Demarcation

[Marquard Dirk Pienaar]

According to Karl Popper, Kant also wanted to, like
Popper, demarcate metaphysical matters away from
science, because metaphysical appearances cannot be
objectively discussed. In my opinion Popper and Kant
did not consider, metaphysical matters, are important,
to keep, for example, Truth in place, which is the 1st
principle of science.

[Pete Barrett]

What is Truth? It looks like a value, but in the two major philosphical
theories about the nature of truth, the correspondence theory and the
coherence theory, it doesn't seem to have the same metaphysical status as
beauty and goodness have in aesthetic and moral theories.

Kant (and Popper) would probably say that science deals with phenomena, not
noumena, and that in the end anything that's true in scientific terms has to
be consistent with the phenomenal world. Put like that, truth doesn't look
like a metaphysical principle.


--
Pete BARRETT

[Marquard Dirk Pienaar]

On Friday, September 30, 2016 at 4:14:18 PM UTC+2, Pete Barrett wrote:
> On Wednesday 28 Sep 2016 11:07, Marquard Dirk Pienaar wrote:
>
> > According to Karl Popper, Kant also wanted to, like
> > Popper, demarcate metaphysical matters away from
> > science, because metaphysical appearances cannot be
> > objectively discussed. In my opinion Popper and Kant
> > did not consider, metaphysical matters, are important,
> > to keep, for example, Truth in place, which is the 1st
> > principle of science.
>
> What is Truth? It looks like a value, but in the two major philosphical
> theories about the nature of truth, the correspondence theory and the
> coherence theory, it doesn't seem to have the same metaphysical status as
> beauty and goodness have in aesthetic and moral theories.

Truth is universal because there is one reality, which we each
experience a part of. With honesty (correspondence) a coherent
picture of the one reality can be formed whilst sharing in the
idea Truth.

>
> Kant (and Popper) would probably say that science deals with phenomena, not
> noumena, and that in the end anything that's true in scientific terms has to
> be consistent with the phenomenal world. Put like that, truth doesn't look
> like a metaphysical principle.

The noumenon becomes gradually more phenomenal as science
progresses and new discoveries are made. The metaphysical
keeps the idea Truth in place and become especially relevant
when oppositions to the idea, cause danger. Truth causes
creativities, especially when group cooperation is considered.
Creativity is positively correlated to the transfer of
information, not disinformation.
>
>
> --
> Pete BARRETT

[Pete Barrett]

On Friday 30 Sep 2016 20:57, Marquard Dirk Pienaar wrote:

> On Friday, September 30, 2016 at 4:14:18 PM UTC+2, Pete Barrett wrote:
>> On Wednesday 28 Sep 2016 11:07, Marquard Dirk Pienaar wrote:
>>
>> > According to Karl Popper, Kant also wanted to, like
>> > Popper, demarcate metaphysical matters away from
>> > science, because metaphysical appearances cannot be
>> > objectively discussed. In my opinion Popper and Kant
>> > did not consider, metaphysical matters, are important,
>> > to keep, for example, Truth in place, which is the 1st
>> > principle of science.
>>
>> What is Truth? It looks like a value, but in the two major philosphical
>> theories about the nature of truth, the correspondence theory and the
>> coherence theory, it doesn't seem to have the same metaphysical status as
>> beauty and goodness have in aesthetic and moral theories.
>
> Truth is universal because there is one reality, which we each
> experience a part of.

That's possible, but as Kant (and Hume, and Berkeley...) points out, it's
more than we know. The only thing we actually know is our own sensations -
that those sensations are caused by a single external reality is an
assumption (though one that we all make).

> With honesty (correspondence) a coherent
> picture of the one reality can be formed whilst sharing in the
> idea Truth.

This is probably Popper's point - if you accept, with Kant, that we don't
have access to the one reality, only to our own sensations, then talk of 'a
coherent picture of the one reality' is at best unscientific; all we can
really get is a picture which is consistent with our sensations and which we
_believe_ (without proof) to be 'a coherent picture of the one reality'. And
that, of course, is more or less how science works.

