E-Prime (qwertyuiop)
Immortalist
use any form of (to_be) in what I write and/or say.
http://www.hilgart.org/papers_html/091S196.B07.html
In 1933, in Science and Sanity, Alfred Korzybski proposed that we
should abolish the "is of identity" from the English language. (The "is
of identity" takes the form X is a Y. e.g., "Joe is a Communist," "Mary
is a dumb file-clerk," "The universe is a giant machine," etc.) In
1949, D. David Bourland Jr. proposed the abolition of all forms of the
words "is" or "to be" and the Bourland proposal (English without
"isness") he called E-Prime, or English-Prime.
http://fusionanomaly.net/eprime.html
"It was found that the background linguistic system (in other words,
the grammar) of each language is not merely a reproducing instrument
for voicing ideas but rather is itself the shaper of ideas, the program
and guide for the individual's mental activity, for his analysis of
impressions, for his synthesis of his mental stock in trade."
--Benjamin Lee Whorf: 'Language, Thought and Reality'
English Prime - E-Prime for short. E-Prime comprises standard English
with all forms of the verb 'TO BE' deleted; its use prevents forms of
the verb 'TO BE' creating erroneous and irrational generalisations in
language and thought. Further techniques presented in here provide for
accuracy in linguistic description such as to destroy the peculiar
notion held by some that assertions and opinions (using the 'TO BE'
verb) exist as 'out there' independent facts; the speaker gets
re-attached to his comments and thoughts - as it occurs in reality.
http://www.angelfire.com/nd/danscorpio/ep2.html
The idea for English Prime comes from a concern that "to be" verbs tend
to mislead our thinking. They do this in two ways: "to be" suggests an
equation, that saying "John is a football player." sounds like "John"
and "football player" equal one another, while in reality John has many
more categories in which he could fit; calling John a football player
sounds like you now know everything that can be known about John.
The verb "to be" also tends to suggest a frozen, static condition. The
universe constantly changes, but saying something "is" can lead us to
ignore changes. I like the comparison semanticists make between "maps"
and "territories": maps do not change as fast as the territories they
represent change. Using "is" reinforces the mistaken idea that the
territories-words represent continue on with no changes.
http://www.wonderfulwritingskillsunhandbook.com/html/e-prime.html
1. Personal Perspective:
E-Prime, the omission of the verb "to be" from English usage, alleges
not only to clarify meaning in written and spoken English, but also
actually to enhance critical thinking! So says its inventor, the
semanticist D. David Bourland, Jr.
2. Impersonal Perspective:
E-Prime is the omission of the verb "to be" from English usage, and is
alleged not only to clarify meaning in written and spoken English, but
also actually to enhance critical thinking! This is according to its
inventor, the semanticist D. David Bourland, Jr.
http://www.ctlow.ca/E-Prime/E-Prime.html
TOWARD UNDERSTANDING E -PRIME
Robert Anton Wilson
E-PRIME, abolishing all forms of the verb "to be," has its roots in the
field of general semantics, as presented by Alfred Korzybski in his
1933 book, Science and Sanity. Korzybski pointed out the pitfalls
associated with, and produced by, two usages of "to be": identity and
predication. His student D. David Bourland, Jr., observed that even
linguistically sensitive people do not seem able to avoid identity and
predication uses of "to be" if they continue to use the verb at all.
Bourland pioneered in demonstrating that one can indeed write and speak
without using any form of "to be," calling this subset of the English
language "E-Prime." Many have urged the use of E-Prime in writing
scientific and technical papers. Dr. Kellogg exemplifies a prime
exponent of this activity. Dr. Albert Ellis has rewritten five of his
books in E-Prime, in collaboration with Dr. Robert H. Moore, to improve
their clarity and to reap the epistemological benefits of this language
revision. Korzybski felt that all humans should receive training in
general semantics from grade school on, as "semantic hygiene" against
the most prevalent forms of logical error, emotional distortion, and
"demonological thinking." E-Prime provides a straightforward training
technique for acquiring such semantic hygiene.
To understand E-Prime, consider the human brain as a computer. (Note
that I did not say the brain "is" a computer.) As the Prime Law of
Computers tells us, GARBAGE IN, GARBAGE OUT (GIGO, for short). The
wrong software guarantees wrong answers. Conversely, finding the right
software can "miraculously" solve problems that previously appeared
intractable.
It seems likely that the principal software used in the human brain
consists of words, metaphors, disguised metaphors, and linguistic
structures in general. The Sapir-Whorf-Korzybski Hypothesis, in
anthropology, holds that a change in language can alter our perception
of the cosmos. A revision of language structure, in particular, can
alter the brain as dramatically as a psychedelic. In our metaphor, if
we change the software, the computer operates in a new way.
Consider the following paired sets of propositions, in which Standard
English alternates with English-Prime (E-Prime):
lA. The electron is a wave.
lB. The electron appears as a wave when measured with instrument-l.
