no inconsistency there with Kant. Kant does not suggest that our
world models are innate. They are constructed from the data of experience.
But the methodologies for building them (the most primitive ones) are
innate. The theoretical models for neural processing have similar *a priori*
features. The data do not write the program which processes it (although the
program evolved within the constraints of prior data).
> unlike the kantian notion
> these senses sense information
> _real_information_
> in the sense of information theory
> in units of threshold signalling
The senses do not sense *information*. They sense *signals*. Information may
be extracted from those signals after processing. That information then
generates a change in the world model. Without the processing there is no
information, and no change in the world model.
> attractor basins form the basic connectives for a logic
> and
> or
> complement
> but only in a topological sense allowing nonexclusion
>
> truth here is not an absolute
> but a dynamic information appraisel
> that may or may not have constancy
> or noncontradiction
"Truth" and "noncontradiction" are inapplicable to low-level information
processing. Those concepts only apply to verbal expressions of conceptual
models (theories).
> i know it is taboo to have a theory of epistemology
> that refers to our metaphysical models of science
> but i insist this is the only meaningful way to do epistemology
It is not only taboo --- it is question-begging!
> we learn how we learn from everything we learn
I agree!
> that kant himself proposed ontological models
> but his ontology included very vague notions
> like intuitions and transcendental ideas
> with very little predictive power
Every model proposes an ontology. But philosophical theories, unlike
scientific ones, need not have predictive power. They have, instead,
"organizing power" --- they supply a framework within which other concepts,
including science, can be rendered coherent.
> i am more likely to trust experimental predictions
> from a mathematical neuroarchitectonicist
> than from a kantian
Kantians (by which I assume you mean philosophers) don't do experimental
predictions!
> modern models of cognition
> have sensation only receiving such input
> symbols
> signals
> over neural nets
>
> they explain the formation of meaning
> as a learned association of information categories
> habitual use
> repeatability
>
> knowledge is only found in such information
> as the symbols supply
>
> the interpretations associated internally
> are the models of expectation and prediction
> that allow evaluation
>
> evaluation allows computational exchange of information
> in the information theoretic manner
> to provide meaning
>
> this is abstracted in modern agent theory
Yes. And all those models have some *a priori* constraints built-in (traps,
filters, channels, conditional handling routines, etc.) not derived from the
datastream. The computer does not program itself (except evolutionarily
speaking).
> !! > there are first-order symbol statistics
> !! > and correlation and higher statistics
> !! > that can be calculated from the message
> !!
> !! Yup. And none of that conveys any information whatever. It will tell
> us !! nothing about what the Sumerians ate for lunch.
>
> it actually gives us a good start
I think this is an important point --- probably the key to our disagreement.
Here is a *gedankenexperiment*:
The first astronauts arrive on Mars, and after exploring for several months,
they discover a labyrinth of deep caves. In some of those caves they find
some stone tablets, not unlike those of the Sumerians. Further exploration
yields more caves, scattered widely over the planet, many with similar stone
tablets. A very few other artifacts are also found, all formed from various
species of stone found on Mars. The tablets themselves have been cut from
thin layers of Martian shale (the discovery of which confirms that Mars had
surface water for an extended period). Because of the scarcity of other
artifacts, the explorers surmise that the caves were dedicated information
repositories, rather than habitations or other general use shelters.
Via various techniques the tablets are dated to between 800 million to 1
billion years old. Nothing on the surface of Mars survives from that era,
which we know was vastly different from today --- Mars had a much denser
atmosphere, surface water, almost constant tectonic and volcanic activity.
The tablets are inscribed with what appears to be an alphabetic language
having 41 symbols. The same symbol set is used on all the tablets, which
together bear over 100 million characters. Of course, none of the symbols
resemble any used in any Earth language.
Let us assume that the tablets are indeed written records of some kind (and
that is an assumption), and that they record the same general range of
information humans would record --- histories, myths, laws, descriptive
scientific texts, stories and plays, biographies, recipes, "how-tos", poems,
etc.
I'd agree that we should be able to divine the syntax of that written
language (and perhaps even discover that the tablets record a few different
languages which use the same symbol set). But I'd argue that we would never
be able to translate a *single word*.
Do you disagree?
> rawlinson's text tells very little
> of what sumerians had for lunch
>
> instead it concerns itself with dar-i-us' rise to power
> as a stabilising emperor after the chaotic death of cambyses
>
> these types of texts are common
> as are accounting tabs on goats and other goods
> some of which we already knew about before rawlinson
Only because we had a few other keys, or because the meanings were
constrained by context.
> rarely in this period are there
> descriptions of sexual sadism in settings of existential ennui
>
> those were a later development
:-)
> so knowledge allows us to assign probabilities
> to interpretations of information
> that allow prediction
> without assuming an interpretation before hand
Not unless we have some candidate interpretations at the outset. Any string
of symbols can represent any information whatsoever. (That is fairly easy to
prove).
> we are back to antikant empiricism
> even if we are categorising innately
> because that innate state is empirical
> possibly contradictory
> dynamic
An innate state is empirical? Are you trying to illustrate your thesis here
(possibly contradictory)?
> information channels
> your datastreams
> are the only information sources in the modern models
Aren't you forgetting the processing algorithms?
Jos Horikx
>Which is the fact of reality that Kant's expression *man's knowledge
>comes from experience* ignores, e.g. the mystics claim knowledge of god
>by claiming they have experienced it, and the mere fact they have had
>an *experience* qualifies it as knowledge, according to Kant's silly
>standard.
