Syntactic Brain, Semantic Mind
Zerkon
The following is a thumbnail of John Searle's argument challenging the
computational mind theory:
============================
(A1) "Programs are formal (syntactic)."
A program uses syntax to manipulate symbols and pays no attention
the semantics of the symbols. It knows where to put the symbols and how
to move them around, but it doesn't know what they stand for or what they
mean. For the program, the symbols are just physical objects like any
others.
(A2) "Minds have mental contents (semantics)."
Unlike the symbols used by a program, our thoughts have meaning:
they represent things and we know what it is they represent.
(A3) "Syntax by itself is neither constitutive of nor sufficient for
semantics."
.........
Conclusion:
(C1) Programs are neither constitutive of nor sufficient for minds.
This should follow without controversy from the first three:
Programs don't have semantics. Programs have only syntax, and syntax is
insufficient for semantics. Every mind has semantics. Therefore programs
are not minds.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room
===============================
Given that the binary brain/mind does not exist, one must resolve the
other.
Searle's resolve:
"Brains must have something that causes a mind to exist. Science has yet
to determine exactly what it is, but it must exist, because minds exist.
Searle calls it "causal powers". "Causal powers" is whatever the brain
uses to create a mind. If anything else can cause a mind to exist, it
must have "equivalent causal powers". "Equivalent causal powers" is
whatever else that could be used to make a mind."
Not much help here. He does suggest that it is the brain that causes the
mind. First brain uses something outside of itself (aka "causal powers")
then mind is created (emerges?). Pretty thin.
Searle a known card carrying anti-dualist(!) seems to be forcing it here
by using the old operative of cause/effect. So, let's not.
A beginning would be brain and mind are not separated from each other nor
from anything else in absolute physical terms. The "something else" of
causal power is, in degrees, everything else. Sounds good but where's the
proof, other than just to be 'seemingly correct'?
Certainly if even one aspect of 'everything else' can be proved this at
least would open the door for all other things. So, the proof is food and
water and air. All proved to effect changes in human physicality as well
as 'causing' it to begin with.
Exactly how and to what degree these and the many other things do make or
cause/effect or create the human mind/brain to emerge into human
perception can now be only matter of small 's' scientific study.
Zerkon
> A program uses syntax to manipulate symbols and pays no attention the
> semantics of the symbols.
Come to think of it, has Dr. Searle fallen into a metaphorical abyss here
therefore creating the very daemon he wants to slay?
It is the programmer that uses syntax not the program. A program is
symbols and only 'manipulates' as a hammer 'hits'. It is the human who
writes a program using symbols to manipulate a binary, on/off electrical
appliance. The program itself is a tool humans use to make another tool
work. It pays no attention because it has no attention to pay.
In this discussion, how is the program of today different from the punch
card of the textile loom? Did the card 'use' or 'manipulate'? It seems
that once things disappeared into the electric night via ascii and
keyboard, all sorts of hebejeebe spirits were born who then 'thought' and
'calculated', 'saw' had 'memory', 'manipulated' and withdrew attention.
John Jones
It's not the case that science must find out "exactly" what causes mind.
It must find out "remotely" what causes mind. For at the moment science
hasn't even got off the ground.
and the idea of a mind "causation"? Hardly causation, unless mind
affects matter, which is against science.
Ed
The trouble is that Searle’s text is full of words whose meaning we
don’t know at the level of detail that he is invoking.
He says”
“Unlike the symbols used by a program, our thoughts have meaning:
they represent things and we know what it is they represent. “
When he says “we know what it is they represent” what does “know”
mean? Does it mean something other than “there is some kind of
association between thing and symbol”?
We don’t know much about how or if the mind uses symbols. Computation
does not need symbols; a thermostat performs a simple computation and
acts accordingly but it doesn’t use symbols at all. A baseball player
sees the ball’s trajectory and moves appropriately and catches it;
it’s not clear that any symbology is involved.
The crux is (A2). "Minds have mental contents (semantics)."
