Kant's treatment of beauty in CPJ- 3 main questions
Marcello Penso
In CPJ Kant discusses beauty (aesthetic judgement). I'm wondering:
1) In Section 7, why does Kant feel obligated to state that a statement
like 'that is beautiful' implies that the person making the statement
'demands' universal agreement? How does having the disinterested
satisfaction in a object stretch all the way to demanding agreement from
others? Can't it be the case that someone can state 'this object is
beautiful to me?' without seeming 'laughable'?
2) Kant talks of pure judgements of taste with respect to nature, but
rarely touches on similar judgements regarding art, architecture or even
non artistic things, or events (a beautiful wedding). Are these different
in some way or did Kant not wish to make an extensive list?
3) It seems from reading that portion of CPJ Kant is saying that beauty
is not really in the 'eye of the beholder', but that, if we all had the
same capacity and experience, we would all reach the same consensus of
what's beautiful. But are there any specific criteria/properties that an
object/thing/event might have to 'always' qualify it as beautiful (like
in Kant's description of what constitutes an experience of the sublime-
i.e. having an intuition of being part of some universal order)?
Thanks in advance. I'm an architect by profession, and not much of a
philosopher at all, and am having a hard time digesting this part of
Kant, and trying to reconcile it with theories of perception. Any
suggested annotated translations or essays on this part would be most
appreciated.
Marcello
Malenor
"Marcello Penso" <m.p...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
news:MPG.17424e147...@netnews.worldnet.att.net...
> Dear All,
>
> In CPJ Kant discusses beauty (aesthetic judgement). I'm wondering:
>
> 1) In Section 7, why does Kant feel obligated to state that a statement
> like 'that is beautiful' implies that the person making the statement
> 'demands' universal agreement? How does having the disinterested
> satisfaction in a object stretch all the way to demanding agreement from
> others? Can't it be the case that someone can state 'this object is
> beautiful to me?' without seeming 'laughable'?
Because "he can find as reason for his delight no personal conditions
to which his own subjective self might alone be party. Hence he must
regard it as resting on what he may also presuppose in every other
person; and therefore he must believe that he has reason for demanding
a similar delight from every one."
Taste in the beautiful is disinterested, objective, therefore universal.
If universal, then all humans should have the same experience and
possess the same taste. If a person were found who had a genuine
dislike for the object, and who was on all accounts physically normal,
then there is probably a pathological condition involved. Perhaps
the aversion is due to some past trauma related to the object.
Malenor
"Marcello Penso" <m.p...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
news:MPG.17424e147...@netnews.worldnet.att.net...
>
> In CPJ Kant discusses beauty (aesthetic judgement). I'm wondering:
> 2) Kant talks of pure judgements of taste with respect to nature, but
> rarely touches on similar judgements regarding art, architecture or even
> non artistic things, or events (a beautiful wedding). Are these different
> in some way or did Kant not wish to make an extensive list?
>
>
As I recall, Kant believed that nature was more beautiful in
reality than represented in art.
BTW, I did a text search of CPJ for the noun "building" and found 10
instances of it in the context of other man-made artifacts. But I only
have half the book in etext form, so it may have appeared more often:
"This object (the
building we see, the dress that person has on, the concert we hear,
the poem submitted to our criticism) is beautiful for me."
"But the beauty of man (including under this head that of a man,
woman, or child), the beauty of a horse, or of a building (such as a
church, palace, arsenal, or summer-house), presupposes a concept of
the end that defines what the thing has to be, and consequently a
concept of its perfection;"
"Much might be added to a building that would immediately please
the eye, were it not intended for a church. A figure might be
beautified with all manner of flourishes and light but regular
lines, as is done by the New Zealanders with their tattooing, were
we dealing with anything but the figure of a human being. And here
is one whose rugged features might be softened and given a more
pleasing aspect, only he has got to be a man, or is, perhaps, a
warrior that has to have a warlike appearance."
"A room with the walls making oblique angles, a
plot laid out in a garden in a similar way, even any violation of
symmetry, as well in the figure of animals (e.g., being one-eyed) as
in that of buildings, or of flower-beds, is displeasing because of its
perversity of form, not alone in a practical way in respect of some
definite use to which the thing may be put, but for an estimate that
looks to all manner of possible purposes."
"With a thing that owes its possibility to a purpose, a building,
or even an animal, its regularity, which consists in symmetry, must
express the unity of the intuition accompanying the concept of its
end, and belongs with it to cognition. But where all that is
intended is the maintenance of a free play of the powers of
representation (subject, however, to the condition that there is to be
nothing for understanding to take exception to), in ornamental
gardens, in the decoration of rooms, in all kinds of furniture that
shows good taste, etc., regularity in the shape of constraint is to be
avoided as far as possible. Thus English taste in gardens, and
fantastic taste in furniture, push the freedom of imagination to the
verge of what is grotesque the idea being that in this divorce from
all constraint of rules the precise instance is being afforded where
taste can exhibit its perfection in projects of the imagination to the
fullest extent."
"we must not point to the
sublime in works of art, e.g., buildings, statues and the like,
where a human end determines the form as well as the magnitude, nor
yet in things of nature, that in their very concept import a
definite end, e.g., animals of a recognized natural order, but in rude
nature merely as involving magnitude (and only in this so far as it
does not convey any charm or any emotion arising from actual
danger)."
"This expression, however, comes in time to be
applied to things-such as buildings, a garment, literary style, the
carriage of one's person, and the like-provided they do not so much
excite astonishment (the affection attending the representation of
novelty exceeding expectation) as admiration (an astonishment which
does not cease when the novelty wears off)-and this obtains where
ideas undesignedly and artlessly accord in their presentation with
aesthetic delight."
" If any one does not think a building, view, or poem beautiful, then,
in the first place, he refuses, so far as his inmost conviction
goes, to allow approval to be wrung from him by a hundred voices all
lauding it to the skies."
"Thus statues of men, gods, animals, etc., belong to
sculpture; but temples, splendid buildings for public concourse, or
even dwelling-houses, triumphal arches, columns, mausoleums, etc.,
erected as monuments, belong to architecture, and in fact all
household furniture (the work of cabinetmakers, and so forth-things
meant to be used) may be added to the list, on the ground that
adaptation of the product to a particular use is the essential element
in a work of architecture. On the other hand, a mere piece of
sculpture, made simply to be looked at and intended to please on its
own account, is, as a corporeal presentation, a mere imitation of
nature, though one in which regard is paid to aesthetic ideas, and
in which, therefore, sensuous truth should not go the length of losing
the appearance of being an art and a product of the elective will.
Painting, as the second kind of formative art, which presents the
sensuous semblance in artful combination with ideas, I would divide
into that of the beautiful Portrayal of nature, and that of the
beautiful arrangement of its products. The first is painting proper,
the second landscape gardening. For the first gives only the semblance
of bodily extension; whereas the second, giving this, no doubt,
according to its truth, gives only the semblance of utility and
employment for ends other than the play of the imagination in the
contemplation of its forms.* The latter consists in no more than
decking out the ground with the same manifold variety (grasses,
flowers, shrubs, and trees, and even water, hills, and dales) as
that with which nature presents it to our view, only arranged
differently and in obedience to certain ideas. The beautiful
arrangement of corporeal things, however, is also a thing for the
eye only, just like painting-the sense of touch can form no intuitable
representation of such a form, In addition I would place under the
head of painting, in the wide sense, the decoration of rooms by
means of hangings, ornamental accessories, and all beautiful furniture
the sole function of which is to be looked at; and in the same way the
art of tasteful dressing (with rings, snuffboxes, etc.). For a
parterre of various flowers, a room with a variety of ornaments
(including even the ladies' attire), go to make at a festal
gathering a sort of picture which, like pictures in the true sense
of the word (those which are not intended to teach history or
natural science), has no business beyond appealing to the eye, in
order to entertain the imagination in free play with ideas, and to
engage actively the aesthetic judgement independently of any
definite end. No matter how heterogeneous, on the mechanical side, may
be the craft involved in all this decoration, and no matter what a
variety of artists may be required, still the judgement of taste, so
far as it is one upon what is beautiful in this art, is determined
in one and the same way: namely, as a judgement only upon the forms
(without regard to any end) as they present themselves to the eye,
singly or in combination, according to their effect upon the
imagination. The justification, however, of bringing formative art (by
analogy) under a common head with gesture in a speech, lies in the
fact that through these figures the soul of the artists furnishes a
bodily expression for the substance and character of his thought,
and makes the thing itself speak, as it were, in mimic language-a very
common play of our fancy, that attributes to lifeless things a soul
suitable to their form, and that uses them as its mouthpiece.
*It seems strange that landscape gardening may be regarded as a kind
of painting, notwithstanding that it presents its forms corporeally.
But, as it takes its forms bodily from nature (the trees, shrubs,
grasses, and flowers taken, originally at least, from wood and
field) it is to that extent not an art such as, let us say, plastic
art. Further, the arrangement which it makes is not conditioned by any
concept of the object or of its end (as is the case in sculpture), but
by the mere free play of the imagination in the act of
contemplation. Hence it bears a degree of resemblance to simple
aesthetic painting that has no definite theme (but by means of light
and shade makes a pleasing composition of atmosphere, land, and
water.)"
" We call
buildings or trees majestic and stately, or plains laughing and gay;
even colours are called innocent, modest, soft, because they excite
sensations containing something analogous to the consciousness of
the state of mind produced by moral judgements"
Malenor
"Marcello Penso" <m.p...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
news:MPG.17424e147...@netnews.worldnet.att.net...
> 3) It seems from reading that portion of CPJ Kant is saying that beauty
> is not really in the 'eye of the beholder', but that, if we all had the
> same capacity and experience, we would all reach the same consensus of
> what's beautiful. But are there any specific criteria/properties that an
> object/thing/event might have to 'always' qualify it as beautiful (like
> in Kant's description of what constitutes an experience of the sublime-
> i.e. having an intuition of being part of some universal order)?
>
"there neither is, nor can be, a science of the beautiful, and the judgement
of taste is not determinable by principles."
>
> Thanks in advance. I'm an architect by profession, and not much of a
> philosopher at all, and am having a hard time digesting this part of
> Kant, and trying to reconcile it with theories of perception. Any
> suggested annotated translations or essays on this part would be most
> appreciated.
