Understanding philosophers
ja...@news.delphi.com
can gorw a red apple which is not red, he has uttered a contradiction. If
a philosopher says that hethinks reason and faith are compatible, then he
has also uttered a contradiction, because reason is the faculty which
accepts conclusions on ther basis of evidence, while faith accepts them in
spite of or in absense of evidence. Such distinctions as
"knowledge/reason" are uselesss in this case (how can there be a conflict
between the object of reason and that faculty itself?). If you accept a
conclusion on faith, you bar yourself from examining the evidence, and
accustom your mind to accept arbitrary cliams _qua_ arbitrary.
The interpretative tack taken by Kress and others mirrors that taken by
George Walsh in his address to the Ayn Rand Society entitled "Ayn Rand an
the Metaphysics of Kant." He fought Rand's polemics against Kant by saying
that "Kant didn't say that he wanted to destroy reason," and then
bringing up a 1,001 nonessential distinctions to justify this. There is an
implicit subjectivism in here: Since the mind is a distorting mechanism,
we shouldn't try and interpret any thinker, but merely spill out the
details of his doctrine. The question of sorting through all these minor
distinctions and discovering the philosopher's _fundamental_
position on the issues is regarded as irrelevant.
Mr. Kress and his ilk have failed to ask the fundamental question: What
happens when
you try and _practice_ a philosopher's doctrine? Do these distinctions make
any difference if you tryu and act on these ideas? And the answer, in this
case, is no. If a man accepts the arbitrary on faith, he is shutting off
his mind to reality. He is refusing to process the facts, and is
resigning himself to a pathetic mental passivity.
A final note: Mr. Kress has never given this fabulous "reason" Kant held
for having faith in God, Freedom, and Immortality. It deserves to be
brought out.
Kant proved his epistemological doctrines by accepting the absolute
validity of physics and mathematics, and then deducing from them the
proper principles of human thinking. How did he know that science and math
were valid? "...we can say with confidence that certain pure _a_priori_
synthetical cognitions, pure Mathematics and pure Physics are actual and
given; for both contain propositions, which are thoroughly recognized as
apodeictally certain, partly by mere reason, _partly_from_general_consent_
_arising_from_experience_,..." (Prolegomena, Carus edition, p.25) Why is
"general consent" necessary? This is an instance of Kant's social
subjectivism.
This principle extends into his ethics. We must have God, Freedom, and
Immortality, he says, in order to have ethics. Why these principles?
Because Kant accepts the Christian ethics as the paradigm of this
science. Why the Christian ethics? Because these principles are "known, in
some sense, by every decent man, however untutored." (Foundations, intro. to
Paul Wolff version, p.xvi.)
So Kant "proves" that we should use faith by assuming, on the basis of
subjectivist agreement, that Christianity is the right thing to do.
Anyway you look at it, Mr. Kress, Kant is anything but the champion of
reason you make him out to be.
Jay Allen
P.S. Yes, I've removed Kress from my kill file, only because keeping him
in there gives him far more ammunition against me. guess I'll just haveto
endure his ad hominem and his defensive anger when people point out that
he doesn't understand what they just told him.
KRESSJA
>: A clue to understanding a philosopher like Kant: If a man says that he
>can gorw a red apple which is not red, he has uttered a contradiction. If
>a philosopher says that hethinks reason and faith are compatible, then he
>has also uttered a contradiction, because reason is the faculty which
>accepts conclusions on ther basis of evidence, while faith accepts them in
>spite of or in absense of evidence. Such distinctions as
Beg.beg.beg the question some more, why don't you? The contradiction exists
only if we accept YOUR definitions. Kant says otherwise, and if a great
philosopher says something, then isn't it precipitous to dismiss it without
evidence? You ask us to do what you denounce: to accept your definitions
on faith and without evidence.
>"knowledge/reason" are uselesss in this case (how can there be a conflict
>between the object of reason and that faculty itself?). If you accept a
>conclusion on faith, you bar yourself from examining the evidence, and
>accustom your mind to accept arbitrary cliams _qua_ arbitrary.
Despite your efforts to promote this, we will not accept what you say
without evidence. Strange that you claim to be against this, at the
same time as you insist upon it.
>The interpretative tack taken by Kress and others mirrors that taken by
>George Walsh in his address to the Ayn Rand Society entitled "Ayn Rand an
>the Metaphysics of Kant." He fought Rand's polemics against Kant by saying
>that "Kant didn't say that he wanted to destroy reason," and then
>bringing up a 1,001 nonessential distinctions to justify this. There is an
>implicit subjectivism in here: Since the mind is a distorting mechanism,
>we shouldn't try and interpret any thinker, but merely spill out the
>details of his doctrine. The question of sorting through all these minor
>distinctions and discovering the philosopher's _fundamental_
>position on the issues is regarded as irrelevant.
Which, like Grossman, allows you to know NOTHING about the philosopher whom
you criticize, while claiming to talk about "fundamental positions," (usually
gotten straight from Rand).
>Mr. Kress and his ilk have failed to ask the fundamental question: What
>happens when
>you try and _practice_ a philosopher's doctrine? Do these distinctions make
>any difference if you tryu and act on these ideas?
I have asked this question in regard to objectivism and have been told that
it is unfair/inappropriate/etc. If I post bout Rand's "fundamental
positions" I am immediately asked for specific evidence. I reserve the
right to require the same of you.
>And the answer, in this
>case, is no. If a man accepts the arbitrary on faith, he is shutting off
>his mind to reality. He is refusing to process the facts, and is
>resigning himself to a pathetic mental passivity.
More objectivist claptrap. Kant (to say it again) doesn't ask one to
take anything on faith, either in theory or in practice.
>A final note: Mr. Kress has never given this fabulous "reason" Kant held
>for having faith in God, Freedom, and Immortality. It deserves to be
>brought out.
>
>Kant proved his epistemological doctrines by accepting the absolute
>validity of physics and mathematics, and then deducing from them the
>proper principles of human thinking. How did he know that science and math
>were valid? "...we can say with confidence that certain pure _a_priori_
>synthetical cognitions, pure Mathematics and pure Physics are actual and
>given; for both contain propositions, which are thoroughly recognized as
>apodeictally certain, partly by mere reason, _partly_from_general_consent_
>_arising_from_experience_,..." (Prolegomena, Carus edition, p.25) Why is
>"general consent" necessary? This is an instance of Kant's social
>subjectivism.
Because everyone has experience. In this case it's called "counting."
Anyone who doubts that 2 + 3 = 5, can go and count it out for himself.
>This principle extends into his ethics. We must have God, Freedom, and
>Immortality, he says, in order to have ethics. Why these principles
He gives reasons.
>Because Kant accepts the Christian ethics as the paradigm of this
>science. Why the Christian ethics? Because these principles are "known, in
>some sense, by every decent man, however untutored." (Foundations, intro. to
>Paul Wolff version, p.xvi.)
It isn't Christian ethics; Kant's works were condemned by the Pope, for
example.
>So Kant "proves" that we should use faith by assuming, on the basis of
>subjectivist agreement, that Christianity is the right thing to do.
Not at all. Kant even critiques Christianity on a number of points.
>Anyway you look at it, Mr. Kress, Kant is anything but the champion of
>reason you make him out to be.
So long as you look at it through the objectivist lens, which means begging
the question. I will admit that Kant is NOT a champion of REASON AS
DEFINED BY AYN RAND. He would consider it immoral, i.e. beneath human
dignity.