I presume he means minds have semantics AND (internal) symbols.
It’s kind of like the arguments on consciousness, how do we know that
there is that “something extra” since we can’t (currently) detect it.
Maybe we don’t understand what the implications of “programs” are.
The brain is astronomically more complex than any computer built to
date, if there are semantic aspects to running programs it may well be
that the crude programs that we run on current computers do not
measurably display them, kind of like the increase in mass that
results from acceleration, only detectable when the velocity is near
the speed of light.
dorayme
wrote:
> The following is a thumbnail of John Searle's argument challenging the
> computational mind theory:
>
> ============================
> (A1) "Programs are formal (syntactic)."
>
> A program uses syntax to manipulate symbols and pays no attention
> the semantics of the symbols. It knows where to put the symbols and how
> to move them around, but it doesn't know what they stand for or what they
> mean. For the program, the symbols are just physical objects like any
> others.
>
> (A2) "Minds have mental contents (semantics)."
>
> Unlike the symbols used by a program, our thoughts have meaning:
> they represent things and we know what it is they represent.
>
> (A3) "Syntax by itself is neither constitutive of nor sufficient for
> semantics."
>
> .........
>
> Conclusion:
>
> (C1) Programs are neither constitutive of nor sufficient for minds.
>
> This should follow without controversy from the first three:
> Programs don't have semantics. Programs have only syntax, and syntax is
> insufficient for semantics. Every mind has semantics. Therefore programs
> are not minds.
Only a very unsubtle philosopher would propose that that a mind was a
program in the first place. A mind is something that might be turn out
to be *an object* with lots and lots of parts, each part running in such
a manner that a counterpart that was artificially made by someone and
run on an explicit program could do exactly the same job.
Searle's Chinese room argument fails because if it really could provide
good translations in a flexible manner it would understand language and
yes, it would have semantic understanding (imagine it speeded up and
miniturised and walking and talking).
Intuitions can only take you so far. They cannot form rocks that you can
wholly base things on.
--
dorayme
John Stafford
dorayme <dorayme...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> Only a very unsubtle philosopher would propose that that a mind was a
> program in the first place.
To qualify, I think that we might agree that contemporary programs have
the deterministic assumption that there is an end to the program. In
that regard, of course the Mind has no end game - we do not even know if
it ends at biological death.
> [...]
> Searle's Chinese room argument fails because if it really could provide
> good translations in a flexible manner it would understand language [...]
But you do know that Searle's posit was a set-up to show how AI (as he
defined it) was to fail. Self-fulfilling thing in the paradigm of
pessimism.
Given how dim the population at-large is, there will be AI agents of
compelling power, whether we like it or not.
cmp6_gamehall_ Averdein decaplex
>The following is a thumbnail of John
> Searle's argument challenging the
> computational mind theory:
Searle: "Well, it's such a simple argument that I find myself somewhat
embarrassed to be constantly repeating it, but you can say it in a
couple of seconds. Here's how it goes...."
http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people/Searle/searle-con4.html
Excerpt, closing remarks:
Searle: "....the computer does a model or a simulation of a process. And
a computer simulation of a mind is about like computer simulation of
digestion. I don't know why people make this dumb mistake. You see, if
we made a perfect computer simulation of digestion, nobody would think,
'Well, let's run out and buy a pizza and stuff it in the computer.' It's
a model, it's a picture of digestion. It shows you the formal structure
of how it works, it doesn't actually digest anything! That's what it is
with the things that a computer does for anything. A computer model of
what it's like to fall in love or read a novel or get drunk doesn't
actually fall in love or read a novel or get drunk. It just does a
picture or model of that."
Another interview, lengthier:
http://machineslikeus.com/interviews/machines-us-interviews-john-searle
_
Immortalist
Isn't it exciting, how much we have ahead to learn about how the
brains activities are identical to personal experience?!
