The Methods and Goals of Objectivism

[Lawrence M Sanger]

This is the first time I have ever posted to any newsgroup, so I hope that some
sympathetic newsgroup-member will come to my aid if I make any blunders in
executing this post.

I do not consider myself an Objectivist, but I am, so to speak, a "fellow
traveler"; I nod in agreement when Ayn Rand stands on her one foot and
summarizes her views. This is already to say a great deal, since I am a
graduate student in philosophy, and as everyone in this newsgroup knows,
Objectivism is at odds with contemporary philosophy down to fundamentals.

My purpose in writing is to challenge Objectivists. Generally, I think I
understand the Objectivists' goals, but I am utterly baffled as to why they get
the proper method so seemingly wrong. Perhaps someone can enlighten me. If
not, I hope that Objectivists will decide for themselves whether my arguments
weigh in favor of a change in their own methods.

Rand's view is that ideas are what ultimately shape history, and that
philosophers are what ultimately shape ideas. Here there is already ample room
for dispute, but let us grant this. Being a philosopher, I suppose I rather
like the idea of having so much power. This is a joke -- not to say that I am
making light of what very well may be fact, that philosophers rule the world in
the long run.

Hence it is the intellectual leaders who must change, says Rand, if the
political systems and cultures are to change. The goal of Objectivism,
accordingly, is to help effect this change. To this end Rand's books are
published, student and other clubs are formed, prominent Objectivists lecture
at campuses around the country, and even such things as this newsgroup pop up.
(How long has this been around, I wonder?)

The results of these efforts are undeniable. It is pretty well-known that
Libertarianism is an offshot of disenchanted Objectivists, or at least that is
my understanding. Perhaps some of the popularity of the old "Reagan
Revolution" (not much of a revolution, really) can be attributed to the fact
that a number of people have been influenced by Rand and her followers.
Doubtlessly someone out there knows much more than I do about all this.

But the intellectual leaders have not changed. There is not a single prominent
philosopher, or intellectual, who is an Objectivist. (I guess I am not
counting Leonard Peikoff or David Kelly as "prominent." They may seem so to
Objectivists, but to the rest of the world, they are either unknown or objects
of contempt. And I am assuming that the Chairman of the Fed is no longer an
Objectivist.) There is a good reason for this. Objectivists are good at
convincing undergraduates and non-philosophers, but terrible at convincing
graduate students and professors in philosophy.

Now what I would like to suggest, gingerly, is an explanation of why
Objectivism is not popular among graduate students and professors in
philosophy. But before I offer my theory, I suppose I should look at Rand's.
Rand knew that her philosophy would not be popular among professional
philosophers. She said, in essence, "Forget them. They're too far gone. They
cannot be saved. Better to work with youth." And she antagonised them.

I think this is only part of the explanation. I think she could not have aimed
her philosophy at professional philosophers because her philosophy lacked the
requisite sophistication. Here is where I must be careful. I am sympathetic
to some, perhaps most, of what Rand wrote. But that does not mean that I have
to like the way she developed her basic ideas.

I do not mean to antagonize anyone reading this, and I hope my potential
interlocutors will weigh my words here. Ayn Rand wrote primarily to persuade
nonphilosophers to look at some very general issues in philosophy in a very
general way. She often used many rhetorical devices that cannot really pass
for argument. This is not to say that she had no arguments; but many of the
arguments which she did have were incompletely-stated, and some were clearly
quite bad.

Moreover, Rand had very little sense for the finer points which occupy much of
a professional philosopher's time. She thought that they were splitting hairs,
like modern-day Scholastics, and really wasting their time. "Don't bother to
examine a folly," I think the motto goes, "just examine its results." But this
essentially blinded her to an extremely important aspect of philosophy, namely,
that very many of the most important issues turn upon the fine points she did
not care to investigate.

For example, while Rand acknowledges that the problem of universals is of the
utmost importance, as I think it is, it is quite difficult to make out what her
answer is in _Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology_. If someone can
explain to me how her so-called theory of concepts constitutes a solution to
the problem of universals, I would be very interested to hear it. Perhaps
reference to Peikoff's _Objectivism_ may help in this task, though I doubt it.

I say all this not to prove my superiority and the superiority of analytic
philosophy to Objectivism; my purpose is to generate discussion of the methods
of Objectivism, and in particular, what methods are appropriate to achieving
a major aim of Objectivism, namely, to win over the intellectual leaders of
the day.

Since my senior year of college and attending graduate school in philosophy, I
have been struck by the fact that analytic philosophers are, after all, fairly
reasonable people; at least, a very significant percentage are. By this I mean
that they are, in most of what they think about, convinced by arguments rather
than prejudice or emotion-driven ideology. The unfortunate fact about analytic
philosophers, however, is that the arguments by which they are convinced are
very bad arguments. Indeed, they are incredibly bad arguments, very many of
them. A patient Objectivist, who is willing to learn these arguments and the
concepts required to understand them, would easily and gleefully enjoy refuting
them. Moreover, this impresses analytic philosophers. If one really can
produce a compelling argument, then contemporary philosophers will be made
uncomfortable and will seek a solution.

An undergraduate in philosophy may find this hard to believe. If he is an
Objectivist, he may have the feeling that there is simply nothing he can say
that will be right. To such a person all I can say is: It's easier in graduate
school. You may even learn that what you used to say was indeed incorrect, but
correct "in essentials" (which is something a professor may disagree with).

If Objectivists truly wish to subvert the Establishment, they must be able to
dominate the game that the Establishment plays. An Objectivist-like philosophy
could be enunciated in a style, and more importantly, with the depth, that is
required by contemporary analytic philosophers. To pursue such an aim would
not be to sell out to the Enemy. Indeed, there is a great deal Objectivism has
to gain by becoming analytic.

Thus I suggest that Objectivists master logic and analytic philosophy, and
attempt to formulate Objectivism in the very carefully-argued, circumspect,
formal way in which other philosophies are formulated today.

This, however, is not half as important as attacking all the very bad
arguments, propounded mainly in the twentieth century, which are accepted by
many contemporary philosophers. Objectivists should be spending their time
gaining the skills to awaken their comfortable philosophical colleagues from
their dogmatic slumbers. The more you read, the easier it becomes to read,
and the easier it is to conceive of exactly how you ought to reply.

When I refer to these "very bad arguments," I mean a set of arguments that
numbers in the dozens, perhaps not in the hundreds. These include: the open
question argument (Moore), Wittgenstein's puzzle about meaning-grasp (Kripke),
Quine's argument for the indeterminacy of translation and inscrutability of
reference, Russell's and Quine's arguments that 'exists' is not a logical
predicate, arguments against foundationalism, and so on. (This is just a
random list of what happens to occur to me right now.) These arguments can
be located at particular places in particular volumes. There are probably at
least three in each separate topic in philosophy (e.g., justification, truth,
existence, value). -- I say all this so as to demonstrate that what I am
talking about does not require some arcane knowledge or membership in a secret
society. In other words, what I am suggesting is not impossibly difficult. I
am doing it, and I am not the most intelligent person in the world.

There is a serious impediment to any steadfast Objectivist taking my advice,
and that is the Objectivist's tendency to take Ayn Rand and Leonard Peikoff as
authorities on these topics. Of course, you know what I will say: one ought
not to take these, or any thinkers, as authorities. In philosophy one ought to
think for oneself. But this is what Rand herself recommended, is it not? Is
this not what those steadfast Objectivists are already doing?

Again, I wish to antagonize no one, but I must say what it seems I observe. I
think this is not what many Objectivists do. I think that many Objectivists
are followers. Indeed, I think that no one ought to call himself an
Objectivist, if he presumes to intellectual independence, until he has
independently formulated his own views, and attempted to justify them without
appeal to any authority, and found (after the requisite decades of study in
philosophy) that his own views are precisely matched to Ayn Rand's. The
chances of this happening are astronomically low, of course. Hence I conclude
that at least many Objectivists are followers.

Intellectual individualism is extremely difficult. It entails actually
doubting everything which one had hitherto believed on the grounds that one had
been told it. This in itself is very difficult to do, and indeed can be
painful. It entails, further, an active search for the truth, by a rational
method. (This conception of intellectual individualism is hardly original on
my part; see Descartes' _Discourse on the Method_ and _Rules_. One will
constantly be reinventing the wheel in philosophy. This is an essential part
of intellectual individualism, however.) Not to say one may not consult any
authority. Indeed, one may read as much as one likes. It is how one reads, how
critically. But perhaps as important is writing a great deal, for oneself,
working out what one thinks about this and that, preferably concentrating on
the issues that interest one most at the moment (since one is most apt to have
good ideas then).

I hope I have made my points clearly enough. I also hope that some
Objectivists will be interested enough to reply, whether approving of what I
have said or not. In essence, what I am asking, and what Objectivism needs, is
a lot of Objectivists going to the top graduate schools in the country,
specializing in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy
of science, and logic, and annoying and puzzling their professors with very
cogent, careful refutations of the dogmas of the day. Moreover, Objectivism
needs the helpful criticism of truly independent thinkers.

Sincerely,

Larry Sanger

[Robert J. Kolker]

Yoder Writes:

[heavy snipping]
"I think that the Objectivist tradition is generally quite carefully
argued, but it is not argued in the same opaque hair-splitting sytyle as
the analytics use. I don't particularly like that
*mathematically-oriented* [emphasis mine CtL] style (which, by the way,
has invaded almost all other academic areas including my own and it has
generally represented a step backward in thos areas) but if portraying
Objectivism in that form will help it speard then I'm for it......"

[more heavy snipping to end]

Two questions:

1. If the area in question is succeptable to proper mathematical analysis
or modelling, what is the problem?

2. What is your area (see quote above "....including my own....")?

I would be the last person to claim mathematics is appropriately applied
just any old place, but in areas where precise logical relationships
constitute the essence of the endeavour, mathematics can be quite helpful.
Whre would physics, for example, be without mathematics.

Mathematical logic has gone the deepest in demonstrating and defining just
what constitutes a proof. And the metalogical theory of first and second
order logic has gone the furthest in discerning the limits of provability.
For example, Goedel's incompleteness theorem.

Conan the Libertarian

--
"If you can't love the Constitution, then at least hate the Government"

[Brian K. Yoder]

In article <26dlek$h...@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu> lsa...@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Lawrence M Sanger) writes:
>This is the first time I have ever posted to any newsgroup, so I hope that some
>sympathetic newsgroup-member will come to my aid if I make any blunders in
>executing this post.

Actually, yours was much more worthwhile and appropriate than 90% of the other
stuff in this group.

>I do not consider myself an Objectivist, but I am, so to speak, a "fellow
>traveler"; I nod in agreement when Ayn Rand stands on her one foot and
>summarizes her views. This is already to say a great deal, since I am a
>graduate student in philosophy, and as everyone in this newsgroup knows,
>Objectivism is at odds with contemporary philosophy down to fundamentals.

Actually, I am amazed at the growing number of Objectivist philosophy
students out there. Certainly the number who are "out" is much bigger than it
was just a few years ago. I don't know whether this is because it is becoming
more acceptable or if there are just a lot more of them (my guess is that it
is a little of both).

>My purpose in writing is to challenge Objectivists. Generally, I think I
>understand the Objectivists' goals, but I am utterly baffled as to why they get
>the proper method so seemingly wrong. Perhaps someone can enlighten me. If
>not, I hope that Objectivists will decide for themselves whether my arguments
>weigh in favor of a change in their own methods.

Fair enough.

>Rand's view is that ideas are what ultimately shape history, and that
>philosophers are what ultimately shape ideas. Here there is already ample room
>for dispute, but let us grant this. Being a philosopher, I suppose I rather
>like the idea of having so much power. This is a joke -- not to say that I am
>making light of what very well may be fact, that philosophers rule the world in
>the long run.

Actually, I think you may be looking at "philosophy" a bit to narrowly. What
shapes history is the *philosophy* people have. This may or may not be
strongly influenced by professional philosophers, preachers, teachers,
witch doctors, or politicians. In some cultures there are no professional
philosophers. In others, they are ignored or are actually just political
or religious mouthpieces for non-philosophers who promote philosophical
ideas. In the modern west professional philosophers have traditionally
had a major role in setting the philosophical tone of society, but this is
not necessarily going to continue being the case (thought I hope it will be
and that the philosophers will improve).

