Intro to ethical subjectivism (I. Terminology)
George Dance
distinguish concepts that normally get confused or conflated in the
discussions:
The first question meta-ethics has to answer is: Are there any moral
statements either true or false? The two possible answers are:
Cognitivism: "Some moral statements are either true or false."
Non-cognitivism: "No moral statements are either true or false."
The next question, for the cognitivist, is: What makes moral statements
true or false ? The two possible answers are:
Absolutism: "All moral statements are true or false independently of
anything else."
Non-absolutism: "The truth or falsity of some moral statements depends
on something else."
The next question for the cognitivist, is: Are any moral statements
true? The possible answers are:
Realism: "Some moral statements are true."
Non-realism: "All moral statements are false."
The next question, for the non-absolutist, is: "On what does the truth
or falsity of moral statements depend?"
The possble answers are:
Objectivism: "The truth or falsity of moral statements does not depend
on anyone's beliefs about them."
Relativism: "The truth or falsity of moral statements depends on
someone's beliefs about them."
The next question, for the relativist, is: On whose beliefs does the
truth or falsity of moral beliefs depend? The two standard answers
have been given:
(Simple) subjectivism: "The truth or falsity of moral statements
depends on each person's beliefs about them."
Conventionalism: "The truth or falsity of moral statements depends on
one's societies beliefs about them."
Unlike the other pairs of answers, those two are not mutually
exclusive. Therefore I've suggested a third:
(Complex) subjectivism: "The truth or falsity of moral statements
depends on what those affected, in each case, believe about them."
The final question, for all realists, is: Is it possible to know the
truth of any moral statements. The (three) possible answers are:
Nihilism: "It is not possible to know the truth of any moral
statements."
Rationalism: "It is possible to know the truth of some moral statements
through reason."
Irrationalism: "It is possible to know the tuth of some moral
statements through some method other than reason."
That schema makes it possible to sort or classify moral theories by
their various answers to those questions. For instance, my own theory
("Rational Subjectivism") can be classed as: Cognitivist, Realist,
Non-absolutist, Relativist, (complex) Subjectivist, and Rationalist.
Others are welcome to apply this schema to their own moral theories.
George Dance
Milan
"George Dance" <george...@yahoo.ca> wrote in message
news:1166977630.3...@42g2000cwt.googlegroups.com...
> The best place to start is to define one's terms. That allows one to
> distinguish concepts that normally get confused or conflated in the
> discussions:
>
> The first question meta-ethics has to answer is: Are there any moral
> statements either true or false? The two possible answers are:
> Cognitivism: "Some moral statements are either true or false."
> Non-cognitivism: "No moral statements are either true or false."
>
Good post.
My understanding of a synthetic statement that is subjectable to be said to
be true or false is that its truth or falsity can be verified empirically
(pace Ayer et al). In order for a statement then to be verified (or refuted)
we look to see whether the statement is in harmony with reality, ie whether
the statement accurately describes reality. I fail to see how a moral
statement (ie an "ought statement") can be said to be true or false because
I dont see how it can be verified by the availalbe empirical evidence. You
can certainly build an argument to support the "goodness" of a moral
statement by arguing that its consequences may be beneficial, but I dont
think that you can ever say that the moral statement is "true".
regards
Milan
Immortalist
George Dance wrote:
> The best place to start is to define one's terms. That allows one to
> distinguish concepts that normally get confused or conflated in the
> discussions:
>
> The first question meta-ethics has to answer is: Are there any moral
> statements either true or false? The two possible answers are:
> Cognitivism: "Some moral statements are either true or false."
> Non-cognitivism: "No moral statements are either true or false."
>
Wouldn't the first question be; what is a moral or ethical standard? Is
it a set of beliefs about the human condition, needs and problems? If
so then beliefs about morality are theories and probably not complely
justifiable.
Cormagh
Nice job.
Cormagh
Sphere
George Dance wrote:
...
> Non-cognitivism: "No moral statements are either true or false."
>
> Others are welcome to apply this schema to their own moral theories.
Given that I fell off the train with the first question, I
don't think I can apply this schema.