Immortalist
> In article <pan.2009.12.29.14.39...@erkonx.net>, Zerkon <Z...@erkonx.net>
Sounds like a lot of nostalgia to me since the game is already up, it
is pretty reasonable to believe many things about the brain, like how
sight and sound is interpreted in various layers and then put together
in larger pictures, I mean this old mind/brain argument is a dead
horse argument, easy to kick but useless till the machines start
demanding their humanoidal rights.
bigfl...@gmail.com
>
> - Show quoted text -
Depends which branch of science you use. Quantum physics confirms what
the meta physicians/mystics have been going on about for eons,
although qm is in its early days.
"I am that which I am" has a very different ring to it than "I am that
which I can use my mind to prove I am".
Looking as the semantic approach, why do people who believe the mind
is a far as we go (regardless of the interpretation of what mind is)
still refer to 'their mind'? Semantics are 'of the mind' as are
symbols, and neither support 'greater' realities, such as
consciousness or identity, neither of which are materialistic, no more
than the digestive model suggested by Searl is.. Of course, one can
introduce a model of a pizza, and observe the model of the digestion
process at work.
The recent technology used in the separation of the siamese twins
demonstrated an examples of parallel realities of this nature,whereby
a three dimensional model was produced allowing a procedure simulation
to be applied in the 'real world'.
Zen koans are as good as it gets to try and explain the many
paradoxes, non better than 'the eye cannot see itself'.The more such
koans are contemplated, the more clear the greater reality, involving
transcending both semantics and syntax.
"I am that which I become conscious of", and there is no limitation to
that process.
Not necessary to realize, to enjoy a good pizza but explains why you
do ;-)
BOfL
bigfl...@gmail.com
>
> The trouble is that Searle’s text is full of words whose meaning we
> don’t know at the level of detail that he is invoking.
> He says”
> “Unlike the symbols used by a program, our thoughts have meaning:
> they represent things and we know what it is they represent. “
>
> When he says “we know what it is they represent” what does “know”
> mean? Does it mean something other than “there is some kind of
> association between thing and symbol”?
No only that, but he is 'playing it safe ' by suggesting 'we' as an
essential component.
When I started communicating in this medium, I had no idea how
controversial the word 'know' was.
The natural 'enemy'of the world of belief.
>
> We don’t know much about how or if the mind uses symbols. Computation
> does not need symbols; a thermostat performs a simple computation and
> acts accordingly but it doesn’t use symbols at all. A baseball player
> sees the ball’s trajectory and moves appropriately and catches it;
> it’s not clear that any symbology is involved.
>
> The crux is (A2). "Minds have mental contents (semantics)."
> I presume he means minds have semantics AND (internal) symbols.
>
> It’s kind of like the arguments on consciousness, how do we know that
> there is that “something extra” since we can’t (currently) detect it.
What better example, than saying 'we' are conscious of things we are
not conscious of.
Perhaps the metaphorical association with the understanding of light
may help, as in 'One sees through the light of ones consciousness'.Of
course, this also suggests the possibility also of seeing the
limitations of the 'group consciousness', which I find today, as
natural as breathing.
> Maybe we don’t understand what the implications of “programs” are.
Exactly, particularly relevant when you apply modelling projections to
the current GW controversy.
> The brain is astronomically more complex than any computer built to
> date, if there are semantic aspects to running programs it may well be
> that the crude programs that we run on current computers do not
> measurably display them, kind of like the increase in mass that
> results from acceleration, only detectable when the velocity is near
> the speed of light.
And beyond, as exemplified in super-symmetry.
BOfL
Zerkon
> It's not the case that science must find out "exactly" what causes mind.
> It must find out "remotely" what causes mind. For at the moment science
> hasn't even got off the ground.
I have to disagree somewhat if 'remotely' is the criteria. Unless the
mind/body disconnect is maintained, certainly what causes body has in
some degree directly to do with the mind. So, I'd say sciences like
nutrition and biology have gotten off the ground at least.
The demand of 'exactly' is another issue.
> and the idea of a mind "causation"? Hardly causation, unless mind
> affects matter, which is against science.