>Hence it is the intellectual leaders who must change, says Rand, if the
>political systems and cultures are to change. The goal of Objectivism,
>accordingly, is to help effect this change. To this end Rand's books are
>published, student and other clubs are formed, prominent Objectivists lecture
>at campuses around the country, and even such things as this newsgroup pop up.

>The results of these efforts are undeniable. It is pretty well-known that

>Libertarianism is an offshot of disenchanted Objectivists, or at least that is
>my understanding.

It is true that a very large number of Libertarians have been influenced by
Rand, but I'm not so sure that they could be generally classified as
"an offshot of disenchanted Objectivists".

>Perhaps some of the popularity of the old "Reagan
>Revolution" (not much of a revolution, really) can be attributed to the fact
>that a number of people have been influenced by Rand and her followers.
>Doubtlessly someone out there knows much more than I do about all this.

That is also true. I recall reading that according to someone high up in the
Reagan administration (Peggy Noonan as I recall) commented that Atlas
Shrugged was considered required reading among the staff members. Certainly
they weren't Objectivists, but the influence is undeniable.

>But the intellectual leaders have not changed. There is not a single prominent
>philosopher, or intellectual, who is an Objectivist. (I guess I am not
>counting Leonard Peikoff or David Kelly as "prominent." They may seem so to
>Objectivists, but to the rest of the world, they are either unknown or objects
>of contempt.

Certainly they are not widely known and loved, but then again anyone with
big new ideas is not going to be immediately and widely accepted. Rand was
herself widely known and was (and in a certain sense still is) an
intellectual leader. How would you define "prominent" and "leader" in this
sense? I would venture to say that in terms of general fame (or infamy)
Rand stands at least as tall as anyone else in the contemporary intellectual
world (although that's not how I would define importance, prominence, or
leadership). Her name recognition in the general public is likely much
better than say, Rawls, Quine, Chomsky, and Learner, and probably better
than that of Russell and Skinner. Then again, I don't think name recognition
is what makes one a prominent intellectual leader either. (Dan Quayle is
a perfect counter-example.)

>And I am assuming that the Chairman of the Fed is no longer an
>Objectivist.) There is a good reason for this. Objectivists are good at
>convincing undergraduates and non-philosophers, but terrible at convincing
>graduate students and professors in philosophy.

>Now what I would like to suggest, gingerly, is an explanation of why
>Objectivism is not popular among graduate students and professors in
>philosophy.

That is an interesting subject, although I think things are much less grim
than you may think. 40 years ago there was only one Objectivist.
30 years ago there were less than a dozen. 20 years ago there were
thousands. 10 years ago, many times that. And now even more (such
counts are hard to estimate because the definition of who is actually
an Objectivist will strongly influence the statistic for obvious reasons).

In any event, out of say, 10,000 members of the public at large, or even
intellectuals in particular, how many are likely to be professional academic
philosophers? Probably zero or one, so I should come as no surprise that
any philosophical movement coming from outside the philosophical establishment
would not begin with hundreds of professional philosophers in the ranks.
Even so, there are hundreds of people out there who are phiosophy professors
and graduate students who are either Objectivists or at least very sympathetic
to Objectivism, but since we are a young movement such people tend not to
occupy the top spots in academic departments, particularly since the
existing department chairmen etc. are not particularly friendly.

>But before I offer my theory, I suppose I should look at Rand's.
>Rand knew that her philosophy would not be popular among professional
>philosophers. She said, in essence, "Forget them. They're too far gone. They
>cannot be saved. Better to work with youth." And she antagonised them.

>I think this is only part of the explanation. I think she could not have aimed
>her philosophy at professional philosophers because her philosophy lacked the
>requisite sophistication.

Sophisticaltion? Or was it just that she wrote for a different audience?
If she had written about the same ideas but in the format approved of by
academics, we would never have heard of her, and all that would be left would
be some papers in unread obscure journals in a library.

>Here is where I must be careful. I am sympathetic
>to some, perhaps most, of what Rand wrote. But that does not mean that I have
>to like the way she developed her basic ideas.

>I do not mean to antagonize anyone reading this, and I hope my potential
>interlocutors will weigh my words here. Ayn Rand wrote primarily to persuade
>nonphilosophers to look at some very general issues in philosophy in a very
>general way.

That is certainly true, although considering that her goal was to speak to
the intelligent public her methods would seem to be exactly the right ones.
It sounds as though you more disagree with her goals than her methods.

>She often used many rhetorical devices that cannot really pass
>for argument. This is not to say that she had no arguments; but many of the
>arguments which she did have were incompletely-stated, and some were clearly
>quite bad.

Perhaps we should talk about some specific ones. Without doing so, it seems
hard to discuss this claim of yours.

>Moreover, Rand had very little sense for the finer points which occupy much of
>a professional philosopher's time. She thought that they were splitting hairs,
>like modern-day Scholastics, and really wasting their time.

Do you disagree with that in general? Certainly she was not a "specialist"
or interested in splitting all of the hairs that exist (100 lifetimes
would not have been enough to do that anyway). Are you of the opinion that
what most academic philosophers write about is vital and important to
learning the way to live a good life and understand reality? Or are they
just churning out a bunch of irrelevant hair-splitting for the most part?

>"Don't bother to
>examine a folly," I think the motto goes, "just examine its results."

Actually, as I recall it was Ellsworth Toohey who said that, but in terms
of the issue he was discussing, it makes sense. When evaluating the ideas
of dishonest or irrational people, it makes no sense to spend a lot of time
running over the finer points of the irrationalities they engage in. If you
can determine the root of the error (say, some psychological factor which
makes them make some fundamental philosophical error) then note what that
error consists of. One need not trace every last consequence of that error.
Wouldn't you agree?

>But this
>essentially blinded her to an extremely important aspect of philosophy, namely,
>that very many of the most important issues turn upon the fine points she did
>not care to investigate.

Do you have any particular ones in mind?

John Robbins in his book "An Answer to Ayn Rand" made similar criticisms,
although my general reaction to his pointing out that there was more to say
about certain issues she raised was "of course there is, but so what?".
She never claimed to have said everything there is to be said about
philosophy. In fact if she had, your job would be over wouldn't it?

>For example, while Rand acknowledges that the problem of universals is of the
>utmost importance, as I think it is, it is quite difficult to make out what her
>answer is in _Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology_. If someone can
>explain to me how her so-called theory of concepts constitutes a solution to
>the problem of universals, I would be very interested to hear it. Perhaps
>reference to Peikoff's _Objectivism_ may help in this task, though I doubt it.

Have you read OPAR? That may be helpful. I wuld be glad to discuss this with
you since I think I understand Rand's answer quite well, but I don't really
know where to begin since your question was so vague. What exactly are you unclear on?

>I say all this not to prove my superiority and the superiority of analytic
>philosophy to Objectivism; my purpose is to generate discussion of the methods
>of Objectivism, and in particular, what methods are appropriate to achieving
>a major aim of Objectivism, namely, to win over the intellectual leaders of
>the day.

Do you not think that people (such as yourself perhaps) will not come along
and fill in the hair-splitting? Only professional academics can really be
expected to produce papers and books of a format acceptable to the academic
philosophers, and it isn't likely that an outsider like Rand would have been
able to make many inroads there among people who had already long adopted
very different views. On the other hand, she COULD (and did) become an
intellectual leader among intellectuals who were not professional philosophers.
Would you preferred that she did something else?

Even if you don't think she made the right choice, she made the one she did.
If you don't think that enough of Rand's ideas have been expressed in the
academic style, then by all means, remedy that problem by writing such
things yourself. There's more than enough of that to keep you busy for
the next few semesters. ;-)

>Since my senior year of college and attending graduate school in philosophy, I
>have been struck by the fact that analytic philosophers are, after all, fairly
>reasonable people; at least, a very significant percentage are.

That has not been my experience, but certainly they aren't all completely
closed and the analytic school is a much more fertile ground than the
various post-modernist sects. If you are able to convince some of them to
change their ways, more power to you.

>By this I mean
>that they are, in most of what they think about, convinced by arguments rather
>than prejudice or emotion-driven ideology.

Again, that has not been my general experience, but you have probably spent
a lot more time with such people than I have (and as someone who is not
a "colleague" they probably have less respect for what I say than someone
with some credentials, particularly back during my college days when
it was pretty clear to me that few of my professors cared what I had to say
since I didn't have a PhD and therefore couldn't possibly have anything
interesting to say). Anyway, assuming you are right about the existence of
lots of "reachable" philosopher professors out there (or even if there are just
a few) they are worth "recruiting" and that's a job we have only started to
take on.

>The unfortunate fact about analytic
>philosophers, however, is that the arguments by which they are convinced are
>very bad arguments. Indeed, they are incredibly bad arguments, very many of
>them. A patient Objectivist, who is willing to learn these arguments and the
>concepts required to understand them, would easily and gleefully enjoy refuting
>them. Moreover, this impresses analytic philosophers. If one really can
>produce a compelling argument, then contemporary philosophers will be made
>uncomfortable and will seek a solution.

True enough. That's one reason why we need to have professional Objectivist
professors out there. I am not as convinced as you are that there are a lot
of professors out there who are open, but regardless of how many there are,
we ought to go after them.

>An undergraduate in philosophy may find this hard to believe. If he is an
>Objectivist, he may have the feeling that there is simply nothing he can say
>that will be right. To such a person all I can say is: It's easier in graduate
>school. You may even learn that what you used to say was indeed incorrect, but
>correct "in essentials" (which is something a professor may disagree with).

It is certainly tru that people who are not professors or graduate students
in philosophy get very little respect from the professors, but that answers
the first issue you brought up. If a philosophy undergrad gets no respect
in the academic world, what kind of reaction would you expect a novelist,
a businessman, an engineer, or political writer would get no matter how good
his ideas are? Such a person coculd hope to inspire academic specialists
to write such things, but it would never be widely accepted in academia
until then.

>If Objectivists truly wish to subvert the Establishment, they must be able to
>dominate the game that the Establishment plays.

That game happens to have referees and they are generally opposed to everything
in the philosophy, so without some support from outside, such subversion would
likely never succeed. I think that the stage is being set for that to take
place, but I don't see how that would work as a first stage in the process.

>An Objectivist-like philosophy
>could be enunciated in a style, and more importantly, with the depth, that is
>required by contemporary analytic philosophers. To pursue such an aim would
>not be to sell out to the Enemy. Indeed, there is a great deal Objectivism has
>to gain by becoming analytic.

I don't know whether I would call it "becoming analytic", but there is much
work to be done in formalizing the philosophy. I think that more books and
shorter essays along the lines of Peikoff's and Binswanger's are more
important in fleshing things out than trying to putting the ideas into the
academic format, but there's probably some value in doing that too.

>Thus I suggest that Objectivists master logic and analytic philosophy, and
>attempt to formulate Objectivism in the very carefully-argued, circumspect,
>formal way in which other philosophies are formulated today.

I think that the Objectivist tradition is generally quite carefully argued, but
it is not argued in the same opaque hair-splitting style as the analytics
use. I don't particularly like that mathematically-oriented style (which, by

the way, has invaded almost all other academic areas including my own and

it has generally represented a step backward in those areas) but if portraying
Objectivism in that form will help it spread then I'm for it just as I am
in favor of seeing the ideas translated into all kinds of other foreign
tongues.

>This, however, is not half as important as attacking all the very bad
>arguments, propounded mainly in the twentieth century, which are accepted by
>many contemporary philosophers. Objectivists should be spending their time
>gaining the skills to awaken their comfortable philosophical colleagues from
>their dogmatic slumbers. The more you read, the easier it becomes to read,
>and the easier it is to conceive of exactly how you ought to reply.

While attacking the bad ideas is very important, I think that ultimately it
is more important to have better ideas to take the place of the fallen ones.
Various philosophical positions are disproven or driven out of style
all the time, and in fact these days there are folks with canned skepticism
ready to shoot down (or at least try) anything that comes along. If all
Objectivism accomplishes is to shoot down existing dogma, then it will just
add to the tide of "See, nothing it proven or true and some new idea will
always come along to replace the old." we see out there today.