>
> Marcello
>
If you are reading 20th-century theories of perception, then it is
no wonder you are seeking a scientific criterion for judging beauty.
Science has infected modern culture with its attempts to explain
everything in accordance with materialistic principles.
How we know if something is beautiful or at least tasteful is
through subjective feelings and emotions, impossible to quantify
for science's examination.
Marcello Penso
smu...@earthlink.net says...
If today we say 'beauty is in the eye of the beholder' then would it be
fair to say that our 'generally used' notion of beauty is different from
how Kant defines it? When I make such statements I can just as easily say
that such pleasure is only personal. I can say that some buildings merely
hold perceptual interest (interesting to look at), or are good looking,
or are beautiful, or are spectacularly fine.
It's not clear to me how Kant can say that such statements imply
objectivity, or seek universal agreement, unless his notion of beautiful
has a 18th century flavor, like Keats beauty is truth statement.
Also, if such statments 'can' be valid for everyone, then there must be
some principle/characteristic (at least of how visual perception works in
humans) for Kant to say people would experience it the samy way.
And if beauty comes out only in certain objects, but not others, surely
there must be something in the object that stimulates such feelings, no?
Marcello
Marcello Penso
smu...@earthlink.net says...
>
> "Marcello Penso" <m.p...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
> news:MPG.17424e147...@netnews.worldnet.att.net...
> > Dear All,
> >
> > In CPJ Kant discusses beauty (aesthetic judgement). I'm wondering:
>
> > 2) Kant talks of pure judgements of taste with respect to nature, but
> > rarely touches on similar judgements regarding art, architecture or even
> > non artistic things, or events (a beautiful wedding). Are these different
> > in some way or did Kant not wish to make an extensive list?
> >
> >
> As I recall, Kant believed that nature was more beautiful in
> reality than represented in art.
>
> BTW, I did a text search of CPJ for the noun "building" and found 10
> instances of it in the context of other man-made artifacts. But I only
> have half the book in etext form, so it may have appeared more often:
>
but I didn't see much of in the section of aesthetic judgement. I'll have
to check my translation if it's really complete.
Marcello
Marcello Penso
smu...@earthlink.net says...
>
> "Marcello Penso" <m.p...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
> news:MPG.17424e147...@netnews.worldnet.att.net...
>
> > 3) It seems from reading that portion of CPJ Kant is saying that beauty
> > is not really in the 'eye of the beholder', but that, if we all had the
> > same capacity and experience, we would all reach the same consensus of
> > what's beautiful. But are there any specific criteria/properties that an
> > object/thing/event might have to 'always' qualify it as beautiful (like
> > in Kant's description of what constitutes an experience of the sublime-
> > i.e. having an intuition of being part of some universal order)?
> >
>
> "there neither is, nor can be, a science of the beautiful, and the judgement
> of taste is not determinable by principles."
>
> >
> > Thanks in advance. I'm an architect by profession, and not much of a
> > philosopher at all, and am having a hard time digesting this part of
> > Kant, and trying to reconcile it with theories of perception. Any
> > suggested annotated translations or essays on this part would be most
> > appreciated.
> >
> > Marcello
> >
> If you are reading 20th-century theories of perception, then it is
> no wonder you are seeking a scientific criterion for judging beauty.
> Science has infected modern culture with its attempts to explain
> everything in accordance with materialistic principles.
Actually the theories of perception come from D.W. Hamlyn, a contemporary
English philosopher. Do you know him?
And also from books by neurologists on how the brain works, or seems to
at any rate.
>
> How we know if something is beautiful or at least tasteful is
> through subjective feelings and emotions, impossible to quantify
> for science's examination.
>
Yes, that's true. But if we all have the same capacity as Kant maintains,
there must be something about the brain's workings in perception that
elicits such a response. And, there must be something in the object that
elicits such a response as well. After all, we don't call everything as
being beautiful.
Marcello
Malenor
> > If you are reading 20th-century theories of perception, then it is
> > no wonder you are seeking a scientific criterion for judging beauty.
> > Science has infected modern culture with its attempts to explain
> > everything in accordance with materialistic principles.
>
> Actually the theories of perception come from D.W. Hamlyn, a contemporary
> English philosopher. Do you know him?
No.
> And also from books by neurologists on how the brain works, or seems to
> at any rate.
>
> >
> > How we know if something is beautiful or at least tasteful is
> > through subjective feelings and emotions, impossible to quantify
> > for science's examination.
> >
> Yes, that's true. But if we all have the same capacity as Kant maintains,
> there must be something about the brain's workings in perception that
> elicits such a response. And, there must be something in the object that
> elicits such a response as well. After all, we don't call everything as
> being beautiful.
>
If Kant were alive today he would have been seen as prejudiced toward
a western cultural idea of beauty. He also believed in the superiority of
western culture, and the enlightenment. It could be that primitive tribe
members hold that fat is beautiful, and "demand" that all humans see
it the same way. And it is true, when people from other cultures are
confronted with very different aesthetic ideas, they are perplexed.
They may think the other people are crazy for thinking thin is beautiful.
So what we are talking about here is not what lies in the object, but
what lies in the mind apriori to the experience of beauty. And it seems
to only be Kant's observation that we demand the same aesthetic
response from everybody universally. So Kant is arguing to an
inductive observation, that beauty demands the same universal
appraisal. His accounting of aesthetic appreciation is thus not as
deep as it appears to be. He is not arguing, somehow, from some
transcendental basis, that certain things are beautiful as if their
beauty reflected some perfect, super-dimensional Platonic form.
The forms are all in our minds. It can easily be shown that they
are the result of cultural biases. However, that does not negate the
experience itself, that it adopts the tenor of a universal claim, and
that we regard someone who doesn't share the experience as somehow
odd, crazy, demented. Perhaps he is, or perhaps he is just from a
culture with wildly different values ("oh those crazy city folk!").
If there is some structure in the brain involved in this experience
(and of course there are these physical correlates), they would
not be innately or genetically programmed to do anything but
receive impressions of what is aesthetically valuable from others
within one's society or tribe.
There is an individual maturity involved in learning to discriminate
the beautiful from the merely tasteful. That is simply an observation
of my own. For example, you will find children reacting to what
we adults regard as merely tasteful in such a manner that they demand
that everybody else appreciate the object, say, chocolate ice cream,
in the same way. But as they mature, they learn to understand that
not everybody should be expected to like chocolate ice cream.
As we mature as a culture, we learn that other cultures do not
appreciate beauty the same way we do, so we learn not to have this
automatic rebellion against those who do not experience 'beauty'
toward the same objects.
Are there then any aesthetic judgments that can be held as truly
universalizable? Probably. The products of nature are held in
common by all cultures. Some purely sensual experiences may
be universalizable, so long as there is an immediate response
within the nervous system that bypasses any neural structures not
pre-programmed by culture.
But to demand that everybody experience the same event as
beautiful is largely a cultural expectation, analogous to the
expectations of children with regard to chocolate ice cream
(as either good or bad).
I think that about covers it, although it's a huge topic that
could be drawn out much, much further.
Malenor
> Thanks. I guess I'll need to get an etext copy to see where these fall,
> but I didn't see much of in the section of aesthetic judgement. I'll have
> to check my translation if it's really complete.
>
http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/K1texts.html is the best source for
Kant etexts that I know of. Or I can send you mine, email.
Malenor
> If today we say 'beauty is in the eye of the beholder' then would it be
> fair to say that our 'generally used' notion of beauty is different from
> how Kant defines it? When I make such statements I can just as easily say
> that such pleasure is only personal. I can say that some buildings merely
> hold perceptual interest (interesting to look at), or are good looking,
> or are beautiful, or are spectacularly fine.
>
How much of that judgment is intellectual, based on your education?
Some people just don't know what architectural elements to look for --
but your demand would be such that if people had the knowledge you
have, then they would have the same aesthetic appreciation for the building.
Of course your experience is personal, but it does not have to be "only"
personal.
>
> It's not clear to me how Kant can say that such statements imply
> objectivity, or seek universal agreement, unless his notion of beautiful
> has a 18th century flavor, like Keats beauty is truth statement.
>
I'm sure it does. However, Kant is not demanding from a philosophical
perspective that everybody have the same aesthetic notions. He is only
noticing that the experience of beauty carries with it a certain "demand"
or expectation from others, and is therefore objective. It is like my
observation in another post that children hold the same demand with
regard to their mere tastes, preferences in things like chocolate.
> Also, if such statments 'can' be valid for everyone, then there must be
> some principle/characteristic (at least of how visual perception works in
> humans) for Kant to say people would experience it the samy way.
>
Kant is not saying that. He is saying that the expectation or demand of
universalizability is universal in the experience of beauty.
> And if beauty comes out only in certain objects, but not others, surely
> there must be something in the object that stimulates such feelings, no?
>
Yes, but it is, in Kant's terms, a "pathological" experience, which is to
say, it is merely biological and subjective. But along with this experience
comes the expectation that everybody else must see it the same way,
particularly if "everybody" includes members of the same civilized culture.
But back in Kant's time I don't know if he had the perspective of
"cultures," or if he understood children.
Marcello Penso
smu...@earthlink.net says...
Marcello
Marcello Penso
smu...@earthlink.net says...
>
> "Marcello Penso" <m.p...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
> news:MPG.1742d7f3a...@netnews.worldnet.att.net...
>
>
> > If today we say 'beauty is in the eye of the beholder' then would it be
> > fair to say that our 'generally used' notion of beauty is different from
> > how Kant defines it? When I make such statements I can just as easily say
> > that such pleasure is only personal. I can say that some buildings merely
> > hold perceptual interest (interesting to look at), or are good looking,
> > or are beautiful, or are spectacularly fine.
> >
>
> How much of that judgment is intellectual, based on your education?
> Some people just don't know what architectural elements to look for --
> but your demand would be such that if people had the knowledge you
> have, then they would have the same aesthetic appreciation for the building.
But would that be more about what is 'good' architecture, i.e. an
appreciation of objects based on concepts? In that sense, I can
understand Kant's claim better, but I think it's also possible (at least
in my experience) to be able to judge buildings, natural landscapes,
works of art, etc. with respect to their beauty and still be completely
'noncommital' (having no expectations) about both the object and the
experience itself.