>>
>> Kant (and Popper) would probably say that science deals with phenomena,
>> not noumena, and that in the end anything that's true in scientific terms
>> has to be consistent with the phenomenal world. Put like that, truth
>> doesn't look like a metaphysical principle.
>
> The noumenon becomes gradually more phenomenal as science
> progresses and new discoveries are made. The metaphysical
> keeps the idea Truth in place and become especially relevant
> when oppositions to the idea, cause danger. Truth causes
> creativities, especially when group cooperation is considered.
> Creativity is positively correlated to the transfer of
> information, not disinformation.

I don't know where you get this from - not Kant, I think. Is it Hegel? (I've
never bothered to try to understand Hegel - I really don't have the time!)
Schopenhauer objected to Kant's use of the _words_, complaining that he
wasn't using them in their original meaning, so perhaps you're using a non-
Kantian meaning for them. I'm pretty sure Kant would have rejected a
statement like 'the noumenon becomes gradually more phenomenal'!

--
Pete BARRETT

[Marquard Dirk Pienaar]

On Saturday, October 1, 2016 at 6:20:35 PM UTC+2, Pete Barrett wrote:
> On Friday 30 Sep 2016 20:57, Marquard Dirk Pienaar wrote:
>
> > On Friday, September 30, 2016 at 4:14:18 PM UTC+2, Pete Barrett wrote:
> >> On Wednesday 28 Sep 2016 11:07, Marquard Dirk Pienaar wrote:
> >>
> >> > According to Karl Popper, Kant also wanted to, like
> >> > Popper, demarcate metaphysical matters away from
> >> > science, because metaphysical appearances cannot be
> >> > objectively discussed. In my opinion Popper and Kant
> >> > did not consider, metaphysical matters, are important,
> >> > to keep, for example, Truth in place, which is the 1st
> >> > principle of science.
> >>
> >> What is Truth? It looks like a value, but in the two major philosphical
> >> theories about the nature of truth, the correspondence theory and the
> >> coherence theory, it doesn't seem to have the same metaphysical status as
> >> beauty and goodness have in aesthetic and moral theories.
> >
> > Truth is universal because there is one reality, which we each
> > experience a part of.
>
> That's possible, but as Kant (and Hume, and Berkeley...) points out, it's
> more than we know. The only thing we actually know is our own sensations -
> that those sensations are caused by a single external reality is an
> assumption (though one that we all make).

There are too many corresponding stories, photos etc.
by different people of the same places at
different times, to say we can only be certain of
our own sensations. Considering the Eiffel Tower for
example. All the photos you have seen and people who
told you they visited it. Can you say the Eiffel tower
is not an actuality existing outside of you?

>
> > With honesty (correspondence) a coherent
> > picture of the one reality can be formed whilst sharing in the
> > idea Truth.
>
> This is probably Popper's point - if you accept, with Kant, that we don't
> have access to the one reality, only to our own sensations, then talk of 'a
> coherent picture of the one reality' is at best unscientific; all we can
> really get is a picture which is consistent with our sensations and which we
> _believe_ (without proof) to be 'a coherent picture of the one reality'. And
> that, of course, is more or less how science works.

One person cannot form a coherent picture of the whole because of
the partiality of individual experience. If people work together
and communicate honestly, then a wider picture than only individuals'
pictures can be formed. A group sitting around a table can then
combine their experiences/pictures if they know what truths (actualities)
are and the Truth (the idea) is. It can only be done properly if those
people accept deontological constraints, imo.

>
> >>
> >> Kant (and Popper) would probably say that science deals with phenomena,
> >> not noumena, and that in the end anything that's true in scientific terms
> >> has to be consistent with the phenomenal world. Put like that, truth
> >> doesn't look like a metaphysical principle.
> >
> > The noumenon becomes gradually more phenomenal as science
> > progresses and new discoveries are made. The metaphysical
> > keeps the idea Truth in place and become especially relevant
> > when oppositions to the idea, cause danger. Truth causes
> > creativities, especially when group cooperation is considered.
> > Creativity is positively correlated to the transfer of
> > information, not disinformation.
>
> I don't know where you get this from - not Kant, I think. Is it Hegel? (I've
> never bothered to try to understand Hegel - I really don't have the time!)
> Schopenhauer objected to Kant's use of the _words_, complaining that he
> wasn't using them in their original meaning, so perhaps you're using a non-
> Kantian meaning for them. I'm pretty sure Kant would have rejected a
> statement like 'the noumenon becomes gradually more phenomenal'!