How would you like to talk about skillful and unskillful
statements instead?
---
No essence. No permanence. No perfection.
Sphere
Immortalist wrote:
> George Dance wrote:
> > The best place to start is to define one's terms. That allows one to
> > distinguish concepts that normally get confused or conflated in the
> > discussions:
> >
> > The first question meta-ethics has to answer is: Are there any moral
> > statements either true or false? The two possible answers are:
> > Cognitivism: "Some moral statements are either true or false."
> > Non-cognitivism: "No moral statements are either true or false."
> >
>
> Wouldn't the first question be; what is a moral or ethical standard? Is
> it a set of beliefs about the human condition, needs and problems? If
> so then beliefs about morality are theories and probably not complely
> justifiable.
>
Well, at least if we start here I don't find that
the conversation starts out as nonsense.
Before we get to any proposed standard, just
what is morality? How does morality relate
to ethics? It seems to me that morality is
a plan for dealing with the interplay of
activity in the face of perceived conflict,
and that ethics is a formalization of this plan.
Is it moral to eat meat? The conflict here is
between myself and the intended food. (Given
that the conflict arises when the food is plant,
I see no moral difference between carnivorism
and vegetarianism. I am not at this point asserting
that either is moral -- just that they are morally
indistingushable.)
George Dance
> George Dance wrote:
> ...
> > Non-cognitivism: "No moral statements are either true or false."
> >
>
> Given that I fell off the train with the first question, I
> don't think I can apply this schema.
Since you've told many a time that you don't believe any statements are
true or false,
it's fair to call you a 'non-cognitivist',whether you like the name or
not.
> How would you like to talk about skillful and unskillful
> statements instead?
We could try, but we probably wouldn't get very far without running
into the same types of questions:
Are any moral statements either skillful or unskillful?
What makes moral statements skillful or unskillful?
Are any moral statements skillful?
On what does the skillfulness or unskillfulness of moral statements
depend?
On whose beliefs (if any) does the skillfulness or unskillfulness of
moral beliefs depend?
Is it possible to know the skillfulness of any moral statements?
zinnic
George Dance wrote:
>> That schema makes it possible to sort or classify moral theories by
> their various answers to those questions. For instance, my own theory
> ("Rational Subjectivism") can be classed as: Cognitivist, Realist,
> Non-absolutist, Relativist, (complex) Subjectivist, and Rationalist.
>
> Others are welcome to apply this schema to their own moral theories.
Would it be fair to say that your theory (Rational Subjectivism) is
essentially contingent or, as the plain man says, it all depends?
Zinnic
a_friend
George Dance wrote:
> The best place to start is to define one's terms. That allows one to
> distinguish concepts that normally get confused or conflated in the
> discussions:
>
> The first question meta-ethics has to answer is: Are there any moral
> statements either true or false? The two possible answers are:
> Cognitivism: "Some moral statements are either true or false."
> Non-cognitivism: "No moral statements are either true or false."
Moralists suffer under the weight of their own belief systems.
Publius
> The first question meta-ethics has to answer is: Are there any moral
> statements either true or false? The two possible answers are:
> Cognitivism: "Some moral statements are either true or false."
> Non-cognitivism: "No moral statements are either true or false."
That is an important question, but not the first that metaethics must answer.
That first question is, What is the subject matter of Ethics? What questions
does ethical inquiry hope to answer, or what problems does it hope to solve?
Anyone who holds that ethics deals with substantive and important questions
will necessarily be a cognitivist. Noncognitivists are perforce nihilists.
Nice to see you are still around, George.
Publius
news:4v7sueF...@mid.individual.net:
> My understanding of a synthetic statement that is subjectable to be said
> to be true or false is that its truth or falsity can be verified
> empirically (pace Ayer et al). In order for a statement then to be
> verified (or refuted) we look to see whether the statement is in harmony
> with reality, ie whether the statement accurately describes reality. I
> fail to see how a moral statement (ie an "ought statement") can be said
> to be true or false because I dont see how it can be verified by the
> availalbe empirical evidence.
Not all true statements are synthetic. Some are analytic, and (if Kant is
right), some are synthetic *a priori*.
