A term to describe "everything"?
Jason Glumidge
I was wondering if I could get the benefit of your collective
knowledge: I am looking for a word in philosophy (whether that be of
math/metaphysics/religion) that denotes "everything", as in the whole
continuous plenum that is reality - before we chop it up and partition
it into conceptual objects and categories for everyday use ;)
I'm wondering if there is already a technical (or at least
philosophical) term that describes the whole "fabric" of the universe
of discourse. The closest I have found is something like
"anatta" (thanks to google/wikipedia) but i'm not sure its perfect.
The term "everything" is loaded in that it implies a set of all
things, when really i'm coming from the reverse angle, of one
universal thing that we then cut up as suits whatever task we are
dealing with.
Anyhow, thanks in advance for _any_ guidance you guys can give.
All best, J.
{:-])))
>Hi all,
hi
>I was wondering if I could get the benefit of your collective
>knowledge: I am looking for a word in philosophy (whether that be of
>math/metaphysics/religion) that denotes "everything", as in the whole
>continuous plenum that is reality - before we chop it up and partition
>it into conceptual objects and categories for everyday use ;)
I've read about Wu, or Wu Chi, or Wuji.
Some translate it as Nothingness or Nonbeing.
Others say it connotes (if not denotes)
undifferentiated. Not knowing Chinese however,
anything I say is subject to dispute.
You might use, "undifferentiated unity"
if such a phrase gets your point across.
Ore, you may wish to point toward the background,
the unpainted canvas on which all things are drawn
kinda like the screen behind these words.
Metaphors are a pair a dimes per doze in.
>I'm wondering if there is already a technical (or at least
>philosophical) term that describes the whole "fabric" of the universe
>of discourse.
The fabric of the universe of discourse
might mean something else.
Everything, in terms of Taoism,
is often referred to as the ten thousand things
or wan-wu, or wanwu.
>The closest I have found is something like
>"anatta" (thanks to google/wikipedia) but i'm not sure its perfect.
>The term "everything" is loaded in that it implies a set of all
>things, when really i'm coming from the reverse angle, of one
>universal thing that we then cut up as suits whatever task we are
>dealing with.
You could say, "of a whole cloth"
when referring to how things are all tied together
into a singular thing\non/thing.
Context may be king in this regard, so to speak.
>Anyhow, thanks in advance for _any_ guidance you guys can give.
A word or phrase may work just fine
but it might not work fine all the time.
That cud be some thing to keep in mind.
Chewy thought. One mulls.
Semantics can be frought with quibbles.
>All best, J.
Good luck.
-cheers!
Marshall
>
> I was wondering if I could get the benefit of your collective
> knowledge: I am looking for a word in philosophy (whether that be of
> math/metaphysics/religion) that denotes "everything", as in the whole
> continuous plenum that is reality - before we chop it up and partition
> it into conceptual objects and categories for everyday use ;)
"Universe"?
Marshall
shazi
>Jason wrote:
>>I was wondering if I could get the benefit of your collective
>>knowledge: I am looking for a word in philosophy (whether that be of
>>math/metaphysics/religion) that denotes "everything", as in the whole
>>continuous plenum that is reality - before we chop it up and partition
>>it into conceptual objects and categories for everyday use ;)
>
>I've read about Wu, or Wu Chi, or Wuji.
>Some translate it as Nothingness or Nonbeing.
>Others say it connotes (if not denotes)
>undifferentiated. Not knowing Chinese however,
>anything I say is subject to dispute.
wu = nothing.
wuji = "without limit",
which, according to later daoism,
referred to the undifferentiated unity.
dao shang yi. 'dao brings-to-pass the-one'
according to daodejing 42.
this would be at least something
that exists (in daoist cosmology)
before things are chopped up into
10,000 little pieces.
>>I'm wondering if there is already a technical (or at least
>>philosophical) term that describes the whole "fabric" of the universe
>>of discourse.
>
>The fabric of the universe of discourse
>might mean something else.
>Everything, in terms of Taoism,
>is often referred to as the ten thousand things
>or wan-wu, or wanwu.
the chinese of the time of the philosophers
used two terms to refer to 'everything',
- tian di - "Heaven and Earth"
- wan wu - "10,000 things"
in the dingzhou wenzi, an ancient manuscript
dug up from the former han, tian di,
or 'heaven and earth', is a term used to
describe all things, as is 'wan wu',
the '10,000 things'. 10,000 being a
particularly big number that for all intents
and purposes meant 'unlimited'.
to the writer of the wenzi, they were the same.
but to some, later perhaps, tian and di
heaven and earth are the 'two things'
first created, before things go to 10,000.
>>Anyhow, thanks in advance for _any_ guidance you guys can give.
>A word or phrase may work just fine
>but it might not work fine all the time.
>That cud be some thing to keep in mind.
>Chewy thought. One mulls.
>Semantics can be frought with quibbles.
>
>>All best, J.
>
>Good luck.
>-cheers!
bottomlessness up!
-shazi
noname
I see that you have crossposted, Jason. Given the groups involved,
I've chosen to reply only to apt. There will be enough argument
without making waves elsewhere.
The term you are looking for isn't one term. There are frames of
reference involved. It is difficult to communicate.
You can talk about everything inside a bag but that excludes the hand
that holds the bag. You can talk about everything in the world that
includes the hand, but that excludes the bag that holds the world..
You get into confusing areas if you do strange things like recognize
the difference between the material universe and the reality that
manifests it.
It is a very jellyful topic. I would suggest that you do everything
you can to avoid using any single term for "everything". You'll need
to write more words, or speak them, but maybe there will be less
confusion.
--
when you can't remember what you sig-line means
it's time to change it.
Keynes
I think 'anatta' means 'no-self', a description rather than a definition.
It's a buddhist term contrasting with the hindu idea of Universal
Self as the ground of all being. It's a buddhist principle that
there is no self in persons or anywhere else.