>P.S. Yes, I've removed Kress from my kill file, only because keeping him
>in there gives him far more ammunition against me. guess I'll just haveto
>endure his ad hominem and his defensive anger when people point out that
>he doesn't understand what they just told him.
Brave of you. You'll also have to deal with my humor and my good arguments
and my eidence that Rand warps Kant beyond all recognition and contradicts
herself quite a bit as well.
-JK
____________________________________________________________________________
| | |
| John Kress | "The last thing *I* should promise would be to 'improve' |
| | mankind. No new idols are erected by me; let the old |
| | ones learn what feet of clay mean." |
| | -Nietzsche, Ecce Homo |
|________________|___________________________________________________________|
Stephen Grossman
>If a philosopher says that hethinks reason and faith are compatible, then he
>has also uttered a contradiction, because reason is the faculty which
>accepts conclusions on ther basis of evidence, while faith accepts them in
>spite of or in absense of evidence.
>
>The interpretative tack taken by Kress and others mirrors that taken by
>George Walsh in his address to the Ayn Rand Society entitled "Ayn Rand an
>the Metaphysics of Kant." He fought Rand's polemics against Kant by saying
>that "Kant didn't say that he wanted to destroy reason," and then
>bringing up a 1,001 nonessential distinctions to justify this.
>
THanks.i was wondering about this.
>Mr. Kress and his ilk have failed to ask the fundamental question: What
>happens when
>you try and _practice_ a philosopher's doctrine? Do these distinctions make
>any difference if you tryu and act on these ideas? And the answer, in this
>case, is no.
>
>A final note: Mr. Kress has never given this fabulous "reason" Kant held
>for having faith in God, Freedom, and Immortality. It deserves to be
>brought out.
>
>Kant proved his epistemological doctrines by accepting
>by mere reason, _partly_from_general_consent_
>social subjectivism.
>
>Kant accepts the Christian ethics
>Because these principles are "known, in
>some sense, by every decent man, however untutored." (Foundations, intro. to
>Paul Wolff version, p.xvi.)
>
>So Kant "proves" that we should use faith by assuming, on the basis of
>subjectivist agreement, that Christianity is the right thing to do.
>
>Anyway you look at it, Mr. Kress, Kant is anything but the champion of
>reason you make him out to be.
>
Very good on essentials! Now, it remains to be seen how Kress and other
Kantians will rationalize away your comments aND quotes.
One day, feeling bored and a desire for amusement, i turned to the intro of
the _Critique of Pure Reason_. All Kant does is discuss various states or
types of subjective experience. THe entire book is an elaboration, a hidiously
complicated elaboration of Kant's interest in subjective experience and its
alleged transcendence by unknowable noumena. THere is no concern with
objective reality (ignoring the absurdity and dishonesty of claiming that the
products of subjective exp are objective; so my fantasy of red elephants is
"objective" because it is "out there" in my consciousness). Of course, Kantian
scholars will claim i ignored some obscure footnote in which Kant makes
further distinctions among subjective experiences and so I am not aas precise
as i should be. I don't care to know the abssurd details of how people evade
reality. THat's for therapists. THe principle is clear: reality or
subjectivism.reply
In his 1st preface, Kant starts out by allegedly talkiing about reason.
Curiously, tho, he never relates his alleged reason to reality. He has ignored
reality for the primacy of his consciousness and then tries to work backwards
to it. He never finds it, except in traditional faith. End of Kant.
################################################################################
"Wink, wink. Nudge, nudge."
[Kant, _Critique of Pure Reason_]
################################################################################
Stephen Grossman
>In article <26jj4b$1...@news.delphi.com>, ja...@news.delphi.com (JA...@DELPHI.COM) writes...
>
>>happens when
>>you try and _practice_ a philosopher's doctrine? Do these distinctions make
>>any difference if you tryu and act on these ideas?
>
>I have asked this question in regard to objectivism and have been told that
>it is unfair/inappropriate/etc. If I post bout Rand's "fundamental
>positions" I am immediately asked for specific evidence. I reserve the
>right to require the same of you.
i notice Kress stiil wont answer
>>
>>Kant proved his epistemological doctrines by accepting the absolute
>>validity of physics and mathematics, and then deducing from them the
>>proper principles of human thinking. How did he know that science and math
>>were valid? "...we can say with confidence that certain pure _a_priori_
>>synthetical cognitions, pure Mathematics and pure Physics are actual and
>>given; for both contain propositions, which are thoroughly recognized as
>>apodeictally certain, partly by mere reason, _partly_from_general_consent_
>>_arising_from_experience_,..." (Prolegomena, Carus edition, p.25) Why is
>>"general consent" necessary? This is an instance of Kant's social
>>subjectivism.
>
>Because everyone has experience. In this case it's called "counting."
>Anyone who doubts that 2 + 3 = 5, can go and count it out for himself.
Kress knows Kant's principles cannot be objectively defended so he focuses
upon a detail. and if you refuted that detail he would conceptually
disintegrate to fine dust and discuss details about deetails.....ad infinitum.
I note Kress does not discuss the weakness and dishonesty of Kants reliance
upon mere general consent.
>
>>This principle extends into his ethics. We must have God, Freedom, and
>>Immortality, he says, in order to have ethics. Why these principles
>
>He gives reasons.
And their ultimate validation? Faith! Widen your awareness!
>
>>Because Kant accepts the Christian ethics as the paradigm of this
>>science. Why the Christian ethics? Because these principles are "known, in
>>some sense, by every decent man, however untutored." (Foundations, intro. to
>>Paul Wolff version, p.xvi.)
>
>It isn't Christian ethics; Kant's works were condemned by the Pope, for
>example.
Kress is a competent student of Kant in that he has learned to evade objective
principles and reality with pragmatic sophistication and constant
disintegration. Make the issue small enough and Kant, Kress, etc will
"happily' provide details until Hell freezes over.
>
>>So Kant "proves" that we should use faith by assuming, on the basis of
>>subjectivist agreement, that Christianity is the right thing to do.
>
>Not at all. Kant even critiques Christianity on a number of points.
Again, Kress evades the principle, faith and sacrifice, for differing views on
exactly how one should evade reality. Well, we can evade reality with racism,
altruism, statism, ethnicity, economic classes or any one of any infinity of
subjective states of consciousness. Nietzche was, at least honest about this in
predicting nihilism and threnecessity for constantly fighting dispair. I
suggest Nietzche would despise Kress' intellectual cowardice in refsing to
admit that faith in the alleged duty to sacrifice himself is HIS principle.
Now, of course, Kress will discourse on why I don't have sacrifice exactly
right. "Well, you see, you should sacrifice yourself by jumping off a cliff
rather than hanging. anmd make sure its a cliff near a church, a Pietist
church, after dark, on Sunday, after vespers, and carry a Bible in your pocket
and a sprig of garlic around your throat incase this is all a lot of happy
horseshit.
J W Dalton
>In article <26jj4b$1...@news.delphi.com>, ja...@news.delphi.com (JA...@DELPHI.COM) writes...
>>: A clue to understanding a philosopher like Kant: If a man says that he
>>can gorw a red apple which is not red, he has uttered a contradiction. If
>>a philosopher says that hethinks reason and faith are compatible, then he
>>has also uttered a contradiction, because reason is the faculty which
>>accepts conclusions on ther basis of evidence, while faith accepts them in
>>spite of or in absense of evidence. Such distinctions as
>Beg.beg.beg the question some more, why don't you? The contradiction exists
>only if we accept YOUR definitions. Kant says otherwise, and if a great
>philosopher says something, then isn't it precipitous to dismiss it without
>evidence? You ask us to do what you denounce: to accept your definitions
>on faith and without evidence.
