Kant and Copernicus
ac
in philosophy to what Copernicus did in astronomy is somewhat
misleading.
The comparison does have a certain limited truth - Copernicus shows
that the way we see things (sun moving around earth) is partly because
of our relative, subjective, limiting viewpoint. Clearly, there is a
similarity between this and Kant's attempt to show that our knowledge
in general is restricted, and conditioned, and so forth.
But surely the whole point about Copernicus is that he showed that you
can get beyond this, that, through science, one can find out the way
that things actually are! It seems outrageous for Kant to compare what
he takes to be his discovery that such knowledge is impossible to
Copernicus discovery of the actual structure of the solar system!
I realise that doesn't in itself show that Kant's conclusions were
wrong, since they are based on philosophy, not science. But surely, if
Kant is going to place so much importance on Copernicus, the flawed
nature of the comparison should make one doubt Kant. What is your
view? Is Kant missing the point here, or what?
HPO JURY = Malenor
It's an imperfect analogy. It may be true that Copernicus demonstrated
that one may go beyond the appearances to find the reality, but Kant
proved the method by which this is accomplished. You didn't mention
the nature of the a priori in this process, the fact that knowledge
originates with man, and that this originality is responsible for the
growth of our knowledge. The faculty involved with this growth is not
so much the understanding with its laws, but the transcendental
imagination which freely produces from its own resources ideas which
set the understanding free of the empirical world and its mere
appearances which are brought to it by the sensibility.
In the third paragraph you mention this idea that science, for Kant,
cannot discover the way things "really are." That comment is based on
a misunderstanding of the noumenal which you take in the positive,
ontological sense, when Kant intended it to be applied in the
negative, methodological sense.
---------------
"I want you to know that this will go down on your permanent record!"
"Oh yeahhhh? Well don't get so distressed. Did I happen to mention
that I am impressed?"
Violent Femmes
ac
I wasn't trying to suggest that Kant thought that science can't
discover how things really are, and I'm sorry if the muddled way that
I tried to make my point gave you that idea. The only thing I was
trying to say was that a philosophy which maintains that you can't
reach absolute truth about the world through philosophy shouldn't be
comparing itself to a scientific approach which gets to the truth of
things about scientific matters.
I'm not the only person who thinks that Kant wasn't a genuine
Copernican. Eg, the guy at http://www.markalanwalker.com/kant.html
recognises that there is something wrong with Kant calling himself a
Copernican, though he doesn't have the same take on it.
HPO JURY = Malenor
I didn't think you muddled it. You made your point clear when you said
"through science, one can find out the way that things actually are!
It seems outrageous for Kant to compare what he takes to be his
discovery that such knowledge is impossible to Copernicus discovery of
the actual structure of the solar system!" That is not an accurate
characterization of Kant's goal in the Critique.
I should also add that Copernicus did not *discover* that the solar
system is structured heliocentrically. This could only be classified
as a scientific hypothesis. Nor did Kant classify himself as a
Copernican in your meaning, although in a way he was Copernican
since he also believed in the heliocentric model.
About the site you gave: the information there is untrustworthy. For
instance, the author states, "While Kant did not extend idealism to
the things in themselves...". This is once again to treat of the thing
in itself ontologically, as you did with the noumenon. But Kant's
intent for these notions is purely methodological. Beyond that use,
they are merely empty thoughts.
ac
I'd continue this discussion, but I just found a post by you in
Google's archive where you equate Nietzsche with Hitler. I'm losing
interest now, and hope.
HPO JURY = Malenor
Show it to me, because I don't equate them.
John Hernlund
Yes, however all Copernicus did is reverse the roles...what if we "consider"
the Sun to be still and the Earth and other planets moving? This did not add
anything to our scientific knowledge at all in itself. It is a simple
kinematic description, with one "still" reference frame chosen rather than
another. One can indeed describe, in terms of the laws of mechanics, the
dynamics of bodies of the solar system from a purely Earth-centric frame of
reference...this is how ground-based astronomy is done. You can just
transform the equations into whatever coordinate reference you wish.
What is perhaps more important than any scientific understanding gained from
Copernicus' view is the simple idea that maybe it is beneficial to view the
solar system "like so," rather than the usual way. Such a perspective leads
to the possibility of asking interesting questions, which is what Kant did.
In this sense, the terminology "Copernican revolution" is rather
appropriate.
Cheers!
John
HPO JURY = Malenor
Kant's revolution is the opposite of the Copernican. For him, the
world revolves around us, metaphysically not physically. But it
nevertheless represents a reversal of the traditional role imputed to
reason in general. And that reversal is the only point of comparison
that matters here.
---------------
John Hernlund
> On Wed, 28 May 2003 02:50:44 -0700, John Hernlund
> <no....@no.spam.com> wrote:
>
>>Yes, however all Copernicus did is reverse the roles...what if we "consider"
>>the Sun to be still and the Earth and other planets moving? This did not add
>>anything to our scientific knowledge at all in itself. It is a simple
>>kinematic description, with one "still" reference frame chosen rather than
>>another. One can indeed describe, in terms of the laws of mechanics, the
>>dynamics of bodies of the solar system from a purely Earth-centric frame of
>>reference...this is how ground-based astronomy is done. You can just
>>transform the equations into whatever coordinate reference you wish.
>>
>>What is perhaps more important than any scientific understanding gained from
>>Copernicus' view is the simple idea that maybe it is beneficial to view the
>>solar system "like so," rather than the usual way. Such a perspective leads
>>to the possibility of asking interesting questions, which is what Kant did.
>>In this sense, the terminology "Copernican revolution" is rather
>>appropriate.
>
> Kant's revolution is the opposite of the Copernican. For him, the
> world revolves around us, metaphysically not physically.
I don't think he meant for the analogy to be taken this far...and the
actual comparison is somewhat more difficult than you stated above,
since it has more to do with the mind acting on its objects ("object is
that in which a manifold of intuition is unified"), rather than objects
acting on the mind (Hume's perspective). In this case, you might venture
to analogize the mind to be the sun, and the objects to be the
planets...but at any rate, like I said, he probably didn't mean for the
analogy to be taken this far...although it is fun to do so.
> But it
> nevertheless represents a reversal of the traditional role imputed to
> reason in general. And that reversal is the only point of comparison
> that matters here.
Right, and that is exactly what he meant by this analogy.
Cheers!
John
Varrius
"John Hernlund" <hern...@ess.ucla.edu> wrote in message
news:3ED596D9...@ess.ucla.edu...
As i recall Hume talked of impressions and ideas (i.e. a derivative
rationalism), not objects acting on the mind (which would be some kind of
realism).
John Hernlund
"Varrius" <na...@ajax.net> wrote:
Speaking relative to Kant's views, it is not unreasonable to suggest that
such an "impression" is not the same as "object is that in which a manifold
of intuition is unified." The role reversal is what is impressing and what
is impressed...
J
Varrius
"Jos Horikx" <jho...@chello.nl> wrote in message
news:fhqjdvo4mpk7rfgoe...@4ax.com...> [ Kant and his "Copernian turn"]
>
> >I wasn't trying to suggest that Kant thought that science can't
> >discover how things really are, and I'm sorry if the muddled way that
> >I tried to make my point gave you that idea. The only thing I was
> >trying to say was that a philosophy which maintains that you can't
> >reach absolute truth about the world through philosophy shouldn't be
> >comparing itself to a scientific approach which gets to the truth of
> >things about scientific matters.
>
> comparison itself. The comparison is that our knowledge do not con-
> form to (real) things, but that things conform themselves to our
> knowledge. It's not the things that are central (like the earth was
> before copernic) but our mode of knowing them.
>
> Kant is very clear about the way his philosophy has to be understood:
> it is a *transcendental* philosophy and he defines "transcendental" as
> follows: "I apply the term transcendental to all knowledge which is
> not so much occupied with objects as with the mode of our cognition of
> these objects, so far as this mode of cognition is possible a priori."
>
> So Kants object is not the things themselves, but our way of dealing
> with them.
>
> The (wrong) notion that Kant could be seen as some kind of relativist
> has been planted in the philosophy by e.a. Lenin (being a realist
> rather than a materialist) who considered him simply as an idealist
> between idealists like Berkeley, Hegel (and others), denying all the
> substantial differences between Kant and those guys.
Any kind of idealism (transcendental or garden variety) is arguably
relativistic.
Second Lenin was a materialist (and a relativist), not a realist.
Thirdly, I see no basis for your conclusion that Lenin (and by extension the
Marxists) saw no substantial difference between Kant and Hegel etc. Marxism
is very much an attempt to produce a material version of Hegel's philosophy.
Marxists consciously rejected Kant's philosophy whilst embracing Hegel. That
does not denote an attitude of 'denial of substantive difference between
Hegel and Kant' etc..
>
>
> JH
> --
> http://www.france.diplomatie.fr/actu/articletxt.gb.asp?ART=29337
> http://www.rense.com/1.imagesE/newspeak.jpg
> http://members.rott.chello.nl/jhorikx/little-nemo.html
Varrius
"John Hernlund" <no....@no.spam.com> wrote in message
news:BAFF1B1E.84E%no....@no.spam.com...
Hume holds a view of simple ideas and impressions that requires the mind in
some sense to be constitutive of what is impressed (which is why I called
him a Rationalist).
Jos Horikx
And that is something I can't agree with. I sometimes think that
persons are more important than "systems", "names" or "phrases"
and in this respect I consider Kant and Hegel as more distinct from
each other than the notions of realism and idealism (that is, when I
assume that we agree on the point that we both call Kant an idealist)
One of the points that supports this point-of-view, is the notion that
Kantian philosophy (about nature and empirism) is, in my eyes, fully
compatible with the so-called scientific realism of the 20th century.
( The scientific realism, in my vocabulary, states that there exists
a real world that is outside the thinking subject and that is not
"generated" by that subject)
So (Kantian) idealism and (scientific) realism do touch each other, in
my opinion.
>Second Lenin was a materialist (and a relativist), not a realist.
Lenin says: "There is definitely no difference in principle between
the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, and there can be no such
difference". In my view of philosophy (and in that of Kant as well,
if I am not erroneous) that makes him a realist.
( http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/02.htm )
>Thirdly, I see no basis for your conclusion that Lenin (and by extension the
>Marxists) saw no substantial difference between Kant and Hegel etc.
The reasoning (in a higher level) of the piece of which the url is
given, is that *all* idealists are more or less relativistst
>Marxism
>is very much an attempt to produce a material version of Hegel's philosophy.
>Marxists consciously rejected Kant's philosophy whilst embracing Hegel.
Well, in fact Marx embraced Hegels "dialectic" that's not quite the
same. But it is just that combination of realism (though they more or
less equated "materialism" and "realism" themselves) and (Hegelian)
dialectic that really can't be seen as a very lucky one.
(What was wrong with classical dialectic in the first place?)
> That
>does not denote an attitude of 'denial of substantive difference between
>Hegel and Kant' etc..
The difference I was denying, concerned their idealism, I was not
referring to the sphere of (the new-made) dialectic.
Jos Horikx
And that is something I can't agree with. I sometimes think that
persons are more important than "systems", "names" or "phrases"
and in this respect I consider Kant and Hegel as more distinct from
each other than the notions of realism and idealism (that is, when I
assume that we agree on the point that we both call Kant an idealist)
One of the points that supports this point-of-view, is the notion that
Kantian philosophy (about nature and empirism) is, in my eyes, fully
compatible with the so-called scientific realism of the 20th century.
( The scientific realism, in my vocabulary, states that there exists
a real world that is outside the thinking subject and that is not
"generated" by that subject)
So (Kantian) idealism and (scientific) realism do touch each other, in
my opinion.
>Second Lenin was a materialist (and a relativist), not a realist.
Lenin says: "There is definitely no difference in principle between
the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, and there can be no such
difference". In my view of philosophy (and in that of Kant as well,
if I am not erroneous) that makes him a realist.
( http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/02.htm )
>Thirdly, I see no basis for your conclusion that Lenin (and by extension the
>Marxists) saw no substantial difference between Kant and Hegel etc.
The reasoning (in a higher level) of the piece of which the url is
given, is that *all* idealists are more or less relativistst
>Marxism
>is very much an attempt to produce a material version of Hegel's philosophy.
>Marxists consciously rejected Kant's philosophy whilst embracing Hegel.
Well, in fact Marx embraced Hegels "dialectic" that's not quite the
same. But it is just that combination of realism (though they more or
less equated "materialism" and "realism" themselves) and (Hegelian)
dialectic that really can't be seen as a very lucky one.
(What was wrong with classical dialectic in the first place?)