It is logical. Noumenon during the time of Kant is not the
same as today because of new phenomena, which were discovered.
Noumenon became smaller. On the other hand, more nonsense
from people who have to publish new "phenomena", for advancements
of their careers entered "knowledge", which perhaps enlarged
noumena. I am referring to theories, which do not respect
correspondence and coherence.

"The new philosophy of science" threatens objective functions of language. Incommensurabilities are results of attributing corresponding truths values to theories, because when that happens, every theory has an own 'reality' connected to it. Sometimes other theories than the theory of corresponding truths then become idealistically True. (Botha, 1988:42).

Reference:
BOTHA, ME. 1988. Objectivity under attack: rethinking paradigms in social theory – a survey. (In Marshall, PA and Vander Vennen, R, eds. Social sciences in christian perspective, 33-62. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America)
>
> --
> Pete BARRETT

[Pete Barrett]

But all of them rely on your sensations in the end - you've _heard_ stories
and _seen_ photos.

> Considering the Eiffel Tower for
> example. All the photos you have seen and people who
> told you they visited it. Can you say the Eiffel tower
> is not an actuality existing outside of you?

I can't say that it _is_ - which is Hume's sceptical point. Kant then tried
to work out exactly what the limits of human knowledge were, and in my
opinion did a pretty good job.

>>
>> > With honesty (correspondence) a coherent
>> > picture of the one reality can be formed whilst sharing in the
>> > idea Truth.
>>
>> This is probably Popper's point - if you accept, with Kant, that we don't
>> have access to the one reality, only to our own sensations, then talk of
>> 'a coherent picture of the one reality' is at best unscientific; all we
>> can really get is a picture which is consistent with our sensations and
>> which we _believe_ (without proof) to be 'a coherent picture of the one
>> reality'. And that, of course, is more or less how science works.
>
> One person cannot form a coherent picture of the whole because of
> the partiality of individual experience. If people work together
> and communicate honestly, then a wider picture than only individuals'
> pictures can be formed. A group sitting around a table can then
> combine their experiences/pictures if they know what truths (actualities)
> are and the Truth (the idea) is. It can only be done properly if those
> people accept deontological constraints, imo.

Deontological constraints? I'm familiar with deontological constraints in
morality, but not in metaphysics or ontology. What constraints do you have
in mind?

I think you'd better say what you mean by 'noumenon'. It doesn't seem to be
what I think Kant means by the word.

>
> "The new philosophy of science" threatens objective functions of language.
> Incommensurabilities are results of attributing corresponding truths
> values to theories, because when that happens, every theory has an own
> 'reality' connected to it. Sometimes other theories than the theory of
> corresponding truths then become idealistically True. (Botha, 1988:42).
>
> Reference:
> BOTHA, ME. 1988. Objectivity under attack: rethinking paradigms in social
> theory – a survey. (In Marshall, PA and Vander Vennen, R, eds. Social
> sciences in christian perspective, 33-62. Lanham, Md.: University Press of
> America)

So he's saying that a theory has to have some correspondence with the facts?
It doesn't seem to have much to do with Kant. Or Popper, for that matter
(who, if I recall correctly, gave the social sciences little credence).

--
Pete BARRETT

[Marquard Dirk Pienaar]

assumption (though one that we all make)." You have conviction in some
sort of communal Mind do you? Let's say you are right that the result
of all the work, which formed the Eiffel Tower is in every person's
mind and the result gets only active when people are in that region
of Earth. The communal Mind then allows people to go up in a lift
to high above the ground. Could you explain to me the reason of not
accepting that as actuality and rather as assumption? What are the
implications of your view that reality is an assumption by all? Does
it effect causality in a different way than reality? I am not
sure what the difference in meaning is to us between my "reality" and
your "assumption".