The greeks used 'cosmos' which has a materialist flavor
in spite of their common official polytheism.
Taoists use 'Tao', literally 'way'. What they mean by that
is briefly (not) explained in the Tao Te Ching. (Available
on line.)
As we discriminate light and dark, good and bad, we
divide 'what is' arbitrarily into polar opposites, dualism.
Tao is what exists by itself before any divisions are
discriminated. From the undefined undiscriminated
all things arise, and we commonly divide them into
the this and that, the good and bad.
But of course all polarities arise together and depend
on their opposite to have any meaning. There can't be
up without down, or good without bad. As long as
men pursue the good, they are manufacturing the
bad in annoyingly equal amounts.
The way of knowledge multiplies the divisions of
discrimination more and more finely until (if one lived
forever) he might know a very little about everything.
The way of wisdom is to make fewer and fewer divisive
discriminations until one knows everything about no-thing.
{:-])))
> Given the groups involved,
>I've chosen to reply only to apt. There will be enough argument
>without making waves elsewhere.
>
>The term you are looking for isn't one term. There are frames of
>reference involved. It is difficult to communicate.
A thought occurred to me how folks may
qualify their terms. Prior to or during usage,
an individual may say what the term means.
"Not-two" for instance can be a such a technical
type of jargon to denote oneness of a sort.
Chris Menzel
> Hi all,
>
> I was wondering if I could get the benefit of your collective
> knowledge: I am looking for a word in philosophy (whether that be of
> math/metaphysics/religion) that denotes "everything",
That would be ""everything"", wouldn't it?
> as in the whole continuous plenum that is reality - before we chop it
> up and partition it into conceptual objects and categories for
> everyday use ;)
Ohhhh, then how about "everything"?
> I'm wondering if there is already a technical (or at least
> philosophical) term that describes the whole "fabric" of the universe
> of discourse.
"Fabric" seems to imply the sort of conceptualizing and categorizing
you're hoping to avoid, doesn't it?
> The closest I have found is something like "anatta" (thanks to
> google/wikipedia) but i'm not sure its perfect. The term "everything"
> is loaded in that it implies a set of all things,
Does it? It is true that the concept of a formal interpretation for a
formal language requires that the universal quantifiers of the language
range over sets, but why do you think the ordinary concept of everything
implies that there is a set of all things? Surely that is not part of
the ordinary meaning of "everything".
In case you *are* interested in the connections to formal issues here,
Peter Smith posted a series of very comprehensive reviews of a recent
collection of papers on unrestricted quantification on his blog; click
here: http://logicmatters.blogspot.com/search?q=absolute+generality
Jason Glumidge
> On Mon, 12 May 2008 16:12:34 -0700 (PDT), Jason Glumidge
> <Jason.Glumi...@gmail.com> said:
>
> > Hi all,
>
> > I was wondering if I could get the benefit of your collective
> > knowledge: I am looking for a word in philosophy (whether that be of
> > math/metaphysics/religion) that denotes "everything",
>
> That would be ""everything"", wouldn't it?
>
> > as in the whole continuous plenum that is reality - before we chop it
> > up and partition it into conceptual objects and categories for
> > everyday use ;)
>
> Ohhhh, then how about "everything"?
>
> > I'm wondering if there is already a technical (or at least
> > philosophical) term that describes the whole "fabric" of the universe
> > of discourse.
>
> "Fabric" seems to imply the sort of conceptualizing and categorizing
> you're hoping to avoid, doesn't it?
Agreed. Its a sloppy word to use. Something like "single universal
whole" would be far more apt, without wishy washy talk about
"fabrics".
>
> > The closest I have found is something like "anatta" (thanks to
> > google/wikipedia) but i'm not sure its perfect. The term "everything"
> > is loaded in that it implies a set of all things,
>
> Does it? It is true that the concept of a formal interpretation for a
> formal language requires that the universal quantifiers of the language
> range over sets, but why do you think the ordinary concept of everything
> implies that there is a set of all things? Surely that is not part of
> the ordinary meaning of "everything".
I would probably better have said aggregation than set - don't wanna
rule out them there mereologists. Either way I'd still suggest that
"everything" infers an aggregation of things (as in 'every', and
'thing'), which is something was trying to get away from (i.e. the
state of play before we've split that whole up into bundles).
>
> In case you *are* interested in the connections to formal issues here,
> Peter Smith posted a series of very comprehensive reviews of a recent
> collection of papers on unrestricted quantification on his blog; click
> here:http://logicmatters.blogspot.com/search?q=absolute+generality
many thanks for the link.lots of good reading to be had. Regards.
N
>
> - Show quoted text -
I think 'Universe' is great...I suppose as the question in Comp...and
that
has something to do with 'cultural studies' somewhere? at least
'cultural
(reasoning) be considered?, as its basis is a supposition, a unified
consciously understood consequence to a formula.....in otherwords just
because we all agree, doesnt mean that something is a whole, or a
fully
functional and harmonious organisation....somehow our collusion only
means to an end is that everyone agreed ! ...
more simply...I pick a word...we all understand the definition of that
word
we all 'universally' agreed....but also the contrary, the word and its
definition are always private regardless of taste.
noname
>noname <n...@no.no> wrote:
>
>> Given the groups involved,
>>I've chosen to reply only to apt. There will be enough argument
>>without making waves elsewhere.
>>
>>The term you are looking for isn't one term. There are frames of
>>reference involved. It is difficult to communicate.
>
>A thought occurred to me how folks may
>qualify their terms. Prior to or during usage,
>an individual may say what the term means.
Sometimes people do that. The problem occurs when people assume
others will have the same meaning handy, then have to explain
afterwards. That seldom works out.
{:-])))
>>>The term you are looking for isn't one term. There are frames of
>>>reference involved. It is difficult to communicate.
>>
>>A thought occurred to me how folks may
>>qualify their terms. Prior to or during usage,
>>an individual may say what the term means.