> That
>does not denote an attitude of 'denial of substantive difference between
>Hegel and Kant' etc..
The difference that I said Lenin was denying, concerned their
idealism, I was not referring to the his opinions in the sphere of
(the new-made) dialectic.
Varrius
Still, Kant and Hegel are both idealists and if we were to critique them
from the perspective of direct realism, they would both commit more or less
the same error.
> One of the points that supports this point-of-view, is the notion that
> Kantian philosophy (about nature and empirism) is, in my eyes, fully
> compatible with the so-called scientific realism of the 20th century.
I would think that scientific realism holds that there is an independent
world capable of being discovered by us... I don''t think this is
compatiable with Kant.
> ( The scientific realism, in my vocabulary, states that there exists
> a real world that is outside the thinking subject and that is not
> "generated" by that subject)
ah, if space and time are ideal then they are in some sense 'in the mind'
(ideal). What does this have to do with the real (noumenal) world?
I would consider that a basic tenent of idealism is 'generation' (in some
sense) of the world by the mind.
> So (Kantian) idealism and (scientific) realism do touch each other, in
> my opinion.
>
> >Second Lenin was a materialist (and a relativist), not a realist.
>
> Lenin says: "There is definitely no difference in principle between
> the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, and there can be no such
> difference". In my view of philosophy (and in that of Kant as well,
> if I am not erroneous) that makes him a realist.
> ( http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/02.htm )
(in *that* book) Lenin specifically disavows the term 'realism' as something
that has been hijacked by positivists and idealists so care is needed in
delineating his precise philosophical school (though we could broadly call
him a realist, yes)
> >Thirdly, I see no basis for your conclusion that Lenin (and by extension
the
> >Marxists) saw no substantial difference between Kant and Hegel etc.
>
> The reasoning (in a higher level) of the piece of which the url is
> given, is that *all* idealists are more or less relativistst
Lenin has no problem with the notion of relative truths- so if idealists are
''more or less relativists'', this would not (for Lenin) be an objection to
idealism.
> >Marxism
> >is very much an attempt to produce a material version of Hegel's
philosophy.
> >Marxists consciously rejected Kant's philosophy whilst embracing Hegel.
>
> Well, in fact Marx embraced Hegels "dialectic" that's not quite the
> same.
In fact Lenin said that to understand Marxism one would need to fully digest
Hegel's logic- because Marxism is fundamentally a synthesis of Feuerbach
(the christian materialist) and Hegel.
>But it is just that combination of realism (though they more or
> less equated "materialism" and "realism" themselves) and (Hegelian)
> dialectic that really can't be seen as a very lucky one.
Marxists didn't see it as a combination, they saw their philosophy as an
inversion of the Hegelian dialectic- from the idea creating the world to the
world creating the idea.
> (What was wrong with classical dialectic in the first place?)
For the Marxists it was it's idealism...
Jos Horikx
wrote:
Some lines further you say, correctly (on the term 'realism') :
"so care is needed in delineating his precise philosophical school"
The same applies to the term 'idealism'. Nevertheless, what you
say about the point of view of direct realism is more or less void
because of two things: first there are no real realists left, and
secondly: the same thing holds for *all* non-realists. But my own
point (thirdly that is) remains: where a canyon divides Kantian and
Hegelian idealism, there is only a thin line between (nowadays,
scientific) realism and (Kantian) idealism
>> One of the points that supports this point-of-view, is the notion that
>> Kantian philosophy (about nature and empirism) is, in my eyes, fully
>> compatible with the so-called scientific realism of the 20th century.
>I would think that scientific realism holds that there is an independent
>world capable of being discovered by us... I don''t think this is
>compatiable with Kant.
Why not? Kants philosophy can well be interpreted as a good marriage
between empirism and rationalism...
>> ( The scientific realism, in my vocabulary, states that there exists
>> a real world that is outside the thinking subject and that is not
>> "generated" by that subject)
>ah, if space and time are ideal then they are in some sense 'in the mind'
>(ideal). What does this have to do with the real (noumenal) world?
Space and time are (in Kants view) pure forms of sensual understanding
("reine Formen sinnlicher Anschauung") and these are neccesary to
place the "things" (Gegenstände) in
>I would consider that a basic tenent of idealism is 'generation' (in some
>sense) of the world by the mind.
Kant is also an empirist. His philosophy was a transcendental one.
This doesn't imply he refutes empirism. There is a real world
"outside" and this is no contradiction with transcendental philosophy,
as I see it. Once again Kant himself: "I apply the term transcendental
to all knowledge which is not so much occupied with objects as with
the mode of our cognition of these objects, so far as this mode of
cognition is possible a priori."
>> So (Kantian) idealism and (scientific) realism do touch each other, in
>> my opinion.
>>>Second Lenin was a materialist (and a relativist), not a realist.
>> Lenin says: "There is definitely no difference in principle between
>> the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, and there can be no such
>> difference". In my view of philosophy (and in that of Kant as well,
>> if I am not erroneous) that makes him a realist.
>> ( http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/02.htm )
>(in *that* book) Lenin specifically disavows the term 'realism' as something
>that has been hijacked by positivists and idealists so care is needed in
>delineating his precise philosophical school (though we could broadly call
>him a realist, yes)
Hmm, earlier you called him a "relativist" as well. How is that
compatible with this realism of his?
>>>Thirdly, I see no basis for your conclusion that Lenin (and by extension the
>>>Marxists) saw no substantial difference between Kant and Hegel etc.
>> The reasoning (in a higher level) of the piece of which the url is
>> given, is that *all* idealists are more or less relativistst
>Lenin has no problem with the notion of relative truths- so if idealists are
>''more or less relativists'', this would not (for Lenin) be an objection to
>idealism.
Lenin says: "Thus the entire school of Feuerbach, Marx and Engels
turned from Kant to the Left, to a complete rejection of all idealism
and of all agnosticism". He wrote this in chapter 4 of the same work
as above (see the url). It's subtitle is: "The Philosophical Idealists
As Comrades-In-Arms And Successors Of Empirio-Criticism". What
do you suggest, that Lenin rejected Marx, Feuerbach and Engels, or
that they didn't reject idealism because of its (supposed) relativism
or agnosticisn?
>>>Marxism
>>>is very much an attempt to produce a material version of Hegel's philosophy.
>>>Marxists consciously rejected Kant's philosophy whilst embracing Hegel.
>> Well, in fact Marx embraced Hegels "dialectic" that's not quite the
>> same.
>In fact Lenin said that to understand Marxism one would need to fully digest
>Hegel's logic- because Marxism is fundamentally a synthesis of Feuerbach
>(the christian materialist) and Hegel.
Yes, and its a synthesis only forsofar its logic is non-idealistic
(from Marx'point of view). They liked Hegel a bit because of his
dialectic but they appreciated Kant a bit (but not much) because they
considered his "thing in itself" as an accommodating to materialism
(again, from Marx' point of view)
>>But it is just that combination of realism (though they more or
>> less equated "materialism" and "realism" themselves) and (Hegelian)
>> dialectic that really can't be seen as a very lucky one.
>Marxists didn't see it as a combination, they saw their philosophy as an
>inversion of the Hegelian dialectic- from the idea creating the world to the
>world creating the idea.
>> (What was wrong with classical dialectic in the first place?)
>For the Marxists it was it's idealism...
Its difficult to accept this fully for Marx knew a lot about classical
materialism and he knew very well that those people used a normal
(classical) dialectic. At some place (chapter 1 of the same url )
Lenin suggests that the opposite of "dialectical" is "metaphysical"
(though he adds that it is meant in a Marxist sense of the term)
Varrius
That depends with how much precision we want to classify.
Nevertheless, what you
> say about the point of view of direct realism is more or less void
> because of two things:
>first there are no real realists left,
This is just not true.
> and
> secondly: the same thing holds for *all* non-realists. But my own
> point (thirdly that is) remains: where a canyon divides Kantian and
> Hegelian idealism, there is only a thin line between (nowadays,
> scientific) realism and (Kantian) idealism
A point which you have failed to elucidate.
> >> One of the points that supports this point-of-view, is the notion that
> >> Kantian philosophy (about nature and empirism) is, in my eyes, fully
> >> compatible with the so-called scientific realism of the 20th century.
>
> >I would think that scientific realism holds that there is an independent
> >world capable of being discovered by us... I don''t think this is
> >compatiable with Kant.
>
> Why not? Kants philosophy can well be interpreted as a good marriage
> between empirism and rationalism...
>
> >> ( The scientific realism, in my vocabulary, states that there exists
> >> a real world that is outside the thinking subject and that is not
> >> "generated" by that subject)
>
> >ah, if space and time are ideal then they are in some sense 'in the mind'
> >(ideal). What does this have to do with the real (noumenal) world?
>
> Space and time are (in Kants view) pure forms of sensual understanding
> ("reine Formen sinnlicher Anschauung") and these are neccesary to
> place the "things" (Gegenstände) in
Yes and this makes space and time subjective to human experience. i.e.
KAnt makes space and time part of the mind, not part of the world.
> >I would consider that a basic tenent of idealism is 'generation' (in some
> >sense) of the world by the mind.
>
> Kant is also an empirist.
Kant is a rationalist, as can be seen by his need to draw incommensurable
classifications.
> His philosophy was a transcendental one.
> This doesn't imply he refutes empirism.
Insofar as empiricism rejects the possibility of substantive knowledge a
priori Kant cannot be an empiricist.
> There is a real world "outside" and this is no contradiction with
transcendental philosophy,
> as I see it. Once again Kant himself: "I apply the term transcendental
> to all knowledge which is not so much occupied with objects as with
> the mode of our cognition of these objects, so far as this mode of
> cognition is possible a priori."
But for Kant the real world is *unconditioned*. Kant's empirical world is
*conditioned*.
> >> So (Kantian) idealism and (scientific) realism do touch each other, in
> >> my opinion.
>
> >>>Second Lenin was a materialist (and a relativist), not a realist.
>
> >> Lenin says: "There is definitely no difference in principle between
> >> the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, and there can be no such
> >> difference". In my view of philosophy (and in that of Kant as well,
> >> if I am not erroneous) that makes him a realist.
> >> ( http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/02.htm )
>
> >(in *that* book) Lenin specifically disavows the term 'realism' as
something
> >that has been hijacked by positivists and idealists so care is needed in
> >delineating his precise philosophical school (though we could broadly
call
> >him a realist, yes)
>
> Hmm, earlier you called him a "relativist" as well. How is that
> compatible with this realism of his?
Lenin's relativism is tied in to his acceptance of the Hegelian dialectic-
i.e. there is one absolute (complete) truth and all other truths are only
true relative to the absolute.
> >>>Thirdly, I see no basis for your conclusion that Lenin (and by
extension the
> >>>Marxists) saw no substantial difference between Kant and Hegel etc.
>
> >> The reasoning (in a higher level) of the piece of which the url is
> >> given, is that *all* idealists are more or less relativistst
>
> >Lenin has no problem with the notion of relative truths- so if idealists
are
> >''more or less relativists'', this would not (for Lenin) be an objection
to
> >idealism.
>
> Lenin says: "Thus the entire school of Feuerbach, Marx and Engels
> turned from Kant to the Left, to a complete rejection of all idealism
> and of all agnosticism". He wrote this in chapter 4 of the same work
> as above (see the url). It's subtitle is: "The Philosophical Idealists
> As Comrades-In-Arms And Successors Of Empirio-Criticism". What
> do you suggest, that Lenin rejected Marx, Feuerbach and Engels, or
> that they didn't reject idealism because of its (supposed) relativism
> or agnosticisn?
I suggest only that they rejected idealism. They 'turned Hegel on his head'-
but that does not constitute a rejection of Hegel.
> >>>Marxism
> >>>is very much an attempt to produce a material version of Hegel's
philosophy.
> >>>Marxists consciously rejected Kant's philosophy whilst embracing Hegel.
>
> >> Well, in fact Marx embraced Hegels "dialectic" that's not quite the
> >> same.
>
> >In fact Lenin said that to understand Marxism one would need to fully
digest
> >Hegel's logic- because Marxism is fundamentally a synthesis of Feuerbach
> >(the christian materialist) and Hegel.
>
> Yes, and its a synthesis only forsofar its logic is non-idealistic
> (from Marx'point of view). They liked Hegel a bit because of his
> dialectic but they appreciated Kant a bit (but not much) because they
> considered his "thing in itself" as an accommodating to materialism
> (again, from Marx' point of view)
"...the eternally unknowable thing in itself... the bit of Kant that least
merited preservation"
(Engels, Anti-Duhring)
> >>But it is just that combination of realism (though they more or
> >> less equated "materialism" and "realism" themselves) and (Hegelian)
> >> dialectic that really can't be seen as a very lucky one.