Kant placed much value on honesty. When a group sits around a table
and discusses their experience, i.e. to enrich each other towards a
wider view than only own experiences, misleading is a deontological
constraint, with regard to ontological identifications of others'
experience.

Noumenon is "thing-in-itself". It is thus what is underneath
the phenomena (forms) of things, outside of minds. It is for
example the wood underneath the form of a table. A table can
have a baroque form, which cause a baroque phenomenon in minds.
The wood under the baroque form is noumenon unless the wood is
'known' by an observer.

> >
> > "The new philosophy of science" threatens objective functions of language.
> > Incommensurabilities are results of attributing corresponding truths
> > values to theories, because when that happens, every theory has an own
> > 'reality' connected to it. Sometimes other theories than the theory of
> > corresponding truths then become idealistically True. (Botha, 1988:42).
> >
> > Reference:
> > BOTHA, ME. 1988. Objectivity under attack: rethinking paradigms in social
> > theory – a survey. (In Marshall, PA and Vander Vennen, R, eds. Social
> > sciences in christian perspective, 33-62. Lanham, Md.: University Press of
> > America)
>
> So he's saying that a theory has to have some correspondence with the facts?
> It doesn't seem to have much to do with Kant. Or Popper, for that matter
> (who, if I recall correctly, gave the social sciences little credence).

Didn't Kant say that all good judgment, for example theorizing
start with corresponding views? That is what i was taught.
That is also my interpretation after reading Critique of Pure
Reason.
>
> --
> Pete BARRETT

[Pete Barrett]

Everything you know about the Eiffel Tower is mediated through your
sensations. You don't know it independently of the sensations you have of
it, or which refer to it. You have to assume that there is something which
gives rise to those sensations. We all make that assumption (I'm sure even
Bishop Berkeley, when he sat down to dinner, thought there was some real
food in front of him!), but it's still an assumption.

Knowing the Eiffel Tower independently of the sensations we have of it
probably isn't even conceivable. I could understand knowing it through some
senses which I don't have (a bat, for instance, would know it through echo-
location, and I can understand that); but knowing it directly, independently
of any sensation of it? I can't understand that at all.

Well, OK. But it seems to me that its only application to science is that
scientists are expected not to fake their results!

Well, if that's what Kant means, then I've totally misunderstood him! I take
'noumena' (to Kant) to be things directly known (ie. without the mediation
of the senses). That would mean mental objects (ideas) and sensations
themselves; he also seems to use it to mean Things-in-Themselves, and I
think it's that use which Schopenhauer objected to.

The Thing-in-Itself would be something in what you call reality, which gives
rise to our sensations. I've never understood him to mean that the wood that
a table is made of is the Thing-in-Itself!

>> >
>> > "The new philosophy of science" threatens objective functions of
>> > language. Incommensurabilities are results of attributing corresponding
>> > truths values to theories, because when that happens, every theory has
>> > an own 'reality' connected to it. Sometimes other theories than the
>> > theory of
>> > corresponding truths then become idealistically True. (Botha,
>> > 1988:42).
>> >
>> > Reference:
>> > BOTHA, ME. 1988. Objectivity under attack: rethinking paradigms in
>> > social theory – a survey. (In Marshall, PA and Vander Vennen, R, eds.
>> > Social sciences in christian perspective, 33-62. Lanham, Md.:
>> > University Press of America)
>>
>> So he's saying that a theory has to have some correspondence with the
>> facts? It doesn't seem to have much to do with Kant. Or Popper, for that
>> matter (who, if I recall correctly, gave the social sciences little
>> credence).
>
> Didn't Kant say that all good judgment, for example theorizing
> start with corresponding views? That is what i was taught.
> That is also my interpretation after reading Critique of Pure
> Reason.

Perhaps. I can't think where he said it for the moment, but it sounds
likely. But all I take him to mean is that we should our theories in our
sensations - Popper would agree with that.

--
Pete BARRETT

[Marquard Dirk Pienaar]

Noumenon, imo means, we know something is probably there but we do not
know exactly what it is. It means to me something similar to the
philosophical view that, knowing we cannot know everything is important.

