HELP! Post-Modernism and choice
Sightreader
I'm trying to understand where post modernist thinkers stand on the issue
of choice. I'm sure their opinions are not uniform, nevertheless, I was
curious what some may have said on the issue.
I understand that we don't have as many choices as we think when in
comes to the religion we believe in, the clothes we wear, the language we
speak, and other culturally sensitive things. However, do we still have a
choice in attitude? That is, decisions about whether to push on or give
up, to be aggressive or passive, kind or cruel, happy or unsatisfied, etc?
Aren't these sorts of choices independent of culture? I understand that
how we might EXPRESS these choices would be culturally dependent,
and that they are influenced by genetics, but nevertheless, going back
to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, I don't think these choices are
determined. Don't even animals have such choices?
Sir Frederick
John Jones
showing only replies?
Please explain what post you are answering to as I have your post as a main
starter topic.
Sir Frederick <mmcn...@fuzzysys.com> wrote in message
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> Let's Roll!
Immortalist
"Sightreader" <sight...@attbi.compost> wrote in message
news:tB59a.350613$HN5.1...@rwcrnsc51.ops.asp.att.net...
These choice's expanding cone of influences is at this time
"un-determinable" and randomness could be construed as an vague reference to
these causes and choices. If we can't decide on what an general voter is in
the district of an representative we don't eliminate the voters.
>
Miller
"Sightreader" <sight...@attbi.compost> wrote in message
news:tB59a.350613$HN5.1...@rwcrnsc51.ops.asp.att.net...
Please define further what you mena by a determined choice. I do not
beleive that such a thing as a totaly determined choice exists (otherwise,
it would not be a choice!). There is choice in everything we do.
Scott
Sir Frederick
>
> Was your post the new thread? Is my computer omitting new subject posts and
> showing only replies?
> Please explain what post you are answering to as I have your post as a main
> starter topic.
>
--
Best,
Frederick Martin McNeill
Poway, California, United States of America
mmcn...@fuzzysys.com
http://www.fuzzysys.com
*************************
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Sightreader
news:v6a2b5e...@corp.supernews.com...
> > I understand that we don't have as many choices as we think when in
> > comes to the religion we believe in, the clothes we wear, the language
we
> > speak, and other culturally sensitive things. However, do we still have
a
> > choice in attitude? That is, decisions about whether to push on or give
> > up, to be aggressive or passive, kind or cruel, happy or unsatisfied,
etc?
> > Aren't these sorts of choices independent of culture? I understand that
> > how we might EXPRESS these choices would be culturally dependent,
> > and that they are influenced by genetics, but nevertheless, going back
> > to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, I don't think these choices are
> > determined. Don't even animals have such choices?
> >
>
> These choice's expanding cone of influences is at this time
> "un-determinable" and randomness could be construed as an vague reference
to
> these causes and choices. If we can't decide on what an general voter is
in
> the district of an representative we don't eliminate the voters.
>
Please forgive me, I'm not as well versed in philosophical rhetoric. I'm
not
quite sure what you're saying here: what do you mean by an "expanding
cone of influences"? Are you talking about how the side effects of a choice
expands over time? If so, how do these side effects affect the existence of
true choices? How is randomness related to this "cone of influence"? And,
as a ultimate sign of my stupidity, how does the voter analogy relate to the
problem?
Sorry... you're talking to a layman here....
Sightreader
"Miller" <chumley7...@chartermi.net> wrote in message
news:v6a32r3...@corp.supernews.com...
>
> Please define further what you mena by a determined choice. I do not
> beleive that such a thing as a totaly determined choice exists (otherwise,
> it would not be a choice!). There is choice in everything we do.
>
Perhaps I've totally misunderstood what I know about philosophy (quite
possible:
all that I know is through informal chats with people). Anyway, I thought
one
might argue that our choices are really an illusion: that, in fact, our
environment
and genetics steer us to our choices, and we're just not aware of that.
Thus, we
THINK we are making all these choices when actually we're just
subconsciously
following our programming. Our lives are therefore more determined that we
think they are, and we are more reflections of our society than true
individuals.
I have little doubt that I totally bungled that explanation (otherwise I
probably
wouldn't be on here wondering what the heck I'm talking about). How might
you
clarify what post modernists feel about the relation of choice to one's
environment?
Keynes
Living things make decisions. Most of them are as
trivial as doing what we want to do. This appears
to be freedom, since want and choice agree.
So we assume that we have the power of choosing.
But who chooses what your 'wants' may be? They may
be inborn instinct or the result of previous thought and
experience. But did you choose or control those instincts,
experiences or thoughts? No. They all came into you
from the outside whether you wanted them to or not.
We are MADE, not makers. Re-actors, not actors.
If the will were free we could choose to love what
we hate and to hate what we love. But we can't
do that because we don't WANT to. (And even
if we could possibly will it, the emotions control
the will, and not the will controling the emotions.)
If there is cause and effect, there IS no freedom.
You may think I am kidnapping the tooth fairy
with this argument and react negatively, feeling
the acute loss of something you never really had.
Then you'll reject the argument.
(Because that's what your emotions direct your will to do.)
Or you could take the positive view that a great
burden has been lifted from you, that life is not
a problem to be solved, and that there is really nothing
to gain or to lose. (Hmm. Sounds like freedom.)
Or you may refuse to consider this argument at all,
and comfortably agree with 'common sense' just like
everybody else. How can 50,000 frenchmen be wrong?
Doo de doo de doo.
Freely choose the view that PLEASES you..
andy-k
news:tB59a.350613$HN5.1...@rwcrnsc51.ops.asp.att.net...
I don't know whether I'd qualify as a postmodernist thinker, but for
what it's worth you can have my opinion anyway :)
If there is no such thing as an uncaused cause then there is no
absolutely free aspect to the will. The term "free will" only makes
sense in the relative aspect of "free from coercion by the will of
others". It would follow that the fate of the cosmos and of everything
in it was predestined from its inception. The term "choice" refers to
the impression we have of there being a multiplicity of possible future
outcomes from which the actual outcome will spring, depending on the
actions that I perform in the present. If there is no absolutely free
aspect to the will, then choice is condemned to be nothing more than an
erroneous impression that we have, so it remains to be debated as to
whether there can be any such thing as an uncaused cause. I have my
doubts, however much I might dislike the implications.
Regarding Heisenberg indeterminacy, this introduces an element of
apparent randomness into the cosmos -- it does not make any judgements
on whether that randomness is merely epistemological (as predestination
would dictate) or ontological (allowing contingency). However, the other
great pillar of modern physics is relativity theory, and this claims
that simultaneity is merely a matter of reference frame. The upshot is
that if event A is in the future of event B in a given reference frame,
a frame can be found where the reverse is true. This would seem to favor
the epistemological interpretation of indeterminacy.