>
> >Marxists didn't see it as a combination, they saw their philosophy as an
> >inversion of the Hegelian dialectic- from the idea creating the world to
the
> >world creating the idea.
>
> >> (What was wrong with classical dialectic in the first place?)
>
> >For the Marxists it was it's idealism...
>
> Its difficult to accept this fully for Marx knew a lot about classical
> materialism
Marx knew Feuerbach's materialsim, which one could hardly call 'classical'
>and he knew very well that those people used a normal
> (classical) dialectic. At some place (chapter 1 of the same url )
> Lenin suggests that the opposite of "dialectical" is "metaphysical"
> (though he adds that it is meant in a Marxist sense of the term)
Presumably meaning something like the dialectic is tied to the world and its
processes in a way that metaphysics is not...
Jos Horikx
wrote:
On Fri, 13 Jun 2003 09:55:05 +1000, "Varrius" <var...@yahoo.com.au>
wrote:
(I've cut a lot because of the length of the reply)
...
>> Some lines further you say, correctly (on the term 'realism') :
>> "so care is needed in delineating his precise philosophical school"
>> The same applies to the term 'idealism'.
>That depends with how much precision we want to classify.
Both realism and idealism ars schools of thought, and the content of
both the terms have changed during the centuries.
> Nevertheless, what you
>> say about the point of view of direct realism is more or less void
>> because of two things:
>>first there are no real realists left,
>This is just not true.
Ehh, could you name me one serious guy that competes with Kant?
>> and
>> secondly: the same thing holds for *all* non-realists. But my own
>> point (thirdly that is) remains: where a canyon divides Kantian and
>> Hegelian idealism, there is only a thin line between (nowadays,
>> scientific) realism and (Kantian) idealism
>A point which you have failed to elucidate.
Nowadays (scientific) realism is to be considered as some mixture of
modern (Kant was a modernist) realism and idealism. Think of
particle-things (quarks, spin, etc.): it's both: realism and idealism.
...
>> Space and time are (in Kants view) pure forms of sensual understanding
>> ("reine Formen sinnlicher Anschauung") and these are neccesary to
>> place the "things" (Gegenstände) in
>Yes and this makes space and time subjective to human experience. i.e.
>KAnt makes space and time part of the mind, not part of the world.
Kants uses space and time to elucidate his view about things, not the
other way around.He is not talking about the things themselves, but
about our possibillities to cognite them. He is not talking about
space and time as realistic objects because he wasn't a realist but an
idealist.
>> >I would consider that a basic tenent of idealism is 'generation' (in some
>> >sense) of the world by the mind.
>> Kant is also an empirist.
>Kant is a rationalist, as can be seen by his need to draw incommensurable
>classifications.
For this event I consulted (e.a.) a general accepted body of knowledge
in your own language (not mine), the Encyclopedia Britannica. It says:
"Kant was the foremost thinker of the Enlightenment and one of the
greatest philosophers of all time. In him were subsumed new trends
that had begun with the Rationalism (stressing reason) of René
Descartes and the Empiricism (stressing experience) of Francis Bacon."
But once again, his object was transcendental philosophy, beyond
that, in daily life, as a scientist, he was just a normal empirist as
anyone else. (There are some astronomical theories called after Kant,
e.g. the Kant-Laplace model of the solar system)
>> His philosophy was a transcendental one.
>> This doesn't imply he refutes empirism.
>Insofar as empiricism rejects the possibility of substantive knowledge a
>priori Kant cannot be an empiricist.
But Kant has to be seen as a essentialist (well, sort of, that is),
provided that his "essences" are not to be found in the things (as in
Plato's time) but in the human distinctions between those things. He
makes a radical distinction between the rational and empirical
thinking saying: " First, as concerns the sources of metaphysical
cognition, its very concept implies that they cannot be empirical. Its
principles (including not only its maxims but its basic notions) must
never be derived from experience. It must not be physical but
metaphysical knowledge, viz., knowledge lying beyond experience. It
can therefore have for its basis neither external experience, which is
the source of physics proper, nor internal, which is the basis of
empirical psychology. It is therefore a priori knowledge, coming from
pure Understanding and pure Reason." (Prolegomena)
He defines his terms there. He doesn't defy empirism.
>> There is a real world "outside" and this is no contradiction with
>> transcendental >>philosophy, as I see it. Once again Kant himself:
>> "I apply the term transcendental to all knowledge which is not so
>> much occupied with objects as with the mode of our cognition of
>> these objects, so far as this mode of cognition is possible a priori."
>But for Kant the real world is *unconditioned*. Kant's empirical world is
>*conditioned*.
So what? Kant isn't a realist. So why (as a philosopher) bother about
some lack of one-one correspondence between the "real" world and the
known world? (that is what Kant should do as a scientist, bothering
about a lack of correspondence between phenomina and his thoughts
about them)
...
>Lenin's relativism is tied in to his acceptance of the Hegelian dialectic-
>i.e. there is one absolute (complete) truth and all other truths are only
>true relative to the absolute.
Hmm, sounds not very relativistic in my ears...
...
>> Lenin says: "Thus the entire school of Feuerbach, Marx and Engels
>> turned from Kant to the Left, to a complete rejection of all idealism
>> and of all agnosticism". He wrote this in chapter 4 of the same work
>> as above (see the url). It's subtitle is: "The Philosophical Idealists
>> As Comrades-In-Arms And Successors Of Empirio-Criticism". What
>> do you suggest, that Lenin rejected Marx, Feuerbach and Engels, or
>> that they didn't reject idealism because of its (supposed) relativism
>> or agnosticisn?
>I suggest only that they rejected idealism. They 'turned Hegel on his head'-
>but that does not constitute a rejection of Hegel.
But Hegel *was* a (absolute) idealist. So they have rejected Hegel in
the same way as they rejected Kant. They "turned Hegel on his head"
means that they refuted his idealism and conserved his dialectical
approach.(But turning a house or a van *twice* around doesnt place the
things back in order. The first "revolution" was Hegel after Kant. A
collegue of Hegel, not one of the least, wrote a satirical poem on
Hegels philosophy. It's called "Der Zauberlehrling" On one page both
the German and English texts are presented:
http://www.fln.vcu.edu/goethe/zauber_dual.html )
>>>>>Marxism
>>>>>is very much an attempt to produce a material version of Hegel's philosophy.
>>>>>Marxists consciously rejected Kant's philosophy whilst embracing Hegel.
>>>> Well, in fact Marx embraced Hegels "dialectic" that's not quite the
>>>> same.
>>>In fact Lenin said that to understand Marxism one would need to fully digest
>>>Hegel's logic- because Marxism is fundamentally a synthesis of Feuerbach
>>>(the christian materialist) and Hegel.
>> Yes, and its a synthesis only forsofar its logic is non-idealistic
>> (from Marx'point of view). They liked Hegel a bit because of his
>> dialectic but they appreciated Kant a bit (but not much) because they
>> considered his "thing in itself" as an accommodating to materialism
>> (again, from Marx' point of view)
>"...the eternally unknowable thing in itself... the bit of Kant that least
>merited preservation"
>(Engels, Anti-Duhring)
Can you present me a phrase of Engels where he shows that he
understands both, the transcendental nature of Kants thought and the
fact that, by consequence, this distinguishes him (Kant) a lot from
other idealists?
>>>>But it is just that combination of realism (though they more or
>>>> less equated "materialism" and "realism" themselves) and (Hegelian)
>>>> dialectic that really can't be seen as a very lucky one.
>>>Marxists didn't see it as a combination, they saw their philosophy as an
>>>inversion of the Hegelian dialectic- from the idea creating the world to the
>>>world creating the idea.
>>>> (What was wrong with classical dialectic in the first place?)
>>>For the Marxists it was it's idealism...
>> Its difficult to accept this fully for Marx knew a lot about classical
>> materialism
>Marx knew Feuerbach's materialsim, which one could hardly call 'classical
Marx intellectual foundation rests on his study of materialists like
Democrites and the differences with Epicurus (His doktor theses was:
"The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of
Nature."). And, sure, of course Marx knew a lot also about (in his
time) contempory thought as well. That is nothing new to me...
>>and he knew very well that those people used a normal
>> (classical) dialectic. At some place (chapter 1 of the same url )
>> Lenin suggests that the opposite of "dialectical" is "metaphysical"
>> (though he adds that it is meant in a Marxist sense of the term)
>Presumably meaning something like the dialectic is tied to the world and its
>processes in a way that metaphysics is not...
Well, and just showing in this way that they didn't really understand
the transcendental nature of Kants philosophy.
When talking about metaphysics, Kant said: "It must not be physical
but metaphysical knowledge" The same accounts, of course, to all other
philosophy that has not the physics itself as his first or main object
Varrius
> > Nevertheless, what you
> >> say about the point of view of direct realism is more or less void
> >> because of two things:
> >>first there are no real realists left,
>
> >This is just not true.
>
> Ehh, could you name me one serious guy that competes with Kant?
Hmmm, argumentum ad verecundiam here perhaps?
Hegel, Marx, Sartre, Heidegger, Bacon, Hume, Locke, Berkley, ...
> >> and
> >> secondly: the same thing holds for *all* non-realists. But my own
> >> point (thirdly that is) remains: where a canyon divides Kantian and
> >> Hegelian idealism, there is only a thin line between (nowadays,
> >> scientific) realism and (Kantian) idealism
>
> >A point which you have failed to elucidate.
>
> Nowadays (scientific) realism is to be considered as some mixture of
> modern (Kant was a modernist) realism and idealism. Think of
> particle-things (quarks, spin, etc.): it's both: realism and idealism.
Uh, modern physics (at least the popular copenhagen interpretation) is
berkleyian idealism, pure and simple.
> ...
>
> >> Space and time are (in Kants view) pure forms of sensual understanding
> >> ("reine Formen sinnlicher Anschauung") and these are neccesary to
> >> place the "things" (Gegenstände) in
>
> >Yes and this makes space and time subjective to human experience. i.e.
> >KAnt makes space and time part of the mind, not part of the world.
>
> Kants uses space and time to elucidate his view about things, not the
> other way around.He is not talking about the things themselves, but
> about our possibillities to cognite them. He is not talking about
> space and time as realistic objects because he wasn't a realist but an
> idealist.
Yes.
However Kant's view is incompatiable with a naturalistic account of science.
> >> >I would consider that a basic tenent of idealism is 'generation' (in
some
> >> >sense) of the world by the mind.
>
> >> Kant is also an empirist.
>
> >Kant is a rationalist, as can be seen by his need to draw incommensurable
> >classifications.
>
> For this event I consulted (e.a.) a general accepted body of knowledge
> in your own language (not mine), the Encyclopedia Britannica. It says:
> "Kant was the foremost thinker of the Enlightenment and one of the
> greatest philosophers of all time. In him were subsumed new trends
> that had begun with the Rationalism (stressing reason) of René
> Descartes and the Empiricism (stressing experience) of Francis Bacon."
Yes, I understand Kant's programme.
However he never shook off certain rationalist dogma's e.g. that things
cannot be both distinct and connected.- this is found in both the so called
rationalists (e.g. leibniz) as well empiricists (see especially Hume's
treatise).
*I* consider him properly classified as a rationalist.
> But once again, his object was transcendental philosophy, beyond
> that, in daily life, as a scientist, he was just a normal empirist as
> anyone else. (There are some astronomical theories called after Kant,
> e.g. the Kant-Laplace model of the solar system)
Yes, and if we followed the Kantian model of philosophy in science, certain
scientific theories would never have got off the ground- e.g. quantum
mechanics violates the laws of Kant's Newtonian universe.
> >> His philosophy was a transcendental one.
> >> This doesn't imply he refutes empirism.
>
> >Insofar as empiricism rejects the possibility of substantive knowledge a
> >priori Kant cannot be an empiricist.
>
> But Kant has to be seen as a essentialist (well, sort of, that is),
> provided that his "essences" are not to be found in the things (as in
> Plato's time) but in the human distinctions between those things. He
> makes a radical distinction between the rational and empirical
> thinking saying: " First, as concerns the sources of metaphysical
> cognition, its very concept implies that they cannot be empirical. Its
> principles (including not only its maxims but its basic notions) must
> never be derived from experience. It must not be physical but
> metaphysical knowledge, viz., knowledge lying beyond experience. It
> can therefore have for its basis neither external experience, which is
> the source of physics proper, nor internal, which is the basis of
> empirical psychology. It is therefore a priori knowledge, coming from
> pure Understanding and pure Reason." (Prolegomena)
>
> He defines his terms there. He doesn't defy empirism.