See, there is such a presumption of finality in all of this. Will mind
always be so separated from matter, or matter from mind as new
discoveries (scopes) are made? Anyway, a passive connection between
thought and feeling and physical development has been established
beginning with facial expression.
If you are referring to a sort of telekinetic ability.. 'against science'
seems a overreach.
Zerkon
> Isn't it exciting, how much we have ahead to learn about how the brains
> activities are identical to personal experience?!
Indeed and how the personal experience might not be so personal of an
experience.
Zerkon
> Zen koans are as good as it gets to try and explain the many paradoxes,
> non better than 'the eye cannot see itself'.The more such koans are
> contemplated, the more clear the greater reality, involving transcending
> both semantics and syntax.
Yes, this actually seems to be the case here with Searle. He doesn't say
so but it seems he begins with the existence of mind as being self
evident. Semantics and syntax becoming redundant at best and more than
not just confusing clutter.
Shrikeback
I agree it hasn't even got off the ground.
> and the idea of a mind "causation"? Hardly causation, unless mind
> affects matter, which is against science.- Hide quoted text -
Of course mind affects matter. I decide I want
a drink, say. I get up and pour one. Mind affecting
matter: voila. After I drink the drink, and maybe
a couple more, I get jocose. Matter affecting mind.
Therefore, dualism is bunk.
Shrikeback
> On Tue, 29 Dec 2009 14:39:04 +0000, Zerkon wrote:
> > A program uses syntax to manipulate symbols and pays no attention the
> > semantics of the symbols.
>
> Come to think of it, has Dr. Searle fallen into a metaphorical abyss here
> therefore creating the very daemon he wants to slay?
>
> It is the programmer that uses syntax not the program. A program is
> symbols and only 'manipulates' as a hammer 'hits'. It is the human who
> writes a program using symbols to manipulate a binary, on/off electrical
> appliance. The program itself is a tool humans use to make another tool
> work. It pays no attention because it has no attention to pay.
Yes, the syntax is in the written program, the running program
is semantic in that each instruction is an actual instruction to
_do_ something. It is in what is done in response to the varied
instrauctions that the semantics exists.
> In this discussion, how is the program of today different from the punch
> card of the textile loom? Did the card 'use' or 'manipulate'? It seems
> that once things disappeared into the electric night via ascii and
> keyboard, all sorts of hebejeebe spirits were born who then 'thought' and
> 'calculated', 'saw' had 'memory', 'manipulated' and withdrew attention.
The difference between the program of today and the textile loom
is that the program of today is running in a Turing-complete system.
Back before Noam Chomsky became an intellectual, as it were, he
made some contributions to the classification of languages. In
order of increasing complexity:
Ring 0 languages, regular expressions, which can be parsed
by a finite state machine (I'm guessing that a loom is a finite
state machine, though likely a simple one),
Ring 1 languages, the context-free languages, which can be
parsed by a state machine with a stack (a last in/last out
means for storing data),
Ring 2 langauges, context-sensitive languages, which can be
parsed by a Turing machine,
and Ring 3 languages, non-computable languages, which
cannot even be parsed by a Turing machine.
I often lean toward believing that human "natural" langauge
is in that last category, though the proof is not yet there.
Still, I don't think semantics is lacking in a Turing machine,
the semantics is in the state transitions, those are the ground
floor definitions for the symbols.
Zerkon
> The trouble is that Searle’s text is full of words whose meaning we
> don’t know at the level of detail that he is invoking. He says”
> “Unlike the symbols used by a program, our thoughts have meaning: they
> represent things and we know what it is they represent. “
>
> When he says “we know what it is they represent” what does “know” mean?
> Does it mean something other than “there is some kind of association
> between thing and symbol”?
>
> We don’t know much about how or if the mind uses symbols. Computation
> does not need symbols; a thermostat performs a simple computation and
> acts accordingly but it doesn’t use symbols at all. A baseball player
> sees the ball’s trajectory and moves appropriately and catches it; it’s
> not clear that any symbology is involved.