Ethics is a constructive theory not unlike geometry. It derives from some
informal and idealized background assumptions concerning the subject matter,
posits some axioms, and then derives theorems analytically from those axioms.
If the initial assumptions and axioms are well-chosen, the theorems, like
those of geometry, will be empirically verifiable, to the limits of
measurement.
Sphere
George Dance wrote:
> Sphere wrote:
> > George Dance wrote:
> > ...
> > > Non-cognitivism: "No moral statements are either true or false."
> > >
> > > Others are welcome to apply this schema to their own moral theories.
> >
> > Given that I fell off the train with the first question, I
> > don't think I can apply this schema.
>
> Since you've told many a time that you don't believe any statements are
> true or false,
> it's fair to call you a 'non-cognitivist',whether you like the name or
> not.
I'd say that 'non-cognitivist' is as good a descriptor as
any. Of course, being a non-cognitivist I'll have to
object to being labeled non-cognitivist.
>
> > How would you like to talk about skillful and unskillful
> > statements instead?
>
> We could try, but we probably wouldn't get very far without running
> into the same types of questions:
>
> Are any moral statements either skillful or unskillful?
Surely. It is unskillful to assert that one's
desires are more important than everyone
else's. Aside from anything else about
such an asertion, it is likely to eventually
get you shunned.
>
> What makes moral statements skillful or unskillful?
Their pragmatic value.
>
> Are any moral statements skillful?
>
> On what does the skillfulness or unskillfulness of moral statements
> depend?
The interplay of activity -- just like everything else.
>
> On whose beliefs (if any) does the skillfulness or unskillfulness of
> moral beliefs depend?
Posterity's.
>
> Is it possible to know the skillfulness of any moral statements?
I think you are using the word 'know' in a sense
which I don't think makes any sense. I don't
believe in truth. It is certainly possible to know
the skillfulness in the same sense that I know
the sun is rising. It is not possible to assign
any sort of absolute to a moral statement, or
anything else.
charles
first, define what you mean by morals? Are you referring to our
evolutionarily-evolved social-instinctive make up?
Also, by taking our existence in which all is relative and trying to
neatly slot it all into either "true" or "false" is
ridiculously simplistic. Surely, you do not think that there
actually exists such a thing as "the absolute truth, do you? That
is a carry over concept from Medieval Christianity!
Considering all that, I am wondering what is left other than
double-talk. . .
Charles, http://humanpurpose.simplenet.com
George Dance
Publius wrote:
> "George Dance" <george...@yahoo.ca> wrote in
> news:1166977630.3...@42g2000cwt.googlegroups.com:
>
> > statements either true or false? The two possible answers are:
> > Cognitivism: "Some moral statements are either true or false."
> > Non-cognitivism: "No moral statements are either true or false."
>
> That is an important question, but not the first that metaethics must answer.
> That first question is, What is the subject matter of Ethics?
Ethics studies moralities, the latter being collections of moral or
normative statements (statements about what ought to be) that various
people believe. Descriptive ethics looks at what statements are
believed by what people; normative ethics at those statements'
validity.
> What questions
> does ethical inquiry hope to answer, or what problems does it hope to solve?
The most pressing problem, for anyone confronted with the brute fact
that people believe different moral statements, would be: Which
statements, if any, should he believe? Answering that means solving
the problem of determining what, if any, moral statements are true or
false; I don't think though that one can narrow down the generality of
that question except by implicitly assuming some of the answer.
> Anyone who holds that ethics deals with substantive and important questions
> will necessarily be a cognitivist. Noncognitivists are perforce nihilists.
Agreed. However, as an ethical position, noncognitivism is just as
much a claim about moral truths as any cognitivist position, just as
criticizeable and just as much in need of rational support.
> Nice to see you are still around, George.
I'm afraid you cursed me; I lost my ISP connection just after reading
this, and haven't been able to get into the discussion for a week now.
Next time, say "Break a leg" or something. 8)
George Dance
> You start by defining terms, but then why not define terms? Why not,
> first, define what you mean by morals?
Moral statements are statements or assertions about what ought to be.