To which the empiricist replies-''ALL our knowledge is derived from
experience''
>
> >> There is a real world "outside" and this is no contradiction with
> >> transcendental >>philosophy, as I see it. Once again Kant himself:
> >> "I apply the term transcendental to all knowledge which is not so
> >> much occupied with objects as with the mode of our cognition of
> >> these objects, so far as this mode of cognition is possible a priori."
>
> >But for Kant the real world is *unconditioned*. Kant's empirical world is
> >*conditioned*.
>
> So what? Kant isn't a realist.
Yes, Kant isn't a realist.
> So why (as a philosopher) bother about
> some lack of one-one correspondence between the "real" world and the
> known world?
As a philosopher one can believe anything, no matter how tenuous its
connexion to reality.
> (that is what Kant should do as a scientist, bothering
> about a lack of correspondence between phenomina and his thoughts
> about them)
Say humans evolved in a world full of creatures and things. Could such an
evolution be wholly without reference to the things that *actually* exist in
the world?
> ...
>
> >Lenin's relativism is tied in to his acceptance of the Hegelian
dialectic-
> >i.e. there is one absolute (complete) truth and all other truths are only
> >true relative to the absolute.
>
> Hmm, sounds not very relativistic in my ears...
Ok.
Engels in Feuerbach:
"Truth, which it is the province of a philosophy to recognise, was no
longer, according to Hegel, a collection of ready-made dogmatic statements,
which once discoved must be thoroughly learned; truth lay now in the process
of knowledge itself, in the long historical development of learning, which
climbs from lower to ever higher heights of knowledge, without ever reaching
the point of so-called absolute truth, where it can go no further, where it
has nothing more to look forward to, except to fold its hands in its lap and
contemplate the absolute truth already gained"
and further dialectic philosophy has
"destroyed all theories of absolute truth, and of an absolute state of
humanity corresponding with them. In the face of it nothing final, absolute
or sacred exists..."
> ...
>
> >> Lenin says: "Thus the entire school of Feuerbach, Marx and Engels
> >> turned from Kant to the Left, to a complete rejection of all idealism
> >> and of all agnosticism". He wrote this in chapter 4 of the same work
> >> as above (see the url). It's subtitle is: "The Philosophical Idealists
> >> As Comrades-In-Arms And Successors Of Empirio-Criticism". What
> >> do you suggest, that Lenin rejected Marx, Feuerbach and Engels, or
> >> that they didn't reject idealism because of its (supposed) relativism
> >> or agnosticisn?
>
> >I suggest only that they rejected idealism. They 'turned Hegel on his
head'-
> >but that does not constitute a rejection of Hegel.
>
> But Hegel *was* a (absolute) idealist. So they have rejected Hegel in
> the same way as they rejected Kant. They "turned Hegel on his head"
> means that they refuted his idealism and conserved his dialectical
> approach.
No, Marx accepted Hegel's method.
He rejected his system.
I doubt it.
However this was not the question.
In any case its rejection is implicit.
> >>>>But it is just that combination of realism (though they more or
> >>>> less equated "materialism" and "realism" themselves) and (Hegelian)
> >>>> dialectic that really can't be seen as a very lucky one.
>
> >>>Marxists didn't see it as a combination, they saw their philosophy as
an
> >>>inversion of the Hegelian dialectic- from the idea creating the world
to the
> >>>world creating the idea.
>
> >>>> (What was wrong with classical dialectic in the first place?)
>
> >>>For the Marxists it was it's idealism...
>
> >> Its difficult to accept this fully for Marx knew a lot about classical
> >> materialism
>
> >Marx knew Feuerbach's materialsim, which one could hardly call 'classical
>
> Marx intellectual foundation rests on his study of materialists like
> Democrites and the differences with Epicurus (His doktor theses was:
> "The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of
> Nature."). And, sure, of course Marx knew a lot also about (in his
> time) contempory thought as well. That is nothing new to me...
THen you will recall theses of Feuerbach...
>
> >>and he knew very well that those people used a normal
> >> (classical) dialectic. At some place (chapter 1 of the same url )
> >> Lenin suggests that the opposite of "dialectical" is "metaphysical"
> >> (though he adds that it is meant in a Marxist sense of the term)
>
> >Presumably meaning something like the dialectic is tied to the world and
its
> >processes in a way that metaphysics is not...
>
> Well, and just showing in this way that they didn't really understand
> the transcendental nature of Kants philosophy.
Marx's dialectical method is completely at odds with Kant.
Jos Horikx
wrote:
On Mon, 16 Jun 2003 20:44:16 +1000, "Varrius" <var...@yahoo.com.au>
wrote:
>[snip]
>
>>>> Nevertheless, what you
>>>> say about the point of view of direct realism is more or less void
>>>> because of two things:
>>>>first there are no real realists left,
>> >This is just not true.
>> Ehh, could you name me one serious guy that competes with Kant?
>Hmmm, argumentum ad verecundiam here perhaps?
>Hegel, Marx, Sartre, Heidegger, Bacon, Hume, Locke, Berkley, ...
Hegel and Berkeley "realists"?? Maybe the only one that could be
called a realist (in Kantian vocabulary) is Marx. That is how this
(part of the) thread started in the first place. Kants definition of a
realist is at follows:
" We have sufficiently proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic that
everything intuited in space or time, and therefore all objects of
any experience possible to us, are nothing but appearances, that
is, mere representations, which, in the manner in which they are
represented, as extended beings, or as series of alterations, have
no independent existence outside our thoughts. This doctrine I
entitle transcendental idealism. The realist, in the
transcendental meaning of this term, treats these modifications of
our sensibility as self-subsistent things, that is, treats mere
representations as things in themselves."
>>>> and
>>>> secondly: the same thing holds for *all* non-realists. But my own
>>>> point (thirdly that is) remains: where a canyon divides Kantian and
>>>> Hegelian idealism, there is only a thin line between (nowadays,
>>>> scientific) realism and (Kantian) idealism
>>>A point which you have failed to elucidate.
>> Nowadays (scientific) realism is to be considered as some mixture of
>> modern (Kant was a modernist) realism and idealism. Think of
>> particle-things (quarks, spin, etc.): it's both: realism and idealism.
>Uh, modern physics (at least the popular copenhagen interpretation) is
>berkleyian idealism, pure and simple.
No, they also treats the electron etc as a thing itself, so becoming
realists in Kantian terms.
>>>> Space and time are (in Kants view) pure forms of sensual understanding
>>>> ("reine Formen sinnlicher Anschauung") and these are neccesary to
>>>> place the "things" (Gegenstände) in
>>>Yes and this makes space and time subjective to human experience. i.e.
>>>KAnt makes space and time part of the mind, not part of the world.
>> Kants uses space and time to elucidate his view about things, not the
>> other way around.He is not talking about the things themselves, but
>> about our possibillities to cognite them. He is not talking about
>> space and time as realistic objects because he wasn't a realist but an
>> idealist.
>Yes.
>However Kant's view is incompatiable with a naturalistic account of science.
Forsofar naturalism co-incides with realism.
>>>>>I would consider that a basic tenent of idealism is 'generation' (in some
>>>>>sense) of the world by the mind.
>>>> Kant is also an empirist.
>>>Kant is a rationalist, as can be seen by his need to draw incommensurable
>>>classifications.
>> For this event I consulted (e.a.) a general accepted body of knowledge
>> in your own language (not mine), the Encyclopedia Britannica. It says:
>> "Kant was the foremost thinker of the Enlightenment and one of the
>> greatest philosophers of all time. In him were subsumed new trends
>> that had begun with the Rationalism (stressing reason) of René
>> Descartes and the Empiricism (stressing experience) of Francis Bacon."
>Yes, I understand Kant's programme.
>However he never shook off certain rationalist dogma's e.g. that things
>cannot be both distinct and connected.- this is found in both the so called
>rationalists (e.g. leibniz) as well empiricists (see especially Hume's
>treatise).
What are you talking about? you say "things": do you mean things in
themselves or do you mean the phenomena?
>*I* consider him properly classified as a rationalist.
As I said before: Kant could be seen as an essentialist (well, sort
of, that is), provided that his "essences" are not to be found in the
things (as in Plato's time) but in the human distinctions between
those things.
One of his first distinctions is that of the two exclusive views:
empirism and rationalism. Why are those two exclusive? because
empirism states that all knowledge comes from experience and
rationalism says that reason is at the basis of all ideas (in fact,
modern rationalism was a reaction on religious thinking that stated
that knowledge was given to us by revelation, via the Bible) Kant
liked both the ideas, but he saw the contradiction. That is one of his
central themes on a higher level.
>> But once again, his object was transcendental philosophy, beyond
>> that, in daily life, as a scientist, he was just a normal empirist as
>> anyone else. (There are some astronomical theories called after Kant,
>> e.g. the Kant-Laplace model of the solar system)
>Yes, and if we followed the Kantian model of philosophy in science, certain
>scientific theories would never have got off the ground- e.g. quantum
>mechanics violates the laws of Kant's Newtonian universe.
I am afraid that there is some kind of misjudgment involved here. The
critic of someone as Werner Heisenberg on Kant is e.a. that Kants a
priori of causality doesn't appear to work anymore when quantum-
mechanics is in question. But what does Lenin say about causality? :
"...it must be clear that Engels does not admit even the shadow of a
doubt as to the existence of objective law, causality and necessity in
nature" and: "The recognition of objective law in nature and the re-
cognition that this law is reflected with approximate fidelity in the
mind of man is materialism" and last but not least (because he
referres to Kant): " ...The distinction between the Humean and the
Kantian theories of causality is only a secondary difference of
opinion between agnostics who are basically at one, viz., in their
denial of objective law in nature, and who thus inevitably condemn
themselves to idealist conclusions of one kind or another."
(Concerning Heisenbergs critic on Kant, I would answer that Kants
distinctiom between rationalism and empirism (and their reconnection
again) is more fundamental than the specific ways in which he gave
form to that rationalism, I mean the specific names of the categories
etc...)
>>>> His philosophy was a transcendental one.
>>>> This doesn't imply he refutes empirism.
>>>Insofar as empiricism rejects the possibility of substantive knowledge a
>>>priori Kant cannot be an empiricist.
>> But Kant has to be seen as a essentialist (well, sort of, that is),
>> provided that his "essences" are not to be found in the things (as in
>> Plato's time) but in the human distinctions between those things. He
>> makes a radical distinction between the rational and empirical
>> thinking saying: " First, as concerns the sources of metaphysical
>> cognition, its very concept implies that they cannot be empirical. Its
>> principles (including not only its maxims but its basic notions) must
>> never be derived from experience. It must not be physical but
>> metaphysical knowledge, viz., knowledge lying beyond experience. It
>> can therefore have for its basis neither external experience, which is
>> the source of physics proper, nor internal, which is the basis of
>> empirical psychology. It is therefore a priori knowledge, coming from
>> pure Understanding and pure Reason." (Prolegomena)
>> He defines his terms there. He doesn't defy empirism.
>To which the empiricist replies-''ALL our knowledge is derived from
>experience''
Sure, except of course someones knowledge from revelation ;-)
But honestly, how do you categorize mathematical knowledge in this
respect?
>>>> There is a real world "outside" and this is no contradiction with
>>>> transcendental >>philosophy, as I see it. Once again Kant himself:
>>>> "I apply the term transcendental to all knowledge which is not so
>>>> much occupied with objects as with the mode of our cognition of
>>>> these objects, so far as this mode of cognition is possible a priori."
>>>But for Kant the real world is *unconditioned*. Kant's empirical world is
>>>*conditioned*.
>> So what? Kant isn't a realist.
>Yes, Kant isn't a realist.
>> So why (as a philosopher) bother about
>> some lack of one-one correspondence between the "real" world and the
>> known world?
>As a philosopher one can believe anything, no matter how tenuous its
>connexion to reality.
That is an accusation that no-one can blame Kant for. (surely not if
one understands what "transcendental" means)
>> (that is what Kant should do as a scientist, bothering
>> about a lack of correspondence between phenomina and his thoughts
>> about them)
>Say humans evolved in a world full of creatures and things. Could such an
>evolution be wholly without reference to the things that *actually* exist in
>the world?
No, thats why Kant distinguises rationalism and empirism, and the
noumena and phenomena etc.
>>>Lenin's relativism is tied in to his acceptance of the Hegelian dialectic-
>>>i.e. there is one absolute (complete) truth and all other truths are only
>>>true relative to the absolute.
>> Hmm, sounds not very relativistic in my ears...
>Ok.