Read Kants: „Träume eines Geistersehers erläutert durch Träume der
Metaphysik“ (1766)
(Dreams of a Ghost-Seer / Dreams of the Spirit Seer, Explained by
the Dreams of Metaphysics)
JH
Jos Horikx
wrote:
>one thing i notice is a fear of formalism
You talk about Kant.
You say: "one thing i notice is a fear of formalism"
May I remind you to the fact that Kant himself defined (his)
transcendental philosophy as:
" [Transzendentalphilosophie] ist die von allem Inhalt (d.i. allen
Gegenständen) abstrahierende synthetische Erkenntnis a priori
aus Begriffen, also bloß das _Formale_ des theoretisch spekulativen
und moralisch praktischen sich selbst bestimmenden Subjekts"
(OP XXI 92). OP stands for Opus Posthumum (Vittorio Mathieu)
I will try to translate that (Neither German nor English is my
mother tongue, maybe someone feels the need to make some
additional remarks):
Transcendental philosophy is the a priori synthetic knowledge/in-
sight of our notions that abstracts from all content (that is: all
objects), that is (only) the pure _formal_ part of the theoretical
speculative and praktical moral subject that defines/determines
him/herself.
(Once again, people with more knowledge than I have of German,
English and/or Kant are invited to make the necessary corrections
in this translation)
JH
Bob Kolker
>
> (Once again, people with more knowledge than I have of German,
> English and/or Kant are invited to make the necessary corrections
> in this translation)
THere is no such thing as a synthetic a priori. All synthetic
proposition are derived from experience.
Kant's best examples of synthetic a priori apodictic judgements were
Newtonian Physics and Euclidean Geometry. Newtonian physics is wrong and
there are other geometries beside Euclidean geometry. Kant produced a
dud, and Hume was right all along.
Bob Kolker
rc
> THere is no such thing as a synthetic a priori. All synthetic
> proposition are derived from experience.
How would you classify the statement, 'a thing that is green all over
is not red all over'?
>
> Kant's best examples of synthetic a priori apodictic judgements were
> Newtonian Physics and Euclidean Geometry.
> Newtonian physics is wrong and there are other geometries beside
> Euclidean geometry.
Newtonian physics is NOT wrong. This misconception is due to a limited
understanding of physics. It can be said that Newtonian physics is not
complete enough to describe the entire universe, but that in no way
makes it wrong. The law of gravity is not 'the good idea of gravity',
it is the law of gravity. And to my knowledge no one has disproved it
yet.
The same goes for euclidean geometry. There are no geometries that
nullify the arguments of euclidean geometry to my knowledge. Euclidean
geometry is not wrong, just not entirely complete.
> Kant produced a dud, and Hume was right all along.
You seem to have it all figured out, but dud is a triffle dismissive
for Immanuel Kant, don't you think?
Bob Kolker
>
>
> Newtonian physics is NOT wrong. This misconception is due to a limited
> understanding of physics.
Newtonian (classical) mechanics is galilean invariant. Velocities add.
This is not the way the world works. That is why locally Lorentzian
Invariant physics has taken its place.
In addition to the invariance being incorrect the Newton concept of
space and time are just plain wrong, as Einstein has demonstrated.
Getting past the physics, Kant was dead wrong about Euclidean Geometry
being an apodictic synthetic a priori. There are an infinite number of
consistent non-Euclidean geometries.
As to Kant's assertion that 5 + 7 = 12 is synthetic a priori, this
equation can be trivially derived from the Peano Axioms which are
neither synthetic nor analytic. They are just conventional assumptions,
in the sense that Poincare' defined convention.
Kant struck out with his synthetic a priori nonsense. Hume was dead on
right.
Bob Kolker
Jos Horikx
wrote:
>THere is no such thing as a synthetic a priori. All synthetic
>proposition are derived from experience.
Pure reason doesn't allow experience.
JH
Bob Kolker
>
> Pure reason doesn't allow experience.
THere is no such thing as pure reason. Reason is done by humans brains
in human skulls so it is polluted by experience.
Without experience you could not think.
Bob Kolker
Jos Horikx
>Jos Horikx wrote:
>> Pure reason doesn't allow experience.
>THere is no such thing as pure reason. Reason is done by humans brains
>in human skulls so it is polluted by experience.
That is your kind of metaphysics. It is Kants "intellectus ectypus"
and you are still into that. But Kants purpose was to get rid of the
scepticism of empirism (and it was his purpose to get rid of the
dogmatism of the "intellectus archetypus as well)
If you try to understand Kant than you must know that all natural
things are conditioned. In Kants morals this comes back as the
"hypothetical imperative" (because it rests on our -scientific-
notions of things, but the form of all our notions of that kind is
that they are in fact hypotheses). But Kants ethics does have a
categorical imperative as well. And that one does _not_ depend on
empiristic things. (because they were already taken into account)
Its the sphere in which "the practical moral subject defines/deter-
mines him- or herself" and you need a "intellectus archetypus" to
deal with that kind of questions. (and you need a frame of formal
notions to distinguish between both types of intellect)
>Without experience you could not think.
Nobody said so.
JH
Jos Horikx
>>Without experience you could not think.
>
>Nobody said so.
That means: nobody argues that, nobody said the contrary.
(it could be misunderstood without this correction)
JH
rc
> rc wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Newtonian physics is NOT wrong. This misconception is due to a limited
>> understanding of physics.
