Representationalism Reviewed
Sir Frederick
resolved by recognizing that the perceiver(self) is a
representation as well, and that the perceiving self
representation is included in the situation representation.
The brain's built in pragmatic deceit easily glosses over
the underlying hardware(meatware) functions.
I am posting this issue as there seems to be some interest
and a lot of BS.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Representationalism
Representationalism
Representationalism, or the representational theory of perception, is a philosophical doctrine that in any act of perception, the
immediate (direct) object of perception is a sense-datum that represents an external object, which is the mediate (indirect) object
of perception.
Two 17th century philosophers, René Descartes, and John Locke most prominently advocated this theory. The term they used was not
"sense-datum" but "idea." This article does not discuss any differences in meaning that these terms might have. "Idea" as used in
the theory of perception is a technical term, meaning roughly the same thing as sense-datum. Representationalism is one of the key
assumptions of cognitivism in psychology.
Representationalism asserts that sense-data represent external objects -- physical objects, properties, and events. But this
immediately raises a question: How well do sense-data represent external objects, properties, and events? At least sometimes, they
do not represent them at all well. It is often the case that our perceptions do not correlate at all well with physical reality and
this aspect of representationalism has led to psychologists questioning such things as police identity parades.
Dreams and imaginings can be considered representations in a way analogous to perceptions, perhaps, as recent fMRI studies have
shown, using similar areas of the brain.
A problem with representationalism is that if it assumes that something in the brain, described as a homunculus, is viewing the
perception, this suggests that some physical effect or phenomenon other than simple data flow and information processing must be
involved in perception. This was not an issue for the rationalist philosophers such as Descartes, since dualism held that there is
indeed a 'homunculus' in the form of the mind. For those who doubt dualism, explaining precisely what it is that sees the
representation is problematic. But if Representationalism is thought of as an explanation of how we indeed see, then it falls foul
of the homunculus fallacy which would suggest that representationalism is either an incomplete or invalid description of perception.
A further difficulty is that, since we only have knowledge of the representations of our perceptions, how is it possible to show
that they resemble in any significant way the objects to which they are supposed to correspond? Any creature with a representation
in its brain would need to interact with the objects that are represented to identify them with the representation.
A final difficulty arises when attempting to explain reference from a representational viewpoint. If I say "I see the Eiffel Tower"
at a time when I am indeed looking at the Eiffel Tower, to what does the term "Eiffel Tower" refer? One might wish to say it refers
to the Eiffel Tower, but in the representational account we do not really see the tower, presumably the reference is to our sense
experience. But this would mean that when I refer to the Eiffel Tower, I am referring to my sense experience; but when you refer to
the Tower, you are referring to your sense experience. Therefore when we each refer to the Eiffel Tower, we are not referring to the
same thing - an apparent absurdity. Although we have little difficulty resolving a similar problem that occurs when two people each
watch pictures of the Eiffel Tower on their own televisions.
--
Best,
Frederick Martin McNeill
Poway, California, United States of America
mmcn...@fuzzysys.com
http://www.fuzzysys.com
http://members.cox.net/fmmcneill
*************************
Phrase of the week :
"A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. Specialization is for insects."
-Robert A. Heinlein
:-))))Snort!)
**************************************
Tim
"Sir Frederick" <mmcn...@fuzzysys.com> wrote in message
news:5bgr5255acb5ccg6a...@4ax.com...
> The homunculus issue (and other issues) can be easily
> resolved by recognizing that the perceiver(self) is a
> representation as well, and that the perceiving self
> representation is included in the situation representation.
> The brain's built in pragmatic deceit easily glosses over
> the underlying hardware(meatware) functions.
>
So you are deceived, I've suspected that you are for some time now. Since
you are deceived it is therefore safe to say that the 'thoughts' expressed
above are deceitful. Funny pov that, but I guess deceivers will be
deceitful.
Mercy Brown
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Representationalism
> Representationalism
> A problem with representationalism is that if it assumes that something in the brain, described as a homunculus, is viewing the
> perception, this suggests that some physical effect or phenomenon other than simple data flow and information processing must be
> involved in perception. This was not an issue for the rationalist philosophers such as Descartes, since dualism held that there is
> indeed a 'homunculus' in the form of the mind. For those who doubt dualism, explaining precisely what it is that sees the
> representation is problematic. But if Representationalism is thought of as an explanation of how we indeed see, then it falls foul
> of the homunculus fallacy which would suggest that representationalism is either an incomplete or invalid description of perception.
>
If "simple data flow and information processing" is the basis of
perception, then it would be ubiquitous in at least some elemental form
throughout the brain, the nervous system, electronic devices,
computers, and probably the interactions of fermions and bosons in
general {from rocks to stars}. It the context of physical reductionism,
it would depend upon matter-energy having internal relationships, which
physics --dealing in extrinsic relationships-- doesn't posit. This
doesn't mean one can't posit internal states in philosophy, but it's
science fiction otherwise.
> A further difficulty is that, since we only have knowledge of the representations of our perceptions, how is it possible to show
> that they resemble in any significant way the objects to which they are supposed to correspond? Any creature with a representation
> in its brain would need to interact with the objects that are represented to identify them with the representation.
>
It's amusing at times how anti-representationalists either offer no
alternative to epistemological dualism/pluralism at all (they're just
"anti-") or place a person's consciousness outside the brain, so that
it's in direct contact with the "objects" of the world; i.e., a person
is then somehow "experiencing the world as it is" rather than a
phenomenal replica of it in the brain. Glossing over dreams and the
horde of clinical conditions that indicate representation is taking
place within the skull. An hallucinating schizophrenic or psychedelic
drug user is not experiencing the same world as the average person, so
that if perception did involve direct and unmediated contact or union
with external environments, the delusional person's consciousness would
have to be connecting to alternate universes to be experiencing what
they do (not to mention the same happening with dreams). The problem
with anti-representationalism is that its adherents cut short an
exploration of its own wild consequences, to generate the appearance
that it has fewer problems than representationalism.