>Engels in Feuerbach:
>"Truth, which it is the province of a philosophy to recognise, was no
>longer, according to Hegel, a collection of ready-made dogmatic statements,
>which once discoved must be thoroughly learned; truth lay now in the process
>of knowledge itself, in the long historical development of learning, which
>climbs from lower to ever higher heights of knowledge, without ever reaching
>the point of so-called absolute truth, where it can go no further, where it
>has nothing more to look forward to, except to fold its hands in its lap and
>contemplate the absolute truth already gained"
>and further dialectic philosophy has
>"destroyed all theories of absolute truth, and of an absolute state of
>humanity corresponding with them. In the face of it nothing final, absolute
>or sacred exists..."
Sounds rather absolute again! ;-) But well, except the law of
causality than, that was final and objective, according to Lenin.
Remember?. But just that law was the central point of critique from
Heisenberg on Kant.
>>>> Lenin says: "Thus the entire school of Feuerbach, Marx and Engels
>>>> turned from Kant to the Left, to a complete rejection of all idealism
>>>> and of all agnosticism". He wrote this in chapter 4 of the same work
>>>> as above (see the url). It's subtitle is: "The Philosophical Idealists
>>>> As Comrades-In-Arms And Successors Of Empirio-Criticism". What
>>>> do you suggest, that Lenin rejected Marx, Feuerbach and Engels, or
>>>> that they didn't reject idealism because of its (supposed) relativism
>>>> or agnosticisn?
>>>I suggest only that they rejected idealism. They 'turned Hegel on his head'-
>>>but that does not constitute a rejection of Hegel.
>> But Hegel *was* a (absolute) idealist. So they have rejected Hegel in
>> the same way as they rejected Kant. They "turned Hegel on his head"
>> means that they refuted his idealism and conserved his dialectical
>> approach.
>No, Marx accepted Hegel's method.
>He rejected his system.
He accepted his dialectical "method" and rejected his idealistic
"system". Just what I said...
>>(But turning a house or a van *twice* around doesnt >place the
>> things back in order. The first "revolution" was Hegel after Kant. A
>> collegue of Hegel, not one of the least, wrote a satirical poem on
>> Hegels philosophy. It's called "Der Zauberlehrling" On one page both
>> the German and English texts are presented:
>> http://www.fln.vcu.edu/goethe/zauber_dual.html )
...
>> Can you present me a phrase of Engels where he shows that he
>> understands both, the transcendental nature of Kants thought and the
>> fact that, by consequence, this distinguishes him (Kant) a lot from
>> other idealists?
>I doubt it.
>However this was not the question.
>In any case its rejection is implicit.
And I don't like broccoli, that's for sure!
...
>> Marx intellectual foundation rests on his study of materialists like
>> Democrites and the differences with Epicurus (His doktor theses was:
>> "The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of
>> Nature."). And, sure, of course Marx knew a lot also about (in his
>> time) contempory thought as well. That is nothing new to me...
>THen you will recall theses of Feuerbach...
Is that your book of revelation?
>>>>and he knew very well that those people used a normal
>>>> (classical) dialectic. At some place (chapter 1 of the same url )
>>>> Lenin suggests that the opposite of "dialectical" is "metaphysical"
>>>> (though he adds that it is meant in a Marxist sense of the term)
>>>Presumably meaning something like the dialectic is tied to the world and its
>>>processes in a way that metaphysics is not...
>> Well, and just showing in this way that they didn't really understand
>> the transcendental nature of Kants philosophy.
>Marx's dialectical method is completely at odds with Kant.
Because he borrowed that part from Hegel (and we all do have our
opinions about Hegel, don't we?)
JH
Varrius
> On Mon, 16 Jun 2003 20:44:16 +1000, "Varrius" <var...@yahoo.com.au>
> wrote:
> On Mon, 16 Jun 2003 20:44:16 +1000, "Varrius" <var...@yahoo.com.au>
> wrote:
>
> >[snip]
> >
> >>>> Nevertheless, what you
> >>>> say about the point of view of direct realism is more or less void
> >>>> because of two things:
> >>>>first there are no real realists left,
>
> >> >This is just not true.
>
> >> Ehh, could you name me one serious guy that competes with Kant?
>
> >Hmmm, argumentum ad verecundiam here perhaps?
>
> >Hegel, Marx, Sartre, Heidegger, Bacon, Hume, Locke, Berkley, ...
>
> Hegel and Berkeley "realists"?? Maybe the only one that could be
> called a realist (in Kantian vocabulary) is Marx.
Ok, I am losing the thread of the argument- I thought you were asking for
'one serious guy' that competes- not one serious realist... ok
Alexander gave a realist spin to kant in his space, time and deity
Early Moore and Russell
Reid
James in 'radical empiricism'
Certain pre-socratics
Armstrong, Anderson- Australian Realism
J.J. Gibson
How do they treat it as a thing in itself?
See Hume, Treatise, Appendix
"If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being
connected together. But no connexions among distinct existences are ever
discoverable by human understanding. We only feel a connexion or
determination of the thought, to pass from one object to another."
(http://www.blackmask.com/books69c/trthnent.htm#1_14_7)
> >*I* consider him properly classified as a rationalist.
>
> As I said before: Kant could be seen as an essentialist (well, sort
> of, that is), provided that his "essences" are not to be found in the
> things (as in Plato's time) but in the human distinctions between
> those things.
>
> One of his first distinctions is that of the two exclusive views:
> empirism and rationalism. Why are those two exclusive? because
> empirism states that all knowledge comes from experience and
> rationalism says that reason is at the basis of all ideas (in fact,
> modern rationalism was a reaction on religious thinking that stated
> that knowledge was given to us by revelation, via the Bible) Kant
> liked both the ideas, but he saw the contradiction. That is one of his
> central themes on a higher level.
The distinction between rationalism and empiricism is not clear cut. Many of
the so called english empiricists inherited distinct lines of rationalist
thought.
> >> But once again, his object was transcendental philosophy, beyond
> >> that, in daily life, as a scientist, he was just a normal empirist as
> >> anyone else. (There are some astronomical theories called after Kant,
> >> e.g. the Kant-Laplace model of the solar system)
>
> >Yes, and if we followed the Kantian model of philosophy in science,
certain
> >scientific theories would never have got off the ground- e.g. quantum
> >mechanics violates the laws of Kant's Newtonian universe.
>
> I am afraid that there is some kind of misjudgment involved here. The
> critic of someone as Werner Heisenberg on Kant is e.a. that Kants a
> priori of causality doesn't appear to work anymore when quantum-
> mechanics is in question.
Erm, 'doesn't appear to work anymore' means goodbye to Kantian
epistemology...
> But what does Lenin say about causality? :
> "...it must be clear that Engels does not admit even the shadow of a
> doubt as to the existence of objective law, causality and necessity in
> nature" and: "The recognition of objective law in nature and the re-
> cognition that this law is reflected with approximate fidelity in the
> mind of man is materialism" and last but not least (because he
> referres to Kant): " ...The distinction between the Humean and the
> Kantian theories of causality is only a secondary difference of
> opinion between agnostics who are basically at one, viz., in their
> denial of objective law in nature, and who thus inevitably condemn
> themselves to idealist conclusions of one kind or another."
Well, I wouldn't agree with Lenin.
[snip]
(Have to read the rest later...)
HPO JURY = Malenor
wrote:
>"Jos Horikx" <jho...@chello.nl> wrote in message
>news:grfrevcogm9s210bs...@4ax.com...
>> I am afraid that there is some kind of misjudgment involved here. The
>> critic of someone as Werner Heisenberg on Kant is e.a. that Kants a
>> priori of causality doesn't appear to work anymore when quantum-
>> mechanics is in question.
>Erm, 'doesn't appear to work anymore' means goodbye to Kantian
>epistemology...
No, it means QM is faulty, particularly since it is only a scientific
theory and not a philosophy.
Robert J. Kolker
HPO JURY = Malenor wrote:
>> No, it means QM is faulty, particularly since it is only a scientific
> theory and not a philosophy.
Quantum Electrodynamics and the Standard Theory of fields and particles
are yet to be falsified experimentally. The biggest lack is a quantum
theory of gravity.
On the other hand, Kant went down in flames when non-euclidean geometry
was invented.
Bob Kolker
Robert ASF.
snipo
> On the other hand, Kant went down in flames when non-euclidean geometry
> was invented.
This really should be added to the FAQ:
One wonders what Kant would have thought of non- Euclidean geometry
First, you are implicitly linking Kant to Euclidean geometry when
clearly this is not the case. What is the case is that one school of post Kantian
thinkers made the link. Over time this has become something that was linked to
Kant...
I wrote this back on 2000-12-24
begin text
One of the trolls often posts that Kant fails because of his strong link
to Euclidian geometries. In fact Kant does not make such a link, though the
people who followed him later did do so. However reading in Beck's Early German
Philosophy, P. 447, Beck has some insight that is rather damaging to the troll's
claims.
Beck writes: "If Newton's empirically discovered law were different, space
would not be Euclidean. Other kinds of space are possible and a "a science of all
these possible kinds of space would undoubtedly be the highest enterprise which a
finite understanding could undertake in the field of geometry." (Thoughts on the
true estimation of living forces (tran Handyside P12, $10)
Beck then writes:
"...there is an irony in the fact that many philosophers think the existence of
non-Euclidean geometries is a fatal objection to the theory of the mature Kant."
Kant never went back to this idea he had when he was 23 years old...
End text
Just Thought I Should Mention It
Varrius
"HPO JURY = Malenor" <Mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:ma8uev8i6bf91qlu2...@4ax.com...
> On Tue, 17 Jun 2003 14:27:19 +1000, "Varrius" <var...@yahoo.com.au>
> wrote:
>
>
> >"Jos Horikx" <jho...@chello.nl> wrote in message
> >news:grfrevcogm9s210bs...@4ax.com...
>
> >> I am afraid that there is some kind of misjudgment involved here. The
> >> critic of someone as Werner Heisenberg on Kant is e.a. that Kants a
> >> priori of causality doesn't appear to work anymore when quantum-
> >> mechanics is in question.
>
> >Erm, 'doesn't appear to work anymore' means goodbye to Kantian
> >epistemology...
>
> No, it means QM is faulty, particularly since it is only a scientific
> theory and not a philosophy.
"Man as the minister and interpreter of nature does and understands as much
as his observations on the order of nature permit him. The creations of the
mind consist of an excessive refinement and of deductions from a few well
known matters. Our present sciences are nothing more than peculiar
arrangements of matters already known, and not methods for discovery. We
must bring men to particulars and their regular series and order, and they
must for a while renounce their notions and begins to form an acquaintance
with things..." (Bacon)
i.e. scholasticism tells us nothing about the world...
HPO JURY = Malenor
<bobk...@attbi.com> wrote:
>HPO JURY = Malenor wrote:
>>> No, it means QM is faulty, particularly since it is only a scientific
>> theory and not a philosophy.
>Quantum Electrodynamics and the Standard Theory of fields and particles
>are yet to be falsified experimentally. The biggest lack is a quantum
>theory of gravity.
QM is still only a scientific theory, and both its strengths and
weaknesses are based on the fact that it's only a theory.
>On the other hand, Kant went down in flames when non-euclidean geometry
>was invented.
I repeat: Kantian metaphysics of space and time supports non-Euclidean
geometry. His theory of appearances invalidates the absoluteness of
Euclidean geometry, since it is not applicable to
things-in-themselves. This factor brings all such geometries, which
are intended to reflect reality, down to the level of mere theories
about reality.
HPO JURY = Malenor
wrote:
Since I have not brought any scholasticism to this Kant forum, what
does Bacon's comment have to do with what I said?
I do know where you're coming from with the quote: scientism. However,
while scientism may derive its theories partially from exploring
reality in its particulars, it does not and cannot derive proof for
its own existence as a postulate from reality. For the latter, it
needs philosophy, not scholastic philosophy, but Kant.
Varrius
You are trying to invalidate scientific theory by reference to a priori
notions. That's scholasticism in my book.
Varrius
> On Tue, 17 Jun 2003 11:04:52 -0400, "Robert J. Kolker"
> <bobk...@attbi.com> wrote:
>
>
> >HPO JURY = Malenor wrote:
> >>> No, it means QM is faulty, particularly since it is only a scientific
> >> theory and not a philosophy.
>
> >Quantum Electrodynamics and the Standard Theory of fields and particles
> >are yet to be falsified experimentally. The biggest lack is a quantum
> >theory of gravity.
>
> QM is still only a scientific theory, and both its strengths and
> weaknesses are based on the fact that it's only a theory.
Erm, the very reason why science is successful is because it uses testable
theories.