>
> Newtonian (classical) mechanics is galilean invariant. Velocities add.
> This is not the way the world works. That is why locally Lorentzian
> Invariant physics has taken its place.
No. It is well understood that Newtonian mechanics is a limiting case
of relativistic mechanics. When speeds are small with respect to light,
Newtonian mechanics are approximately correct. As the speeds approach
zero Newtonian mechanics are exactly correct. Relativity does not ruin
the laws of newtonian mechanics, it generalizes them.
This is why in any university text book there is usually one chapter
dedicated to relativity, and the rest of the book dedicated to Newton.
> In addition to the invariance being incorrect the Newton concept of
> space and time are just plain wrong, as Einstein has demonstrated.
At speeds small compared to light in a vaccumm (most speeds), time
dilation and length contraction are completely unobservable. Ever heard
of correspondant principle? Newton's laws rest on very strong base of
physical evidence. EVERY one of the principles of Newtonian mechanics
survives as a special case of relativity.
>
> Getting past the physics, Kant was dead wrong about Euclidean Geometry
> being an apodictic synthetic a priori.
Why?
> There are an infinite number of consistent non-Euclidean geometries.
And?
Do any of them dispute that a triangle is a three sided geometric
figure with internal angles equalling 180 degrees? Furthermore, if this
is not a sythetic apriori judgement, what would you call it?
If David Hume is dropped from a 200 meter building what would his
velocity be at 50 meters off the ground? 25 meters? Would he fall? If I
see him hit the earth, then hear the sound of shattering bones, how do
I know that Hume hitting is causally related to the sound that I hear?
Michael Press
<motnr2d6tk8lkf5ti...@4ax.com>,
Jos Horikx <REMOVECAPIT...@chello.nl> wrote:
This must be how it feels to be one of the students who
struggled so hard in geometry class. My eyes glaze over
and I have no idea how any of these phrases are
translated into something that is real for me. I have
read philosophy from various authors: Plato, Aristotle,
Kant, Kirkagard (sp?), Heidigger (sp?). I cannot get
any traction from the very first page. It's a closed
world. I have much better success with comparative
religions. Some of that makes sense to me, particularly
where they agree with one another. Animists make sense
to me and Kant does not.
--
Michael Press
galathaea
> "galathaea" <galath...@veawb.coop> wrote in message
>
> news:galathaea-230...@10.0.1.2...
>
> Sorry the delay --- your posts require bigger time blocks for responses than
> most. :-)
there is no need to rush
i have wanted on many occasions to respond to very old threads
because some conversations should continue
but time can be scarce on occasion
and points can get left unsaid
this particular line is very interesting
> > !! We don't know that, Galathaea. We only know that many of them are.
> > But even !! if it is the case, it doesn't settle the question of *a
> > priori* knowledge. !! That is because knowledge (concepts, and the truth
> > or falsity of !! propositions constructed from those concepts), is not
> > identifiable with any !! particular neural structures or ensembles. So
> > the stability or instability !! of any particular structures does not
> > imply stability or instability of any !! particular knowledge. Indeed,
> > the neural plasticity to which you refer !! renders making those
> > correlations more difficult.
>
> > the correlations are already in the literature
>
> Well, I'm very skeptical of that. Certain types or classes of knowledge
> *depend upon* certain brain structures being intact. But that is not saying
> much more than that the brain has to be in working order for us to know
> anything. There is no identifiable neural structure or ensemble that
> represents my knowledge that Paris is the capital of France, or my
> preference for sharp Cheddar over Swiss.
>
> I'm fairly familiar with the neurophys literature. Do you have a cite?
i think there is plenty of literature
which can start to form a full description
for your preferences in cheese-sensations
the olfactory system is well analysed
the key to understanding the olfactory system
is the "basic circuit" in the olfactory bulb
which is the basic abstraction conceptualiser
the main pathway passes from olfactory nerves
through mitral or tufted cells to their output axons
there are two cross-talk levels
the first level is the olfactory glomeruli
whose interaction selects primary classification of sense
commonly called "input processing"
the second level consists of the directed interpretation
as requested by central olfactory system process
commonly called "output control"
once processed by the bulb
the signal represents an attractor in mostly typical form
and then becomes a computational signal
the characterisation done in the system is learned
through a mainly long-term potentiation mechanism
( though there may be some other learning mechanisms
in interacting pathways )
so your preference may be strongly a consequence of history
sometimes it may be a very immediate defiant act
though
and every now and then you might go for swiss
these are controlled by systems of drives
that perform the calculational manipulations of desire
all of this structure is actually in
books i have referenced in past posts with you
but i would like to also point to
" drive: neurobiological and molecular mechanisms
of sexual motivation "
by donald pfaff
the caption on figure 4.3 ( p43 ) reads
( as a representative sample ):
" Neuroanatomy of two-component drives. As discovered at the
Karolinska Institute during the 1960s, groups of noradrenergic
neurons (A) and dopaminergic neurons (B) located in the
hindbrain and midbrain give rise to widely distributed axonal
trajectories and terminations in the forebrain. Excitations and
activity of such neurons are likely to comprise the
mechanisms of generalised drive states (G sources). Their
concerted actions are at the basis of electrophysiological
and behavioral arousal, the general component of drive. By
comparison, for the particular sources (P) of activation of
particular drives serving individual biological needs, humoral
stimuli, including hormones, act at specific forebrain
locations. In each case, their specific actions determine
individualised motivational states. Together, the effect of
generalised arousal (G) and particular biological need states
(P) energise and direct motivational behavior. "
[...]