Oxford dictionary:
"noumenon |ˈnuːmənɒn, ˈnaʊmənɒn|
noun (pl.noumena)
(in Kantian philosophy) a thing as it is in itself, as distinct from a thing as it is knowable by the senses through phenomenal attributes."

[M Winther]

Metaphysical, ontological, cognition is _mental_. Quantum physics has
established that mental categories are inherent in objects. So
metaphysics is part and parcel of creation. Kant and Popper were wrong.
Indeed, Werner Heisenberg wanted to remove mental metaphysics from the
theory of quantum physics, describing it in only mathematical terms, but
Bohr showed that it is undoable.

Mats
http://mlwi.magix.com

[Marquard Dirk Pienaar]

Deontology of Kant is metaphysical, imo, because it has the idea Truth
in its important scientific position. Maybe Kant's deontology did not
promote Love enough, am not 100% sure, though, cause i read only Critique
of Pure Reason. Loving: Not doing evil to all others and doing good to close others, are duties, and thus part of deontology. Kant did not want to argue
about the necessity of metaphysical duties, because he knew factually, it was
important, imo.

[Marquard Dirk Pienaar]

Forgot about The Moral Law, i read. In it, if i recall correctly,
Kant explained his categorical imperative, which is an expansion
of Love. Categorical imperative: Ask self,
what the world will be like if all do like self. The not-doing
evil to all others, like selves want not to be done to AND the doing
good to close other like selves want to be done to, did not, i.e.
explain clearly why ones should not throw garbage in streets, but
Kant's categorical imperative universally explained why it should
not be done.

[M Winther]

Anyway, deeper levels of physical reality are accessible to experimental
physicists despite the fact that these levels are not directly
perceptible to our eyes. This has established the veracity of the
connection between our sensory experiences and the outer world. Our
mental percepetion of quantum phenomena are on a par with the findings
of the experimental physicist, although he often describes them in
different terms.

Mats

[M Winther]

Morality builds on _feeling_, as David Hume correctly concluded. There
exists no moral law that can be posited in intellectual terms. So these
are mere guiding principles for the populace. To abide by ethical rules
gives rise to an ethics on lines of Islam, where "good character" is
central. It leads to a hypocritical attitude, imitating goodness. Jesus,
in his own time, was characterized as having "bad character".

Mats

[Marquard Dirk Pienaar]

Goodness is a logical universal idea, which has developed
during thousands of years, and is still busy developing.
Currently, imo, Goodness depend on the right balance between
Truth and Love among a plurality of people. It seems from
history, Truth developed before Love. Truth became despotic
and Love (Universal laws) therefore started to oppose despotic
Truth. It also happens today that people who put reductionist
emphasis on Truth only, sometimes snap, like despots of the past,
who regarded Truth above all.

Why do you say Kant was wrong?

[M Winther]

That seems like a Neoplatonic or Gnostic variant of theology, where Love
corresponds to Sophia--a lower emanation than Nous, which is the
Platonic realm of Truth.

Kant was wrong because St Paul was right. Paul repudiated the Law as
relevant only to the childhood of humanity. Adult humanity are capable
of listening to the heart--the Christ within. Jesus says:

"The wind blows wherever it pleases. You hear its sound, but you cannot
tell where it comes from or where it is going. So it is with everyone
born of the Spirit."

So it cannot be pinned down. Yet Kant attempted to pin everything down.
The fact that nobody has ever succeeded in following his programme shows
that it is defunct. To apply moral cognition is like solving a problem.
You can't rely on predefined rules.

Blackbirds have no notion of ethical rules by which to abide. Instead
they listen to the heart. I use to feed them during wintertime. They are
often defensive about feeding places but can also be benevolent. This
winter I observed a female blackbird who came to my balcony for the
first time. She was quite nervous and it took some time before she dared
to jump down to the table with peanuts served. Then it took some time
before she dared to take a peanut in her beak.