>When I refer to these "very bad arguments," I mean a set of arguments that
>numbers in the dozens, perhaps not in the hundreds. These include: the open
>question argument (Moore), Wittgenstein's puzzle about meaning-grasp (Kripke),
>Quine's argument for the indeterminacy of translation and inscrutability of
>reference, Russell's and Quine's arguments that 'exists' is not a logical
>predicate, arguments against foundationalism, and so on. (This is just a
>random list of what happens to occur to me right now.) These arguments can
>be located at particular places in particular volumes. There are probably at
>least three in each separate topic in philosophy (e.g., justification, truth,
>existence, value). -- I say all this so as to demonstrate that what I am
>talking about does not require some arcane knowledge or membership in a secret
>society.

I agree (although it does take a rather extended bit of study to understand
them). What requires arcan knowledge and the ability to write papers and
speak at philosophical symposia is a PhD in philosophy and a job in a
university, and that's about as closed as any "secret society" is. It might
only take a few months to thoroughly understand one of these questions, but
to get the academic credentials necessary to write one paper for one academic
journal (which may or may not be accepted by the referees) would require
many years of jumping through hoops (something I am sure I don't have to
point out to you) and what is essentially a life-long commitment to get the
credentials necessary to write such things. Do you ever recall seeing
a paper published in an academic journal by a non-academic (say, an
informed businessman or engineer rather than a professor)?

>In other words, what I am suggesting is not impossibly difficult. I
>am doing it, and I am not the most intelligent person in the world.

In formal academic circumstances what is important is not as much intelligence
(though it helps ;-) as credentials, and those can't be achieved very
quickly or cheaply.

>There is a serious impediment to any steadfast Objectivist taking my advice,
>and that is the Objectivist's tendency to take Ayn Rand and Leonard Peikoff as
>authorities on these topics. Of course, you know what I will say: one ought
>not to take these, or any thinkers, as authorities. In philosophy one ought to
>think for oneself. But this is what Rand herself recommended, is it not? Is
>this not what those steadfast Objectivists are already doing?

Of course there are people who are like that, but then again they aren't
Objectivists. As I am sure you are aware, one can agree with Rand and Peikoff
without being a "randroid".

>Again, I wish to antagonize no one, but I must say what it seems I observe. I
>think this is not what many Objectivists do. I think that many Objectivists
>are followers. Indeed, I think that no one ought to call himself an
>Objectivist, if he presumes to intellectual independence, until he has
>independently formulated his own views, and attempted to justify them without
>appeal to any authority, and found (after the requisite decades of study in
>philosophy) that his own views are precisely matched to Ayn Rand's. The
>chances of this happening are astronomically low, of course. Hence I conclude
>that at least many Objectivists are followers.

There are lots of people out there who claim to be Objectivists who aren't
thinking for themselves, but I wouldn't call them Objectivists. I don't
really see what relevance such people have to this discussion though.
Such people are not the ones who are writing papers, making speeches, and
becoming professors. Such people are part of any movement. They are just
'along for the ride". I am more concerned about the folks like Grossman
the Extropians, and the Neo-Tech idiots who call their ideas "Objectivist"
when they really aren't at all.

>Intellectual individualism is extremely difficult.

True enough.

>It entails actually doubting
>everything which one had hitherto believed on the grounds that one had
>been told it.

That sounds like a recipe for skepticism if you get carried away with it.
You need to question your ideas but you also have to accept your own
conclusions when you come to them. A lot of people suffer from either
doubting everything and never coming to any firm conclusions or accepting
everything and trying to make sense of how it could all be true. The
first error is common among academics and the second is common among
readers of the National Enquirer. Both are equally bad.

>This in itself is very difficult to do, and indeed can be
>painful. It entails, further, an active search for the truth, by a rational
>method. (This conception of intellectual individualism is hardly original on
>my part; see Descartes' _Discourse on the Method_ and _Rules_. One will
>constantly be reinventing the wheel in philosophy. This is an essential part
>of intellectual individualism, however.) Not to say one may not consult any
>authority. Indeed, one may read as much as one likes. It is how one reads, how
>critically. But perhaps as important is writing a great deal, for oneself,
>working out what one thinks about this and that, preferably concentrating on
>the issues that interest one most at the moment (since one is most apt to have
>good ideas then).

Of course this is true. The fact that you have taken this view is probably
why Rand generally appeals to you.

>I hope I have made my points clearly enough. I also hope that some
>Objectivists will be interested enough to reply, whether approving of what I
>have said or not. In essence, what I am asking, and what Objectivism needs, is
>a lot of Objectivists going to the top graduate schools in the country,
>specializing in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy
>of science, and logic, and annoying and puzzling their professors with very
>cogent, careful refutations of the dogmas of the day.

Indeed I think this would be helpful, but I don't think that we need to
make the choice between just being interested in writing on popular
topics or in academic contexts. Both are important if we are going to
change the culture.

--Brian

[Stephen Grossman]

In article <26dlek$h...@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>,

lsa...@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Lawrence M Sanger) writes:

>I do not consider myself an Objectivist, but I am, so to speak, a "fellow

>traveler"; I am utterly baffled as to why they get

>the proper method so seemingly wrong.

wrong within what limit?

>There is not a single prominent
>philosopher, or intellectual, who is an Objectivist.

Its new and radical. Cultural change takes time.

>Objectivists are good at
>convincing undergraduates and non-philosophers, but terrible at convincing
>graduate students and professors in philosophy.

>Rand knew that her philosophy would not be popular among professional
>philosophers. She said, in essence, "Forget them. They're too far gone. They
>cannot be saved. Better to work with youth." And she antagonised them.
>
>I think this is only part of the explanation. I think she could not have aimed
>her philosophy at professional philosophers because her philosophy lacked the
>requisite sophistication.

sophistication within what limit, the mainstream of contemp phil or Obj?

>This is not to say that she had no arguments; but many of the
>arguments which she did have were incompletely-stated, and some were clearly
>quite bad.

This is wildly out-of-context. Or, better, incomplete or bad within what
limit?

>
>Moreover, Rand had very little sense for the finer points which occupy much of
>a professional philosopher's time.

Whoa! Professional or amateur, this is irrelevant. The (objectively) important
distinction is: objective or subjective. Most great philosophers were
amateurs. And, finer points within Obj or the mainstream of contemp phil?

>She thought that they were splitting hairs,

>like modern-day Scholastics, and really wasting their time. "Don't bother to
>examine a folly," I think the motto goes, "just examine its results." But this

>essentially blinded her to an extremely important aspect of philosophy, namely,
>that very many of the most important issues turn upon the fine points she did
>not care to investigate.

distinctions are contextual. fine points in Obj are not fine points within the
mainstream of contemp phil.

>
>For example, while Rand acknowledges that the problem of universals is of the
>utmost importance, as I think it is, it is quite difficult to make out what her
>answer is in _Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology_. If someone can
>explain to me how her so-called theory of concepts constitutes a solution to
>the problem of universals, I would be very interested to hear it. Perhaps
>reference to Peikoff's _Objectivism_ may help in this task, though I doubt it.

Your above questions are answered in _IOE_. This is a whole topic in itself,
far beyond your basic concern, in this post, to study philosophical influence.
I merely here note a very general observation about the importance of context
(limit): within your philosophy (seemingly a mix of Obj and analysis?), Rand's
theory of concepts cannot, in principle, be a solution to the problem of
universals. Thus, you must examine your principles and consider changing them.

>my purpose is to generate discussion of the methods
>of Objectivism, and in particular, what methods are appropriate to achieving
>a major aim of Objectivism, namely, to win over the intellectual leaders of
>the day.

Since she thought they were hopeless, she wanted to create, not win over,
intellectual leaders, "the _new_ intellectuals."

>
>analytic philosophers are, after all, fairly

>reasonable people; at least, a very significant percentage are. By this I mean

>that they are, in most of what they think about, convinced by arguments rather

>than prejudice or emotion-driven ideology. The unfortunate fact about analytic

>philosophers, however, is that the arguments by which they are convinced are
>very bad arguments. Indeed, they are incredibly bad arguments, very many of
>them.

"Reasonable?!" That might mean Pragmatic or willing to compromise anything
with anything. You say they value argument in _most_ of their ideas; but that
means they oppose argument at some point. Is that point basic to their
arguments. Eg, analytic logic is arbitrary and conventional. This perverts
everything within an argument. And, the arb and conv is based on the claim
that reality is unknowable and thus reason (and thus argument) is mere
rationalization. So much for analytic "reasonableness." Sophistication is also
sophistry. See Socrates. You may not fully recognize the Obj stress on
axiomatic concepts and conceptual hierarchy and its importance to judging
other philosophies. Ie, never let a subjectivist premise develop unchallenged.
Skill at foolishness remains foolish.

Symbol manipulation is not argument. I spent 4 years winning countless debates
in tech philosophy with phil professors. None had the intellectual honesty to
admit that something odd was happening. In one semester, four (4) phil profs
explicitly told me to stop discussing fundamentals! Consider this carefully,
please. They _knew_ that Obj arguments were refuting theirs but did not want
students to know. This is why Rand so carefully presents and discusses
fundamentals. They conveniently forgot, from
discussion to discussion, that i had already refuted what they were presently
saying. Contemp phil, whether analytic, Pragmatist, or post-Existentialist, or
post-modern,
is a formal rejection of reality and reason. They do not argue and are not
impressed by argument. That claim is excessively narrow; they use a
pseudo-rational style to evade and destroy reason. The problem is radically
deeper than you have considered.

>
>An undergraduate in philosophy may find this hard to believe. If he is an
>Objectivist, he may have the feeling that there is simply nothing he can say
>that will be right. To such a person all I can say is: It's easier in graduate
>school. You may even learn that what you used to say was indeed incorrect, but
>correct "in essentials" (which is something a professor may disagree with).

Its essentials which determine the rest

>
>If Objectivists truly wish to subvert the Establishment, they must be able to

>dominate the game that the Establishment plays. An Objectivist-like philosophy

>could be enunciated in a style, and more importantly, with the depth, that is
>required by contemporary analytic philosophers. To pursue such an aim would
>not be to sell out to the Enemy. Indeed, there is a great deal Objectivism has
>to gain by becoming analytic.

Obj requires the creation of a new Establishment. The old is rotten, termite
infected, and ready to fall. It has no objective value. The depth of contemp
analysis is that of a mud puddle. Its style is psychosis (no conceptual
integration, concrete-bound and metaphors at critical points). An Obj-like
phil is not Obj! It would be compromise. There are no objective gains to Obj
becoming analytic

>
>Thus I suggest that Objectivists master logic and analytic philosophy, and
>attempt to formulate Objectivism in the very carefully-argued, circumspect,
>formal way in which other philosophies are formulated today.

Which logic, Aristotelian or arbitrary and conventional? The "very

carefully-argued, circumspect, formal way in which other philosophies are

formulated today" is contradictory to Obj. Obj has its own "very
carefully-argued, circumspect,
>formal way in which" it is argued. Each philosophy is a separate world,
containing judgements on literally everything and only by its standards. Obj
is a radical rejection, not merely of analysis and the mainstream of contemp
phil but of its Kantian-Cartesian-Platonic context. It may be that analysis
contains a tiny bit of objectivity here and there but that is a matter of
chance or error. Obj is a radical concern with hierarchical contexts and
system. The system of analysis is not the system of Obj. The truth is the
whole.

>This, however, is not half as important as attacking all the very bad
>arguments, propounded mainly in the twentieth century, which are accepted by
>many contemporary philosophers. Objectivists should be spending their time
>gaining the skills to awaken their comfortable philosophical colleagues from
>their dogmatic slumbers. The more you read, the easier it becomes to read,
>and the easier it is to conceive of exactly how you ought to reply.

THere are no "colleagues" for Objectivists within university phil depts. There
are only subjectivists, a few confused classical realists, and even less
Objectivists.