> A final difficulty arises when attempting to explain reference from a representational viewpoint. If I say "I see the Eiffel Tower"
> at a time when I am indeed looking at the Eiffel Tower, to what does the term "Eiffel Tower" refer? One might wish to say it refers
> to the Eiffel Tower, but in the representational account we do not really see the tower, presumably the reference is to our sense
> experience. But this would mean that when I refer to the Eiffel Tower, I am referring to my sense experience; but when you refer to
> the Tower, you are referring to your sense experience. Therefore when we each refer to the Eiffel Tower, we are not referring to the
> same thing - an apparent absurdity. Although we have little difficulty resolving a similar problem that occurs when two people each
> watch pictures of the Eiffel Tower on their own televisions.
>
Exactly, in regard to the last sentence. Representationalism is
anti-solipsistic by its very assertion that it is *representing*;
simulating another epistemic realm (the world) that has a causal
connection to an individual's own epistemic realm.
Sir Frederick
gibbs
"Mercy Brown" <eosop...@operamail.com> wrote in message
news:1147013130....@u72g2000cwu.googlegroups.com...
> Exactly, in regard to the last sentence. Representationalism is
> anti-solipsistic by its very assertion that it is *representing*;
> simulating another epistemic realm (the world) that has a causal
> connection to an individual's own epistemic realm.
This is the very recipe of solipsism and is how the whole notion arose in
the first place. If you experience a representation and not what is
actually there, then you can never, ever know for certain if you are
actually experiencing the world as it "actually is". The assumption that
you experience sense-data, or whatever, created centuries of epistemological
nonsense (Locke -> Hume -> Kant -> Russell).
Better to assume that you experience not sense-data (or some analogue), but
what is actually there. You avoid the misery that obsessed philosophers and
which most philosophers have gotten beyond.
Sir Frederick
that the anti representationalists do not discuss is
synaesthesia : from wiki :
Synaesthesia (also spelt synæsthesia, synesthesia); from the Greek (syn-) “union,” and (aesthesis) “sensation,” has been used to
describe various phenomena. A person who experiences synaesthesia is called a synaesthete. Normally the term synaesthesia is used to
indicate a condition in which the stimulation of one sensory modality gives rise to an experience in another modality. In an
auditory synaesthete, for example, an auditory experience may give rise to an experience in the visual modality.
Synaesthetes often experience correspondences between the shades of color, tones of sounds, and intensities of tastes that provoke
alternate sensations. For instance, a synaesthete may see a more intense red as the pitch of a sound gets higher, or a smoother
surface might make one taste a sweeter taste. These experiences are not metaphorical or merely associations; rather, they are
involuntary and are consistent throughout life, although some young synaesthetes seem to lose their ability by or during adulthood.
Depressants tend to increase the depth of the perception.
Synaesthesia can even occur when one of the senses no longer functions properly, e.g., a person who can see colors when words are
spoken can still see the colors if he becomes blind in later life. This phenomenon is known as "martian colors." The term originated
from a case of a synaesthete who was born partially color blind, but saw certain 'alien' colors in his synaesthetic perceptions that
he never saw (was incapable of seeing) in the 'real world.'
The most common forms of synaesthesia involve color being assigned to letters, numbers, days of the week or (especially for
musicians) musical keys.
Richard Cytowic wrote a pop-psych book about this condition entitled The Man Who Tasted Shapes.
Some researchers and theorists have suggested that synaesthesia may have played a part in early humans' development of writing and
written literacies. An informal study conducted at the Centre for Ukrainian Canadian Studies at the University of Manitoba showed
that individuals of slavic background are more likely to experience a synasthetic experience than non-slavs. This finding is
correlated to some degree in the research literature in which a preponderance of Slavic based studies exist, while non-slavic
studies are considerably rarer.
--------------------------------------------------------------
I myself experience several forms of synaesthesia. Mine are of redirection and transformation of
stimulation of various private parts. For instance when I use a bidet my right foot feels
wet and cold (though it isn't).
Representalism points to adjacent sensory processing structures in the brain, with cross
activation occurring.
andy-k
>
> It's amusing at times how anti-representationalists either offer no
> alternative to epistemological dualism/pluralism at all (they're just
> "anti-") or place a person's consciousness outside the brain, so that
> it's in direct contact with the "objects" of the world; i.e., a person
> is then somehow "experiencing the world as it is" rather than a
> phenomenal replica of it in the brain.
I'd be highly suspicious of any claim that "a person's consciousness
is in direct contact with the objects of the world", but I don't think the
rejection of such a claim is helpful in deciding the rep/anti-rep issue.
> Glossing over dreams and the horde of clinical conditions that indicate
> representation is taking place within the skull. An hallucinating
> schizophrenic or psychedelic drug user is not experiencing the same world
> as the average person,
Given the wealth of evidence to support the idea that the brain acquires,
stores, modifies, and transfers data (sourced both internally and externally
to the host organism), I don't see how the idea that the brain models the
host organism's environment can be contested . Similarly that in dreams
and hallucinations this modeling continues in the absence of sufficient
environmental data for accurate modeling.
> so that if perception did involve direct and unmediated contact or union
> with external environments, the delusional person's consciousness would
> have to be connecting to alternate universes to be experiencing what they
> do (not to mention the same happening with dreams).
I suspect this is a misrepresentation of the anti-rep view for the purpose
of bringing that view into disrepute.
> The problem with anti-representationalism is that its adherents cut short
> an exploration of its own wild consequences, to generate the appearance
> that it has fewer problems than representationalism.
I would be interested in pursuing such an investigation.
Mercy Brown
gibbs wrote:
> "Mercy Brown" <eosop...@operamail.com> wrote in message
> news:1147013130....@u72g2000cwu.googlegroups.com...
>Better to assume that you experience not sense-data
> (or some analogue), but what is actually there.
Incredible. When you see the Moon, you believe you become the Moon, and
also anyone else looking at it? Where are dreams and hallucinations to
found?
>You avoid the misery that obsessed philosophers and
> which most philosophers have gotten beyond.
If that's supposed to be misery, it's preferable to the insanity of
believing that perception is taking place outside your head, or you're
telepathically uniting with various parts of the universe, according to
the experience of the moment.
Mercy
Mercy Brown
I agree. V S Ramachandran's work on synesthesia is also outstanding.
Mercy
Mercy Brown
andy-k wrote:
>I suspect this is a misrepresentation of the
> anti-rep view for the purpose of bringing that
> view into disrepute.