Objectivists have a magical theory of meaning. They think there is a
true definition of each word (that's the magical theory -- think of
true names), so if someone uses them differently they are wrong. But
if Kant specifies a definition that to the Objectivist is nonstandard
and wrong they will _misunderstand_ Kant if they suppose that he is
nonehteless using the term their way. So ... as a complement to my
adivice that non-Objectivists prefix words with $ to indicate they
have their Objectivist sense, I suggest Objectivists prefix Kant's
words with "K-".
Now, if Kant thinks K-reason and K-faith are compatible, maybe
he's right. He'd be wrong if he said $faith and $reason are
compatible; but he doesn't say that, he says K-faith and K-reason
are compatible.
Now, if anyone really wants to they can fight over whether
reason is K-reason or $reason and whether faith is K-faith
or $faith, but I think they'll look pretty silly if they do.
-- jd
Stephen Grossman
>
>Objectivists have a magical theory of meaning. They think there is a
>true definition of each word (that's the magical theory -- think of
>true names), so if someone uses them differently they are wrong. But
>if Kant specifies a definition that to the Objectivist is nonstandard
>and wrong they will _misunderstand_ Kant if they suppose that he is
>nonehteless using the term their way. So ... as a complement to my
>adivice that non-Objectivists prefix words with $ to indicate they
>have their Objectivist sense, I suggest Objectivists prefix Kant's
>words with "K-".
>
>Now, if Kant thinks K-reason and K-faith are compatible, maybe
>he's right. He'd be wrong if he said $faith and $reason are
>compatible; but he doesn't say that, he says K-faith and K-reason
>are compatible.
>
>Now, if anyone really wants to they can fight over whether
>reason is K-reason or $reason and whether faith is K-faith
>or $faith, but I think they'll look pretty silly if they do.
your major point, that definitions are system-dependent (ie, contextual) is
very good. It would eliminate much confusion to keep this systematically
clear. In fact, an entire, systematic theory of context would be a great
intellectual help to philosophy. I believe you may find that it has already
been created, fortunately. Its called Objectivism. Try it, you'll like it.
KRESSJA
pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU (Stephen Grossman) meeps and gibbers...
>In article <CD1vI...@festival.ed.ac.uk>, je...@festival.ed.ac.uk (J W Dalton) writes:
>>
>>Objectivists have a magical theory of meaning. They think there is a
>>true definition of each word (that's the magical theory -- think of
>>true names), so if someone uses them differently they are wrong. But
>>if Kant specifies a definition that to the Objectivist is nonstandard
>>and wrong they will _misunderstand_ Kant if they suppose that he is
>>nonehteless using the term their way. So ... as a complement to my
>>adivice that non-Objectivists prefix words with $ to indicate they
>>have their Objectivist sense, I suggest Objectivists prefix Kant's
>>words with "K-".
>>
>>Now, if Kant thinks K-reason and K-faith are compatible, maybe
>>he's right. He'd be wrong if he said $faith and $reason are
>>compatible; but he doesn't say that, he says K-faith and K-reason
>>are compatible.
>>
>>Now, if anyone really wants to they can fight over whether
>>reason is K-reason or $reason and whether faith is K-faith
>>or $faith, but I think they'll look pretty silly if they do.
>your major point, that definitions are system-dependent (ie, contextual) is
>very good. It would eliminate much confusion to keep this systematically
>clear. In fact, an entire, systematic theory of context would be a great
>intellectual help to philosophy. I believe you may find that it has already
>been created, fortunately. It's called Objectivism. Try it, you'll like it.
Then why is it that many objectivists, and you in particular, refuse to take
terms as their authors employed them? Why, for instance, do you keep insisting
that Kant advocates what Mr.Dalton calls $faith (objectivist faith)?
-JK
P.S. I still await your answers to my Quick Kant Quiz, or else a retraction
of your claim to know more about Kant than I do...
"ever eager to enlighten and clarify"
______________________________________________________________________________
| | |
| John Kress | "Could it be that this sensuous chaos the rational mind |
| | overcomes is the trace of the tragic essence of nature, |
| | economy of glory and of horror, solar economy, that which |
| | which was disallowed by the natural philosophy of Aristotle?"|
| | -Alphonso Lingis, Excesses |
|______________|_______________________________________________________________|
Stephen Grossman
>true definition of each word (that's the magical theory -- think of
>true names), so if someone uses them differently they are wrong. But
>if Kant specifies a definition that to the Objectivist is nonstandard
>and wrong they will _misunderstand_ Kant if they suppose that he is
>nonehteless using the term their way. So ... as a complement to my
>adivice that non-Objectivists prefix words with $ to indicate they
>have their Objectivist sense, I suggest Objectivists prefix Kant's
>words with "K-".
>
>Now, if Kant thinks K-reason and K-faith are compatible, maybe
>he's right. He'd be wrong if he said $faith and $reason are
>compatible; but he doesn't say that, he says K-faith and K-reason
>are compatible.
>
>Now, if anyone really wants to they can fight over whether
>reason is K-reason or $reason and whether faith is K-faith
>or $faith, but I think they'll look pretty silly if they do.
You are starting to systematically recognize existence. Im not sure what you
mean by your last paragraph but you may be interested in an online, 16p essay,
"Existence 2," in which,among other things, the very fact that there are
different philosophies is discussed. Its as radical to the history of
philosophy (including Objectivism) as Obj is to conventional philosophy.
________________________________________________________________________________
His teeth chattered and he jerked bolt upright, a bead of sweat rolling
down his forehead. The urine-stained copy of _The Critique of Pure Reason_
slid from his limp hand to the cockroaches and cigarette butts on the floor. He
widened his eyes and screamed soundlessly. "Oh, the horror, the horror," he
whimpered. "Existence really exists!" The light bulb flickered again and
popped. They found a pawn ticket in his pocket but it wasn't enough to cover
the rent. A shovel of lime in a pauper's grave and it was done.
Stephen Grossman
kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu (KRESSJA) writes, as best he can.......
>In article <CD2Eo...@umassd.edu>,
>pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU (Stephen Grossman) meeps and gibbers...
>>In article <CD1vI...@festival.ed.ac.uk>, je...@festival.ed.ac.uk (J W Dalton) writes:
>
>>your major point, that definitions are system-dependent (ie, contextual) is
>>very good. It would eliminate much confusion to keep this systematically
>>clear. In fact, an entire, systematic theory of context would be a great
>>intellectual help to philosophy. I believe you may find that it has already
>>been created, fortunately. It's called Objectivism. Try it, you'll like it.
>Then why is it that many objectivists, and you in particular, refuse to take
>terms as their authors employed them? Why, for instance, do you keep insisting
>that Kant advocates what Mr.Dalton calls $faith (objectivist faith)?
"take terms as their authors employed them?" IN WHAT CONTEXT, Obj, Plato,
Kress, empiricism, idealism, etc? God is an intellectually destructive
concept, whether it goes by the name of Form of the Good, metaphysical
essence, noumena, cogito, Sartre's nothing(!), ideal language, the arbitrary
and conventional, etc. Your positivist faith in out-of-context facts is
touching but we must be adults here. No Schopenhauerian wimpering, nosiree!