2A. The electron is a particle.
2B. The electron appears as a particle when measured with instrument-2.
3A. John is lethargic and unhappy.
3B. John appears lethargic and unhappy in the office.
4A. John is bright and cheerful.
4B. John appears bright and cheerful on holiday at the beach.
5A. This is the knife the first man used to stab the second man.
5B. The first man appeared to stab the second man with what looked like
a knife to me.
6A. The car involved in the hit-and-run accident was a blue Ford.
6B. In memory, I think I recall the car involved in the hit-and-run
accident as a blue Ford.
7A. This is a fascist idea.
7B. This seems like a fascist idea to me.
8A. Beethoven is better than Mozart.
8B. In my present mixed state of musical education and ignorance,
Beethoven seems better to me than Mozart.
9A. That is a sexist movie.
9B. That seems like a sexist movie to me.
10A. The fetus is a person.
10B. In my system of metaphysics, I classify the fetus as a person.
The "A"-type statements (Standard English) all implicitly or explicitly
assume the medieval view called "Aristotelian essentialism" or "naive
realism." In other words, they assume a world made up of block-like
entities with indwelling "essences" or spooks- "ghosts in the machine."
The "B"-type statements (E-Prime) recast these sentences into a form
isomorphic to modern science by first abolishing the "is" of
Aristotelian essence and then reformulating each observation in terms
of signals received and interpreted by a body (or instrument) moving in
space-time.
Relativity, quantum mechanics, large sections of general physics,
perception psychology, sociology, linguistics, modern math,
anthropology, ethology, and several other sciences make perfect sense
when put into the software of E-Prime. Each of these sciences generates
paradoxes, some bordering on "nonsense" or "gibberish," if you try to
translate them back into the software of Standard English.
Concretely, "The electron is a wave" employs the Aristotelian "is" and
thereby introduces us to the false-to-experience notion that we can
know the indwelling "essence" of the electron. "The electron appears as
a wave when measured by instrument-1" reports what actually occurred in
space-time, namely that the electron when constrained by a certain
instrument behaved in a certain way.
Similarly, "The electron is a particle" contains medieval Aristotelian
software, but "The electron appears as a particle when measured by
instrument-2" contains modern scientific software. Once again, the
software determines whether we impose a medieval or modern grid upon
our reality-tunnel.
Note that "the electron is a wave" and "the electron is a particle"
contradict each other and begin the insidious process by which we move
gradually from paradox to nonsense to total gibberish. On the other
hand, the modern scientific statements "the electron appears as a wave
when measured one way" and "the electron appears as a particle measured
another way" do not contradict, but rather complement each other.
(Bohr's Principle of Complementarity, which explained this and
revolutionized physics, would have appeared obvious to all, and not
just to a person of his genius, if physicists had written in E-Prime
all along. . . .)
Looking at our next pair, "John is lethargic and unhappy" vs. "John is
bright and cheerful,' we see again how medieval software creates
metaphysical puzzles and totally imaginary contradictions.
Operationalizing the statements, as physicists since Bohr have learned
to operationalize, we find that the E-Prime translations do not contain
any contradiction, and even give us a clue as to causes of John's
changing moods. (Look back if you forgot the translations.)
"The first man stabbed the second man with a knife" lacks the overt
"is" of identity but contains Aristotelian software nonetheless. The
E-Prime translation not only operationalizes the data, but may fit the
facts better-if the incident occurred in a psychology class, which
often conduct this experiment. (The first man "stabs," or makes
stabbing gestures at, the second man, with a banana, but many students,
conditioned by Aristotelian software, nonetheless "see" a knife. You
don't need to take drugs to hallucinate; improper language can fill
your world with phantoms and spooks of many kinds.)
The reader may employ his or her own ingenuity in analyzing how
"is-ness" creates false-to-facts reality-tunnels in the remaining
examples, and how E-Prime brings us back to the scientific, the
operational, the existential, the phenomenological--to what humans and
their instruments actually do in space-time as they create
observations, perceptions, thoughts, deductions, and General Theories.
I have found repeatedly that when baffled by a problem in science, in
"philosophy," or in daily life, I gain immediate insight by writing
down what I know about the enigma in strict E-Prime. Often, solutions
appear immediately-just as happens when you throw out the "wrong"
software and put the "right" software into your PC. In other cases, I
at least get an insight into why the problem remains intractable and
where and how future science might go about finding an answer. (This
has contributed greatly to my ever-escalating agnosticism about the
political, ideological, and religious issues that still generate the
most passion on this primitive planet.)