A misrepresentation? How can there be misrepresentations of anything if
one rejects representationalism? By all means, if you want to clarify
what "A-R" really is, then have at it. But something besides "I or they
are against representationalism" and then not offering any alternatives
for it.
Mercy
Sir Frederick
.
>
>I agree. V S Ramachandran's work on synesthesia is also outstanding.
>
>Mercy
I collect Ramachandran's writings and have his PBS Nova program on tape.
On the tape I was especially impressed by his subject that
had epilepsy and refused medication cause he (the subject)
liked "meeting God".
Tim
he did the only thing he can do - he dodged. Why? one askes. Because he's
deceitful, because he's got nothing to say, because cut and pasters aren't
capable of producing anything but meaningless and indefensible garbage.
Sir Frederick
Tim
he did the only thing he can do - he dodged. Why? one asks. Because he's
Mercy Brown
Here's the online transcript of that program. Obviously not as good as
watching the video, but something for lurkers to peruse:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/transcripts/2812mind.html
Also, for lurkers, here's Ramachandran's account in Sci-Am of how they
verified synesthesia, which was one clinical condition that wasn't
covered on the NOVA episode:
http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?chanID=sa006&articleID=0003014B-9D06-1E8F-8EA5809EC5880000
devoirs, Mercy
andy-k
> andy-k wrote:
>>"Mercy Brown" wrote:
>>>
>>> so that if perception did involve direct and unmediated contact or union
>>> with external environments, the delusional person's consciousness would
>>> have to be connecting to alternate universes to be experiencing what
>>> they do (not to mention the same happening with dreams).
>>
Rhetoric is not helpful in deciding the rep/anti-rep issue, so permit me to
take a different approach. It seems to me the this distinction rests upon
another -- that of the realist/anti-realist distinction. I understand
realism as the conjecture that the world would still exist, in a manner that
provides the pattern for our conscious experience of it, even in the absence
of anything capable of so experiencing it. Taking realism as axiomatic
yields a multiplicity of problems, and the anti-realist is seeking to
circumvent those problems by calling that axiom into question. The very
valid question you raise is how that position should be developed.
One way of developing that position is to conjecture that there is nothing
more than a multiplicity of experiential perspectives. I understand Leibniz'
monadology to be such a view. However, this raises the problem of how those
perspectives could have anything in common -- i.e. how they might be
perspectives upon a *shared* world. Leibniz had to invoke the g-word on this
account. A.N.Whitehead developed Leibniz' view further, conjecturing that
all such perspectives are "mutually immanent", thereby eliminating the need
to invoke the g-word for this role. Whitehead's student D.R.Griffin referred
to Whitehead's view as "panexperientialism". If you wish to investigate a
very powerful anti-realist position then I recommend you read Griffin's book
"Unsnarling the World Knot: Consciousness, Freedom, and the Mind-Body
Problem" (University of California Press 1998).
Like realism, anti-realism has its conceptual problems and its detractors.
The issue here is that of demonstrating, either by empirical evidence or by
reasoned argument, that one of these positions is wrong. I don't believe
that to be possible, but you may prove me wrong. Over to you.
Sean
To be honest, and why not, I do not have a clue what u guys are on about
here, nor really do I care to know. right now ... but a comment/question on
telepathically ..
I have had a number of reports by friends/ of LSD users ... generally sane
ocssaional users report a similar type expereince .. as an example :: two
people drop a tab each .. a while later at the exact same time both arise
and go to the say the kitchen ... either may or may not say "I'm going to
go to the kiutchen" ...... in the kitchen they begin to decide why they are
there for, eg food and some self-talk goes on in the mind, normal stuff,
like wheres the bread, the butter, etc ..... anyway very soon this internal
"talk" beocmes an ongoing dialog a conversation beteeen the two people ...
but not verbally, not outwardly in voice, but internally in their "brains"
as in telepathically .... thru this process they work together to cook a
meal, and co-operate without saying a word but asking each other questions
and answering them ... smiles of recognition happen and ... everyhting workd
fine. In other ocassions people go on a car trip somehwere, and things like
buying petrol food happen with veyr little words being said .... eg johninni
comes back to the driver a cheeseburger just like he asked for "internally"
Other s have reported "trips" where clarirty of past lives with relatives
friends become vivid and the reaons for being together again this life etc
the issues to resolve if any .... of course these types of things do not
happen with all lsd users from what I hear .... so besides drugs being bad
man, what does al this sort of thing suggest?
OK 3rd situation myself and my wife during a guided meditation session...
unexpceted event, and not meditators or devote religoous people .... just
there for antenatal classes ok, but instantly at about 6th comment into the
meditation we both go completely out of body in full consciousness and meet
in the "astral plane" and see each other talk, take walk in a field, walk
thru a tree, very happy very vivid very clear where we are, and also clear
that our bodies are back in workshop laying on the floor ..... after a while
we both come back to the group with all others already in *reality* looking
at both of us blissed out on the floor and the leader repeatedly calling to
us to "wake up". it took them several minutes of calling to get us to come
to! <vbg> When we come to we look at each other and "know" what had happened
and smile .... later we compare notes of the expereince and what I saw my
wife saw/did and vice versa ......
This experiecne for me was somewhat similar to the feeling visuals in many
lucid dream expereinces, iow they weren't dreams, they were as real as
sitting here typing this here post.
So it's easy to say people "halucinate or dream stuff" and it's all in the
head .... but please tell me [ if u can ] how do TWO people get inside the
same head so to speak as the above 3 examples?
Of course I'll expect the usual it never happned I just imagined it line ,,,
whatever that's fine what you believe too. But I guess I'm wondering how do
"philosophers" and other have any idea about these types fo expereinces are
unless they themselves have also had them?
People maybe able to recognise the eiffle tower by a photo, but unless one
has actually been there physically and seen it in the flesh, then one really
does not know what it is like to expereince the eiffle Tower, or any other
expereince in the world for that matter be it crashing in a race car at
200mph, or having an nde/obe. All the brain scans and all the neural
printouts, and all the therapist questions really are not the same thing as
being there.
anyway .. may interest someone to posit an answer or two. <G>
gibbs
> Incredible. When you see the Moon, you believe you become the Moon, and
> also anyone else looking at it? Where are dreams and hallucinations to
> found?
