Russell on Kant
Occidental
Philosophy, had a low opinion of Kant (eg he writes "Hume, by his
criticism of the concept of causality, awakened [Kant] from his
dogmatic slumbers, so at least he says, but the awakening was only
temporary and he soon invented a soporific that enabled him to sleep
again")
Here is Russell's objection to Kant's theory of space - the notion
that space is a "form of intuition", ie an ordering principle
generated by the mind to make perception possible, but having no
existence in itself:
"There is here, as throughout Kant's theory of the subjectivity of
space and time, a difficulty which he seems to have never felt. What
induces me to arrange objects of perception as I do rather than
otherwise? Why, for instance, do I always see people's eyes above
their mouths and not below them? According to Kant, the eyes and the
mouth exist as things in themselves, and cause my separate percepts,
but nothing in them corresponds to the spatial arrangement that exists
in my perception."
This seems a rather obvious objection, and it is likely that Kant or
his later apologists dealt with it. Anyone know how it is overcome?
Mal
If Kant had made such an argument as is depicted here, he would
have failed to keep his argument for space on a transcendental
level. The very way in which you depict his argument is entirely
empirical.
The arrangements of things like mouths and eyes is an empirical
matter.
Furthermore, you are saying you know that the mouth and eyes are
not in themselves in a certain spatial arrangement, when this is
something you cannot know without appealing to space.
It is necessary therefore to consider Kant's actual arguments and
try not to interpret them empirically for whatever reason, for
example,
to make his arguments easier to intuit. Those arguments can be
found in the CPR itself, and can be researched on the etext here
http://arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Philosophy/Kant/cpr/ .
But in the long run, the shallowness of Russell's objection can be
located in his failure to identify Kant's definition of appearance in
space as an "undetermined object of an empirical intuition." A20/B34.
This literally means that Kant is, empirically speaking, not at this
point in the CPR discussing any determinate object in perception.
He is therefore not discussing the arrangement of mouths and eyes,
but the nature of space and time as forms of appearances or
undetermined objects in the most general sense - at this point,
a purely contentless issue holding only the barest possibility of
content. In this way, Kant can discuss the forms purely without
entering into the question of spatial arrangements of empirical
objects.
Russell's criticism misses the boat in that not only does he
fail to construe Kant's arguments correctly, but that in doing so he
has neglected to take into account the transcendental (pure) form
of Kant's argument and the reason Kant decided to take this
course of reasoning. The purpose of the Aesthetic was to develop a
new form of logic called "transcendental logic" which was ultimately
designed to support his thesis of transcendental imagination at the
very heart of the transcendental deduction.
These are all rungs of a ladder leading to higher principles, the
highest
being the Ideas of pure reason. From space and time to transcendental
logic, transcendental imagination, transcendental deduction and
schema,
it is all a different way of looking not at the issue of perception
but at
the "cognition behind cognition," a priori to cognition, and how it is
supported by its own form of logic not acquired from the empirical.
Eppur Si
time may or may not be a priori aspects of human cognition. Kant
doesn't really convince me, becuase his argument seems to be "Because
I said so!" Russell is saying that whether or not space and time are
inherent in human cognition, they do not exist SOLELY in human
cognition. To whatever extent there is a real world which interacts
with our minds (and Kant affirms that there is one), space and time
are ACTUAL aspects of that real world as we perceive it, not just
because we perceive it. In other words, space and time really exist
(to the extent that one accepts that anything really exists), rather
than being purely constructs of the mind by which we order our
perceptions.
And, by the way, I have no difficulty conceiving of something (the
color blue, for example) without reference to space or time. That
shouldn't be possible, according to Kant.
And I don't know about you Bud, but if I walk further than the
distance to the wall in front of me, I bump my head.
Mal
> Mal's argument does not really address Russell's objection. Space and
> time may or may not be a priori aspects of human cognition. Kant
> doesn't really convince me, becuase his argument seems to be "Because
> I said so!" Russell is saying that whether or not space and time are
> inherent in human cognition, they do not exist SOLELY in human
> cognition.
Kant's "I said so!" consists of an explication, and you are free to
knock
it down. But so far neither you nor Russell have taken on Kant's
argument.
As for your second point, Russell only asserts that space and time
really exist, and so as it turns out it is Russell's argument that is
not convincing since all one has to do is assert the contrary.