Examples of their forms include: "X is wrong," "One should do y", "Z
is unjust," etc.
> Are you referring to our
> evolutionarily-evolved social-instinctive make up?
Only in the trivial sense that anything anyone says or believes can be
considered 'evolutionarily-evolved' and 'social-instinctive' - but in
that sense there's nothing to distinguish moral from non-moral beliefs
or statements.
> Also, by taking our existence in which all is relative and trying to
> neatly slot it all into either "true" or "false" is
> ridiculously simplistic.
Indeed, it's only an assumption of logic that:
(1) Statements are either true or false; and
(2) No statements are both true and false (at the same time and the
same respect)
Both assumptions may indeed be 'ridiculously simplistic' (Though I
don't see how that could be without you statement being true. 8)
> Surely, you do not think that there
> actually exists such a thing as "the absolute truth, do you?
"All is relative" sounds like a rather dogmatic statement of absolute
truth, which you haven't offered any reason to believe. How would you
support it? For example, how would you explain the apparent
counterexamples to it of (1) and (2)?
Publius
>> > The first question meta-ethics has to answer is: Are any moral
>> > statements either true or false? The two possible answers are:
>> > Cognitivism: "Some moral statements are either true or false."
>> > Non-cognitivism: "No moral statements are either true or false."
>> That is an important question, but not the first that metaethics must
>> answer. That first question is, What is the subject matter of Ethics?
> Ethics studies moralities, the latter being collections of moral or
> normative statements (statements about what ought to be) that various
> people believe. Descriptive ethics looks at what statements are
> believed by what people; normative ethics at those statements'
> validity.
Hmmm. Suppose the question were instead, "What is the subject matter of
Physics?" Would your answer be, "the collection of statements about the
physical world that people believe"?
> The most pressing problem, for anyone confronted with the brute fact
> that people believe different moral statements, would be: Which
> statements, if any, should he believe?
Methinks one could not go about answering that question unless one first
understands what is the subject matter of Ethics, for that will supply the
framework, the methodology, for validating those various statements. Just as
one could not go about deciding which statements about the physical world to
believe unless one already understood that the business of Physics is to
describe and explain observable natural phenomena.
George Dance
> "George Dance" <george...@yahoo.ca> wrote in
> news:1168039027.0...@i15g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:
>
> >> > The first question meta-ethics has to answer is: Are any moral
> >> > statements either true or false? The two possible answers are:
> >> > Cognitivism: "Some moral statements are either true or false."
> >> > Non-cognitivism: "No moral statements are either true or false."
>
> >> That is an important question, but not the first that metaethics must
> >> answer. That first question is, What is the subject matter of Ethics?
>
> > Ethics studies moralities, the latter being collections of moral or
> > normative statements (statements about what ought to be) that various
> > people believe. Descriptive ethics looks at what statements are
> > believed by what people; normative ethics at those statements'
> > validity.
>
> Hmmm. Suppose the question were instead, "What is the subject matter of
> Physics?" Would your answer be, "the collection of statements about the
> physical world that people believe"?
No, I'd say, as you do, that the subject matter of physics is
'observable natural phenomena' - since it's possible to observe such
phenomena, it's possible to study them directly rather than indirectly
through other people's statements about them. That is not the case with
moralities, where the only observable phenomena are such statements.
> > The most pressing problem, for anyone confronted with the brute fact
> > that people believe different moral statements, would be: Which
> > statements, if any, should he believe?
>
> Methinks one could not go about answering that question unless one first
> understands what is the subject matter of Ethics, for that will supply the
> framework, the methodology, for validating those various statements. Just as
> one could not go about deciding which statements about the physical world to
> believe unless one already understood that the business of Physics is to
> describe and explain observable natural phenomena.
But how did that become the 'business' of physics? I'd suggest that
people began by directly observing and gaining knowledge of phenomena,
then later constructed theories consistent with that body of knowledge,
and at some point simply applied a label ("physics") to what they were
already doing. That's not how it had to be, of course; people could
have begun with the name and general concept of Physics, and
constructed their physical theories a priori from those foundations
alone, before studying any phenomena (similarly to how Kant for example
constructs his Ethics). Indeed, there's some evidence that physics
began as metaphysics, which has just such an a priori foundation.