No, when I see the moon, I see the moon. I don't see representations of the
moon in my head, sense-data, or anything like that. Hallucinations make
very much sense in that case and can be distinguished from what is actually
there. If you perceive sense-data or representations instead of what is
actually there, you have no way of telling what is an hallucination and what
is not.
gibbs
news:6sKdnSlHn4X...@inspired.net.au...
> So it's easy to say people "halucinate or dream stuff" and it's all in the
> head .... but please tell me [ if u can ] how do TWO people get inside the
> same head so to speak as the above 3 examples?
Having experienced LSD in the 70s, I can tell you that I had lots of
experiences of telepathy-like communication. Use of LSD (which I don't
consider to be a drug and certainly not in the category of vicious drugs
like alcohol or narcotics) opens up the brain to a different consciousness
than ordinary waking consciousness. It's like normal consciousness is a
flashlight that helps you see in the dark, but LSD is like the sun rising
and suddenly you are aware of things you never knew were there.
"Picture yourself in a boat on a river...."
Craig Franck
> Like realism, anti-realism has its conceptual problems and its detractors.
> The issue here is that of demonstrating, either by empirical evidence or
> by
> reasoned argument, that one of these positions is wrong. I don't believe
> that to be possible, but you may prove me wrong. Over to you.
One approach Russell took was to hold that statements could
refer either to perceptual or physical space. The "real" world is
modeled in language (or math), not perception.
If I make a detailed observation of an apple, and then put it in a
box for an extended period of time, when I retrieve it, it will likely
be rotten. The statement "The apple is rotten" refers to the
physical apple, because it's hard to see how a perceptual
representation itself can in anyway "rot" short of mental defect;
it may reveal a change of state, but it is a dead end to try and
explain the process as completely perceptual in nature. It's
also difficult to see how a perception could ever be mistaken
if all there are is perceptions.
Statements about development or decay are the representations
of actual physical entities since they participate in physical
theories, and can clearly be considered correct or incorrect based
on a correspondence to reality, not just perceptions of a supposed
reality.
Dewey made point the that we don't experience experiences, but
rather we experience nature through our experiences. Much of
the force of his argument comes from the fact that experiencing
nature makes sense while experiencing experiences is incoherent.
Certain things simply must point outside themselves to have
any real meaning.
--
Craig Franck
craig....@verizon.net
Cortland, NY
Sean
"gibbs" <gib...@fakedemailaddress.edu> wrote in message
news:2YydnWeNce6...@comcast.com...
well doesn't that of itself sort of prove that what happens around here on
earth is barely a sliver of what "reality" really is??
I just wonder why so many people miss, ignore overlook so many examples like
this, and yet still expect something like "reality" or God to be provided or
proved to them on a platter.
How can one find "God/Truth/all that is" [ whatever it is] wandering around
in the dark when only using a humble flashlight? <smile>
I and many others have had different consciousness experiences.. "like the
sun rising and suddenly you are aware of things you never knew were there."
without using LSD.
Such things have been reported for millennia .............. on every
continent, in every age, in all societies, and by people of all religions
and spiritual paths.
that's all ... just a comment.
I expect it to be debunked, ignored and a never ending demand to provide
"proof" of these non-existent experiences.
Sir Frederick
>
>
>well doesn't that of itself sort of prove that what happens around here on
>earth is barely a sliver of what "reality" really is??
>
>I just wonder why so many people miss, ignore overlook so many examples like
>this, and yet still expect something like "reality" or God to be provided or
>proved to them on a platter.
>
>How can one find "God/Truth/all that is" [ whatever it is] wandering around
>in the dark when only using a humble flashlight? <smile>
>
>I and many others have had different consciousness experiences.. "like the
>sun rising and suddenly you are aware of things you never knew were there."
>without using LSD.
>
>Such things have been reported for millennia .............. on every
>continent, in every age, in all societies, and by people of all religions
>and spiritual paths.
>
>that's all ... just a comment.
>
>I expect it to be debunked, ignored and a never ending demand to provide
>"proof" of these non-existent experiences.
>
You want proof? Just ask this guy with epilepsy :
(as discussed below in this thread)
<quote me>
I collect Ramachandran's writings and have his PBS Nova program on tape.
On the tape I was especially impressed by his subject that
had epilepsy and refused medication cause he (the subject)
liked "meeting God".
<end quote>
(transcript available)
Mercy Brown
>No, when I see the moon, I see the moon. I don't
> see representations of the moon in my head,
> sense-data, or anything like that.
Okey-doke. I'd probably prefer electromagnetic waves that were
reflected by the Moon striking my eyes, imparting their own pattern or
"interpretation" of that encounter to my sensory system; but if your
eyes can survive impact with the original 3576 km diameter object, then
all the power to you. :)
take care, Mercedes B.
Mercy Brown
> Like realism, anti-realism has its conceptual problems and its detractors.
> The issue here is that of demonstrating, either by empirical evidence or by
> reasoned argument, that one of these positions is wrong. I don't believe
> that to be possible, but you may prove me wrong. Over to you.
What does anti-realism mean in this case? Solipsism? Idealism? I'll try
to chime in at some less gothic hour tomorrow.
c'ya, Mercedes B.
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote
>
>> Like realism, anti-realism has its conceptual problems and its
>> detractors. The issue here is that of demonstrating, either by
>> empirical evidence or by reasoned argument, that one of these
>> positions is wrong. I don't believe that to be possible, but you
>> may prove me wrong. Over to you.
>
> One approach Russell took was to hold that statements could
> refer either to perceptual or physical space. The "real" world is
> modeled in language (or math), not perception.
Isn't that just begging the question?
> If I make a detailed observation of an apple, and then put it in a
> box for an extended period of time, when I retrieve it, it will likely
> be rotten. The statement "The apple is rotten" refers to the
> physical apple, because it's hard to see how a perceptual
> representation itself can in anyway "rot" short of mental defect;
> it may reveal a change of state, but it is a dead end to try and
> explain the process as completely perceptual in nature. It's
> also difficult to see how a perception could ever be mistaken
> if all there are is perceptions.