>
>Sometimes people do that. The problem occurs when people assume
>others will have the same meaning handy, then have to explain
>afterwards. That seldom works out.
Very true. We see that often here.
In the crossposted branch of this thread
mention was made about "everything"
as a term being sufficient of itself.
But that isn't a term
that describes, "everything."
The op seamed to be searching
for a term that means all things,
taken as a whole, undifferentiated.
Sometimes acronyms are coined
from which words become minted.
All-things-wholly-undifferentiated
might be, a.t.w.u.
From th'air the op may use, "atwu"
as a term that describes what is meant.
In a context, he could shorten it to simply wu.
Wu, in this case, means wholly-undifferentiated.
It describes, "everything."
All things differentiated, in TTC 1,
might be Yu, or You, as a name (ming) given.
Depending on punctuation, Yu is the mother
or a name describing the mother of all things.
Translated, it might mean, Being.
Such a term may also be used by the op
to describe, "everything" if sew desired.
Shifting or inserting the punctuation,
with-name, yu-ming, can be the mother.
Without-name, or without naming, wu-ming
can be a that from which all things differentiate.
Reification returns to mind.
-smoke and mirrors
^@%>---*=#
"Jason Glumidge" <Jason.G...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:ca5f3633-e0fa-495a...@l42g2000hsc.googlegroups.com...
> Hi all,
>
> I was wondering if I could get the benefit of your collective
> knowledge: I am looking for a word in philosophy (whether that be of
> math/metaphysics/religion) that denotes "everything",
omniphallicregurgitation
Noel
A concept used by Arthur Koestler is "holon", which is not exactly
"everything" but more like a quality that everything has, meaning
something like "being something on its own, but also being part of
something"
Philosophicaly speaking you might not have something that is not a part
of something also. Think f.i. about Russell's paradox:
http://www.iep.utm.edu/p/par-russ.htm
Anyhow maybe "whole" is what you look for
You might also try to google "define:whole"
LauLuna
You may be interested in the Heideggerian opposition 'Sein/Seiendes'.
Unfortunately the translation into English is very hard.
It's also called 'the ontological difference' ('ontologischer
Unterschied').
Regards
N
>
> - Show quoted text -
mass extinction perhaps...Hmmmm...unidentified code of a coherent
myth maybe? a complete global brainwash
Chris Menzel
So you are saying that it is actually part of the meaning of
"everything" that, among all the things, there is also a thing with is
the set/collection/aggregation of all the things. I'm not sure what
circles you run in, but I don't think anyone I know thinks that. I'm
really sure my wife doesn't, and she seems to me to speak excellent
English. :-)
Chris Menzel
Being/Beings pretty well covers it, doesn't it? I.e., Being per se vs.
all the things there are, all the things that *have* being. Not that I
think that that, or anything else Heidegger wrote, is terribly clear...
Jason Glumidge
wrote:
No, I was saying that the term "everything" implies that there were
"things" in the first place, before we considered all of them
together. I was just wondering if there was a term already used that
tried to avoid that commitment. Been some great suggestions anyhow,
and lots of food for thought.
> I'm not sure what
> circles you run in,
ever decreasing ones by the looks of it ;)
Chris Menzel
Ohhh. How about "all the stuff"?
>> I'm not sure what circles you run in,
>
> ever decreasing ones by the looks of it ;)
Good one.
noname
There can really be no accurate word that means all things taken as a
whole undifferentiated. All things are differentiated, mystery and
manifestation are two... if you back up to a point where you're beyond
the differentation between mystery and manifestion (however you would
do that, if you could do that) you would be on a level simpler than
even those and words would not apply. But people can certainly think
of the manifestation as all things taken as a whole undifferentiated,
they seem to do that most of the time. They call it "the world" or
"the universe" or "reality". They have it figured out. "Everything"
is why I chose not to crosspost my reply to those other groups where
people never even heard of the mystery and think the manifestation is
the whole undifferentiated thing. They need not figure it out, they
can be "human" in a way that is "natural" to them and reach the end of
their lives just like anybody else.
{:-])))
>There can really be no accurate word that means all things taken as a
>whole undifferentiated. All things are differentiated, mystery and
>manifestation are two... if you back up to a point where you're beyond
>the differentation between mystery and manifestion (however you would
>do that, if you could do that) you would be on a level simpler than
>even those and words would not apply.
Another Taoist term might be, "pu."
Uncarved, unhewn.
Pointing to an aspect or facet
and walking thru, entering into it,
being one, could be two different states.
> But people can certainly think
>of the manifestation as all things taken as a whole undifferentiated,
>they seem to do that most of the time. They call it "the world" or
>"the universe" or "reality". They have it figured out. "Everything"
>is why I chose not to crosspost my reply to those other groups where
>people never even heard of the mystery and think the manifestation is
>the whole undifferentiated thing. They need not figure it out, they
>can be "human" in a way that is "natural" to them and reach the end of
>their lives just like anybody else.
Then what happens?
noname
>noname <n...@no.no> wrote:
>> But people can certainly think
>>of the manifestation as all things taken as a whole undifferentiated,
>>they seem to do that most of the time. They call it "the world" or
>>"the universe" or "reality". They have it figured out. "Everything"
>>is why I chose not to crosspost my reply to those other groups where
>>people never even heard of the mystery and think the manifestation is
>>the whole undifferentiated thing. They need not figure it out, they
>>can be "human" in a way that is "natural" to them and reach the end of
>>their lives just like anybody else.
>
>Then what happens?
Are you looking for a guess, or are you wanting an explanation in
no-words? I would guess that at the end of your life you die, then
the next thing happens, or doesn't. You'll have to wait for the
explanation in no-words, as far as I know I have a lot of wood to chop
and water to carry before I reach the end of my life.
Keynes
Beginnings and ends are conjectures.
No one has seen any beginning or ending.
noname
Frame-of-reference games can be fun at times.