i think the word translate is vague here
obviously those symbols will not usually correspond
to anything we have ever experienced
many of the symbols will be of ephemera lost to time
so all of the symbols available to "translate into"
would be only weakly relevant
but the point is that information is still transmitted
we cannot play the game to negotiate referent
but we can predict what we will find on future tablets found
and we can even analyse the evolution of the symbols
over the time span discovered
and we can form hypotheses of meaning
which could be tested by future observations
if our models can predict more
information has been transferred
no matter how foreign or unassociated with experience
no matter how primitive
it is still structural
if one martian was trapped falling into a black hole
and we used our advanced technology to save it
before it crosses the event horizon
even it though it gets horribly damaged in extraction
we might be able pour its brain-like organ
into our ubernet and "communicate"
the information acquired would allow us
to much more quickly comprehend this communication
and if the game of association is possible
we can agree to experience and translate
without access to the game
and a martian to communicate with
we have still hypothesis and correlation
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Jos Horikx
wrote:
[Marsian tablets]
>but the point is that information is still transmitted
Do you make a distinction between "information as such" and
"transmitted information"? Do you think that "information" is
some kind of realistic (contrair to idealistic) concept?
JH
Jos Horikx
<m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
>"Truth" and "noncontradiction" are inapplicable to low-level information
>processing.
Hmm... One could also say that "truth" is _only_ applicable to
low-level information.
(Because of two reasons: first because it is only applicable to
sayings with a predicate-type character, see e.g. Kant CPR B83
and second because a trancendent interpretation of it _needs_ some
compexity that is based on our lower levels of knowledge; Kant
distinguishes Vernunft and Verstand. Maybe in English sense and
reason, or reason and wisdom, ik do not really know the best Ger-
man-English translations)
JH
Jos Horikx
> Kant
>distinguishes Vernunft and Verstand. Maybe in English sense and
>reason, or reason and wisdom, ik do not really know the best Ger-
>man-English translations
The "translation" should be the other way around, "Vernunft"
is the "higher" faculty (wisdom vs reason or reason vs sense)
JH
galathaea
wrote:
> On 4 Feb 2007 00:25:52 -0800, "galathaea" <galath...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> [Marsian tablets]
>
> >but the point is that information is still transmitted
>
> Do you make a distinction between "information as such" and
> "transmitted information"?
only that the first is an object in the ontology
and the latter is the dynamics it undergoes in a model
> Do you think that "information" is
> some kind of realistic (contrair to idealistic) concept?
information is found in experience
and can be described in our physical models
the physical connection is thermodynamics
and the general theory of energy
molecules of the breeze tasted
late winter / early spring sun photons on the retina
convey tangible information in these models
Publius
Read that back to yourself, g. So far you have sketched a neuromodel of how
I discriminate between Cheddar and Swiss. You have not explained why I
*prefer* Cheddar to Swiss.
> so your preference may be strongly a consequence of history
More likely not. Most preferences are revealed upon first presentation of
the alternatives. There is no learning involved (not all, of course. There
are "acquired tastes").
Most preferences seem to be innate but not hereditary. You are born with
them, but they are not coded in DNA. They are the result of numerous
algorithms settling on discrete solutions during prenatal development. The
DNA codes the algorithms, but the values of variables depend on the
microchemistry of the ovum and micro factors in the interuterine
environment --- maybe what Mom had for lunch yesterday. Others are "purely
chance" (meaning we'll never trace them to specific factors). So you get a
"protopreference hierarchy" over the range of stimuli the organism is
equipped to recognize. The preferences are crystallized when the choices are
presented. It is as unique and unpredictable as the fingerprints you
mentioned.
> sometimes it may be a very immediate defiant act
> though
>
> and every now and then you might go for swiss
Yes. When a preference is satisfied, procurement behavior is redirected to
the next lower preference in the hierarchy.
> " Neuroanatomy of two-component drives. As discovered at the
> Karolinska Institute during the 1960s, groups of noradrenergic
> neurons (A) and dopaminergic neurons (B) located in the
> hindbrain and midbrain give rise to widely distributed axonal
> trajectories and terminations in the forebrain. Excitations and
> activity of such neurons are likely to comprise the
> mechanisms of generalised drive states (G sources). Their
> concerted actions are at the basis of electrophysiological
> and behavioral arousal, the general component of drive. By
> comparison, for the particular sources (P) of activation of
> particular drives serving individual biological needs, humoral
> stimuli, including hormones, act at specific forebrain
> locations. In each case, their specific actions determine
> individualised motivational states. Together, the effect of
> generalised arousal (G) and particular biological need states
> (P) energise and direct motivational behavior. "
Explains how I act on a preference, not why I have that preference.
>> Here is a *gedankenexperiment*:
[no need to repeat the scenario]
>> I'd agree that we should be able to divine the syntax of that written
>> language (and perhaps even discover that the tablets record a few
>> different languages which use the same symbol set). But I'd argue that
>> we would never be able to translate a *single word*.
>>
>> Do you disagree?
>
> i think the word translate is vague here
Cop out! It is not in the least vague. By "translate," I mean render in
English (or whatever human language you like) what the Martians were talking
about.