I think the error here is in taking the word "perception" to refer to
human experience alone. Whitehead conjectures that all things
are experiential, even the cells of an apple. Consequently processes
continue in the absence of human observers.
> Statements about development or decay are the representations
> of actual physical entities since they participate in physical
> theories, and can clearly be considered correct or incorrect based
> on a correspondence to reality, not just perceptions of a supposed
> reality.
To claim that there is no world would exist in the absence of any
experience of it is not the same as claiming that there is no objective
world. Since all experiential perspectives are mutually immanent in
Whitehead's view, there is an objective world upon which individual
"occasions of actual experience" (to use Whitehead's terminology)
take a perspective. Objectivity now amounts to nothing more than
inter-subjective agreement. I wouldn't find it disturbing if anybody
wanted to call that objective world 'reality' despite its anti-realist
origins.
> Dewey made point the that we don't experience experiences, but
> rather we experience nature through our experiences. Much of
> the force of his argument comes from the fact that experiencing
> nature makes sense while experiencing experiences is incoherent.
> Certain things simply must point outside themselves to have
> any real meaning.
That's fine with me, but it could also apply to Whitehead's version
of 'nature' (i.e. the inter-subjective world).
andy-k
> andy-k wrote:
>
>> Like realism, anti-realism has its conceptual problems and its
>> detractors. The issue here is that of demonstrating, either by empirical
>> evidence or by reasoned argument, that one of these positions is wrong. I
>> don't believe that to be possible, but you may prove me wrong. Over to
>> you.
>
> What does anti-realism mean in this case? Solipsism? Idealism?
It means panexperientialism. It certainly isn't solipsism, and the term
'idealism' is very slippery although Whitehead has been classed as an
idealist.
Mercy Brown
>To be honest, and why not, I do not have a clue
> what u guys are on about
Yet another introduction:
http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/Representationalism.html
c'ya, Mercedes B.
Sean
> On Mon, 8 May 2006 14:46:54 +1000, "Sean" <santimva...@yahoo.com>
> wrote:
>
>
>>
>>
>>well doesn't that of itself sort of prove that what happens around here on
>>earth is barely a sliver of what "reality" really is??
>>
>>I just wonder why so many people miss, ignore overlook so many examples
>>like
>>this, and yet still expect something like "reality" or God to be provided
>>or
>>proved to them on a platter.
>>
>>How can one find "God/Truth/all that is" [ whatever it is] wandering
>>around
>>in the dark when only using a humble flashlight? <smile>
>>
>>I and many others have had different consciousness experiences.. "like
>>the
>>sun rising and suddenly you are aware of things you never knew were
>>there."
>>without using LSD.
>>
>>Such things have been reported for millennia .............. on every
>>continent, in every age, in all societies, and by people of all religions
>>and spiritual paths.
>>
>>that's all ... just a comment.
>>
>>I expect it to be debunked, ignored and a never ending demand to provide
>>"proof" of these non-existent experiences.
>>
> You want proof?
have more than eniough thanks .... it;s others keep expecting it to be given
to them on a platter was my point.
Just ask this guy with epilepsy :
> (as discussed below in this thread)
>
> <quote me>
> I collect Ramachandran's writings and have his PBS Nova program on tape.
>
> On the tape I was especially impressed by his subject that
> had epilepsy and refused medication cause he (the subject)
> liked "meeting God".
> <end quote>
> (transcript available)
This is what is known commonly as a straw man argument Sir Fred ... the
issue is one of relevance.
anyway .... how do u know he doesn;t meet with "god" ???
who made u the expert to judge others expereinces? <smile>
gibbs
> I and many others have had different consciousness experiences.. "like
> the sun rising and suddenly you are aware of things you never knew were
> there." without using LSD.
Believe me, unless you've had LSD, you have had nothing remotely similar to
the LSD experience.
gibbs
> Okey-doke. I'd probably prefer electromagnetic waves that were
> reflected by the Moon striking my eyes, imparting their own pattern or
> "interpretation" of that encounter to my sensory system; but if your
> eyes can survive impact with the original 3576 km diameter object, then
> all the power to you. :)
You are confusing how we see with what we see. Big difference.
Ciao!
Mercy Brown
>It means panexperientialism. It certainly isn't
> solipsism, and the term 'idealism' is very slippery
> although Whitehead has been classed as an
> idealist.
Okay; but panex is somewhat ambiguous itself, to me; it seems
interpreted as widespread natural dualism by some and reality only
consisting of sentience or consciousness by others; I'm going to
backtrack.
andy-k wrote:
>Like realism, anti-realism has its conceptual
> problems and its detractors. The issue here is
> that of demonstrating, either by empirical
> evidence or by reasoned argument, that one of
> these positions is wrong. I don't believe that to
> be possible, but you may prove me wrong. Over
> to you.
When a logical stalemate or antinomious condition exists between
arguments, doctrines, or propositions -- it might be time to:
(1) Take a view similar to the that of the mathematical purist {MP}.
MPs are only interested in the the internal consistencies of
mathematical theorems, discounting them as having anything to do with
everyday reality {albeit being extremely irritated over the many times
that theorems have later been discovered by sci-tech to have a
practical application in the world}. In similar vein, the concern of
the philosophical purist would be: "Is this argument consistent with
itself?" rather than comparing it to another argument founded on
different axioms or pitting them against each other in the "concrete
arena".
(2) Or go ahead and do just that --pit them against each other in
everyday life and science and see which one works its way up to being a
"winner". While this might not resolve a supposed logical stalemate
between them, it settles that one of them is fit for active duty --
like the mathematical theorem that betrays the mathematical purist by
finding application in sci-tech.
In the case of latter option, where realism versus antirealism becomes
an issue for people rather than abstract examination, the winner in
everyday behavior and attitudes is realism. Not merely street folks,
but most scientists are materialists and realists, made clear in their
public lectures and essays if not their technical papers with any
neutrally epistemological bent of description.
So that, taking this back to rep versus anti-rep, what tips the scales
in favor of representationalism is that a variety of neural studies and
clinical conditions support that perception is confined to one's head
-- that data is delivered to one's brain for analysis, interpretation,
and perception via a sequence of causation; these causal intermediator
stages themselves being non-experiential representations of the
original sources {or experiential in a speculative sense}. And
perception not consisting of some soul, telepathic extension of
consciousness, or whatever, pressing around or mentally uniting with
the local environment or distant environment {like the stars} to get a
"direct and perfect impression" of what things are like out there.