When a proposition resists all efforts to recast it in a form
consistent with what we now call E-Prime, many consider it
"meaningless." Korzybski, Wittgenstein, the Logical Positivists, and
(in his own way) Niels Bohr promoted this view. I happen to agree with
that verdict (which condemns 99 percent of theology and 99.999999
percent of metaphysics to the category of Noise rather than
Meaning)--but we must save that subject for another article. For now,
it suffices to note that those who fervently believe such Aristotelian
propositions as "A piece of bread, blessed by a priest, is a person
(who died two thousand years ago)," "The flag is a living being," or
"The fetus is a human being" do not, in general, appear to make sense
by normal twentieth-century scientific standards.
http://www.nobeliefs.com/eprime.htm
E-prime
Software for Generating Psychology Experiments
http://personal.bgsu.edu/~randers/e-prime.htm
http://www.trans4mind.com/personal_development/GeneralSemantics/Ken'sEPrime.htm
Immortalist
In Peircean logical system, the logic of abduction and deduction
contribute to our conceptual understanding of a phenomenon, while the
logic of induction adds quantitative details to the conceptual
knowledge. Although Peirce justified the validity of induction as a
self-corrective process, Peirce asserted that neither induction nor
deduction can help us to unveil the internal structure of meaning. As
exploratory data analysis performs the function as a model builder for
confirmatory data analysis, abduction plays a role of explorer of
viable paths to further inquiry. Thus, the logic of abduction fits well
into exploratory data analysis. At the stage of abduction, the goal is
to explore the data, find out a pattern, and suggest a plausible
hypothesis; deduction is to refine the hypothesis based upon other
plausible premises; and induction is the empirical substantiation.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++
By speculative grammar Peirce understood the analysis of the kinds of
signs there are and the ways that they can be combined significantly.
For example, under this heading he introduced three trichotomies of
signs and argued for the real possibility of only certain kinds of
signs. Signs are qualisigns, sinsigns, or legisigns, accordingly as
they are mere qualities, individual events and states, or habits (or
laws), respectively. Signs are icons, indices (also called "semes"), or
symbols (sometimes called "tokens"), accordingly as they derive their
significance from resemblance to their objects, a real relation (for
example, of causation) with their objects, or are connected only by
convention to their objects, respectively. Signs are rhematic signs
(also called "sumisigns" and "rhemes"), dicisigns (also called
"quasi-propositions"), or arguments (also called "suadisigns"),
accordingly as they are predicational/relational in character,
propositional in character, or argumentative in character. Because the
three trichotomies are orthogonal to each other, together they yield
the abstract possibility that there are 27 distinct kinds of signs.
Peirce argued, however, that 17 of these are logically impossible, so
that finally only 10 kinds of signs are genuinely possible. In terms of
these 10 kinds of signs, Peirce endeavored to construct a theory of all
possible natural and conventional signs, whether simple or complex.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce/
In another trichotomy, Peirce saw that there are three distinct kinds
of signs, or different ways in which one thing can stand for another.
This distinction is extremely useful in elucidating the function of
language and other forms of communication. Peirce elaborated his system
to include ten (and ultimately sixty-four) different kinds of signs,
but the distinctions he makes become so fine and complex as not to be
useful for the present endeavor. The three basic types, based on the
different relations signs can have to their objects, are icon, index,
and symbol.
An icon stands for its object by virtue of being similar to it. An icon
can be a diagram, a map, or a more fully representational picture. An
index stands for its object by contiguity, by a physical, spatial, or
temporal connection to the object, or even by a causal connection to
it. Examples are a pointing gesture, an arrow, or a noise by which I
locate the noisemaker. There are two basic things an organism needs to
know about an object in itself as object - what it is and where it is
in space and time. Icons tend to be about "what"; indices about "where"
and "when." We also need to know the object's affective valence to the
self - we might say the "why." As I will discuss later on, this third
major characteristic is necessarily subjective, and is related to the
sense of self. Affects make use of both indices and icons.
Then there is the symbol. This represents its object by social
convention. The other two signs can be used in informational exchanges
by unicellular creatures, but symbols require a human social community.
Symbols include words, tokens, flags, and almost all the items in a
culture. A symbol is more complex than the other two sign types; Icons
and indices can represent their objects in a one-to-one relationship. A
symbol has varying degrees of relationship with its referent, but its
most important relationship is with all the other symbols in the
language, or in the culture. In other words, the symbol "bottle" (the
word) can refer to an object in the world that we call its referent, an
object Webster defines as "a rigid or semi-rigid container typically
made of glass, having a comparatively narrow neck or mouth and usually
no handle." But the symbol's relation to the palpable object is in a
sense trivial, in comparison to its relation to all those words used in
the previous sentence to make the object's composition and function
clear.
It must be remembered that there are few, if any signs of a pure type.
