a failure of consequentialism
kamerynn
In this post, I will be using "consequentialism" to mean any moral theory,
except character utilitarianism, that places moral value in the consequences
of actions (other forms of utilitarianism do this, for example). Despite its
widespread following and implementation, I believe that consequentialism is
false, and will use a narrow account of hypocrisy to show this.
I will be using "hypocrisy" to mean any act of intentional deception
in which the deceiver espouses a moral position that he does not
believe in or act according to (unless it is convenient for him to act
in accordance with it - because, say, his friends are around).
This is a narrow construal, as I've already noted - it purposely excludes
cases in which one espouses a moral position but simply does not act
according to it - perhaps being self-deceived about his own belief.
Hypocrisy is a part of contemporary meta-ethics; its precise definition is
still a matter of controversy. Instead of quibbling over the precise
(not too broad or narrow) definition of hypocrisy, I have provided one
that I believe will serve my present purpose, and will not point to any
actions that would provoke disagreement as to whether or not they are
hypocritical.
A *perfect* hypocrite I will define as a hypocrite that never gets
caught. In other words, he continues to prescribe acting according
to a moral principle while not actually believing in it. He will not
act according to the principle himself unless others are around,
and there is a chance that those others will reveal his true nature
to those he preaches to. It just so happens, for the perfect hypocrite,
that those he preaches the moral principle to are never made aware
of the fact that he doesn't believe in it.
To be sure, bad consequences may result from his not acting
in accordance with the principle. A utilitarian, then, could point
toward these undesirable consequences and make the assertion
that Jones, the perfect hypocrite, is acting immorally in those
cases. But, can a utilitarian, or any consequentialist, assert that
Jones' *hypocrisy* is immoral? In order to do so, a utilitarian
must point toward the undesirable consequences of Jones' hypocrisy.
Suppose that Jones' preaching of the moral principle has no bad
consequences itself - suppose that his preaching results in others
following the principle, and so it has *good* consequences. The
utilitarian has no recourse - he must assert that Jones' *preaching*
(that is, his hypocrisy) has only good consequences, and thus is
a moral act. But, hypocrisy is not a moral act, so consequentialism
(including non-character utilitarianism) must be false.
The above argument is of the form:
1) Consequentialism says that X is moral
2) X is not moral
3) so, consequentialism must be false
One might object: "but, utilitarianism, for example, is a
theory that defines what is moral and what isn't. Saying that
hypocrisy is immoral is like putting the cart before the horse."
The fact of the matter is, hypocrisy, murder, rape, and other
things are immoral no matter what utilitarianism says. The
cart is not put before the horse - one cannot allow for this
counter argument. If one did, then one would have no argument
against the most immoral of theories, just in case those theories
were otherwise reasonable. A theory could prescribe murder
and rape as its moral tenants, and all we should have to say to
the theorist is, "that's not a proper moral theory - it prescribes
immoral acts." We can only say this because of the general
consensus on the fact that rape and murder are not moral.
That's exactly what I'm asserting of utilitarianism and other
forms of consequentialism - they are not proper moral
theories because they find perfect hypocrisy to be a good
thing, and there is a general consensus that hypocrisy is immoral.
Kamerynn
Qexugir
something. At one time, most people believed the earth was flat, and it is highly
unlikely that the earth was, indeed, flat in those days and only came to be
spherical recently. So while hypocrisy makes a person difficult to deal with, the
existence of a general consensus on the immorality of hypocrisy does not establish
its immorality.
Also, I have doubts about this general consensus. There is a principle of Islam
which says that, when a Moslem is threatened with death because of his religion, he
is free to deny being a Moslem (and might even be commanded by religious law to do
so). Given the existence of more than a billion Moslems on earth right now, I
think that puts a huge dent in your assertion of a general consensus.
Qexugir
Philip Baker
writes
Can you give us an example of a real life hypocrite whose behaviour has
had nothing but good consequences? I find that obvious hypocrites quite
often occur in literature but are rather difficult to identify in real
life.
--
Philip Baker
http://textual.net/link.to/amazon/critical_thinking
Humanist
The problem with this argument is that character utilitarianism fails the same
test (unless God is among the jury): a perfect hypocrit's immorality is
undetectable not only by consequentialists but also by any (common mortal)
character utilitarian. If armed with the same omniscience you're reserving to
the character utilitarian, the consequentialist would also be able to perceive
the immoral behavior and condemn it accordingly.
kamerynn
Qexugir wrote:
> I have only one comment: A general consensus does not establilsh the truth of
> something.
Kam:
But, we are not merely talking about a general "something," here.
To be sure, consensus does not establish the truth of matters of fact.
But, we are not talking about matters of fact, here (such as the flatness
of the earth, for example).
> At one time, most people believed the earth was flat, and it is highly
> unlikely that the earth was, indeed, flat in those days and only came to be
> spherical recently. So while hypocrisy makes a person difficult to deal with, the
> existence of a general consensus on the immorality of hypocrisy does not establish
> its immorality.
Kam:
Value statements cannot be derived from factual statements (one
cannot derive an ought from an is - ala Hume). Values - morals -
are not inherent in the state of nature; morality comes from *us*.
Either consensus in a culture decides the morality of a culture, or
else morality does not exist - for it has no other place to come from.
> Also, I have doubts about this general consensus. There is a principle of Islam
> which says that, when a Moslem is threatened with death because of his religion, he
> is free to deny being a Moslem (and might even be commanded by religious law to do
> so). Given the existence of more than a billion Moslems on earth right now, I
> think that puts a huge dent in your assertion of a general consensus.
Kam:
Not at all. How that Moslem's actions are morally valued by his peers,
by his very culture, is definitely decided on by general consensus. Again,
this is the *only* possible basis for morality, since morals cannot be
derived from facts.
kamerynn
Philip Baker wrote:
>
> Can you give us an example of a real life hypocrite whose behaviour has
> had nothing but good consequences? I find that obvious hypocrites quite
> often occur in literature but are rather difficult to identify in real
> life.
Kam:
I cannot give such an example. Of course, I do not have to
give such an example to support the argument I gave. It is
sufficient to say, against a moral theory, that *if* there were
such a person, then the moral theory would incorrectly assess
the moral status of his actions. Hence, the moral theory does
not (necessarily) correctly assess the moral status of actions.