At this moment a male blackbird came flying up to the balcony, at which
she churned out the peanut and flied away screaming to a nearby fir
tree. The male blackbird immediately understood the situation. He had
not intended to defend the feeding place. He simply didn't know that she
was there. So he flew after her and seated himself on a nearby branch
where he was facing away from her, while also turning his head to look
at her. In this way he signalled non-aggression. Thus he sat for several
minutes until she had calmed down. She understood the signal and
returned to the balcony to eat peanuts, this time not even slightly
nervous. The male blackbird remained perched on his branch, but had now
turned around, facing my balcony.

Blackbirds are not egoists, but are entirely empathic. The fact that
they have to take responsibility for their own lives is merely the law
of nature. It would surprise me very much if human nature is worse in
this respect. We have a natural inclination, just like the blackbirds,
to take responsibility for our fellow beings. It is merely a matter of
showing compassion when it suits the occasion. But to build a
machine-society where each and everybody are bound to follow the Ethical
Rules is contrary to nature, and it also passivates the empathic function.

Mats Winther
http://mlwi.magix.net

[Marquard Dirk Pienaar]

Jesus defined Love as the law and the prophets (Matthew 22:40)
It developed in the East (Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucius etc)
in the negative universal form: Not doing evil to all others
as selves want not to be done to.
In the West the positive is more common, which applies more to
family and friends: Doing good to family and friends like selves
want to be done to. It also took the form of pity, Samaritan
style. Becoming wealthy by making donations to the less fortunate.
Imo, in the West, universal law is not as well developed as in the
East.
I don't know the Bible well enough to know whether St Paul
actually opposed law. I think it is more likely he meant that
people automatically comply with universal laws, without it
being forced down on them, due to responsible adult actions.
I think Kant also had that view; that responsible adults do
not need law enforcement to make them comply with the law,
because they understand the logic of Love, which was expanded
on by Kant's categorical imperative; ask self what the world
will be like if all act like self.
If universal law does not apply, then societies enter "states
of nature, in which life is brutish and short" (something like
that) as described by Thomas Hobbes and others, whilst
explaining social contract theory. Those
states of natures required sovereigns to restore order, with
laws being forced down on people, because they did not show
responsibility of self-subjection to universal laws. In Leviathan,
i.e., Thomas Hobbes explained how Love (doing to others, like
selves want to be done to), was the origin of social contract
theory.

>
> Kant was wrong because St Paul was right.

I would not be surprised if St Paul meant the law should not be
enforced with violence because people should comply to universal
laws, due to understanding the logic and being responsible adults.

Paul repudiated the Law as
> relevant only to the childhood of humanity. Adult humanity are capable
> of listening to the heart--the Christ within. Jesus says:
>
> "The wind blows wherever it pleases. You hear its sound, but you cannot
> tell where it comes from or where it is going. So it is with everyone
> born of the Spirit."
>
> So it cannot be pinned down. Yet Kant attempted to pin everything down.
> The fact that nobody has ever succeeded in following his programme shows
> that it is defunct.

With regard to what of Kant's philosophy did nobody ever succeed?

[Marquard Dirk Pienaar]

"1 Corinthians 13:4-7New International Version (NIV)

4 Love is patient, love is kind. It does not envy, it does not boast, it is not proud. 5 It does not dishonor others, it is not self-seeking, it is not easily angered, it keeps no record of wrongs. 6 Love does not delight in evil but rejoices with the truth. 7 It always protects, always trusts, always hopes, always perseveres."
From: https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=1+Corinthians+13:4-7

The above looks similar to universal Love "not doing evil to
others like selves want not to be done to", which responsible adults
comply with, without it being forced down on them. Children learn
the logic of universal law/Love as they get older.

[M Winther]

"So the law was our guardian until Christ came that we might be
justified by faith." (Galatians 3:24)

"For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to everyone who
believes." (Romans 10:4).

"Do we then make void the law through faith? Certainly not! On the
contrary, we establish the law." (Romans 3:31)

So it takes root in the nature of man. This is antithetical to Kant's
rational morality which centers on following an unconditional principle
formulated by the intellect. Paul's, unlike Kant's, is a morality of
feeling and faith. He got it right, because the feeling function decides
what is good and bad. David Hume came to this conclusion also.