>
> The crux is (A2). "Minds have mental contents (semantics)." I presume he
> means minds have semantics AND (internal) symbols.
>
> It’s kind of like the arguments on consciousness, how do we know that
> there is that “something extra” since we can’t (currently) detect it.
>
> Maybe we don’t understand what the implications of “programs” are. The
> brain is astronomically more complex than any computer built to date, if
> there are semantic aspects to running programs it may well be that the
> crude programs that we run on current computers do not measurably
> display them, kind of like the increase in mass that results from
> acceleration, only detectable when the velocity is near the speed of
> light.
His base is Semantics is meaning, Syntax is symbol only. He gets lost to
me a little because symbol must have meaning to be symbol otherwise it is
only object.
I think his main point is mind sees meaning in symbols whereas computers
see only symbol. I agree with you in that he gets jumbled a little by
forcing symbol to center stage. Computers using symbols starts a
compounding mistake, almost self-defeating, I think.
Text aside, his position is the computer and human mind are innately
different as process and function. This I do agree with. It centers on
this complexity you mention which I think can better be defined as human
mind trying to be measured. Which raises a question on the nature of the
number or measurements before it does the mind.
A thermostat literally does not perform computations. As you know, it is
basically a metal strip that is affected by changes in temperature which
then effects other things. The only computation involved is in the human
production of it. Same would hold if a computer made the thermostat.
The calculation being done only in the human production of that
production computer.
Zerkon
> Searle's Chinese room argument fails because if it really could provide
> good translations in a flexible manner it would understand language and
> yes, it would have semantic understanding (imagine it speeded up and
> miniturised and walking and talking).
The Chinese room argument deserves another thread (again).
The issue here is the idea 'understanding'. For now here is a question
for you, can a person know how to act without understanding why? If so,
is there a difference?
Zerkon
> In article <doraymeRidThis-BAB...@news.albasani.net>,
> dorayme <dorayme...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
>> Only a very unsubtle philosopher would propose that that a mind was a
>> program in the first place.
>
> To qualify, I think that we might agree that contemporary programs have
> the deterministic assumption that there is an end to the program. In
> that regard, of course the Mind has no end game - we do not even know if
> it ends at biological death.
How do you see a program as having assumptions? Even if they had, how or
upon what would these assumptions be based?
>> [...]
>> Searle's Chinese room argument fails because if it really could provide
>> good translations in a flexible manner it would understand language
>> [...]
>
> But you do know that Searle's posit was a set-up to show how AI (as he
> defined it) was to fail. Self-fulfilling thing in the paradigm of
> pessimism.
humm.. I see a paradigm of affirmation.
This is a paradigm of pessimism....
> Given how dim the population at-large is, there will be AI agents of
> compelling power, whether we like it or not.
If agents of compelling power is the issue, AI will have to get in line.
Now that is pessimistic!
Shrikeback
I really meant that gleaning the semantics of human
"natural" language is in the non-computable category.
Also, since the above classification of languages is
all with regard to parsing, which is a syntactic operation,
I have to re-emphasize the semantics underneath.
A function's syntax is just the code; it's semantics
is what it does.
I remember watching something on PBS when I was
a teen about some AI experiment which involved giving
the program a few limited commands in English
specifying what to do with a bunch of virtual objects in
a 3D (monochrome) space. "Put the red ball on top
of the green box." That sort of thing. And the program
followed these orders. That _is_ semantics, without
a doubt, and Searles' semantics argument is flawed.
Zerkon
> each instruction is an actual instruction to _do_ something.
You will forgive me for pulling this out. I am focusing, actually
testing, where a literal ends and a metaphor begins so I'd like to look
at the use of 'instruction' here as this relates to meaning.
I understand 'instruction' is regarded now as a literal computer term but
it also retains a strong metaphorical aspect. The programmer has the need
to have something done so he writes a program with commands or
instructions to... to what exactly? For what or to do what is clear
enough.
What does separate program instructions or commands to a computer and
pulling a mechanical lever which then instructs a mechanical wheel to
turn? Is it the layer of insulation that comes with the intermediate step
of writing?