Tighten your belt and suck in that gut! No philosophical flabbiness in my
outfit! What would Nietzche think? You should be ashamed of yourself. Here,
have a tissue. There is no "terms as their authors employed them" which exists
in some metaphysically privileged realm, contacted by "intellectual inuition."
There is only "terms as their authors employed them" IN SOME CONTEXT. Your
implicit context is naive realism since you are not critical about the context
within which you understand "terms as their authors employed them." You may
use a context from Nietzche, analysis, phenomenology, postmodernism, Obj,
Pragmatism, etc. but you must and will use a context, some context, any
context. Knowledge of reality is contextual. Reality is cognitively processed
by consciousness. Aristotle recognized that reality was knowable but denied
cognitive processing as part of knowledge. Kant recognized cognitive
processing but denied it could reach reality. BOTH thought cognitive
processing was a barrier to knowing reality.
"to attain a knowledge of the real we must go out of consciousness." [Henry
Mansel, "On the Phil. of Kant"]
"The implicit, but unadmitted premise of the neo-mystics of modern philosophy,
is the notion that only an ineffable consciousness can acquire a valid
knowledge of reality, that 'true' knowledge has to be causeless, ie, acquired
without any means of cognition." [Rand, IOE, 1990, 80]
"'True nutrition' has to consist of absorbing some ineffable substance without
the participation of a digestive system, but since man is incapbale of 'true
feeding,' nutrition is a subjective matter open to his whim, and it is merely
a social convention that forbids him to eat poisonous mushrooms." [Rand, IOE,
1990, 81]
"Nature, to be apprehended, must be obeyed." [Rand, op cit, 82]
"The rules of cognition must be derived from the nature of existence and the
nature, the identity, of his cognitive faculty." [Rand, ibid]
>P.S. I still await your answers to my Quick Kant Quiz, or else a retraction
>of your claim to know more about Kant than I do...
You know more about Kant than i do, IN SOME CONTEXT. What is that context?
>
>"ever eager to enlighten and clarify"
Then, dare I say it, you're an eager beaver! Listen, bub, you couldn't
enlighten a dark room with a searchlight. What does clarifying butter to get
ice cream have to do with philosophy?
> ______________________________________________________________________________
>| | |
>| John Kress | "Could it be that this sensuous chaos the rational mind |
>| | overcomes is the trace of the tragic essence of nature, |
>| | economy of glory and of horror, solar economy, that which |
>| | which was disallowed by the natural philosophy of Aristotle?"|
>| | -Alphonso Lingis, Excesses |
>|______________|_______________________________________________________________|
I guess this means you're educated, huh? Far out, man. Boy, would I like to
be educated. The only thing i know is philosophy.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
His teeth chattered and he jerked bolt upright, a bead of sweat rolling
down his forehead. The urine-stained copy of _The Critique of Pure Reason_
slid from his limp hand to the cockroaches and cigarette butts on the floor. He
widened his eyes and screamed soundlessly. "Oh, the horror, the horror," he
whimpered. "Existence really exists!" The light bulb flickered again and
popped. They found a pawn ticket in his pocket but it wasn't enough to cover
the burial. A shovel of lime in a pauper's grave and it was done.
KRESSJA
>>Then why is it that many objectivists, and you in particular, refuse to take
>>terms as their authors employed them? Why, for instance, do you keep insisting
>>that Kant advocates what Mr.Dalton calls $faith (objectivist faith)?
>
>"take terms as their authors employed them?" IN WHAT CONTEXT, Obj, Plato,
>Kress, empiricism, idealism, etc? God is an intellectually destructive
>concept, whether it goes by the name of Form of the Good, metaphysical
>essence, noumena, cogito, Sartre's nothing(!), ideal language, the arbitrary
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Since the philosophers in question specifically claimed that what they were
talking about was NOT God, then you need to make an argument. (We know you
can't, but the burden is nevertheless yours...)
>and conventional, etc. Your positivist faith in out-of-context facts is
>touching but we must be adults here. No Schopenhauerian wimpering, nosiree!
>Tighten your belt and suck in that gut! No philosophical flabbiness in my
>outfit! What would Nietzche think? You should be ashamed of yourself. Here,
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
I don't know. But I suspect that NIETZSCHE wouldn't approve of what you have
say...
>have a tissue. There is no "terms as their authors employed them" which exists
^^
The word that you were groping for is "are."
>in some metaphysically privileged realm, contacted by "intellectual inuition."
>There is only "terms as their authors employed them" IN SOME CONTEXT. Your
>implicit context is naive realism since you are not critical about the context
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Nope. Needs proof, which means, an argument. You objectivists are far closer
to naive realism than anyone else around here. "Goofy realism," let's call
it. ;)=
>within which you understand "terms as their authors employed them." You may
>use a context from Nietzche, analysis, phenomenology, postmodernism, Obj,
^^^^^^^^
Nietzsche, damn it! Is the reason that you denounce Kant so often that he's
the only philosopher whose name you can spell correctly?
>Pragmatism, etc. but you must and will use a context, some context, any
>context. Knowledge of reality is contextual. Reality is cognitively processed
>by consciousness. Aristotle recognized that reality was knowable but denied
>cognitive processing as part of knowledge. Kant recognized cognitive
>processing but denied it could reach reality. BOTH thought cognitive
>processing was a barrier to knowing reality.
Old, normal, standard realism...
>"to attain a knowledge of the real we must go out of consciousness." [Henry
>Mansel, "On the Phil. of Kant"]
>"The implicit, but unadmitted premise of the neo-mystics of modern philosophy,
>is the notion that only an ineffable consciousness can acquire a valid
>knowledge of reality, that 'true' knowledge has to be causeless, ie, acquired
>without any means of cognition." [Rand, IOE, 1990, 80]
OUT OF CONSCIOUSNESS. The quote that you use refutes your point. Kant insists
again and again that there CAN BE NO KNOWLEDGE without something empirically
given.
>"'True nutrition' has to consist of absorbing some ineffable substance without
>the participation of a digestive system, but since man is incapbale of 'true
>feeding,' nutrition is a subjective matter open to his whim, and it is merely
>a social convention that forbids him to eat poisonous mushrooms." [Rand, IOE,
>1990, 81]
Straw man. Kant never claims that knowledge is conventional. He claims the
opposite, in fact.
>"Nature, to be apprehended, must be obeyed." [Rand, op cit, 82]
Duhhhhhh.
>"The rules of cognition must be derived from the nature of existence and the
>nature, the identity, of his cognitive faculty." [Rand, ibid]
As has been observed, quoting your holy scriptures does not prove anything.
>>P.S. I still await your answers to my Quick Kant Quiz, or else a retraction
>>of your claim to know more about Kant than I do...
>
>You know more about Kant than i do, IN SOME CONTEXT. What is that context?
In the contxt that I am a better philosopher than you, have read more,
have a far more subtle grasp on matters than you, and do not make an ass
of myself by criticizing philosophers about whom I do not know enough even
to answer key questions about their philosophy, when asked to do so in very
general and simple terms.
In other words, my little relativist, I know more than you do in an absolute
sense, regardless of context.
>>"ever eager to enlighten and clarify"
>You couldn't enlighten a dark room with a searchlight.
You, by contrast, if ignorance were literal darkness, could blot out the sun.