This is a problem for the theory - most likely a systemic one.
kamerynn
Kam:
But remember: the consequentialist values actions according to the
consequences that result from them. Thus, the consequentialist will not
perceive the behavior as immoral because the behavior has good
consequences (maximizing happiness, for example).
The character utilitarian, however, says that we ought to value
character traits if they *tend* to produce good consequences.
Hypocrisy does not *tend* to produce good consequences, even
though it might do so in this special case.
In fact, any indirect form of utilitarianism avoids my argument.
Rule utilitarians, for example, believe that rules ought to be held
if and only if they tend to maximize utility. "Act hypocritically"
is not such a rule, even though it may maximize utility in a certain,
special case.
Qexugir
kamerynn wrote:
> Qexugir wrote:
>
> > I have only one comment: A general consensus does not establilsh the truth of
> > something.
>
> Kam:
> But, we are not merely talking about a general "something," here.
> To be sure, consensus does not establish the truth of matters of fact.
> But, we are not talking about matters of fact, here (such as the flatness
> of the earth, for example).
I reject the distinction between "facts" and "values" as baseless. Put simply:
separating "fact" from "value" is sort of like separating the sodium from the chlorine -
you lose the salt in the process. That, however, is a different thread, and I'd be
willing to join it, but am not motivated to start it.
Since your entire reply to my reply seems to be based on the facts/values distinction,
and I don't accept that distinction, I have to reject your whole reply as based on a
false assumption. Please try to forgive me.
Qexugir
Humanist
Thanks for clarifying. I now agree with you about the flaws of "pure"
consequentialism.
My problem with character utilitarianism is that evaluating character traits
is an imperfect&subjective business. Theoretically, it is the "answer" to
the moral problem but in practical terms, since humans lack Spock's mind
melting capability, we can only analyze traits statistically in terms of
known prior behavior,etc with a low degree of certitude, with the exception
of extreme examples.
Brian Fletcher
Snip.......
>
> Kam:
> Value statements cannot be derived from factual statements (one
> cannot derive an ought from an is - ala Hume). Values - morals -
> are not inherent in the state of nature; morality comes from *us*.
> Either consensus in a culture decides the morality of a culture, or
> else morality does not exist - for it has no other place to come from.
So many, in their reasoning seperate *us* from nature.
It is interesting to contemplate the significance of events if one considers
the fact that *we* are in fact, "part of nature"
Brian
Brian Fletcher
Snip...
> Theoretically, it is the "answer" to
> the moral problem but in practical terms, since humans lack Spock's mind
> melting capability, we can only analyze traits statistically in terms of
> known prior behavior,etc with a low degree of certitude, with the
exception
> of extreme examples.
"Free Radicles" do not just exist at the atomic level. ;-))
Brian
>
Humanist
I don't see the connection between free radicals and verifiability of
character traits. Perhaps you could elaborate. In the meantime, I'll settle
for a moral uncertainty principle :)
Brian Fletcher
"Humanist" <x@y.z> wrote in message
news:3e538fa4$0$15524$45be...@newscene.com...
Hehehehe...wondering what th consequences will be ehhhh ;-).
A good friend, and spiritual 'warrior', who is also a biochemist, was
explaining the role of the free radical to me some years ago...(sp check
complete....my handwritten spelling is far greater than my keyboard
version.... ;-).....
I saw another example of the situation "as above so below". That when I was
going through the "individualisation initiation", the very process caused
destruction in those around me.
The destruction, was , of course, their illusions. This is a universal
"stage". They saw my views as "radical". I also knew I was tasting freedom
for the first time.
Brian
>
kamerynn
Qexugir wrote:
> kamerynn wrote:
>
> > Qexugir wrote:
> >
> > > I have only one comment: A general consensus does not establilsh the truth of
> > > something.
> >
> > Kam:
> > But, we are not merely talking about a general "something," here.
> > To be sure, consensus does not establish the truth of matters of fact.
> > But, we are not talking about matters of fact, here (such as the flatness
> > of the earth, for example).
>
> I reject the distinction between "facts" and "values" as baseless. Put simply:
> separating "fact" from "value" is sort of like separating the sodium from the chlorine -
> you lose the salt in the process. That, however, is a different thread, and I'd be
> willing to join it, but am not motivated to start it.
>
> Since your entire reply to my reply seems to be based on the facts/values distinction,
> and I don't accept that distinction, I have to reject your whole reply as based on a
> false assumption. Please try to forgive me.
I have no problem with the fact that you have your philosophical
biases - I have mine, after all :-) I may start that thread, someday -
but I wish to deal with what I've already started, first. For now, we
will simply have to agree to disagree. Until then, Qexugir,
Kamerynn
kamerynn
Brian Fletcher wrote:
Kam:
Let's do just that. I must then reformulate my previous statement...
- values come from us, not from any other part of nature.
... and my argument doesn't change. Morality is still a human
invention, and moral theories must either correspond with that
invention, or fail to correspond with it.
kamerynn
Humanist wrote:
> Thanks for clarifying. I now agree with you about the flaws of "pure"
> consequentialism.
> My problem with character utilitarianism is that evaluating character traits
> is an imperfect&subjective business.
Kam:
It sure is. In theory, theories work in practice. But, in practice...
Character utilitarianism is a tool that one can use to evaluate one's
self - but that's all. One cannot know what character traits another
is operating according to, just as one cannot *know* another's intentions,
but only speculate.
> Theoretically, it is the "answer" to
> the moral problem but in practical terms, since humans lack Spock's mind
> melting capability,
Kam:
Isn't that "mind melding?" Yes - that is exactly the problem.
We do not have access to the inner states (intentions, character
traits, etc.) of others. But, a character utilitarian may not find
that too problematic. They would still say, "develop those
character traits that tend to maximize utility, and then act
according to them." They believe that this is a good moral
principle, even if they cannot judge how successful another
is at following the principle. They seem to have a fairly strong
position...
Immortalist
"kamerynn" <askifne...@me.com> wrote in message
news:3E51467A...@me.com...
This all seem more an argument about what to do with the consequential
nature of space, time, and fluxing organizations. Evolution is an trial and
error process that somehow incorperates symbols of consequences into it's
structure somehow and in a way that when the system configuration meets
similar circumstances an resistence is offered by the priorely changed
internal organization. Some applications of Consequentialism break free of
Godel's axiom problem. Evolving processes can mutate new axioms and select
which work best. This consequentialism is the secret to like, we don't just
have a black box, but a black box with a few holes in it, holes that we can
stick our leavers down into and through parallel series of chain reactions
steer the mystery any way we want without ever getting inside it ourselves.