>When I refer to these "very bad arguments," I mean a set of arguments that
>numbers in the dozens, perhaps not in the hundreds. These include: the open
>question argument (Moore), Wittgenstein's puzzle about meaning-grasp (Kripke),
>Quine's argument for the indeterminacy of translation and inscrutability of
>reference, Russell's and Quine's arguments that 'exists' is not a logical
>predicate, arguments against foundationalism, and so on. (This is just a
>random list of what happens to occur to me right now.) These arguments can
>be located at particular places in particular volumes. There are probably at
>least three in each separate topic in philosophy (e.g., justification, truth,
>existence, value). -- I say all this so as to demonstrate that what I am
>talking about does not require some arcane knowledge or membership in a secret

>society. In other words, what I am suggesting is not impossibly difficult. I

>am doing it, and I am not the most intelligent person in the world.

these are either met within Obj or have no value within Obj. _IOE_ and
Peikoff's _Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy_, systemized within Peikoff's
_Objectivism_, contains the basic Obj views. Peikoff said he had to stop
thinking like an analyst to be objective. He was grateful to Rand for teaching
him to think in principles rather than the wildly out-of-context and
concrete-bound method of analysis. But it took him years to get analysis out
of his mind.

>
>There is a serious impediment to any steadfast Objectivist taking my advice,
>and that is the Objectivist's tendency to take Ayn Rand and Leonard Peikoff as
>authorities on these topics. Of course, you know what I will say: one ought
>not to take these, or any thinkers, as authorities. In philosophy one ought to
>think for oneself. But this is what Rand herself recommended, is it not? Is
>this not what those steadfast Objectivists are already doing?

ad hominem. Rational authorities are good to teach what others know; and then
one judges them.

>
>Again, I wish to antagonize no one, but I must say what it seems I observe. I
>think this is not what many Objectivists do. I think that many Objectivists
>are followers.

most people are not historical, turning-point philosophers.

>Indeed, I think that no one ought to call himself an
>Objectivist, if he presumes to intellectual independence, until he has
>independently formulated his own views, and attempted to justify them without
>appeal to any authority, and found (after the requisite decades of study in
>philosophy) that his own views are precisely matched to Ayn Rand's. The
>chances of this happening are astronomically low, of course.

Yes, they are low; does this suggest anything wrong here? Your standard for
Objectivism is not objective, but subjective. Intellectual independence means
judging reality, not creating it. You are merely opposed to people judging
that Obj is their philosophy. Besides, only a few Objectivists will understand
it profoundly and completely or on a level valid for a university. Most will
get enough out of it to satisfy their basically practical concerns for a good
life and then return to their practical life. Not everyone who likes
anlaysis has, eg, Wittgenstein's understanding.

Hence I conclude
>that at least many Objectivists are followers.

Of course, Rand created it so others who like it are necessarily followers.
Aquinas followed Aristotle but he thought very independently about his ideas.
>
>Intellectual individualism is extremely difficult. It entails actually

>doubting everything which one had hitherto believed on the grounds that one had

>been told it. This in itself is very difficult to do, and indeed can be

>painful. It entails, further, an active search for the truth, by a rational
>method. (This conception of intellectual individualism is hardly original on
>my part; see Descartes' _Discourse on the Method_ and _Rules_. One will
>constantly be reinventing the wheel in philosophy. This is an essential part
>of intellectual individualism, however.)

Individualism is not subjectivism. Individualism is based on reality as
rationally undertstood. Subjectivism (Cartesian, Kantian, etc) is based on a
state of consciousness (basically emotion) not directly connected to reality,
eg, doubt. Rand and classical realists are advocates of the primacy of
existence. The rest of philosophy is primacy of consciousness. Rand starts in
reality. Descartes starts by doubting reality.
Truth, objective or subjective?

>what Objectivism needs, is
>a lot of Objectivists going to the top graduate schools in the country,
>specializing in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy
>of science, and logic, and annoying and puzzling their professors with very

>cogent, careful refutations of the dogmas of the day. Moreover, Objectivism
>needs the helpful criticism of truly independent thinkers.

Its already happening. Obj is spreading. Slow, but, hopefully, sure.
################################################################################
"Wink, wink. Nudge, nudge."
[Kant, _Critique of Pure Reason_]
################################################################################

[Brian K. Yoder]

In article <CCy79...@world.std.com> r...@world.std.com (Robert J. Kolker) writes:
>Yoder Writes:

>[heavy snipping]
>"I think that the Objectivist tradition is generally quite carefully
>argued, but it is not argued in the same opaque hair-splitting sytyle as
>the analytics use. I don't particularly like that
>*mathematically-oriented* [emphasis mine CtL] style (which, by the way,
>has invaded almost all other academic areas including my own and it has
>generally represented a step backward in thos areas) but if portraying
>Objectivism in that form will help it speard then I'm for it......"

>[more heavy snipping to end]

>Two questions:

>1. If the area in question is succeptable to proper mathematical analysis
>or modelling, what is the problem?

If the area is succeptable to it then I have no problem with lots of math and
fancy symbology. Certainly in some areas and on some subjects it is perfectly
appropriate. The problem is that in academic journals many authors can't
write a paper about buying milk at the supermarket without using half a dozen
calculus formulae and some wierd logic statements. I think the general
reason for this is that including a lot of fancy math makes a dull or
unimportant paper appear to be deep and complex. As Neitzsche said, "They
muddy their waters to make them appar deep.". Have you not had the experience
of reading a maze of mathematese only to realize at the end that the whole
concept could have easily been conveyed in a simple sentence? I have no
problem understanding the math (usually) and I have a pretty strong
mathematical background, but the intentional obfuscation really bugs me.

>2. What is your area (see quote above "....including my own....")?

Sorry, I should have said, my own area is computer science.

>I would be the last person to claim mathematics is appropriately applied
>just any old place, but in areas where precise logical relationships
>constitute the essence of the endeavour, mathematics can be quite helpful.
>Whre would physics, for example, be without mathematics.

I didn't say that math is never appropriate, just that is it often used
to cover up trivialities and make it more difficult to criticize the
ideas (or lack of them) in a paper.

>Mathematical logic has gone the deepest in demonstrating and defining just
>what constitutes a proof. And the metalogical theory of first and second
>order logic has gone the furthest in discerning the limits of provability.

Mathematical logic is well and good in it's place, but it is used FAR too often
as a substitute for clear statements and clear meaning in areas where it adds
nothing. Consider the following trivial statements:

"Bob chose to eat an apple instead of an orange because he liked the taste of
apples more than oranges."

vs.

"Consider a decision space {A,O} in which each alternative a is compared by
the actor B using a preference vector V represented as [V1, V2, V3...]
where there exists a Vt associated with a olfactory/oral sensory modality
such that if in the decision space {A,O}, Vta>Vto B will express a choice
of A."

(I don't mean for this to be in conformance with any particular notation,
but then again many of the authors of these papers are making up their own
symbology as they go anyway (especially in the social sciences. The fact
is that I find it very difficult to write things this way because it is so
strange to write in such a way as to obfuscate the meaning.)

>For example, Goedel's incompleteness theorem.

Don't get me started on Godel again.

--Brian

[Lawrence M Sanger]

My comments are not preceded by any number of these: '>'.

In article <byoderCC...@netcom.com> byo...@netcom.com (Brian K. Yoder) wri
tes:
>In article <26dlek$h...@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu> lsa...@magnus.acs.ohi
o-state.edu (Lawrence M Sanger) writes:

...

>Actually, I think you may be looking at "philosophy" a bit to narrowly. What
>shapes history is the *philosophy* people have. This may or may not be
>strongly influenced by professional philosophers, preachers, teachers,
>witch doctors, or politicians. In some cultures there are no professional
>philosophers. In others, they are ignored or are actually just political
>or religious mouthpieces for non-philosophers who promote philosophical
>ideas. In the modern west professional philosophers have traditionally
>had a major role in setting the philosophical tone of society, but this is
>not necessarily going to continue being the case (thought I hope it will be
>and that the philosophers will improve).

This seems to me perfectly right.

>>But the intellectual leaders have not changed. There is not a single promine
nt
>>philosopher, or intellectual, who is an Objectivist. (I guess I am not
>>counting Leonard Peikoff or David Kelly as "prominent." They may seem so to
>>Objectivists, but to the rest of the world, they are either unknown or object
s

>>of contempt.
>
>Certainly they are not widely known and loved, but then again anyone with
>big new ideas is not going to be immediately and widely accepted. Rand was
>herself widely known and was (and in a certain sense still is) an
>intellectual leader. How would you define "prominent" and "leader" in this
>sense?

Someone is prominent if, at the mention that he is coming to speak, the
professors of The Ohio State University quiver with excitement. Someone is
prominent if he is able to get an article published in _The Journal of
Philosophy_ without too much trouble. I could, if you like, give a rather long
disjunctive (extensional) definition, but I'm afraid I would get it wrong.

These are the prominent ones in academic philosophy, anyway. Someone is
prominent in the overall intellectual world if his books are reviewed by The
New York Times Review of Books, or the Times Literary Supplement. How does
that grab you? (Uh oh, now I have to wonder whether Peikoff's _Objectivism_
was reviewed by the NYT. Well, I doubt it.) You get the idea, I hope.

>In any event, out of say, 10,000 members of the public at large, or even
>intellectuals in particular, how many are likely to be professional academic
>philosophers? Probably zero or one, so I should come as no surprise that
>any philosophical movement coming from outside the philosophical establishment
>would not begin with hundreds of professional philosophers in the ranks.
>Even so, there are hundreds of people out there who are phiosophy professors
>and graduate students who are either Objectivists or at least very sympathetic
>to Objectivism, but since we are a young movement such people tend not to
>occupy the top spots in academic departments, particularly since the
>existing department chairmen etc. are not particularly friendly.

Is the number really in the hundreds? I find that hard to believe, but I am
willing to learn.

>>She often used many rhetorical devices that cannot really pass
>>for argument. This is not to say that she had no arguments; but many of the
>>arguments which she did have were incompletely-stated, and some were clearly
>>quite bad.
>

>Perhaps we should talk about some specific ones. Without doing so, it seems
>hard to discuss this claim of yours.

Granted. Please see my post entitled "Replies and Some Problems."

>>Moreover, Rand had very little sense for the finer points which occupy much o
f
>>a professional philosopher's time. She thought that they were splitting hair
s,
>>like modern-day Scholastics, and really wasting their time.
>

>Do you disagree with that in general? Certainly she was not a "specialist"
>or interested in splitting all of the hairs that exist (100 lifetimes
>would not have been enough to do that anyway). Are you of the opinion that
>what most academic philosophers write about is vital and important to
>learning the way to live a good life and understand reality? Or are they
>just churning out a bunch of irrelevant hair-splitting for the most part?

No, I really do think that what they write is incredibly relevant. I think it
is a fatal error not to think so. As Rand would say, when they say that my
meaning such-and-such when I say so-and-so is to be determined entirely by my
speech community, they mean it.

The term 'hair-splitting' makes me a little uncomfortable. It implies that
what analytic philosophers do is make completely irrelevant distinctions and
use completely useless concepts to prove what makes no difference whatsoever.
That is not what analytic philosophers do. Granted, many distinctions they
make are silly, and many of their concepts are ridiculous. But this is not due
to their attention to detail; it is due to their bad philosophizing. This
point can't be emphasized enough. Perhaps we can substitute the term
'attention to detail' for 'hair-splitting'. Theories are often made or broken
in the details.

>
>>"Don't bother to
>>examine a folly," I think the motto goes, "just examine its results."
>

>Actually, as I recall it was Ellsworth Toohey who said that, but in terms
>of the issue he was discussing, it makes sense. When evaluating the ideas
>of dishonest or irrational people, it makes no sense to spend a lot of time
>running over the finer points of the irrationalities they engage in.

I agree with this. But I think many Objectivists think that one need not say
anything at all to those who hold bad theories, or theories one suspects are
bad, on various subjects. For example, if one were to say, "You are a Kantian,
so it's unnecessary for me to say what is wrong with your theory of truth
[the coherence theory, probably]," one would be foregoing one's dialectical
responsibilities. Such responsibilities are part of engaging in rational
debate. If one refuses to take them up, one's professors and others are
justified in their haughty, contemptuous silence.