Immortalist
"Sightreader" <sight...@attbi.compost> wrote in message
An Spreading and widening cone representing all causes for something up top
the hierarchy. If we think of an theme in a story the cone of causation
would widen when we tried to see if this summarry fit. As an general in an
army or an CEO in an corperation, the widening cone of parallel causes are
representented in an serial command spreading parallel events exponentially
as the command unfolds through the various levels. A processing cycle
between components, mid level features, up to higher level features
consisting of these features.
Think of an ascending narrowing cone of grammatical meaning. The simple
statement of what an block of letters amount to from the bottom. One
sentence may take many chapters of text to illustrate and the vagueness of
the summary statement will become exposed as partial in an sea of details.
>
Miller
"Sightreader" <sight...@attbi.compost> wrote in message
Well, what do post modernists feel about the relation of choice to one's
environment? For myself, I know of no one who has claimed to be a post
modernist--the jargon of philosophical academia notwithstanding. Like
"politically correct" it seems to me that the term is most commonly used by
non-academics to attack another's choice of a subjective morality system.
So anyway, you ask about what if we just
> THINK we are making all these choices when actually we're just
> subconsciously
> following our programming
The idea has been tossed around for centuries. From Ulysses to The Matrix.
But one must ask: If everything is externally determined in some fashion,
why ask about choice at all? Surely the idea is moot if my choices are
determined by some god or subconscious complex or alien race?
Existentialists like Sartre would argue exactly the opposite--that
everything we do is of our own free choice. The facticity of the world
about us conditions decisions, yes, but to say that we have no real part in
our choice is a futile attempt at giving up responsibility for our actions.
In other words, we can talk about genetics and "illusionary choices" and
even alien mind control all we want, but what this only goes to show us is
that we seem to have an innate fear, an anguish, over what we know to be
true--that we are totally free to choose, at all times, in every situation.
This means that we are always "making our own reality"--to steal a term from
the New-agers. Its just that we are so damn scared of the idea that we keep
creating religions and psychologies and philosophies to try to codify it
all.
Whose right? Plato or Sartre? Bergson or Kant? Its your choice...
P.S. I prefer a good informal chat to a philosophy discussion any day!
Reagrds, Scott
Sightreader
> An Spreading and widening cone representing all causes for something up
top
> the hierarchy. If we think of an theme in a story the cone of causation
> would widen when we tried to see if this summarry fit.
OK, so let me see if my weak mind can comprehend what you're saying...
Is this "cone of causation" is all the factors that led to your choice? Is
it
shaped like a cone because the farther back in time you go, the larger
the number of factors that may have influenced your current decision?
Or am I hopelessly lost again?
Sightreader
I almost understand what you're saying, but I'm
not very bright or knowledgeable about this, so
I still need a few more questions...
"Keynes" <Key...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:r7bb6vog2o70tlba7...@4ax.com...
> Living things make decisions. Most of them are as
> trivial as doing what we want to do. This appears
> to be freedom, since want and choice agree.
> So we assume that we have the power of choosing.
Lemme see if I can make things a little easier
for me by dividing choices into categories....
NO-BRAINER
Certainly there are a lot of deterministic
no-brainers between what is wanted and what is
unwanted (hmm... should I test a guillotine on my
head or not?). I doubt these are worth talking
much about.
BIASED
At the next level, there are choices where
our upbringing (or "construction?") strongly
points us in a particular direction (hmm... I'm a
medieval monk... should I be Christian?) You
have a choice at this level, but your construction
is so biased that it's unlikely you'll change paths.
DIFFICULT
Finally, there are the choices where our previous
history really doesn't seem to be much help at all.
In this case "what we want" is very hard to
determine: our values are in close conflict (hmm...
which my two children should I save?), or we don't
know nearly enough to make an informed decision
(hmmm... showcase A or showcase B?)
> We are MADE, not makers.
Perhaps you already addressed my concern and
I'm simply too thick to see it. Lemme try to do
some more categories to see if it will help:
ACTUAL CHOICE
This, as I mentioned in my initial post, is more
an attitude than anything else: to be daring or
conservative, to be happy or unhappy, etc. As
a rough guideline, choices in attitude should
be relatively free of context: the same choices
should probably exist whether you're a dog
or a medieval monk.
EXPRESSION
This is how the choice manifests itself in action.
If I'm rebellious, I wear yellow. If I'm liberal,
I join the Democrats.
Now to use these categories...
I would agree that the "expression" of your choice
is pretty much constructed. As far as the "actual
choice" is concerned, I feel they further break
down into the "no-brainer", "biased", and
"difficult" categories above. How much your
"construction" influences your choice depends on
which category it's in, doesn't it?
That's where I have trouble seeing how our
choices are constructed. For "difficult" choices,
our construction doesn't seem to give us much
help in deciding. Remember not to confuse
the "actual choice" with its "expression": the
actions I take as a result of that choice may
very well be constructed, but I do believe there
is a fundamental branch at the bottom of those
actions that I don't see as determined.
>
> If there is cause and effect, there IS no freedom.
This is why I brought up the Heisenberg thing: it
appears there's at least one case in nature where
"cause and effect" breaks down, where you can't
predict what's going to happen (if I understand
Heisenberg correctly, that is). Might that not
expand to larger cases? Might a choice in the
"difficult" category be subject to such
unpredicatability?
Sightreader
"andy-k" <spam....@ntlworld.com> wrote in message
news:6Qk9a.378$tP3.24465@newsfep2-gui...
> I don't know whether I'd qualify as a postmodernist thinker, but for
> what it's worth you can have my opinion anyway :)
My apologies. I didn't know calling someone "post-modernist" was
an insult. If you can tell me where I went wrong; however, I'd be
most interested, whether you're a "post-modernist" or not!
>
> If there is no such thing as an uncaused cause then there is no
> absolutely free aspect to the will. The term "free will" only makes
> sense in the relative aspect of "free from coercion by the will of
> others".
What about the cases where the various coercive forces balance
each other out? That is, you get coerced roughly equally toward
different options and are thus left with a "difficult" choice. Would it
be wrong to say that the more these coercive forces balance out,
the more likely it is that your choice will be determined by either
sheer randomness or your "free will"?
>
> Regarding Heisenberg indeterminacy, this introduces an element of
By the way, I brought up Heisenberg because I thought it might
imply that, even if you know ALL the causes, the result is not
necessarily determined. That is, repeating the same conditions
would not necessarily yield the same results. I'm not sure if that's
the point you are making in the next sentence... I got lost!
> apparent randomness into the cosmos -- it does not make any judgements
> on whether that randomness is merely epistemological (as predestination
> would dictate) or ontological (allowing contingency). However, the other
Help! I'm lost!
Let's see... I think "epistemological" talks about how we know things.
Would that mean it randomizes our ability to deduce causes?
I think "ontological" has something to do with figuring out why we're
here. Would randomness in that mean that we would be made up
of a bunch of random events?
> that if event A is in the future of event B in a given reference frame,
> a frame can be found where the reverse is true. This would seem to favor
> the epistemological interpretation of indeterminacy.