On the other hand, I think it's a lot more common for people (at least
nowadays) to make statements like 'that was a beautiful movie' and not
have any expectations about agreement, but merely as a matter of personal
opinion.
Maybe it's because Kant is putting forward arguments about 'pure'
judgements of taste, when in fact (I think) most such judgements are
normally colored with either concepts or sensual pleasure of a sort.
>
> Of course your experience is personal, but it does not have to be "only"
> personal.
>
> >
> > It's not clear to me how Kant can say that such statements imply
> > objectivity, or seek universal agreement, unless his notion of beautiful
> > has a 18th century flavor, like Keats beauty is truth statement.
> >
>
> I'm sure it does. However, Kant is not demanding from a philosophical
> perspective that everybody have the same aesthetic notions. He is only
> noticing that the experience of beauty carries with it a certain "demand"
> or expectation from others, and is therefore objective. It is like my
> observation in another post that children hold the same demand with
> regard to their mere tastes, preferences in things like chocolate.
I can understand this point if one makes the statement when in the
presence of others. But I'm wondering if one is merely appreciating a
sunrise or sunset by his or herself, whether that expectation still
holds.
>
> > Also, if such statments 'can' be valid for everyone, then there must be
> > some principle/characteristic (at least of how visual perception works in
> > humans) for Kant to say people would experience it the samy way.
> >
>
> Kant is not saying that. He is saying that the expectation or demand of
> universalizability is universal in the experience of beauty.
>
> > And if beauty comes out only in certain objects, but not others, surely
> > there must be something in the object that stimulates such feelings, no?
> >
> Yes, but it is, in Kant's terms, a "pathological" experience, which is to
> say, it is merely biological and subjective. But along with this experience
> comes the expectation that everybody else must see it the same way,
> particularly if "everybody" includes members of the same civilized culture.
But I wonder why there 'must' be an expectation. Yes, one can realize as
Kants says that maybe the judgement is not based on personal concepts
(though it's a personal experience), but it's one thing to say that,
another to say that such an experience (by logical default?) has to be
objective, and yet another to say such statements imply demands of
agreement in others. No?
> But back in Kant's time I don't know if he had the perspective of
> "cultures," or if he understood children.
>
>
>
Marcello
Marcello Penso
smu...@earthlink.net says...
>
> "Marcello Penso" <m.p...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
> news:MPG.1742db294...@netnews.worldnet.att.net...
> > In article <FY2C8.2386$pc6.2...@newsread2.prod.itd.earthlink.net>,
> > smu...@earthlink.net says...
>
>
> > > If you are reading 20th-century theories of perception, then it is
> > > no wonder you are seeking a scientific criterion for judging beauty.
> > > Science has infected modern culture with its attempts to explain
> > > everything in accordance with materialistic principles.
> >
> > Actually the theories of perception come from D.W. Hamlyn, a contemporary
> > English philosopher. Do you know him?
>
> No.
>
He's written a number of philosophical books involving perception, and he
has wrote a (brief) history of philosophy. I'd recommend his Sensation
and Perception (1961 I believe) an his Perception, Learning and the Self
(1983).
The only reason why I know him is because during graduate school (some 16
years ago...) I took an elective in philosophy at U of F- just to get
away from architecture, and the prof there used Hamlyn's Theory of
Knowledge (1970) as a course basis.
Ok, I can understand how Kant might be talking about cultural bias
without really stating it, and in this context, his statements make a lot
more sense.
Still, I think there's a great range in the experience of beauty, and
some of it I think, even requires concepts (like in being able to
appreciate the elegance of a mathematical formula), while other times it
might just be a visceral reaction, and sometimes it can be a mere
observation (complete disinterest, even in having anyone agree).
Good post, by the way. Thanks for the clarity.
Marcello
Malenor
> But would that be more about what is 'good' architecture, i.e. an
> appreciation of objects based on concepts? In that sense, I can
> understand Kant's claim better, but I think it's also possible (at least
> in my experience) to be able to judge buildings, natural landscapes,
> works of art, etc. with respect to their beauty and still be completely
> 'noncommital' (having no expectations) about both the object and the
> experience itself.
>
That expectation or lack of is a psychological assumption. I don't think
Kant meant the term "demand" to be meant in that way. My experience
with Kant is that the term in question is to be determined in a different
manner; see the end of this post.
I actually am just now thinking this through, so bear with me. (Such
thinking is something to do during the non-philosophical part of my day.)
But my experience with Kant is good and I think most of my judgments
are reliable. I wouldn't mind however if Robert would lend a hand here.
He has more experience then me with this particular work.
> On the other hand, I think it's a lot more common for people (at least
> nowadays) to make statements like 'that was a beautiful movie' and not
> have any expectations about agreement, but merely as a matter of personal
> opinion.
>
> Maybe it's because Kant is putting forward arguments about 'pure'
> judgements of taste, when in fact (I think) most such judgements are
> normally colored with either concepts or sensual pleasure of a sort.
>
I have thought about your point that nobody has expectations on others.
I think it is a part of cultural degeneration. But the expectation itself is
only a logical consequence of the "demand" which human nature itself
places on us, individually, to adjudge an experience beautiful. There is
a certain maturity involved in understanding that not every culture has
the same tastes; however, I think it can be taken too far until there is
no longer any possibility of objective aesthetic judgment.
I think it should also be kept in mind my previous point that matters of
taste are less intellectual, more sensual, and that maturity is in knowing
that not everybody is biologically configured the same or has had the
same environmental influences. So tastes differ. However, on the
intellectual level, the bio-environmental factor has been bypassed in
favor of being able to purely reason out an aesthetics just as man has
reasoned out mathematics, from axioms. And so there is no discipline
of "taste" as there are various artistic disciplines such as architecture.
Is it possible to reason out one's preference for various shades of color
or styles of clothing? On the other hand, entire genres of art have
revolved around intellectual theories concerning the good and the
beautiful.
But of course, the experience remains subjective no matter how
intellectual therefore objective one tries to make it.
> > I'm sure it does. However, Kant is not demanding from a philosophical
> > perspective that everybody have the same aesthetic notions. He is only
> > noticing that the experience of beauty carries with it a certain
"demand"
> > or expectation from others, and is therefore objective. It is like my
> > observation in another post that children hold the same demand with
> > regard to their mere tastes, preferences in things like chocolate.
>
> I can understand this point if one makes the statement when in the
> presence of others. But I'm wondering if one is merely appreciating a
> sunrise or sunset by his or herself, whether that expectation still
> holds.
>
Is there beauty in a mathematical equation even when nobody is
around to see it?
> >
> > > Also, if such statments 'can' be valid for everyone, then there must
be
> > > some principle/characteristic (at least of how visual perception works
in
> > > humans) for Kant to say people would experience it the samy way.
> > >
> >
> > Kant is not saying that. He is saying that the expectation or demand of
> > universalizability is universal in the experience of beauty.
> >
> > > And if beauty comes out only in certain objects, but not others,
surely
> > > there must be something in the object that stimulates such feelings,
no?
> > >
> > Yes, but it is, in Kant's terms, a "pathological" experience, which is
to
> > say, it is merely biological and subjective. But along with this
experience
> > comes the expectation that everybody else must see it the same way,
> > particularly if "everybody" includes members of the same civilized
culture.
>
> But I wonder why there 'must' be an expectation. Yes, one can realize as
> Kants says that maybe the judgement is not based on personal concepts
> (though it's a personal experience), but it's one thing to say that,
> another to say that such an experience (by logical default?) has to be
> objective, and yet another to say such statements imply demands of
> agreement in others. No?
>
It is a demand that has the force upon oneself of a mathematical logic. It's
not that *I* demand that everybody accept that 2+2=4, only that the
mathematics itself demands it of *us*. So it is even more objective than
subjectively demanding that everybody have the same experience of
beauty. It is as if to say, Human nature itself, and not my mere senses,
has unquestionably and unequivocally given me the experience of a
beautiful thing. And since we all have the same basic nature, logic
would demand (or as Spock would say, dictate) that everybody
have the same experience.
In terms more of psychology, not logic, there is therefore the
reasonable expectation that others will share in the experience. But no,
there is no fascistic demand placed on others.
On the other hand, if science proves that there is a definite formula
determining what is beautiful, then everybody will have to agree with it.
Malenor
> Ok, I can understand how Kant might be talking about cultural bias
> without really stating it, and in this context, his statements make a lot
> more sense.
>
> Still, I think there's a great range in the experience of beauty, and
> some of it I think, even requires concepts (like in being able to
> appreciate the elegance of a mathematical formula), while other times it
> might just be a visceral reaction, and sometimes it can be a mere
> observation (complete disinterest, even in having anyone agree).
>
> Good post, by the way. Thanks for the clarity.
>
> Marcello
>
Thanks for the compliment. I just don't think the topic has been dealt
with quite as firmly as I'd like. It is hard to distinguish the products of
cultural bias from that which is invoked naturally from human nature
itself, or how much of cultural bias has a basis in human nature. But
I don't think that Kant was talking about cultural bias. There is no
question that he was literally trying to objectify beauty. He is
objectifying it in terms of the universalizability of the experience.
For Kant this is often his definition of objectivity, whether or not
an idea possesses the force of universal agreeability (and not
just general consensus as some modern accounts of truth would
have it).
In terms of culture, Kant would definitely declare that modern
civilization's view of the beautiful (especially in terms of the
magnificent art of his era) was vastly superior to that of some
primitive tribe. But the tribal members have intellectual characteristics
that set them apart from us anyway. They are far less intellectually
mature: for instance, they do not have much if any notion of science,
and none whatsoever of philosophy. They are, intellectually speaking,
at ground-zero. So what can one expect but more-or-less
haphazard and subjective judgments of the beautiful from such a
people?
Kant takes many of his cues for his works, particular the religion,
morality and aesthetics, from what civilized people have done for
thousands of years. It literally is only his observation that the
experience of beauty carries with it a certain demand on others,
but only because we are all equals on some level behind the
appearances. (This is quite an egalitarian view true to the times,
the American and French Revolutions.) The peasant and the king
should experience the same things the same way, in a very
general sense of distinguishing pain from pleasure. (And didn't
Voltaire try to bring the kings down to the common level by
declaring that even they have to sit on their posteriors?)