An index often has iconic properties of similarity. A birdcall, as an
index, says, "I am over here." But it is the iconic "shape" or temporal
pattern of the call, the complement to the other bird's receiver, by
which it is recognized and stimulates a response. An icon may often
have indexical properties. A road sign with a cartoon drawing of a
gasoline pump is an icon, but its presence before a highway exit
indicates "You can get fuel here at this exit." At the level of symbols
things become much more complex. A symbol may have iconic and/or
indexical properties. On a dashboard, a cartoon of an oilcan may flash
on, serving as an icon, but also functioning as an index calling
attention to it, and thereby referring to a symbolic phrase meaning
"low oil pressure." In another example, the word "I" is a symbol, but
also necessarily an index of the speaker; the English word, being a
single letter, is also an icon for the "individual." A word may have
onomatopoeic (iconic) aspects in its sounding, as with the name of
Jonathan Swift's horse-people, the Houyhnhnms.
http://www.psychoanalysis.net/Japa_Psa-NETCAST/Olds2.html
Peirce devised his ten classes of signs as part of his general theory
of signs, or semiotic theory. At first glance, these classes look like
a categorization scheme.
The ten classes are:
1) Open Iconic Tone (or Omen/Hunch);
This type of inference deals with the possibility of a possible
resemblance. A more concrete way to characterize this type of reasoning
is to describe it as reasoning in order to determine the possibility
that our initial observations might serve as omens for possible
evidence. An omen is a sign whose resolution is in future acts of
inquiry and observation. When the inference of the omen is more
implicit, we might call it a hunch. For instance, an archeologist might
guess that she should examine the banks of an old stream bed, because
she might possibly find something that might possibly be an artifact.
This type of inference we traditionally consider to be merely a
subjective act. However, it is an abduction, and one that is
systematically related to other types of abductions.
2) Open Iconic Token (or Symptom);
This type of inference deals with possible resemblances. Here we have
the case where we are trying to decide whether or not some actual
observation has enough properties to be considered as some case. A more
concrete way to characterize this type of reasoning is to describe it
as reasoning in order to determine whether our observations serve as
symptoms for the presence of some more general phenomenon. A symptom is
a sign whose action is ongoing in the present. For instance, our
archeologist, let us say, finds a smoothed stone. It is not immediately
clear whether or not the smoothness is natural or man-made, and so she
has to make an inference. In these inferences, we often find a
dependence on prior experience is involved.
3) Open Iconic Type (or Metaphor/Analogy);
This type of inference deals with the manipulation of resemblance to
create or discover a possible rule. A more concrete way to characterize
this type of reasoning is to describe it as the mode of inference that
uses analogy and metaphor to create new potential rules of order. For
example, suppose our archeologist is unhappy with current theories of
migration to describe the movements of the ancient tribes whose
artifacts she has been collecting. She needs to generate a new
conceptual frame of reference. Since most, if not all, general
conceptual frames are metaphorical in nature (cf. Lakoff & Johnson,
1980), it makes sense to create a new root metaphor to guide the
formation of the new frame of reference. In order to do this, she can
shift her metaphorical base deliberately, using a principle that Shank
(1987) has called the Method of Juxtaposition. Suppose, she decides to
look at tribal migration as if it were like, say, reading behavior.
What areas of investigation does this new metaphorical area of
juxtaposition suggest? Notice that there is no requirement that the
juxtaposition make explicit sense. We can get away with this due to the
fact that human beings are compelled to render any juxtaposition as
meaningful, or at least as meaningful as possible. In fact,
juxtapositions which are arbitrary can be quite useful, in that they
can lead to new areas of insight and understanding.
4) Open Indexical Token (or Clue);
This type of inference deals with possible evidence. A more concrete
way to characterize this type of reasoning is to describe it as
reasoning in order to determine whether or not our observations are
clues of some more general phenomenon. A clue is a sign which indicates
some past state of affairs. Therefore, any act of reasoning which
centers on clues is an act that tries to infer what past states of
affairs or circumstances were, and is therefore an act of detection.
For example, our archeologist discovers a number of pottery shards next
to the smooth stone. Is there any connection between the two, or is it
just a coincidence? In order to make a judgment, she looks at the
shards and looks at the smooth stone, searching for evidence of some
physical connection. If she finds pieces of pottery on the stone, then
she has a potential clue that the stone was used, for some reason she
does not know yet, to shatter the pots.
5) Open Indexical Type (or Diagnosis/Scenario);
This type of inference involves the formation of a possible rule based
on available evidence. A more concrete way to characterize this type of
reasoning is to describe it as reasoning in order to discover possible
diagnostic judgments amidst our observations. It is the act of
reasoning that also finishes off the detection process by the creation
of plausible scenarios from the body of clues. For instance, our
archeologist notes that the shattered pots are all placed in a shallow
pit, and there are other smooth stones organized around the edges of
the pit. She then starts the process of assembling these individual
observations no longer as observations, but now as potential scenarios.
As scenarios, these patterns of clues take on a possible unity of
character.