>I guess this means you're educated, huh? Far out, man. Boy, would I like to
>be educated. The only thing i know is philosophy.
Correction: all you know is Rand, which leaves you in a pretty sorry state.
-JK
"ever eager to enlighten and clarify"
______________________________________________________________________________
| | |
| John Kress | "Two things fill my mind with ever-increasing awe and wonder: |
| | The starry heavens above me, and the moral law within me." |
| | -Kant, Critique of Pure Reason |
|______________|_______________________________________________________________|
Stephen Grossman
>In article <CD2Eo...@umassd.edu>,
>pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU (Stephen Grossman) meeps and gibbers...
>
>>Kress, empiricism, idealism, etc? God is an intellectually destructive
>>concept, whether it goes by the name of Form of the Good, metaphysical
>>essence, noumena, cogito, Sartre's nothing(!), ideal language, the arbitrary
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>Since the philosophers in question specifically claimed that what they were
>talking about was NOT God, then you need to make an argument. (We know you
>can't, but the burden is nevertheless yours...)
As recognized in my definitive "Existence 2" (available online), all
philosophers, excepting Rand, thought that there was some "absolute" part of
existence which existed "more" than the "lesser" or "relative" part. Thus
Platonic-Aristotelian forms, the Cartesian cogito, even Nietzche's
perspectives(!) and Sartre's pre-reflective cogito or perhaps his imagination,
Kant's noumena, analyst's language, deconstructionist's text, and the
postmodernist concretes.
They split existence into opposing realms and devised elaborate and failed
methods for reconciling the poles of the split. Eg, Plato's infamous problem
of "participation," of how matter "participates" in forms or, more
contemporary, how ideas relate to concretes. It is now generally
recognized that, given metaphysical splits, the poles of the split can never
be reconciled. Ie, the metaphysically superior part of existence cannot, by
definition, be related to the metaphysically inferior part. Contemporary
philosophers often talk of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy but this is merely
the resultant episte split. Ie, each part of the split requires its own
episte. Ie, (contingent) experience requires synthetic knowleddge and
(sometimes) necessary logic requires analytic knowledge.
>>and conventional, etc. Your positivist faith in out-of-context facts is
>>touching but we must be adults here. No Schopenhauerian wimpering, nosiree!
>>Tighten your belt and suck in that gut! No philosophical flabbiness in my
>>outfit! What would Nietzche think? You should be ashamed of yourself. Here,
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>I don't know. But I suspect that NIETZSCHE wouldn't approve of what you have
>say...
Neecha would approve of my philosophical boldness, of going where no
philosopher has gone before.
>>in some metaphysically privileged realm, contacted by "intellectual inuition."
>>There is only "terms as their authors employed them" IN SOME CONTEXT. Your
>>implicit context is naive realism since you are not critical about the context
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>Nope. Needs proof, which means, an argument. You objectivists are far closer
>to naive realism than anyone else around here. "Goofy realism," let's call
>it. ;)=
But you frequently rely on "facts" while dismissing my request for a context.
Isn't naive realism called "naive" because it has no control or criticism over
the episte which is used to know those facts? Ie, the Platonic-Aristotelian
claim that there is an essence or form transcending/inside matter has no
method for knowing
which particular form since "intellectual intuition" cannot be volitionally
controlled. Eg, you "intellectually intuit" that some matter has the "form" of
horse while I "intellectually intuit" that it has the "form" of cow. There's no
way, in this context, to decide, thus naive realism.
>>within which you understand "terms as their authors employed them." You may
>>use a context from Nietzche, analysis, phenomenology, postmodernism, Obj,
> ^^^^^^^^
>Nietzsche, damn it! Is the reason that you denounce Kant so often that he's
>the only philosopher whose name you can spell correctly?
What's wrong with that? Jack Niezsche was the pianist with the early Rolling
Stones. Any relation?
>
>>Pragmatism, etc. but you must and will use a context, some context, any
>>context. Knowledge of reality is contextual. Reality is cognitively processed
>>by consciousness. Aristotle recognized that reality was knowable but denied
>>cognitive processing as part of knowledge. Kant recognized cognitive
>>processing but denied it could reach reality. BOTH thought cognitive
>>processing was a barrier to knowing reality.
>
>Old, normal, standard realism...
What is and what's your point?
>>"to attain a knowledge of the real we must go out of consciousness." [Henry
>>Mansel, "On the Phil. of Kant"]
>OUT OF CONSCIOUSNESS. The quote that you use refutes your point. Kant insists
>again and again that there CAN BE NO KNOWLEDGE without something empirically
>given.
I thought that you might have known that Mansel was a 19th century Kantian.
Anyway, the "empirical" and the "categories of the understanding" exhaust
Kant's episte. They are both subjective. There is no consciousness of reality.
>>"'True nutrition' has to consist of absorbing some ineffable substance without
>>the participation of a digestive system, but since man is incapbale of 'true
>>feeding,' nutrition is a subjective matter open to his whim, and it is merely
>>a social convention that forbids him to eat poisonous mushrooms." [Rand, IOE,
>>1990, 81]
>
>Straw man. Kant never claims that knowledge is conventional. He claims the
>opposite, in fact.
Following the (Kantian) cognitive psychology of Piaget, your error, ie, your
concern with conventionalism, reveals something important about your episte.
You do not focus on essentials. Rand's analogy is not an essential concern
with conventionl subjectivism but with the principle, subjectivism. You need
systematic philosophy, Kant's, Plato's, somebody's, anybody's.
>
>>"Nature, to be apprehended, must be obeyed." [Rand, op cit, 82]
>
>Duhhhhhh.
Hey, how did Beavis and Butthead get into our philosophy discussion?! Rand
means that episte must be a study of the nature of consciousness and reality,
not subjective creations.
>>You know more about Kant than i do, IN SOME CONTEXT. What is that context?
>In the contxt that I am a better philosopher than you,
in what context? heh heh heh heh
>have read more,
in what context?
>have a far more subtle grasp on matters than you,
what happened to Neecha's sledgehamer?
and do not make an ass
>of myself by criticizing philosophers about whom I do not know enough
in what context?
even
>to answer key
in what context?
questions about their philosophy, when asked to do so in very
>general and simple terms.
I thought you opposed generalization and considered simplicity as simplistic.
>
>In other words, my little relativist, I know more than you do in an absolute
>sense, regardless of context.
OK, which absolute? heh heh heh heh. And, yes, you have no regard for context,
a strange claim since you have suggested or implied an acceptance of the
subjectivism of the mainstream of contemporary philosophy.
> ______________________________________________________________________________
>| | |
>| John Kress | "Two things fill my mind with ever-increasing awe and wonder: |
>| | The starry heavens above me, and the moral law within me." |
>| | -Kant, Critique of Pure Reason |
>|______________|_______________________________________________________________|
That's Kant's metaphors for noumenal reality and the noumenal self, a massive
evasion of reality and the consciousness of reality.
christopher currie
>philosophers, excepting Rand, thought that there was some "absolute" part of
>existence which existed "more" than the "lesser" or "relative" part. Thus
What is your EVIDENCE for that claim? You cannot mean that a philosopher
is by definition someone who thought as above, since you count Rand as
a philosopher and you state that she did not think so. Therefore you
must have a wider definition of philosopher. If all you mean is that
'the class of philosophers is the sum of the class of those who
thought [as above] about existence and the class of Ayn Rand', please
make that clear; because it makes the term 'philosopher' redundant and
confusing in the discussion.