> obviously those symbols will not usually correspond
> to anything we have ever experienced
>
> many of the symbols will be of ephemera lost to time
> so all of the symbols available to "translate into"
> would be only weakly relevant
>
> but the point is that information is still transmitted
And what information is that? Suppose some segment of that text is a recipe
for baking Martian bread. A Martian reading it would learn something ---
namely, how to bake bread. That string of symbols would equip him (her/it)
with a new skill. He would then exhibit a behavioral sequence not hitherto
observed, and which would never have been manifested without the new
programming acquired from that text. *That* is information. That is the
information the text was written to convey.
I agree we can extract some information from the text. We can learn
something about the structure of Martian languages. But we cannot learn how
to bake Martian bread. Even if all the ingredients and utensils were still
available or Mars, we would still be unable to bake bread, or at least, we
could not learn how via that text. We'd have to learn how on our own.
A string of symbols contains within itself only information about itself.
But strings of symbols are used to convey information about something else.
And unless you know how to decode them, you cannot recover that implicit
information.
> we cannot play the game to negotiate referent
> but we can predict what we will find on future tablets found
> and we can even analyse the evolution of the symbols
> over the time span discovered
> and we can form hypotheses of meaning
> which could be tested by future observations
Any hypotheses of meaning would be arbitrary. There is no hook upon which to
hang any hypothesis.
> if our models can predict more
> information has been transferred
> no matter how foreign or unassociated with experience
> no matter how primitive
You have to predict more than the symbol patterns and formation rules of
newly discovered tablets.
> if one martian was trapped falling into a black hole
> and we used our advanced technology to save it
> before it crosses the event horizon
>
> even it though it gets horribly damaged in extraction
> we might be able pour its brain-like organ
> into our ubernet and "communicate"
>
> the information acquired would allow us
> to much more quickly comprehend this communication
> and if the game of association is possible
> we can agree to experience and translate
Disagree. The tablets would not help us a bit in communicating with the
Martian. We'd have to extract from his brain the associations of concepts
with symbols. But then we have decoded the text.
And even then we could not be sure. Tidal forces may have distorted all the
associations is such a way that the tablets translate into gibberish.
:-)
Publius
news:v9qbs2ldmtqf0bt3e...@4ax.com:
>>"Truth" and "noncontradiction" are inapplicable to low-level information
>>processing.
>
> Hmm... One could also say that "truth" is _only_ applicable to
> low-level information.
>
> (Because of two reasons: first because it is only applicable to
> sayings with a predicate-type character, see e.g. Kant CPR B83
> and second because a trancendent interpretation of it _needs_ some
> compexity that is based on our lower levels of knowledge; Kant
> distinguishes Vernunft and Verstand. Maybe in English sense and
> reason, or reason and wisdom, ik do not really know the best Ger-
> man-English translations)
The "low-level processing" I meant was processing which occurs below
conscious awareness. Truth, logic, etc., only apply to languages and the
concepts encodable in languages. And those are high-level processes.
Stephen Harris
I've read "For Kant in his three criticisms Aufklaerung means the unity
of "Verstand" and "Vernunft" - for both there's only the English word
"reason"."
I've seen them translated as Reason and Understanding which melds
the meanings in English, so that one is not the "higher" faculty,
but are two parts contributing to a whole.
Jos Horikx
>Jos Horikx wrote:
>> On Sun, 04 Feb 2007 15:19:48 +0100, Jos Horikx wrote:
>>> Kant
>>> distinguishes Vernunft and Verstand. Maybe in English sense and
>>> reason, or reason and wisdom, ik do not really know the best Ger-
>>> man-English translations
>> The "translation" should be the other way around, "Vernunft"
>> is the "higher" faculty (wisdom vs reason or reason vs sense)
>I've read "For Kant in his three criticisms Aufklaerung means the unity
>of "Verstand" and "Vernunft" - for both there's only the English word
>"reason"."
>I've seen them translated as Reason and Understanding which melds
>the meanings in English, so that one is not the "higher" faculty,
>but are two parts contributing to a whole.
Sure. Thats correct. But Kant explicitly works toward a "system" or
a "whole". Your quote go's on, saying that "verstand" is the pre-
condition for our "empirical part of our vernuft".
Concerning the human intellect as a whole, Kant distinguishes be-
tween the "intellectus ectypus" and the "intellectus archetypus".
"Vernunft" has to to with the (transcendental) union of both of them
while "verstand" primaraly has to do with the ectypus-part.
JH
Jos Horikx
>On Feb 4, 6:09 am, Jos Horikx wrote:
>> On 4 Feb 2007 00:25:52 -0800, "galathaea" wrote:
>> [Marsian tablets]
>> >but the point is that information is still transmitted
>> Do you make a distinction between "information as such" and
>> "transmitted information"?
>only that the first is an object in the ontology
> and the latter is the dynamics it undergoes in a model
But if you swapped those remarks (that the latter is an object in
the ontology and the meaning of the first is the dynamics it
undergoes in a model) it would make the same amount of sense.
(All models are intented to have some ontological impact, aint that
right?)
>> Do you think that "information" is
>> some kind of realistic (contrair to idealistic) concept?
>information is found in experience
> and can be described in our physical models
>the physical connection is thermodynamics
> and the general theory of energy
Huh? thermodynamics?
What thermodynamis does is that it explains a lot, in particular the
conservation-laws.
If you make a distinction between "information as such" and
"transmitted information, an if you carry thermodynamis into the
dispute to lay a foundation under this distinction, than I ask my-
self: What is there to be conserved? In my eyes the conservation
laws or neither applicible on the "information as such" nor on the
total "transmission" of information.
>molecules of the breeze tasted
>late winter / early spring sun photons on the retina
> convey tangible information in these models
Does this have a meaning or is it blabla?