I see the beginning of a party whenever I start one,
the end whenever I leave it.
When I wake in the morning I can see every detail
after half an hour few are recalled.
I have to sit and think to remember what happened yesterday,
but does not remembering its beginning mean it was unseen?
Every day we see both a beginning and an ending.
Every moment has a beginning and an ending.
That we recall one from another is a challenge to ask who does the
recalling.
Throw a rock into the air and it passes through moments before falling
through levels of time into our hands. In harmony with Tao we become
as the rock, Tao becomes our path and momentum. With a path and
momentum even the sage can fall through moments of time without
dissolving into nonbeing.
Hold fast to the center.
{:-])))
>Keynes <Key...@earthlinkspam.net> wrote:
>>Beginnings and ends are conjectures.
I might want to call them arbitrary lines.
>>No one has seen any beginning or ending.
A line can begin with a point.
The point gets drawn out for a spell.
At another point, the line ends.
Where the pencil or pen is removed,
that's the end of the line.
-----------------------------------------
>Every moment has a beginning and an ending.
One may be the other as well.
A slippery now, chopped into moments,
each one is the end of the previous and start
of the next one to follow.
Moments ago, I drew a line, above.
Did the moment really begin and end?
The line did, after a fashion, hence
there were really moments, movements.
Without motion, movement takes longer.
Without measure, time springs eternal.
Space makes way.
LauLuna
wrote:
>
> - Show quoted text -
Yes, maybe. The opposition singular/plural could do part of the job. I
confess I'm not apt to determine to what degree a native English
speaker grasps the opposition 'Sein/Seiendes' in 'being/beings'.
Most European languages formally distinguish the general meaning of
the verb (expressed by an infinitive) from the verbal adjective or
present participle:
Sein/Seiendes
Ser/ente
Être/étant
...
But English frequently uses a form identical to the present participle
for the general meaning of the verb, namely 'being', for the verb 'to
be'. Curiously this happened also in ancient Greek: 'tò ón', but not
in Latin: 'esse/ens'.
I wonder how Heidegger would express the ontological difference in his
beloved Greek. Perhaps just as you propose for English: 'tò ón/ tà
ónta'.
Now coming from metaphysics to logic, I wonder whether Heidegger's
Being relates to the beings as a set to its elements or a property to
the objects in its extension. For example, whether Heidegger would
have claimed that Boolos' plural quantification is alike to ignorance
of the ontological difference.
That's just fancy.
Regards
Paul Holbach
> In case you *are* interested in the connections to formal issues here,
> Peter Smith posted a series of very comprehensive reviews of a recent
> collection of papers on unrestricted quantification on his blog; click
> here:http://logicmatters.blogspot.com/search?q=absolute+generality
Here's Timothy Williamson's paper "Everything":
http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/1307/everything.pdf
Paul Holbach
> So you are saying that it is actually part of the meaning of
> "everything" that, among all the things, there is also a thing with is
> the set/collection/aggregation of all the things. I'm not sure what
> circles you run in, but I don't think anyone I know thinks that. I'm
> really sure my wife doesn't, and she seems to me to speak excellent
> English. :-)
One can say there are the things and their mereological sum: the sum
of things.
But the sum (or whole) of things is nothing over and above the things.
Keynes
Depends on what 'things' are.
Matches and wood make fire, although fire
isn't in them. You may say that I left oxygen
out. That's another thing. matches and wood
and oxygen don't make fire either, unless
somebody strikes the match. But matches
and wood and oxygen and somebody to
strike the match don't make fire without
that somebody intending to do it. And
there is probably some reason for a
person to make a fire. Possibly hunger
or cold, or pyromania.
Definitions. Sufficient causes.
Is there any end to it?
The All has exactly 10,000 things.
Begin counting.
Chris Menzel
<laurea...@yahoo.es> said:
> ...
> Now coming from metaphysics to logic, I wonder whether Heidegger's
> Being relates to the beings as a set to its elements or a property to
> the objects in its extension.
Pretty clearly he had something like that in mind, though the
set/members and property/instances distinctions are probably far too
clear to have interested anyone as Deep as Heidegger. ;-)
> For example, whether Heidegger would have claimed that Boolos' plural
> quantification is alike to ignorance of the ontological difference.
Well, he might have claimed it, but surely plural quantification is not
due to *ignorance* of the distinction but *awareness* of it, as the idea
(at least for Boolos and other defenders of the "ontological innocence"
of plural quantification) is exactly to avoid quantification over, hence
ontological commitment to, "higher-order" entities.
demibee
>I was wondering if I could get the benefit of your collective
>knowledge: I am looking for a word in philosophy (whether that be of
>math/metaphysics/religion) that denotes "everything", as in the whole
>continuous plenum that is reality - before we chop it up and partition
>it into conceptual objects and categories for everyday use ;)
A scientific term that comes close is "cosmos" -- the universe as a
unified system... as a single, large "event." But even that can be
used to refer only to *our* universe... If there are others, it may
or may not encompass that. It does, however, encompass all times
*within* this universe.
Any time I need to use a simple term for "Everything" in conversation,
without feeling the need to explain it, I tend toward "the Whole of
Reality" (capitals included), "Ultimate Reality," "The Infinite,"...
things like that. "Totality" is another possibility.
But if you're looking for a technical term, consider...
news://alt.sci.physics.new-theories
db
Nam D. Nguyen
> Hi all,
>
> I was wondering if I could get the benefit of your collective
> knowledge: I am looking for a word in philosophy (whether that be of
> math/metaphysics/religion) that denotes "everything", as in the whole
> continuous plenum that is reality - before we chop it up and partition
> it into conceptual objects and categories for everyday use ;)
How about "OM", as explained in:
http://www.dharmamemphis.com/symbols.htm
kleptoma...@hotmail.com
the naive notion of the "set of all sets". Using the english language,
or a language with roughly equivalent expressions to the above, for
many years, may lead one to think that because you can say it in the
english (or equivalent) language, it is coherent, and one should be
able to have rational conversations about it. This is, however, not
the case.