6) Open Symbolic Type (or Explanation);
This type of inference deals with a possible formal rule. A more
concrete way to characterize this type of reasoning is to describe it
as reasoning in order to form a general plausible explanation. For
example, suppose our archeologist is trying to account for a puzzling
collection of artifacts. She has never seen burnt sticks with smooth
stones attached to them. As tools, these implements have been weakened
by having been burnt. If she shifts her mode of explanation, though,
she can make better sense of them. Suppose, instead of being tools,
these artifacts have religious significance? The burnt sticks might
serve to illustrate some ritual point. Note that this explanation by
itself carries no weight of certainty, but it might serve to simplify
other explanations, and create a pattern to account for other data.
This explanation, if it holds, allows us to summarize a lot of separate
pieces of evidence, and a number of alternative scenarios, into a
single coherent explanation that has the additional advantage of
serving as the basis for meaningful insight. That is, a good
explanatory hypothesis does not just explain the obvious. It directs us
toward the less obvious, and sheds light on areas once seen as unclear
or unconnected.
7) Singular Indexical Token;
8) Singular Indexical Type;
9) Singular Symbolic Type; and
10) Formal Symbolic Type (2.254-264).
http://www.cs.indiana.edu/event/maics96/Proceedings/shank.html
Peirce uses the example of the proposition "The stove is black" to show
that blackness is a quality that can be abstracted (prescinded) from
the stove, as the (precise) respect in which the experience of seeing
it is available to thought. Peirce then analyzes this experience into
two distinct moments: first, reference to a "ground," as in this
instance singling out the color rather than, say, the weight or
temperature of the stove; and second, reference to a "correlate,"
indicating that the specific quality is abstractable so as to be
applicable to other things, such as black shoes or black pots, as
comparable to what is seen in the stove (1, sec. 551).
Thus our ability to make comparisons requires, in addition to the
related thing, the ground and the correlate, a "mediating
representation" or "interpretant" (1, sec. 553) that can be addressed
to someone (including, in the limiting case, ourselves). This analysis
provides a basis both for Peirce's theory of semiotic and for his
distinctive version of pragmatism. As he later elaborated his theory of
the categories, a "first" is a quality, a feeling, a possibility; a
"second" is an individual, discerned by its resistance to and
interaction with an environment, embodying or exemplifying a
possibility as actual; while a "third" is a general term, a rule, a
law, or a "habit" that represents the fallible but still determinate
knowledge of a regularity or principle (8, secs. 264-69).
Semiotically, one can then say that as signs or representations, a
first may be an "icon," based on resemblance; a second may be an
"index," based on correspondence to fact; and a third may be a general
sign or "symbol" (4, secs. 55 ff.; Peirce, Semiotic 22-36). As Peirce
developed these three terms (especially in his letters to Lady Welby),
they appear as the basis for a much fuller and more specific way of
using Peirce's semiotic analytically, in reference to specific texts or
other signifying elements. Thus, an "icon" is a semiotic function that
invites attention to some character contained in or expressed by an
instance, while an "index" depends on some existential relation into
which the instance enters, as smoke is an index of fire. The "symbol,"
then, is not connected merely to a ground or a relation to the object
but is a relation to an "interpretant." "Symbol" in this sense is
general, because it presupposes both the quality (in a reference to a
ground) and the existential relations of a particular case, but
specific in that it refers to an interpretant, a cognitive state,
determined by a first and a second but not confined to either (Sheriff
67).
http://www.press.jhu.edu/books/hopkins_guide_to_literary_theory/charles_sanders_peirce.html
By Peirce's semeiotic realism language does not simply refer to things
outside of signs. Though largely of a conventional nature, language is
a mode of conduct, and as such, produces conceivable consequences and
is normatively bounded. In its abilities to body forth new
possibilities for conduct, to determine and be determined by further
experience, and to communicate valid generals bearing conceivable
consequences, language is real, in Peirce's non-modern version of
semeiotic realism. Both his realism and pragmatism are theoretically at
odds with the positivism and behaviorism of Charles Morris, and to the
nominalist conventionalism of Saussure and more recent
poststructuralists. Though linguists and semioticians have been most
fascinated by Peirce's elaborate triadic technical divisions of signs,
such as icon, index, and symbol and type, token and (usually ignored)
tone, the larger philosophical outlook and anthropology underlying
those divisions have yet to be incorporated into linguistic studies.
http://www.nd.edu/~ehalton/Peirce.htm
Concerning: GOODMAN, Nelson: 'Languagues of Art. An approach to a
theory of symbols', Hackett Publishing Company Inc.,
Indianapolis/Cambridge 1976.
As already the title indicates, Goodman considers artworks to be signs
('symbols'). He bluntly puts: ''pictorial representation is a
mode of signification' (p. 3). Which immediately raises the question
how signs that are artworks ('pictorial representations') can be
distinguished from signs that are not artworks ('descriptions').