Christopher
KRESSJA
pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU (Stephen Grossman) sings his same song...
>In article <12SEP199...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu>, kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu (KRESSJA) writes:
>>In article <CD2Eo...@umassd.edu>,
>>pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU (Stephen Grossman) meeps and gibbers...
>>
>>>"take terms as their authors employed them?" IN WHAT CONTEXT, Obj, Plato,
>>>Kress, empiricism, idealism, etc? God is an intellectually destructive
>>>concept, whether it goes by the name of Form of the Good, metaphysical
>>>essence, noumena, cogito, Sartre's nothing(!), ideal language, the arbitrary
>> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>>Since the philosophers in question specifically claimed that what they were
>>talking about was NOT God, then you need to make an argument. (We know you
>>can't, but the burden is nevertheless yours...)
>
>As recognized in my definitive "Existence 2" (available online), all
>philosophers, excepting Rand, thought that there was some "absolute" part of
>existence which existed "more" than the "lesser" or "relative" part. Thus
>Platonic-Aristotelian forms, the Cartesian cogito, even Nietzche's
>perspectives(!) and Sartre's pre-reflective cogito or perhaps his imagination,
>Kant's noumena, analyst's language, deconstructionist's text, and the
>postmodernist concretes.
Then your "definitive 'Existence 2'" is as screwed up as you are. Nietzsche
maintains no such thing; nor does Heidegger; nor do 'deconstructionists'
(names?)
>They split existence into opposing realms and devised elaborate and failed
>methods for reconciling the poles of the split. Eg, Plato's infamous problem
>of "participation," of how matter "participates" in forms or, more
>contemporary, how ideas relate to concretes. It is now generally
>recognized that, given metaphysical splits, the poles of the split can never
>be reconciled. Ie, the metaphysically superior part of existence cannot, by
>definition, be related to the metaphysically inferior part. Contemporary
>philosophers often talk of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy but this is merely
>the resultant episte split. Ie, each part of the split requires its own
>episte. Ie, (contingent) experience requires synthetic knowleddge and
>(sometimes) necessary logic requires analytic knowledge.
We know that you are incapable of making distinctions, but please note that
your deficiencies are no reason for others to refrain from thinking.
>>>and conventional, etc. Your positivist faith in out-of-context facts is
>>>touching but we must be adults here. No Schopenhauerian wimpering, nosiree!
>>>Tighten your belt and suck in that gut! No philosophical flabbiness in my
>>>outfit! What would Nietzche think? You should be ashamed of yourself. Here,
>> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>>I don't know. But I suspect that NIETZSCHE wouldn't approve of what you have>>say...
>
>Neecha would approve of my philosophical boldness, of going where no
>philosopher has gone before.
No, Nietzsche had contempt for the ill-educated and loud-mouthed.
>>>in some metaphysically privileged realm, contacted by "intellectual inuition."
>>>There is only "terms as their authors employed them" IN SOME CONTEXT. Your
>>>implicit context is naive realism since you are not critical about the context
>> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>>Nope. Needs proof, which means, an argument. You objectivists are far closer
>>to naive realism than anyone else around here. "Goofy realism," let's call
>>it. ;)=
>But you frequently rely on "facts" while dismissing my request for a context.
>Isn't naive realism called "naive" because it has no control or criticism over
>the episte which is used to know those facts? Ie, the Platonic-Aristotelian
>claim that there is an essence or form transcending/inside matter has no
>method for knowing
>which particular form since "intellectual intuition" cannot be volitionally
>controlled. Eg, you "intellectually intuit" that some matter has the "form" of
>horse while I "intellectually intuit" that it has the "form" of cow. There's no
>way, in this context, to decide, thus naive realism.
Nonsense. Let's say that I see a horse and you see a cow; how do we decide?
Obviously, for Plato there is no subjective element in the apprehension of
the forms. No one considers Plato and Aristotle examples of naive realism
(unless they're stupid of course, but there's no helping that).
>>>within which you understand "terms as their authors employed them." You may
>>>use a context from Nietzche, analysis, phenomenology, postmodernism, Obj,
>> ^^^^^^^^
>>Nietzsche, damn it! Is the reason that you denounce Kant so often that he's
>>the only philosopher whose name you can spell correctly?
>
>What's wrong with that? Jack Niezsche was the pianist with the early Rolling
>Stones. Any relation?
>>
>>>Pragmatism, etc. but you must and will use a context, some context, any
>>>context. Knowledge of reality is contextual. Reality is cognitively processed
>>>by consciousness. Aristotle recognized that reality was knowable but denied
>>>cognitive processing as part of knowledge. Kant recognized cognitive
>>>processing but denied it could reach reality. BOTH thought cognitive
>>>processing was a barrier to knowing reality.
>>
>>Old, normal, standard realism...
>
>What is and what's your point?
That this isn't at all radical or new or very interesting.
>>>"to attain a knowledge of the real we must go out of consciousness." [Henry
>>>Mansel, "On the Phil. of Kant"]
>
>>OUT OF CONSCIOUSNESS. The quote that you use refutes your point. Kant insists
>>again and again that there CAN BE NO KNOWLEDGE without something empirically
>>given.
>
>I thought that you might have known that Mansel was a 19th century Kantian.
>Anyway, the "empirical" and the "categories of the understanding" exhaust
>Kant's episte. They are both subjective. There is no consciousness of reality.
The empirical is not the subjective; the categories are subjective in the
sense of being in the subject, but not in the sense of being arbitrary. Rand's
concepts are just as 'subjective' as Kant's categories.
>>>"'True nutrition' has to consist of absorbing some ineffable substance without
>>>the participation of a digestive system, but since man is incapbale of 'true
>>>feeding,' nutrition is a subjective matter open to his whim, and it is merely
>>>a social convention that forbids him to eat poisonous mushrooms." [Rand, IOE,
>>>1990, 81]
>>
>>Straw man. Kant never claims that knowledge is conventional. He claims the
>>opposite, in fact.
>
>Following the (Kantian) cognitive psychology of Piaget, your error, ie, your
>concern with conventionalism, reveals something important about your episte.
>You do not focus on essentials. Rand's analogy is not an essential concern
>with conventionl subjectivism but with the principle, subjectivism. You need
>systematic philosophy, Kant's, Plato's, somebody's, anybody's.
You keep saying this, and you keep failing to give any sort of evidence.
YOU were the one who (inaccurately) called Kant a conventionalist; *I* was
just pointing out that you don't know what you are talking about.
>>>"Nature, to be apprehended, must be obeyed." [Rand, op cit, 82]
>>
>>Duhhhhhh.
>
>Hey, how did Beavis and Butthead get into our philosophy discussion?! Rand
>means that episte must be a study of the nature of consciousness and reality,
>not subjective creations.
Well no shit again. More radical stuff, with which everyone in creation agrees.
>>>You know more about Kant than i do, IN SOME CONTEXT. What is that context?
>
>>In the contxt that I am a better philosopher than you,
>
>in what context? heh heh heh heh
The absolute one.
>>have read more,
>
>in what context?
The absolute one.
>>have a far more subtle grasp on matters than you,
>
>what happened to Neecha's sledgehamer?
It isn't a sledgehammer. "Idols are touch here as with a tuning fork."
Try again. Go read a book (not Rand).
>and do not make an ass
>>of myself by criticizing philosophers about whom I do not know enough
>
>in what context?
On the Usenet.