Jason Glumidge
> The notion of quantifying over "everything" is as unsatisfactory as
> the naive notion of the "set of all sets".
That's very interesting. I assume that is because a set of all sets
would then have to contain itself, which would then generate a new
set, which would also have to be contained, and so on ad infinitum?
Having said that, there are some set theories that do presuppose the
existence of such a universal set, no?
> Using the english language,
> or a language with roughly equivalent expressions to the above, for
> many years, may lead one to think that because you can say it in the
> english (or equivalent) language, it is coherent, and one should be
> able to have rational conversations about it. This is, however, not
> the case.
Yes I agree that the term "everything" is naive due to its
recursivity, but then that's the very reason I was considering the
situation that exists before a "thing" has been specified at all. It
seems to me that the universal set is probably the /exact/ concept I'm
trying to avoid. Regards, J.
JP
All the terms you are considering are discrete, and the only one that
I can think of that might not suggest a "thing", thus being non
discrete is continuum.
JP
herbzet
Marshall wrote:
> Jason Glumidge wrote:
> >
> > I was wondering if I could get the benefit of your collective
> > knowledge: I am looking for a word in philosophy (whether that be of
> > math/metaphysics/religion) that denotes "everything", as in the whole
> > continuous plenum that is reality - before we chop it up and partition
> > it into conceptual objects and categories for everyday use ;)
>
> "Universe"?
I like this answer -- like the Immortals in "Highlander", there can be,
finally, only One.
Etymologically, uni = Latin unus "one" + versus = Latin past pariciple
of verture "to turn".
From Latin "universus" literally "turned into one".
(G.S. Brown suggests ["Laws of Form"], iirc, "all that can be seen in one turn".)
Hmm, do "possible universes" fit into the plenum?
--
hz
herbzet
It is not at all clear what a "thing" is, (that which "has being"
in the Heideggerian sense), that we are to quantify over all of:
i.e., is a battalion a thing, or are the men that make up a battalion
things? Are men things, or are the atoms that make up men things?
Or are the quarks that make up the atoms things? Or are they all
things at different "levels" of organization?
Perhaps, after all, the only things there are, are classes ... ;-)
(Heidegger, btw, wrote a book "What Is a Thing"
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0895269791/hyperjeffhistory
which I must finish someday. See the reviews at amazon.)
--
hz
Chris Menzel
<Jason.G...@gmail.com> said:
> On May 18, 2:04 pm, kleptomaniac6...@hotmail.com wrote:
>> The notion of quantifying over "everything" is as unsatisfactory as
>> the naive notion of the "set of all sets".
>
> That's very interesting. I assume that is because a set of all sets
> would then have to contain itself, which would then generate a new
> set, which would also have to be contained, and so on ad infinitum?
> Having said that, there are some set theories that do presuppose the
> existence of such a universal set, no?
Quine's NF, for example.
>> Using the english language, or a language with roughly equivalent
>> expressions to the above, for many years, may lead one to think that
>> because you can say it in the english (or equivalent) language, it is
>> coherent, and one should be able to have rational conversations about
>> it. This is, however, not the case.
>
> Yes I agree that the term "everything" is naive due to its
> recursivity,
What is "recursive" about it?
kleptoma...@hotmail.com
> Perhaps, after all, the only things there are, are classes ... ;-)
Perhaps, after all, the only things there are, are super-middleweight
boxers.
Schlock
wrote:
>> Yes I agree that the term "everything" is naive due to its
>> recursivity, but then that's the very reason I was considering the
>> situation that exists before a "thing" has been specified at all. It
>> seems to me that the universal set is probably the /exact/ concept I'm
>> trying to avoid. Regards, J.
>
>All the terms you are considering are discrete, and the only one that
>I can think of that might not suggest a "thing", thus being non
>discrete is continuum.
Why not just use "A" or "X" and be done with it?
JP
> On Sun, 18 May 2008 10:53:47 -0700 (PDT), JP <gms2...@lycos.com>
Because A or X are discrete terms, they are what the OP called
"things".
"Everything" cannot be differentiated (discrete), because if it is, it
needs something against what to be differentiated and a criterion to
differentiate.
JP .
herbzet
How about "weightless generalized principles" (Buckminster Fuller)?
Any better?
--
hz
kleptoma...@hotmail.com
Well, I was joking. It makes no sense to say "the only things there
are, are <such and such>".
herbzet
kleptoma...@hotmail.com wrote:
> On May 20, 5:43 am, herbzet <herb...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > kleptomaniac6...@hotmail.com wrote:
> > > On May 19, 4:49 am, herbzet <herb...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > > > Perhaps, after all, the only things there are, are classes ... ;-)
> >
> > > Perhaps, after all, the only things there are, are super-middleweight
> > > boxers.
> >
> > How about "weightless generalized principles" (Buckminster Fuller)?
> >
> > Any better?
>
> Well, I was joking. It makes no sense to say "the only things there
> are, are <such and such>".
I was kind of joking too, hence the winkie. ;-)
--
hz
Paul Holbach
> I'm wondering if there is already a technical (or at least
> philosophical) term that describes the whole "fabric" of the universe
> of discourse.
In German there is the phrase "das All", which is a synonym of "the
universe".
And it seems that the equivalent English phrase "the All" is
linguistically acceptable.
Schlock
wrote:
>On May 19, 5:24 pm, Schlock <schl...@truthless.net> wrote:
>> On Sun, 18 May 2008 10:53:47 -0700 (PDT), JP <gms2...@lycos.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> >> Yes I agree that the term "everything" is naive due to its
>> >> recursivity, but then that's the very reason I was considering the
>> >> situation that exists before a "thing" has been specified at all. It
>> >> seems to me that the universal set is probably the /exact/ concept I'm
>> >> trying to avoid. Regards, J.