If you
>can determine the root of the error (say, some psychological factor which
>makes them make some fundamental philosophical error) then note what that
>error consists of. One need not trace every last consequence of that error.
>Wouldn't you agree?

Not if one were writing a paper about an area where a theory had some
particular consequence. Then it would be appropriate to address the
consequence, especially if it were a prominent theory.

>>Thus I suggest that Objectivists master logic and analytic philosophy, and
>>attempt to formulate Objectivism in the very carefully-argued, circumspect,
>>formal way in which other philosophies are formulated today.
>

>I think that the Objectivist tradition is generally quite carefully argued, bu
t

>it is not argued in the same opaque hair-splitting style as the analytics
>use. I don't particularly like that mathematically-oriented style (which, by

>the way, has invaded almost all other academic areas including my own and

>it has generally represented a step backward in those areas) but if portrayin
g

>Objectivism in that form will help it spread then I'm for it just as I am
>in favor of seeing the ideas translated into all kinds of other foreign
>tongues.

I notice that this reply has generated some other comments, so here is my take.
My point was not that all philosophy be written as are articles in _The Journal
of Symbolic Logic_. Logic is merely a tool in other areas of philosophy
(except where the philosophy of logic creates issues in metaphysics and the
philosophy of language). My point was that articles ought to be written in
using what I called the "analytic method" (see my post "Replies and Some
Problems").

>This, however, is not half as important as attacking all the very bad
>>arguments, propounded mainly in the twentieth century, which are accepted by
>>many contemporary philosophers. Objectivists should be spending their time
>>gaining the skills to awaken their comfortable philosophical colleagues from
>>their dogmatic slumbers. The more you read, the easier it becomes to read,
>>and the easier it is to conceive of exactly how you ought to reply.
>

>While attacking the bad ideas is very important, I think that ultimately it
>is more important to have better ideas to take the place of the fallen ones.

Problem is, no one thinks they have fallen yet! Sharpen your axes; there is
work to be done first.

>Various philosophical positions are disproven or driven out of style
>all the time, and in fact these days there are folks with canned skepticism
>ready to shoot down (or at least try) anything that comes along.

Well, this is part of the intellectual dogmatism that must be attacked. We
must be the skeptics' skeptics.

>If all
>Objectivism accomplishes is to shoot down existing dogma, then it will just
>add to the tide of "See, nothing it proven or true and some new idea will
>always come along to replace the old." we see out there today.

Point well taken, but this is not all that I said I thought Objectivism should
accomplish.

>There are lots of people out there who claim to be Objectivists who aren't
>thinking for themselves, but I wouldn't call them Objectivists.

I'm sorry, but I'm afraid my point was more insulting than that. My point is
that practically anyone (including, probably, you) who calls himself an
'Objectivist' and means by that that he agrees with all that Rand has written
perforce could not possibly be thinking for himself. I say this not because
lots of what Rand wrote is so obviously false, but because "confirming for
oneself" what she wrote is, as I said originally, a process that would
necessarily take decades.

>>It entails actually doubting
>>everything which one had hitherto believed on the grounds that one had
>>been told it.
>

>That sounds like a recipe for skepticism if you get carried away with it.
>You need to question your ideas but you also have to accept your own
>conclusions when you come to them. A lot of people suffer from either
>doubting everything and never coming to any firm conclusions or accepting
>everything and trying to make sense of how it could all be true. The
>first error is common among academics and the second is common among
>readers of the National Enquirer. Both are equally bad.

I am an advocate of a very radical sort of doubting (though not Cartesian
doubt). I really do think that if one begins philosophizing with a lot of
baggage, one can never achieve anything very brilliant. One may suspect, be
strongly inclined to think, etc., but if one actually concludes that something
is the case before the appropriate time (more on this later if you like), one
does oneself a great disservice. For probably one has embraced something that
is only half-true.

Doubt is, clearly, not an end in itself: it is a tool, a necessary tool, for
truth-seeking. It is not used enough by Objectivists, in my opinion. (Again
see the problems at the end of the post referred to above.)

>I don't think that we need to
>make the choice between just being interested in writing on popular
>topics or in academic contexts. Both are important if we are going to
>change the culture.

I agree entirely. I was only trying to emphasize the latter.

Sincerely,

Larry

[Torkel Franzen]

In article <byoderCC...@netcom.com> byo...@netcom.com (Brian K. Yoder)
writes:

>Don't get me started on Godel again.

As far as I know, you haven't said anything about Godel. You have made
various statements about some "Godel" of your imagination (?), coyly declining
to divulge what you believe yourself to be referring to.

[Robert J. Kolker]

Reply to Yoder:

I think we are experiencing intense agreement. You are quite correct in
saying that some of the social sciences use the *appearance* of
mathematical sophistication to mask conceptual vacuity or triviality. On
the other hand, there are cases of logical complexity where use of natural
language would be so clumsly, as to obscure meaning. I am of the school
that believes the first and best task of language is to convey facts and
ideas.

One area where a moderate use of mathematics has helped in the social and
political sciences is the analysis of preferences and voting schemes. The
papers of Kenneth Arrow are very good in this regard. He has shown that
individuals with consistent preference (i.e. where preference is a
transitive relationship) collectively can express intransitive
preferences. So much for democracy!

BTW I too am in the computer business. I started professional life as a
mathematician, but went into software engineering. I never gave up
mathematics entirely and I keep my hand in it to some extent.

I believe it was you who pointed out the affinity between computer related
occupations (such as comp sci) and interest in objectivism.

Tally ho!

[Brian K. Yoder]

Torkel,

We have been over this again and again and you insist on trying to pose my
replies into some pre-conceived categories you are unwilling to question.
Since you have proven yourself unwilling to read what I write about Godel
I don't know why I should bother discussing it with you again.

--Brian

[Torkel Franzen]

In article <byoderCC...@netcom.com> byo...@netcom.com (Brian K. Yoder)
writes:

>Since you have proven yourself unwilling to read what I write about Godel

>I don't know why I should bother discussing it with you again.

On the contrary, I have read it with great interest, but you have
never answered my questions about it, so I'm at a loss as to what
"discussion" you have in mind.

[Lawrence M Sanger]

In article <CD1tp...@umassd.edu> pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU writes:
>In article <26g2m7$h...@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>, lsa...@magnus.acs.oh

io-state.edu (Lawrence M Sanger) writes:

>>In article <CCwts...@umassd.edu> pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU writes:
>>>In article <26dlek$h...@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>,
>>>lsa...@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Lawrence M Sanger) writes:

...

>>>wrong within what limit?
>>
>>This is a vague question. I take it you do not want to imply that rightness
or
>>wrongness of method is relative to some conceptual scheme (though it is, of
>>course, relative to goals, which I'm sure you realize). So what do you mean
by
>>the question?
>
>THis and your other following rejections of context (limit, identity, thing,
>existent, identity) are very curious. Platonic-Aristotelian naive realism
>(Rand's term is intrinsicism) is an ignorance of the contribution that
>consciousness makes to knowledge. The subjectivist reaction to this properly
>stressed context but, unlike the naive realists, rejected reality as part of
>knowledge. I am completely bewildered that your study of linguistic analysis
>has not acquainted you with the importance of context.

Certainly the term 'context' is not used as you use it; what else you can be
referring to is unclear to me. Perhaps what you mean is, for example, Quine's
"Two Dogmas," where he makes acceptability relative to conceptual scheme. One
could say that a claim is acceptable for Quine relative only to some context or
other. Doubtlessly you have read "Two Dogmas." Do you approve of the last few
sections of it? I'm afraid that what you have written reminds me a great deal
of Quine, and other contemporary relativists.

>Perhaps you also reject
>subjectivism for the mistaken belief that Rand likes naive realism. she does
>not.

Am I right to understand that you think Rand is a subjectivist? Land amighty,
I am puzzled. Please quote to me, as I'm sure you can, where Rand says she
embraces anything remotely like subjectivism. I take it that 'subjectivism'
in this discussion means something like 'the theory that the possession of
truth, right, and other qualities are dependent upon and vary by the person or
group who holds that they are possessed or not'.

If you honestly believe that Ayn Rand is a subjectivist in this sense, I hope
you are prepared to defend your astonishing belief.

>>Your use of 'limit' absolutely baffles me. Surely you do not mean to imply
>>that an argument is good or bad relative to some conceptual scheme or
>>philosophy! An argument is either good or bad, period. (This goes for
>>soundness as well: the premises are either true or not.)
>
>See above as well as Rand's _Intro to Obj Episte_, 2nd ed. Yes, since
>knowledge is contextual, is limited, is something definite, with definite
>properties, just as an apple or a sidewalk has an identity, then argument is
>relative to a specific philosophy.

The merits of an argument are not, on Rand's view as I understand it, relative
to anything but reality. Please find the precise passage in _IOE_ that
contraverts this!

>Good, bad, soundness, true, false, etc., etc. are all contextual, limited.
>Even if you accept a naively realistic good, I can ask for the context of
>naive realism. Reason is not automatic. We must control it by systematically
>identifying the limit, context, identity of our judgements just as scientists
>define experimental parameters. In context A, A' is true. In context B, B' is
>true, etc.

Again, if you think this is what Rand thinks, please find the passages to prove
it. I very strongly doubt it! After all, it is her absolutism that attracted
me in the first place!

>>>I spent 4 years winning countless debates
>>>in tech philosophy with phil professors. None had the intellectual honesty t
o
>>>admit that something odd was happening.
>>

>>Probably your professors would disagree that you had won the debates.
>
>Oh, no, they became horribly frustrated. One accused me of treating them as
>children. I wisely remained silent. Another (a Jesuit w/5 degrees and
>international teaching) complained that I always won. Another, who taught
>logic, claimed an argument of his was valid until I diagrammed it with
>Aristotle's syllogism. The existentialist often pulled back his gums to show
>he was smiling. And so on. You are evoking good memeories.Thanks.

Anytime. Congratulations on a successful college career. You have certainly
accomplished something that I was not able to do. Hence I expect that you will
be able to answer my challenges all the better.

>>>>Thus I suggest that Objectivists master logic and analytic philosophy, and
>>>>attempt to formulate Objectivism in the very carefully-argued, circumspect,
>>>>formal way in which other philosophies are formulated today.
>>>
>>>Which logic, Aristotelian or arbitrary and conventional?
>>

>>Do you really mean to imply that you prefer Aristotelian logic?
>
>Is your acceptance of a&c logic itself a&c?!

First of all, I don't know what you mean by 'arbitrary and conventional'
logic. Second, I did not say that I accepted any logic. Third, you did not
answer my question; please do so. Your answer will be much more informative if
you say what you mean by 'Aristotelian logic' with sufficiently clarity as for
me to be able to distinguish it from what is called 'classical' first-order
predicate logic. Let me say that the following remark --

>It is not primarily the details, which may have omissions or errors, but the
>basis in reality, in the principle of identity recognized as corresponding to
>the identity of reality. Again, the context of reality and reason.

does not allow me to do so. Classical first-order predicate logic can
certainly be interpreted so that the statement "(x)(x=x)" is said to make a
statement about reality. One need only assume existential import for the
universal quantifier; and there are probably other ways to do it as well.

>>>These [problems] are either met within Obj or have no value within Obj.

_IOE_
>>and
>>>Peikoff's _Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy_, systemized within Peikoff's
>>>_Objectivism_, contains the basic Obj views.

>>This claim is simply false. I have read some of _Objectivism_ with a little
>>reading group, especially the first few chapters, and Peikoff answers none of
>>these sorts of objections, but studiously ignores them. Now, of course that
>>"have no value within" Objectivism.

>False within linguistic analysis but not within Obj.

Mr. Grossman, do you really mean that truth and falsity is relative to context,
philosophy, or whatnot? I, of course, do not; but that is beside the point,
since you claim to be a defender of Ayn Rand, and I simply do not believe that
Ayn Rand would agree that relativism is her view. Please supply the relevant
quotes. If she is a relativist after all, and you have proven it, I guess
that's all the better reason not to be a hard-line Objectivist!