>-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
>galathaea: prankster, fablist, magician, liar
Sure, what do toy do to make yourself better?
JH
Jos Horikx
>> On 4 Feb 2007 00:25:52 -0800, "galathaea" wrote:
(revised version because of too many typo's in the former)
>> [Marsian tablets]
>> >but the point is that information is still transmitted
>> Do you make a distinction between "information as such" and
>> "transmitted information"?
>only that the first is an object in the ontology
> and the latter is the dynamics it undergoes in a model
But if you swapped those remarks (such that the latter is an object
in the ontology and that the meaning of the first is the dynamics it
undergoes in a model) it would make the same amount of sense.
(All models are intented to have some ontological impact, aint that
right?)
>> Do you think that "information" is
>> some kind of realistic (contrair to idealistic) concept?
>information is found in experience
> and can be described in our physical models
>the physical connection is thermodynamics
> and the general theory of energy
Huh? thermodynamics?
What thermodynamis does is that it explains a lot, in particular the
conservation-laws.
If you make a distinction between "information as such" and
"transmitted information, and if you carry thermodynamis into the
dispute in order to lay a foundation under this distinction, than I
ask myself: What is there to be conserved? In my eyes the conser-
vation laws are neither applicible on the "information as such" nor
on the total "transmission" of information.
>molecules of the breeze tasted
>late winter / early spring sun photons on the retina
> convey tangible information in these models
Does this have a meaning or is it blabla?
>-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
>galathaea: prankster, fablist, magician, liar
Sure, what do you do to make yourself better?
JH
galathaea
> "galathaea" <galath...@gmail.com> wrote in message
yes but with an "outer" connection in the second level
which is the point of the latter reference to drives
in particular
our neurocomputational system has these boundaries
where an external net learning process of sensual categorisation
interacts with internal processing loops
drives are these internal processing loops
they control the origins of arousal and motivation towards act
through manipulation of instances in attractors
the study of boundary cases
leads naturally to catastrophe theory
which is: the study of boundaries in attractor dynamics
( so its pretty well suited to the cause )
but this is not simply dynamics
this is computational dynamics
and response plasticity provides the state transition capability
of an event driven architecture
event driven computational architectures
allow internal dialogue with self-events
or loops
-*-*-
this is the key to drive mechanisms
whether the internal scan-wave of the retinal loops
or the lordosis behavior studied by pfaff
we are learning what drives us to focus on objects
reach for objects
or prepare for more intimate encounters
neural path by neural path by history by learning
thought
decisions
in drive
[..]
> > " Neuroanatomy of two-component drives. As discovered at the
> > Karolinska Institute during the 1960s, groups of noradrenergic
> > neurons (A) and dopaminergic neurons (B) located in the
> > hindbrain and midbrain give rise to widely distributed axonal
> > trajectories and terminations in the forebrain. Excitations and
> > activity of such neurons are likely to comprise the
> > mechanisms of generalised drive states (G sources). Their
> > concerted actions are at the basis of electrophysiological
> > and behavioral arousal, the general component of drive. By
> > comparison, for the particular sources (P) of activation of
> > particular drives serving individual biological needs, humoral
> > stimuli, including hormones, act at specific forebrain
> > locations. In each case, their specific actions determine
> > individualised motivational states. Together, the effect of
> > generalised arousal (G) and particular biological need states
> > (P) energise and direct motivational behavior. "
>
> Explains how I act on a preference, not why I have that preference.
but that's what the learning algorithms do
the system is
internal drive loops drive learning in the sensory processing nets
the basic pattern is repeated in nearly all sensory system
including sense of muscular action and other "non-5"s
> >> Here is a *gedankenexperiment*:
>
> [no need to repeat the scenario]
>
> >> I'd agree that we should be able to divine the syntax of that written
> >> language (and perhaps even discover that the tablets record a few
> >> different languages which use the same symbol set). But I'd argue that
> >> we would never be able to translate a *single word*.
>
> >> Do you disagree?
>
> > i think the word translate is vague here
>
> Cop out! It is not in the least vague. By "translate," I mean render in
> English (or whatever human language you like) what the Martians were talking
> about.
but english would not necessrily have words
for ancient martian monuments
or social behaviors
or historical events
or ...
if meaning is discursive
then what we discourse with controls our ability to negotiate
meaning
if we find a spoon like object
with the word "-/ ^+" on it
we might conjecture -/ ^+ means that type of object
but calling -/ ^+ "spoon" would be presumptuous of purpose
> > obviously those symbols will not usually correspond
> > to anything we have ever experienced
>
> > many of the symbols will be of ephemera lost to time
> > so all of the symbols available to "translate into"
> > would be only weakly relevant
>
> > but the point is that information is still transmitted
>
> And what information is that? Suppose some segment of that text is a recipe
> for baking Martian bread. A Martian reading it would learn something ---
> namely, how to bake bread. That string of symbols would equip him (her/it)
> with a new skill. He would then exhibit a behavioral sequence not hitherto
> observed, and which would never have been manifested without the new
> programming acquired from that text. *That* is information. That is the
> information the text was written to convey.
>
> I agree we can extract some information from the text. We can learn
> something about the structure of Martian languages. But we cannot learn how
> to bake Martian bread. Even if all the ingredients and utensils were still
> available or Mars, we would still be unable to bake bread, or at least, we
> could not learn how via that text. We'd have to learn how on our own.
>
> A string of symbols contains within itself only information about itself.