However, that's not been the foundation of physics since at least the
time of Bacon; and it's quite doubtful that physics would have achieved
any of the respectability it has, as a source of knowledge, if it were.
Publius
>> Hmmm. Suppose the question were instead, "What is the subject matter of
>> Physics?" Would your answer be, "the collection of statements about the
>> physical world that people believe"?
> No, I'd say, as you do, that the subject matter of physics is
> 'observable natural phenomena' - since it's possible to observe such
> phenomena, it's possible to study them directly rather than indirectly
> through other people's statements about them. That is not the case with
> moralities, where the only observable phenomena are such statements.
Not at all. What is also observable are the various rules and constraints
actually followed and practiced by humans (and some other animals) living
in social settings.
Having observed the variety of those, and the utility of some and the
disutility of others, the question naturally arises: What would be the
*optimum* set of rules for regulating interactions among humans in a social
setting?
Thus the theoretical inquiry into Ethics.
>> > The most pressing problem, for anyone confronted with the brute fact
>> > that people believe different moral statements, would be: Which
>> > statements, if any, should he believe?
Again, we could make the same observation regarding beliefs about the laws
of the physical world. And (including primitive and historical societies),
we'd find as wide a range of beliefs. But they are not our data for
devising sound theories of physics.
>> Methinks one could not go about answering that question unless one
>> first understands what is the subject matter of Ethics, for that will
>> supply the framework, the methodology, for validating those various
>> statements. Just as one could not go about deciding which statements
>> about the physical world to believe unless one already understood that
>> the business of Physics is to describe and explain observable natural
>> phenomena.
> But how did that become the 'business' of physics? I'd suggest that
> people began by directly observing and gaining knowledge of phenomena,
> then later constructed theories consistent with that body of knowledge,
> and at some point simply applied a label ("physics") to what they were
> already doing. That's not how it had to be, of course; people could
> have begun with the name and general concept of Physics, and
> constructed their physical theories a priori from those foundations
> alone, before studying any phenomena (similarly to how Kant for example
> constructs his Ethics). Indeed, there's some evidence that physics
> began as metaphysics, which has just such an a priori foundation.
> However, that's not been the foundation of physics since at least the
> time of Bacon; and it's quite doubtful that physics would have achieved
> any of the respectability it has, as a source of knowledge, if it were.
I like to compare Ethics to Geometry. Most of the theorems of geometry were
known and used by builders and other craftsmen long before they were
formalized by Euclid. They were discovered by trial and error, in the
course of solving real-world problems ("How many bricks will it take to
build this temple?" "How can I arrange the rows in this field to get the
largest yield of barley?")
So we begin Ethics by reflecting on real-world problems and the various
solutions which have been tried, paying special attention those which have
endured and those which can be found in many disparate societies --- rules
which have been adopted and disseminated through *adaptive consensus*.
Then, like Euclid, we idealize some of the key concepts by giving them
precise definitions, set forth some postulates around which there seems to
be little controversy, and then proceed to draw out the consequences of
those axioms. And, voila, we have a deductive theory of Ethics. It is an *a
priori* theory, but because its axioms are drawn from real-world
experience, it is a model of the real world. And like those of geometry,
its theorems can be applied to real-world problems.
George Dance
> "George Dance" <george...@yahoo.ca> wrote in
> news:1168096573.8...@s34g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:
>
> >> Hmmm. Suppose the question were instead, "What is the subject matter of
> >> Physics?" Would your answer be, "the collection of statements about the
> >> physical world that people believe"?
>
> > No, I'd say, as you do, that the subject matter of physics is
> > 'observable natural phenomena' - since it's possible to observe such
> > phenomena, it's possible to study them directly rather than indirectly
> > through other people's statements about them. That is not the case with
> > moralities, where the only observable phenomena are such statements.
>
> Not at all. What is also observable are the various rules and constraints
> actually followed and practiced by humans (and some other animals) living
> in social settings.
Yes, I agree with that. Promugating rules is no different from
asserting moral statements, but following rules is not the same thing.