Who knows what consequentialism will discover while running its programs on
matter in the universal computer.
Humanist
Ah. Mind melding it must be :>
I understand character utilitarianism to be a framework for moral evaluation of
good and evi, that actions are not to be viewed independently, they are to be
linked to the root-cause character trait responsible for triggering the
behavior, and the character trait itself is to be labeled good/evil.
But based on (what seems to me to be) the unorthodox definition above c.u is
portrayed as a self-evualation and self-improvement tool rather than a framwork
for moral judgement.
JusUK
> > The fact of the matter is, hypocrisy, murder, rape, and other
> > things are immoral no matter what utilitarianism says. The
> > cart is not put before the horse - one cannot allow for this
> > counter argument. If one did, then one would have no argument
> > against the most immoral of theories, just in case those theories
> > were otherwise reasonable. A theory could prescribe murder
> > and rape as its moral tenants, and all we should have to say to
> > the theorist is, "that's not a proper moral theory - it prescribes
> > immoral acts." We can only say this because of the general
> > consensus on the fact that rape and murder are not moral.
> > That's exactly what I'm asserting of utilitarianism and other
> > forms of consequentialism - they are not proper moral
> > theories because they find perfect hypocrisy to be a good
> > thing, and there is a general consensus that hypocrisy is immoral.
> >
> > Kamerynn
> >
>
or human culture but are universal in their nature. For instance the
principle that if you expect others to follow your advice you should really
be following it yourself if it as applicable for you, i.e. non-hypocrisy,
and on that basis you should only give advice worth following. I think a lot
of 'moral' rules are as much for the protection of the person in danger of
breaking them as their victims and if you believe in Karma this would extend
to any 'wrong' action. Certainly hypocrisy can be imagined to have a severe
effect on the character of the hypocrite and could conceivably lead to
serious mental illness I would think as well as an eventual exposure and
loss of reputation etc.
John Jones
kamerynn
<snip>
> Humanist wrote:
> >> Theoretically, it is the "answer" to
> >> the moral problem but in practical terms, since humans lack Spock's mind
> >> melting capability,
> >
> >Kam:
> > Isn't that "mind melding?" Yes - that is exactly the problem.
> >We do not have access to the inner states (intentions, character
> >traits, etc.) of others. But, a character utilitarian may not find
> >that too problematic. They would still say, "develop those
> >character traits that tend to maximize utility, and then act
> >according to them." They believe that this is a good moral
> >principle, even if they cannot judge how successful another
> >is at following the principle. They seem to have a fairly strong
> >position...
> >
> >> we can only analyze traits statistically in terms of
> >> known prior behavior,etc with a low degree of certitude, with the exception
> >> of extreme examples.
>
> Ah. Mind melding it must be :>
>
> I understand character utilitarianism to be a framework for moral evaluation of
> good and evi, that actions are not to be viewed independently, they are to be
> linked to the root-cause character trait responsible for triggering the
> behavior, and the character trait itself is to be labeled good/evil.
Kam:
I believe you understand character utilitarianism quite
well.
> But based on (what seems to me to be) the unorthodox definition above c.u is
> portrayed as a self-evualation and self-improvement tool rather than a framwork
> for moral judgement.
Kam:
It ought to be both. Of course, a character utilitarian looks
at character traits whenever a direct utilitarian is looking at actions.
Actions are accessible to all viewers, while character traits are
internal to a person. It's true that character utilitarianism suffers
from this - but that does not necessarily mean that it isn't a
framework for moral judgement. It is certainly harder to judge
another's character than it is to judge their mere action - but
that difficulty shouldn't be viewed as disqualifying character
utilitarianism as a good moral theory. Perhaps character
utilitarians are right - good actions spring from good people,
and it's hard to tell whether or not one is a good person.
All moral theories ought to function as self-evaluation
and self-improvement tools - but must also be frameworks
of moral judgment in order to properly fulfill that function.
After all, judging our actions (and, the character traits they
spring from) is a part of evaluating them and of possibly
improving them.
Ron Peterson
> It ought to be both. Of course, a character utilitarian looks
> at character traits whenever a direct utilitarian is looking at actions.
> Actions are accessible to all viewers, while character traits are
> internal to a person. It's true that character utilitarianism suffers
> from this - but that does not necessarily mean that it isn't a
> framework for moral judgement. It is certainly harder to judge
> another's character than it is to judge their mere action - but
> that difficulty shouldn't be viewed as disqualifying character
> utilitarianism as a good moral theory. Perhaps character
> utilitarians are right - good actions spring from good people,
> and it's hard to tell whether or not one is a good person.
Unfortunately, evil actions also spring from good people.
> All moral theories ought to function as self-evaluation
> and self-improvement tools - but must also be frameworks
> of moral judgment in order to properly fulfill that function.
What do you see as the purposes of a moral theory?
> After all, judging our actions (and, the character traits they
> spring from) is a part of evaluating them and of possibly
> improving them.
Can we judge our own actions honestly? If I were on trial for some
alleged crime, I would like to be my own judge.
--
Ron
Ron Peterson
> Kam is it not possible that some moral principles are not created by humans
> or human culture but are universal in their nature. ...
I don't think that we can say any moral principles are universal for
all species of animals, but some of the moral principles are very
similar and looking at other species can give us some insight as to
what morality is.
For instance, one colony of monkeys has a moral principle that any
food that is found should be shared. If a monkey finds some food, but
doesn't let out a cry to share the food, and is observed by another
monkey, the monkey that found the food is punished.
I think that we need to look at moral principles as a social code of
conduct. Particularly, those principles that are of benefit to the
group.
--
Ron
kamerynn
> kamerynn <askifne...@me.com> wrote in message news:<3E55A940...@me.com>...
>
> > It ought to be both. Of course, a character utilitarian looks
> > at character traits whenever a direct utilitarian is looking at actions.
> > Actions are accessible to all viewers, while character traits are
> > internal to a person. It's true that character utilitarianism suffers
> > from this - but that does not necessarily mean that it isn't a
> > framework for moral judgement. It is certainly harder to judge
> > another's character than it is to judge their mere action - but
> > that difficulty shouldn't be viewed as disqualifying character
> > utilitarianism as a good moral theory. Perhaps character
> > utilitarians are right - good actions spring from good people,
> > and it's hard to tell whether or not one is a good person.