But this doesn't mean that the explanations of biology and cog-sci will
reign always in the future; or that reality will not be later revealed
to only consist of relationships (rather than primary properties and
entities) which create space, particles, characteristics, and objects
via how they are inter-connected in any moment. But this seems to lead
to experiential constructivism; IOW, the more "connections" added or
altered the more it changes the former composite of relationships,
since that would be all any thing or feature is temporarily.
And as a result, it doesn't necessarily eliminate representationalism;
because although perception might then consist of the observer and the
"object" being merged together in an augmented complex of
relationships, the very addition of the observer to the object (or vice
versa) creates something "new". IOW, you don't know entirely what the
situation was before union with it, only the experience that the set of
combined relationships create after merger. Thus, the "after" is like a
representation of what was there before you united with it --it might
be somewhat accurate of the original composite or it might be quite
different from it {the human interpretation}.
C'ya, Mercedes
Craig Franck
> "Craig Franck" wrote:
>> "andy-k" wrote
>>> Like realism, anti-realism has its conceptual problems and its
>>> detractors. The issue here is that of demonstrating, either by
>>> empirical evidence or by reasoned argument, that one of these
>>> positions is wrong. I don't believe that to be possible, but you
>>> may prove me wrong. Over to you.
>>
>> One approach Russell took was to hold that statements could
>> refer either to perceptual or physical space. The "real" world is
>> modeled in language (or math), not perception.
>
> Isn't that just begging the question?
Perhaps, but Russell felt that "causal chains of events" occurring
in physical space was such a useful idea that the very concept of an
explanation required either that or something to stand in its place.
It seems you need two spaces for a statement like "glass is a liquid"
to make sense: It has the physical make up of a very viscous liquid
at room temperature, but is perceived as a brittle solid.
So anti-realists are not quite wrong, just conceptually impoverished
unless they load up with an experiential framework that handles
generic events in a way that allows science to function identically in
either a realist or anti-realist universe; which means there is no
empirical test imaginable to tell which is the case.
>> If I make a detailed observation of an apple, and then put it in a
>> box for an extended period of time, when I retrieve it, it will likely
>> be rotten. The statement "The apple is rotten" refers to the
>> physical apple, because it's hard to see how a perceptual
>> representation itself can in anyway "rot" short of mental defect;
>> it may reveal a change of state, but it is a dead end to try and
>> explain the process as completely perceptual in nature. It's
>> also difficult to see how a perception could ever be mistaken
>> if all there are is perceptions.
>
> I think the error here is in taking the word "perception" to refer to
> human experience alone. Whitehead conjectures that all things
> are experiential, even the cells of an apple. Consequently processes
> continue in the absence of human observers.
That does work. My criticism of that view is that simple physical
events seem more than adequate to explain the universe minus
minds with perceptual experiences. I don't know what is added
by claiming the quark/gluon soup right after the BB had
experiences in addition to its quantum state, or that the Earth
had experiences prior to being occupied by living things.
andy-k
> where realism versus antirealism becomes an issue for people rather than
> abstract examination, the winner in everyday behavior and attitudes is
> realism. Not merely street folks, but most scientists are materialists and
> realists, made clear in their public lectures and essays if not their
> technical papers with any neutrally epistemological bent of description.
Herd mentality is no guarantee of veracity, else the world would have been
flat until relatively recently. What is needed is either empirical evidence
or reasoned argument. Furthermore, whilst scientists (being only human)
often have their metaphysical prejudices, science itself demands no
commitment to realism.
> So that, taking this back to rep versus anti-rep, what tips the scales
> in favor of representationalism is that a variety of neural studies and
> clinical conditions support that perception is confined to one's head
> -- that data is delivered to one's brain for analysis, interpretation,
> and perception via a sequence of causation; these causal intermediator
> stages themselves being non-experiential representations of the
> original sources {or experiential in a speculative sense}. And
> perception not consisting of some soul, telepathic extension of
> consciousness, or whatever, pressing around or mentally uniting with
> the local environment or distant environment {like the stars} to get a
> "direct and perfect impression" of what things are like out there.
A serious investigation of anti-representationalism would disabuse
you of such naive objections -- I refer you back to Griffin's book.
Sadly most people prefer to follow fashions rather than undertake
serious investigations.
"There are in fact four very significant stumblingblocks in the way of
grasping the truth, which hinder every man however learned, and scarcely
allow anyone to win a clear title to wisdom, namely, the example of weak and
unworthy authority, longstanding custom, the feeling of the ignorant crowd,
and the hiding of our own ignorance while making a display of our apparent
knowledge." -- Roger Bacon (1214-1292).
andy-k
>
> So anti-realists are not quite wrong, just conceptually impoverished
> unless they load up with an experiential framework that handles
> generic events in a way that allows science to function identically in
> either a realist or anti-realist universe; which means there is no
> empirical test imaginable to tell which is the case.
Is there an empirical test to tell whether realism or anti-realism is the
case?
>> I think the error here is in taking the word "perception" to refer to
>> human experience alone. Whitehead conjectures that all things
>> are experiential, even the cells of an apple. Consequently processes
>> continue in the absence of human observers.
>
> That does work. My criticism of that view is that simple physical
> events seem more than adequate to explain the universe minus
> minds with perceptual experiences. I don't know what is added
> by claiming the quark/gluon soup right after the BB had
> experiences in addition to its quantum state, or that the Earth
> had experiences prior to being occupied by living things.
I don't know what is lost by making such claims either -- what difference
would it make to the world if an electron experienced its interactions with
photons, or if it didn't?
Craig Franck
> In the case of latter option, where realism versus antirealism becomes
> an issue for people rather than abstract examination, the winner in
> everyday behavior and attitudes is realism. Not merely street folks,
> but most scientists are materialists and realists, made clear in their
> public lectures and essays if not their technical papers with any
> neutrally epistemological bent of description.
That's true, but you can be anti-realist wrt the terminal points of
physical theories and still regard the everyday world as "real."