Are you saying that because we can't always determine the order of
events, then we can't always determine what caused what? Help!
Keynes
<sight...@attbi.compost> wrote:
>Thank you VERY much for your reply: I think
>I almost understand what you're saying, but I'm
>not very bright or knowledgeable about this, so
>I still need a few more questions...
>
I suspect you are not what you claim...
There is such a thing as indecision. "Hamletism", I think.
>
>> We are MADE, not makers.
>
>Perhaps you already addressed my concern and
>I'm simply too thick to see it. Lemme try to do
>some more categories to see if it will help:
>
>ACTUAL CHOICE
>This, as I mentioned in my initial post, is more
>an attitude than anything else: to be daring or
>conservative, to be happy or unhappy, etc. As
>a rough guideline, choices in attitude should
>be relatively free of context: the same choices
>should probably exist whether you're a dog
>or a medieval monk.
>
Here's the meat of it. Will doesn't choose emotions.
Emotions direct the will. Emotional responses are instinctive,
and/or conditioned responses recieved mostly indirectly
from parents, peers, and society in general.
We train our children and pets the same ways.
And they are also training us at the same time.
A smiling giggling baby learns to manipulate the
big people for amusement. Crying gets lots of
attention. Pets work on us the same way.
You teach them a trick for a reward. Then
they can play on us for rewards when they like.
Maybe they're not so dumb.
(A bored city boy visiting rural relatives goes to town
to see the village idiot. The Idiot is shown two coins.
"Which one do ya want? The little dime or the big nickel?"
"Uhh. I'll take the nickel for sure." After the crowd
disburses the city boy says, "Don't you know the
dime is worth two nickles? You should take the dime!"
And the idiot answers, "But then folks would stop
bringing me shiny nickels." )
>EXPRESSION
>This is how the choice manifests itself in action.
>If I'm rebellious, I wear yellow. If I'm liberal,
>I join the Democrats.
>
>Now to use these categories...
>
>I would agree that the "expression" of your choice
>is pretty much constructed. As far as the "actual
>choice" is concerned, I feel they further break
>down into the "no-brainer", "biased", and
>"difficult" categories above. How much your
>"construction" influences your choice depends on
>which category it's in, doesn't it?
>
Right. But your construction makes all the choices.
What other influence could there possibly be?
>That's where I have trouble seeing how our
>choices are constructed. For "difficult" choices,
>our construction doesn't seem to give us much
>help in deciding. Remember not to confuse
>the "actual choice" with its "expression": the
>actions I take as a result of that choice may
>very well be constructed, but I do believe there
>is a fundamental branch at the bottom of those
>actions that I don't see as determined.
>
But it is determined. You will act according to
your emotional will, (that you really had no part
in making yourself). You may have run with a
bad crowd and picked up harmful or dangerous
emotional-decision associations. Or you may
have avoided the bad crowd. Why? Because
you didn't like them or feared them. One choice
cascades into others and others, and every one
an emotional response to the circumstance.
We don't make the first choice or the last or any.
It's just a probing of this or that by our attraction
and aversion responses.
The hell of it is that most people are totally unaware
of their emotional state most of the time. They imagine
they are making decisions or even 'thinking'.
>>
>> If there is cause and effect, there IS no freedom.
>
>This is why I brought up the Heisenberg thing: it
>appears there's at least one case in nature where
>"cause and effect" breaks down, where you can't
>predict what's going to happen (if I understand
>Heisenberg correctly, that is). Might that not
>expand to larger cases? Might a choice in the
>"difficult" category be subject to such
>unpredicatability?
Uncertainty operates on the smallest of sub-atomic
particles in a probabilistic-statistical way. But in my reading
about it I came across the claim that "for large numbers
of particles, the statistical method is accurate to even
more decimal places than any other". It's true that
atoms can display wavelike properties over relatively
short distances, but in the macro world, uncertainty
is pretty much insignificant.
There is talk of the quantum mind. Before that the mind
was electric, then holographic, then computer-like, and now
quantum-like, Maybe. (Fortunately before that, even though
we had phrenology, the study of cranial bumps as indicators of
personaity, no one theorized a steam powered mind. LOL)
I think the old theory of brain size=intelligence has been debunked
for humans anyway, since geniuses have not had the fattest heads.
I really don't think quantum mechanics can save 'free will'.
If there was anything to it, wouldn't all phenomena also
be free of physical laws? And decision is pure emotional
response to circumstance. It's hard to see how minute
quantum fluctuations could turn attraction to aversion.
If the will was truly free we would find everyone acting
much more irrationally than they do. While it is true
than no one is actually very rational, folks can be
manipulated easily when you push their well known
buttons. This unity of general behavior argues for
a rational 'construction' of minds, even if the minds
themselves are fairly irrational. (Making them easy.)
Keynes
A point I overlooked --
>I really don't think quantum mechanics can save 'free will'.
>If there was anything to it, wouldn't all phenomena also
>be free of physical laws? And decision is pure emotional
>response to circumstance. It's hard to see how minute
>quantum fluctuations could turn attraction to aversion.
Even then, would that be 'freedom'?
It would simply be a deeper layer of mechanical action,
and not a creative act of will.
For quantum fluctuations to affect will, you would have
to will the arrangement of the fluctuations. Not only
is this improbable, it leads to infinite regression.
Oh the folly of trying to understand a mind
when your only tool is your mind. But what the hell...
andy-k
> > I don't know whether I'd qualify as a postmodernist thinker, but for
> > what it's worth you can have my opinion anyway :)
>
> My apologies. I didn't know calling someone "post-modernist" was
> an insult. If you can tell me where I went wrong; however, I'd be
> most interested, whether you're a "post-modernist" or not!
No offence taken. As for post-modernism, I don't know much about it --
that's why I made the statement above.
> > If there is no such thing as an uncaused cause then there is no
> > absolutely free aspect to the will. The term "free will" only makes
> > sense in the relative aspect of "free from coercion by the will of
> > others".
>
> What about the cases where the various coercive forces balance
> each other out? That is, you get coerced roughly equally toward
> different options and are thus left with a "difficult" choice. Would
> it be wrong to say that the more these coercive forces balance out,
> the more likely it is that your choice will be determined by either
> sheer randomness or your "free will"?
I would go for the former option myself. Dynamic systems in that sort of
mode exhibit non-linearity and consequently their behavior is best
described by chaos theory.
> > Regarding Heisenberg indeterminacy, this introduces an element of
>
> By the way, I brought up Heisenberg because I thought it might
> imply that, even if you know ALL the causes, the result is not
> necessarily determined. That is, repeating the same conditions
> would not necessarily yield the same results. I'm not sure if that's
> the point you are making in the next sentence... I got lost!
Determinism is different from predestination. True randomness (if it
exists) would generate indeterminate results (i.e. can't be calculated
beforehand, even in principle), but the outcome may still be
predestined. Consequently even Heisenberg indeterminacy doesn't
eliminate the possibility of predestination, even if it can be argued
that it disqualifies any pure form of determinism.