> Ron Peterson wrote:
>
> Unfortunately, evil actions also spring from good people.
Kam:
A character utilitarian can consistently believe such - one
may also consistently believe that good actions spring from
evil people. The character utilitarian merely asserts that
good character traits are the ones that *tend* to produce
good actions. Occasionally, they may produce evil actions,
but that doesn't, for the character utilitarian, disqualify them
as good character traits as long as those traits maximize
happiness in the long run (i.e. tend to maximize happiness).
>
> > All moral theories ought to function as self-evaluation
> > and self-improvement tools - but must also be frameworks
> > of moral judgment in order to properly fulfill that function.
> Ron Peterson wrote:
>
> What do you see as the purposes of a moral theory?
Kam:
I believe that your question has no easy answer.
Perhaps a moral theory's only purpose is to describe,
in objective terms, the moral beliefs of a given culture.
According to deontologists like Kant, morality consists
of those prescriptive statements that can be derived from
reason alone. In this case, the purpose of a moral theory
seems to have something to do with reason worship.
Perhaps maximizing happiness is its own purpose. I'm
reminded of the hedonistic utilitarians as well of the
Greeks, here (happiness = morality = beauty). So,
perhaps moral theories merely describe those actions
which are in our best interests (but... I doubt it).
The purpose of a moral theory is undoubtedly tied
to the motives of its creator.
For me, it isn't important what I do with philosophy,
but what phil. does with me - moral theory included. So, for me,
one of the purposes of philosophy is self-development.
It certainly isn't its only purpose, however - philosophy
is a large part of the history of science, psychology,
linguistics, or what have you. Philosophy should be
considered to be force for "progress."
>
>
> > After all, judging our actions (and, the character traits they
> > spring from) is a part of evaluating them and of possibly
> > improving them.
> Ron Peterson wrote:
>
> Can we judge our own actions honestly? If I were on trial for some
> alleged crime, I would like to be my own judge.
Kam:
Yes, we can judge our own actions honestly - we can also
fail to do so. Even though we may sometimes fail, we should
not be discouraged. We ought to continue to try to become
better people.
One has access to his inner states - and if one can stave off
self-deception for long enough, then one might benefit from using
a character utilitarian approach to assess one's own actions.
kamerynn
> > > The fact of the matter is, hypocrisy, murder, rape, and other
> > > things are immoral no matter what utilitarianism says. The
> > > cart is not put before the horse - one cannot allow for this
> > > counter argument. If one did, then one would have no argument
> > > against the most immoral of theories, just in case those theories
> > > were otherwise reasonable. A theory could prescribe murder
> > > and rape as its moral tenants, and all we should have to say to
> > > the theorist is, "that's not a proper moral theory - it prescribes
> > > immoral acts." We can only say this because of the general
> > > consensus on the fact that rape and murder are not moral.
> > > That's exactly what I'm asserting of utilitarianism and other
> > > forms of consequentialism - they are not proper moral
> > > theories because they find perfect hypocrisy to be a good
> > > thing, and there is a general consensus that hypocrisy is immoral.
> > >
> > > Kamerynn
> JusUK wrote:
>
> Kam is it not possible that some moral principles are not created by humans
> or human culture but are universal in their nature. For instance the
> principle that if you expect others to follow your advice you should really
> be following it yourself if it as applicable for you, i.e. non-hypocrisy,
> and on that basis you should only give advice worth following.
Kam:
The principle of non-hypocrisy that you propose does not
seem universal in nature; it presupposes that one ought not lie.
Without that presupposition, we cannot say that preaching a
belief without practicing it (or believing in it) is immoral, can we?
It seems pretty self-evident that, as you state, one should
follow one's own advice if one expects others to do the same.
That may be true, but that doesn't necessarily mean that one
*ought* to follow one's own advice. *If* one wishes others to
follow his advice, *then* one follows his own advice. So, we
can say that "one should follow his own advice *if* one wants
others to do the same." But, we cannot yet say that "one should
follow one's own advice...period."
> I think a lot
> of 'moral' rules are as much for the protection of the person in danger of
> breaking them as their victims and if you believe in Karma this would extend
> to any 'wrong' action.
Kam:
It's like giving a person the mental tools to protect himself from
unhappiness. I believe that being a good person is in one's own
best interests - and that seems to be what you're stating as well. Being
good seems to have "happy consequences," while being evil seems
to have "unhappy consequences." Of course, sociopaths are excluded
from this point - they do not operate on the same psychological
principles as the rest of us.
> Certainly hypocrisy can be imagined to have a severe
> effect on the character of the hypocrite and could conceivably lead to
> serious mental illness I would think as well as an eventual exposure and
> loss of reputation etc.
Kam:
It sure could - and utilitarians defending their position are quick
to bring that up. "Hypocrisy has bad consequences," says the
utilitarian. Ahh... but, what about the hypocrite that never gets
caught, and never suffers from any (even slightly) disabling mental
illness? Is his hypocrisy still immoral, mr. utilitarian? If so, it isn't
because of the hypocrisy's consequences... so maximizing happiness
is really beside the point...
JusUK
I've noticed that theoretical and hypothetical (thank you spellchecker!)
situations can often be misleading. Is it really possible that such a person
would suffer no psychological damage over time or even that they would not
eventually get caught out. Some might argue that a person who puts
themselves in such a position must already be somewhat compromised.
Intuitively it, the hypothetical situation, seems possible but intuition can
sometimes be very misleading also. I suppose if it does occasionally happen
then it might be said "the exception proves the rule".
>
>
Jesse Nowells
On Mon, 24 Feb 2003, kamerynn wrote:
> It seems pretty self-evident that, as you state, one should follow
> one's own advice if one expects others to do the same. That may be
> true, but that doesn't necessarily mean that one *ought* to follow
> one's own advice. *If* one wishes others to follow his advice, *then*
> one follows his own advice.
Not necessasrily. The advice given might be only applicable to the person
it is addressed to rather than the person who gives it. Following ones own
advice might not be applicable to other people.
Ron Peterson
> > Ron Peterson wrote:
> > Unfortunately, evil actions also spring from good people.
> Kam:
> A character utilitarian can consistently believe such - one
> may also consistently believe that good actions spring from
> evil people. The character utilitarian merely asserts that
> good character traits are the ones that *tend* to produce
> good actions. Occasionally, they may produce evil actions,
> but that doesn't, for the character utilitarian, disqualify them
> as good character traits as long as those traits maximize
> happiness in the long run (i.e. tend to maximize happiness).