> It is in what is done in response to the varied instrauctions that the
> semantics exists.
This seems like a purely behavioral definition. Meaning is equated to
observable response. Is this what you mean?
Zerkon
> Of course mind affects matter. I get up and pour one.
And remember what the lightest thing in the world is. The thing that can
be raised by only a thought...
Shrikeback
> On Wed, 30 Dec 2009 10:42:02 -0800, Shrikeback wrote:
> > each instruction is an actual instruction to _do_ something.
>
> You will forgive me for pulling this out. I am focusing, actually
> testing, where a literal ends and a metaphor begins so I'd like to look
> at the use of 'instruction' here as this relates to meaning.
Of course I will do more than forgive you, I'll be
grateful to you for it. One thing that jumps out
at me is that all words are metaphors. Langauge
is actually all metaphor. The description of a
thing is not the thing itself. Nevertheless, I'll
try to deal with your objection.
> I understand 'instruction' is regarded now as a literal computer term but
> it also retains a strong metaphorical aspect. The programmer has the need
> to have something done so he writes a program with commands or
> instructions to... to what exactly? For what or to do what is clear
> enough.
Ah, to the underlying machine, which is designed to emulate
a universal Turing machine, hopefully, and execute any logically
and physically possible algorithm.
> What does separate program instructions or commands to a computer and
> pulling a mechanical lever which then instructs a mechanical wheel to
> turn? Is it the layer of insulation that comes with the intermediate step
> of writing?
I don't think so. The thing that makes the Turing
machine qualitatively different from all machines
that came before it is that it provides a mechanism
for executing logical operations, and in fact any
sequence of logical operations that is possible to
execute.
I think that equating a Turing machine to pulling
levers is close to what you accuse the hard AI
types of doing. There really is a qualitative
differnce between a Turing machine and simpler
automata. A Turing machine can be constructed
to execute any logically possible algorithm,.
> > It is in what is done in response to the varied instrauctions that the
> > semantics exists.
>
> This seems like a purely behavioral definition. Meaning is equated to
> observable response. Is this what you mean?
I am not even sure it is a matter of observable response.
For instance, a particular algorithm may be buried and
separated from hardware I/O, yet it would still have
semantics. For instance, it could be a function to
find the average of a series of numbers. It's semantics
is what it is, regardless how it affects or does not
affect the observable response. The semantics of
an algorithm are what it does, which is a logical/
mathematical thing. In fact, the semantics is built
in to the syntax; it is what the author intends to
do with the syntax.
I think that imperatives are semantical. They are a
subset of all semantics, I suppose, but in computer
you can simulate declarative and inquisitive semantics
using imperative command semantics anyway.
Zerkon
> On Dec 31, 9:59 am, Zerkon <Z...@erkonx.net> wrote:
>> On Wed, 30 Dec 2009 10:42:02 -0800, Shrikeback wrote:
>> > each instruction is an actual instruction to _do_ something.
>>
>> You will forgive me for pulling this out. I am focusing, actually
>> testing, where a literal ends and a metaphor begins so I'd like to look
>> at the use of 'instruction' here as this relates to meaning.
>
> Of course I will do more than forgive you, I'll be grateful to you for
> it. One thing that jumps out at me is that all words are metaphors.
> Langauge is actually all metaphor. The description of a thing is not
> the thing itself. Nevertheless, I'll try to deal with your objection.
For any of this to make any sense at all, a common understanding of
metaphor has to be agreed upon or at least how it is usually defined.
It is important, possibly profoundly so, if thought is contained or
liberated by language concepts and these concepts become part of commonly
held perceptual environment.
So, "Langauge is actually all metaphor" certainly can be argued but since
we are trying to communicate via language, there should be a granted
difference between: the literal "we use gasoline to fuel our cars" and
the metaphorical "our cars use gasoline for their fuel".
It is important, I think, particularly in the compu-world. Easier seen in
the above because it is a illustration using the mechanical devise 'car'.