>>
>> >All the terms you are considering are discrete, and the only one that
>> >I can think of that might not suggest a "thing", thus being non
>> >discrete is continuum.
>>
>> Why not just use "A" or "X" and be done with it?
>
>Because A or X are discrete terms, they are what the OP called
>"things".
All names are discrete. "Names" just refer to combinations or
collations of predicates which determine groups, collectives, or
"sets" to which named things belong.
>"Everything" cannot be differentiated (discrete), because if it is, it
>needs something against what to be differentiated and a criterion to
>differentiate.
Not necessarily if we only work with differences between differences
and that principle compounded in terms of itself because that's what
defines "things".
"Everything" just requires specification of predicates in terms of
differences betweeen differences etc. which belong universally of
necessity to all things specified as part of the group including the
group itself.
If "differences" are that predicate, it's impossible to specify what
the antecedent requirements for differences are since differences
themselves are taken between differences. In other words you can't
really say that differences require "something" apart from differences
against which they're differentiated.
Doing so simply emphasizes assumptions regarding the origin of
differences. It makes no sense to argue that differences can only be
taken between things because things can only be known in terms of
differences with differences known only between other differences.
{:-])))
>All names are discrete. "Names" just refer to combinations or
>collations of predicates which determine groups, collectives, or
>"sets" to which named things belong.
>
>>"Everything" cannot be differentiated (discrete), because if it is, it
>>needs something against what to be differentiated and a criterion to
>>differentiate.
>
>Not necessarily if we only work with differences between differences
>and that principle compounded in terms of itself because that's what
>defines "things".
>
>"Everything" just requires specification of predicates in terms of
>differences betweeen differences etc. which belong universally of
>necessity to all things specified as part of the group including the
>group itself.
>
>If "differences" are that predicate, it's impossible to specify what
>the antecedent requirements for differences are since differences
>themselves are taken between differences. In other words you can't
>really say that differences require "something" apart from differences
>against which they're differentiated.
>
>Doing so simply emphasizes assumptions regarding the origin of
>differences. It makes no sense to argue that differences can only be
>taken between things because things can only be known in terms of
>differences with differences known only between other differences.
I guess that makes a difference.
-hmmm
Rick Lightburn
"deus sive natura," i.e., "God or (equivalently) nature." But he
concludes (in his fashion) that it is the only thing that exists,
while you seem to want to start there. I suspect that THAT may be the
challenge: you want a term to establish the "quiddity" (to coin a
term) of the totality. Not everyone would grant that such a concept
would be useful or valid. So you'd need an argument that it is useful
or valid.
A Platonist would (I think) deny that the sensible world has any
existence, and that only the ideals have existence. For them the
"universe of discourse" is exactly those ideals. So that the
"continuous plenum that is reality" begs that the Platonists (as I
imagine them) are wrong. I don't think that their claims can be
dismissed so lightly.
As noted elsewhere in the responses, "anatta" has overtones which you
may not want, and certainly has a point of view to which not all would
be sympathetic.
jason
> knowledge: I am looking for a word in philosophy (whether that be of
> math/metaphysics/religion) that denotes "everything", as in the whole
> continuous plenum that is reality - before we chop it up and partition
> it into conceptual objects and categories for everyday use ;)
>
> philosophical) term that describes the whole "fabric" of the universe
> "anatta" (thanks to google/wikipedia) but i'm not sure its perfect.
> The term "everything" is loaded in that it implies a set of all
> things, when really i'm coming from the reverse angle, of one
> universal thing that we then cut up as suits whatever task we are
> dealing with.
>
> Anyhow, thanks in advance for _any_ guidance you guys can give.
>
> All best, J.
"Being" would be my first pick, laid in opposition to the empty term
"nothing". If you don't want to include the concept "set" then I
imagine you've replaced it with an immanent, pantheistic kind of
concept.
Of course the concept of being has some pretty difficult philosophical
problems associated with it, which are still unresolved.
shuai.wang.zju
> Hi all,
>
> I was wondering if I could get the benefit of your collective
> knowledge: I am looking for a word in philosophy (whether that be of
> math/metaphysics/religion) that denotes "everything", as in the whole
> continuous plenum that is reality - before we chop it up and partition
> it into conceptual objects and categories for everyday use ;)
>
> I'm wondering if there is already a technical (or at least
> philosophical) term that describes the whole "fabric" of the universe
> of discourse. The closest I have found is something like
> "anatta" (thanks to google/wikipedia) but i'm not sure its perfect.
> The term "everything" is loaded in that it implies a set of all
> things, when really i'm coming from the reverse angle, of one
> universal thing that we then cut up as suits whatever task we are
> dealing with.
>
> Anyhow, thanks in advance for _any_ guidance you guys can give.
>
> All best, J.
How about the Chinese word 道 ，which is "Tao" in English?
{:-])))
cuz while Tao is in everything,
Tao isn't everything.
N
>
> How about the Chinese word 道 ，which is "Tao" in English?- Hide quoted text -
>
I don't know, perhaps the word 'money' describes a lot....and that
which
it can't we can pay someone else to do it, heh? ;)
John Jones
> Hi all,
>
> I was wondering if I could get the benefit of your collective
> knowledge: I am looking for a word in philosophy (whether that be of
> math/metaphysics/religion) that denotes "everything", as in the whole
> continuous plenum that is reality - before we chop it up and partition
> it into conceptual objects and categories for everyday use ;)
>
> I'm wondering if there is already a technical (or at least
> philosophical) term that describes the whole "fabric" of the universe
> of discourse. The closest I have found is something like
> "anatta" (thanks to google/wikipedia) but i'm not sure its perfect.
> The term "everything" is loaded in that it implies a set of all
> things, when really i'm coming from the reverse angle, of one
> universal thing that we then cut up as suits whatever task we are
> dealing with.
>
> Anyhow, thanks in advance for _any_ guidance you guys can give.
>
> All best, J.
Kant uses the term "manifold".