I think that categorizing people doesn't solve the problems of moral
philosophy and only compounds them. It's not a good idea to say that
it's moral for good people to kill evil people.
> > Ron Peterson wrote:
> > What do you see as the purposes of a moral theory?
> Kam:
> I believe that your question has no easy answer.
> Perhaps a moral theory's only purpose is to describe,
> in objective terms, the moral beliefs of a given culture.
I can see that matches up with my idea that a moral theory should
develop a morality (a set of moral principles) that when followed is
beneficial to society.
> According to deontologists like Kant, morality consists
> of those prescriptive statements that can be derived from
> reason alone. In this case, the purpose of a moral theory
> seems to have something to do with reason worship.
Kant would have been much better if he would have also included
knowledge in addtion to reason.
> Perhaps maximizing happiness is its own purpose. I'm
> reminded of the hedonistic utilitarians as well of the
> Greeks, here (happiness = morality = beauty). So,
> perhaps moral theories merely describe those actions
> which are in our best interests (but... I doubt it).
I don't see why anyone should doubt that humanist approach.
> The purpose of a moral theory is undoubtedly tied
> to the motives of its creator.
Yes, moralities to reflect the motives of their creators, but it seems
best if moralities be developed as an informed consensus.
> For me, it isn't important what I do with philosophy,
> but what phil. does with me - moral theory included. So, for me,
> one of the purposes of philosophy is self-development.
> It certainly isn't its only purpose, however - philosophy
> is a large part of the history of science, psychology,
> linguistics, or what have you. Philosophy should be
> considered to be force for "progress."
Good points.
> > Ron Peterson wrote:
> > Can we judge our own actions honestly? If I were on trial for some
> > alleged crime, I would like to be my own judge.
> Kam:
> Yes, we can judge our own actions honestly - we can also
> fail to do so. Even though we may sometimes fail, we should
> not be discouraged. We ought to continue to try to become
> better people.
> One has access to his inner states - and if one can stave off
> self-deception for long enough, then one might benefit from using
> a character utilitarian approach to assess one's own actions.
I think life is easier if one respects others rather than trying to
get all one can for oneself.
--
Ron
kamerynn
Ron Peterson wrote:
> kamerynn <askifne...@me.com> wrote in message news:<3E5AD9F9...@me.com>...
>
> > > Ron Peterson wrote:
>
> > > Unfortunately, evil actions also spring from good people.
>
> > Kam:
> > A character utilitarian can consistently believe such - one
> > may also consistently believe that good actions spring from
> > evil people. The character utilitarian merely asserts that
> > good character traits are the ones that *tend* to produce
> > good actions. Occasionally, they may produce evil actions,
> > but that doesn't, for the character utilitarian, disqualify them
> > as good character traits as long as those traits maximize
> > happiness in the long run (i.e. tend to maximize happiness).
>
> I think that categorizing people doesn't solve the problems of moral
> philosophy and only compounds them. It's not a good idea to say that
> it's moral for good people to kill evil people.
Kam:
I see this as a good reply to character utilitarianism. It is of the
same form as the argument against consequentialism that I gave
earlier. Character utilitarianism says that immoral actions are
actually moral, and thus C.U. must be false. It says that immoral
actions are actually moral because it allows for hypocrisy/double
standards - it says that it's ok for good people to kill, but not
for bad people to do the same.
>
> > > Ron Peterson wrote:
>
> > > What do you see as the purposes of a moral theory?
>
> > Kam:
> > I believe that your question has no easy answer.
> > Perhaps a moral theory's only purpose is to describe,
> > in objective terms, the moral beliefs of a given culture.
>
> I can see that matches up with my idea that a moral theory should
> develop a morality (a set of moral principles) that when followed is
> beneficial to society.
Kam:
I agree to an extent - but morality seems to be something
more, and moral theory should reflect that. I believe that it's
moral to hide Jews from Nazis, even if one must lie to do so.
Is such a lie beneficial to society? Hitler certainly didn't think
so - and all of the wasps (white, Anglo-Saxon protestants) that
society was composed of tended to agree. It seems that
eliminating Jews was beneficial to society, at least in society's
opinion.
Such are the reasons why I cannot make the leap towards
a view of cultural relativity - even some culturally acceptable
deeds are morally reprehensible. A cultural relativist, of course,
would simply accuse me of imposing my culture on the
practices of others in another culture. But, I'm not about to
concede, saying, "I guess you're right - what the Nazis did
was actually just fine, and we have no reason or authority to
stop them." In my opinion, if cultural relativism requires me
to make that statement, then cultural relativism is hogwash
to some degree. It seems to me that a synthesis is needed
between what is right about cultural relativism and what is
right about "objective" moral theories.
>
> > According to deontologists like Kant, morality consists
> > of those prescriptive statements that can be derived from
> > reason alone. In this case, the purpose of a moral theory
> > seems to have something to do with reason worship.
>
> Kant would have been much better if he would have also included
> knowledge in addtion to reason.
Kam:
Sure, if only he could of let go of his idea of transcendental proof.
Then, he could have knowledge that isn't derived from reason
alone - knowledge of moral values, for example - which he
seems somewhat ignorant of because he believed that all morality
was discovered, not invented. Morality is invented, of course -
it does not exist separate from people, waiting for someone to
discover it. If it did exist separate from people, then we could
have no rational and informed disagreement about it.
>
> > Perhaps maximizing happiness is its own purpose. I'm
> > reminded of the hedonistic utilitarians as well of the
> > Greeks, here (happiness = morality = beauty). So,
> > perhaps moral theories merely describe those actions
> > which are in our best interests (but... I doubt it).
>
> I don't see why anyone should doubt that humanist approach.
Kam:
Only because many moral actions are not in everyone's
best interests. Some sociopaths only feel complete when
they are peeling the skin off of another living being - in this
case, happiness does not equal morality or beauty.
I'm not so sure that I'd call hedonistic utilitarianism - or
the Greek triad - a humanist approach.
>
> > The purpose of a moral theory is undoubtedly tied
> > to the motives of its creator.
>
> Yes, moralities to reflect the motives of their creators, but it seems
> best if moralities be developed as an informed consensus.