Like 'instruction' the issue in the above is 'use'. 'Cars using' implies
a car initiated the use. Nothing wrong with this. It's a figurative way
of saying humans use gasoline but if it is mistaken as literal, one can
actually then think it is cars which are capable of deciding use.
The old product slogan "Cars love Shell (gasoline)" is a old example. You
may know people who actually believe this, I do. "Cars are happy after
they are washed" ...and so forth.
>> I understand 'instruction' is regarded now as a literal computer term
>> but it also retains a strong metaphorical aspect. The programmer has
>> the need to have something done so he writes a program with commands or
>> instructions to... to what exactly? For what or to do what is clear
>> enough.
>
> Ah, to the underlying machine, which is designed to emulate a universal
> Turing machine, hopefully, and execute any logically and physically
> possible algorithm.
>
>> What does separate program instructions or commands to a computer and
>> pulling a mechanical lever which then instructs a mechanical wheel to
>> turn? Is it the layer of insulation that comes with the intermediate
>> step of writing?
>
> I don't think so. The thing that makes the Turing machine qualitatively
> different from all machines that came before it is that it provides a
> mechanism for executing logical operations, and in fact any sequence of
> logical operations that is possible to execute.
>
> I think that equating a Turing machine to pulling levers is close to
> what you accuse the hard AI types of doing. There really is a
> qualitative differnce between a Turing machine and simpler automata. A
> Turing machine can be constructed to execute any logically possible
> algorithm.
The difficulty here for me anyhow is 'logic' being completely equated and
contained as property of the algorithm as if it possessed logic which
then the machine understands as logic then acts logically. this is the
same basic thing as 'cars using gas'.
I understand the metaphorical basis of: "This type of mathematics shall
be called 'logic' from now on because it seems like human logic" as "cars
seem like they are the ones using gasoline so we say cars use gas". But,
as in religion when metaphorical constructs are taken or forced as
literal things can get twisted.
>> > It is in what is done in response to the varied instrauctions that
>> > the semantics exists.
>>
>> This seems like a purely behavioral definition. Meaning is equated to
>> observable response. Is this what you mean?
>
> I am not even sure it is a matter of observable response. For instance,
> a particular algorithm may be buried and separated from hardware I/O,
> yet it would still have semantics. For instance, it could be a function
> to find the average of a series of numbers. It's semantics is what it
> is, regardless how it affects or does not affect the observable
> response. The semantics of an algorithm are what it does, which is a
> logical/ mathematical thing. In fact, the semantics is built in to the
> syntax; it is what the author intends to do with the syntax.
>
> I think that imperatives are semantical. They are a subset of all
> semantics, I suppose, but in computer you can simulate declarative and
> inquisitive semantics using imperative command semantics anyway.
The entire process is that of simulation, correct? Logic, meaning,
symbols all are intended for a machine to simulate. But the actually fact
is the machine is being used to harness and direct electricity (ie: as a
hammer is used to hit a nail) which is perceived as AND/OR or If/THEN
which I still think is the same as "if that lever is pulled, then that
wheel will turn"
M Purcell
> On Thu, 31 Dec 2009 12:05:22 -0800, Shrikeback wrote:
> > On Dec 31, 9:59 am, Zerkon <Z...@erkonx.net> wrote:
> >> On Wed, 30 Dec 2009 10:42:02 -0800, Shrikeback wrote:
> >> > each instruction is an actual instruction to _do_ something.
>
> >> You will forgive me for pulling this out. I am focusing, actually
> >> testing, where a literal ends and a metaphor begins so I'd like to look
> >> at the use of 'instruction' here as this relates to meaning.
>
> > Of course I will do more than forgive you, I'll be grateful to you for
> > it. One thing that jumps out at me is that all words are metaphors.
> > Langauge is actually all metaphor. The description of a thing is not
> > the thing itself. Nevertheless, I'll try to deal with your objection.