Substance, as generally conceived today (or prior to the 20th
century by scientists), clearly does not exist.
An anti-realist might argue that the ontological status of energy
or quantum fields is that of useful fictions since we know nothing
of them other than how they participate in physical theories.
> So that, taking this back to rep versus anti-rep, what tips the scales
> in favor of representationalism is that a variety of neural studies and
> clinical conditions support that perception is confined to one's head
> -- that data is delivered to one's brain for analysis, interpretation,
> and perception via a sequence of causation; these causal intermediator
> stages themselves being non-experiential representations of the
> original sources {or experiential in a speculative sense}.
That is sound, but there is the issue of the representations themselves.
The structure of conscious experience and the structure of the brain
seem completely different. I'm not sure why one would have anything
to do with the other beside the fact we can map experience to
brain function.
[...]
> And as a result, it doesn't necessarily eliminate representationalism;
> because although perception might then consist of the observer and the
> "object" being merged together in an augmented complex of
> relationships, the very addition of the observer to the object (or vice
> versa) creates something "new". IOW, you don't know entirely what the
> situation was before union with it, only the experience that the set of
> combined relationships create after merger. Thus, the "after" is like a
> representation of what was there before you united with it --it might
> be somewhat accurate of the original composite or it might be quite
> different from it {the human interpretation}.
I see it as one big feedback loop. You can take a pencil and run it
over various textures and get very good representation of the surface.
But you are clearly feeling the pencil, not the texture of the surface.
What is sense organ and what is perceived object aren't clear.
Mercy Brown
>Herd mentality is no guarantee of veracity,
It's not about the arrogant quest of certainty, but that everyday life
breaks such antinomious stalemates. I seriously doubt that
antirealists, during the course of most of a week, stray from the view
that they're a body wandering around in a space filled with objects.
"Oh, that speeding truck is bearing down on me, but why bother stepping
out of the way; it's only visual and audible sensations that have no
causal correlation to anything that could do damage to me."
> flat until relatively recently. What is needed is either empirical evidence
> or reasoned argument.
Empirical evidence? If seeing a world filled with other people that
interact with you is dismissed as evidence that there are exterior
casuations for your perceptions, then anything else provided by the
senses would also be rejected as "just another habit that this fairy
tale of a dream has taken up". Skepticism is settled each day the
acosmist walks through a door rather than trying to pass through a
solid wall. If one day people start venturing through the walls with
ease, then another argument becomes "fit for duty".
>Furthermore, whilst scientists (being only
> human) often have their metaphysical
> prejudices, science itself demands no
> commitment to realism.
Science is not necessarily some unchanging Platonic form or universal
field above and beyond the individuals engaging in it, and their
endeavors. What "science is about" has been debated by the human
particulars for centuries and will continue so, akin to a process
"working itself out" indefinitely. If science "demands no commitment to
realism", that's a lack of tyranny for now and was issued by an
individual or organization of peers with some degree of power or
persuasion itself to enforce that opinion.
> A serious investigation of anti-representationalism would disabuse
> you of such naive objections -- I refer you back to Griffin's book.
> Sadly most people prefer to follow fashions rather than undertake
> serious investigations.
>
Anti-representationalism is a general category for supposed arguments
"against representationalism", and a hi-jacking of it by a specific
doctrine doesn't make it the exclusive owner. One can use any as an
example and be under that umbrella. I've examined other supposedly more
sophisticated kinds than direct-realism or folk-realism and found them
to be either ambiguously evasive, unconvincing as to how they escape
solipsism, or found them to be a form of indirect realism in disguise.
However, it is the arrogance of anti-reps that warrants my pet-peeve
about them, their mantra of "representationalism leading to solipsism",
as if there's no other option but rep leading to solipsism. In fact,
there is no option in representationalism but what it regards:
representation of things independent of the observer, or that
perceptions have a causal relationship with events indepedent of the
observer. It is anti-solipsistic.
Yes, there is a dogmatic element to this: "I believe there other minds
or other people causing my perceptions of them", but dogma exists in
anti-representationlism as well. The latter is hardly a solution to
fears of skepticism and solipsism; so that any advice I might receive
that "you should abandon rep for anti-rep because it doesn't have any
problems" is sheer idiocy.
Take Leibniz's panpsychism, for instance: complete isolation of the
windowless monads, their perceptions are uncaused by anything external
to them. Leibniz escapes solipsism by dogmatically proclaiming that
other minds or monads do exist, and there is the harmonized appearance
of relational causations between them (and also the materialist world
that is the content of their perceptions). When the stream of
sensations experiencing itself as "Dorothy Jones" is talking to a
percept called "Tom Smith", another monad experiencing itself as "Tom
Smith" is talking to a percept called "Dorothy Jones". Completely
dogmatic, no way to know these percepts are also shared events in other
monads or that monads have the illusionary appearance of causally
interpenetrating each other so that they are not solipsistically living
in their "own dream" or out of sync with each other temporally.
But I have no problem with the dogmatic aspect of it because that's all
any form of anti-solipsism can do: "I believe there are other minds
(minimum) or things (maximum) that correlate to my perceptions".
Representationalism does the same. What is insane, though, is singling
out representational arguments as if they are only the ones dogmatic,
or that they are about "solipsism" or about "collapsing into
solipsism".
> "There are in fact four very significant stumblingblocks in the way of
> grasping the truth, which hinder every man however learned, and scarcely
> allow anyone to win a clear title to wisdom, namely, the example of weak and
> unworthy authority, longstanding custom, the feeling of the ignorant crowd,
> and the hiding of our own ignorance while making a display of our apparent
> knowledge." -- Roger Bacon (1214-1292).
Maybe anti-representationalists should apply to that to their own
convictions. After all, representationalism doesn't contain "anti-"
(opposed to [another viewpoint]) as part of its very identity. When I
see the tired tactic of weaving representationalism into solipsism and
etc, I'm going to do some weaving of my own against the source those
stereotypical criticisms.
c'ya, Mercedes
andy-k
> andy-k wrote:
>
>>Herd mentality is no guarantee of veracity,
>
> It's not about the arrogant quest of certainty, but that everyday life
> breaks such antinomious stalemates. I seriously doubt that
> antirealists, during the course of most of a week, stray from the view
> that they're a body wandering around in a space filled with objects.