>even
>>to answer key
>
>in what context?
The axis of knowledge and ignorance.
>questions about their philosophy, when asked to do so in very
>>general and simple terms.
>
>I thought you opposed generalization and considered simplicity as simplistic.
You have no idea what I think.
>>In other words, my little relativist, I know more than you do in an absolute
>>sense, regardless of context.
>OK, which absolute? heh heh heh heh. And, yes, you have no regard for context,
>a strange claim since you have suggested or implied an acceptance of the
>subjectivism of the mainstream of contemporary philosophy.
I have never suggested or implied anything of the sort; it is you who have
not established that what you say is accurate regarding contemporary
philosophy.
-JK
"ever eager to enlighten and clarify"
______________________________________________________________________________
| | |
| John Kress | "Philosophy, as I have so far understood and lived it, means |
| | living voluntarily among ice and high mountains--seeking out |
| | everything strange and questionable in existence..." |
| | -Nietzsche, Ecce Homo |
|______________|_______________________________________________________________|
Stephen Grossman
Im confused. You seem to find some grammatical or logical subtlety I don't
intend. Eg, All cars, except Ferraris, don't have a prancing horse emblem.
All i mean is that, of all philosophers, most split existence and Rand
did not. Are you asking for examples? Aristotle and Plato/form & matter or
potentiality and actuality. Descartes/body & mind. Hume/event & substance or
percept & concept. Kant/phenomena & noumena. Etc.
Stephen Grossman
>In article <CDKEJ...@umassd.edu>,
>pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU (Stephen Grossman) sings his same song...
>>In article <12SEP199...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu>, kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu (KRESSJA) writes:
>>>In article <CD2Eo...@umassd.edu>,
>>>pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU (Stephen Grossman) meeps and gibbers...
>>As recognized in my definitive "Existence 2" (available online), all
>>philosophers, excepting Rand, thought that there was some "absolute" part of
>>existence which existed "more" than the "lesser" or "relative" part. Thus
>>Platonic-Aristotelian forms, the Cartesian cogito, even Nietzche's
>>perspectives(!) and Sartre's pre-reflective cogito or perhaps his imagination,
>>Kant's noumena, analyst's language, deconstructionist's text, and the
>>postmodernist concretes.
>
>Then your "definitive 'Existence 2'" is as screwed up as you are. Nietzsche
>maintains no such thing; nor does Heidegger; nor do 'deconstructionists'
>(names?)
One of the philosophical skills lacking in contemporary philosophy is the
ability to identify the meetaphysical limit or context of claims.
Meta, its their limit; episte, its implicit. Eg, Neecha held that process or
quanta was real whereas entities or substances were illusory. Marty H held
Existence was real and existents illusion or of lesser meta status.
Deconstructionists hold text is
real and world is not. Kant, of course, liked noumenal reality and claimed
mind-created phenomena to be of lesser metaphysical value. Don't get caught on
terms each philoospher uses. A metaphysically split existence is advocated by
all philosphers except Rand. She says, "Existence is identity." Peikloff holds
that "an entity is: all of the things it is." I say, everything exists
equally. THere is no meta privileged realm. Kant's philosophy exists just as
much as Rand's. Rand's knowable reality exists just as much as Kant's
unknowable reality. Don't infer relativism, as if relativism MUST be used to
judge my claim. Relativism exists just as much as anything else, even
abslolutism! This is metaphysics without epistemology. Everything, literally,
everything exists. And exists equally. There is no metaphysical essence, not
noumena, form, facts, text, concretes, ideas, etc, etc. Even chaos has no meta
privilege. It exists but so does soap. God exists no more than vomit. Faith
does not exist more than reason or throwing chicken bones into the air and
"interpreting" their position. All epistemologies exist equally and what each
reveals exists equally. Your ideas exist just as much as mine. However, your
philoosphy needs a meta essence whereas mine does not. There are an infinity
of philosophies and relative to existence they are equal. Relative to
existence, Kant=Obj. However, within Kant, Kant is superior. Within, Obj, Obj
is superior. Within relativism (AND ONLY WITHIN RELATIVISM), relativism is
superior. THere is nothing about existence which justifies any particular
philosophy. You can value splitting existence if you like, but existence
itself does not justify this. Eg, Kant's claims about the subjectivity of the
senses is valid within Kant,not beyond. Kant exists. Spoons exist. That's
all. You may value one or the other but existence has no metaphysically
privileged realm in which Kant or spoons is justified. Your claims are
limited. Know your limit and remain within in it and all will be OK (by the
standards internal to your limit). I don't claim that objectivity is true (by
some standard external to Obj and Kant. I claim objectivity exists. There is
objectivity. It is. It exists. I value it. You don't. I reamin within my
limit, ie, Objectivism. You believe Kant is justified by a limit or standard
or evidence which I and everyone must accept because existence justifies it.
But this requires a meta essence, an impossibility since everything exists
equally, Kant, Obj, television game shows. Within Obj, Kant=TV game shows, but
there is no meta essence justifying Obj so you can value another limit, ie,
Kant, TV game shows, etc. Curb your limit!
>
>>They split existence into opposing realms and devised elaborate and failed
>>methods for reconciling the poles of the split. Eg, Plato's infamous problem
>>of "participation," of how matter "participates" in forms or, more
>>contemporary, how ideas relate to concretes. It is now generally
>>recognized that, given metaphysical splits, the poles of the split can never
>>be reconciled. Ie, the metaphysically superior part of existence cannot, by
>>definition, be related to the metaphysically inferior part. Contemporary
>>philosophers often talk of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy but this is merely
>>the resultant episte split. Ie, each part of the split requires its own
>>episte. Ie, (contingent) experience requires synthetic knowleddge and
>>(sometimes) necessary logic requires analytic knowledge.
>
>We know that you are incapable of making distinctions, but please note that
>your deficiencies are no reason for others to refrain from thinking.
There is no metaphysical justification for your concern with distinctions.
It's your value; thats all. Besides, each philosophy has its own distinctions
which may be invalid in other philosophies. Try metaphysics a bit. Too much
epistemology can make one stupid.
>>But you frequently rely on "facts" while dismissing my request for a context.
>>Isn't naive realism called "naive" because it has no control or criticism over
>>the episte which is used to know those facts? Ie, the Platonic-Aristotelian
>>claim that there is an essence or form transcending/inside matter has no
>>method for knowing
>>which particular form since "intellectual intuition" cannot be volitionally
>>controlled. Eg, you "intellectually intuit" that some matter has the "form" of
>>horse while I "intellectually intuit" that it has the "form" of cow. There's no
>>way, in this context, to decide, thus naive realism.
>
>Nonsense. Let's say that I see a horse and you see a cow; how do we decide?
>Obviously, for Plato there is no subjective element in the apprehension of
>the forms. No one considers Plato and Aristotle examples of naive realism
>(unless they're stupid of course, but there's no helping that).
You have merely restated the problem.
How do we decide horse or cow? THats the key. How do you split naive realism
from the lack of subjectivity? THey are the same.
>
>>Anyway, the "empirical" and the "categories of the understanding" exhaust
>>Kant's episte. They are both subjective. There is no consciousness of reality.
>
>The empirical is not the subjective; the categories are subjective in the
>sense of being in the subject, but not in the sense of being arbitrary. Rand's
>concepts are just as 'subjective' as Kant's categories.
What is the context/limit to Kant's deduction of the categories?
THe empirical is in the subject; it certainly does not come from the noumena.