(And for those who point to barbaric acts of war committed
by so-called civilized countries -- I did not realize that we
eat our enemy after conquering him. Oh yes, that is a ritual with
uncivilized tribes...)
Anyway, all during the day today I was trying to work my way
out of the view that Kant's is a cultural relativism of art. I just
don't think he would stoop so low as to compare superior
"us" to lowly "them." Relativism is anyway a 20th-century theory.
If Kant 'demanded' the universalizability of beauty, then he
was doing so only in terms of the most civilized parts of the
world. And I did say as much above. That's why I said that
the "demand" is itself the universalizable principle, true for the
civilized and uncivilized alike no matter what their respective
aesthetic views are. But does Kant say that particular experiences
of beauty are universalizable? I just don't think so, unless one
considers western cultural ideas to be absolute. But that *all*
humans experience *some things* as beautiful, and that this
experience carries with it the weight of universalizability, there
is no doubt, whatever those particular things may be, by
definition of the beautiful.
Therefore, as I stated previously, Kant is not demanding that
we obey his notions of what constitutes the beautiful. (Yes,
amazingly enough, some of his readers will erroneously conclude
that such was his attitude.) He only wants to point out the
distinction between the beautiful and the tasteful (and the good).
In order to objectify the beautiful it is necessary to create
schools of thought around the issue, it is not decided merely
by the act of experiencing the beautiful. To objectify an issue
one thereby sets for oneself the intellectual task of proving
it. That is what the various schools of thought are for. It is as
intellectual as mathematics, but much, much more difficult
of proof.
Marcello Penso
smu...@earthlink.net says...
I can see where you're coming from, and I think this makes even more
sense.
Do you know of any related philosophical books on the subject of beauty?
Marcello
Malenor
> I can see where you're coming from, and I think this makes even more
> sense.
>
there is no demand on others in your own experience of beauty. I hope you
understand though that it is a highly intellectualized "demand," on a par
with such a "demand" in terms of mathematics or logic: 2+2=4,
and the beautiful is the beautiful (not just the tasteful).
> Do you know of any related philosophical books on the subject of beauty?
>
No, but I imagine there are tons in publication. Probably someone here
can recommend a favorite book on the topic.
Marcello Penso
> "Marcello Penso" <m.p...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
> news:MPG.1744ecde8...@netnews.worldnet.att.net...
> > I can see where you're coming from, and I think this makes even more
> > sense.
> >
> Oh, good. I understand what you're saying though when you claim
> there is no demand on others in your own experience of beauty. I hope you
> understand though that it is a highly intellectualized "demand," on a par
> with such a "demand" in terms of mathematics or logic: 2+2=4,
> and the beautiful is the beautiful (not just the tasteful).
Yes, I think so... I can understand the reasoning, that the demand is
really a 'force' of logical reasoning, but I'm having a hard time
couching it in an example using everyday language. Perhaps something
like this:
"I just saw a beautiful building. It's experience delights my senses
even without my knowing anything about it. Check it out. What do you
think?"
>
> > Do you know of any related philosophical books on the subject of beauty?
> >
> No, but I imagine there are tons in publication. Probably someone here
> can recommend a favorite book on the topic.
I've done a bit of research on the web for books and I haven't found
much, specifically on beauty. I've got Cambridge University Press
'Companion to Aesthetics' (or something like that), and I've seen that
Mothersill has written on it, as well as Roger Scruton (I have a few
of his books, but haven't sat down to read them in detail.) But I
haven't found much else that deals specifically with beauty, at least
nothing that's recent.
Marcello
Malenor
"Marcello Penso" <mpe...@offler.com> wrote in message
news:a3bcf635.02051...@posting.google.com...
> "Malenor" <smu...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:<3XIC8.147$Nt3....@newsread2.prod.itd.earthlink.net>...
> > "Marcello Penso" <m.p...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
> > news:MPG.1744ecde8...@netnews.worldnet.att.net...
> > > I can see where you're coming from, and I think this makes even more
> > > sense.
> > >
> > Oh, good. I understand what you're saying though when you claim
> > there is no demand on others in your own experience of beauty. I hope
you
> > understand though that it is a highly intellectualized "demand," on a
par
> > with such a "demand" in terms of mathematics or logic: 2+2=4,
> > and the beautiful is the beautiful (not just the tasteful).
>
> Yes, I think so... I can understand the reasoning, that the demand is
> really a 'force' of logical reasoning,
I need to clarify something here. While the experience has the force
of certainty, it lacks the logic of reasonableness. But along with the
experience comes the belief that others will certainly judge
the experience the same way.
I should really get to work and study Kantian aesthetics. I was
hoping Robert would lend a hand here because he's been over this
subject with more thoroughness than me.
> but I'm having a hard time couching it in an example using everyday
> language. Perhaps something like this:
>
> "I just saw a beautiful building. It's experience delights my senses
> even without my knowing anything about it. Check it out. What do you
> think?"
>
Why the stipulation that you don't know anything about it? I think
the more knowledge you have of architecture the more beauty is
apparent. However, it could also be that the flaws become more apparent.
Here's a more likely scenario: Spontaneously grabbing my friend's arm
and saying, "Wow, look at that...." And if I didn't think my friend would
have the same experience, I wouldn't have bothered to get his or her
attention.
> >
> > > Do you know of any related philosophical books on the subject of
beauty?
> > >
> > No, but I imagine there are tons in publication. Probably someone here
> > can recommend a favorite book on the topic.
>
> I've done a bit of research on the web for books and I haven't found
> much, specifically on beauty. I've got Cambridge University Press
> 'Companion to Aesthetics' (or something like that), and I've seen that
> Mothersill has written on it, as well as Roger Scruton (I have a few
> of his books, but haven't sat down to read them in detail.) But I
> haven't found much else that deals specifically with beauty, at least
> nothing that's recent.
>
Darn. Unfortunately I'm not into aesthetics. But I was really thinking
more in terms of books on aesthetics. If you look for those, I'm
sure you'll find more than a little mention of "beauty" within them.
As for books on beauty itself, I don't know.
(Michael Kelly's "Encyclopedia of Aesthetics" is listed at only
$495 at Amazon!)
Robert ASF.
snip
>I should really get to work and study Kantian aesthetics. I was
>hoping Robert would lend a hand here because he's been over this
>subject with more thoroughness than me.
"I'll Be Back"
Actually, Robert who only gets time once a week on
usenet will lend a hand here... Tonight...
Alas i remember the days when i would spend hours
and hours on usenet...
And yes i did get your email, i just haven't had
any time...
snip
Just Thought I Should Mention It
Marcello Penso
I thought that having knowledge, relying on concepts, about the
building would make the appraisal more about whether it's good
architecturem rather than beautiful architecture (at least, that's how
I'm understanding Kant.) And I guess for Kant this would even be valid
even to the point about knowing a particular ornamental style and
knowing how to 'read' it. Then what you judge is how well the
architect made use of the style, or even simply admire his/her choices
of materials, design motifs, etc.
But that's where I have difficulty with Kant, because I think a lot of
times the experience of beauty is bundled up with this type of
knowledge (the more you know, the more you can appreciate), so that,
at least to me, it's difficult to sustain we have pure judgements of
taste. I think most times, at least for man-made items, concepts play
an important role in allowing one to being able to judge the
look/sound/feel of a thing.
This is especially relevant, I think, in music- where first hearing a
piece may be striking, but as you get more familiar with it, you can
appreciate the finer qualities, and really come to understand its
'beauty'.
Marcello
Malenor
"Marcello Penso" <mpe...@offler.com> wrote in message
news:a3bcf635.02051...@posting.google.com...
> "Malenor" <smu...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
> > Why the stipulation that you don't know anything about it? I think
> > the more knowledge you have of architecture the more beauty is
> > apparent. However, it could also be that the flaws become more apparent.
>
> I thought that having knowledge, relying on concepts, about the
> building would make the appraisal more about whether it's good
> architecturem rather than beautiful architecture (at least, that's how
> I'm understanding Kant.)
There is a difference between a good design and a beautiful building.
But I'm sure that's true too. However, I should mention that I don't
always stick to Kant when I write these responses, far from it. Besides,
his aesthetics should be brought up to date with our knowledge
of other cultures' aesthetic values.
> And I guess for Kant this would even be valid
> even to the point about knowing a particular ornamental style and
> knowing how to 'read' it. Then what you judge is how well the
> architect made use of the style, or even simply admire his/her choices
> of materials, design motifs, etc.
>
> But that's where I have difficulty with Kant, because I think a lot of
> times the experience of beauty is bundled up with this type of
> knowledge (the more you know, the more you can appreciate), so that,
> at least to me, it's difficult to sustain we have pure judgements of
> taste. I think most times, at least for man-made items, concepts play
> an important role in allowing one to being able to judge the
> look/sound/feel of a thing.
>
It depends on the complexity of your subject (the art). If it is a
pure judgment of taste, then how can it be art? In that case, you
are talking "ice cream," something involving a singular feeling.
> This is especially relevant, I think, in music- where first hearing a
> piece may be striking, but as you get more familiar with it, you can
> appreciate the finer qualities, and really come to understand its
> 'beauty'.
>
What does it mean to say "you have good taste in music"? It means
the subject of the beautiful is complex when trying to determine
it objectively even in the absence of an experiencer. You are
caught up in the idea of scientifically establishing a standard
of beauty. When did Kant even mention anything about this?
Yes it is difficult, and there are various schools of aesthetic
opinion based on various approaches to the subject of beauty.
But that is beyond Kant's thesis. He is only distinguishing
the experience of beauty from that of the good and the tasteful.
Since you are looking for such an objective standard, then
objectively speaking you will be forced to give up Kant and
attach yourself to some school of thought or other that has its
own opinions on the subject, because Kant gives none. Either
that, or start your own genre because there is no Kantian
school of art.
Marcello Penso
smu...@earthlink.net says...
>
> "Marcello Penso" <mpe...@offler.com> wrote in message
> news:a3bcf635.02051...@posting.google.com...