>
> For any of this to make any sense at all, a common understanding of
> metaphor has to be agreed upon or at least how it is usually defined.
> It is important, possibly profoundly so, if thought is contained or
> liberated by language concepts and these concepts become part of commonly
> held perceptual environment.
There must be common definitions and understanding to attempt
communication however new or original concepts are not common and
language evolves.
> So, "Langauge is actually all metaphor" certainly can be argued but since
> we are trying to communicate via language, there should be a granted
> difference between: the literal "we use gasoline to fuel our cars" and
> the metaphorical "our cars use gasoline for their fuel".
Your examples use equivocation, the first instance refers to our
valuation of gasoline while the second refers a car's burning of
gasoline. In addition, the second example is redundent given that
gasoline is generally considered a fuel. However both refer to animate
objects.
> It is important, I think, particularly in the compu-world. Easier seen in
> the above because it is a illustration using the mechanical devise 'car'.
> Like 'instruction' the issue in the above is 'use'. 'Cars using' implies
> a car initiated the use. Nothing wrong with this. It's a figurative way
> of saying humans use gasoline but if it is mistaken as literal, one can
> actually then think it is cars which are capable of deciding use.
Who's mistake would that be?
> The old product slogan "Cars love Shell (gasoline)" is a old example. You
> may know people who actually believe this, I do. "Cars are happy after
> they are washed" ...and so forth.
I'm reminded of "Foundation's Edge" where there are devices on Gaia
(next to Sayshell) which enable a person to tell if an inantimate
object is happy, for example a well built wall with solid foundations
is a happy wall.
Indeed, mathematical logic is very different from human logic.
> >> > It is in what is done in response to the varied instrauctions that
> >> > the semantics exists.
>
> >> This seems like a purely behavioral definition. Meaning is equated to
> >> observable response. Is this what you mean?
>
> > I am not even sure it is a matter of observable response. For instance,
> > a particular algorithm may be buried and separated from hardware I/O,
> > yet it would still have semantics. For instance, it could be a function
> > to find the average of a series of numbers. It's semantics is what it
> > is, regardless how it affects or does not affect the observable
> > response. The semantics of an algorithm are what it does, which is a
> > logical/ mathematical thing. In fact, the semantics is built in to the
> > syntax; it is what the author intends to do with the syntax.
>
> > I think that imperatives are semantical. They are a subset of all
> > semantics, I suppose, but in computer you can simulate declarative and
> > inquisitive semantics using imperative command semantics anyway.
>
> The entire process is that of simulation, correct? Logic, meaning,
> symbols all are intended for a machine to simulate. But the actually fact
> is the machine is being used to harness and direct electricity (ie: as a
> hammer is used to hit a nail) which is perceived as AND/OR or If/THEN
> which I still think is the same as "if that lever is pulled, then that
> wheel will turn"
Only if the machine is well designed.
M Purcell
The simularity would be more pronounced if we used ethenol.
John Jones
Can you activate neurons in your brain by the power of thought?
Immortalist
As technology increases it seems that our personal privacy diminishes
until we learn how to preserve what was once the default and not
intruded upon.
bigfl...@gmail.com
> affects matter, which is against science.- Hide quoted text -
>
But not quantum science.
Just different laws for different planes.
BOfL
Shrikeback
Obviously, I can activate neurons in my legs by the power
of thought. For example. I think I want a drink, so I get
up and walk to the wet bar. Voila, not only were neurons
in my brain activated, neurons in my legs were. QED.
John Jones
Thta's no answer.
Shrikeback
Of course it's an answer. The "power of thought" causes
the activation of neurons somehow, because thinking
causes neurons to cause muscles to do things. We can
infer the activation of neurons by the activation of muscles.
It's not pendulum science. Are you expecting a direct
concious link, where I can think to neuron 194830593-Z
that it should pump out more serotonin? There's no need
for that.
BTW, John, I just spotted an old post from around Christmas
where you were lamenting the philosophy to noise ratio
and it almost sounded as if you'd leave forever. I, for one,
am glad to see you haven't.