> > apparent randomness into the cosmos -- it does not make any
> > judgements on whether that randomness is merely epistemological (as
> > predestination would dictate) or ontological (allowing contingency).
> > However, the other
>
> Help! I'm lost!
>
> Let's see... I think "epistemological" talks about how we know things.
> Would that mean it randomizes our ability to deduce causes?
>
> I think "ontological" has something to do with figuring out why we're
> here. Would randomness in that mean that we would be made up
> of a bunch of random events?
Forgive me -- I know that jargon is often used as a means of exclusion,
but not always -- it is also often a kind of short-hand that avoids
unnecessary expansion. When I say that randomness may be merely
epistemological, I mean it may be a constraint on the accuracy of our
*knowledge* about something -- e.g. it may be possible in principle to
calculate the weather a month ahead if we could make accurate enough
measurements, but since we can't make measurements with sufficient
accuracy, our knowledge of the weather next month is inaccurate. When I
say that randomness may be ontological, I mean it may be a feature of a
wider reality in such a way that it really could have been otherwise
(like in the Many Worlds Interpretation of the Quantum Theory).
> > that if event A is in the future of event B in a given reference
> > frame, a frame can be found where the reverse is true. This would
> > seem to favor the epistemological interpretation of indeterminacy.
>
> Are you saying that because we can't always determine the order of
> events, then we can't always determine what caused what? Help!
Relativity theory (Minkowski spacetime in particular) does seem to throw
the notion of causality into confusion, since if event A appears to be
the cause of event B in one frame of reference, a frame can be found
where event B appears to be the cause of event A. But my point was that
in this model of spacetime the future is already as fixed as the past --
i.e. predestination holds.
Immortalist
"Sightreader" <sight...@attbi.compost> wrote in message
Yes that is along the lines of increasing causal factors in some
organizationally changing systems. We can observe our bodies, organs, cells,
cell organelles, macromolecules, flows, etc... and each level down we go the
factors increase that merge more-or-less into what Hume would call and
"field"
We can comprehend chemical processes going on in individual cells but since
there are 70 billion cells in an human it would be hard to predict with this
field of active cells what we can with knowledge about the super-function of
assemblages of cells called organs or levels of hormones......
When we try and focus in on the precise causes of the will, freedom may be
in the cards (field). Then degree of interactions that can be altered by
massive sensory inputs pulsing along without hesitation might not yet be the
place to stake the claim of determinism, at least as that word is used in
society. Even in society it is often hard to find "the cause" or even
"causes" but only trends that seem regular in those circumstances. Far from
an detailed science this free will.
>
Immortalist
Correction; 70 "trillion" cells in 425 cell types. type to fast.....
> >
>
>
Sightreader
>
> Here's the meat of it. Will doesn't choose emotions.
> Emotions direct the will. Emotional responses are instinctive,
> and/or conditioned responses recieved mostly indirectly
> from parents, peers, and society in general.
Oh... duh... (bonks himself in the forehead). I
see... emotions fall under the umbrella of being
constructed too. I don't know why that didn't
occur to me.
> There is such a thing as indecision. "Hamletism", I think.
This I am most curious about this in several
aspects... these points where the course of
future events hovers in the balance...
> It's hard to see how minute
> quantum fluctuations could turn attraction to aversion.
I don't know much about quantum or chaos stuff, nor
am I familiar with the readings you're refering to. I do
hear that a lot of reactions depend on electrons. If
we can't really pin down where they are or how they
are moving, I'd think that would make it HARDER to
predict the reactions they drive at a larger scale. So
rather than a bunch of little uncertainties washing away
on a grand scale, they would instead add up, like the
"butterfly effect" thingie. If it was intrinsically impossible
to predict the behavior of butterflies, wouldn't it then be
intrinsically impossible to predict the weather until it got
going?
P.S. Don't forget that once a weather pattern gets going,
it's a lot easier to predict, so finding one of many cases
where you can predict what masses of atoms are going
to do doesn't necessarily solve this problem...
> atoms can display wavelike properties over relatively
> short distances, but in the macro world, uncertainty
> is pretty much insignificant.
I haven't done readings of this sort (I'm just a layman).
Do we have any sort of definitive proof that the mass
behavior of atoms is deterministic rather than chaotic?
(Of course, I have no firm idea of what "chaotic" really
means outside of pop science articles...)
> Right. But your construction makes all the choices.
> What other influence could there possibly be?
The following argument only makes sense if you
buy my "butterfly" garbage above, but here we
go anyway...
I've often had emotions that change quite rapidly
even though I haven't had much additional stimuli
influencing my emotional makeup (the extreme ups
and downs I might have while dreaming may be an
example). What sort of emotional state you
happen to be in when a decision is thrust upon
you can, as you've noted, have an enormous effect
on what decision you make. Is it possible that
emotional fluctuations are subject to that chaos
stuff described above? If that's the case, then
wouldn't it then be impossible to be SURE what
your state is going to be when a choice is tossed
into your lap?
Sightreader
>
> Determinism is different from predestination. True randomness (if it
> exists) would generate indeterminate results (i.e. can't be calculated
> beforehand, even in principle), but the outcome may still be
> predestined. Consequently even Heisenberg indeterminacy doesn't
> eliminate the possibility of predestination, even if it can be argued
> that it disqualifies any pure form of determinism.
OK, now I'm starting to get WAY in over my head. Forgive me as
I struggle with these concepts...
Are you saying that there are a lot of "indeterminate" results that
can't affect the outcome? If so, then are you also saying that
NO indeterminate results can EVER affect the outcome? Let's
take the only analogy I know, the "butterfly effect" from pop
science. Let's say that butterfly flapping is truly unpredictable.
Certainly, no matter what he does, he's not going to stop that
massive storm front that's a mile away. However, aren't there
instances in less stable weather patterns where his flapping
could have a much greater effect, especially as we look farther
and farther into the future?
...or am I just hopelessly confused?
>
> Forgive me -- I know that jargon is often used as a means of exclusion,
> but not always -- it is also often a kind of short-hand that avoids
> unnecessary expansion.
So are you saying that the "epistemological" thing is a more a
practical concern? That is, randomness gets in the way of us
humans trying to figure anything out, but someone like God
who's not limited by earthly mechanisms could theoretically
predict it all and thus figure everything in advance?
> Relativity theory (Minkowski spacetime in particular) does seem to throw
> the notion of causality into confusion, since if event A appears to be
> the cause of event B in one frame of reference, a frame can be found
> where event B appears to be the cause of event A. But my point was that
> in this model of spacetime the future is already as fixed as the past --
> i.e. predestination holds.
(stares blankly for a few moments...)
Umm... uhhh...
andy-k
> "andy-k" <spam....@ntlworld.com> wrote in message
> news:veL9a.697$rB4.1...@newsfep1-win.server.ntli.net...