(For example, a person can, if asked, verbally agree with "Shoplifting
is wrong," and then go out and shoplift; ie, act as if he disagrees
that shoplifting is wrong after all.) It's harder to tell, by a
person's actions alone, what moral statements he agrees and disagrees
with (since any particular acton could be compatible with more than one
maxim), but wherever one can do that, one has better evidence for what
statements or maxims he agrees with than his words alone.
> Having observed the variety of those, and the utility of some and the
> disutility of others, the question naturally arises: What would be the
> *optimum* set of rules for regulating interactions among humans in a social
> setting?
>
> Thus the theoretical inquiry into Ethics.
Well, that's *a* question that can arise; and it leads to *a*
theoretical line of inquiry. And I should quickly add that for many
(myself included), it is *the* question and *the* line of inquiry that
Ethics ends up with - I think that both your question and the line of
inquiry you've taken to solve it are the right methods. However, I
think it's a stretch from the initial observations - collecting the
data about individual moralities - to the conclusion that morality
should be about optimizing interactions; and while it's a stretch that
I think you've crossed reasonably (as it's one I can cross using my
own reasoning), I think that many ethicists - the whole 'intuitionist'
line - would simply declare you guilty of a misunderstanding the topic.
A Kantian, for example, would tell you that you're simply confusing
morality with self-interest - when those are 'obviously' two different
motives - while a Moorean would say that you've committed the
'naturalistic' fallacy, by conflating moral good with specific
benefits. IOW, I think there's a huge amount of ethics required to get
from one point to another, including proveable answers to all my
initial questions, which cannot be simply glossed over or shrugged
aside.
> >> > The most pressing problem, for anyone confronted with the brute fact
> >> > that people believe different moral statements, would be: Which
> >> > statements, if any, should he believe?
>
> Again, we could make the same observation regarding beliefs about the laws
> of the physical world. And (including primitive and historical societies),
> we'd find as wide a range of beliefs. But they are not our data for
> devising sound theories of physics.
Well, no, they don't have to be; because it's possible to get beyond
them and look at the data they're about, for ourselves. Similarly, of
course, intuitionists think that it's possible to dispense with the
moral beliefs and look at the primary data - the basic 'rightness' or
'wrongness' that they 'perceive' intuitively; however, given that they
often claim to 'perceive' wildly different things, and there's no way
to check between them (other than to use someone else's claimed
intuitions), they can't be considered scientific, or even reliable,
data in the same way as the data used in physics.
I'll leave my critical comments to the end; but I've got to jump in
here and say that I agree with this absolutely. Here's an authority
who agrees with both of us: "[T]he early geometers ... were concerned
with such problems as measuring the size of fields and laying out
accruatel right angles for the corners of buildings. This type of
empirical geometry, that flourished in ancient Egypt, was refined and
systematized by the Greeks. In the 6th century BC the Greek
mathematician Pythagoras [showed] that the vaious arbitrary nd
unconnected laws of empirical geometry could be proved to follow as
llogical conclusions from a limited number of postulates" (James Singer
& James McPherson, "Geometry", /Funk & Wagnall's New Enyclopedia/,
1983).
I'd conjecture that logic, eg, had a similar origin.
> So we begin Ethics by reflecting on real-world problems and the various
> solutions which have been tried, paying special attention those which have
> endured and those which can be found in many disparate societies --- rules
> which have been adopted and disseminated through *adaptive consensus*.
>
> Then, like Euclid, we idealize some of the key concepts by giving them
> precise definitions, set forth some postulates around which there seems to
> be little controversy, and then proceed to draw out the consequences of
> those axioms. And, voila, we have a deductive theory of Ethics. It is an *a
> priori* theory, but because its axioms are drawn from real-world
> experience, it is a model of the real world. And like those of geometry,
> its theorems can be applied to real-world problems.
I'd call your approach 'applied ethics,' and normally (to continue with
the analogies) liken it to engineering or technology - the constructive
use of physics (and geometry8) which is distinct from physics proper.