If you want to continue representing Objectivism to others, you have a lot of
explaining to do.

Sincerely,

Larry Sanger

[Stephen Grossman]

In article <26lgbu$m...@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>, lsa...@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Lawrence M Sanger) writes:
>In article <CD1tp...@umassd.edu> pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU writes:
>>In article <26g2m7$h...@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>, lsa...@magnus.acs.oh
>io-state.edu (Lawrence M Sanger) writes:
>>>In article <CCwts...@umassd.edu> pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU writes:

>>>>In article <26dlek$h...@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>,
>>>>lsa...@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Lawrence M Sanger) writes:
>

>>>>I spent 4 years winning countless debates
>>>>in tech philosophy with phil professors. None had the intellectual honesty t
>o
>>>>admit that something odd was happening.
>>>

>>>Probably your professors would disagree that you had won the debates.
>>
>>Oh, no, they became horribly frustrated. One accused me of treating them as
>>children. I wisely remained silent. Another (a Jesuit w/5 degrees and
>>international teaching) complained that I always won. Another, who taught
>>logic, claimed an argument of his was valid until I diagrammed it with
>>Aristotle's syllogism. The existentialist often pulled back his gums to show
>>he was smiling. And so on. You are evoking good memeories.Thanks.
>
>Anytime. Congratulations on a successful college career. You have certainly
>accomplished something that I was not able to do. Hence I expect that you will
>be able to answer my challenges all the better.
>

>>>>>Thus I suggest that Objectivists master logic and analytic philosophy, and
>>>>>attempt to formulate Objectivism in the very carefully-argued, circumspect,
>>>>>formal way in which other philosophies are formulated today.
>>>>
>>>>Which logic, Aristotelian or arbitrary and conventional?
>>>

>>>Do you really mean to imply that you prefer Aristotelian logic?
>>
>>Is your acceptance of a&c logic itself a&c?!
>
>First of all, I don't know what you mean by 'arbitrary and conventional'
>logic. Second, I did not say that I accepted any logic. Third, you did not
>answer my question; please do so. Your answer will be much more informative if
>you say what you mean by 'Aristotelian logic' with sufficiently clarity as for
>me to be able to distinguish it from what is called 'classical' first-order
>predicate logic. Let me say that the following remark --
>
>>It is not primarily the details, which may have omissions or errors, but the
>>basis in reality, in the principle of identity recognized as corresponding to
>>the identity of reality. Again, the context of reality and reason.
>
>does not allow me to do so. Classical first-order predicate logic can
>certainly be interpreted so that the statement "(x)(x=x)" is said to make a
>statement about reality. One need only assume existential import for the
>universal quantifier; and there are probably other ways to do it as well.
>

>>>>These [problems] are either met within Obj or have no value within Obj.

>_IOE_
>>>and
>>>>Peikoff's _Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy_, systemized within Peikoff's
>>>>_Objectivism_, contains the basic Obj views.
>

>>>This claim is simply false. I have read some of _Objectivism_ with a little
>>>reading group, especially the first few chapters, and Peikoff answers none of
>>>these sorts of objections, but studiously ignores them. Now, of course that
>>>"have no value within" Objectivism.
>
>>False within linguistic analysis but not within Obj.
>
>Mr. Grossman, do you really mean that truth and falsity is relative to context,
>philosophy, or whatnot? I, of course, do not; but that is beside the point,
>since you claim to be a defender of Ayn Rand, and I simply do not believe that
>Ayn Rand would agree that relativism is her view. Please supply the relevant
>quotes. If she is a relativist after all, and you have proven it, I guess
>that's all the better reason not to be a hard-line Objectivist!
>
>If you want to continue representing Objectivism to others, you have a lot of
>explaining to do.

Now I know why we have been arguing at cross-purposes, bewildered by the
other. You believe Rand accepts the traditional epistemological alternatives
of realism and subjectivism, ie, that knowledge is intrinsic to reality and
unrelated to a distorting consciousness or that knowledge is subjective to
consciousness and unrelated to an unknowable reality. She does not accept any
version of these two alternatives. That's one of the major points about Obj.
Before continuing, your respect for what you understand as her realism is
ceertainly respectable. However, she is not, under any variation, a naive or
Platonic-Aristotelian epistemological realist.

Rand's radical third alternative is her radical view of objectivity: knowledge
is the product of the interaction of reality and consciousness; reality as we
are conscious of it. "All knowledge is processed knowledge." [Rand, _IOE_, 2nd
ed., 81] IE, knowledge is reality as processed by consciousness. The
processing of subjective states is not knowledge. It is reality that is
processed by our consciousness. This processing acts according to the facts of
reality and the requirements of human cognition. Human consciousness acts in
a specific way when it is directed to reality. Epistemology, in the context of
a realist metaphysics (very generally speaking) studies that specific way.

There is much more that i will say later but some talented friends are playing
good rock at a nighclub and i must be on my way. I'll be beck!

[Lawrence M Sanger]

In article <CD2GE...@umassd.edu> pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU writes:
>In article <26lgbu$m...@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>, lsa...@magnus.acs.oh

io-state.edu (Lawrence M Sanger) writes:
>>In article <CD1tp...@umassd.edu> pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU writes:
>>>In article <26g2m7$h...@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>, lsa...@magnus.acs.
oh
>>io-state.edu (Lawrence M Sanger) writes:
>>>>In article <CCwts...@umassd.edu> pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU writes:
>>>>>In article <26dlek$h...@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>,
>>>>>lsa...@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Lawrence M Sanger) writes:

Whew! After a long and, well, interesting exchange, I put the challenge to
Mr. Grossman which, it seems, was the best sort of challenge to put to him:

Quote:

Mr. Grossman, do you really mean that truth and falsity is relative to context,
philosophy, or whatnot? I, of course, do not; but that is beside the point,
since you claim to be a defender of Ayn Rand, and I simply do not believe that
Ayn Rand would agree that relativism is her view. Please supply the relevant
quotes. If she is a relativist after all, and you have proven it, I guess
that's all the better reason not to be a hard-line Objectivist!

If you want to continue representing Objectivism to others, you have a lot of
explaining to do.

End of quote. Mr. Grossman replies:

>Now I know why we have been arguing at cross-purposes, bewildered by the
>other. You believe Rand accepts the traditional epistemological alternatives
>of realism and subjectivism, ie, that knowledge is intrinsic to reality and
>unrelated to a distorting consciousness or that knowledge is subjective to
>consciousness and unrelated to an unknowable reality. She does not accept any
>version of these two alternatives. That's one of the major points about Obj.
>Before continuing, your respect for what you understand as her realism is
>ceertainly respectable. However, she is not, under any variation, a naive or
>Platonic-Aristotelian epistemological realist.
>
>Rand's radical third alternative is her radical view of objectivity: knowledge
>is the product of the interaction of reality and consciousness; reality as we
>are conscious of it. "All knowledge is processed knowledge." [Rand, _IOE_, 2nd
>ed., 81] IE, knowledge is reality as processed by consciousness. The
>processing of subjective states is not knowledge. It is reality that is
>processed by our consciousness. This processing acts according to the facts of
>reality and the requirements of human cognition. Human consciousness acts in
>a specific way when it is directed to reality. Epistemology, in the context of
>a realist metaphysics (very generally speaking) studies that specific way.
>There is much more that i will say later but some talented friends are playing
>good rock at a nighclub and i must be on my way. I'll be beck!

Mr. Grossman, please, before you start any manner of reply to me, please run
home and get _IOE_ and any other relevant Objectivist volume and do what I
originally requested. That is, find some _passage_ from Rand's writing -- not
your memory thereof, but an actual passage, which you can quote to me and
others interested -- that supports your view that Rand's philosophy is
consistent with relativism or subjectivism.

So we are not discussing realism, Mr. Grossman, we are discussing whether Rand
was a relativist or a subjectivist. The latter are contrasted by absolutism
and objectivism, respectively.

Let us use the following definitions. Relativism is the view that what is true
(good, right, beautiful, etc. -- sometimes, even what exists) is relative to
(that is, is dependent upon) some "context" (culture, group, etc.). Usually,
relativism is consistent with the view that truth, goodness, etc., are entirely
socially constituted. -- Subjectivism is the view that what is true (etc.) is
relative to (etc.) what some particular person, or each individual, thinks
about the matter.

Happy quoting!

Regards,

Larry Sanger

[Stephen Grossman]

In article <26lgbu$m...@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>, lsa...@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Lawrence M Sanger) writes:
>In article <CD1tp...@umassd.edu> pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU writes:

>>In article <26g2m7$h...@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>, lsa...@magnus.acs.oh

>io-state.edu (Lawrence M Sanger) writes:
>>>In article <CCwts...@umassd.edu> pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU writes:
>>>>In article <26dlek$h...@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>,
>>>>lsa...@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Lawrence M Sanger) writes:
>

>>THis and your other following rejections of context (limit, identity, thing,
>>existent, identity) are very curious. Platonic-Aristotelian naive realism
>>(Rand's term is intrinsicism) is an ignorance of the contribution that
>>consciousness makes to knowledge. The subjectivist reaction to this properly
>>stressed context but, unlike the naive realists, rejected reality as part of
>>knowledge. I am completely bewildered that your study of linguistic analysis
>>has not acquainted you with the importance of context.
>
>Certainly the term 'context' is not used as you use it; what else you can be
>referring to is unclear to me. Perhaps what you mean is, for example, Quine's
>"Two Dogmas," where he makes acceptability relative to conceptual scheme. One
>could say that a claim is acceptable for Quine relative only to some context or
>other. Doubtlessly you have read "Two Dogmas." Do you approve of the last few
>sections of it? I'm afraid that what you have written reminds me a great deal
>of Quine, and other contemporary relativists.

Rand rejects naive realism, not for subjectivism, but for what may
be called critical or contextual realism. Caution! I believe that there is a
Pragmatist critical "realism" but this is essentially different since
Pragmatists deny knowledge of reality. Objectivist contexts, unlike
subjectivist contexts, are constructed solely from reality and reason.

I have not read "2 Dogmas." Quine, in a 1980s _J of P_ article thinks reality
is change and that philosophy is the arbitrary evaluation of it. Analysis is
absurd.

>
>>Perhaps you also reject
>>subjectivism for the mistaken belief that Rand likes naive realism. she does
>>not.
>
>Am I right to understand that you think Rand is a subjectivist? Land amighty,
>I am puzzled. Please quote to me, as I'm sure you can, where Rand says she
>embraces anything remotely like subjectivism. I take it that 'subjectivism'
>in this discussion means something like 'the theory that the possession of
>truth, right, and other qualities are dependent upon and vary by the person or
>group who holds that they are possessed or not'.

No, Rand is not a subjectivist.

The theme and details of her _Intro. to Obj Episte_ are a study of reason
(including argument) as relative to reality AND consciousness. Kant is right
in claiming that consciousness contributes to knowledge. He is wrong in
claiming that the contribution of consciousness causes the unknowability of
reality.

"The process of conceptualization consists of observing the differences and
similarities of the existents [reality] WITHIN THE FIELD FIELD OF ONE'S
AWARENESS (consciousness)." [Rand, IOE, 1979, 55; Rand's stress]

"a consciousness able...to apprehend reality by a PROCESS of reason." [Rand,
IOE, 1990, 44]

"concepts [are] OBJECTIVE,. ie, as neither revealed [in a special metaphysical
state within reality by "intellectual intuition" as realists claim] nor
invented [by consciousness apart from reality as subjectivists claim], but a
produced by man's CONSCIOUSNESS in accordance with the facts of REALITY, as
MENTAL integrations of FACTUAL data COMPUTED BY MAN-as the products of a
COGNITIVE method of classification whose processes must be PERFORMED BY MAN,
but whose CONTENT is dicated by REALITY." [Rand, IOE, 1990. 54; stress by
Rand, me]

"The truth is established by reference to a body of EVIDENCE and within a
CONTEXT." [Peikoff, "P. of Obj." lecture series, Lecture 6; my stress]

>The merits of an argument are not, on Rand's view as I understand it, relative
>to anything but reality. Please find the precise passage in _IOE_ that
>contraverts this!