> But strings of symbols are used to convey information about something else.
> And unless you know how to decode them, you cannot recover that implicit
> information.
it is the classic syntax / semantics distinction
however
science presumes we can use information
as evidence of source
the big bang
biogenesis
these are left to us
only as palimpsest information
with only modern experience to discourse with
why would we presume to have meaningful models in one case
and not the other?
> > we cannot play the game to negotiate referent
> > but we can predict what we will find on future tablets found
> > and we can even analyse the evolution of the symbols
> > over the time span discovered
> > and we can form hypotheses of meaning
> > which could be tested by future observations
>
> Any hypotheses of meaning would be arbitrary. There is no hook upon which to
> hang any hypothesis.
not arbitrary
prediction means testability
and structures likeliness in possibility
if we see two symbols
they do not likely convey meaning
of high kolmogorov complexity in english
and at the same time be of little practical use
it is possible
but it would be inefficient use of language
playing slippery slope
if we turn the complexity up to astronomical levels
it becomes extremely unlikely the concept was ever constructed
let alone named
yes
if you wipe away most useful data
you are left with far fewer constraint
but that is the nature of data
constraining our models
Publius
>> Cop out! It is not in the least vague. By "translate," I mean render in
>> English (or whatever human language you like) what the Martians were
>> talking about.
> but english would not necessrily have words
> for ancient martian monuments
> or social behaviors
> or historical events
> or ...
Of course not. But that is not the problem. If we had the referent for a
certain Martian morpheme then we could coin an English word for it and
define that word: "A Martian monument having such-and-such characteristics
and erected for so-and-so purpose." We do that when translating human
languages, often by just importing the foreign word, e.g., "siesta." But for
the Martian text we don't have the referent, and cannot retrieve it from the
text.
> if meaning is discursive
> then what we discourse with controls our ability to negotiate
> meaning
By "what we discourse with" do you mean what symbols and combinatorial
rules?
I agree that meaning is discursive, and that is why we cannot translate the
Martian tablets. We have not been involved in discourse with the Martians in
their environment (or some common environment). And their mappings of
symbols to referents is arbitrary, like all other such mappings.
> if we find a spoon like object
> with the word "-/ ^+" on it
>
> we might conjecture -/ ^+ means that type of object
> but calling -/ ^+ "spoon" would be presumptuous of purpose
Yes, it would.
>> A string of symbols contains within itself only information about
>> itself. But strings of symbols are used to convey information about
>> something else. And unless you know how to decode them, you cannot
>> recover that implicit information.
> it is the classic syntax / semantics distinction
>
> however
> science presumes we can use information
> as evidence of source
>
> the big bang
> biogenesis
>
> these are left to us
> only as palimpsest information
> with only modern experience to discourse with
>
> why would we presume to have meaningful models in one case
> and not the other?
Because we are in a continuing dialog with the universe. It speaks to us
(via the senses) with a constant syntax, and we have erected a semantics
upon that syntax. That semantics is our model of the universe. We can
validate our semantics by testing the universe and observing the universe's
response. But we can't do that with the Martians. We could perhaps construct
a semantics for that text, but we will get no feedback.
>> Any hypotheses of meaning would be arbitrary. There is no hook upon
>> which to hang any hypothesis.
>
> not arbitrary
>
> prediction means testability
> and structures likeliness in possibility
>
> if we see two symbols
> they do not likely convey meaning
> of high kolmogorov complexity in english
> and at the same time be of little practical use
We agree that the Martian texts have meaning. We don't need to calculate the
Kolmogorov complexity to determine that. We can also agree that for Martians
they would have practical use. But we cannot determine that meaning or use.
George Dance
> Publius wrote:
> > This conversation has been scattered over several threads. Though I'd try to
> > get it into one, with a more descriptive title.
>
> 1. a priori:
>
> All bachelors are unmarried.
> All triangles have three sides.
>
Analytic and /a priori/.
> 2. a posteriori:
>
> That bachelor is tall.
> This triangle is blue.
>
Synthetic and /a posteriori./
> The terms "a priori" and "a posteriori" are used in philosophy to
> distinguish between two different types of propositional knowledge.
> Thus, attempts to define clearly or explain a priori and a posteriori
> knowledge are part of a central thread in epistemology, the study of
> knowledge. Since the definitions and usage of the terms are disputed
> and have evolved in the history of philosophy, it is difficult to
> provide proper definitions of them.
>
> Rough and oversimplified explanations are as follows:
>
> a priori knowledge is independent of experience,
> while a posteriori knowledge is dependent
> on experience.
>
That's ambiguous; 'dependence' could mean either logical or temporal
dependence. Better to say: "A priori knowledge is not justified by
experience, while a posterior knowledge is justified by
experience."
> Lawyers sometimes use "a priori" to describe a step in an argument the
> truth of which can be deduced entirely from the truth of the premises.
> "A posteriori", on the other hand, requires a bit more evidence.
>
Quite rightly so. Logical inferences (or what Leibniz called 'truths
of reason') are all justified by analytic /a priori./.
> The intuitive distinction
>
> Although definitions and usage of the terms have varied in the history
> of philosophy, they have been consistently intended to demarcate two
> separate epistemological notions. The intuitive distinction between a
> priori and a posteriori knowledge can be seen in examples of what is
> supposed to fall under each concept. To borrow from Jerry Fodor (2004),
> take, for example, the proposition expressed by the sentence, "George V
> reigned from 1910-1936". This is something that one must come to know a
> posteriori (assuming that it is knowledge), because it expresses an
> empirical fact that one cannot come to know of by reason alone. By
> contrast, consider the proposition expressed by the sentence, "If
> George V reigned at all, then he reigned for a while". This is
> something that one knows a priori, because it expresses a fact that is
> non-empirical and that one can come to know by reason alone.