Kam:
Again, I agree to (a quite large) extent. Moralities must
also be developed according to reason. If a culture hold
unreasonable moral beliefs, then we can say of those beliefs
that they aren't moral ones. The Nazis, for example, didn't
realize that morality must apply to all people - the Jews cannot
be excluded. Moral principles must apply to people equally in
order to be moral principles - they otherwise lose their prescriptive
power and become mere prejudices.
>
> > For me, it isn't important what I do with philosophy,
> > but what phil. does with me - moral theory included. So, for me,
> > one of the purposes of philosophy is self-development.
> > It certainly isn't its only purpose, however - philosophy
> > is a large part of the history of science, psychology,
> > linguistics, or what have you. Philosophy should be
> > considered to be force for "progress."
>
> Good points.
>
> > > Ron Peterson wrote:
>
> > > Can we judge our own actions honestly? If I were on trial for some
> > > alleged crime, I would like to be my own judge.
>
> > Kam:
> > Yes, we can judge our own actions honestly - we can also
> > fail to do so. Even though we may sometimes fail, we should
> > not be discouraged. We ought to continue to try to become
> > better people.
> > One has access to his inner states - and if one can stave off
> > self-deception for long enough, then one might benefit from using
> > a character utilitarian approach to assess one's own actions.
>
> I think life is easier if one respects others rather than trying to
> get all one can for oneself.
Kam:
Aye. And respecting others ought to be part and
parcel to any moral theory, including C.U. If it isn't,
then C.U. is not a good moral theory. If we use C.U.
to become better people, it is because C.U. prescribes
respecting others.
kamerynn
Jesse Nowells wrote:
Kam:
That's fine. My point was merely that the position you are
arguing against doesn't refute my position (the position you are
arguing against is someone else's). Even if one should follow
one's advice (if one expects others to do the same), that does not
entail that one *ought* to follow one's own advice. One is a
statement of fact (whether it is true or not) - a statement about
how things actually are. The other is a statement of value - a
statement, not about how things merely are, but about how they
ought to be.
kamerynn
<big snip>
JusUK wrote:
> I've noticed that theoretical and hypothetical (thank you spellchecker!)
> situations can often be misleading. Is it really possible that such a person
> would suffer no psychological damage over time or even that they would not
> eventually get caught out. Some might argue that a person who puts
> themselves in such a position must already be somewhat compromised.
> Intuitively it, the hypothetical situation, seems possible but intuition can
> sometimes be very misleading also. I suppose if it does occasionally happen
> then it might be said "the exception proves the rule".
Kam:
I believe that hypothetical situations are not misleading when
applied to moral theory. Quite the opposite, I believe that they
can be elucidating and enlightening. Moral theory is supposed
to provide us with an answer to the question, "what should I do
if this happens?" That is simply the function of moral theory -
to tell us what to do in a situation. If there is some possible
situation that a moral theory cannot deal with, or deals with
wrongly, then the moral theory is incomplete or downright false.
When it comes to providing counter-examples, the exception
certainly does prove (disproves, actually) the rule. It takes only
one counter-example to destroy any theory, be it scientific or
philosophical.
Jesse Nowells
On Thu, 27 Feb 2003, kamerynn wrote:
>>> It seems pretty self-evident that, as you state, one should follow
>>> one's own advice if one expects others to do the same. That may be
>>> true, but that doesn't necessarily mean that one *ought* to follow
>>> one's own advice. *If* one wishes others to follow his advice, *then*
>>> one follows his own advice.
>> Not necessasrily. The advice given might be only applicable to the person
>> it is addressed to rather than the person who gives it. Following ones own
>> advice might not be applicable to other people.
> That's fine. My point was merely that the position you are arguing
> against doesn't refute my position (the position you are arguing
> against is someone else's). Even if one should follow one's advice
> (if one expects others to do the same), that does not entail that one
> *ought* to follow one's own advice. One is a statement of fact
> (whether it is true or not) - a statement about how things actually
> are. The other is a statement of value - a statement, not about how
> things merely are, but about how they ought to be.
What exactly here is a statement of fact? All these oughts & shoulds are
normative.
Ron Peterson
> Ron Peterson wrote:
I agree that cultural relativism doesn't solve the problem because a
morality developed to serve the interests of a particular group may
not match that of society. As your example shows, it is not a good
idea to declare lying immoral without further qualification.
I think that a objective morality can be developed with appropriate
considerations of the economic and organizational structure that a
society may have.
> > Kant would have been much better if he would have also included
> > knowledge in addtion to reason.
> Kam:
> Sure, if only he could of let go of his idea of transcendental proof.
> Then, he could have knowledge that isn't derived from reason
> alone - knowledge of moral values, for example - which he
> seems somewhat ignorant of because he believed that all morality
> was discovered, not invented. Morality is invented, of course -
> it does not exist separate from people, waiting for someone to
> discover it. If it did exist separate from people, then we could
> have no rational and informed disagreement about it.
I consider the development of moral principles to be a science and the
corresponding development of laws to be invention.
> > I don't see why anyone should doubt that humanist approach.
> Kam:
> Only because many moral actions are not in everyone's
> best interests. Some sociopaths only feel complete when
> they are peeling the skin off of another living being - in this
> case, happiness does not equal morality or beauty.
> I'm not so sure that I'd call hedonistic utilitarianism - or
> the Greek triad - a humanist approach.
I agree, I should have said "a humanist approach". I don't consider
happiness the basis of morality. I don't think that a morality should
try to identify the good one may do, but instead should only identify
those actions that cause harm.
> > Yes, moralities to reflect the motives of their creators, but it seems
> > best if moralities be developed as an informed consensus.
> Kam:
> Again, I agree to (a quite large) extent. Moralities must
> also be developed according to reason. If a culture hold
> unreasonable moral beliefs, then we can say of those beliefs
> that they aren't moral ones. The Nazis, for example, didn't
> realize that morality must apply to all people - the Jews cannot
> be excluded. Moral principles must apply to people equally in
> order to be moral principles - they otherwise lose their prescriptive
> power and become mere prejudices.
Moral principles need to be ennumerated so that they can be either
accepted or rejected. Society (e.g. government) isn't bound by moral
principles so there needs to be a set of "rights" given to individuals
that the government can't violate. And for that matter, individuals
are bound by moral principles, but instead, are bound by laws. And the
hope is that those laws and rights implement the moral principles that
have been developed in an objective manner.