Goodman rejects the xisting answers, in particular those of Peirce and
Langer (p. 228). Peirce introduced the concept 'icon' for signs
that resemble what they refer to. Langer distinguished 'discursive'
from 'presentational' symbols. Goodman negates that something would
become a 'representation' (say, a painting) when it resembles what
it refers to. He fiercely opposes the idea that a painting would be a
copy or an imitation.
Instead, Goodman introduces a whole array of 'symbol systems'. The
'representational' differs from the 'verbal' in that its
'symbol system' is not 'articulated' (like verbal language),
but 'dense' (gradients of colours and black and white).
Here is not the place to examine whether the Goodman's criteria
suffice to distinguish 'representations' from 'descriptions'.
Our aim is to show that such distinction is not relevant, as far as art
is concerned. What really matters here is the distinction between words
or images ('pictorial representations') that conjure up a world,
and words or images that merely refer to world - words and images
that are merely signs ('symbols'). No doubt, an image may be used
as a sign. The representation of an eagle in an encyclopaedia refers to
'eagles' in general. And the same goes for the pictorial
representation of dishes on a menu: they refer to the real dishes that
will soon be served. We do not look at hem in view of enjoying what is
represented, but as a means of forming an idea of pleasures
forthcoming.
Totally different is the eagle on Michelangelo's drawing of Zeus and
Ganymede. Here, we are not looking through the image at an alleged
happening in a mythical world. We rather obliterate every real or
mythic world and totally submerge in the world evoked in the drawing,
as if the event were unfolding there before our very eyes. Thus, as
opposed to an image that is used as a sign - an image that refers to
something outside the painting - there is also the image that
conjures up a world, that is a world itself.
And, just as there are two kinds of images - images that refer and
images that conjure up - there are also two kinds of (verbal) signs.
As a rule words are used to refer to the outside world: 'It rains'.
But, as soon as one says 'Once upon a time...', the words stop
referring and begin to conjure up a world in our imagination. The
difference between art and other human activities, such as science or
philosophy, cannot possibly be understood in terms of signs. Only the
difference between referring to and conjuring up - between semiosis
and mimesis - will do.
Which is not to say that the world that is conjured in art cannot be
understood in terms of signs, just like the real world. The expression
on the face of the Mona Lisa is a sign, just like the real expression.
And both a real palm and the palm in an image are symbols of martyrdom.
Yet, such semiotic - iconologic - exercises have nothing to do with
art as such.
How much this approach misses the mark, becomes apparent when Goodman
claims that 'pictorial representations' belong to the same kind of
'symbol systems' as ... seismographs and thermometers! How, then,
to tell a temperature curve from a Hokusai drawing of the Fujiyama (p.
229)? Goodman remarks that even when in both cases the lines exactly
match, we still call the one a graph and the other an image. 'What
makes the difference?'. In both cases we are dealing with 'dense
schemes'. According to Goodman, the difference is 'syntactic': in
the graph the quality of the line does not matter, whereas in the print
the subtle variations are constitutive.
This is evidently false. Hokusai's drawing continues to conjure up a
volcano, however much we might vary the quality of its lines with a
computer program. Only the artistic quality will change, not the fact
that we have to do with an image. Also the graph remains a graph
whatever the nature of its lines What, then, really makes the graph a
sign and a drawing an image? The answer is obvious: Hokusai's lines
are an optic given that readily conjures up an equally optic landscape,
while a temperature curve is an optic given the optic qualities of
which are readily overlooked because they only refer to a tactile
given: temperature. Also variations in the intensity of light or even a
succession of sounds would do. Whereas a translation of the optic
givens of Hokusai's drawing in variations of sound or pressure would
utterly destroy every evocative power of the image. And that evidently
has everything to do with the difference between an image and a sign.
Goodman's theory turns out to be one of the many futile efforts to
fill the gap left by giving up the good old - but all too often
misunderstood - conception of art as mimesis
http://www.d-sites.net/english/goodman.htm
PEIRCIAN CATEGORIES FOR SIGNS
AND SIGN-OBJECT-INTERPRETANT RELATIONSHIPS
Peirce developed three trichotomies of concepts for analyzing different
aspects of a sign and distinct types of relationships between the three
basic components of semiosis: sign-object-interpretant. Combining one
component from each of the three trichotomies to more fully comprehend
the nature of a given sign, Peirce arrived at ten basic sign types.
These range from signs that produce particularly direct effects without
need for the mediation of linguistically-based thought, to signs,
objects, and interpretants grounded in language. I will first go
through all the concepts briefly and then return to those that have the
most potential for explaining music's power to create affect and forge
social identities.
