ibsh...@gmail.com schrieb am Mittwoch, 20. Juni 2018 um 01:50:06 UTC+2:
> The empiricist approach to discerning reality is making sense of evidence that has been gleaned from the senses. Some philosophers – such as Kant – challenged this approach. They stated such things as that senses are imprecise,
Kant neither questions the pre -scientific nor scientific experience (on the contrary!) - that is not the starting point of his criticism. But he criticizes that empiricism overlooks the fact that the empirical world (the world of phenomena) is not simply given, but is already the subject-related product of a variety of synthesis.
> and that (in Kant) they only see the appearance of things – the “phenomenal” - but fail to see the things in themselves – the “noumenal.”
Yes.
>
> I want to make sense of the whole thing.
>
> Now the senses are actually not imprecise. Incomplete yes, but imprecise no. We do not see the radio waves or the infrared radiation; we see the visible light. However the information that I get from seeing the visible light is not an erroneous one. If I see you, I am fairly certain that I am actually seeing you – both the phenomenal you and the noumenal you. I can from this make an educated guess that you are not Adolf Hitler.
> In many cases, the things as they appear are very much the things as they are. If I am beholding an apple, I can be sure that I am holding an apple and not a frog.
I think Kant would hardly contradict you so far.
> In this case the noumenal and the phenomenal are the same thing;
No!
Kant believes that we cannot know anything about things in itself. (That, what you probably mean by "noumenal".)
> and senses very much are a valid guide to reality.
Yes, but the senses alone only give a partly incoherent and unordered "chaos" of disparate sensory data, in which only the mind brings coherence, unity and order:
"Wenn aber gleich alle unsere Erkenntnis mit der Erfahrung anhebt, so entspringt sie darum doch nicht eben alle aus der Erfahrung. Denn es könnte wohl sein, daß selbst unsere Erfahrungserkenntnis ein Zusammengesetztes aus dem sei, was wir durch Eindrücke empfangen, und dem, was unser eigenes Erkenntnisvermögen (durch sinnliche Eindrücke bloß veranlaßt) aus sich selbst hergibt, ..."
"But even if all of our knowledge begins with experience, it does not all spring from experience. For it could well be that even our knowledge of experience is a composite of what we receive through impressions and what our own faculty of cognition [the mind] ... yields of itself ..."