I suppose that when you say *only a scientific theory* you mean to place it
somewhere below the lofty notions of metaphysics. However that just means
you are advocating something like a return to pre-bacon scholasticism.
> >On the other hand, Kant went down in flames when non-euclidean geometry
> >was invented.
>
> I repeat: Kantian metaphysics of space and time supports non-Euclidean
> geometry. His theory of appearances invalidates the absoluteness of
> Euclidean geometry, since it is not applicable to
> things-in-themselves. This factor brings all such geometries, which
> are intended to reflect reality, down to the level of mere theories
> about reality.
But Kant says that we cannot know about things in themselves, let alone
postulate theories about them...
HPO JURY = Malenor
wrote:
>
>"HPO JURY = Malenor" <Mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
>news:f5cvevkm6hdcs7qr7...@4ax.com...
>> On Tue, 17 Jun 2003 11:04:52 -0400, "Robert J. Kolker"
>> <bobk...@attbi.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>> >HPO JURY = Malenor wrote:
>> >>> No, it means QM is faulty, particularly since it is only a scientific
>> >> theory and not a philosophy.
>>
>> >Quantum Electrodynamics and the Standard Theory of fields and particles
>> >are yet to be falsified experimentally. The biggest lack is a quantum
>> >theory of gravity.
>>
>> QM is still only a scientific theory, and both its strengths and
>> weaknesses are based on the fact that it's only a theory.
>
>Erm, the very reason why science is successful is because it uses testable
>theories.
>
>I suppose that when you say *only a scientific theory* you mean to place it
>somewhere below the lofty notions of metaphysics. However that just means
>you are advocating something like a return to pre-bacon scholasticism.
In your opinion, which you hope is true since you have this
devastating Bacon quote to blow at the straw man.
>> >On the other hand, Kant went down in flames when non-euclidean geometry
>> >was invented.
>>
>> I repeat: Kantian metaphysics of space and time supports non-Euclidean
>> geometry. His theory of appearances invalidates the absoluteness of
>> Euclidean geometry, since it is not applicable to
>> things-in-themselves. This factor brings all such geometries, which
>> are intended to reflect reality, down to the level of mere theories
>> about reality.
>
>But Kant says that we cannot know about things in themselves, let alone
>postulate theories about them...
Where did he say you cannot postulate such theories? Why in Kant's
name can't you theorize about the thing-in-itself?
HPO JURY = Malenor
wrote:
The a priori wasn't invented during scholastic times, at least not in
Kant's meaning of the term.
>> what
>> does Bacon's comment have to do with what I said?
>>
>> I do know where you're coming from with the quote: scientism. However,
>> while scientism may derive its theories partially from exploring
>> reality in its particulars, it does not and cannot derive proof for
>> its own existence as a postulate from reality. For the latter, it
>> needs philosophy, not scholastic philosophy, but Kant.
I.e., your scientism is a dogma, and it competes with scholasticism
for the crown of dogmatism.
Jos Horikx
[realism]
>Ok, I am losing the thread of the argument-
That's curious, in <6hBDa.162$x15....@nnrp1.ozemail.com.au> it seemed
that you knew perfectly what the subject was, and that subject didn't
really change.
>I thought you were asking for
>'one serious guy' that competes- not one serious realist... ok
>Alexander gave a realist spin to kant in his space, time and deity
>
>Early Moore and Russell
>
>Reid
>
>James in 'radical empiricism'
>
>Certain pre-socratics
>
>Armstrong, Anderson- Australian Realism
>
>J.J. Gibson
In what way were this guys, as realists, competing with Kant. Do you
have some quotes?
Because, in the way they work with it, it's fully in line with the
definition given above.
...
[is Kant a empirist?]
>>>Yes, I understand Kant's programme.
>>>However he never shook off certain rationalist dogma's e.g. that things
>>>cannot be both distinct and connected.- this is found in both the so called
>>>rationalists (e.g. leibniz) as well empiricists (see especially Hume's
>>>treatise).
>> What are you talking about? you say "things": do you mean things in
>> themselves or do you mean the phenomena?
>See Hume, Treatise, Appendix
I thought I was talking with you. Why going to Hume if I ask you to
clarify your terms?
> "If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being
>connected together. But no connexions among distinct existences are ever
>discoverable by human understanding. We only feel a connexion or
>determination of the thought, to pass from one object to another."
Well, yes, so what?
>(http://www.blackmask.com/books69c/trthnent.htm#1_14_7)
>>>*I* consider him properly classified as a rationalist.
>> As I said before: Kant could be seen as an essentialist (well, sort
>> of, that is), provided that his "essences" are not to be found in the
>> things (as in Plato's time) but in the human distinctions between
>> those things.
>> One of his first distinctions is that of the two exclusive views:
>> empirism and rationalism. Why are those two exclusive? because
>> empirism states that all knowledge comes from experience and
>> rationalism says that reason is at the basis of all ideas (in fact,
>> modern rationalism was a reaction on religious thinking that stated
>> that knowledge was given to us by revelation, via the Bible) Kant
>> liked both the ideas, but he saw the contradiction. That is one of his
>> central themes on a higher level.
>The distinction between rationalism and empiricism is not clear cut.
Not clear cut? Those two are being regarded as (philosophical)
opposites!
>Many of
>the so called english empiricists inherited distinct lines of rationalist
>thought.
You have both eyes and ears. Is there no "clear cut" distinction
between the two, though there are many people having eyes and ears as
well, whether they are english empiricists or not,
>> >> But once again, his object was transcendental philosophy, beyond
>> >> that, in daily life, as a scientist, he was just a normal empirist as
>> >> anyone else. (There are some astronomical theories called after Kant,
>> >> e.g. the Kant-Laplace model of the solar system)
>> >Yes, and if we followed the Kantian model of philosophy in science,
>certain
>> >scientific theories would never have got off the ground- e.g. quantum
>> >mechanics violates the laws of Kant's Newtonian universe.
>> I am afraid that there is some kind of misjudgment involved here. The
>> critic of someone as Werner Heisenberg on Kant is e.a. that Kants a
>> priori of causality doesn't appear to work anymore when quantum-
>> mechanics is in question.
>Erm, 'doesn't appear to work anymore' means goodbye to Kantian
>epistemology...
Some people even say that logic is not appropriate because "the world
is not logical" do you really agree with that type of argument? (That
is, don't you see the paradox in it?)
>> But what does Lenin say about causality? :
>> "...it must be clear that Engels does not admit even the shadow of a
>> doubt as to the existence of objective law, causality and necessity in
>> nature" and: "The recognition of objective law in nature and the re-
>> cognition that this law is reflected with approximate fidelity in the
>> mind of man is materialism" and last but not least (because he
>> referres to Kant): " ...The distinction between the Humean and the
>> Kantian theories of causality is only a secondary difference of
>> opinion between agnostics who are basically at one, viz., in their
>> denial of objective law in nature, and who thus inevitably condemn
>> themselves to idealist conclusions of one kind or another."
>Well, I wouldn't agree with Lenin.
It doesn't matter whether you agree with Lenin or not. The subject was
realism, idealism, relativism, materialism and Lenins remarks on Kant
This part of the thread was started with your
<6hBDa.162$x15....@nnrp1.ozemail.com.au>, where you took a posotion
on these things, remember?
JH
Varrius
> On Wed, 18 Jun 2003 15:24:31 +1000, "Varrius" <var...@yahoo.com.au>
> wrote:
>
> >
> >"HPO JURY = Malenor" <Mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> >news:f5cvevkm6hdcs7qr7...@4ax.com...
> >> On Tue, 17 Jun 2003 11:04:52 -0400, "Robert J. Kolker"
> >> <bobk...@attbi.com> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> >HPO JURY = Malenor wrote:
> >> >>> No, it means QM is faulty, particularly since it is only a
scientific
> >> >> theory and not a philosophy.
> >>
> >> >Quantum Electrodynamics and the Standard Theory of fields and
particles
> >> >are yet to be falsified experimentally. The biggest lack is a quantum
> >> >theory of gravity.
> >>
> >> QM is still only a scientific theory, and both its strengths and
> >> weaknesses are based on the fact that it's only a theory.
> >
> >Erm, the very reason why science is successful is because it uses
testable
> >theories.
> >
> >I suppose that when you say *only a scientific theory* you mean to place
it
> >somewhere below the lofty notions of metaphysics. However that just means
> >you are advocating something like a return to pre-bacon scholasticism.
>
> devastating Bacon quote to blow at the straw man.
Argumentum ad hominem
> >> >On the other hand, Kant went down in flames when non-euclidean
geometry
> >> >was invented.
> >>
> >> I repeat: Kantian metaphysics of space and time supports non-Euclidean
> >> geometry. His theory of appearances invalidates the absoluteness of
> >> Euclidean geometry, since it is not applicable to
> >> things-in-themselves. This factor brings all such geometries, which
> >> are intended to reflect reality, down to the level of mere theories
> >> about reality.
> >
> >But Kant says that we cannot know about things in themselves, let alone
> >postulate theories about them...
>
> Where did he say you cannot postulate such theories? Why in Kant's
> name can't you theorize about the thing-in-itself?
For Kant, science deals with the world of appearances. The thing in itself
does not belong to that world and as such is not a proper object of study
for science.
Varrius
Irelevant (and not true)
> >> what
> >> does Bacon's comment have to do with what I said?
> >>
> >> I do know where you're coming from with the quote: scientism. However,
> >> while scientism may derive its theories partially from exploring
> >> reality in its particulars, it does not and cannot derive proof for
> >> its own existence as a postulate from reality. For the latter, it
> >> needs philosophy, not scholastic philosophy, but Kant.
>
> I.e., your scientism is a dogma, and it competes with scholasticism
> for the crown of dogmatism.
Given that science allows for and expects error, it can hardly be called
dogmatic.
Robert J. Kolker
Varrius wrote:
> For Kant, science deals with the world of appearances. The thing in itself
> does not belong to that world and as such is not a proper object of study
> for science.
By definition the ding an sich is not accessible to us.
Bob Kolker
HPO JURY = Malenor
wrote:
Then how is this a reply to my original point: "Kantian metaphysics of
space and time supports non-Euclidean geometry. His theory of
appearances invalidates the absoluteness of Euclidean geometry, since
it is not applicable to things-in-themselves. This factor brings all
such geometries, which are intended to reflect reality, down to the
level of mere theories about reality."
If I substitute the term "appearances" for "reality," do you still
have an issue with that comment?
HPO JURY = Malenor
wrote:
First of all, I am not trying to invalidate scientific theory. I would
only point to the falsifiability of such theories. However, your
scientism itself is not falsifiable. That is the issue. It is
therefore hypocritical of you to accuse Kant of the same thing.
>> >> what
>> >> does Bacon's comment have to do with what I said?
>> >>
>> >> I do know where you're coming from with the quote: scientism. However,
>> >> while scientism may derive its theories partially from exploring
>> >> reality in its particulars, it does not and cannot derive proof for
>> >> its own existence as a postulate from reality. For the latter, it
>> >> needs philosophy, not scholastic philosophy, but Kant.
>>
>> I.e., your scientism is a dogma, and it competes with scholasticism
>> for the crown of dogmatism.
>
>Given that science allows for and expects error, it can hardly be called
>dogmatic.
I'm not talking about the theories themselves, but the unproven
assumptions which underlie science, such as materialism.
John Hernlund
"HPO JURY = Malenor" <Mal...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> On Tue, 17 Jun 2003 11:04:52 -0400, "Robert J. Kolker"
> <bobk...@attbi.com> wrote:
>
>> HPO JURY = Malenor wrote:
>>>> No, it means QM is faulty, particularly since it is only a scientific
>>>> theory and not a philosophy.
>
>> Quantum Electrodynamics and the Standard Theory of fields and particles
>> are yet to be falsified experimentally. The biggest lack is a quantum
>> theory of gravity.
Perhaps because their range/scale of prediction are rather limited to the
particular evidence for the theory?
Not that I'm against E&M or QM...
You would think gravity would be quite analogous to EM, with the 1/r
potential scaling and all...but the symmetries are quite different, as if
one body's protons only saw the electrons in other bodies, shielded some how
from interaction with another body's protons, in the appropriate ratio to
produce the gravitational potential. But then, gravity curves space time...a
real mess.
> QM is still only a scientific theory, and both its strengths and
> weaknesses are based on the fact that it's only a theory.
"only" is probably not an appropriate descriptor. It is a great example of a
scientific theory. A model is constructed to describe the systems internal
interactions, as well as implications for the external world (except quantum
gravity of course).
>> On the other hand, Kant went down in flames when non-euclidean geometry
>> was invented.