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_priori_and_a_posteriori_%28philosophy%29
>
> APRIORI [B:xvii] Kant opposes a priori and empirical knowledge. He
> distinguishes between pure theoretical reason, pure practical reason,
> and mathematics, all of which are sources of a priori knowledge, and he
> also claims that we have a peculiar kind of a priori knowledge of the
> self. For Kant, a priori knowledge is certain, and the possibility of a
> priori knowledge about concepts and intuitions is grounded on his
> so-called "Copernican Revolution", according to which "we suppose that
> objects must conform to our knowledge"--Kant argues that the "rules" of
> sensibility and the understanding are "in me prior to being given to
> me, and therefore as given a priori". It is the possibility of such a
> priori knowledge, he thinks, that "promises to metaphysics...the secure
> path of a science". His programme involves (1) "explaining how there
> can be knowledge a priori" and (2) "furnishing satisfactory proofs of
> the laws which form the a priori basis of nature" (thereby showing in
> what sense objects must conform to our knowledge). He insists that a
> priori speculative (theoretical) knowledge is limited to possible
> experience (and thus to the realm of appearances, and their
> construction by the faculties of our minds); however, it is possible
> through practical a priori knowledge to "pass beyond the limits of all
> possible experience"
To do that, of course, Kant has to show that it's possible to squeeze
new knowledge out of the /a priori/ - which can't be done
analytically, by definition - and therefore, he comes up with a new
classification, the synthetic /a priori/.
> [A2/B3] Kant gives the general definition of a priori knowledge as
> "knowledge absolutely independent of all experience. Opposed to it is
> empirical knowledge, which is knowledge possible only a posteriori ,
> that is, through experience. A priori modes of knowledge are entitled
> pure when there is no admixture of anything empirical [but not all a
> priori propositions are pure, e.g., the causal maxim is a priori but
> not pure]".
>
> --------------------------
>
> D. Rationalism vs. Empiricism
>
> Theories of knowledge divide naturally, theoretically and historically
> into the two rival schools of rationalism and empiricism. Neither
> rationalism nor empiricism disregards the primary tool of the other
> school entirely. The issue revolves on beliefs about necessary
> knowledge and empirical knowledge.
>
> 1. Rationalism
>
> Rationalism believes that some ideas or concepts are independent of
> experience and that some truth is known by reason alone.
>
> a. a priori
>
> This is necessary knowledge not given in nor dependent upon experience;
> it is necessarily true by definition. For instance "black cats are
> black." This is an analytic statement, and broadly, it is a tautology;
> its denial would be self-contradictory.
>
> 2. Empiricism
>
> Empiricism believes that some ideas or concepts are independent of
> experience and that truth must be established by reference to
> experience alone.
>
> b. a posteriori
>
> This is knowledge that comes after or is dependent upon experience. for
> instance "Desks are brown" is a synthetic statement. Unlike the
> analytic statement "Black cats are black", the synthetic statement
> "Desks are brown" is not necessarily true unless all desks are by
> definition brown, and to deny it would not be self-contradictory. We
> would probably refer the matter to experience.
>
> Since knowledge depends primarily on synthetic statements -- statements
> that may be true or may be false -- their nature and status are crucial
> to theories of knowledge. The controvercial issue is the possibility of
> synthetic necessary knowledge -- that is, the possibility of having
> genuine knowledge of the world without the need to rely on experience.
> Consider these statements:
>
> 1) The sum of the angles of a triangle is 180 degrees.
>
True by logical implication of the definition of a degree.
> 2) Parallel lines never meet.
>
False.
> 3) A whole is the sum of all its parts.
>
True by definitions of 'part' and 'whole.'
> Rationalism may believe these to be synthetic necessary statements,
> universally treu, and genunie knowledge; i.e., they are not merely
> empty as the analytic or tautologous statemenst (Black cats are black)
> and are not dependent on experience for their truth value.
>
> Empiricism denies that these statements are synthetic and necessary.
> Strict empriicism asserts that all such statements only appear to be
> necessary or a priori. Actually, they derive from experience.
>
> Logical empiricism admits that these statements are ncessary but only
> because they are not really synthetic statements but analytic
> statements, which are true by definition alone and do not give us
> genuine knowledge of the world.
>
That last is my view (in case anyone hasn't noticed. 8)
> GENUINE KNOWLEDGE
>
> Rationalism includes in genuine knowledge synthetic necessary
> statements (or, if this term is rejected, then those analytic necessary
> statements that "reveal reality" in terms of universally necessary
> truth; e.g., "An entity is what it is and not something else.")
>
> Empiricism limits genuine knowledge to empirical statements. Necessary
> statements are empty (that is, they tell us nothing of the world).
>
> Logical empiricism admits as genuine knowledge only analytic necessary
> (Black cats are black) or synthetic empirical statements (desks are
> brown). But the anyalytic necessary statements or laws of logic and
> mathematics derive from arbitrary rules of usage, definitions, and the
> like, and therefore reveal nothing about reality. (This is the
> antimetaphysical point of view).
>
> http://www.theology.edu/logic/logic4.htm
>
Defintions exist just so we can talk to each other. They can't be
used to prove anything except for their own logical implications.