The theme and details of her _Intro. to Obj Episte_ are a study of reason
(including argument) as relative to reality AND consciousness. Kant is right
in claiming that consciousness contributes to knowledge. He is wrong in
claiming that the contribution of consciousness causes the unknowability of
reality.

>>Good, bad, soundness, true, false, etc., etc. are all contextual, limited.
>>Even if you accept a naively realistic good, I can ask for the context of
>>naive realism. Reason is not automatic. We must control it by systematically
>>identifying the limit, context, identity of our judgements just as scientists
>>define experimental parameters. In context A, A' is true. In context B, B' is
>>true, etc.
>
>Again, if you think this is what Rand thinks, please find the passages to prove
>it. I very strongly doubt it! After all, it is her absolutism that attracted
>me in the first place!

Obj episte absolutes are not solely in reality (intrinsic) as Aristotle
thought. They are not solely in consciousness (subjective) as Kant thought.
They are objectively contextual absolutes, reality as known by consciousness.
Reality as known by consciousness is, like everything else, an identity,
something with definite properties.

>>>Do you really mean to imply that you prefer Aristotelian logic?
>>
>>Is your acceptance of a&c logic itself a&c?!
>
>First of all, I don't know what you mean by 'arbitrary and conventional'
>logic.

I am most embaressed, having gone lo these many years deluding myself that
Peikoff said it in "The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy." Now, as it turns out,
it is not there! I scarcely know what to say! Still, it should have been. I
feel I have lost a dear and valued friend. Yet, isn't the arbitrary and
conventional the general status of the mainstream of contemp phil? Perhaps
"contingent" couyld be used. The point is that absolutes, having been
abandoned in both meta and episte, and social relativism become the order of
the day, the arbitrary and conventional follow as night the day. I can assure
you that i would not have created such a horrid phrase.

>Third, you did not
>answer my question; please do so. Your answer will be much more informative if
>you say what you mean by 'Aristotelian logic' with sufficiently clarity as for
>me to be able to distinguish it from what is called 'classical' first-order
>predicate logic. Let me say that the following remark --

Obj includes Aristotelian logic since it is based on the metaphysics of
identity tho Rand never discussed more than this principle.

>Mr. Grossman, do you really mean that truth and falsity is relative to context,
>philosophy, or whatnot? I, of course, do not; but that is beside the point,
>since you claim to be a defender of Ayn Rand, and I simply do not believe that
>Ayn Rand would agree that relativism is her view. Please supply the relevant
>quotes. If she is a relativist after all, and you have proven it, I guess
>that's all the better reason not to be a hard-line Objectivist!

Yes, objective truth is relative to context but context includes reality and
consciousness. See above quotes.

>
>you have a lot of explaining to do.

People have been telling me this all my life. Now, with Obj, I can. What a
relief! And, moreover, with a theory of explanation.
________________________________________________________________________________
His teeth chattered and he jerked bolt upright, a bead of sweat rolling
down his forehead. The urine-stained copy of _The Critique of Pure Reason_
slid from his limp hand to the cockroaches and cigarette butts on the floor. He
widened his eyes and screamed soundlessly. "Oh, the horror, the horror," he
whimpered. "Existence really exists!" The light bulb flickered again and
popped. They found a pawn ticket in his pocket but it wasn't enough to cover
the rent. A shovel of lime in a pauper's grave and it was done.

[Lawrence M Sanger]

I would call your attention especially to the last quote. Peikoff does
not say that the fact that something is true is relative to evidence and
context. If he had said that, it would be pretty clear that, as far as
this quote goes, Peikoff is a relativist. What he says is, the truth is
_established by reference to_ evidence and context. That is, what we
take to be true is to be determined according to our evidence and
context. It is not too clear, from this line alone, what he means by
"context," but presumably, being Peikoff and an Objectivist and all, he
does NOT mean that we are to accept as true various contrary statements
depending on whether we are speaking in a "Kantian" or "Hegelian" or
other context. That is, presumably, that is NOT what he means. For I
can assure you that Peikoff accepts the law of excluded middle, which
states that either a meaningful proposition is true, or it is false;
there is no middle ground (and it can't be both).

Mr. Grossman, I hope you can leave off your late-summer antics and for
once really focus your highly-trained faculties upon the latter passage
of mine, and give it your honest and fair consideration.

Sincerely,

Larry Sanger

[Stephen Grossman]

In article <26ndcf$n...@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>, lsa...@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Lawrence M Sanger) writes:
>In article <CD2GE...@umassd.edu> pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU writes:

>>In article <26lgbu$m...@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>, lsa...@magnus.acs.oh

>io-state.edu (Lawrence M Sanger) writes:
>>>In article <CD1tp...@umassd.edu> pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU writes:
>>>>In article <26g2m7$h...@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>, lsa...@magnus.acs.
>oh
>>>io-state.edu (Lawrence M Sanger) writes:
>>>>>In article <CCwts...@umassd.edu> pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU writes:
>>>>>>In article <26dlek$h...@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>,
>>>>>>lsa...@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Lawrence M Sanger) writes:

>>>Mr. Grossman, do you really mean that truth and falsity is relative to
>>>context, philosophy, or whatnot?
>

I can swivel my chair away from my computer and modem and reach to my
excellent essential library. For my non-essential library, however, i must
stand up, hike into the next room, and find other books. It's a rough life.

But you include my post, directly above your query, in which I deny that Rand
is subjective! And then you claim I claim that she is subjective. Am I missing
something?!

"The process of conceptualization consists of observing the differences and

similarities of the existents [reality] WITHIN THE FIELD OF ONE'S

AWARENESS (consciousness)." [Rand, IOE, 1979, 55; Rand's stress]

"a consciousness able...to apprehend reality by a PROCESS of reason." [Rand,

IOE, 1990, 44; my stress]

"concepts [are] OBJECTIVE,. ie, as neither revealed [in a special metaphysical
state within reality by "intellectual intuition" as realists claim] nor

invented [by consciousness apart from reality as subjectivists claim], but as

produced by man's CONSCIOUSNESS in accordance with the facts of REALITY, as
MENTAL integrations of FACTUAL data COMPUTED BY MAN-as the products of a
COGNITIVE method of classification whose processes must be PERFORMED BY MAN,
but whose CONTENT is dicated by REALITY." [Rand, IOE, 1990. 54; stress by
Rand, me]

"The truth is established by reference to a body of EVIDENCE and within a
CONTEXT." [Peikoff, "P. of Obj." lecture series, Lecture 6; my stress]

If I understand you, you claim that you thought Rand was an episte realist and
you missed her denial of that and you missed her radical alternative to
realism/intrinsicism and subjectivism. If I am correct, this explains why you
like analysis and think it akin to Objectivism. Can you reconstruct the error?
It may be useful to both Objectivists and analysts. It will certainly be
useful to you. Her powerful episte obscures her meta for many, creating
confusion. Peikoff noted that many Objectivists think it a type of
rationalism, ie, a manipulation of "ideas" apart from concrete reality. His
"Understanding Obj" cassette lecture course is excellent.

>So we are not discussing realism, Mr. Grossman, we are discussing whether Rand
>was a relativist or a subjectivist. The latter are contrasted by absolutism
>and objectivism, respectively.

This is unclear. However, the following list of epistemologies may help

1. Classical or naive Realism/traditional
absolutism/mysticism/intrinsicism/traditional objectivism-universals are
in(trinisic to) a metaphysically privileged part of reality, unrelated to
consciousness, known by (intellectual) intuition. Plato, Aristotle, Augustine,
Aquinas, some contemporary philosophers, i believe.

2. Subjectivism/relativism, universal, individual, or group-universals
are subjective to consciousness, unrelated to reality. Conceptualists,
medieval, modern, and contemporary nominalists, Descartes, rationalists,
empiricists, Kant, idealists, German romanticists & pragmatists, positivists,
analysts, Existentialists, phenomenologists, Amer. pragmatists,
postmodernists, etc. IE, almost all of the history of phil!

3. Objectivism/contextual absolutism/contextual or critical realism (not
Pragmatist critical pseudo-realism!)-universals are reality as cognitively
processed or reality and consciousness. Rand and and a very few other(s) she
suggested but didn't name. I vaguely recall someone suggesting Ockham or
somebody around that time. Ockham is a nominalist but it has been suggested
someplace that he was a bridge between Aquinas' realism and nominalism, thus
making his episte unusual. That's all i know.

>Let us use the following definitions. Relativism is the view that what is true
>(good, right, beautiful, etc. -- sometimes, even what exists) is relative to
>(that is, is dependent upon) some "context" (culture, group, etc.). Usually,
>relativism is consistent with the view that truth, goodness, etc., are entirely
>socially constituted. -- Subjectivism is the view that what is true (etc.) is
>relative to (etc.) what some particular person, or each individual, thinks
>about the matter.

Those definitions are confusing. Subjectivism is the wider term, meaning that
we only know what consciousness has created. I just noticed that relativism
seems to be identical in meaning. Maybe there's a small difference. As i note
above, there are varieties of subjectivism, tho trivial for our discussion.

All non-universal subjectivisms are what Marx called polylogism or many
logics. Person or group A has logic (or episte) A' and so forth. Eg, the
proletariat has one logic, capitalists another. Notice that ethnic
collectivists and racists, etc. need polylogism or group relativism. Nazis
made this explicit w/Ger and Jewish physics, a claim that cost them Einstein's
nuclear weapon when he fled.

Recent racism in US universities is caused by
multiculturalism, tho at a level of abstraction too remote for Pragmatist
fools. Multiculturalists need egalitarianism since they deny universal
subjectivism. All groups, for them, are equal. However, they focus on groups,
not HUMAN values. Students accept groups and deny egalitarianism as too
"rational." Thus racism, Marxism, ethnicity, & feminist claims that sex causes
values.

Steve, a 90s human kinda guy.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

His teeth chattered and he jerked bolt upright, a bead of sweat rolling
down his forehead. The urine-stained copy of _The Critique of Pure Reason_
slid from his limp hand to the cockroaches and cigarette butts on the floor. He
widened his eyes and screamed soundlessly. "Oh, the horror, the horror," he
whimpered. "Existence really exists!" The light bulb flickered again and
popped. They found a pawn ticket in his pocket but it wasn't enough to cover

the burial. A shovel of lime in a pauper's grave and it was done.

[christopher currie]

pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU (Stephen Grossman) writes:

>In article <26ndcf$n...@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>, lsa...@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Lawrence M Sanger) writes:
>>In article <CD2GE...@umassd.edu> pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU writes:
>>>In article <26lgbu$m...@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>, lsa...@magnus.acs.oh
>>io-state.edu (Lawrence M Sanger) writes:
>>>>In article <CD1tp...@umassd.edu> pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU writes:
>>>>>In article <26g2m7$h...@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>, lsa...@magnus.acs.
>>oh
>>>>io-state.edu (Lawrence M Sanger) writes:
>>>>>>In article <CCwts...@umassd.edu> pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU writes:
>>>>>>>In article <26dlek$h...@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>,
>>>>>>>lsa...@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Lawrence M Sanger) writes:

Wow! Outrageous slings and arrows indeed.

>suggested but didn't name. I vaguely recall someone suggesting Ockham or
>somebody around that time. Ockham is a nominalist but it has been suggested
>someplace that he was a bridge between Aquinas' realism and nominalism, thus
>making his episte unusual. That's all i know.

So it's taken you three months to admit that you haven't read Ockham. It
might have been more honest to do so when the question of trends in late
medieval/renaissance philosophy were being discussed in relation to
Rand's (and your) claims about their history.

>made this explicit w/Ger and Jewish physics, a claim that cost them Einstein's
>nuclear weapon when he fled.

Leo Szilard's nuclear weapon, surely. And he was in London already when
he thought of the idea.

