Altruism

[Mark Vernon]

Brad Mason (marked as from Todd Paoletti) writes about altruism and invites
comment.

The definitions he takes as uncontroversial are not above dispute. For
example, altruism need not imply a loss of concern for one's own welfare,
only that the welfare of another becomes a concern. Ethics might be more
an art than a science (pace Kant) - and the notion that it delivers a
'code' of good acts refers to a certain usage of the word, as a counsellor
might have an ethical code involving confidentiality, etc.; but
philosophical ethics is about the principles underlying such codes, and the
meanings of the terms involved. And values could possibly be created
rather than 'discovered' (pace Kant: this has to be an open question at
the outset). The assumption that the moral is essentially about acts is
also disputable; Aristotle for example tends to focus on character
instead.

The idea that what are called altruistic acts are really selfish is one
that appeals to the prejudices of the present age. It is a psychological
argument, and there are psychological reasons for believing it. That does
not show it to be false, but indicates caution. Consider an act we
ordinarily call selfish, and another we ordinarily call altruistic. The
claim is, that the ordinary usage of 'altruistic' is misleading, and that
the act is 'really' selfish. In order to uphold this theory, we must
maintain that the ordinary definitions are of no account, that our reasons
for calling an act altruistic are misguided, and that there is some true
definition to be discovered, that is independent of the way the words are
used. Aristotle allows a "proper pleasure" to attach to virtuous acts (in
stark contrast to Kant, for whom it is virtuous to do one's duty, and all
the more so if it is done in defiance of one's inclinations, as Brad points
out). This gives us a reason for acting well, but it does not follow that
the act is selfish. Some people get their pleasure from acts that involve
harming others; and it is absurd that they should not be distinguished, or
distinguishable, from those who choose to act in a way we would ordinarily
call altruistic.

Kant's answer to the theory is effective but has problems of its own. A
crucial objection is Hume's claim that reason alone does not provide a
reason for acting; it is "the slave of the passions, and has no other
office than to serve and obey them". The criminal knows all about what
society accepts as categorical imperatives, but chooses to ignore them.
Another way of putting this is that Kant has not shown us how to cross the
divide from "is" to "ought". A merit of Aristotle's ethics is that the
ought emerges pragmatically out of what is.

It is hard to get a handle on the rest of Brad's contribution and respond.
The question "What is value?" is clearly crucial. The notion that value is
essentially metaphysical strikes me as doubtful, and a reason for rejecting
Kant's general approach. There is middle ground between the Kantian view
that values are absolute, and the prevailing prejudice of society at large,
that they are subjective. Values are in some way, in my view, objective,
but it is very hard to find any basis for the proposition that they are
absolute (or metaphysical). Objectivity is a relative term: in this case,
values might be objective in relation to the existence and nature of
intelligent social beings.
...
mark....@btinternet.com
England

[Terence Kuch]

The postings on this topic deserve extensive comment, but for now I'd just
like to add a note on definitions of 'altruism' and 'selfishness'. There's
a tendency in the philosophic literature either to explain all acts as
selfish, or to explain some acts as altruistic and all others as selfish.
But most of our everyday acts are not really motivated either by altruism
or selfishness, they are simply things that we do without a prior "maxim",
conscious or unconscious. Even Kant didn't hold that every act has moral
status or impact. Therefore I don't think it's necessary to find either
altruistic or selfish explanations for every one of our everyday acts of
consideration for others, and it's justifiable even for people who adhere
to a 'selfish' morality to perform them.

Comment?

[Mark Vernon]

Terence Kuch <tk...@issoln.com> wrote in article
<01bc6dd2$89aff0a0$0802cfcf@tkuch>...

Agreed that the definitions - or rather, the actual use - of the terms
'selfishness' and 'altruism' should be examined (See my posting 'Re
Altruism', 31 May). Such common-sense distinctions, the philosopher should
beware of moving to abolish: especially in moral philosophy, which is a
practical study.

Agreed also that a great many actions are neither selfish nor altruistic.

But if there are everyday actions that show consideration for others,
surely they are morally significant, even if the will to be altruistic is
lacking at that moment. Altruism calls for an explanation, whether there
is altruistic volition or not. Once again Aristotle provides an
illuminating contrast with Kant; for like most of the moderns, Kant
focuses on acts, while Aristotle also considers character. We are partly
responsible, Aristotle maintains, for our own character, for our virtues
are habits that spring from crucial choices made during our formative years
of development. We are responsible for acting well or badly, even where
the immediate good or bad intention is lacking, because we are responsible
for who we are, as well as for what we do. Our lifelong habits introduce
an element of determinism into our behaviour. We cannot control the stone
as it breaks the window, but if we were responsible for throwing it, then
we are responsible for its effects.

The 'altruism-is-really-just-disguised-selfishness' theorists are not
really entitled to mark out any act as altruistic, or morally good. If our
alleged selfishness refers only to some lower level, then it is not morally
significant.

--
mark....@btinternet.com
England

[themantaking...@yahoo.com.au]

Altruism as a peculiar moral code is simply a matter of behaving normal, because it wouldn't be normal to be letting people suffer, simply put, it's not normal to be selfish, and what ethics or morals centres around is behaving normal, which is why it's proper and right in the first place. But as concerns uniqueness then the issue is the diamtric same problem, as to how to be all right to act strange, if that's what society has to live with. That's why ethics exists, it's intelligence and the ceasing of ignorance. But morals is not only the good, decent and righteous duty, it also teaches you responsibility and looking after yourself, it's necessary. This is boring work which I had to deliberate on, when everyone should already know that.

[Marquard Dirk Pienaar]

Aristotle, imo, was an ethical man, not a theoretical man.
Ethos vs. theos. Aristotle, for example, wrote that the sign
of a knowledgeable man, is, that he knows how to deceive. In
Kant's philosophy, it is deontologically unacceptable to
deceive because Kant was a theoretical man, not an ethical man.

[Marquard Dirk Pienaar]

The meaning of ethical currently has at least two sides.
The ones side follows, for example, Aristotle's philosophy
and the other side applies, for example, deontology. The
"theos" 'part' of ethos complicates the matter due to
functional hullabaloo.