> > "Malenor" <smu...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
> news:<gV0D8.2529$Nt3.1...@newsread2.prod.itd.earthlink.net>...
>
> > > Why the stipulation that you don't know anything about it? I think
> > > the more knowledge you have of architecture the more beauty is
> > > apparent. However, it could also be that the flaws become more apparent.
> >
> > I thought that having knowledge, relying on concepts, about the
> > building would make the appraisal more about whether it's good
> > architecturem rather than beautiful architecture (at least, that's how
> > I'm understanding Kant.)
>
> There is a difference between a good design and a beautiful building.
>
> But I'm sure that's true too. However, I should mention that I don't
> always stick to Kant when I write these responses, far from it. Besides,
> his aesthetics should be brought up to date with our knowledge
> of other cultures' aesthetic values.
Yes. My 'example' in everyday conversation of a beautiful experience was
simply an attempt to get a grasp on your clarifying Kant's notion of
demand, and putting it back into Kant's distinctions between the
experience of beauty and the experience good (which Kant says relies on
knowledge).
>
> > And I guess for Kant this would even be valid
> > even to the point about knowing a particular ornamental style and
> > knowing how to 'read' it. Then what you judge is how well the
> > architect made use of the style, or even simply admire his/her choices
> > of materials, design motifs, etc.
> >
> > But that's where I have difficulty with Kant, because I think a lot of
> > times the experience of beauty is bundled up with this type of
> > knowledge (the more you know, the more you can appreciate), so that,
> > at least to me, it's difficult to sustain we have pure judgements of
> > taste. I think most times, at least for man-made items, concepts play
> > an important role in allowing one to being able to judge the
> > look/sound/feel of a thing.
> >
>
> It depends on the complexity of your subject (the art). If it is a
> pure judgment of taste, then how can it be art? In that case, you
> are talking "ice cream," something involving a singular feeling.
Yes, I agree. That's exactly why I have difficulty with Kant's
'precise' notion of beauty, because I believe many of our experiences of
beauty are also intimately bound up with knowledge (which for Kant is
good) or sensual pleasure (which for Kant is charm).
>
>
> > This is especially relevant, I think, in music- where first hearing a
> > piece may be striking, but as you get more familiar with it, you can
> > appreciate the finer qualities, and really come to understand its
> > 'beauty'.
> >
> What does it mean to say "you have good taste in music"? It means
> the subject of the beautiful is complex when trying to determine
> it objectively even in the absence of an experiencer. You are
> caught up in the idea of scientifically establishing a standard
> of beauty. When did Kant even mention anything about this?
> Yes it is difficult, and there are various schools of aesthetic
> opinion based on various approaches to the subject of beauty.
> But that is beyond Kant's thesis. He is only distinguishing
> the experience of beauty from that of the good and the tasteful.
> Since you are looking for such an objective standard, then
> objectively speaking you will be forced to give up Kant and
> attach yourself to some school of thought or other that has its
> own opinions on the subject, because Kant gives none. Either
> that, or start your own genre because there is no Kantian
> school of art.
>
Perhaps I wasn't clear enough. My comment on music was not about seeking
a standard for beauty, but was to show how difficult it is to apply
Kant's distinction between good and pure judgements of taste/beauty
(without knowledge) to normal experiences of beauty, like the kind I have
when listening to music. With music, knowledge, and especially
familiarity, frequently play a fundamental role in my ability to
appreciate the quality and beauty of the music.
In architecture, knowledge of the decorative language, of a syntax of the
parts of architectural ornament, (like Mannerism, for instance) 'can'
make the appreciation more a matter about good architecture (how well
it's designed) versus whether it's a beautiful building. In other words,
you can look at Alberti's Palazzo Rucellai and not know much about
Renaissance architecture and say that's a beautiful building, or you can
know more about the use of greco-roman orders, capitals, banding,
rustication, proportioning, cornice shapes and the like and recognize
that Alberti did a superb job of design. At least, this is what I think
Kant has in mind when he's looking to distinguish judgements of beauty
(first case) with judgements of good (second case). And I can understand
how this kind of distinction can be useful in everyday discussions about
architecture
But in music knowledge of a piece can be much more... elemental I guess,
and yet such knowledge can allow one to appreciate the music much more in
a beautiful sense, rather than a good sense. For instance, after
listening to Mozart's Requiem for the 20th time, I can better appreciate
the beauty of certain melodies in certain sections because I am familiar
with them, and this appreciation might not have been apparent to me in
the first hearings when I was trying to assimilate as much as I could.
And this can be an appreciation quite different from whether Mozart
actually composed the Requiem in a well enough matter.
All I was trying to say is that in normal everyday experiences of beauty,
it's difficult top use Kant's distinctions because, I think, the
experiences of beauty are murky, can be wrapped up in memories, meanings,
etc. and are highly dependant on what's being perceived.
Marcello
Malenor
> In article <2tcD8.279$X%5....@newsread1.prod.itd.earthlink.net>,
> smu...@earthlink.net says...
> >
> > "Marcello Penso" <mpe...@offler.com> wrote in message
> > news:a3bcf635.02051...@posting.google.com...
> > > "Malenor" <smu...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
> > news:<gV0D8.2529$Nt3.1...@newsread2.prod.itd.earthlink.net>...
> >
> > > > Why the stipulation that you don't know anything about it? I think
> > > > the more knowledge you have of architecture the more beauty is
> > > > apparent. However, it could also be that the flaws become more
apparent.
> > >
> > > I thought that having knowledge, relying on concepts, about the
> > > building would make the appraisal more about whether it's good
> > > architecturem rather than beautiful architecture (at least, that's how
> > > I'm understanding Kant.)
> >
> > There is a difference between a good design and a beautiful building.
> >
> > But I'm sure that's true too. However, I should mention that I don't
> > always stick to Kant when I write these responses, far from it. Besides,
> > his aesthetics should be brought up to date with our knowledge
> > of other cultures' aesthetic values.
>
> Yes. My 'example' in everyday conversation of a beautiful experience was
> simply an attempt to get a grasp on your clarifying Kant's notion of
> demand, and putting it back into Kant's distinctions between the
> experience of beauty and the experience good (which Kant says relies on
> knowledge).
>
intermingle such that knowledge enables one to be even more aware of
the beauty. The experience of beauty is more sensual by far. But as you
argued below, the more you experienced the Mozart piece the more
aware you became of certain aspects. Therefore, the knowledge of
the piece brought out more of its beauty.
Does this cause me to become confused between the good and
the beautiful? No. Why should it? Oh, perhaps if I was a complete
newbie at this sort of introspection it would seem confusing at first.
But I have focused on these sorts of issues for many years, perhaps
even decades.
> >
> > > And I guess for Kant this would even be valid
> > > even to the point about knowing a particular ornamental style and
> > > knowing how to 'read' it. Then what you judge is how well the
> > > architect made use of the style, or even simply admire his/her choices
> > > of materials, design motifs, etc.
> > >
> > > But that's where I have difficulty with Kant, because I think a lot of
> > > times the experience of beauty is bundled up with this type of
> > > knowledge (the more you know, the more you can appreciate), so that,
> > > at least to me, it's difficult to sustain we have pure judgements of
> > > taste. I think most times, at least for man-made items, concepts play
> > > an important role in allowing one to being able to judge the
> > > look/sound/feel of a thing.
> > >
> >
> > It depends on the complexity of your subject (the art). If it is a
> > pure judgment of taste, then how can it be art? In that case, you
> > are talking "ice cream," something involving a singular feeling.
>
> Yes, I agree. That's exactly why I have difficulty with Kant's
> 'precise' notion of beauty, because I believe many of our experiences of
> beauty are also intimately bound up with knowledge (which for Kant is
> good) or sensual pleasure (which for Kant is charm).
>
I'm not really happy with my response there. And it's obvious you have
studied more of the topic than I have. But I decided it was possible at
least
to lend you my general experience with Kant. I pretty much know how
he thought.
What does it mean to tell somebody, "You have very good taste"? It means
I agree with your aesthetic judgment. But isn't that what it's all about,
whether it is an issue of taste or beauty? Isn't this how we determine
objective beauty by "demanding" universal agreement? And it is based
somewhat on the objective pleasure-pain principle anyhow, even on
the complex levels of art. I have had the unpleasant experience of
listening to music that was physically and, somehow, spiritually
painful to listen to. (It was some genre of Mexican music.) I don't
understand how anybody can find that beautiful, and I wonder if
they really do. Or is it, as you say below, a mixture of experiences:
perhaps the music brings out a certain nostalgic state. Maybe the
music itself isn't beautiful, but the psychological state (feelings and
images) associated with it is beautiful. But the individual mistakenly
believes that the music is what is beautiful.
I have done a lot of aesthetic thinking (funny I say that after already
saying that I am not interested in it -- but I'm not interested in
studying it *formally*). In fact, I do a lot of this kind of thinking
in general; and I use philosophy only as a guide, not as something
to "believe" in. I know for a fact that people tend to like the kind
of music that they grew up listening to. And of course, musical
tastes do change anyway, but there is always a fondness for
that 'oldies' stuff that never seems to grow old. So there is a
highly subjective process of judging this art form. It differs wildly
from our subjective experiences of other art forms because most
of us were not subjected to them from an early age. But music is
ubiquitous.
How then do I know what is best categorizable as beautiful when
it comes to music? It is not something with a great deal of nostalgia
attached to it, it is something new and fresh. I was listening to an
FM radio station last night that played some highly unusual music,
nothing I'd ever heard before, but it affected me in some
interestingly physiological ways. The mellow undertones in the
background, from some strange instrument, gave me some very
strange sensations, and even evoked some strange images.
"Beautiful" is too vague a word to use for the experience, but
I'd say it was an enjoyable piece. And anybody else who likes
it, I'd say they have good, although odd, taste in music. And I'd
say that anybody who did not enjoy the piece simply was not
intellectually open to it. So yes, beautiful, in that I think anybody
with an open mind and a normal nervous system could (no, should)
be capable of the same experience.
The ear can't catch everything the first time, or the second time, or the
third time...
> All I was trying to say is that in normal everyday experiences of beauty,
> it's difficult top use Kant's distinctions because, I think, the
> experiences of beauty are murky, can be wrapped up in memories, meanings,
> etc. and are highly dependant on what's being perceived.