Trichotomy I: The Sign Itself
The first trichotomy involves the nature of the sign itself. Every
chain of semiosis begins with the qualisign: a pure quality embedded in
a sign such as redness, or the quality of a particular musical sound,
or the quality of a harmonic or melodic relation. This aspect helps
determine the identity and semiotic potential of the sign. The second
concept in Trichotomy I is the sinsign which is the actual specific
instance of a sign, e.g., each individual appearance of the word `the'
on this page. The third term is the legisign which is the sign as a
general type, e.g., "The Star Spangled Banner" as a piece apart from
any given performance of it, or the word `the' apart from any instance
of it.
Both qualisigns and the legisigns are dependent on actual realizations
(the sinsign), just as any realization is dependent on the qualities of
the sign (qualisigns) which allows us to apprehend it. Particularly
important, the social meaning of a given instance of a sign is also
informed by its belonging to general nested classes of phenomena
(legisigns). Thus, the effects of a given performance of the "Star
Spangled Banner" (sinsign) are informed by being related to the piece
as a general class (legisign) so that we recognize it and relate it to
former hearings. "The Star Spangled Banner" is also nested within other
general classes of phenomena such as `American nationalistic music,'
and `music;' these are other potential legisigns for a given
performance. As socially-relative categories by which phenomena are
conceptually grouped, legisigns are a foundational aspect of culture.
Trichotomy II: Sign-Object Relations
Peirce's second trichotomy of concepts, involving the icon, index, and
symbol, specifies three ways that the sign and object are related in a
perceiver. This is the aspect of Peirce's work that has received the
most attention.
The term icon refers to a sign that is related to its object through
some type of resemblance between them. The degree, basis, and even
accuracy of resemblance is not so much at issue as the fact that
resemblance calls forth the object when perceiving the sign. Thus, if a
literal musical quotation or even the vaguest trace of another piece
brings that piece to mind, iconicity is involved--the experienced
quotation or trace is the sinsign, the piece as general class
(legisign) is the object. Motivic unity and most aspects of musical
form operate iconically. This much is obvious. More importantly, common
musical devices such as a rising melodic line, accelerando, and
crescendo may create tension and excitement in a listener because they
sound like so many human voices we have heard rising in pitch, speed,
and volume when the speaker becomes excited. For most listeners, such
signs are typically not processed in terms of language-based thought
but are simply felt because of a direct identity established by
resemblance between the musical signs and other expressions of
excitement.
Peirce suggests three types of icons: an image, a diagram, and a
metaphor (1955:104-105). In an image, the sign-object relation is based
in simple qualities shared; a musical "trace" or quote in one piece
calling forth another piece would be of this type, as are most musical
icons. A diagram involves analogous relations of the parts in each the
sign and object as the basis of similarity between them, a map is of
this type. In metaphors, juxtaposed linguistic signs, which are not
iconically related to their objects or to each other, posit some
parallelism or similarity between the objects of the signs--e.g., "A
mountain of a man" suggests that `the man' is `large,' `hard,'
`durable,' etc. The concept of metaphor has become popular in
anthropology and ethnomusicology to denote iconicity in general and
even other types of semiotic relations. Often lacking clear definition,
the term has lost its usefulness for semiotic and cultural analysis
whereas, as with Peirce's other formulations, his definition of
metaphor more precisely pinpoints what is going on semiotically.
The second concept in Trichotomy II is index which refers to a sign
that is related to its object through co-occurrence in actual
experience. Smoke can serve as an index of fire, a TV show's theme song
can come to serve as an index for the program, a V7-I progression may
index musical closure in European societies, the "Star Spangled Banner"
may serve as an index for Baseball games, Fourth of July Parades,
School Assemblies, or imperialism depending on the experiences of the
perceiver. The power of indices derives from the fact that the
sign-object relations are based in co-occurrences within one's own life
experiences, and thus become intimately bound as experience.
Peirce uses the term symbol in a particular way that differs, and must
be actively divorced, from standard usage. The Peircian symbol is a
sign that is related to its object through the use of language rather
than being fully dependent on iconicity or indexicality. Symbols are
themselves of a general type (legisigns) whose objects are also general
classes of phenomena (Peirce 1955:102). Most linguistic
signs--words--are symbols, and language is the only semiotic mode that,
in and of itself, has symbolic capability. Language also uses iconic
and indexical processes but it is particularly in propositional speech,
and in the semantico-referential functions of language (i.e., language
used to refer to and define other parts of language) where its symbolic
capacities differentiate it radically from other semiotic modes like
music.
After the early stages of language acquisition, we learn the objects of
words through linguistic explanations, those objects being general
concepts which are also articulated through symbols. For example when
we explain that `a cat is a furry animal,' both `furry' and `animal'
are general language-bound concepts. We can experience what the feeling
of furriness is by patting an actual cat, but we can not designate the
general feeling without symbols anymore than we can reproduce the
sensation through them. The symbolic function of language is what
allows us to think in, and express generalities. Yet because they are
mediational signs which do not resemble, or can be removed from direct
connections with their objects, symbols can not reproduce the feelings,
and experiences of those objects. Symbols are signs about other things,
whereas icons and indices are signs of identity (resemblance,
commonality) and direct connections.