--
Ron
kamerynn
Jesse Nowells wrote:
Kam:
"Should" is not necessarily normative. I was only using
"ought" in a normative way.
should 1 - pt. of shall [I had hoped I should see you]
2 - used to express obligation, duty, propriety, or
desirability [you should ask first]
3 - used to express expectation or probability
[he should be here soon, I should know by tomorrow]
4 - used to express a future condition [if I should die
tomorrow]
5 - used in polite or tentative expression of opinion
[I should think they will be pleased]
----Webster's New World College Dictionary, 4th ed.
As far as I can tell, only use number 2 is normative.
I was using "should" in sense number 3 - if one expects
others to follow his advice, then one should follow his
own advice. Meaning, if one does not follow his own
advice, then others will likely not follow it either. The point
was - that is merely a statement about how things *are*,
not about how they *ought to be.* Furthermore, the
statement about how things are does not entail the
statement about how things ought to be.
kamerynn
Ron Peterson wrote:
Kam:
You're thinking, I assume, of a society in which there is
cultural diversity. Interesting point - I'll file that one away
for future use against the cultural relativism position.
> As your example shows, it is not a good
> idea to declare lying immoral without further qualification.
>
> I think that a objective morality can be developed with appropriate
> considerations of the economic and organizational structure that a
> society may have.
Kam:
Sure - as Rawls writes on a related topic, the first principles
of justice are those terms of association that rational people
would agree to in an initial position that is fair. Of course, this
is about justice, but I believe that a similar point bears on
morality (given an that morality comes from society). The *basic*
moral principles seem to be those terms of association that
all rational people would unanimously agree to, e.g. no one
may kill anyone else.
>
> > > Kant would have been much better if he would have also included
> > > knowledge in addtion to reason.
>
> > Kam:
> > Sure, if only he could of let go of his idea of transcendental proof.
> > Then, he could have knowledge that isn't derived from reason
> > alone - knowledge of moral values, for example - which he
> > seems somewhat ignorant of because he believed that all morality
> > was discovered, not invented. Morality is invented, of course -
> > it does not exist separate from people, waiting for someone to
> > discover it. If it did exist separate from people, then we could
> > have no rational and informed disagreement about it.
>
> I consider the development of moral principles to be a science and the
> corresponding development of laws to be invention.
Kam:
Interesting. Do you consider the development of moral
principles a science because one can test them against
societal intuitions, thereby falsifying or confirming them?
>
> > > I don't see why anyone should doubt that humanist approach.
>
> > Kam:
> > Only because many moral actions are not in everyone's
> > best interests. Some sociopaths only feel complete when
> > they are peeling the skin off of another living being - in this
> > case, happiness does not equal morality or beauty.
> > I'm not so sure that I'd call hedonistic utilitarianism - or
> > the Greek triad - a humanist approach.
>
> I agree, I should have said "a humanist approach".
Kam:
Considering the rest of your paragraph (below), I'd bet that
you meant to write, "I shouldn't have said..."
> I don't consider
> happiness the basis of morality. I don't think that a morality should
> try to identify the good one may do, but instead should only identify
> those actions that cause harm.
Kam:
Agreed. Direct utilitarianism would have us "maximizing happiness."
It would have us believe that we are *obligated* to jump into a stream
to save a drowning child if that action would maximize happiness.
Of course, saving the child is a supererogatory action - it is not an
obligation. One ought not feel any pressure from a moral theory to
endanger one's own life for the sake of another, except perhaps in
very special circumstances.
>
> > > Yes, moralities to reflect the motives of their creators, but it seems
> > > best if moralities be developed as an informed consensus.
>
> > Kam:
> > Again, I agree to (a quite large) extent. Moralities must
> > also be developed according to reason. If a culture hold
> > unreasonable moral beliefs, then we can say of those beliefs
> > that they aren't moral ones. The Nazis, for example, didn't
> > realize that morality must apply to all people - the Jews cannot
> > be excluded. Moral principles must apply to people equally in
> > order to be moral principles - they otherwise lose their prescriptive
> > power and become mere prejudices.
>
> Moral principles need to be ennumerated so that they can be either
> accepted or rejected. Society (e.g. government) isn't bound by moral
> principles so there needs to be a set of "rights" given to individuals
> that the government can't violate. And for that matter, individuals
> are bound by moral principles, but instead, are bound by laws. And the
> hope is that those laws and rights implement the moral principles that
> have been developed in an objective manner.
Kam:
This reminds me of my earlier thread on attempted murder :-)
I believe that you meant to write, "...individuals are *not* bound
by moral principles, but instead..." As long as all moral principles
are in fact properly implemented in law, I have no problem with that
idea. Unfortunately, it seems quite impossible to give the law an
overhaul (it resists change rather well) - which I believe that it
desperately needs if it is going to properly reflect moral principles.
I could rant for quite some time about spousal/divorce law...
Jesse Nowells
There is no equivalence between (1) "if one expects others to follow his
advice, then one should follow his own advice" & (2) "if one does not
follow his own advice, then others will likely not follow it either". (2)
does not use the term "should" & (1) evidently is normative.
The point
> was - that is merely a statement about how things *are*,
> not about how they *ought to be.*
That's (2) of true but all these other statements asserting shoulds &
oughts are normative.
Furthermore, the
> statement about how things are does not entail the
> statement about how things ought to be.
But you are signifying how things ought to be as if you're making a
statement of fact. & it's not necessarily the case that if one doesn't
follow ones own advice that others won't follow that advice.
>
>
Ron Peterson
> Ron Peterson wrote:
> > I agree that cultural relativism doesn't solve the problem because a
> > morality developed to serve the interests of a particular group may
> > not match that of society.
> Kam:
> You're thinking, I assume, of a society in which there is
> cultural diversity. Interesting point - I'll file that one away
> for future use against the cultural relativism position.
Actually, I wasn't thinking of cultural diversity. I was thinking of
the cases where society may have principles that inhibit scientific
research. But, if cultural relativism advocates that certain cultures
should be able to eliminate cultural diversity, it would seem that
cultural relativism isn't consistent.
> > I think that a objective morality can be developed with appropriate
> > considerations of the economic and organizational structure that a
> > society may have.
> Kam:
> Sure - as Rawls writes on a related topic, the first principles
> of justice are those terms of association that rational people
> would agree to in an initial position that is fair. Of course, this
> is about justice, but I believe that a similar point bears on
> morality (given an that morality comes from society). The *basic*
> moral principles seem to be those terms of association that
> all rational people would unanimously agree to, e.g. no one
> may kill anyone else.