Furthermore, Russell is construing Kant as arguing that formal space
has the advantage of putting mouths below eyes in perception,
rather than eyes below mouths. But that is not Kant's argument,
as I showed in my previous response. So Russell missed the mark.
Mal
> And, by the way, I have no difficulty conceiving of something (the
> color blue, for example) without reference to space or time. That
> shouldn't be possible, according to Kant.
It is possible to conceive of anything without reference
to space and time. For example, I can conceive of "elephant" without
reference to space and time. See, I just did that - "elephant."
But once again, you're missing the point. Kant has conceived
of space and time without reference to the empirical, that is to
say, purely and formally.
> And I don't know about you Bud, but if I walk further than the
> distance to the wall in front of me, I bump my head.
Kant's argument is not about the wall in front of you or bumping
your head, it is about space and time in general, and not any
particular distance in space or time either.
Occidental
> Mal's argument does not really address Russell's objection.
I think Mal does not understand the Russell quote, or Kant, for that
matter.
> Space and
> time may or may not be a priori aspects of human cognition. Kant
> doesn't really convince me, becuase his argument seems to be "Because
> I said so!"
I think you go too far here; Kant did have an argument - from the
internal contradictions (which he calls an "antinomies") implicit in
the way in which we conceive space and time. Here is his time argument
(from CofPR):
QUOTE
First, that the world has no beginning: it is then too large for our
concept, which, consisting as it does in a successive regress, can
never reach the whole eternity that has elapsed. Or suppose that the
world has a beginning, it will then, in the necessary empirical
regress, be too small for the concept of the understanding. For since
the beginning still presupposes a time which precedes it, it is still
not unconditioned; and the law of the empirical employment of the
understanding therefore obliges us to look for a higher temporal
condition; and the world [as limited in time] is therefore obviously
too small for this law.
END QUOTE
Ie we cannot conceive of infinite time, and cannot conceive that time
began "at some time". Thus the concept of time contains an implicit
contradiction, and so it must be, says Kant, an artifact of cognition,
having no "in-itself" existence.
> Russell is saying that whether or not space and time are
> inherent in human cognition, they do not exist SOLELY in human
> cognition.
Exactly.
> To whatever extent there is a real world which interacts
> with our minds (and Kant affirms that there is one), space and time
> are ACTUAL aspects of that real world as we perceive it, not just
> because we perceive it. In other words, space and time really exist
> (to the extent that one accepts that anything really exists), rather
> than being purely constructs of the mind by which we order our
> perceptions.
Exactly again.
----------------------------
Following Russell, one might also ask where the temporal "paradoxes"
of relativity come from in the Kantian universe. Clocks on GPS
satellites have to be set to run slower than clocks on Earth because
of relativity. The effect is actually twofold: satellite time runs a)
slower because of the satellite's velocity relative to the ground (an
effect of Special relativity) and b) faster because of their higher
position in the Earth's gravitational field (General relativity); the
net effect is that the on-board clocks appear to run faster and thus
have to be set to run slower to remain in sync. How could this happen,
if time is a "form of intuition"? Where do these remarkable properties
of time come from? Why do we have them? What use are they?
ISTM that the resolution of Kant's time and space antinomies is to
recognize that time and space may have an independent existence *and*
give rise to internal contradictions in our conception of them. This
could happen if our intuitions about space and time are only
terrestrial approximations; the Theory of Evolution makes this
plausible. Taking this view, an eighteenth century critic of Kant
could have argued that, in the fullness of time, scientific inquiry
would require wholly new, counter intuitive conceptions of space and
time, which would resolve the antimonies. Kant would not have
conceived of such an argument since he thought that Newtonian physics
(with its associated conceptions of space and time) was the final word
on the nature of the universe.
Mal
> On Feb 23, 8:30 am, Eppur Si <eppu...@live.com> wrote:
>
> > Mal's argument does not really address Russell's objection.
>
> I think Mal does not understand the Russell quote, or Kant, for that
> matter.
>
> > Space and
> > time may or may not be a priori aspects of human cognition. Kant
> > doesn't really convince me, becuase his argument seems to be "Because
> > I said so!"