> >
> > Determinism is different from predestination. True randomness (if it
> > exists) would generate indeterminate results (i.e. can't be
> > calculated beforehand, even in principle), but the outcome may still
> > be predestined. Consequently even Heisenberg indeterminacy doesn't
> > eliminate the possibility of predestination, even if it can be
> > argued that it disqualifies any pure form of determinism.
>
> OK, now I'm starting to get WAY in over my head. Forgive me as
> I struggle with these concepts...
>
> Are you saying that there are a lot of "indeterminate" results that
> can't affect the outcome? If so, then are you also saying that
> NO indeterminate results can EVER affect the outcome? Let's
> take the only analogy I know, the "butterfly effect" from pop
> science. Let's say that butterfly flapping is truly unpredictable.
> Certainly, no matter what he does, he's not going to stop that
> massive storm front that's a mile away. However, aren't there
> instances in less stable weather patterns where his flapping
> could have a much greater effect, especially as we look farther
> and farther into the future?
>
> ...or am I just hopelessly confused?
See below.
> > Forgive me -- I know that jargon is often used as a means of
> > exclusion, but not always -- it is also often a kind of short-hand
> > that avoids unnecessary expansion.
>
> So are you saying that the "epistemological" thing is a more a
> practical concern? That is, randomness gets in the way of us
> humans trying to figure anything out, but someone like God
> who's not limited by earthly mechanisms could theoretically
> predict it all and thus figure everything in advance?
If true randomness exists, then pure determinism is false since random
events are uncaused. But let's say that a particular event, say the
decay of an unstable atom, happens 1s after the measurement begins. That
figure, being truly random, could not have been known beforehand. Now,
if we could run time backwards and repeat the very same measurement at
the very same time, would we repeatedly get the same measurement, or
would we get a statistical spread of measurements? If predestination
holds then we would get the former, and randomness is simply a
limitation on what we can know about the event beforehand (i.e.
epistemological). If predestination doesn't hold, then we would get the
latter, and randomness may be symptomatic of a cosmos in which events
have many possible outcomes as if the cosmos splits at each event, and
from the subjective perspective we would be following one strand of the
cosmos and remain unconscious of the others in which we exist (i.e.
ontological -- think of the episode of Red Dwarf where Rimmer meets
himself as he turned out in another strand of the cosmos ... "what a
guy!").
> > Relativity theory (Minkowski spacetime in particular) does seem to
> > throw the notion of causality into confusion, since if event A
> > appears to be the cause of event B in one frame of reference, a
> > frame can be found where event B appears to be the cause of event A.
> > But my point was that in this model of spacetime the future is
> > already as fixed as the past -- i.e. predestination holds.
>
> (stares blankly for a few moments...)
>
> Umm... uhhh...
I'm not happy about the causality thing ... that bit needs advice from
somebody better clued-up on the physics of spacetime than I am. But my
main point in writing the above was to say that if relativity theory is
correct then the cosmos we inhabit is predestined rather than having to
hypothesize the existence of parallel universes (i.e. epistemological
rather than ontological). The theory has proved very accurate in making
predictions, so there would have to be some serious anomaly to justify
any doubt.
Keynes
<sight...@attbi.compost> wrote:
>
>"Keynes" <Key...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
>news:2i1e6vkmr9ou6he7e...@4ax.com...
>>
>> Here's the meat of it. Will doesn't choose emotions.
>> Emotions direct the will. Emotional responses are instinctive,
>> and/or conditioned responses recieved mostly indirectly
>> from parents, peers, and society in general.
>
>Oh... duh... (bonks himself in the forehead). I
>see... emotions fall under the umbrella of being
>constructed too. I don't know why that didn't
>occur to me.
>
>> There is such a thing as indecision. "Hamletism", I think.
>
>This I am most curious about this in several
>aspects... these points where the course of
>future events hovers in the balance...
>
The present is golden.
The future can take care of itself (if it ever comes).
Just do your best and realize the world doesn't
depend on your decisions. More likely it's the
other way around.
>> It's hard to see how minute
>> quantum fluctuations could turn attraction to aversion.
>
>I don't know much about quantum or chaos stuff, nor
>am I familiar with the readings you're refering to. I do
>hear that a lot of reactions depend on electrons. If
>we can't really pin down where they are or how they
>are moving, I'd think that would make it HARDER to
>predict the reactions they drive at a larger scale. So
>rather than a bunch of little uncertainties washing away
>on a grand scale, they would instead add up, like the
>"butterfly effect" thingie. If it was intrinsically impossible
>to predict the behavior of butterflies, wouldn't it then be
>intrinsically impossible to predict the weather until it got
>going?
>
>P.S. Don't forget that once a weather pattern gets going,
>it's a lot easier to predict, so finding one of many cases
>where you can predict what masses of atoms are going
>to do doesn't necessarily solve this problem...
>
Chaos theory says that very small inputs can have
very large effects, like the straw that broke the camel's back.
Chaotic events are unpredictable in detail, but predictable
in pattern, another uncertainty, now in the macro world.
Small events can snowball, but I don't think that really
applies to the operation of the brain, re quantum effects.
Brain chemistry is perfectly straight forward and lawful.
>> atoms can display wavelike properties over relatively
>> short distances, but in the macro world, uncertainty
>> is pretty much insignificant.
>
>I haven't done readings of this sort (I'm just a layman).
>Do we have any sort of definitive proof that the mass
>behavior of atoms is deterministic rather than chaotic?
>(Of course, I have no firm idea of what "chaotic" really
>means outside of pop science articles...)
>
>> Right. But your construction makes all the choices.
>> What other influence could there possibly be?
>
>The following argument only makes sense if you
>buy my "butterfly" garbage above, but here we
>go anyway...
>
>I've often had emotions that change quite rapidly
>even though I haven't had much additional stimuli
>influencing my emotional makeup (the extreme ups
>and downs I might have while dreaming may be an
>example). What sort of emotional state you
>happen to be in when a decision is thrust upon
>you can, as you've noted, have an enormous effect
>on what decision you make.
If you are aware of your emotional state then
you can make better decisions. Most folks
are unaware of the state they are in.
But it can be done through mind-meditation
training that one would be 'mindful' of emotions,
sensations and more. It's the building of an
habitual mindfulness, a living with present
realities, (which is quite unproblematic and
exhilarating, compared to ordinary mental
processes).
Once properly cultivated through conscious effort,
it can be automatic and effortless. Like riding a bike.
I recommend buddhist meditation to everybody.
This is not a religion, but a rational approach
to percieving reality for yourself and recieving
the benefits of a wider understanding.
>Is it possible that
>emotional fluctuations are subject to that chaos
>stuff described above? If that's the case, then
>wouldn't it then be impossible to be SURE what
>your state is going to be when a choice is tossed
>into your lap?
>
Predicting the future would be a curse IMHO.
I'd rather die tomorrow under a falling piano
than to spend 20 years on death row.