Regardless of your evaluation of Rand's categories, her theory is that they
partially come from reality and partially from the nature of mind AS IT
CONTACTS REALITY. Thus, Randian objectivity and no Randian subjectivity.
>YOU were the one who (inaccurately) called Kant a conventionalist; *I* was
>just pointing out that you don't know what you are talking about.
>
Regardless of whether Kant is or is not a conventionalist, conventionalism is
a type of subjectivism and identifying Kant's subjectivism was the essence of
my claim.
>>Rand
>>means that episte must be a study of the nature of consciousness and reality,
>>not subjective creations.
>
>Well no shit again. More radical stuff, with which everyone in creation
>agrees.
>
Your view of the historry of philosophy is a surprising alternative to that
presented by my philosophy profs and the books they used. Apart from a few
realists, most philosophers held episte independent of reality. Eg, Kant
studied episte unrelated to reality (noumena).
>>>>You know more about Kant than i do, IN SOME CONTEXT. What is that context?
>>
>>>In the contxt that I am a better philosopher than you,
>>
>>in what context? heh heh heh heh
>
>The absolute one.
Which absolute?
>>>have read more,
>>
>>in what context?
>
>The absolute one.
Which absolute?
>>>have a far more subtle grasp on matters than you,
>>
>>what happened to Neecha's sledgehamer?
>
>It isn't a sledgehammer. "Idols are touch here as with a tuning fork."
>Try again. Go read a book (not Rand).
Even your scholarship is poor, but, hey, who cares? you can win on this, i
don't care.
>>and do not make an ass
>>>of myself by criticizing philosophers about whom I do not know enough
>>
>>in what context?
>
>On the Usenet.
In what context?
>>even
>>>to answer key
>>
>>in what context?
>
>The axis of knowledge and ignorance.
i what context?
>
>>questions about their philosophy, when asked to do so in very
>>>general and simple terms.
>>
>>I thought you opposed generalization and considered simplicity as simplistic.
>
>You have no idea what I think.
in what context?
>
>>>In other words, my little relativist, I know more than you do in an absolute
>>>sense, regardless of context.
>>OK, which absolute? heh heh heh heh. And, yes, you have no regard for context,
>>a strange claim since you have suggested or implied an acceptance of the
>>subjectivism of the mainstream of contemporary philosophy.
>
>I have never suggested or implied anything of the sort; it is you who have
>not established that what you say is accurate regarding contemporary
>philosophy.
Again, your view of the historry of phil is an alternative to what I was
taught by professionals (professional whores?). Maybe your view is good but
Its very disintegrated. Can you provide a BRIEF overview, something as brief
as my:
realism/intrinsicism -forms from reality, eg, Plato.
subjectivism-forms from consciousness or subjectivity, eg, Kant.
objectivism-forms from real and consciousness, eg, Rand.
KRESSJA
>some standard external to Obj and Kant. I claim objectivity exists. There is
>objectivity. It is. It exists. I value it. You don't. I reamin within my
So it's all subjective preference, eh?
>limit, ie, Objectivism. You believe Kant is justified by a limit or standard
>or evidence which I and everyone must accept because existence justifies it.
>But this requires a meta essence, an impossibility since everything exists
>equally, Kant, Obj, television game shows. Within Obj, Kant=TV game shows, but
>there is no meta essence justifying Obj so you can value another limit, ie,
>Kant, TV game shows, etc. Curb your limit!
Oh please.
>>We know that you are incapable of making distinctions, but please note that
>>your deficiencies are no reason for others to refrain from thinking.
>There is no metaphysical justification for your concern with distinctions.
>It's your value; thats all. Besides, each philosophy has its own distinctions
>which may be invalid in other philosophies. Try metaphysics a bit. Too much
>epistemology can make one stupid.
More of your relativism. I want to get at the *truth* Presumably you would too,
but you keep denying it's possible. I think Rand would disavow you.
>>>Anyway, the "empirical" and the "categories of the understanding" exhaust
>>>Kant's episte. They are both subjective. There is no consciousness of reality.
Define 'subjective.' This hardly exhausts Kant's epistemology or his
metaphysics. 'Reality' is meaningless other than as a category. (You
claim that reality is more than our senses and reason give us? Mystical...)
>>The empirical is not the subjective; the categories are subjective in the
>>sense of being in the subject, but not in the sense of being arbitrary. Rand's
>>concepts are just as 'subjective' as Kant's categories.
>
>What is the context/limit to Kant's deduction of the categories?
>THe empirical is in the subject; it certainly does not come from the noumena.
>Regardless of your evaluation of Rand's categories, her theory is that they
>partially come from reality and partially from the nature of mind AS IT
>CONTACTS REALITY. Thus, Randian objectivity and no Randian subjectivity.
Your question about contexts and limits is nonsensical within my context/limit;
therefore, I am not going to answer it, now or ever, because you think it
spares you the effort of raising concrete and substantive objections. I *will*
define it as the "Grossman Dodge," viz. a tactic used whenever one is losing,
in order to avoid digging oneself deeper into one's hole.
>>YOU were the one who (inaccurately) called Kant a conventionalist; *I* was
>>just pointing out that you don't know what you are talking about.
>>
>Regardless of whether Kant is or is not a conventionalist, conventionalism is
>a type of subjectivism and identifying Kant's subjectivism was the essence of
>my claim.
MISidentifying Kant, O worshiper of A = A. Paraphrase:
You: A = B!
Me: A <> B!
You: I meant A = C all along...
>>>Rand
>>>means that episte must be a study of the nature of consciousness and reality,
>>>not subjective creations.
>>
>>Well no shit again. More radical stuff, with which everyone in creation
>>agrees.
>>
>Your view of the historry of philosophy is a surprising alternative to that
>presented by my philosophy profs and the books they used. Apart from a few
>realists, most philosophers held episte independent of reality. Eg, Kant
>studied episte unrelated to reality (noumena).
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
So now you admit that noumena is unrelated to reality? After claiming (wrongly)
that it IS reality for Kant? Huh? Have you blown another gasket?
>>>what happened to Neecha's sledgehamer?
>>
>>It isn't a sledgehammer. "Idols are touch here as with a tuning fork."
>>Try again. Go read a book (not Rand).
>
>Even your scholarship is poor, but, hey, who cares? you can win on this, i
>don't care.
Evidence? I cite TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS, or How One Philosophizes with a
Hammer. How is my scholarship deficient? Ad Hominem and untrue. Fallacies
and lies do not strengthen your position.
>>I have never suggested or implied anything of the sort; it is you who have
>>not established that what you say is accurate regarding contemporary
>>philosophy.
>
>Again, your view of the historry of phil is an alternative to what I was
>taught by professionals (professional whores?). Maybe your view is good but
>Its very disintegrated. Can you provide a BRIEF overview, something as brief
>as my:
>realism/intrinsicism -forms from reality, eg, Plato.
>subjectivism-forms from consciousness or subjectivity, eg, Kant.
>objectivism-forms from real and consciousness, eg, Rand.
Impossible. This is your problem. You mistake mind-numbingly vague
oversimplifications for "principles." You are wrong as regards Plato,
wrong as regards Kant, and I withhold comment on Rand. I *am* a
professional, and there is plenty of evidence that you have failed *as a
student* rather than your professors having failed *as teachers*.
Keep trying. Like a blind man with a gun, you might stumble on philosophy
sometime...and then go on as usual...