>
> I think you go too far here; Kant did have an argument - from the
> internal contradictions (which he calls an "antinomies") implicit in
> the way in which we conceive space and time. Here is his time argument
> (from CofPR):
>
Dude, you have skipped the entire Aesthetic, the Deduction of the
Categories,
the Schema, the Refutation of Idealism, and the Amphibolies - when the
argument regarding space occurred way back in the Aesthetic.
Mal
That statement is way, way off target. Part of the approach Kant took
in the Aesthetic was to take Newtonian Space and Time to task. He also
moved against Leibniz's treatment of the same subject in the same
section, as well as Aristotle's.
http://www.radicalacademy.com/philkant1.htm
"Now, for Kant, space and time are not realities existing in
themselves,
as Newton believed, nor are they realities coming from experience, as
Aristotle maintained."
Read the Aesthetic. Try to learn from it. Do your homework. I've been
active in this forum since 1998, and I've done my homework.
Occidental
> Read the Aesthetic. Try to learn from it. Do your homework. I've been
> active in this forum since 1998, and I've done my homework.
Was this part of it?
------------------------
The positive contributions of Immanuel Kant to the Perennial
Philosophy
None. But despite errors, absurdities, and contradictions, Kant's
philosophy has exercised a tremendous influence upon human thinking
for over a century and a half. It exhibits the roots of those
weaknesses we have come to regard as characteristic of what is loosely
called "the German philosophy." It refuses to face reality (witness
the wholly subjectivistic character of knowledge); it unduly stresses
the ego (witness the inner and autonomous character of knowledge and
morality); it proclaims the perfectibility of the will, upon which the
followers of Kant were soon to harp most strongly -- and from
Nietzsche to Hitler we are to hear of "the will to power," the will
which makes "the superman" and "the master race."
http://www.radicalacademy.com/philkant2.htm
-----------------------
Mal
> On Feb 23, 4:42 pm, Mal <male...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Read the Aesthetic. Try to learn from it. Do your homework. I've been
> > active in this forum since 1998, and I've done my homework.
>
> Was this part of it?
>
> http://www.radicalacademy.com/philkant2.htm
Please try to maintain your concentration here. The page I cited
ended in philkant1.htm, not philkant2.htm.
Occidental
But the one is part of the other (at least in the phenomenal world).
If you cite an authority you are bound by whatever that authority
says, Sorry dude. Better luck next time.
Mal
You're a sophomore at which school now?
Occidental
Read a lot of Oscar Wilde, do you Mal?
Mal
No. What's your problem? You waltzed onto this forum, asked a
question (perhaps not a very valid one), and didn't like the answer
I gave?
The answer is: none of the Kant defenders I know about care
about Russell's criticism, probably because they are too busy laughing
at his complete lack of comprehension. So I gave you an answer.
Now, what more do you want from me?
Eppur Si
large for our concept, which, consisting as it does in a successive
regress, can never reach the whole eternity that has elapsed. Or
suppose that the world has a beginning, it will then, in the necessary
empirical regress, be too small for the concept of the understanding.
For since the beginning still presupposes a time which precedes it, it
is still not unconditioned; and the law of the empirical employment of
the understanding therefore obliges us to look for a higher temporal
condition; and the world [as limited in time] is therefore obviously
too small for this law."
That is remarkably unconvincing. There are several epistemological
questions that are paradoxical and just plain unanswerable, including
predestination vs. free will, the existence of "first cause," and (as
per the quote above) created reality vs. eternal reality. I accept
that. But to cite one of those paradoxes and then say it proves that
there is a "higher temporal condition," translates to me into "Because
I said so!"
Any time a philosopher falls back to one of these inherently
unanswerable paradoxes, and then jumps from there to some far-from-
obvious conclusion, I tend to see it as the philosopher ducking any
challenge by wrapping up his reasoning in an inherently unchallengable
premise. It's like saying, "God wills it." You can't really argue
with that, but it isn't convincing either.
Eppur Si
really exist, and so as it turns out it is Russell's argument that is
not convincing since all one has to do is assert the contrary."
You can go ahead and "assert the contrary," but if you walk into a
wall, you will still bump your head. Try it, if you don't believe
me. The bump really exists, You can "assert the contrary," but it
still hurts your head.
Occidental
> Mal quotes: "First, that the world has no beginning: it is then too
Actually, the quote was posted by moi.
> That is remarkably unconvincing. There are several epistemological
> questions that are paradoxical and just plain unanswerable, including
> predestination vs. free will, the existence of "first cause," and (as
> per the quote above) created reality vs. eternal reality.