"Everything" could include phenomena, and noumena or things in
themselves. But according to transcendental idealism, things in
themselves are not things per se - they would not be included in the
term 'everything'.
You also can't have a set of everything. A set is distinguished by its
particular use, so it is difficult to see what particular use could be
accorded to everything, as a 'use' supposes an extra thing which uses.
You also can't use the term 'everything' to include incommensurables.
Liebniz'z monads, for example, as self-contained mirrors of the entire
world could not be countable (except by a presumed deity) and so could
not be included in a totality of 'everything'.
Simply, 'everything' presupposes that all things are alike and so
countable into a totality. But as I showed above, some 'things' cannot
be so included.
Jason Glumidge
> Jason Glumidge wrote:
> > Hi all,
>
> > I was wondering if I could get the benefit of your collective
> > knowledge: I am looking for a word in philosophy (whether that be of
> > math/metaphysics/religion) that denotes "everything", as in the whole
> > continuous plenum that is reality - before we chop it up and partition
> > it into conceptual objects and categories for everyday use ;)
>
> > I'm wondering if there is already a technical (or at least
> > philosophical) term that describes the whole "fabric" of the universe
> > of discourse. The closest I have found is something like
> > "anatta" (thanks to google/wikipedia) but i'm not sure its perfect.
> > The term "everything" is loaded in that it implies a set of all
> > things, when really i'm coming from the reverse angle, of one
> > universal thing that we then cut up as suits whatever task we are
> > dealing with.
>
> > Anyhow, thanks in advance for _any_ guidance you guys can give.
>
> > All best, J.
>
> Kant uses the term "manifold".
> "Everything" could include phenomena, and noumena or things in
> themselves. But according to transcendental idealism, things in
> themselves are not things per se - they would not be included in the
> term 'everything'.
Sorry, you've lost me. Things are not things? This sounds somewhat
kooky to my ears.
>
> You also can't have a set of everything. A set is distinguished by its
> particular use, so it is difficult to see what particular use could be
> accorded to everything, as a 'use' supposes an extra thing which uses.
>
> You also can't use the term 'everything' to include incommensurables.
> Liebniz'z monads, for example, as self-contained mirrors of the entire
> world could not be countable (except by a presumed deity) and so could
> not be included in a totality of 'everything'.
>
> Simply, 'everything' presupposes that all things are alike and so
> countable into a totality. But as I showed above, some 'things' cannot
> be so included.
Again not entirely clear what you mean here. Things are that which can
be counted as individuals - i.e. they possess numerical identity. It's
a quality that they all necessarily share, and the concept that
underpins logic. As such, simply stating that you've shown that some
things can't be included via collectivization doesn't really convince
me. But, of course, thanks for the feedback nonetheless ;)
John Jones
Kant's 'things in themselves' are things by name only. They refer to
objects that can have no possible description. We would not know how to
include them in a totality of everything.
>> You also can't have a set of everything. A set is distinguished by its
>> particular use, so it is difficult to see what particular use could be
>> accorded to everything, as a 'use' supposes an extra thing which uses.
>>
>> You also can't use the term 'everything' to include incommensurables.
>> Liebniz'z monads, for example, as self-contained mirrors of the entire
>> world could not be countable (except by a presumed deity) and so could
>> not be included in a totality of 'everything'.
>>
>> Simply, 'everything' presupposes that all things are alike and so
>> countable into a totality. But as I showed above, some 'things' cannot
>> be so included.
>
> Again not entirely clear what you mean here. Things are that which can
> be counted as individuals - i.e. they possess numerical identity. It's
> a quality that they all necessarily share, and the concept that
> underpins logic.
Some 'things' can't be counted: Liebnizean monads, solitary objects,
personal identity, Kant's intuitions or manifesting conditions of
objects. We might want to include Platonic Ideas which, before they are
particularized and countable, are uncountable ideal forms. Other
uncountables include archetypes, numbers, symbols, ... in fact there are
a lot of uncountable things. How will these be included in a totality of
everything?
> As such, simply stating that you've shown that some
> things can't be included via collectivization doesn't really convince
> me. But, of course, thanks for the feedback nonetheless ;)
This should convince you: if we say that a 'totality' is enough to list
'everything' then we leave out everything that can't be listed in a
totality. Such things as those I spoke of.
pela
"All" will include:
1. every-thing(s) [objects, manifested] included dark.
2. no-things-yet [potency]
3. all measurable energy processes
4. all non-measurable energy processes
dirk
Jason Glumidge
Noumena, right? But what rational justification could there ever be
for believing in the existence of such illusive things?
>
> >> You also can't have a set of everything. A set is distinguished by its
> >> particular use, so it is difficult to see what particular use could be
> >> accorded to everything, as a 'use' supposes an extra thing which uses.
>
> >> You also can't use the term 'everything' to include incommensurables.
> >> Liebniz'z monads, for example, as self-contained mirrors of the entire
> >> world could not be countable (except by a presumed deity) and so could
> >> not be included in a totality of 'everything'.
>
> >> Simply, 'everything' presupposes that all things are alike and so
> >> countable into a totality. But as I showed above, some 'things' cannot
> >> be so included.
>
> > Again not entirely clear what you mean here. Things are that which can
> > be counted as individuals - i.e. they possess numerical identity. It's
> > a quality that they all necessarily share, and the concept that
> > underpins logic.
>
> Some 'things' can't be counted: Liebnizean monads, solitary objects,
> personal identity, Kant's intuitions or manifesting conditions of
> objects. We might want to include Platonic Ideas which, before they are
> particularized and countable, are uncountable ideal forms
See my last answer ;)
> Other uncountables include archetypes, numbers, symbols, ... in fact there are
> a lot of uncountable things. How will these be included in a totality of
> everything?
I'm not sure numerical identity exactly equates to sets of things
being countable in terms of cardinality.