Whereas the meanings of indices are dependent on the experiences of the
perceiver, and thus can be quite fluid and varied, the meanings of
symbols are relatively fixed through social agreement. Dictionaries,
math books, and Morris Code manuals document the conventional meanings
of symbols. If symbols are to serve their special function of
signification in general, relatively context-free, ways, their meanings
must be basically fixed and agreed upon, or, as in this paper,
(linguistic) arguments must be made for why their meanings should be
altered or refined. Icons and indices have distinct semiotic functions
and operate differently.
For the most part, musical sounds that function as signs operate at the
iconic and indexical levels. The sound of a particular Indian raga x
may become a symbol for `morning' (object) if the relationship is
established in general terms through language as, for example, through
verbal explanation in an American classroom, and if, upon hearing raga
x subsequently, a student thinks the general concept `morning.' But
note that in the initial setting up of this relationship, the sound of
the raga was the object of linguistic signs referring to the music and
linking it to the general concept of a given time of day. More
typically, musical sign-object relations are established without the
mediation of symbols. When growing up in India if a young girl
frequently heard a particular set of musical sounds (raga x) being
played in the morning over the radio in her home, she might come to
experience the sensation of `morning' or `home,' or myriad other things
indexed by the sounds when hearing them later in life.
The affective potential of signs is highly dependent on the manner in
which the sign and object are linked. The wealth as well as depth of
associations with raga x are likely to be quite different for the
Indian girl growing up with it, because of the number and variety of
indexical associations, as compared to the American student studying
the raga largely through propositional and semantico-referential speech
in a given class. Indices are experienced as "real" because they are
rooted, often redundantly, in one's own life experiences and, as
memory, become the actual mortar of personal and social identity. When
given indices are tied to the affective foundations of ones personal or
communal life--home, family, childhood, a lover, war experiences--they
have special potential for creating direct emotional effects because
they are often unreflexively apprehended as "real" or "true" parts of
the experiences signified. By contrast, symbols are general,
mediational signs about rather than of the experiences they express.
Trichotomy III: How the Sign is Interpreted
Peirce's third trichotomy--rheme, dicent, and argument-- involves the
way a given sign is interpreted as representing its object. A rheme is
a sign that is interpreted as representing its object as a qualitative
possibility (Peirce 1955:103). A rheme is a sign that is not judged as
true or false but as something that is simply possible. Peirce used the
example that any single word, say common nouns like `cat,' `god'
`unicorn' or `nation,' are rhemes because they suggest the possibility
of these entities without (in themselves) asserting the truth or
falsity of that possibility (1958:392). Likewise, a painting of an
unknown or imaginary person or scene may be interpreted as a rheme.
The second concept in Trichotomy III is the dicent. This is a sign
which is understood to represent its object in respect to actual
existence (Peirce 1955:103). The most important feature here is that a
dicent is interpreted as really being affected by its object. A
weathervane is a dicent-index for `wind direction' (object) because the
wind direction actually affects the position of the weathervane (it is
indexical because of co-occurrence of wind and weathervane). A
linguistic proposition is a dicent-symbol because the truth of the sign
is interpreted as really being affected by the relations of the objects
expressed through symbols.
Dicent-indices are among the most direct and convincing sign types
because typically they are interpreted as being real, true, or natural.
They are often taken for granted and apprehended with a part of our
awareness that does not involve linguistic-based signs, i.e., at the
levels of feeling or energetic interpretants. The field of
kinesics--"body language"--theorized by Gregory Bateson (1972), Ray
Birdwhistell (e.g., 1960, 1970), and Edward Hall (1977) is largely the
study of dicent-indexical signs. "Body language" is a dicent sign
because it is interpreted as being the direct result of a person's
actual attitude (object) and is thus apprehended as actually being
affected by that object. Facial expression, body position, and gesture
typically create effects at the levels of emotional or energetic
interpretants.
It is true that signs that usually operate as dicent-indices such as
tone of voice and "body language" can be manipulated, for example by
actors, used-car salesmen, politicians, and false lovers. In daily
interactions, someone who becomes known for being able to do this,
however, is branded a phoney. Such people are particularly mistrusted
because we are used to taking dicent-indices at face value and are
especially offended when people manipulate these types of signs.
The third concept in Trichotomy III is Argument, involving both
symbolic propositions as well as the language-based premises upon which
the propositions can be interpreted and assessed. Argument is largely
within the propositional, semantico-referential linguistic domain and
is not particularly relevant to the analysis of musical signs. Rhemes
and dicent signs, however, are key to artistic practice and meaning,
and I will emphasize these two types later in the discussion.