Kant wraps all these up in a box called "the noumenon".
Eppur Si
>
> - Show quoted text -
My mistake Occi. I should have known it wasn't Mal because his
response to every argument seems to be: "You haven't read all of
Kant, so you don't know what you're talking about." When I teach my
writing class, I tell students that if they can't reduce something to
writing in clear and plain terms, then they just don't understand what
they are trying to say. I would like to see Mal make an argument,
rather than give us a Bibliography.
Mal
Eppur Si appears to be a sock puppet for Occidental. All I'm saying
is that you need to do your Kant homework. If you can't, then
just continue blathering to your sock puppet.
Mal
This type of sock puppet response doesn't need to be given a
Kantian response. A mere epistemic skeptic could deal with the
question of bumping into a wall.
Eppur Si
imperative give any guidance on the use of ad hominim attack? Does
such a response treat one's interlocutor as an end in himself, or
merely as a means to salve one's own ego? Can one will that every
response in a discussion group be posted in such a way and from such a
motive, without the very idea of the discussion group becoming
contradictory? Since Mal has read his Kant from cover to cover, I'm
sure he will let me know. It seems pretty obvious to me, but what do
I know? I'm a sock puppet.
J. Horikx
>Bertrand Russell, to judge by the chapter in his History of Western
>Philosophy, had a low opinion of Kant (eg he writes "Hume, by his
>criticism of the concept of causality, awakened [Kant] from his
>dogmatic slumbers, so at least he says, but the awakening was only
>temporary and he soon invented a soporific that enabled him to sleep
>again")
>Here is Russell's objection to Kant's theory of space - the notion
>that space is a "form of intuition", ie an ordering principle
>generated by the mind to make perception possible, but having no
>existence in itself:
>"There is here, as throughout Kant's theory of the subjectivity of
>space and time, a difficulty which he seems to have never felt. What
>induces me to arrange objects of perception as I do rather than
>otherwise? Why, for instance, do I always see people's eyes above
>their mouths and not below them? According to Kant, the eyes and the
>mouth exist as things in themselves
Where do Kant say so? (Besides that, things like mouths and eyes and
ears etc have been formed, that is made into existence out of other
things, how could they be the things in themselves when you are not
a philosophical realist?)
> and cause my separate percepts,
>but nothing in them corresponds to the spatial arrangement that exists
>in my perception."
>This seems a rather obvious objection, and it is likely that Kant or
>his later apologists dealt with it. Anyone know how it is overcome?
I do not really see the real ground or the depth of the objection,
It reminds me of "objections" of people who say that all philosophy
is nonsense because we can not be certain of the fact that the way I
see blue or yellow, is the same as you see it, there is no way to
straighten that up either.
JH
J. Horikx
>Mal's argument does not really address Russell's objection. Space and
>time may or may not be a priori aspects of human cognition. Kant
>doesn't really convince me, becuase his argument seems to be "Because
>I said so!" Russell is saying that whether or not space and time are
>inherent in human cognition, they do not exist SOLELY in human
>cognition.
That is, according to Kant, because time and space are _really_ the
things that people use to arrange all experience.
> To whatever extent there is a real world which interacts
>with our minds (and Kant affirms that there is one), space and time
>are ACTUAL aspects of that real world as we perceive it, not just
>because we perceive it. In other words, space and time really exist
>(to the extent that one accepts that anything really exists), rather
>than being purely constructs of the mind by which we order our
>perceptions.
>And, by the way, I have no difficulty conceiving of something (the
>color blue, for example) without reference to space or time. That
>shouldn't be possible, according to Kant.
Why not? Call it: "inner experience", but Kant says that : "...For
this purpose (that is, we are doing real science an we do not commit
ourselves only with fancies, JH), we must prove, that our internal
and, to Descartes, indubitable experience is itself possible
only under the previous assumption of external experience".
>And I don't know about you Bud, but if I walk further than the
>distance to the wall in front of me, I bump my head.
JH
J. Horikx
>Mal says: "Russell only asserts that space and time
But is has already been proven that space and time doesnt really
exist as (empirical) things as such (in themselves), they are at
least interconnected, see Einstein. Nowadays things turn out to be
even more interwoven and complicated (dark matter, dark energy,
weigt of the absolute vacuum etc.)
JH