(A story -
One day the farmer near the barn over heard the
rooster say that the cow would die in three days.
So he milked the cow, then sold her, and three
days later, the cow died suddenly. Later the
farmer over heard the rooster say that the mule
would also die in three days. So the farmer plowed
his field, sold the mule, and sure enough, the
mule dropped dead suddenly and on time.
A week later, the farmer heard the rooster say,
"In three days, the farmer will die.
I wonder who he'll sell himself to?" )
There's no need to have anxiety over choices.
Do the best you can, and you can't reproach yourself.
My sister and my daughter have bipolar problems.
My daughter has been suicidal. Rx Drugs made her
even worse. Now she is drug free and without
therapy, seeming to do well.
I have probably had mood swings myself. I coped
with them through a change in my world view.
Emotions affect thought, but thoughts also affects
emotions. It's my opinion that anxieties are mainly
misinterpretations of events, real or imagined.
There is nothing so insecure, helpless and vulnerable
as a lone person at the mercy of a hostile world.
Particularly since there is no such thing as a lone person
apart from the world.
Sightreader
things seperate: how we cope with what's happening, and WHY
things are happening.
"Keynes" <Key...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:c0sh6vc51brsjijt9...@4ax.com...
>
> Just do your best and realize the world doesn't
> depend on your decisions. More likely it's the
> other way around.
This is an important coping strategy, but I am actually more
interested in why things actually happen, not how I should
view them for my own mental health. I am well aware of
and use these coping strategies: I've gone from athletic to
bedridden in the last 2 years due to back problems with a
very dim prognosis for recovery, and yet I'm as happy as
a clam.
>
> Chaos theory says that very small inputs can have
> very large effects, like the straw that broke the camel's back.
>
> Chaotic events are unpredictable in detail, but predictable
> in pattern, another uncertainty, now in the macro world.
Let's say this is true: that the choices we make cannot alter
the fact that some sort of change is inevitable. This doesn't
seem to rule out that the choices can enormously affect the
NATURE of that change.
As an example, a war is being fought. No matter what the
decision of a commander, instability of the war will last for
a while, then stability as some new regime takes over. So,
the fact that it will move from unstable to stable is inevitable.
However, the commander's decision can have enormous
influence on who wins the war, and what SORT of stability
takes over after the war (i.e. which culture will predominate
the post war world).
>
> If you are aware of your emotional state then
> you can make better decisions. Most folks
> are unaware of the state they are in.
This is of course true, but only to a certain extent. If you
are tired, strung out, and sick, realizing your state is not
some magic wand that helps you see beyond your illness
and make decisions as clearly as if you were healthy. The
timing that issues knock at your door, I feel, remains a
crucial element in your decision making, no matter how
aware you are of your inner workings. This timing, I feel,
is also extremely sensitive to the random variation and
unpredicatbility which, to me, creates a lot of room for
the free will to alter things just enough to drastically
change the outcome.
> I recommend buddhist meditation to everybody.
I've got way too much to say about that to shove my reply
in here. I'm going to generate a second reply so we can
follow this Buddhist stream in another thread.
>
> Predicting the future would be a curse IMHO.
> I'd rather die tomorrow under a falling piano
> than to spend 20 years on death row.
Correct, but this would also be a rather different topic.
Just because things are determined doesn't mean we
can determine it. Of course, as you can see, I'm of
the opinion things aren't so determined anyway.
> There's no need to have anxiety over choices.
> Do the best you can, and you can't reproach yourself.
Sound advice for coping, but (believe it or not) it can
be applied even if you believe in free will (as I do).
Check the Buddhist Thread for that.
Sightreader
> Once properly cultivated through conscious effort,
> it can be automatic and effortless. Like riding a bike.
A noble and useful thing, to be mindful of your
emotions and how they affect your behavior.
Don't forget that there are many happy souls who
could care less about what course their life takes.
For them, putting all this work into understanding
their emotions so they can control their decisions
is just another way of over-analyzing and over
engineering their lives rather than simply "going
with the flow" and letting stuff happen. Not
everything works for everyone.
>
> I recommend buddhist meditation to everybody.
> This is not a religion, but a rational approach
> to percieving reality for yourself and recieving
> the benefits of a wider understanding.
I only know some basics about Buddhism, but
from what I know I see in two parts:
Firstly is the (what I consider) excellent analysis
of the problem. From what I can tell, Buddhists
realize that suffering comes from habits and needs
that hang around even after the conditions they
were based on vanish. I think this describes the
suffering of loss quite well, although I don't know
how much it helps with excruciating physical pain
that you might see in "Saving Private Ryan".
Their recommended solution, if read it right, is where
I disagree. It appears that, as a solution, Buddhists
recommend simply avoiding all sorts of attachments
so that you won't suffer if you have to let them go.
This seems to be an unnecessarily extreme reaction
to me, and it would appear to me that it leads to
some behavior that non-Buddhists find pretty weird.
In many instances, I think it's more healthy to go by
the old motto, "'tis better to have loved and lost than
to have never loved at all".
In April of 1917, the life expectancy of British pilots
was so short that veterans refused to get to know
new arrivals because they were dying so fast. This
is appropriate and natural in such times, but to live
this way at ALL times seems rather unnatural and
unhealthy to me.
Certainly I agree that it's important to focus your
life in the present rather than killing yourself to shape
the future or wallowing in the old glory days. On
the other hand, I think it's OK to go ahead and
engage in stuff, even if it forms habits and needs, as
long as you are aware that they can be revoked at
any time. I think that if you keep your level of
attachment reasonable, you can get more joy out
of life while keeping the pain of loss manageable.
>
> There's no need to have anxiety over choices.
> Do the best you can, and you can't reproach yourself.
This is also important, and helps "free-will" folks
like myself deal with bad decisions in the past.
Another good tool is to create the fiction of "fate",
where even if you could reverse a decision, it was
bound to come get you somehow. I know it's
total B.S., but it sure keeps a mind away from
unhealthy paralysis. Maybe this is why Fate is
such a pervasive theme in Greek literature: life
was so tough back then that you HAD to believe
in it or you'd go insane.
> I have probably had mood swings myself. I coped
> with them through a change in my world view.
> Emotions affect thought, but thoughts also affects
> emotions. It's my opinion that anxieties are mainly
> misinterpretations of events, real or imagined.
I'm very sorry to read about your daughter, and I
wish you the best in coping with it. Such are the
times when philosophy can really help. At the risk
of giving you a pop pundit, have you tried reading
Marcus Aurelius' "The Emperor's Handbook"?
Unlike the other translations of the "Meditations",
I think that one is a lot easier to read and use in
your life, and really seems quite congruent with
the Buddhist interests you've expressed here...
Sightreader
I asked my Dad who actually knows something about physics, so
hopefully that will help me understand what you're saying.
"andy-k" <spam....@ntlworld.com> wrote in message
news:al1aa.1495$887....@newsfep1-gui.server.ntli.net...