>
> I repeat: Kantian metaphysics of space and time supports non-Euclidean
> geometry. His theory of appearances invalidates the absoluteness of
> Euclidean geometry, since it is not applicable to
> things-in-themselves. This factor brings all such geometries, which
> are intended to reflect reality, down to the level of mere theories
> about reality.
Absolutely, and undeniably true. Kant opens the doors to non-Euclidean
geometry, previously held tight shut by dogmatic geometric logicians touting
the self-consistency of the Euclidean system. Lobachevski was the first to
prove that Euclid's "self-evident truths" were not unique by constructing an
different system that contradicted Euclid's, thus toppling the geometers
house of cards forever...this occurred not so long after Kant's death.
Riemmann didn't publish his thesis until the mid-1800s, and probably nobody
read it until the latest 19th century.
There was an early paper by Kant I read once, and can't find it or remember
the exact title of it. It was something like "on the differentiation of
objects in space" or something similar. If anyone knows where I can find
this paper (esp. a link), I would love to read it again. But I recall it
definitely addressing issues quite close to the non-Euclidean work of
mathematicians in the 1800s, and this is even before his writing of the CPR!
This may have been the thread of thinking that motivated Kant to write about
(or mention) geometry in the first place.
Kant's geometric thinking was a HUGE leap over the predominant Newton (space
is continuous) vs. Liebniz (Space is discretized) debates of the day.
Definitely ahead of his time on these issues.
Cheers!
John
HPO JURY = Malenoid
<no....@no.spam.com> wrote:
>On 6/17/03 5:28 PM, in article f5cvevkm6hdcs7qr7...@4ax.com,
>"HPO JURY = Malenor" <Mal...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> On Tue, 17 Jun 2003 11:04:52 -0400, "Robert J. Kolker"
>> <bobk...@attbi.com> wrote:
>>
>>> HPO JURY = Malenor wrote:
>>>>> No, it means QM is faulty, particularly since it is only a scientific
>>>>> theory and not a philosophy.
>>
>>> Quantum Electrodynamics and the Standard Theory of fields and particles
>>> are yet to be falsified experimentally. The biggest lack is a quantum
>>> theory of gravity.
>
>Perhaps because their range/scale of prediction are rather limited to the
>particular evidence for the theory?
>
>Not that I'm against E&M or QM...
>
>You would think gravity would be quite analogous to EM, with the 1/r
>potential scaling and all...but the symmetries are quite different, as if
>one body's protons only saw the electrons in other bodies, shielded some how
>from interaction with another body's protons, in the appropriate ratio to
>produce the gravitational potential. But then, gravity curves space time...a
>real mess.
Or perhaps gravity only appears to curve space/time.
>> QM is still only a scientific theory, and both its strengths and
>> weaknesses are based on the fact that it's only a theory.
>
>"only" is probably not an appropriate descriptor. It is a great example of a
>scientific theory. A model is constructed to describe the systems internal
>interactions, as well as implications for the external world (except quantum
>gravity of course).
"Only" was meant to be a relative term. Empirical science exists
relative to that philosophy which gives it its fundamental principles.
It is also used to describe the falsifiability of scientific theories
versus the immutability of philosophy's necessary principles.
>>> On the other hand, Kant went down in flames when non-euclidean geometry
>>> was invented.
>>
>> I repeat: Kantian metaphysics of space and time supports non-Euclidean
>> geometry. His theory of appearances invalidates the absoluteness of
>> Euclidean geometry, since it is not applicable to
>> things-in-themselves. This factor brings all such geometries, which
>> are intended to reflect reality, down to the level of mere theories
>> about reality.
>
>Absolutely, and undeniably true. Kant opens the doors to non-Euclidean
>geometry, previously held tight shut by dogmatic geometric logicians touting
>the self-consistency of the Euclidean system. Lobachevski was the first to
>prove that Euclid's "self-evident truths" were not unique by constructing an
>different system that contradicted Euclid's, thus toppling the geometers
>house of cards forever...this occurred not so long after Kant's death.
>Riemmann didn't publish his thesis until the mid-1800s, and probably nobody
>read it until the latest 19th century.
>
>There was an early paper by Kant I read once, and can't find it or remember
>the exact title of it. It was something like "on the differentiation of
>objects in space" or something similar. If anyone knows where I can find
>this paper (esp. a link), I would love to read it again. But I recall it
>definitely addressing issues quite close to the non-Euclidean work of
>mathematicians in the 1800s, and this is even before his writing of the CPR!
>This may have been the thread of thinking that motivated Kant to write about
>(or mention) geometry in the first place.
I don't know where to find that paper. However, I do know what it
contains. Kant did not solve the problem there, he only brought it up;
in fact, he solved it decades later in the Transcendental Aesthetic.
>Kant's geometric thinking was a HUGE leap over the predominant Newton (space
>is continuous) vs. Liebniz (Space is discretized) debates of the day.
>Definitely ahead of his time on these issues.
Yes, the Transcendental Aesthetic is Kant's solution. He revealed that
Newton and Leibniz both suffered from a methodological problem he
called 'transcendental realism.' It is brought up again in the second
antinominical conflict.
John Hernlund
"HPO JURY = Malenoid" <Male...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> On Tue, 08 Jul 2003 01:53:35 -0700, John Hernlund
> <no....@no.spam.com> wrote:
>
>> On 6/17/03 5:28 PM, in article f5cvevkm6hdcs7qr7...@4ax.com,
>> "HPO JURY = Malenor" <Mal...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>>> Quantum Electrodynamics and the Standard Theory of fields and particles
>>> are yet to be falsified experimentally. The biggest lack is a quantum
>>> theory of gravity.
>>
>> Perhaps because their range/scale of prediction are rather limited to the
>> particular evidence for the theory?
>>
>> Not that I'm against E&M or QM...
>>
>> You would think gravity would be quite analogous to EM, with the 1/r
>> potential scaling and all...but the symmetries are quite different, as if
>> one body's protons only saw the electrons in other bodies, shielded some how
>> from interaction with another body's protons, in the appropriate ratio to
>> produce the gravitational potential. But then, gravity curves space time...a
>> real mess.
>
> Or perhaps gravity only appears to curve space/time.
Well that's the real bitch, it doesn't appear to curve space time. You need
some very fancy measuring instruments/techniques to detect it. And these do,
indeed, detect it.
>>> QM is still only a scientific theory, and both its strengths and
>>> weaknesses are based on the fact that it's only a theory.
>>
>> "only" is probably not an appropriate descriptor. It is a great example of a
>> scientific theory. A model is constructed to describe the systems internal
>> interactions, as well as implications for the external world (except quantum
>> gravity of course).
>
> "Only" was meant to be a relative term. Empirical science exists
> relative to that philosophy which gives it its fundamental principles.
> It is also used to describe the falsifiability of scientific theories
> versus the immutability of philosophy's necessary principles.
Yes, which is why we have to beware of the circularity/ad hoc-ness of
particle physics. If something happens that no particle explains, then just
invent a new particle to do that. And then test the new particle hypothesis
by having the particle do what it was defined to do in the first place.
Right. I hope somebody knows the paper. I wish I hadn't lost it. I might
write to my old Kant prof to see if he can send me another copy.
>> Kant's geometric thinking was a HUGE leap over the predominant Newton (space
>> is continuous) vs. Liebniz (Space is discretized) debates of the day.
>> Definitely ahead of his time on these issues.
>
> Yes, the Transcendental Aesthetic is Kant's solution. He revealed that
> Newton and Leibniz both suffered from a methodological problem he
> called 'transcendental realism.' It is brought up again in the second
> antinominical conflict.
Right, so why do so many people misunderstand this? It was always (at least
to me) one of Kant's great achievements; one of the things I really grasped
on to when learning Kant.
The misconceptions of Kant are so widespread, diverse, and dogmatically held
that you can get frustrated at times.
Cheers!
John
Jos Horikx
<no....@no.spam.com> wrote:
>>> There was an early paper by Kant I read once, and can't find it or remember
>>> the exact title of it. It was something like "on the differentiation of
>>> objects in space" or something similar. If anyone knows where I can find
>>> this paper (esp. a link), I would love to read it again. But I recall it
>>> definitely addressing issues quite close to the non-Euclidean work of
>>> mathematicians in the 1800s, and this is even before his writing of the CPR!
>>> This may have been the thread of thinking that motivated Kant to write about
>>> (or mention) geometry in the first place.
>>
>> I don't know where to find that paper. However, I do know what it
>> contains. Kant did not solve the problem there, he only brought it up;
>> in fact, he solved it decades later in the Transcendental Aesthetic.
>
>Right. I hope somebody knows the paper. I wish I hadn't lost it. I might
>write to my old Kant prof to see if he can send me another copy.
Do you mean: "Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens"
(1755, with the subtitle: Essay on the Constitution and Mechanical
Origin of the Entire Universe, Treated in Accordance with Newtonian
Principles.)
http://www.mala.bc.ca/~johnstoi/kant1.htm (click right below)
JH
HPO JURY = Malenoid
<no....@no.spam.com> wrote:
>On 7/8/03 8:39 AM, in article hfolgvk37oiv1kdqm...@4ax.com,
>"HPO JURY = Malenoid" <Male...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 08 Jul 2003 01:53:35 -0700, John Hernlund
>> <no....@no.spam.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Not that I'm against E&M or QM...
>>>
>>> You would think gravity would be quite analogous to EM, with the 1/r
>>> potential scaling and all...but the symmetries are quite different, as if
>>> one body's protons only saw the electrons in other bodies, shielded some how
>>> from interaction with another body's protons, in the appropriate ratio to
>>> produce the gravitational potential. But then, gravity curves space time...a
>>> real mess.
>>
>> Or perhaps gravity only appears to curve space/time.
>
>Well that's the real bitch, it doesn't appear to curve space time. You need
>some very fancy measuring instruments/techniques to detect it. And these do,
>indeed, detect it.
That depends on what Kant meant by "appearances." If this curvature is
within the possibility of experience, then it still counts as
appearance.
>>> "only" is probably not an appropriate descriptor. It is a great example of a
>>> scientific theory. A model is constructed to describe the systems internal
>>> interactions, as well as implications for the external world (except quantum
>>> gravity of course).
>>
>> "Only" was meant to be a relative term. Empirical science exists
>> relative to that philosophy which gives it its fundamental principles.
>> It is also used to describe the falsifiability of scientific theories
>> versus the immutability of philosophy's necessary principles.
>
>Yes, which is why we have to beware of the circularity/ad hoc-ness of
>particle physics. If something happens that no particle explains, then just
>invent a new particle to do that. And then test the new particle hypothesis
>by having the particle do what it was defined to do in the first place.
Quite true, thanks. I will point this ad-hocness out to the next QM
troll who wonders on in here.
>>> Absolutely, and undeniably true. Kant opens the doors to non-Euclidean
>>> geometry, previously held tight shut by dogmatic geometric logicians touting
>>> the self-consistency of the Euclidean system. Lobachevski was the first to
>>> prove that Euclid's "self-evident truths" were not unique by constructing an
>>> different system that contradicted Euclid's, thus toppling the geometers
>>> house of cards forever...this occurred not so long after Kant's death.
>>> Riemmann didn't publish his thesis until the mid-1800s, and probably nobody
>>> read it until the latest 19th century.
>>>
>>> There was an early paper by Kant I read once, and can't find it or remember
>>> the exact title of it. It was something like "on the differentiation of
>>> objects in space" or something similar. If anyone knows where I can find
>>> this paper (esp. a link), I would love to read it again. But I recall it
>>> definitely addressing issues quite close to the non-Euclidean work of
>>> mathematicians in the 1800s, and this is even before his writing of the CPR!
>>> This may have been the thread of thinking that motivated Kant to write about
>>> (or mention) geometry in the first place.
>>
>> I don't know where to find that paper. However, I do know what it
>> contains. Kant did not solve the problem there, he only brought it up;
>> in fact, he solved it decades later in the Transcendental Aesthetic.
>
>Right. I hope somebody knows the paper. I wish I hadn't lost it. I might
>write to my old Kant prof to see if he can send me another copy.
Well just bringing up the problem was a large improvement over dogma.
And it shows that Kant was a critical thinker, and not a mere skeptic,
even in his pre-Critical years.
>>> Kant's geometric thinking was a HUGE leap over the predominant Newton (space
>>> is continuous) vs. Liebniz (Space is discretized) debates of the day.
>>> Definitely ahead of his time on these issues.
>>
>> Yes, the Transcendental Aesthetic is Kant's solution. He revealed that
>> Newton and Leibniz both suffered from a methodological problem he
>> called 'transcendental realism.' It is brought up again in the second
>> antinominical conflict.