Yes, well, I had already mentioned that point previously. However, that
doesn't make me all-knowing, in fact I'm not entirely happy with everything
I have to say on this subject. Sometimes yes, sometimes no.
It's a huge topic, which now has branched off into two more topics, the
issue of the "Good," and beauty by ear versus by eye.
In playing a musical instrument there is a distinction between playing
well, technically perfect, and playing beautifully, with feeling. Which
is better? Is it better to play beautifully, and perhaps not be perfect
while playing? Or is it better to play with technical accuracy and hope
the music speaks for itself? Have you ever heard a Chopin piano piece
played "straight" versus with great feeling? So much feeling is already
embedded in the notes that some beauty comes out in a straight
rendition, but so much more comes out by playing it with emotional
abandon. And in fact, the latter was Chopin's intention no matter
what the sheet music may say.
So are Kant's distinctions really that vague? Or are they just difficult
to apply? It is not difficult for us to judge beauty at all. I know the
difference between music of a personal nature and music that I
think anybody with an open mind can appreciate. I also know that
there are highly "provincial" types of people who think that there
is only one type of music, and who even believe that everybody
listens to it and is familiar with it, and who are shocked to find out
that person X has never heard of song Y (song Y being some
piece that was released maybe a year ago or less, hit the "top
10," and became an instant classic -- within its own circle of
influence). That last is a really obvious case of "demanding,"
*as if* the experience carried with it the same certainty as
mathematics that others see it as beautiful.
(This sort of "provincial" thinking goes way beyond the aesthetic.
There are people who can't believe why Al Gore didn't win
the last election, simply because everybody they knew voted
for him -- as if their little part of the world spoke for everybody.)
"The Blues Brothers": John Belushi walks into the cowboy
bar and asks the barmaid, "What type of music do they play
here?" She responds, "We have both types of music, country
and western!" Believe it or not, while a mere stereotype of
the country/western mindset, I have myself actually met
people who think like that barmaid. Stereotype?
Is "their" type of music beautiful? They objectify it as such.
Therefore is it? I think it is a hopeless task to try to sort
out a "noumenal" beauty, so all I can say is, "Sure pardner,
whatever you say..."
Malenor
"Robert ASF." <ra_f...@alcor.concordia.ca> wrote in message
news:abj5u4$o1q$1...@newsflash.concordia.ca...
> And yes i did get your email, i just haven't had any time...
I did manage to dig up an edition of the Ellington translation of
"Groundwork" -- it was in a pile of stuff on the floor.
Robert ASF.
snip
>1) In Section 7, why does Kant feel obligated to state that a statement
>like 'that is beautiful' implies that the person making the statement
>'demands' universal agreement?
Basic word definition at this point. When i say
this is beautiful, i am not saying i like it. If i was then
i would have said "I like it". As such the claim that
something is beautiful must have universal importance. Why?
Again the definition of the word. Something beautiful is
not merely an object that i like. If it were we would
merely be saying i like it. So imagine a heirarchy of
prettiness? where like is below beautiful.
> How does having the disinterested
>satisfaction in a object stretch all the way to demanding agreement from
>others?
Because to say this is beautiful is to make a
universal judgement. ie everyone must think that it is
beautiful. To first make such a judgement, one must be
disinterested in it.
>Can't it be the case that someone can state 'this object is
>beautiful to me?' without seeming 'laughable'?
Yes but they are then using the word beautiful out
of its assigned definition. All they are in fact saying is
that they like it. They are not making the claim to beauty,
>2) Kant talks of pure judgements of taste with respect to nature, but
>rarely touches on similar judgements regarding art, architecture or even
>non artistic things, or events (a beautiful wedding). Are these different
>in some way or did Kant not wish to make an extensive list?
No he is making a point of nature. that which is
most beautiful is natural ie what we are accustom to and
expecting. As art or whatever else on you list approaches
nature it is more likely to be beautiful,
>3) It seems from reading that portion of CPJ Kant is saying that beauty
>is not really in the 'eye of the beholder',
Actually close enough to be right. Kant start out
with the old Latin phrase "Let us not argue about Taste and
begins to do exactly that.
> but that, if we all had the
>same capacity and experience, we would all reach the same consensus of
>what's beautiful.
Yes, Kant defines beauty as that which is an
aestethic judgement that is universal, ie beautiful for all
people at all times. However later on in the work when he
then touches on History, we see that such judgements must
be revisted time after time to either agree with them or
disagree,
>But are there any specific criteria/properties that an
>object/thing/event might have to 'always' qualify it as beautiful (like
>in Kant's description of what constitutes an experience of the sublime-
>i.e. having an intuition of being part of some universal order)?
Err yes and no...
A definite answer i am sure...
Ok there is a general criteria but nothing
specific. eg the closer something is to nature the more it
is beautiful. However this does not tell us what is natural
or what it should hold. So while something may qualify
today, it may not tomorrow when other revisit the
judgement.
Take for example a traditional Oriental Tea
Service. As part of the ritual the man burps to say he is
full at the end of the meal. This was considered to be
beautiful. Today burping is considered rude.
Take another Chinese ritual of bound feet. The
smaller the better. Today we see this as cruel and unusual
punishment. So at the time they were "Beautiful" but now
they are not. so in the Kantian sense the never really
were. They failed the test of different judgements over
time. However take the Mona Lisa. Considered to be
beautiful for 500 years, and still a treasure today... I
prefer the one with sunglasses. (And no i am not an art
historian so if it was only 350 years ago when she was
painted too bad.)
>Thanks in advance. I'm an architect by profession, and not much of a
>philosopher at all,
Heck i am a student by profession. Philosophers are
anyone seeking wisdom. Has nothing to do with what job you
do.
> and am having a hard time digesting this part of
>Kant,
Yes i know it is a difficult book to work with.
> and trying to reconcile it with theories of perception.
It wont rconcile. Different animals all together.
Perception in the philosophical sense has nothing to do
with aestethic.
>Any
>suggested annotated translations or essays on this part would be most
>appreciated.
Errr steer clear of the whole debate. The whole
area of Aestethics is really badly done. Too often the
people reading Kant's CRJ are out of touch with what he is
saying, missing the point or grinding their own axe. Trust
me on this point, or see my web site in the FAQ and you
will understand why i get to say this :-)
Robert ASF.
snip
>If today we say 'beauty is in the eye of the beholder' then would it be
>fair to say that our 'generally used' notion of beauty is different from
>how Kant defines it?
No, only your understanding is different. Kant is
speaking in philosophical terms as such do not confuse the
word beautiful with it everyday usage. When Kant is
speaking if aestethic he is talking in words that sound
familiar to the non philosopher but he has in mind a
specific special meaning.
> When I make such statements I can just as easily say
>that such pleasure is only personal.
You could but then you would not speaking in kants
voice.
> I can say that some buildings merely
>hold perceptual interest (interesting to look at), or are good looking,
>or are beautiful, or are spectacularly fine.
Yes but do they fit the criteria of aestethics?
>It's not clear to me how Kant can say that such statements imply
>objectivity, or seek universal agreement, unless his notion of beautiful
>has a 18th century flavor, like Keats beauty is truth statement.
Nothing to do with the time period and everything
to do with the field. Just as i would not make much sense
trying to draw a building with my stick figure type drawing
ability and then expect a builder to make it. It needs
special training, or in this case special insight to
understand just what Kant is trying to say.
The notion of beauty in aestethic implies a
universal agreement.
>Also, if such statments 'can' be valid for everyone, then there must be
>some principle/characteristic (at least of how visual perception works in
>humans) for Kant to say people would experience it the samy way.
yes there is such a perception. Why it is call
beauty:-)
>And if beauty comes out only in certain objects, but not others, surely
>there must be something in the object that stimulates such feelings, no?
Yes that which is closest to nature...
Robert ASF.
snip
>On the other hand, I think it's a lot more common for people (at least
>nowadays) to make statements like 'that was a beautiful movie' and not
>have any expectations about agreement, but merely as a matter of personal
>opinion.
Blame it on hyperbole. Language dirft or what have
you. The point is just because people are using the same
word does not mean they are making the same claim.
>Maybe it's because Kant is putting forward arguments about 'pure'
>judgements of taste, when in fact (I think) most such judgements are
>normally colored with either concepts or sensual pleasure of a sort.
That would be a judgement of sense which is a
totally different kettle of fish.
snip
>But I wonder why there 'must' be an expectation. Yes, one can realize as
>Kants says that maybe the judgement is not based on personal concepts
>(though it's a personal experience), but it's one thing to say that,
>another to say that such an experience (by logical default?) has to be
>objective, and yet another to say such statements imply demands of
>agreement in others. No?
Let put this to you in a way you might understand.
If i told you to design for me a building that was made of
tooth picks, would you be able to do it? perhaps a very
small one... To design a building you need to understand
just how much weight a structure will hold right? In the
case of aestethic, you have to know what the words are
defined as. In the case of beautiful they mean something
that is unversal.
Robert ASF.
snip
>I actually am just now thinking this through, so bear with me. (Such
>thinking is something to do during the non-philosophical part of my day.)
>But my experience with Kant is good and I think most of my judgments
>are reliable. I wouldn't mind however if Robert would lend a hand here.
>He has more experience then me with this particular work.
Why yes i do... but just a little...
snipo
>I have thought about your point that nobody has expectations on others.
>I think it is a part of cultural degeneration. But the expectation itself is
>only a logical consequence of the "demand" which human nature itself
>places on us, individually, to adjudge an experience beautiful. There is
>a certain maturity involved in understanding that not every culture has
>the same tastes; however, I think it can be taken too far until there is
>no longer any possibility of objective aesthetic judgment.
Just to go a bit deeper here. What a judgement is
according to kant, is an excercise of the will. It can have
no disagreement. Hence the demand for agreement. Kant's
problem with the will is brought forward by Hannah Arendt
among others. When one takes an action, it is based on the
will. I will this to be. Perhaps Kant's idea is seen more
clearly with a royal will. They will something and the
servants all run around trying to do it. Sort of like Kanut
will the ocean to stop its tides... Kant however does mean
that a judgement of beauty demands on all other people to
have the same judgement. If they do not then the object
cannot be call beautiful merely a pleasing object to my
taste. He is making a very strong claim to a very small
amount of objects, the class of objects that are beautiful.