Christopher

[Stephen Grossman]

In article <2724sn$9...@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>, lsa...@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Lawrence M Sanger) writes:

GROSSMAN

>>"The truth is established by reference to a body of EVIDENCE and within a
>>CONTEXT." [Peikoff, "P. of Obj." lecture series, Lecture 6; my stress]
>
>I would call your attention especially to the last quote. Peikoff does
>not say that the fact that something is true is relative to evidence and
>context. If he had said that, it would be pretty clear that, as far as
>this quote goes, Peikoff is a relativist. What he says is, the truth is
>_established by reference to_ evidence and context. That is, what we
>take to be true is to be determined according to our evidence and
>context. It is not too clear, from this line alone, what he means by
>"context," but presumably, being Peikoff and an Objectivist and all, he
>does NOT mean that we are to accept as true various contrary statements
>depending on whether we are speaking in a "Kantian" or "Hegelian" or
>other context. That is, presumably, that is NOT what he means. For I
>can assure you that Peikoff accepts the law of excluded middle, which
>states that either a meaningful proposition is true, or it is false;
>there is no middle ground (and it can't be both).

Peikoff means that evidence must be conceptualized within a context of wider
evidence, that any individual piece of evidence does not, contra empiricism,
stand alone. Eg, Clinton's heath care plan, as evidence for Clinton's
politics, must be conceptualized within wider evidence and does not have
conceptual meaning alone. Eg, one must identify his other policies and
statements of principles (or the lack thereof). And, furthermore, one
conceptualizes all of Clinton's policies, actions, and statements within some
political philosophy, which itself exists within the wider branches of
philosophy such as ethics. Eg, one might note his use of altruism as
justification and then place that within some philosophical judgement of
altruism, etc. This is a very brief description of the structure of reason.
For a more complete description see Rand's _Intro Obj Episte_. For easier
examples see "What in Capitalism" in her _Capitalism_.

Note, however, that an Objectivist context is not subjective "categories of
the understanding." Regardless of the abstractness, an objective context is
always partly concrete reality and partly the mind's processing of that
concrete reality. Even the Obj concern with the nature of
mind is SOLELY mind as connected to reality. Kant described "mind" not
connected to reality, thus later philosophers noted that there was no
necessary limit to subjective states. They could be anything, from Hegel's
contradictions to Schopenhauer's Will to analytic language to Pragmatist
doubt, purpose, and belief.

The early chapters in Rand's _Episte_ provide details of the conceptual
process and the later chapters give the theoretical justifiation.

Very briefly, one perceives two circular things as similar IN THE CONTEXT OF a
third, square thing. This is not the literally mindless association of
empiricism, even considering some PARTICULAR association such as Kant's
categories, etc. Association, within some subjective context, is brute animal
perception. Birds associate with a bird's "categories" (ie, a birdbrain), etc.
Rand's objective categories do not organize some prior, empirical
association. Humans, unlike brutes, can volitionally focus their
consciousnesses upon relations among concretes, study those relations, and
even relate the relations to wider or narrower relations. Eg, circles and
squares can be conceptually integrated into shapes or conceptually analyzed
into small circles, etc. Caution! Relations are objectively relations AMONG
concretes. The mind does not contribute relations; it identifies them. And
mind does all this with logic, the method of non-contradictory identification,
based on, not subjectivity, but the metaphysics of identity, ie, that
existence is identity, that real things have real identities, not supplied by
consciousness or by some alleged supernatural realm.

Thus objectivity is a radical epistemology, not a variation of
intrinsicism/naive realism/mysticism or subjectivism. Only Rand studied the
nature of concept-FORMATION. Subjectivists and mystics mindlessly accept
whatever categories chance to be floating around in their consciousnesses,
from their psychology, random experience, culture, a few, narrow, common
sense, objective categories (that they have logically formed; eg, food, dirt,
animal, etc.), etc. And they have no ability to be critical of their
categories so, like Plato, they assume that whatever ideas they chance to
have, have some referent, if not in nature, then in a supernatural dimension.
Eg, Descartes "proof" for God starts by mindlessly accepting the alleged
concept of God and then mentally manipulating it, not relative to reality, but
other states of consciousness. Ie, "a being greater than that which......blah,
blah, blah, all not derived from concrete reality.

Since you have never discussed the early chapters in Rand's _Episte_ it may be
you skimmed them as trivial relative to their justiication in the later
chapters. I recommend a serious study. If memory serves me well, I read her
episte 19 times and understood about 99% before my university philosophy
studies. So I conceptualized the ideas and facts i later learned rather than
associating them within some uncriticized, _subjective_ context, which is how
most students learn. Two weeks into my first semester, the Thomist/Jesuit said
he'd get me into grad school. The problem was, I was already beyond that into
teaching. :<)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

His teeth chattered and he jerked bolt upright, a bead of sweat rolling
down his forehead. The urine-stained copy of _The Critique of Pure Reason_
slid from his limp hand to the cockroaches and cigarette butts on the floor. He
widened his eyes and screamed soundlessly. "Oh, the horror, the horror," he
whimpered. "Existence really exists!" The light bulb flickered again and
popped. They found a pawn ticket in his pocket but it wasn't enough to cover

the burial. A shovel of lime in a pauper's grave and it was done.

[Stephen Grossman]

Scholarship-the delight in having caught a worm [neecha]

[Stephen Grossman]

In article <18SEP199...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu>, kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu (KRESSJA) writes:
>In article <CDJ16...@umassd.edu>,
>pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU (Stephen Grossman) meeps and gibbers...
>>In article <12SEP199...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu>,
>>kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu (KRESSJA) writes little of note
>>>In article (x) Steve Grossman is his usual, splendid self:
>>>
>>Your lack of the history of philosophy is most distressing. There should be an
>>entrance exam to APO. Episte realism (eg, Plato, Aristotle) is the claim that
>>"forms" in reality (eg, the form of horse) are contacted AUTOMATICALLY by
>>"intellectual intuition" of a PASSIVE consciousness which does not process
>>reality but accepts it UNCHANGED. Notice, realists claim forms are in reality
>>only, not in consciousness. Ie, realists deny consciousness has identity. Your
>>remark about "consciouness and reality
>>just happen to link up really nicely" is more accurate than you understand.
>>The "just happen" part is the passivity of episte realism (and mysticism!).
>
>Wrong about Plato. Read the Republic. Even more about Aristotle. Try the
>analytics, or De Anima.

This is conventional, not merely Obj, history of phil. Your assertions,
without evidence, make it difficult to continue this discussion. Merely
because you're getting the queasy feeling that Obj offers powerful views on
classic philosophical issues is no justification for grabbing scholarly worms.

>>"In the history of phil-with some very rare exceptions-....[m]en have been
>>taught that knowledge is impossible (skepticism) or that it is available
>>without effort (mysticism)....two variants on the same theme...the attempt to
>>escape the responsibility of rational cognition..." [Rand, Intro Obj Episte,
>>1990]
>
>Of course the "very rare exceptions" are about 95%. Name a few philosophers
>who think knowledge is "available without effort." Name one.
>
Once again, you assert without evidence. This is very tedious. Are you certain
you want to continue this discussion? What is the exception
you claim (and I assume it is not Rand's exception)? Plato, Aristotle,
Augustine, Aquinas, all classical realists, think "real forms" come
automatically into a passive consciousness. This is standard history of
philosophy.

>>Rand shares your contempt for "consciouness and reality just happen to link up
>>really nicely" as an episte theory by noting that it is "the attempt to
>>escape the responsibility of rational cognition..." The alternatives of
>>skepticism and mysticism are so traditionally accepted (in all their complex
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>This is a false dichotomy that is historically laughable and exists only in
>the mind [sic] of Ayn Rand.
>
Again, I'm not sure you want this discussion to continue. Please justify your
claims.

>>variations) that its intellectually startling to consider the claim that BOTH
>>are false. Nontheless that is Obj episte and i ask you to judge it as NOT a
>>variation of traditional episte. You recognize Kant's true discovery that
>>consciousness contributes to knowledge but you don't have to follow Kant in
>>claiming the penalty, that knowledge does not get to reality. Consciousness
>>developed in certain living organisms for survival, not for nature's
>>amusement. Consciousness is (literally) identification, the identification of
>>the identity of existence. We know existence IN SOME FORM AND BY SOME MEANS.
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>"Somehow," eh?

I'm finding it very difficult to continue. Philosophy is difficult work but I
will do it with others who respect the need for identifying one's values
rather than express their emotions.
>
>>But, because human consciousness is volitional (the misnamed "free" will),
>>reason does not work automatically. We must INITIATE a process of thought,
>>focus our mind on reality. Surely you have stared mindlessly at an exam book,
>>hoping against hope that the right answer would just pop into your mind. Or,
>>perhaps, looked at the engine of your immobile car as if mere perception,
>>without a mechanic's conceptual framework, would automatically provide the
>>answer. Once in a while, I suppose, even a very rational person acts this way.
>>But that's far different from building an entire epistemology, character,
>>psychology, ethics, and culture on the desire to have automatic survival
>>knowledge. That's part of the theme of Rand's _Atlas Shrugged_.
>
>DUUUUHHHHHHH....we have to THINK to know. No shit, Sherlock, move to the
>head of the class. If you think that this is yet another of Rand's
>"radical discoveries" in epistemology, so much the worse for you. Once
>again, this is the "Argumentum ad Randium": she points out something
>trivial ("reality is real," "one must actively think to know"), and then
>claims that anyone who also sees the trivial truism, perforce agrees with
>what she says about it, its meaning and its implications. And calls her
>"philosophy" radical. And is believed by people like you.

Im unsure if this thread can continue.

Just for the record:
Episte realism-form is, without reason, discovered "in" reality.
Episte subjectivism-form is created, without reason, by consciousness.
Episte objectivism-form is produced by reason identifying reality.

>| John Kress | "Philosophy, as I have so far understood and lived it, means |
>| | living voluntarily among ice and high mountains--seeking out |
>| | everything strange and questionable in existence..." |
>| | -Nietzsche, Ecce Homo |
>|______________|_______________________________________________________________|
Neecha created profoundly beautiful metaphors but, accepting Kant's
skepticism, abandoned reason.

[christopher currie]

>Scholarship-the delight in having caught a worm [neecha]

A pedant: one who likes his statements to be true?

[KRESSJA]

>Im unsure if this thread can continue.

YOU'RE unsure. By the Dog! You have been making sweeping and ridiculous
assertions as long as this thread has been going (and before!) and now
you say that you can't continue because *I* won't do anything but
counter-assert!?

Well what would you recommnd I do when you say something completely arbitrary
and incorrect about Plato? Correct you at length? I did with Kant, and all
I got for my trouble was yet another "in what context is this philosophy?"!
As I said on the thread, if YOU are going to make sweeping assertions and
bald-faced claims, all I can do is flatly deny them, and leave it the
readers (who know us both) to choose whom to believe.

Damn it! If you'd say SOMETHING of substance, I'd respond to it in kind.

>Just for the record:
>Episte realism-form is, without reason, discovered "in" reality.
>Episte subjectivism-form is created, without reason, by consciousness.
>Episte objectivism-form is produced by reason identifying reality.

And what is this vagueness? These are simply definitions (arbitrarily
asserted by you) by means of which you seek to classify every philosopher
in history.

No one maintains any of the above. Plato doesn't (do you even know the
difference between noesis and dianoia?). Kant certainly doesn't maintain
that forms are produced apart from reason and in the absense of the real.
Kant maintains much the same thing as Rand: that concepts are produced by
the understanding by giving abstractive order to the manifold of the senses.
What exactly is your distinction between "reason" and "consciousness." How
do you account for self-consciouness? What is the ground of reason's
capacity to identify reality (i.e. how do you KNOW that you can trust it)?

Answer some of these (all of them actually) and we can talk.

> ____________________________________________________________________________

>>| John Kress | "Philosophy, as I have so far understood and lived it, means |
>>| | living voluntarily among ice and high mountains--seeking out |
>>| | everything strange and questionable in existence..." |
>>| | -Nietzsche, Ecce Homo |
>>|______________|_______________________________________________________________|
>Neecha created profoundly beautiful metaphors but, accepting Kant's
>skepticism, abandoned reason.

Kant is not a skeptic; Nietzsche displaces the primacy of reason, but he
never abandons it; he merely undercuts the myth of a transcendental reason
(attacking Kant) and carries out a genealogical typology of reasons.

-JK
"ever eager to enlighten and clarify"
______________________________________________________________________________