>Right, so why do so many people misunderstand this? It was always (at least
>to me) one of Kant's great achievements; one of the things I really grasped
>on to when learning Kant.
>
>The misconceptions of Kant are so widespread, diverse, and dogmatically held
>that you can get frustrated at times.
If people didn't have someone to attack what would be the point of
living?
John Hernlund
"Jos Horikx" <jho...@chello.nl> wrote:
No, this isn't the one, but thanks for sending the link! I haven't had a
chance to read this particular piece.
The paper I had in mind didn't seem to be very long. Perhaps a dozen pages
of condensed text, though I don't remember for sure.
Cheers!
John
John Hernlund
"HPO JURY = Malenoid" <Male...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> On Wed, 09 Jul 2003 02:05:23 -0700, John Hernlund
> <no....@no.spam.com> wrote:
>
>> On 7/8/03 8:39 AM, in article hfolgvk37oiv1kdqm...@4ax.com,
>> "HPO JURY = Malenoid" <Male...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, 08 Jul 2003 01:53:35 -0700, John Hernlund
>>> <no....@no.spam.com> wrote:
>>>
>
>>>> Not that I'm against E&M or QM...
>>>>
>>>> You would think gravity would be quite analogous to EM, with the 1/r
>>>> potential scaling and all...but the symmetries are quite different, as if
>>>> one body's protons only saw the electrons in other bodies, shielded some
>>>> how
>>>> from interaction with another body's protons, in the appropriate ratio to
>>>> produce the gravitational potential. But then, gravity curves space
>>>> time...a
>>>> real mess.
>>>
>>> Or perhaps gravity only appears to curve space/time.
>>
>> Well that's the real bitch, it doesn't appear to curve space time. You need
>> some very fancy measuring instruments/techniques to detect it. And these do,
>> indeed, detect it.
>
> That depends on what Kant meant by "appearances." If this curvature is
> within the possibility of experience, then it still counts as
> appearance.
Sure, I'll buy that.
We've had some philosophers, like Bridgman, who insisted that a measurement
was entirely different depending on the technique used...i.e. a laser
ranging scope gives a fundamentally different length than the tape measure.
He was probably going mad from his high pressure experiments though.
>>>> "only" is probably not an appropriate descriptor. It is a great example of
>>>> a
>>>> scientific theory. A model is constructed to describe the systems internal
>>>> interactions, as well as implications for the external world (except
>>>> quantum
>>>> gravity of course).
>>>
>>> "Only" was meant to be a relative term. Empirical science exists
>>> relative to that philosophy which gives it its fundamental principles.
>>> It is also used to describe the falsifiability of scientific theories
>>> versus the immutability of philosophy's necessary principles.
>>
>> Yes, which is why we have to beware of the circularity/ad hoc-ness of
>> particle physics. If something happens that no particle explains, then just
>> invent a new particle to do that. And then test the new particle hypothesis
>> by having the particle do what it was defined to do in the first place.
>
> Quite true, thanks. I will point this ad-hocness out to the next QM
> troll who wonders on in here.
No problem. It seems every time particle physics fills a pot hole, others
immediately open up. If you're an optimist, then they're on the right track
and the new pot holes being plugged with invented particle pavement
represent scientific progress. If you're a skeptic, then you might wonder
about the whole standard model.
Very much so. Science also progresses in the same way...you see something
interesting, poke at it some, find its flaws, and open up new doors of
inquiry as a result.
>>>> Kant's geometric thinking was a HUGE leap over the predominant Newton
>>>> (space
>>>> is continuous) vs. Liebniz (Space is discretized) debates of the day.
>>>> Definitely ahead of his time on these issues.
>>>
>>> Yes, the Transcendental Aesthetic is Kant's solution. He revealed that
>>> Newton and Leibniz both suffered from a methodological problem he
>>> called 'transcendental realism.' It is brought up again in the second
>>> antinominical conflict.
>
>> Right, so why do so many people misunderstand this? It was always (at least
>> to me) one of Kant's great achievements; one of the things I really grasped
>> on to when learning Kant.
>>
>> The misconceptions of Kant are so widespread, diverse, and dogmatically held
>> that you can get frustrated at times.
>
> If people didn't have someone to attack what would be the point of
> living?
Okay, but can't we all find a better victim, and better premises?
Cheers!
John
Jos Horikx
<no....@no.spam.com> wrote:
>> http://www.mala.bc.ca/~johnstoi/kant1.htm (click right below)
>No, this isn't the one, but thanks for sending the link! I haven't had a
>chance to read this particular piece.
>The paper I had in mind didn't seem to be very long. Perhaps a dozen pages
>of condensed text, though I don't remember for sure.
A list of titles of all of Kants work (Even bigger than the FAQ I've
seen posted in this very group) is to be found at:
http://sun.soci.niu.edu/~phildept/Dye/KantsWorks.html
JH
Robert J. Kolker
HPO JURY = Malenoid wrote:
>
> That depends on what Kant meant by "appearances." If this curvature is
> within the possibility of experience, then it still counts as
> appearance.
No one has ever experienced the curvature of space time. They have only
inferred it within the context of a theory.
Bob Kolker
> Violent Femmes
John Hernlund
Excellent! I think this is the one I was recalling:
1768 On the First Ground of the Distinction of Regions in Space.
Or a more thorough reference to something in print:
Kant, I. 1991 [1768]. On the first ground of the distinction of regions
in space. In J. Van Cleve, ed. The philosophy of right and left:
incongruent counterparts and the nature of space. Dordrecht: Kluwer. pp.
27-33.
This piece seems to be mostly remembered for the incongruent
counterparts, as the title of the above book suggests.
I've been looking a bit for the source of misunderstandings about Kant
on this topic, and they all seem to boil down to things like the
following example found on a web page:
http://www.worldzone.net/arts/angelk/writing/geometrypage.html
"For years, Euclid’s system went unchallenged, even in the 17th and 18th
century, when the philosophy of skepticism had the intellectual world in
a crisis over the certainty of human knowledge. Descartes discussed the
idea that the world we live in is nothing more than a dream, fostered
upon us by some malignant force. Bishop Berkeley proclaimed that there
might not even be anything material in the world, while David Hume took
this theory one step further and said maybe even what everyman considers
his "self" does not really exist. Yet none of these men would ever have
called into question that the angle sum of a triangle is 180°. One of
the great debates of the day revolved around how man knew what he knew.
The great philosophers, Immanual Kant among them, arranged man's
knowledge into two basic categories: empirical and a priori. Empirical
knowledge comes through the senses and is based only on experience. A
priori knowledge is that which is know without experience. These
categories are further classified as either synthetic or analytic, with
synthetic being judgements made by combining bits of knowledge and
analytic being judgements made by extracting something out of the
knowledge. (Barker, 1964) Kant considered mathematics to be synthetic a
priori knowledge. In other words, mathematical knowledge comes from
"intuitions that are inherent in the human mind." (Davis, 1995) This
view is similar to that of Socrates, who demonstrated the inherent truth
and order of mathematics by pulling aside a slave boy and, through a
series of questions, leading him to the correct answer about the
diagonal length of a square. Socrates then proclaimed that math was
something every man knew or had known in a past life. Plato took this
example as proof that mathematical knowledge was eternal and immutable.
(Davis, 1995) Kant seemed to agree with this philosophy, even going so
far as to assert that no geometry other than the Euclidean system could
exist in the world. (Wilder, 1981)"
Setting aside other problems in this piece, the main thing seems to be a
re-iteration of the idea that Kant had ruled out non-Euclidean geometry
in CPR, found in quite a few searches. The root of this problem in
interpretation may lead back to ideas like this one expressed in
mid-paragraph:
"In other words, mathematical knowledge comes from 'intuitions that are
inherent in the human mind'"
regarding synthetic a priori judgments. Boy, I don't know where to begin
with this. Here's some ideas of root problems for this one:
-> People who say these types of things usually quote something other
than Kant himself...you know what they say about rumors.
-> These objections are usually posed by geometers. A non-specialist origin?
-> Perhaps people take the popular meaning of the word "intuition" when
reading about Kant...that would be a problem...perhaps we might read
some passage one day that says: "Kant believed women were naturally
better mathematicians than men, since you know what everyone says about
a 'woman's intuition.'" :v)
BTW: Are there any women participating in this NG? I've never met a
woman that was fond of Kant, for some odd reason. Perhaps this is an old
problem for Kant, and why the poor fellow never married? What is it
about Kant that turns women off so?
Anyways, care to take this one further Malenor?
Cheers!
John
Robert ASF.
snipo
> BTW: Are there any women participating in this NG? I've never met a
> woman that was fond of Kant, for some odd reason. Perhaps this is an old
> problem for Kant, and why the poor fellow never married? What is it
> about Kant that turns women off so?
Bertrand Russell's wife was granted a divorce on the grounds of mental
cruelty because friends of his would come to discuss Kant...
Jos Horikx
<hern...@ess.ucla.edu> wrote:
>BTW: Are there any women participating in this NG? I've never met a
>woman that was fond of Kant, for some odd reason. Perhaps this is an old
>problem for Kant, and why the poor fellow never married? What is it
>about Kant that turns women off so?
I know, by head, only one place where Kant spoke about woman:
In his "What is Enlightenment?" and speaking about the people
(clergyman etc) that (in Kants days) prevented the public to think for
itself he says about these "guardians":
" The guardians who have kindly taken upon themselves the work of
supervision will soon see to it that by far the largest part of
mankind (including the entire fair sex) should consider the step
forward to maturity not only as difficult but also as highly
dangerous."
The "fair sex" (in German das "schöne Geschlecht", the beautiful sex)
means woman.
JH
Jos Horikx
<hern...@ess.ucla.edu> wrote:
>I've been looking a bit for the source of misunderstandings about Kant
>on this topic, and they all seem to boil down to things like the
>following example found on a web page:
>
>http://www.worldzone.net/arts/angelk/writing/geometrypage.html
There is also a certain Reichenbach that criticized Kantian theory
of synthetic a priori in his " The theory of relativity and a priori
knowledge". See e.a. in the internet encyclopedia of philosophy:
http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/r/reichenb.htm
JH
Dieter Kiel
wrote:
>I know, by head, only one place where Kant spoke about woman:
>
>In his "What is Enlightenment?" and speaking about the people
>(clergyman etc) that (in Kants days) prevented the public to think for
>itself he says about these "guardians":
>
>" The guardians who have kindly taken upon themselves the work of
> supervision will soon see to it that by far the largest part of
> mankind (including the entire fair sex) should consider the step
> forward to maturity not only as difficult but also as highly
> dangerous."
>
>The "fair sex" (in German das "schöne Geschlecht", the beautiful sex)
>means woman.
Another place is:
"Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen"
(1764; Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime)
where he compares men and women.
Here is a site about "Women and German Literature" where this writing
is mentioned.
HPO JURY = Malenoid
<hern...@ess.ucla.edu> wrote:
>Setting aside other problems in this piece, the main thing seems to be a
>re-iteration of the idea that Kant had ruled out non-Euclidean geometry
>in CPR, found in quite a few searches. The root of this problem in
>interpretation may lead back to ideas like this one expressed in
>mid-paragraph:
>
>"In other words, mathematical knowledge comes from 'intuitions that are
>inherent in the human mind'"
>
>regarding synthetic a priori judgments. Boy, I don't know where to begin
>with this. Here's some ideas of root problems for this one:
>
>-> People who say these types of things usually quote something other
>than Kant himself...you know what they say about rumors.
>
>-> These objections are usually posed by geometers. A non-specialist origin?
>
>-> Perhaps people take the popular meaning of the word "intuition" when
>reading about Kant...that would be a problem...perhaps we might read
>some passage one day that says: "Kant believed women were naturally
>better mathematicians than men, since you know what everyone says about
>a 'woman's intuition.'" :v)
>
>BTW: Are there any women participating in this NG? I've never met a
>woman that was fond of Kant, for some odd reason. Perhaps this is an old
>problem for Kant, and why the poor fellow never married? What is it
>about Kant that turns women off so?
>
>Anyways, care to take this one further Malenor?
>
I can't think of any objections to the quoted text other than your
own. It would make more sense if the author had ended by saying, "Kant
seemed to agree with this philosophy, even going so far as to assert
that no geometry other than the Euclidean system could exist in the
world OF APPEARANCES." And besides, it wasn't a mere assertion.
There's all kinds of junk like that on the internet, one could spend
all day and night hunting it down and shooting it dead.
I suppose I could add that there was some question over Euclid's fifth
postulate during the time-frame mentioned, and beyond.
Sometimes it doesn't hurt to send the author of a false Kant page a
little correction by e-mail, if possible, even if it does no good to
try to set these writers straight.