Just as Kant makes such a hard line position on morality,
that which is moral makes a demand upon us to do such a
moral act. So too for beauty.
snip
>On the other hand, if science proves that there is a definite formula
>determining what is beautiful, then everybody will have to agree with it.
Since it is not possible for science to do so...
Kant is attempting to create a series of rules to
establish how to make a judgement of beauty not to demand
that all people like this object, play or what ever.
Robert ASF.
snip
>But that's where I have difficulty with Kant, because I think a lot of
>times the experience of beauty is bundled up with this type of
>knowledge (the more you know, the more you can appreciate), so that,
>at least to me, it's difficult to sustain we have pure judgements of
>taste. I think most times, at least for man-made items, concepts play
>an important role in allowing one to being able to judge the
>look/sound/feel of a thing.
Here is the problem. Your view is not of a pure
concept but that of objects. You are thinking in terms of
this musical piece or that painting, whereas kant is
thinking of Music in general or paintings in general. When
he speaks of beauty, he is looking at aestethics not
particulars. IOW why do we have this concept of the
beautiful, what makes something beautiful, what rules do we
use to make such a judgement. IOW he is not talking about
the Picaso painting or Mozart's music. But the way a
philosopher thinking on the subject show approach it from.
Robert ASF.
snop
>But I'm sure that's true too. However, I should mention that I don't
>always stick to Kant when I write these responses, far from it. Besides,
>his aesthetics should be brought up to date with our knowledge
>of other cultures' aesthetic values.
No. We do not need to consider other cultures
aesthetic values. The reason why is that this would remove
Kants thoughts from pure reason into practical reason.
Aesthetics is based on pure reason abstracted from any
particulars.
snip
>or start your own genre because there is no Kantian
>school of art.
LOL!
Yes there is, the world's a stage...
Malenor
Robert. I've read all your responses. You say that the experience
of beauty carries with it a demand upon others. I agree that's
what Kant says, but I changed the key word to "expectation,"
and altered the meaning of "demand" to give it the purity and
logic of mathematics. Yes we demand it because we will it,
but why do we will it? Because it has the force of a mathematical
truth. We treat the beautiful *as* a mathematical truth. And I
expect others to will the same thing. Otherwise, we are willing it
just because Nietzsche said that willing things is good.
But in the whole conversation the question of Will was never
brought in, so I'm glad you mentioned it.
You say, "Do not confuse the word beautiful with it everyday
usage." I think that's good advice in a sense. But where did
Kant get his idea of the Beautiful? From Plato, or Aristotle?
His reasoning is not historically circular in the manner of the
ancient Greeks, forever cycling around the same concepts.
As I said, Kant takes his ideas from the world around him,
particularly the morality and the religion, then determines their
roots. It is no different with the Aesthetics. The Beautiful is
a judgment that has come down to us through the ages, and
Kant is not about to question its everyday usage.
But what is the meaning of this everyday usage?
I agree that Marcello was trying to subjectify Kant's analysis
of beauty. But I don't agree that it is just a matter of noting
Kant's definition. The definition did not arise out of thin air,
and it did not come from other philosophers who may be
fools on the issue anyway. Nor do I believe that it is
possible to determine the meaning of beauty by taking a
poll. And at least Kant avoids the tactic of saying, "What
is beauty? That over there," which would be non-discursive.
I think Marcello believes that if others don't see beauty the
way we do, then Kant is saying we should look down on them
or some such. It could be that Marcello is extremely
independent of others, a-social, and expects nothing of
other people anyway. Since that is a psychological disorder,
I wouldn't think he is in a position to judge the issue from a
personal perspective.
Beauty carries with it a universal "demand," but that demand
itself is not necessarily universal as far as individuals are
concerned. But as long as people have the capacity for
experiencing beauty, then the "demand" is universal for
them whatever they happen to find beautiful.
You say we should not have to bring Kant's Aesthetics
up to date with our present-day knowledge of other
cultures and their values. I am not actually referring to
the beauty in particulars and how that differs from culture
to culture, I already mentioned that and tossed it out.
Or else I am asking that Kant be subsumed to multi-
culturalism. Beauty is certainly universal to cultures of all
kinds.
Robert ASF.
snip
>Thanks for making an effort to be here and respond to this issue,
>Robert.
I am cheating... i am on vacation :-) which is why i have not been here
especially last week... to take a week off you have to do two weeks before you
leave...
snip
>But in the whole conversation the question of Will was never
>brought in, so I'm glad you mentioned it.
It is one of the links from aesthetics to politics to radical evil. A
very important one but widely missunderstood.
>You say, "Do not confuse the word beautiful with it everyday
>usage." I think that's good advice in a sense. But where did
>Kant get his idea of the Beautiful? From Plato, or Aristotle?
Ultimitly everything philosophical comes from those two. However i do not
think he is reacting to them in this particular sense. He is aiming more at
other German thinkers of his time. The Romatic period is beginning or has just
begun in his time.
snip
>But what is the meaning of this everyday usage?
The meaning of beautiful in everyday usage would have no place in
philosophy. Nor should it. Just as Kant does not write a long list of things to
do with the CI. He will not do so with aesthetics.
>I agree that Marcello was trying to subjectify Kant's analysis
>of beauty. But I don't agree that it is just a matter of noting
>Kant's definition. The definition did not arise out of thin air,
>and it did not come from other philosophers who may be
>fools on the issue anyway.
Take morality, what does it mean in the philosophic sense? If i wanted i
could tell you it had nothing to do with universality. Would it still be
morality? No, it would be situation ethics, or group think etc. Without the
claim to universality we do not have 1) philosophy in general 2) morality and
aesthetics. 3) Remember philosophy is not about small things but universal
understandings such as Beautiful or morality. Take away the universality of
either issue and we have a bar debate, and get to buy the next round of beer. We
however do not have philosophy.
snip
>I think Marcello believes that if others don't see beauty the
>way we do, then Kant is saying we should look down on them
>or some such.
That is too complicated to agree or disagree with. If i say this object
is beautiful, then you disagree. We talk about it. One of us had either made an
error in thinking ie logic and reasoning (that would be you in this example), or
has been subsummed into an interested party towards the object, (that would be
me in this example.) Assume that only one of us could make a mistake in this
example, that person is making an error in judgement and as such, since we are
reasonable people, can be enlightened to understand the beauty of it.
Take Shakespeare. In high school i had Macbeth rammed down my throat. I
still shudder to think of reading it. For this example only assume that i hate
it, i do not but let us assume this. You point out the beautiful parts of the
play and explain that because it was forced upon me in high school that i
cannot have a disinterested position. However take Hamlet, a play i never read
in school but on my own years later. I can point the great parts and the beauty
of it to you. Assume you have not read it, ie totally ignorant of the work. I am
sure you know about the work and have read it but again we shall assume you know
nothing about it. I can then show you the parts of it, or its totality of
beauty.
snip
>Beauty carries with it a universal "demand," but that demand
>itself is not necessarily universal as far as individuals are
>concerned. But as long as people have the capacity for
>experiencing beauty, then the "demand" is universal for
>them whatever they happen to find beautiful.
You have crossed the line here. You have on one hand the philosophical
concept of demanding, in the other you have the real world. do not try to cross
the two, they do not mix well :-) Just like morality we have the CI which is an
abstract concept that does not demand of a person to do anything. It merely
tells them what they ought to do. What they do is up to them.
>You say we should not have to bring Kant's Aesthetics
>up to date with our present-day knowledge of other
>cultures and their values. I am not actually referring to
>the beauty in particulars and how that differs from culture
>to culture, I already mentioned that and tossed it out.
>Or else I am asking that Kant be subsumed to multi-
>culturalism. Beauty is certainly universal to cultures of all
>kinds.
Kant would have no problem with cosmopolitan thinking on this issue.
Marcello Penso
smu...@earthlink.net says...
Not all. I was just wondering why Kant thought the 'demand' was 'so'
necessary, and if this might have been an influence of his time. As
Robert points out German Romanticism was under way (Goethe/Schiller), so
I thought that this 'demand' might have been a known idea peculiar to
that time.
But Robert does have a good point that Kant's discussion isn't really
'translatable' in everday usage- doing that would a change in scope of
the discourse.
> It could be that Marcello is extremely
> independent of others, a-social, and expects nothing of
> other people anyway. Since that is a psychological disorder,
> I wouldn't think he is in a position to judge the issue from a
> personal perspective.
So now I'm a crazy loner psychopath too?........ Cazzo di Buddha!
My experiences of 'beauty', particularly where I don't feel the need to
'demand' confirmation from anyone, are mostly those instances when I
travel and look at architecture. When I think/feel something
(building/detail,/composition) is rather interesting, striking, or even
beautiful, usually I photograph it. My wife, who is not an architect,
sometimes 'sees what I see', but many times is not into the details,
though she does exclaim now and then that this building or that street is
beautiful.
Apart from architecture though, my appreciation of beauty is as regular
as anyone else's.
Marcello
Malenor
> On Mon, 13 May 2002 16:23:12 GMT, Malenor <smu...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>
> snip
>
> >Thanks for making an effort to be here and respond to this issue,
> >Robert.
>
> I am cheating... i am on vacation :-) which is why i have not been here
> especially last week... to take a week off you have to do two weeks before
you
> leave...
>
I didn't think philosophers had regular jobs.
Here's something entertaining to read during your vacation:
http://home.att.net/~sandgryan/essays_on_objectivism/ocr/index.html
> snip
>
> >But in the whole conversation the question of Will was never
> >brought in, so I'm glad you mentioned it.
>
> It is one of the links from aesthetics to politics to radical evil. A
> very important one but widely missunderstood.
>
> >You say, "Do not confuse the word beautiful with it everyday
> >usage." I think that's good advice in a sense. But where did
> >Kant get his idea of the Beautiful? From Plato, or Aristotle?
>
> Ultimitly everything philosophical comes from those two. However i do not
> think he is reacting to them in this particular sense. He is aiming more
at
> other German thinkers of his time. The Romatic period is beginning or has
just
> begun in his time.