>> Paul repudiated the Law as
>> relevant only to the childhood of humanity. Adult humanity are capable
>> of listening to the heart--the Christ within. Jesus says:
>>
>> "The wind blows wherever it pleases. You hear its sound, but you cannot
>> tell where it comes from or where it is going. So it is with everyone
>> born of the Spirit."
>>
>> So it cannot be pinned down. Yet Kant attempted to pin everything down.
>> The fact that nobody has ever succeeded in following his programme shows
>> that it is defunct.
>
> With regard to what of Kant's philosophy did nobody ever succeed?
>

Has anybody ever lived their life according to Kant's premises of duty
and good will, following the categorical imperative? I don't think so.
What's the point with a moral philosophy that, presumably because it
discords with human nature, nobody is able to follow?

Mats Winther
http://mlwi.magix.net

[Marquard Dirk Pienaar]

Good universal laws are still developing and are given by
God, maybe not necessarily enforced by God. I think the
above means that when faiths are right, believers do not
need enforcement of laws, because they will naturally
comply with universal laws.

>
> "For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to everyone who
> believes." (Romans 10:4).
>
> "Do we then make void the law through faith? Certainly not! On the
> contrary, we establish the law." (Romans 3:31)
>
> So it takes root in the nature of man. This is antithetical to Kant's
> rational morality which centers on following an unconditional principle
> formulated by the intellect. Paul's, unlike Kant's, is a morality of
> feeling and faith. He got it right, because the feeling function decides
> what is good and bad. David Hume came to this conclusion also.

Writing the difference between good and evil depends on feeling,
begs the question, whose feeling. The answer cannot be given in
a universal sense, because there will never be agreement about
that, imo. In other words, your thesis is too dependent on
subjectivity (feelings), imo. Would you explain your faith.

>
>
> >> Paul repudiated the Law as
> >> relevant only to the childhood of humanity. Adult humanity are capable
> >> of listening to the heart--the Christ within. Jesus says:
> >>
> >> "The wind blows wherever it pleases. You hear its sound, but you cannot
> >> tell where it comes from or where it is going. So it is with everyone
> >> born of the Spirit."
> >>
> >> So it cannot be pinned down. Yet Kant attempted to pin everything down.
> >> The fact that nobody has ever succeeded in following his programme shows
> >> that it is defunct.
> >
> > With regard to what of Kant's philosophy did nobody ever succeed?
> >
>
> Has anybody ever lived their life according to Kant's premises of duty
> and good will, following the categorical imperative? I don't think so.
> What's the point with a moral philosophy that, presumably because it
> discords with human nature, nobody is able to follow?

I do not know what everyone are doing, but i have no reason to
think that no-one has ever succeeded in living honest and loving
lives, similar to the way Kant promoted it.
>
> Mats Winther
> http://mlwi.magix.net

[M Winther]

Yes, and this means that we must keep listening to the Spirit of Truth
which incarnates in our heart. So morality relates to feeling, and what
Jesus termed faith. We cannot know beforehand what is right and wrong by
recourse to mere intellectual formulations. Morality cannot be
programmed. In that case a computer could be the perfect moral agent.

Absolute Truth is a transcendental concept. It cannot be pinned down in
the sublunar realm, because we cannot formulate a moral algorithm that
always holds true. Only by listening to the spirit may we come to
realize what is True and Right, in this particular situation and at this
point in time. When this realization occurs, the divinely Good and
Truthful incarnates in reality.

But as time passes, its legitimacy founders, because the Absolute cannot
prevail in the temporal realm. That's why the Christ had to return to
the Father and why his truths must be allowed to develop; continue to
grow like the mustard tree.

A tree has its roots in the earth of the unconscious--not in the
rational intellect.

[Marquard Dirk Pienaar]

We all have different definitions for words of definitions
for words, ad infinitum, therefore Truth leaves much room
for improvement for more effective communication. The
relatively new word theodicy means God make mistakes as
well. God is not perfect, due to the human parts of God.

[Marquard Dirk Pienaar]

God is not, God are.