However, on reflection, I'd concede an intermediate stage between
empirical and applied science - the theoretical - and concede that the
same is needed in ethics. For example, Faraday was an empirical
scientist, and Edison a technologist; but in between there was Maxwell;
and what he was doing was undoubtedly physics (of the theorretical
kind). I'd interpret you as saying that what you're doing is similar
to what Maxwell did, and accept that.
In response, though, I'd say that ethics has more than one Maxwell -
Kant played the Maxwell role, so did Mill and Bentham, so did Moore -
and, unlike with physics, there is no clear criteria as to whom is the
true Maxwell and which is the correct theory. Imagine a second
physicist coming out with an entirely different set of equations from
Maxwell, and no clear way to tell which set did not work. That's the
situation of ethics as I see it; rather than any agreed criteria,
there's merely a huge area of controversy that I see as needing
resolution before (meaning logically, not chronologically, before) any
applied ethics can be attempted.
Publius
>> Not at all. What is also observable are the various rules and
>> constraints actually followed and practiced by humans (and some other
>> animals) living in social settings.
> Yes, I agree with that. Promugating rules is no different from
> asserting moral statements, but following rules is not the same thing.
> (For example, a person can, if asked, verbally agree with "Shoplifting
> is wrong," and then go out and shoplift; ie, act as if he disagrees
> that shoplifting is wrong after all.) It's harder to tell, by a
> person's actions alone, what moral statements he agrees and disagrees
> with (since any particular acton could be compatible with more than one
> maxim), but wherever one can do that, one has better evidence for what
> statements or maxims he agrees with than his words alone.
But "what moral statements he agrees and disagrees with" is not (I
maintain), what we are primarily interested in. Indeed I'd say we're not
interested in that at all. At this stage we should attend strictly to what
can be observed, and infer the operative rules from those observations
(just as we would for rats, or bonobos). Or as we might infer the rules of
chess simply by observing the game being played. We regard the players as
subjects, not informants.
Of course the comparison with chess is imperfect, since were we to try to
infer the rules of the game by observing it being played (say at a chess
tournament), we would probably not observe any cheating, while for social
rules we'd observe quite a few departures from any rule we inferred. But
that just compels us to refine our hypothesized rule, to include exceptions
and the circumstances in which those exceptions are permitted, or at least
tolerated.
> However, I
> think it's a stretch from the initial observations - collecting the
> data about individual moralities - to the conclusion that morality
> should be about optimizing interactions; and while it's a stretch that
> I think you've crossed reasonably (as it's one I can cross using my
> own reasoning), I think that many ethicists - the whole 'intuitionist'
> line - would simply declare you guilty of a misunderstanding the topic.
But (as I said) data about individual moralities (at least as reported by
the subjects) is not the data in which we are interested. Taken as a whole
it would be highly unreliable and probably incoherent.
I do agree that taking this approach is tantamount to adopting in advance a
particular meta-ethical position and rejecting others. In particular it
rejects the view that Ethics is concerned with the "nature of the Good."
Moreover, it adopts its meta-ethical stance without argument, by
hypothesis, with the expectation that the success of the theory will
justify the hypotheses.
> A Kantian, for example, would tell you that you're simply confusing
> morality with self-interest - when those are 'obviously' two different
> motives - while a Moorean would say that you've committed the
> 'naturalistic' fallacy, by conflating moral good with specific
> benefits. IOW, I think there's a huge amount of ethics required to get
> from one point to another, including proveable answers to all my
> initial questions, which cannot be simply glossed over or shrugged
> aside.
Actually, I think this approach is quite consistent with Kant's. But
showing that would require some fairly elaborate arguments. The empirical
step described above, BTW, does not enter into the theory in any formal
way. It is only a "reality check." We want some ideal rules applicable to
an idealized society, so that we can have a deductive theory --- but one
which can be seen to apply to the real world.
> In response, though, I'd say that ethics has more than one Maxwell -
> Kant played the Maxwell role, so did Mill and Bentham, so did Moore -
> and, unlike with physics, there is no clear criteria as to whom is the
> true Maxwell and which is the correct theory.
I think there are, and that those criteria are the same as those by which
any other theory is judged --- consistency, economy, and explanatory power.