I am not sure what is a good definition of justice. Rational people
through concensus don't always make the right decision on when an
action is immoral.
> > I consider the development of moral principles to be a science and the
> > corresponding development of laws to be invention.
> Kam:
> Interesting. Do you consider the development of moral
> principles a science because one can test them against
> societal intuitions, thereby falsifying or confirming them?
Yes, and one can also look to biological, social, and economic
sciences for evaluating moral principles.
> > Moral principles need to be ennumerated so that they can be either
> > accepted or rejected. Society (e.g. government) isn't bound by moral
> > principles so there needs to be a set of "rights" given to individuals
> > that the government can't violate. And for that matter, individuals
> > are bound by moral principles, but instead, are bound by laws. And the
> > hope is that those laws and rights implement the moral principles that
> > have been developed in an objective manner.
> Kam:
> This reminds me of my earlier thread on attempted murder :-)
> I believe that you meant to write, "...individuals are *not* bound
> by moral principles, but instead..." As long as all moral principles
> are in fact properly implemented in law, I have no problem with that
> idea. Unfortunately, it seems quite impossible to give the law an
> overhaul (it resists change rather well) - which I believe that it
> desperately needs if it is going to properly reflect moral principles.
> I could rant for quite some time about spousal/divorce law...
I meant that moral principles need to be subject to scrutiny by all,
just as scientific hypotheses are.
I think that it is immoral to imprison people, but society may need
that power to enforce moral principles that prevent a greater harm.
Yes, moral principles aren't compelling on anyone, and that is why
laws to implement those moral principles are needed.
I don't think that every moral principle needs to be enforced by law.
Only those actions that cause a significant amount of harm need to be
discouraged by system of laws.
--
Ron
John Jones
state, including our own.
Isn't it the way of 'access' a communal way? And where we should we put the
dividing line between communal experience and a 'private' experience?
JJ
kamerynn <askifne...@me.com> wrote in message
news:3E55A940...@me.com...
Brian Fletcher
"John Jones" <scooby...@btopenworld.com> wrote in message
news:b3uesg$3mf$1...@knossos.btinternet.com...
> I would not know how we could have access to a private place, or an inner
> state, including our own.
> Isn't it the way of 'access' a communal way? And where we should we put
the
> dividing line between communal experience and a 'private' experience?
> JJ
>
mind".based on beliefs and "synchronised believers".
Try pointing to where you think the public place is. If that doesnt do it ,
look at where you are pointing from .
Brian
kamerynn
Jesse Nowells wrote:
Kam:
Non-sequitor. You cannot stipulate how I was using "should."
I was using it in a non-normative way, which I am allowed to do
(just look at definition #3). When "should" is used in a non-normative
way in (1), then (2) follows from (1) (in fact, they mean pretty
much the same thing).
>
> The point
> > was - that is merely a statement about how things *are*,
> > not about how they *ought to be.*
>
> That's (2) of true but all these other statements asserting shoulds &
> oughts are normative.
Kam:
Again, you cannot stipulate how I use words - I am using
"should" differently than you describe, and it's a recognized use
to boot.
>
> Furthermore, the
> > statement about how things are does not entail the
> > statement about how things ought to be.
>
> But you are signifying how things ought to be as if you're making a
> statement of fact. & it's not necessarily the case that if one doesn't
> follow ones own advice that others won't follow that advice.
Kam:
No, no. One is a statement of likelyhood; the other is
a statement of (absolute) value.
For example -
1) chairs are good for sitting in (they're comfortable)
2) one should sit in chairs (if one wishes to likely be comfortable)
3) one *ought* to sit in chairs.
(2) prescribes sitting in chairs *if* one wishes to be comfortable.
It says "walk down this road, because you likely want what
is at its end." (3) says, "walk this road regardless of its end;
it is *the* road to walk. It is not good relative to some use
(like comfortability), it is simply good, period. That's the
difference according to Wittgenstein.
You might believe that moral statements are those statements
that, say, are good relative to how much happiness they produce.
That's fine. Other statements, like, "practice what you preach if
you wish for others to practice what you preach" are mere logical
constructions with no normative connotations.
Just premise/conclusion, here.
If you're still a bit confused, try thinking about the difference
between:
1) if you don't wish to go to jail, don't commit murder.
2) don't commit murder (because it's wrong).
(1) is not normative, (2) is. There's a difference between
saying, "do what is the norm" and "do x in order to
achieve y."
When speaking of a split between values and facts,
one does well to keep in mind the function of logic,
and how logic does not justify value statements without
using other value statments - facts do not justify values.
Michael Voytinsky
> To be sure, bad consequences may result from his not acting
> in accordance with the principle. A utilitarian, then, could point
> toward these undesirable consequences and make the assertion
> that Jones, the perfect hypocrite, is acting immorally in those
> cases. But, can a utilitarian, or any consequentialist, assert that
> Jones' *hypocrisy* is immoral? In order to do so, a utilitarian
> must point toward the undesirable consequences of Jones' hypocrisy.
So what is the problem here? Why would a consequentialist
(utilitarian or otherwise) need to point to undesireable consequences
of Jones' hypocricy?
St. Augustine, in "On Christian Doctrine", wrote that the words of a
hypocritical preacher of the gospel are no less inherently true than
those of one who practices what he preaches. The results of the
hypocrit's preaching may be positive.
In this case, there are no undesireable consequences to hypocricy -
but I do not see how anything follows from this. Further, a hypocrit
can not be certain that the hypocricy will not be exposed (given the
general uncertainties of life in general) - and exposed hypocricy is,
arguably, harmful - by reducing the credibility of morality in
general. So a hypocrit inevitably risks causing harm through the
hypocricy itself.
> following the principle, and so it has *good* consequences. The
> utilitarian has no recourse - he must assert that Jones' *preaching*
> (that is, his hypocrisy) has only good consequences, and thus is
> a moral act. But, hypocrisy is not a moral act, so consequentialism
> (including non-character utilitarianism) must be false.
This fails to parse.
> The fact of the matter is, hypocrisy, murder, rape, and other
> things are immoral no matter what utilitarianism says.
Where do you observe this fact?
But leaving aside the rather odd notion of "moral facts", why are
these things wrong? Can this be answered without some
consequentialist concepts entering the picture.
> We can only say this because of the general
> consensus on the fact that rape and murder are not moral.
Although you may be forgetting that there is no general consensus on
what precisely is "rape" and "murder".