>
> If true randomness exists, then pure determinism is false
OK, so the problem is that we'll NEVER KNOW if true randomness
exists. If true randomness does NOT exist, then we live in a determined
world. But if true randomness DOES exist, then not even God can
predict what will happen. If that's the case, then would it then be
possible
that there are times when He won't be able to predict our behavior either?
> I'm not happy about the causality thing ... that bit needs advice from
> somebody better clued-up on the physics of spacetime than I am. But my
> main point in writing the above was to say that if relativity theory is
> correct then the cosmos we inhabit is predestined rather than having to
> hypothesize the existence of parallel universes (i.e. epistemological
> rather than ontological). The theory has proved very accurate in making
> predictions, so there would have to be some serious anomaly to justify
> any doubt.
Let's pretend that true randomness exists (ontological, as you'd say?) If
that's the case, wouldn't the "butterfly effect" amplify the effects of even
subatomic randomness to eventually change the tide of even the largest
of changes?
I understand that once the tide of change is in motion, a little randomness
won't dent it much. But if you go back in time far enough, wouldn't you
eventually find a time where even the greatest of changes dangled in the
balance of what a few electrons decided to do? If that's the case, is there
anyway for "ontological" randomness to co-exist with predestination?
Keynes
<sight...@attbi.compost> wrote:
>
>"Keynes" <Key...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
>news:c0sh6vc51brsjijt9...@4ax.com...
>> Once properly cultivated through conscious effort,
>> it can be automatic and effortless. Like riding a bike.
>
>A noble and useful thing, to be mindful of your
>emotions and how they affect your behavior.
>
>Don't forget that there are many happy souls who
>could care less about what course their life takes.
>For them, putting all this work into understanding
>their emotions so they can control their decisions
>is just another way of over-analyzing and over
>engineering their lives rather than simply "going
>with the flow" and letting stuff happen. Not
>everything works for everyone.
>
If a person is carefree, good enough.
Spiritual paths are not easy.
They are medicine for the perplexed.
>>
>> I recommend buddhist meditation to everybody.
>> This is not a religion, but a rational approach
>> to percieving reality for yourself and recieving
>> the benefits of a wider understanding.
>
>I only know some basics about Buddhism, but
>from what I know I see in two parts:
>
>Firstly is the (what I consider) excellent analysis
>of the problem. From what I can tell, Buddhists
>realize that suffering comes from habits and needs
>that hang around even after the conditions they
>were based on vanish. I think this describes the
>suffering of loss quite well, although I don't know
>how much it helps with excruciating physical pain
>that you might see in "Saving Private Ryan".
>
They Buddha claimed he was 'awake', implying
that normal ways of living are like sleepwalking.
The buddha used what he called 'expedient means',
but he stated clearly that the means were not the
ends, and even the means must be abandoned.
Since then there has been an explosion of other more
or less 'expedient means' called the mahayana.
(Buddha originally used the parable of his method
as a raft to get from the shore of suffering across
to the shore of non-suffering (nirvana). Then the
raft was not to be taken up and carried, but abandoned.
Mahayana means 'big raft' implying the boddisattva ideal
of saving all others before entering nirvana yourself.)
There are many forms (means) of meditation used
to reach the goal, including trying to solve paradoxical
zen koans. From all accounts, it's worth doing.
>Their recommended solution, if read it right, is where
>I disagree. It appears that, as a solution, Buddhists
>recommend simply avoiding all sorts of attachments
>so that you won't suffer if you have to let them go.
That is an expedient means in the original system.
But that is not the end of it.
>This seems to be an unnecessarily extreme reaction
>to me, and it would appear to me that it leads to
>some behavior that non-Buddhists find pretty weird.
>In many instances, I think it's more healthy to go by
>the old motto, "'tis better to have loved and lost than
>to have never loved at all".
>
Buddhism is counter-intuitive. So is the method of Jesus.
>In April of 1917, the life expectancy of British pilots
>was so short that veterans refused to get to know
>new arrivals because they were dying so fast. This
>is appropriate and natural in such times, but to live
>this way at ALL times seems rather unnatural and
>unhealthy to me.
>
>Certainly I agree that it's important to focus your
>life in the present rather than killing yourself to shape
>the future or wallowing in the old glory days. On
>the other hand, I think it's OK to go ahead and
>engage in stuff, even if it forms habits and needs, as
>long as you are aware that they can be revoked at
>any time. I think that if you keep your level of
>attachment reasonable, you can get more joy out
>of life while keeping the pain of loss manageable.
>
Good for you.
>>
>> There's no need to have anxiety over choices.
>> Do the best you can, and you can't reproach yourself.
>
>This is also important, and helps "free-will" folks
>like myself deal with bad decisions in the past.
>Another good tool is to create the fiction of "fate",
>where even if you could reverse a decision, it was
>bound to come get you somehow. I know it's
>total B.S., but it sure keeps a mind away from
>unhealthy paralysis. Maybe this is why Fate is
>such a pervasive theme in Greek literature: life
>was so tough back then that you HAD to believe
>in it or you'd go insane.
>
Fate is pretty big in Islam too.
>> I have probably had mood swings myself. I coped
>> with them through a change in my world view.
>> Emotions affect thought, but thoughts also affects
>> emotions. It's my opinion that anxieties are mainly
>> misinterpretations of events, real or imagined.
>
>I'm very sorry to read about your daughter, and I
>wish you the best in coping with it. Such are the
>times when philosophy can really help. At the risk
>of giving you a pop pundit, have you tried reading
>Marcus Aurelius' "The Emperor's Handbook"?
>Unlike the other translations of the "Meditations",
>I think that one is a lot easier to read and use in
>your life, and really seems quite congruent with
>the Buddhist interests you've expressed here...
>
I have an older translation around somewhere.
There seems to be quite a bit of agreement between
all the spiritual traditions. Maybe they're on to something.
I have mainly been collecting zen classics.
One thing leads to another.
Try this -
http://home.att.net/~paul.dowling/archive/zen/hsin.htm
andy-k
>
> OK, so the problem is that we'll NEVER KNOW if true randomness
> exists. If true randomness does NOT exist, then we live in a
> determined world. But if true randomness DOES exist, then not even
> God can predict what will happen. If that's the case, then would it
> then be possible that there are times when He won't be able to
> predict our behavior either?
If even true random events are predestined then taking a "god's eye"
view would reveal every aspect of how the cosmos unfolds. If true random
events aren't predestined then you'd have to ask god for the answer to
your question. I don't subscribe to the notion of an uncaused causer, so
in the latter case I don't know what would be influencing any behavior
that wasn't predestined.
> Let's pretend that true randomness exists (ontological, as you'd say?)
Any true randomness may be either ontological or epistemological
> If that's the case, wouldn't the "butterfly effect" amplify the
> effects of even subatomic randomness to eventually change the tide of
> even the largest of changes?
Yes, whether the randomness was ontological or epistemological. The
difference is that in the latter there would be no contingency (things
could not have happened differently), whilst in the former there would
be contingency.