>
> > As such, simply stating that you've shown that some
> > things can't be included via collectivization doesn't really convince
> > me. But, of course, thanks for the feedback nonetheless ;)
>
> This should convince you: if we say that a 'totality' is enough to list
> 'everything' then we leave out everything that can't be listed in a
> totality. Such things as those I spoke of.
I'd totally agree with you there....if there was any suggestion that
all those non-things you mentioned existed, or if we were actually
talking about collectivizing every "thing" - the concept I was looking
for (originally) concerned the view of a universal whole /before/ its
chopped up into things, so this might all be a red herring. Again,
thanks for the feedback, its all interesting stuff.
John Jones
> On May 30, 3:52 pm, John Jones <jonescard...@aol.com> wrote:
>> Jason Glumidge wrote:
>> Some 'things' can't be counted: Liebnizean monads, solitary objects,
>> personal identity, Kant's intuitions or manifesting conditions of
>> objects. We might want to include Platonic Ideas which, before they are
>> particularized and countable, are uncountable ideal forms
>
> See my last answer ;)
>
>> Other uncountables include archetypes, numbers, symbols, ... in fact there are
>> a lot of uncountable things. How will these be included in a totality of
>> everything?
>
> I'm not sure numerical identity exactly equates to sets of things
> being countable in terms of cardinality.
We can change the crireria of what it is to be included in 'everything'
to 'the totality of facts'.
>>> As such, simply stating that you've shown that some
>>> things can't be included via collectivization doesn't really convince
>>> me. But, of course, thanks for the feedback nonetheless ;)
>> This should convince you: if we say that a 'totality' is enough to list
>> 'everything' then we leave out everything that can't be listed in a
>> totality. Such things as those I spoke of.
>
> I'd totally agree with you there....if there was any suggestion that
> all those non-things you mentioned existed, or if we were actually
> talking about collectivizing every "thing" - the concept I was looking
> for (originally) concerned the view of a universal whole /before/ its
> chopped up into things, so this might all be a red herring. Again,
> thanks for the feedback, its all interesting stuff.
You are talking about an emergent property that arises from all things,
and not simply a totality of all things. Either that, or you mean the
set of conditions that need to be in place before we can even speak of
objects or things. These won't be included in a list of objects or things.
Nick Argall
> Again not entirely clear what you mean here. Things are that which can
> be counted as individuals - i.e. they possess numerical identity. It's
> a quality that they all necessarily share, and the concept that
> underpins logic. As such, simply stating that you've shown that some
> things can't be included via collectivization doesn't really convince
> me. But, of course, thanks for the feedback nonetheless ;)
That's an interesting Thing to say.
Then again: "Things are that which can be counted as individuals -
i.e. they possess numerical identity." --- that's also an interesting
thing to say.
"numerical identity" is a less interesting thing to say, but it's
still some-thing.
How many things did you say?
Nick
Zen again, maybe not.
Nick Argall
> No, I was saying that the term "everything" implies that there were
> "things" in the first place, before we considered all of them
> together. I was just wondering if there was a term already used that
> tried to avoid that commitment. Been some great suggestions anyhow,
> and lots of food for thought.
OK, here's the thing:
Once you invoke the power of naming, the name gets a meaning. This
immediately implies that there's non-meaning for the name - 'proper
usage' requires 'improper usage' (in theory, if not in practice),
otherwise, the name is meaningless.
So you could say, "Everything, including all the non-things" if you
wanted to. It's vague and contradictory, but so is the concept that
you're trying to express. Alternatively, one could say "Things are
not separate" (which would be very 'asian philosophy'), and having
arrived at a definition of 'thing' that does not require integer
arithmetic, one (or many) can use 'everything' to mean 'everything,
including all the non-things'.
The next alternative is to explain yourself, but jargon is far more
emotionally satisfying. (Knowing magic words gives a satisfying
sensation of power.)
Nick
That's my name, don't wear it out (unless it's your name, in which
case I really shouldn't try to stop you from wearing it anywhere you
like)
marika
"N" <n.m....@hotmail.co.uk> wrote in message
news:0c52b255-1c2c-4117...@2g2000hsn.googlegroups.com...
>>
> I don't know, perhaps the word 'money' describes a lot....and that
> which
> it can't we can pay someone else to do it, heh? ;)
No one is gossiping yet, but the meeting isn’t til tomorrow so I’ll
probably know more then
Well hang in there.
mk5000
"All secrets sleep in winters clothes
With one you loved so long ago
Now he don't even know his name
What a beautiful face"--In th Aeroplane over the sea, Neutral Milk Hotel
marika
"jason" <jasonk...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:5cfbdd52-eb43-452d...@j33g2000pri.googlegroups.com...
"Being" would be my first pick, laid in opposition to the empty term
"nothing". If you don't want to include the concept "set" then I
imagine you've replaced it with an immanent, pantheistic kind of
concept.
Of course the concept of being has some pretty difficult philosophical
problems associated with it, which are still unresolved.
================
LOVE the rant
mk5000
"well so long, farewell, good-bye.
And the telephone goes off.
Pick the receiver up, try to meet ends
and find out the beginning, the end and the best of it"--teethlike god's
shoeshine, Modest Mouse
marika
"Paul Holbach" <paulholbachD...@freenet.de> wrote in message
news:6f79950c-e476-4d78...@x41g2000hsb.googlegroups.com...
>
> In German there is the phrase "das All", which is a synonym of "the
> universe".
You lost me, I am very confused by all your choices, I didn't really fully
understand any of them and you never mentioned actual DATES... I think my
father is in
Germany anyway? but I'm not sure
>
mk5000
"The truth of the matter is, my dear woman, that if you were
truly concerned about your health then you would abstain from all
interaction on the Usenet, shunning all the crapola, releasing all
the pent up venom you've built up inside over the years, release it
and live! But, no, here you are contrary to what you've posted above
stirring up crap since desire for attention far supercedes that of
your bodies health or even the health of your mind"--dr wee hung low