> "Oh, that speeding truck is bearing down on me, but why bother stepping
> out of the way; it's only visual and audible sensations that have no
> causal correlation to anything that could do damage to me."
Agreed, but that's no confirmation of realism, and no refutation of
anti-realism.
>> flat until relatively recently. What is needed is either empirical
>> evidence or reasoned argument.
>
> Empirical evidence? If seeing a world filled with other people that
> interact with you is dismissed as evidence that there are exterior
> casuations for your perceptions, then anything else provided by the
> senses would also be rejected as "just another habit that this fairy
> tale of a dream has taken up". Skepticism is settled each day the
> acosmist walks through a door rather than trying to pass through a
> solid wall. If one day people start venturing through the walls with
> ease, then another argument becomes "fit for duty".
I don't believe it possible to provide empirical evidence that a world
exists in the absence of any experience of it. If it were the case that no
such world exists, then there would be nothing to construct a representation
*of*. Consequently I don't believe it possible to provide empirical evidence
that representationalism is the case, or that anti-representationalism is
the case. In practical life the rep/anti-rep debate is a non-issue -- it's
an intellectual indulgence.
>>Furthermore, whilst scientists (being only human) often have their
>>metaphysical prejudices, science itself demands no commitment to realism.
>
> Science is not necessarily some unchanging Platonic form or universal
> field above and beyond the individuals engaging in it, and their
> endeavors. What "science is about" has been debated by the human
> particulars for centuries and will continue so, akin to a process
> "working itself out" indefinitely. If science "demands no commitment to
> realism", that's a lack of tyranny for now and was issued by an
> individual or organization of peers with some degree of power or
> persuasion itself to enforce that opinion.
I'll be more specific then. Realism does not have to be the case in order
for us to be capable of making observations, deducing explanatory
hypotheses, using those hypotheses to make predictions, and testing those
predictions in the fire of further observations.
>> A serious investigation of anti-representationalism would disabuse
>> you of such naive objections -- I refer you back to Griffin's book.
>> Sadly most people prefer to follow fashions rather than undertake
>> serious investigations.
>
> Anti-representationalism is a general category for supposed arguments
> "against representationalism", and a hi-jacking of it by a specific
> doctrine doesn't make it the exclusive owner. One can use any as an
> example and be under that umbrella. I've examined other supposedly more
> sophisticated kinds than direct-realism or folk-realism and found them
> to be either ambiguously evasive, unconvincing as to how they escape
> solipsism, or found them to be a form of indirect realism in disguise.
That is a different claim to your original claim that "The problem with
anti-representationalism is that its adherents cut short an exploration of
its own wild consequences, to generate the appearance that it has fewer
problems than representationalism." As I commented previously, anti-rep is
not without its own problems to counterbalance those of represenationalism,
but they aren't the problems you ground your rejection upon. If anti-rep
were that easily refuted then it would have no intelligent supporters at
all. It would be a brave man that condemned the likes of Whitehead as
unintelligent.
> However, it is the arrogance of anti-reps that warrants my pet-peeve
> about them, their mantra of "representationalism leading to solipsism",
> as if there's no other option but rep leading to solipsism. In fact,
> there is no option in representationalism but what it regards:
> representation of things independent of the observer, or that
> perceptions have a causal relationship with events indepedent of the
> observer. It is anti-solipsistic.
I'm concerned only to rescue anti-rep from slanderous accusations, or to be
corrected in any errors I may be making. The challenge is for you to prove
anti-representationalism wrong rather than just unpopular -- refutation
rather than mere repudiation ("I don't like it"). Of course, if you want to
leave it at mere repudiation then we have no quarrel.
> Yes, there is a dogmatic element to this: "I believe there other minds
> or other people causing my perceptions of them", but dogma exists in
> anti-representationlism as well. The latter is hardly a solution to
> fears of skepticism and solipsism; so that any advice I might receive
> that "you should abandon rep for anti-rep because it doesn't have any
> problems" is sheer idiocy.
Rather like advice that "you should abandon anti-rep for rep because it
doesn't have any problems" then.
> Take Leibniz's panpsychism, for instance: complete isolation of the
> windowless monads, their perceptions are uncaused by anything external
> to them. Leibniz escapes solipsism by dogmatically proclaiming that
> other minds or monads do exist, and there is the harmonized appearance
> of relational causations between them (and also the materialist world
> that is the content of their perceptions). When the stream of
> sensations experiencing itself as "Dorothy Jones" is talking to a
> percept called "Tom Smith", another monad experiencing itself as "Tom
> Smith" is talking to a percept called "Dorothy Jones". Completely
> dogmatic, no way to know these percepts are also shared events in other
> monads or that monads have the illusionary appearance of causally
> interpenetrating each other so that they are not solipsistically living
> in their "own dream" or out of sync with each other temporally.
Hence Whitehead's recourse to "mutual immanence".
> But I have no problem with the dogmatic aspect of it because that's all
> any form of anti-solipsism can do: "I believe there are other minds
> (minimum) or things (maximum) that correlate to my perceptions".
> Representationalism does the same. What is insane, though, is singling
> out representational arguments as if they are only the ones dogmatic,
> or that they are about "solipsism" or about "collapsing into
> solipsism".
That's not my concern.
>> "There are in fact four very significant stumblingblocks in the way of
>> grasping the truth, which hinder every man however learned, and scarcely
>> allow anyone to win a clear title to wisdom, namely, the example of weak
>> and unworthy authority, longstanding custom, the feeling of the ignorant
>> crowd, and the hiding of our own ignorance while making a display of our
>> apparent knowledge." -- Roger Bacon (1214-1292).
>
> Maybe anti-representationalists should apply to that to their own
> convictions.
Over eight centuries old, it remains excellent advice for all -- whatever
ones metaphysical prejudices.
> After all, representationalism doesn't contain "anti-" (opposed to
> [another viewpoint]) as part of its very identity.
That's just a matter of terminology -- representationalism might well be
regarded as "anti-direct-realism".
> When I see the tired tactic of weaving representationalism into solipsism
> and etc, I'm going to do some weaving of my own against the source those
> stereotypical criticisms.
Better still to rise above slanging matches.