>
Hume wrote about beauty; perhaps he is responding to him.
> snip
>
> >But what is the meaning of this everyday usage?
>
> The meaning of beautiful in everyday usage would have no place in
> philosophy. Nor should it. Just as Kant does not write a long list of
things to
> do with the CI. He will not do so with aesthetics.
>
Marcello agrees with you there. (Hooray!) But I still think that his
meaning of beauty is true to the common experience and language.
> >I agree that Marcello was trying to subjectify Kant's analysis
> >of beauty. But I don't agree that it is just a matter of noting
> >Kant's definition. The definition did not arise out of thin air,
> >and it did not come from other philosophers who may be
> >fools on the issue anyway.
>
> Take morality, what does it mean in the philosophic sense? If i wanted i
> could tell you it had nothing to do with universality. Would it still be
> morality? No, it would be situation ethics, or group think etc. Without
the
> claim to universality we do not have 1) philosophy in general 2) morality
and
> aesthetics. 3) Remember philosophy is not about small things but universal
> understandings such as Beautiful or morality. Take away the universality
of
> either issue and we have a bar debate, and get to buy the next round of
beer. We
> however do not have philosophy.
>
I'm not sure how that answers my statements. Yes, philosophy has to make
claims to universality. But somehow for Kant universality always arises out
of the individual, and that would include the average person, not the
philosopher who has thought these things through.
It's like asking an individual: "When you die, do you believe you are
going to heaven or to hell?" His answer, as a matter of faith, is
not applicable to him alone because God made everybody, and
everybody lives under the same God-created sun. His answer is
a universal claim, and as such, yes it carries with it a demand of
universality that others will either go to heaven or hell whether they
believe in them or not.
That is my final take on the issue of beauty, but the analogy is
imperfect because with art the context has switched from God to nature.
Perhaps since we are all products of nature, there is the demand
that our experiences of beauty are universal especially as man-made
art tends to reproduce nature.
> snip
>
> >I think Marcello believes that if others don't see beauty the
> >way we do, then Kant is saying we should look down on them
> >or some such.
>
> That is too complicated to agree or disagree with. If i say this object
> is beautiful, then you disagree. We talk about it. One of us had either
made an
> error in thinking ie logic and reasoning (that would be you in this
example),
Gee thanks.
> or
> has been subsummed into an interested party towards the object, (that
would be
> me in this example.) Assume that only one of us could make a mistake in
this
> example, that person is making an error in judgement and as such, since we
are
> reasonable people, can be enlightened to understand the beauty of it.
>
> Take Shakespeare.
No, I don't want him.
But I did memorize the famous Soliloquy a long time ago. I did actually
find 'Hamlet' to be quite beautiful. How did Shakespeare create
beauty out of so much tragedy?
> In high school i had Macbeth rammed down my throat. I
> still shudder to think of reading it. For this example only assume that i
hate
> it, i do not but let us assume this. You point out the beautiful parts of
the
> play and explain that because it was forced upon me in high school that i
> cannot have a disinterested position. However take Hamlet, a play i never
read
> in school but on my own years later. I can point the great parts and the
beauty
> of it to you. Assume you have not read it, ie totally ignorant of the
work. I am
> sure you know about the work and have read it but again we shall assume
you know
> nothing about it. I can then show you the parts of it, or its totality of
> beauty.
>
Isn't this closer to what Marcello called the "good" aspects, the technical
perfection of the work, versus the beauty of it? Where is the totality of
its
beauty?
> snip
>
> >Beauty carries with it a universal "demand," but that demand
> >itself is not necessarily universal as far as individuals are
> >concerned. But as long as people have the capacity for
> >experiencing beauty, then the "demand" is universal for
> >them whatever they happen to find beautiful.
>
> You have crossed the line here. You have on one hand the philosophical
> concept of demanding, in the other you have the real world. do not try to
cross
> the two, they do not mix well :-) Just like morality we have the CI which
is an
> abstract concept that does not demand of a person to do anything. It
merely
> tells them what they ought to do. What they do is up to them.
>
Yes I mentioned this 'line' before, when I distinguished the psychological
aspect of "expectation" and the "demand" of universal acceptance
that is carried with a mathematical formula.
I am not contradicting my own statements, or being inconsistent.
I had changed "demand" to "expectation" with regard to some kind
of "my culture versus your culture" mentality. I do not wish to see
Kant as maintaining that we must "demand" that others see art the
same way as we do. That is not his point at all.
But the experience of beauty is universal for normal human beings
of all cultures. And concomitant with this is the same *disinterest*
that is carried along with understanding a mathematical equation.
The difference is that one is intellectual, while the other is intuitive.
> >You say we should not have to bring Kant's Aesthetics
> >up to date with our present-day knowledge of other
> >cultures and their values. I am not actually referring to
> >the beauty in particulars and how that differs from culture
> >to culture, I already mentioned that and tossed it out.
> >Or else I am asking that Kant be subsumed to multi-
> >culturalism. Beauty is certainly universal to cultures of all
> >kinds.
>
> Kant would have no problem with cosmopolitan thinking on this issue.
>
But wouldn't he view the aesthetic judgments of primitive cultures
to be inferior to his own?
Take my example of maturity and aesthetic judgment. A child thinks
that his tastes should be universal. An adult realizes that tastes are
not "disinterested," and develops 'true' aesthetic values of a complex
nature. He has certain tastes in art, but his ideas of beauty should
be universal to all.
Then he realizes that his ideas of beauty are not at all universal, and
that his supposed disinterested, objective view was slanted by his
particular culture's artistic values. Then there should be a level above
this level of "complex" aesthetic beauty, and I argued that that would
be simple nature, something held in common by all cultures.
I seem to be covering the same ground over and over again.
Robert ASF.
snip
> I was just wondering why Kant thought the 'demand' was 'so'
>necessary, and if this might have been an influence of his time.
It has to do generally with the nature of philosophy, ie that
unless a theory has a claim to universality, it is not philosophy.
Specifically, if Kant's theory did not demand itself, it would be
contingent as as such not universal and not a philosophy of aesthetics.
snip
Robert ASF.
snip
>I didn't think philosophers had regular jobs.
Shhhh! we are not supposed...
snip
>Hume wrote about beauty; perhaps he is responding to him.
Or Wolf or Plato or have a dozen other philosophers.
snip
>I'm not sure how that answers my statements. Yes, philosophy has to make
>claims to universality. But somehow for Kant universality always arises out
>of the individual, and that would include the average person, not the
>philosopher who has thought these things through.
First keep in mind that this is aesthetics. It is a field of
philosophy that has rules that kant must answer to. Hence the need for a
universal deman. Next keep in mind that morality comes from the
individual in just the same way as aesthetics.
>> Kant would have no problem with cosmopolitan thinking on this issue.
>>
>But wouldn't he view the aesthetic judgments of primitive cultures
>to be inferior to his own?
No, not on that basis. What you are saying is that Kant is
looking down on primitive cultures because of their primitive nature,
which is not the issue in aesthetics. In reality this may occur, but as
a principle, a primitive culture may have art just as beautiful as the
great painters of Germany in Kant's time.
snip
>I seem to be covering the same ground over and over again.
Happens in philosophy a lot...
Malenor
> On Tue, 14 May, Malenor <smu...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>
> snip
>
> >I didn't think philosophers had regular jobs.
>
> Shhhh! we are not supposed...
>
> snip
>
> >Hume wrote about beauty; perhaps he is responding to him.
>
> Or Wolf or Plato or have a dozen other philosophers.
>
> snip
>
> >I'm not sure how that answers my statements. Yes, philosophy has to make
> >claims to universality. But somehow for Kant universality always arises
out
> >of the individual, and that would include the average person, not the
> >philosopher who has thought these things through.
>
> First keep in mind that this is aesthetics. It is a field of
> philosophy that has rules that kant must answer to. Hence the need for a
> universal deman. Next keep in mind that morality comes from the
> individual in just the same way as aesthetics.
>
And has Kant only clarified what the individual already knows on
some level? Marcello thinks, not in his own case.
> >> Kant would have no problem with cosmopolitan thinking on this issue.
> >>
> >But wouldn't he view the aesthetic judgments of primitive cultures
> >to be inferior to his own?
>
> No, not on that basis. What you are saying is that Kant is
> looking down on primitive cultures because of their primitive nature,
> which is not the issue in aesthetics. In reality this may occur, but as
> a principle, a primitive culture may have art just as beautiful as the
> great painters of Germany in Kant's time.
>
I'm not saying this is Kant's point in his aesthetics. It is not even about
primitive culture producing art on a par with Kant's era -- is it even
art in the first place? -- but the fact that primitive cultures have their
own ideas about the beautiful. And in fact, these ideas carry with
them a certain absoluteness which leads them to see other cultures'
aesthetic values as "crazy."
There is, however, the question of whether or not primitive cultures
produce art at all. Surely primitives have aesthetic judgment, but no
skill for artistry, for reproducing in man-made form the beauty found
in nature. But I think I have drifted into the realm of the "good."
Malenor
decisive explanatory analogy. But there is only one small point
of comparison, and that is the absoluteness of the two fields,
their universality.
newlo...@gmail.com
we provide best deals in Washington DC, best online deals. Our deals offer best discounts on beauty spa treatments Sign up now for a new deal every day. Looking for natural and beneficial technique for hair removal?? Here comes the band aid for your theme. New Look Day Spa and Laser are having expertise people dealing with this technique.
for more details:
https://www.newlookdeals.com/
Address: 201 Elden St, Suite #203, Herndon, VA 20170
Customer Enquire:
custome...@newlookdeals.com.Bookmarking Submissions and Direct Submissions
Marquard Dirk Pienaar
judgements is via Truth. I mean the ability to judge comes
via true recognition of experiences, also learning true
knowledge, etc. That implies there are presupposed
realizations about actualities, which must be current before
a true judgement about beauty can be made. I therefore support
Kant's view that beauty 'can' be universal. Not that beauty is
universal currently? The 'can' is hypothetical, imo, and applies
not to reality. If you want to get a true judgment about
beauty, i'd say it is not a 'democratic' opinion, it is rather
agreement by few people who know what the idea Truth means.