> I understand that once the tide of change is in motion, a little
> randomness won't dent it much. But if you go back in time far enough,
> wouldn't you eventually find a time where even the greatest of changes
> dangled in the balance of what a few electrons decided to do? If
> that's the case, is there anyway for "ontological" randomness to
> co-exist with predestination?
I don't think so, because at every instant seemingly insignificant
events are influencing future significant events through just such a
process of "amplification". It's not something that only happened
shortly after the big bang (if it ever happened).
Sightreader
>
> The buddha used what he called 'expedient means',
> but he stated clearly that the means were not the
> ends, and even the means must be abandoned.
I guess I'm still confused about what we're talking about
when we say "expedient means". Is he implying that his
methods of avoiding all attachments is one of several
possible ways to deal with the problem, but not
the only way? I thought nirvana was some sort of state
that was acheivable by releasing all attachments. In my
method, I feel a reasonable level of attachment (and the
suffering that comes along with it) is natural and possibly
even healthy for you, as long as you monitor attachments
so they don't get out of control (which is bad unto itself
but especially bad if they are cut and cause out of control
suffering).
>
> Fate is pretty big in Islam too.
>
From what I can tell, a certain amount of Fate is very a
common (perhaps even universal) belief amongst ancient
cultures, although some may eventually think their way
out of it. I really think it's because such a belief really
works wonders as a coping mechanism.
> I have an older translation around somewhere.
> There seems to be quite a bit of agreement between
> all the spiritual traditions. Maybe they're on to something.
> I have mainly been collecting zen classics.
> One thing leads to another.
Yeah, it's hard to believe that zen masters and stoics
had the monopoly on realizing how healthy it is to live
in the present.
Sightreader
need to nail down, just to be sure...
"andy-k" <spam....@ntlworld.com> wrote in message
news:Hdgaa.2837$EA6.4...@newsfep2-win.server.ntli.net...
> "Sightreader" <sight...@attbi.compost> wrote in message
> news:GDcaa.3180$S_4.2804@rwcrnsc53...
> I don't subscribe to the notion of an uncaused causer, so
> in the latter case I don't know what would be influencing any behavior
> that wasn't predestined.
Is the notion of an "uncaused causer" the notion of a randomness
that not even an all-knowing God could predict? If so, then when
you say you don't subscribe to it, are you saying that you have
hard scientific readings that say it's impossible, or are you saying
that you simply don't like the way it sounds aesthetically?
> Yes, whether the randomness was ontological or epistemological. The
> difference is that in the latter there would be no contingency (things
> could not have happened differently), whilst in the former there would
> be contingency.
Let's say we have some experiment that shows the butterfly effect.
Let's say we repeat the experiment, where God jumps in to make
sure initial conditions are TRULY identical, even at the subatomic
level. Are you saying that in the "no contingency" case, the result
of the experiment is guaranteed to be identical, while in the
"contingency" case, initial conditions don't guarantee consistent
results, so we can only state probabilities?
Sightreader
"Immortalist" <Reanima...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:v6f8ti3...@corp.supernews.com...
>
> Yes that is along the lines of increasing causal factors in some
> organizationally changing systems. We can observe our bodies, organs,
cells,
> cell organelles, macromolecules, flows, etc... and each level down we go
the
> factors increase that merge more-or-less into what Hume would call and
> "field"
OK, I'm going to try to tie this in to the discussions I'm having in the
other threads.
We start following the chain of causes. So, this big event was caused
by a bunch of smaller events, each which was caused by yet another
event, etc. Eventually, one or more of these chains leads us to the
subatomic level where, say, some chemical reaction had to happen,
which required a specific electron to be in a specific place.
However, due to Heisenberg, we know that pinning down the behavior
of such electrons is impossible for us humans. What we *don't* know
is if pinning down their behavior is impossible for God as well: is the
behavior of these particles truly random, or do they have a determined
behavior that we simply will never be able to see?
If the behavior of such a particle can never be predicted, even by God,
then the "butterfly effect" will amplify this unpredictability over time and
through repetitions to eventually shape huge events. This, to me, would
mean that quite a few events are unpredictable, even to God.
If the behavior of such particles can be predicted (just not by us), then
it would seem possible that there is no unpredictability in the universe.
In that case, I would think that our behavior is determined, unless there
are other forces at work that science has yet to discover.
Is that an adequate summary?
andy-k
>
> Is the notion of an "uncaused causer" the notion of a randomness
> that not even an all-knowing God could predict? If so, then when
> you say you don't subscribe to it, are you saying that you have
> hard scientific readings that say it's impossible, or are you saying
> that you simply don't like the way it sounds aesthetically?
No, the notion of an uncaused causer is the notion of agent-induced
behavior that is completely uninfluenced by antecedent events
(uncaused), just as some people claim their "selves" to be capable of
making decisions and initiating activity in a manner that is free from
antecedent events. I guess a truly random event (if true randomness
exists) could be described as an uncaused *cause*, but that isn't how
the term uncaused *causer* is generally understood (the change from
cause to causer implying agency). When I say I don't subscribe to it, I
mean I know of no convincing reason to hypothesize the existence of such
an entity, though the non-existence of uncaused causers is impossible to
prove (as is the non-existence of the tooth fairy).
> Let's say we have some experiment that shows the butterfly effect.
> Let's say we repeat the experiment, where God jumps in to make
> sure initial conditions are TRULY identical, even at the subatomic
> level. Are you saying that in the "no contingency" case, the result
> of the experiment is guaranteed to be identical, while in the
> "contingency" case, initial conditions don't guarantee consistent
> results, so we can only state probabilities?
Yes, that's a fairly accurate description of contingency.
Immortalist
"Sightreader" <sight...@attbi.compost> wrote in message
Not sure yet but it does illustrate how an small garden can collapse into
mush if an fire truck is used at full pressure to water it. If an system
state goes through many simualtaneous changes in an growth, small events at
the begining of the process would be more than simply addition; these
initial effects would be multiplied. We can touch emergent features, and
push back on this field to see what it does.
>
John Jones
Sir Frederick <mmcn...@fuzzysys.com> wrote in message
news:3E651FB9...@fuzzysys.com...
> John Jones wrote:
> >
> > Was your post the new thread? Is my computer omitting new subject posts
and
> > showing only replies?
> > Please explain what post you are answering to as I have your post as a
main
> > starter topic.
> >
> Your news server sucks.
>
>
>
> --
> Best,
> Frederick Martin McNeill
> Poway, California, United States of America
> mmcn...@fuzzysys.com
> http://www.fuzzysys.com
> *************************
> Phrases of the week :
> A clown may be first in the kingdom of Heaven,
> if he has helped lessen the sadness of human life.
> --Talmud
> Some people talk in their sleep.
> Lecturers talk while other people sleep.
> --Albert Camus
> :-))))Snort!) AHOWR AHOWR!
> *************************